



U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

3.8.2 STEEL CONTAINMENT

REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES

Primary - ~~Structural Engineering Branch (SEB)~~Civil Engineering and Geosciences Branch (ECGB)¹

Secondary - None

I. AREAS OF REVIEW

The following areas relating to steel containments or to other Class MC steel portions of steel/concrete containments, as applicable, are reviewed:

1. Description of the Containment

- a. The descriptive information, including plans and sections of the structure, is reviewed to establish that sufficient information is provided to define the primary structural aspects and elements relied upon to perform the containment function. In particular, the type of steel containment is identified and its structural and functional characteristics are examined. Among the various types of steel containments reviewed are:
 - (i) Steel boiling-water-reactor (BWR)² containments utilizing the pressure-suppression concept, including the Mark I (lightbulb/torus), the Mark II (over/under), and the Mark III (with horizontal venting between a centrally located cylindrical drywell and a surrounding suppression pool).

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USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public as part of the Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them is not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. Not all sections of the Standard Format have a corresponding review plan.

Published standard review plans will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information and experience.

Comments and suggestions for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C. 20555.

- (ii) Steel pressurized-water-reactor (PWR)³ containments utilizing the pressure-suppression concept with ice-condenser elements.
- (iii) Steel PWR dry containments.

Various geometries have been utilized for these containments. The geometry most commonly encountered, however, is an upright cylinder topped with a dome and supported on either a flat concrete base mat covered with a liner plate or on a concrete foundation built around the bottom portion of the steel shell, which is an inverted dome. Although applicable to any geometry, the specific provisions of this SRP section are best suited to the cylindrical-type steel containment surrounded by a Category I concrete shield building. If containments with other types of geometry are reviewed, the necessary modifications to this SRP section are made on a case-by-case basis.

- (iv) Steel components of concrete containments that resist pressure and are not backed by structural concrete (e.g., the drywell head in the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor).⁴

The geometry of the containment is reviewed, including sketches showing plan views at various elevations and sections in at least two orthogonal directions. The arrangement of the containment and the relationship and interaction of the shell with its surrounding shield building and with its interior compartments, walls, and floors are reviewed to determine the effect which these structures could have upon the design boundary conditions and the expected behavior of the shell when subjected to the design loads.

- b. General information related to the containment shell is reviewed, including the following:
 - (i) The foundation of the steel containment, including the following:
 - (a) If the bottom of the steel containment is continuous through an inverted dome, the method by which the inverted dome and its supports are anchored to the concrete foundation, which is covered by ~~Standard Review Plan~~SRP⁵ Section 3.8.5, is reviewed.
 - (b) If the bottom of the steel containment is not continuous, and where a concrete base slab topped with a liner plate is used for a foundation, the extent of descriptive information reviewed for the foundation is contained and is reviewed as stated in subsection I.1 of ~~Standard Review Plan~~SRP Section 3.8.1. Further, the method of anchorage of the steel cylindrical shell walls in the concrete base slab is reviewed, particularly the connection between the floor liner plate and the steel shell.

- (ii) The cylindrical portion of the shell is reviewed, including major structural attachments such as beam seats, pipe restraints, crane brackets, and shell stiffeners (if any) in the hoop and vertical directions.
- (iii) The dome of the steel containment, including any reinforcement at the dome/cylinder junction, penetrations or attachments made on the inside such as supports for containment spray piping, and any stiffening of the dome.
- (iv) Major penetrations or portions thereof, of steel or concrete containments, to the limits defined by Subsection NE of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (hereafter "the Code"), Section III, Division 1 (Reference: 1)⁶, and portions of the penetrations that are intended to resist pressure but are not backed by structural concrete, including those of sleeved and unsleeved piping penetrations, mechanical systems penetrations such as fuel transfer tubes, electrical penetrations, and access openings such as the equipment hatch and personnel locks.
- (v) The ice-condenser containments are reviewed with special emphasis on those areas which are unique to this type of design, such as the connection between the ice-condenser and the containment.
- (vi) The containments⁷ of floating nuclear power plants are reviewed with special emphasis on the connection between the platform and the containment, between the containment and the ice-condenser, and associated penetration piping.
- (vii) The BWR pressure suppression systems are reviewed with special attention on those piping which channels steam and air and are⁸ necessary for the containment function. Such items include, but are not limited to, the torus, the vent header, the equalizing ring header, and the downcomers. Also, the drywell/vent header junction, the vent header/downcomers junctions, and the penetrations are reviewed to determine the expected behavior of the structure when subjected to the design loads.

2. Applicable Codes, Standards, and Specifications

The information pertaining to design codes, standards, specifications, and regulatory guides, and other industry standards that are used in the design, fabrication, construction, testing, and inservice surveillance of the steel containment, is reviewed. The specific editions, dates, or addenda identified for each document are also reviewed.

3. Loads and Loading Combinations

Information pertaining to the applicable design loads and various load combinations is reviewed with emphasis on the extent of compliance with Subsection NE of the Code,

Section III, Division 1, and with Regulatory Guide 1.57⁹ ~~(Ref. 2)~~.¹⁰ The loads normally applicable to steel containments include the following:

