

Allegation No.: RI-2004-A-0010
Site/Facility: Salem & Hope Creek
ARB Date: 7/8/04

Branch Chief (AOC): Cobey
Acknowledged: No
Confidentiality Granted: No

Issue discussed: The allegor indicated a number of concerns with the work control process and the way that station management interacted with staff regarding concerns in this area. He/she described seven discrete concerns and one involving discrimination. He/she indicated that: 1) certain first line supervisors in maintenance department have been pressured to inappropriately close work orders for as-found testing of both safety and non-safety related relief valves without all specified work being completed; 2) a union chief was told not to write notifications regarding broken equipment; specifically, he identified that certain service water gates and valves were not installed correctly nor did they operate as designed; 3) in March 2003, during a forced outage, the allegor directly observed rub marks on auxiliary (aux) impeller for the "B" reactor recirculation pump that he attributed to clearance problems between the aux impeller and stuffing box and felt that an internal pump inspection was necessary. Management disagreed with his assertion on the need for an internal inspection and considered it a business decision. He noted that the notification was not updated with their rationale and considered this a corrective action program weakness; 4) he/she learned from certain groups of people onsite that repair parts and critical spares that maintenance needs to do safety-related work are routinely sent back to the wholesaler or manufacturer to limit in-house inventory to minimize PSEG's taxes; 5) he/she wrote a Level 1 notification because of abuses in the work control process in the planning and implementation of work orders and nothing was done to address it; 6) people are afraid to identify tagging errors that involved human errors because they feared that someone will get in trouble, but nothing will get fixed; 7) a first line maintenance supervisor is being pressured to work a HC Chiller job that has been mismanaged and that significant additional work has been added without following the work control process. The supervisor feels his job is in jeopardy every time he raises a concern on this issue. 8) The allegor believes that PSEG did not select him for his new position in the September 2003 reorganization since he was viewed as not being a "team player."

Allegor contacted prior to referral to licensee (if applicable)? Not yet

ALLEGATION REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS

Attendees: Chair - Blough Branch Chief (AOC) - Barber SAC - Harrison/Johnson
OI Rep. - Wilson RI Counsel - Ford Others - Passarelli, Cahill

DISPOSITION ACTIONS:

- 1) Concerns 1-6 were referred to PSEG. Response was received and found acceptable for items 2-6. Closeout in progress for items 2-6. Regarding item 1, DRP will contact PSEG to assess relief valve testing results. If acceptable (evaluating as-found test results), no further action is necessary. If unacceptable, repanel. DRP Branch 3 to provide words to Enclosure 1 to closeout letter.

Responsible Person: PB3
Closure Documentation: _____

ECD: 07/09/04
Completed: _____

- 2) Concern 7 was reviewed by Hope Creek residents. Incorporate 'A' control room chiller info from Hope Creek Resident and detail regarding not opening discrimination case in response to allegor. Close out technical issues with written draft of Enclosure for closeout.

Responsible Person: PB3
Closure Documentation: _____

ECD: 07/09/04
Completed: _____

- 3) Allegor informed NRC not to take independent action to address discrimination assertion in Concern 8.

Responsible Person: SAC
Closure Documentation: _____

ECD: _____
Completed: 2/25/04

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- 4) Review Concern 1 for wrongdoing. If appropriate, refer issue to OI and draft violation.

Responsible Person: ARB

Closure Documentation: _____

ECD: 07/08/04

Completed: 07/08/2004

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ASSESSMENT: The initial safety significance of the relief valve testing issue should be considered moderate/high until the people involved can be contacted to identify the systems that are affected along with the actual relief valve settings. Once the as-found settings of the relief valves for any safety related systems are implemented an appropriate operability determination could be implemented.

PRIORITY OF OI INVESTIGATION:

ARB MINUTES ARE REVIEWED AND APPROVED AT THE ARB