- a. Those loads encountered during preoperational testing.
- b. Those loads encountered during normal plant startup, operation, and shutdown, including dead loads, live loads, thermal loads due to operating temperatures, and hydrostatic loads such as those present in pressure-suppression containments utilizing water.
- c. Those loads to be sustained during severe environmental conditions, including those induced by design wind (if not protected by a shield building) and the operating basis earthquake.
- d. Those loads to be sustained during extreme environmental conditions, including those induced by the design basis tornado (if not protected by a shield building) and the safe shutdown earthquake specified for the plant site.
- e. Those loads to be sustained during abnormal plant conditions, which include loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs). The main abnormal plant condition for containment design is the design basis LOCA. Also to be considered are other accidents involving various high-energy pipe ruptures. Loads induced on the containment by such accidents include elevated temperatures and pressures and possibly localized loads such as jet impingement and associated missile impact. Also included are external pressure loads generated by events inside or outside the containment.
- f. Those loads to be sustained, if applicable, after abnormal plant conditions, including flooding of the containment subsequent to a LOCA for fuel recovery.
- g. Those hydrodynamic loads which are associated with BWR suppression pool swell phenomena and are produced as a result of the purging of air and steam in the drywell and vent system into the subversion pool during a postulated LOCA and/or the actuation of safety relief valve (SRV) discharge. Such loads include bubble pressure, bulk swell, and froth swell loads, drag pressure, pool boundary chugging loads, and other pool well loads associated with these phenomena. Also, those loads which are resulting from fluid-structure interaction due to seismic and/or pool swell should be considered.
- h. Those loads which are generated as a result of platform deformation and flexibility, towing of the platform, and wave action in case of floating plants. Other loads associated with the nonsymmetric dynamic loads generated from LOCA and SRV actuation loads should also be considered.
- i. Those loads which are generated as a result of the LOCA in the ice-condenser. These loads are categorized as nonsymmetric dynamic transient pressure loads

which in the first few seconds might produce compressive stresses in the containment due to the differential pressure across the containment.

- j. Those loads that are generated as a result of an inadvertent full actuation of the postaccident inerting hydrogen control system (assuming carbon dioxide), but not including seismic or design basis accident loadings. (See 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(B)(1).)¹¹
- k. Those loads that are generated by pressure and dead load alone during an accident that releases hydrogen generated from 100% fuel clad metal-water reaction accompanied by either hydrogen burning or added pressure from postaccident inerting. (See 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(A)(1).)¹²

The various combinations of the above loads that are normally postulated and reviewed include the following: Testing loads; normal operating loads; normal operating loads with severe environmental loads; normal operating loads with severe environmental loads and abnormal loads; normal operating loads with extreme environmental loads and abnormal loads; and post-LOCA flooding loads with severe environmental loads, if applicable. Specific and more detailed information on these combinations are delineated in subsection II.3 of this ~~Standard Review Plan~~ SRP section.

Unless the steel containment is protected by a shield building, other site-related design loads might also be applicable, including those described in subsection I.3 of ~~Standard Review Plan~~ SRP Section 3.8.1.

4. Design and Analysis Procedures

The design and analysis procedures utilized for the steel containment are reviewed with emphasis on the extent of compliance with Subsection NE of the Code, Section III, Division 1. Particular emphasis is placed on the following subjects:

- a.¹³ Treatment of nonaxisymmetric and localized loads.
- b. Treatment of local buckling effects.
- c. The computer programs utilized in the design and analysis.
- d. Ultimate capacity of steel containment.
- e. Structural audit.
- f. Design report.

5. Structural Acceptance Criteria

The design limits imposed on the various parameters that serve to quantify the structural behavior of the containment are reviewed, specifically with respect to allowable stresses,

strains, and gross deformations; with emphasis on the extent of compliance with subsection NE of the Code, Section III, Division 1; and with Regulatory Guide 1.57. For each specified load combination, the proposed allowable limits are compared with the acceptable limits delineated in subsection II.5 of this SRP section. Included in these allowable limits are the following major parameters:

- a. Primary stresses, including general membrane (P_m), local membrane (P_L), and bending (P_b) plus local membrane stresses.
- b. Primary and secondary stresses (Q).
- c. Peak stresses (F).
- d. Buckling criteria.

6. Materials, Quality Control, and Special Construction Techniques

- a. Information provided on the materials that are to be used in the construction of the steel containment is reviewed with emphasis on the extent of compliance with Article NE-2000 of Subsection NE of the Code, Section III, Division 1. Among the major materials reviewed are the following:
 - (i) Steel plates used as shell components.
 - (ii) Structural steel shapes used for stiffeners, beam seats, and crane brackets.-
~~Corrosion and corrosion protection procedures are reviewed by the~~
~~Chemical Engineering Branch.~~¹⁴
- b. The quality control program proposed for the fabrication and construction of the containment is reviewed with emphasis on the extent of compliance with Article NE-5000 of Subsection NE of the Code, Section III, Division 1, including the following:
 - (i) Nondestructive examination of the materials, including tests to determine their physical properties.
 - (ii) Welding procedures.
 - (iii) Erection tolerances.

Special construction techniques, if proposed, are reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine their effects on the structural integrity of the completed containment.

7. Testing and Inservice Surveillance Program

The preoperational structural test programs for the completed containment and for individual class MC components reviewed, including the objectives of the test, and the

acceptance criteria with emphasis on the extent of compliance with Article NE-6000 of Subsection NE of the Code, Section III, Division 1. Structural tests for components such as personnel and equipment locks are also reviewed.

Inservice surveillance programs, if any, of components relied upon for containment structural integrity, are reviewed. ~~Any inservice surveillance required in special areas subject to corrosion is reviewed by the Chemical Engineering Branch.~~¹⁵

Special testing and inservice surveillance requirements proposed for new or previously untried design approaches are reviewed.

Review Interfaces¹⁶

ECGB also performs the following reviews under the SRP sections indicated:

1. Computer programs used in the design and analysis are reviewed as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 3.8.1.
2. For steel containments that are not continuous at the bottom and where the concrete base slab is topped with a liner plate, the description of the foundation is reviewed as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 3.8.1.
3. The containment foundation is reviewed as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 3.8.5.
4. Structural design reports and audits are reviewed as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 3.8.4, Appendix B and Appendix C.¹⁷

~~SEBECGB~~¹⁸ coordinates other branches' evaluations that interface with structural engineering aspects of the review, as follows:

- A. ¹⁹Determination of structures which are subject to a quality assurance program in accordance with the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 is performed by the Mechanical Engineering Branch (~~MEB~~)(EMEB)²⁰ as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. ~~SEBECGB~~²¹ will perform its review of safety-related structures on that basis.
- B. Determination of pressure loads from high-energy lines located in safety-related structures other than containment is performed by the ~~Auxiliary Systems Branch~~ (~~ASB~~)Plant Systems Branch (SPLB)²² as part of its primary described review responsibility for SRP Section 3.6.1. ~~SEBECGB~~²³ accepts the loads thus generated, as approved by the ~~ASB~~SPLB,²⁴ to be included in the load combination equations of this SRP section.
- C. Determination of loads generated due to pressure under accident conditions is performed by the ~~Containment Systems Branch~~ CSBContainment Systems and Severe Accident Branch (SCSB)²⁵ as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 6.2.1.

SEBECGB²⁶ accepts the loads thus generated, as approved by the CSBSCSB,²⁷ to be included in the load combinations in this SRP section.

- E. The review for quality assurance is coordinated and performed by the ~~Quality Assurance Branch~~ Quality Assurance and Maintenance Branch (HQMB)²⁸ as part of its primary review responsibility for ~~SRP Section~~ Chapter 17-0.²⁹
- F. Corrosion and corrosion protection procedures are reviewed by the ~~Chemical Engineering Branch~~ Materials and Chemical Engineering Branch (EMCB).³⁰ General Design Criterion 4 allows the exclusion of dynamic effects of pipe ruptures if analyses (i.e., leak-before-break analyses) demonstrate the probability of rupture is extremely low. For containment design, the applicability of these analyses is limited to localized effects only. The EMCB performs a review of those applications that propose to eliminate consideration of design loads associated with the dynamic effects of pipe rupture, as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 3.6.3 (to be developed).³¹
- G. Any inservice surveillance required in special areas subject to corrosion is reviewed by the ~~Chemical Engineering~~ EMCB.³²
- H. The SCSB verifies that containment performance meets severe accident criteria as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 19.2 (proposed).³³

For those areas of review identified above as ~~being reviewed as part of the primary review~~ responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria ~~necessary for the review and their~~ methods of application are contained in the referenced SRP section of the ~~corresponding primary branch~~.³⁴

II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

SEBECGB³⁵ acceptance criteria for the design of steel containments are based on meeting the relevant requirements of the following regulations:

- 1A.³⁶ 10 CFR ~~Part 50, 50.34(f)(3)~~³⁷, 10 CFR³⁸ 50.55a, and General Design Criterion 1 as they relate to steel containments being designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety function to be performed.
- 2B. General Design Criterion 2 as it relates to the design of the steel containments being capable of withstanding the most severe natural phenomena such as winds, tornadoes, floods, and earthquakes and the appropriate combination of all loads.
- 3C. General Design Criterion 4 as it relates to steel containments being capable of withstanding the dynamic effects of equipment failures including missiles pipe whip and blowdown loads associated with the loss-of-coolant accident.
- 4D. General Design Criterion 16 as it relates to the capability of the steel containment to act as a leaktight membrane to prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactive effluents to the environment.

- 5E. General Design Criterion 50 and as it relates to steel containment being designed with sufficient margin of safety to accommodate appropriate design loads.

The regulatory guides and industry standards identified in item 2 of this subsection provide information, recommendations, and guidance and in general describes³⁹ a basis acceptable to the staff that may be used to implement the requirements of 10 CFR ~~Part 50~~, 50.34(f)(3)⁴⁰, 10 CFR 50.55a, and ~~GDC~~ General Design Criteria⁴¹ 1, 2, 4, 16, and 50. Also, specific acceptance criteria necessary to meet these relevant requirements of these regulations for the areas of review described in subsection I of this SRP section are as follows:

1. Description of the Containment

The descriptive information in the safety analysis report (SAR) is considered acceptable if it meets the minimum requirements set forth in Section 3.8.2.1 of the Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," (Ref. 3).⁴²

If the steel containment has new or unique features that are not specifically covered in the "Standard Format..." Regulatory Guide 1.70,⁴³ the reviewer determines that the information necessary to accomplish a meaningful review of the structural aspects of these new or unique features is presented.

2. Applicable Codes, Standards, and Specifications

The design, materials, fabrication, erection, inspection, testing, and inservice surveillance of steel containments are covered by codes, standards, and specifications which are either applicable in their entirety or in part. The following codes and guides are acceptable:

<u>Code/Guide</u> ⁴⁴	<u>Title</u>
ASME	Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, Subsection NE, "Class MC Components"
Regulatory Guide 1.57	Design Limits and Loading Combinations for Metal Primary Reactor Containment System Components

3. Loads and Loading Combinations

Subsection NE of the Code, Section III, Division 1, and Regulatory Guide 1.57 are not explicit with respect to the loads and load combinations which should be considered in the design of steel containments. The specified loads and load combinations are acceptable if found to be in accordance with the following:

a. Loads

D --- Dead loads.

- L --- Live loads, including all loads resulting from platform flexibility and deformation and from⁴⁵ crane loading, if applicable.
- P_t --- Test pressure.
- T_t --- Test temperature.
- T_o --- Thermal effects and loads during startup, normal operating, or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady-state condition.
- R_o --- Pipe reactions during startup, normal operating, or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady-state condition.
- P_o --- External pressure loads resulting from pressure variation either inside or outside containment.
- E --- Loads generated by the operating basis earthquake including sloshing effects, if applicable.
- E' --- Loads generated by the safe shutdown earthquake, including sloshing effects, if applicable.
- P_a --- Pressure load generated by the postulated pipe break accident, including P_o , pool swell, and subsequent hydrodynamic loads.
- T_a --- Thermal loads under thermal conditions generated by the postulated pipe break accident, including T_o , pool swell, and subsequent hydrodynamic reaction loads.
- R_a --- Pipe reactions under thermal conditions generated by the postulated pipe break accident, including R_o , pool swell, and subsequent hydrodynamic reaction loads.
- P_s --- All pressure loads which are caused by the actuation of safety relief valve discharge, including pool swell and subsequent hydrodynamic loads.
- T_s --- All thermal loads which are generated by the actuation of safety relief valve discharge, including pool swell and subsequent hydrodynamic thermal loads.
- R_s --- All pipe reaction loads which are generated by the actuation of safety relief valve discharge, including pool swell and subsequent hydrodynamic reaction loads.
- Y_r --- Equivalent static load on the structure generated by the reaction on the broken pipe during the design basis accident.

Y_j --- Jet impingement equivalent static load on the structure generated by the broken pipe during the design basis accident.

Y_m --- Missile impact equivalent static load on the structure generated by or during the design basis accident, such as pipe whipping.

F_L --- Load generated by the post-LOCA flooding of the containment, if any.

P_{g1} --- Pressure load generated from 100% fuel clad metal-water reaction.

P_{g2} --- Pressure loads generated by hydrogen burning.

P_{g3} --- Pressure load from postaccident inerting, assuming carbon dioxide is the inerting agent.⁴⁶

b. Loading Combinations

These include all loading combinations for which the containment might be designed for or subjected to during the expected life of the plant. The loading combinations include the following:

(i) Testing condition

This includes the testing condition of the containment to verify its leak integrity. The loading combination in this case includes:

$$D + L + T_t + P_t$$

(ii) Design conditions

These include all design loadings for which the containment vessel or portions thereof might be designed for during the expected life of the plant. Such loads include design pressure, design temperature, and the design mechanical loads generated by the design basis accident. The loading combination in this case includes:

$$D + L + P_a + T_a + R_a$$

(iii) Service conditions

The load combinations in these cases correspond to and include Level A service limits, Level B service limits, Level C service limits, Level D service limits, and the post-flooding condition. The loads may be combined by their actual time history of occurrence taking into consideration their dynamic effect upon the structure.

(a) Level A Service Limits

These service limits are applicable to the service loadings to which the containment is subjected, including the plant or system design basis accident conditions for which the containment function is required, excepting only those categorized as Level B, Level C, Level D, or Testing Loadings. The loading combinations corresponding to these limits include the following:

(1) Normal operating plant condition

$$D + L + T_o + R_o + P_o$$

(2) Operating plant condition in conjunction with multiple safety relief valves actuation

$$D + L + T_s + R_s + P_s$$

(3) Loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)⁴⁷

$$D + L + T_a + R_a + P_a$$

(4) Multiple SRV actuations in combination with small-break accident or intermediate-break accident

$$D + L + T_a + R_a + P_a + T_s + R_s + P_s$$

(5) Normal operating plant conditions in combination with inadvertent full actuation of a postaccident inerting hydrogen control system

$$D + L + T_o + R_o + P_o + P_{g3}^{48}$$

(6) Pressure test load to ensure that the containment will safely withstand the pressure calculated to result from carbon-dioxide inerting

$$D + 1.10 \times P_{g3}^{49}$$

(b) Level B Service Limits

These service limits include the loads subject to Level A service limits plus the additional loads resulting from natural phenomena during which the plant must remain operational. The loading combinations corresponding to these limits include the following:

(1) LOCA in combination with operating basis earthquake

$$D + L + T_a + R_a + P_a + E$$

- (2) Operating plant condition in combination with operating basis earthquake

$$D + L + T_o + R_o + P_o + E$$

- (3) Operating plant condition in combination with operating basis earthquake and multiple SRV actuations

$$D + L + T_s + R_s + P_s + E$$

- (4) LOCA in combination with a single active component failure causing one SRV discharge

$$D + L + T_a + P_a + R_a + T_s + R_s + P_s$$

(c) Level C Service Limits

These service limits include the loads subject to Level A service limits plus the additional loads resulting from natural phenomena for which safe shutdown of the plant is required. The loading combinations corresponding to these limits include the following:

- (1) LOCA in combination with safe shutdown earthquake

$$D + L + T_a + R_a + P_a + E'$$

- (2) Operating plant condition in combination with safe shutdown earthquake

$$D + L + T_o + R_o + P_o + E'$$

- (3) Multiple SRV actuations in combination with small-break accident or intermediate-break accident and safe shutdown earthquake

$$D + L + T_a + R_a + P_a + T_s + R_s + P_s + E'$$

- (4) Dead load plus pressure resulting from an accident that releases hydrogen generated from 100% fuel clad metal-water reaction accompanied by hydrogen burning

$$D + P_{g1} + P_{g2}$$

[NOTE: In this load combination, $P_{g1} + P_{g2}$ should not be less than 310 kPa (45 psig).]⁵⁰

- (5) Dead load plus pressure resulting from an accident that releases hydrogen generated from 100% fuel clad metal-water reaction accompanied by the added pressure from postaccident inerting, assuming carbon dioxide as the inerting agent

$$D + P_{g1} + P_{g3}$$

[NOTE: In this load combination, $P_{g1} + P_{g3}$ should not be less than 310 kPa (45 psig).]⁵¹

(d) Level D Service Limits

These service limits include other applicable service limits and loadings of a local dynamic nature for which the containment function is required. The load combinations corresponding to these limits include the following:

- (1) LOCA in combination with safe shutdown earthquake and local dynamic loadings

$$D + L + T_a + R_a + P_a + Y_r + Y_j + Y_m + E'$$

- (2) Multiple SRV actuations in combination with small-break or intermediate-break accident, safe shutdown earthquake, and local dynamic loadings

$$D + L + T_a + R_a + Y_r + Y_j + Y_m + P_s + T_s + R_s + E'$$

(e) Post-Flooding Condition

This includes the post-LOCA flooding of the containment in combination with operating basis earthquake

$$D + L + F_L + E$$

4. Design and Analysis Procedures

Design and analysis procedures for steel containments are covered in Article NE-3000 of Subsection NE of the Code, Section III, Division 1. The procedures given in the Code, as augmented by the applicable provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.57, constitute an acceptable basis for design and analysis. Moreover, for the specific areas of review described in subsection I.4 of this SRP section, the following criteria are acceptable:

a. Treatment of nonaxisymmetric and localized loads

For most containments, the nonaxisymmetric loads which apply are the horizontal seismic and associated sloshing loads, pool swell, and its related

hydrodynamic loads caused either by LOCA or by SRV actuation. Other possible nonaxisymmetric and localized loads are those induced by pipe rupture such as reactions, jet impingement forces, and missiles. For the PWR ice-condenser containment, the design basis accident may result in a nonaxisymmetric pressure load due to compartmentation of the containment interior. For such localized loads, the analyses should include a determination of the local effects of the loads. These effects should then be superimposed on the overall effects. For the overall effects of nonaxisymmetric loads on shells of revolution, an acceptable general procedure is to expand the load by a Fourier series. Other methods are reviewed on a case-by-case basis for applicability to a large thin shell.

b. Treatment of buckling effects

Earthquake and localized pressure loads, such as those encountered in PWR ice-condenser containments, require consideration of buckling of the shell. An acceptable approach to the problem is to perform a nonlinear dynamic analysis. If a static analysis is performed, an appropriate dynamic load factor should be used to obtain the effective static load.

Buckling of shells with more complex shell geometries and loading conditions than those covered by Subsubarticle NE-3133 of the Code should be considered in accordance with the criteria described in ASME Code Case N-284, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.84. Buckling of shells under internal pressure should be considered in accordance with the criteria described in ASME Code Case N-284, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.84.⁵²

c. Computer programs

The computer programs used in the design and analysis should be described and validated by any of the procedures or criteria described in subsection II.4.e of ~~Standard Review Plan~~ SRP Section 3.8.1.

d. Ultimate capacity of steel containment

An analysis should be performed to determine the ultimate capacity of the containment.

The pressure-retaining capacity of localized areas as well as of the overall containment structure should be determined.

The analysis should be made on the basis of the allowable material strength specified in the Code. However, if the actual material properties such as the tested material strength, strength variations indicated by mill test certificates, and other material uncertainties are available, the lower and upper bounds of the containment capacity may be established statistically.

The details of the analysis and the results should be submitted in a report form with the following identifiable information:

- (1) The original design pressure, P, as defined in the Code, Subsubarticle NE-3220;
- (2) Calculated static pressure capacity;
- (3) Equivalent static pressure response calculated from dynamic pressure;
- (4) The associated failure mode;
- (5) The criteria governing the original design and the criteria used to establish failure;
- (6) Analysis details and general results; and
- (7) Appropriate engineering drawings adequate to allow verification of modeling and evaluation of analyses employed for the containment structure.

e. Structural audit

~~Structural Audit~~ is audits are⁵³ conducted as described in Appendix B to SRP Section 3.8.4.

f. Design report

~~Design~~ The design⁵⁴ report is considered acceptable when it satisfies the guidelines of Appendix C to SRP Section 3.8.4.

5. Structural Acceptance Criteria

Stresses at various locations of the shell of the containment for various design loads are determined by analysis. Total stresses for the combination of loads delineated in subsection II.3 of this SRP section are acceptable if found to be within limits defined by various sections of the Code, Section III, Subsection NE, as augmented by Regulatory Guide 1.57. An acceptable interpretation of these limits is contained in Table 3.8.2-1 where the notation is in accordance with the Code.

6. Materials, Quality Control, and Special Construction Techniques

- a. The materials of construction are acceptable if in accordance with Article NE-2000 of Subsection NE of the Code, Section III, Division 1. Corrosion protection ~~are~~ is reviewed by the ~~Chemical Engineering Branch~~ EMTB.⁵⁵

- b. Quality control programs are acceptable if in accordance with Articles NE-4000 and NE-5000 of Subsection NE of the Code, Section III, Division 1.
- c. Special construction techniques, if any, are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

7. Testing and Inservice Surveillance Requirements

- a. Procedures for the preoperational structural proof test are acceptable if found in accordance with Article NE-6000 of Subsection NE of the Code, Section III, Division 1.
- b. Inservice surveillance requirements for steel containments are currently under development.⁵⁶ Acceptance criteria for inservice surveillance programs in areas subject to corrosion are established by the ~~Chemical Engineering Branch~~ EMCB,⁵⁷ as required.

Technical Rationale⁵⁸

The technical rationale for application of these acceptance criteria to reviewing steel containments is discussed in the following paragraphs:⁵⁹

1. Compliance with GDC 1 and 10 CFR 50.55a requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety be designed, constructed, tested, and inspected to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety function to be performed.

This SRP section describes staff positions related to static and dynamic loadings and evaluation programs for steel containments. It also describes acceptable materials, design methodology, quality control procedures, construction methods, and inservice inspections and documentation criteria for design and construction controls.

SRP Section 3.8.2 cites Regulatory Guide 1.57 to provide guidance that is acceptable to the staff regarding load combination equations. ASME Code Section III, Division 1, provides basic guidance for steel containments; code requirements impose specific restrictions to ensure that structures, systems, and components will perform their intended safety functions when designed in accordance with the Code Case provisions.

Meeting these criteria provides assurance that steel containments used for nuclear power plants will be capable of performing their containment function to prevent or mitigate the spread of radioactive material.

2. Compliance with GDC 2 requires that structures important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of expected natural phenomena when combined with the effects of normal accident conditions without loss of capability to perform their safety function.

To ensure that the containment of a nuclear power plant is designed to withstand natural phenomena, it is necessary to specify the most severe natural phenomena event that may occur as a function of the frequency of occurrence. To meet the requirements of GDC 2 for all natural phenomena related to meteorological events (e.g., earthquakes, snow and

ice load, meteorological conditions affecting the ultimate heat sink, tornado parameters, and wind speed), it is necessary to review historical data and obtain the expected frequency of the most severe occurrences. These data are then used to specify design requirements of nuclear power plant components, including the containment, to be evaluated during construction permit (CP), operating license (OP), combined license (COL), or early permit reviews or for site parameter envelopes in the case of standard design certifications, thereby ensuring that the components will function as required.

Meeting this requirement provides assurance that steel containment structures will be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena and will help to ensure that those portions of the facility that are important to safety will function to maintain the plant in a safe condition.

3. Compliance with GDC 4 requires that nuclear power plant structures important to safety be designed to accommodate the effects of and be compatible with environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents (including LOCAs).

SRP Section 3.8.2 cites acceptance criteria, standards, and codes so that steel containments will resist dynamic effects, including missiles and pipe whipping, discharging fluids, and other events (including LOCA effects).

Meeting this requirement provides assurance that structures covered by this SRP section will withstand missile impacts associated with tornadoes or other external sources, including aircraft, thus decreasing the probability that these events could cause accidents.

4. Compliance with GDC 16 requires that the reactor containment and its associated systems be provided to establish an essentially leaktight barrier against uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment and to ensure that design conditions important to safety are not exceeded for as long as required for postulated accident conditions.

The steel containment is designed, constructed, and tested to provide a leaktight barrier. A typical structure is made of steel plates that are shop fabricated and field welded. The plates are thickened around penetrations to compensate for the openings. Penetrations (e.g., personnel locks, equipment hatches, and mechanical and electrical penetrations) are designed in accordance with Section III, Subsection NE, of the ASME Code. Seals provided at the penetrations must be designed to maintain containment integrity for design basis accident conditions, including pressure, temperature, and radiation. Leaktightness of the containment structure must be tested at regular intervals during the life of the plant in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, as described in the SRP Section 6.2.6, "Containment Leakage Testing."

Meeting these criteria provides assurance that an uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment will be prevented and that the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary will be maintained for as long as required.

5. Compliance with GDC 50 requires that the reactor containment structure (including access openings, penetrations, and containment heat removal systems) be designed so that the structure and its internal compartments will have the capability to accommodate, without exceeding the design leakage rate and with sufficient margin, the calculated pressure and temperature conditions resulting from any LOCA.

These requirements apply to this SRP section because the containment structure design is based on the elastic behavior of the material used. That is, when a strength design approach is used, the structure is dimensioned so that the combination of loads multiplied by appropriate load factors will result in stresses within the ultimate strength of the structure. Design criteria for containment structures are provided in the ASME Code, as supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.57. Penetrations are generally analyzed using the finite element method, taking into consideration loads associated with the design basis accident, temperature, and pressure.

Meeting these requirements provides assurance that the containment structure, including the penetrations and the internal compartments, will be able to withstand the loads resulting from pressure and temperature conditions and will perform its design safety function.

6. Compliance with 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(A) and (B) requires that steel containments meet specific provisions of the ASME Code when subjected to loads resulting from fuel damage metal-water reactions, hydrogen burning, and inerting system actuations.

This SRP section describes load combinations and acceptance criteria based on the specific provisions of 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(A) and (B).

Meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34, specifically 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(A) and (B), provides assurance that the containment will remain intact and prevent the spread of radioactive contamination after an accident.

III. REVIEW PROCEDURES

The reviewer selects and emphasizes material from the review procedures described below as may be appropriate for a particular case.

1. Description of the Containment

After the type of containment and its functional characteristics are identified, information on similar and previously licensed applications is obtained for reference. Such information, which is available in safety analysis reports and amendments of previous license applications, enables identification of differences for the case under review which requires additional scrutiny and evaluation. New and unique features that have not been used in the past are of particular interest and are thus examined in greater detail. The information furnished in the SAR is reviewed for completeness in accordance with the "Standard Format..." (Ref. 3) Regulatory Guide 1.70.⁶⁰ A decision is then made with regard to the sufficiency of the descriptive information provided. Any additional

required information not provided is requested from the applicant at an early stage of the review process.

2. Applicable Codes, Standards, and Specifications

The list of codes, standards, guides, and specifications is checked against the list in subsection II.2 of this SRP section. The reviewer ~~assures himself~~ verifies⁶¹ that the applicable edition and effective addenda are utilized.

3. Loads and Loading Combinations

The reviewer verifies that the loads and load combinations are as conservative as those specified in subsection II.3 of this SRP section. Loading conditions that are unique, and not specifically covered in subsection II.3, are treated on a case-by-case basis. Any deviations from the acceptance criteria for loads and load combinations that have not been adequately justified are identified as unacceptable and transmitted to the applicant for further consideration.

4. Design and Analysis Procedures

The reviewer ~~assures himself~~ verifies⁶² that the applicant is committed to the design and analysis procedures delineated in Article NE-3000 of Subsection NE of the Code, Section III, Division 1. Any exceptions to these procedures are reviewed and evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In particular, the areas of review contained in subsection I.4 of this SRP section are evaluated for conformance with the acceptance criteria, and the reviewer ~~assures~~ ensures⁶³ that the provisions of subsection II.4 of this SRP section are met.

5. Structural Acceptance Criteria

The limits on allowable stresses in the steel shell and its components are reviewed and compared with the acceptable limits specified in subsection II.5 of this SRP section. Where the applicant proposes to exceed some of these limits for some of the load combinations and at some localized points of the structure, the justification, provided to show that the structural integrity of the containment will not be affected, is reviewed and evaluated. If such justification is unacceptable, the applicant is required to comply with the acceptance criteria delineated in subsection II.5 of this SRP section.

The reviewer verifies information related to the stresses induced in the structure by inadvertent full actuation of a postaccident inerting hydrogen control system and the pressure tests pertaining thereto, as described in 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(B) and using the load combinations described in subsection II.3.b.(iii)(a)(5) and (6). Stresses generated in the containment structure should be within the appropriate service limits.

The reviewer verifies information related to the stresses induced in the structure by an accident that releases hydrogen, as described in 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(A) and using the

load combinations described in subsection II.3.b(iii)(c)(4) and (5). Stresses generated in the containment structure should be within the appropriate service limits.⁶⁴

6. Materials, Quality Control, and Special Construction Techniques

The information provided on materials, quality control programs, and special construction techniques, if any, is compared with that referenced in subsection II.6 of this SRP section. If a material not covered by the Code is utilized, the applicant is requested to provide sufficient test and user data to establish the acceptability of the material. Similarly, any new quality control programs or construction techniques are reviewed and evaluated to assure⁶⁵ that there will be no degradation of structural quality that might affect the structural integrity of the containment and its various components.

7. Testing and Inservice Surveillance Requirements

The initial structural overpressure test program is reviewed and compared with that indicated as acceptable in subsection II.7 of this SRP section. Any proposed deviations are considered on a case-by-case basis. Inservice surveillance programs, if any, as presented in the technical specifications of the operating license, are similarly reviewed.

In the ABWR and System 80+ design certification FSERs the Staff accepted an exemption to the 10 CFR 100 Appendix A requirement that all safety-related SSCs be designed to remain functional and within applicable stress and deformation limits when subjected to an OBE. The Staff reviewed the controlling load combinations and concluded that, in most cases, load combinations incorporating an OBE load does not control the design of concrete structures. As a result, the Staff concluded that there would be no reduction in the safety margin of concrete structures due to the elimination of the OBE as a design requirement.⁶⁶

For standard design certification reviews under 10 CFR Part 52, the procedures above should be followed, as modified by the procedures in SRP Section 14.3 (proposed), to verify that the design set forth in the standard safety analysis report, including inspections, tests, analysis, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC), site interface requirements and combined license action items, meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II. SRP Section 14.3 (proposed) contains procedures for the review of certified design material (CDM) for the standard design, including the site parameters, interface criteria, and ITAAC.⁶⁷

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided in accordance with the requirements of this SRP section and concludes that ~~his~~the⁶⁸ evaluation is sufficiently complete to support the following type of conclusive statement to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report (SER):⁶⁹

The staff concludes that the design of the steel containment is acceptable and meets the relevant requirements of 10 CFR ~~Part 50~~, 50.34(f), 10 CFR⁷⁰ 50.55a, and General Design Criteria 1, 2, 4, 16, and 50. This conclusion is based on the following:

1. The applicant has met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(f), and the appropriate ASME Code service limits, by designing the containment to withstand the release and subsequent burning of hydrogen, or the added pressure from postaccident inerting, by applying the loads and load combinations as described in 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v).⁷¹

72

- 1.2. The applicant has met the requirements of Section 50.55a and GDC 1 with respect to ~~assuring~~ensuring⁷³ that the steel containment is designed, fabricated, erected, constructed, tested, and inspected to quality standards commensurate with its safety function to be performed by meeting the guidelines of regulatory guides and industry standards indicated below.
- 2.3. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 2 by designing the steel containment to withstand the most severe earthquake that has been established for the site with sufficient margin and the combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of environmental loadings such as earthquakes and other natural phenomena.
- 3.4. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 4 by ~~assuring~~ensuring⁷⁴ that the design of steel containment is capable of withstanding the dynamic effects associated with missiles, pipe whipping, and discharging fluids.
- 4.5. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 16 by designing the steel containment so that it is an essentially leaktight barrier to prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactive effluents to the environment.
- 5.6. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 50 by designing the steel containment to accommodate, with sufficient margin, the design leakage rate, calculated pressure, and temperature conditions resulting from accident conditions and by ~~assuring~~ensuring⁷⁵ that the design conditions are not exceeded during the full course of the accident condition. In meeting these design requirements, the applicant has used the recommendations of regulatory guides and industry standards indicated below. The applicant has also performed appropriate analysis which demonstrates that the ultimate capacity of the containment will not be exceeded and establishes the minimum margin of safety for the design.

The criteria used in the analysis, design, and construction of the steel containment structure to account for anticipated loadings and postulated conditions that may be imposed upon the structure during its service lifetime are in conformance with established criteria, codes, standards, and guides acceptable to the Regulatory staff. These include meeting the position of Regulatory Guide 1.57 and industry standard ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, Subsection NE.

The use of these criteria as defined by applicable codes, standards, and guides; the loads and loading combinations; the design and analysis procedures; the

structural acceptance criteria; the materials, quality control programs, and special construction techniques; and the testing and inservice surveillance requirements, provide reasonable assurance that, in the event of earthquakes and various postulated accidents occurring within and outside the containment, the structure will withstand the specified conditions without impairment of structural integrity or safety function. A Category I concrete shield building protects the steel containment from the effects of wind and tornadoes and various postulated accidents occurring outside the shield building.

For design certification reviews, the findings will also summarize, to the extent that the review is not discussed in other safety evaluation report sections, the staff's evaluation of inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC), including design acceptance criteria (DAC), site interface requirements, and combined license action items that are relevant to this SRP section.⁷⁶

V. IMPLEMENTATION

The following is intended to provide guidance to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this SRP section.

This SRP section will be used by the staff when performing safety evaluations of license applications submitted by applicants pursuant to 10 CFR 50 or 10 CFR 52.⁷⁷ Except in those cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the method described herein will be used by the staff in its evaluation of conformance with Commission regulations.

The provisions of this SRP section apply to reviews of applications docketed six months or more after the date of issuance of this SRP section.⁷⁸

Implementation schedules for conformance to parts of the method discussed herein are contained in the referenced regulatory guides.

VI. REFERENCES

1. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, Subsection NE, "Class MC Components," American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
2. Regulatory Guide 1.57, "Design Limits and Loading Combinations for Metal Primary Reactor Containment System Components."
3. Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants."
4. Regulatory Guide 1.84, "Design and Fabrication Code Case Acceptability, ASME Section III, Division 1."⁷⁹

- 45. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 1, "Quality Standard and Records."
- 56. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena."
- 67. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4, "Environmental and ~~Missile~~ Dynamic Effects⁸⁰ Design Bases."
- 78. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 16, "Containment Design."
- 89. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 50, "Containment Design Basis."
- 10. 10 CFR 50.34(f), "Additional TMI-Related Requirements."⁸¹
- 911. ~~10 CFR Part 50,~~⁸² 50.55a, "Codes and Standards."

Table 3.8.2-1
Stress Intensity Limits for Steel Containments

		Primary Stresses			Primary & Secondary	Peak Stresses	Buckling
SECTION II.3.6 Load Categories	Test, Analysis, or Structure Description ⁸³	Gen. Mem. P_m	Local Mem. P_L	Bending & Local Mem. $P_L + P_b$ (6)	$P_L + P_b + Q$	$P_L + P_b + Q + F$	
Testing Condition	Pneumatic	$0.75 S_y$	$1.15 S_y$	$1.15 S_y$	N/A ⁽²⁾	Consider for fatigue evaluation ⁽⁵⁾	See Note (9)
Design Condition		$1.0 S_{mc}$	$1.5 S_{mc}$	$1.5 S_{mc}$	N/A	N/A	See Note (9)
Level A Service Limit ⁽¹⁾		$1.0 S_{mc}$	$1.5 S_{mc}$	$1.5 S_{mc}$	$3.0 S_{mi}$	Consider for fatigue evaluation	See Note (9)
Level B Service Limit		$1.0 S_{mc}$	$1.5 S_{mc}$	$1.5 S_{mc}$	$3.0 S_{mi}$	Consider for fatigue evaluation	See Note (9)
Level C Service Limit	Not Integral and Continuous	$1.0 S_{mc}$	$1.5 S_{mc}$	$1.5 S_{mc}$	$3.0 S_{mi}$	N/A	See Note (9)
	Integral and Continuous ^{(4),(7)}	$1.2 S_{mc}$ or $1.0 S_y$ ⁽⁴⁾⁸⁴	$1.8 S_{mc}$ or $1.5 S_y$ ⁽⁴⁾	$1.8 S_{mc}$ or $1.5 S_y$ ⁽⁴⁾⁽⁸⁾⁸⁵	N/A	N/A	See Note (9)
Level D Service Limit	Not Integral and Continuous ⁽⁴⁾	$1.2 S_{mc}$ or $1.0 S_y$ ⁽⁴⁾	$1.8 S_{mc}$ or $1.5 S_y$ ⁽⁴⁾	$1.8 S_{mc}$ or $1.5 S_y$ ⁽⁴⁾⁽⁸⁾	N/A	N/A	See Note (9)
	Integ. & Continuous, Elastic Analysis ⁽³⁾	S_f	$1.5 S_f$	$1.5 S_f$	N/A	N/A	See Note (9)
	Integ. & Continuous, Inelastic Analysis ⁽³⁾	S_f	S_f	S_f			
Post-Flooding Condition ⁽⁴⁾		$1.2 S_{mc}$ or $1.0 S_y$ ⁽⁴⁾	$1.8 S_{mc}$ or $1.5 S_y$ ⁽⁴⁾	$1.8 S_{mc}$ or $1.5 S_y$ ⁽⁴⁾	$3 S_{mi}$	N/A ⁽²⁾	See Note (9)

3.8.2-25

DRAFT Rev. 2 - April 1996

NOTES FOR TABLE 3.8.2-1:⁸⁶

- (1) The allowable stress intensity S_{mi} shall be the S_m listed in Tables I-1.0, and the allowable stress intensity S_{mc} shall be the S_m listed in Tables I-10.0 of Appendix I of the ASME Code.
- (2) N/A - No evaluation required.
- (3) S_f is 85% of the general primary membrane allowable permitted in Appendix F. In the application of the rules of Appendix F, S_{mi} , if applicable, shall be as specified in Tables I-1.0.
- (4) These limits identified by ~~(*)~~ ⁸⁷ indicate a choice of the larger of two limits.
- (5) The number of test sequences shall not exceed 10 unless a fatigue evaluation is considered.
- (6) Values shown are for a solid rectangular section. Sec. NE-3220 for other than a solid rectangular section.
- (7) These stress intensity limits apply also to the partial penetration welds.
- (8) Values shown are applicable when $P_L \leq 0.67S_y$. When $P_L > 0.67S_y$, use the larger of the two limits, $[2.5 - 1.5 (P_L/S_y)]1.2S_{mc}$ or $[2.5 - 1.5 (P_L/S_y)]S_y$.
- (9) The applicant is required to demonstrate that any axisymmetric techniques proposed are applicable to a vessel having large asymmetric openings and that the overall margin of safety used to prevent buckling is adequate.

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SRP Draft Section 3.8.2
Attachment A - Proposed Changes in Order of Occurrence

Item numbers in the following table correspond to superscript numbers in the redline/strikeout copy of the draft SRP section.

Item	Source	Description
1.	Current PRB name and abbreviation	Changed PRB to Civil Engineering and Geosciences Branch (ECGB).
2.	Editorial	Defined "BWR" as "boiling water reactor."
3.	Editorial	Defined "PWR" as "pressurized water reactor."
4.	SRP-UDP format item	Added subsection I.1.a(iv) that describes the scope of the SRP section to include steel portions of concrete containments that are not backed up by structural concrete. The text was adapted from SRP Section 3.8.1, which indicates that the subject is covered by SRP Section 3.8.2.
5.	Editorial	Replaced "Standard Review Plan" with "SRP," (global change for this section).
6.	SRP-UDP Format Item, Reformat References	Revised the text by spelling out the word "Reference" in accordance with SRP-UDP guidance for reformatting references.
7.	Editorial	Used plural noun to provide noun-verb agreement.
8.	Editorial	Modified sentence to improve clarity and provide noun-verb agreement.
9.	Note without modification to SRP section	The current version of RG 1.57 cites text in a version of the ASME Code that is not applicable to new plants. The 1989 edition of the ASME Code is cited in the 1994 version of 10 CFR 50.55a. An IPD 7.0 Form was prepared. No change was made to the text of the SRP section.
10.	SRP-UDP format item	Deleted unnecessary reference callout, "(Ref. 2)."
11.	Integrated Impact No. 617	Added load description to reflect the design of 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(B)(1).
12.	Integrated Impact No. 618	Added load description to reflect design criterion of 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(A)(1).
13.	Editorial	Added blank lines between items a through f for clarification.
14.	Editorial	Moved sentence to "Review Interfaces."

SRP Draft Section 3.8.2
Attachment A - Proposed Changes in Order of Occurrence

Item	Source	Description
15.	Editorial	Moved sentence to "Review Interfaces."
16.	SRP-UDP format item	Added "Review Interfaces" to AREAS OF REVIEW and organized in numbered paragraph form to describe how ECGB coordinates review of steel containments analyses with other branches.
17.	SRP-UDP Format Item, Review Interfaces	Added Review Interfaces with SRP Sections 3.8.1, 3.8.4 and 3.8.5. These Review Interfaces were extracted from the existing text of SRP Section 3.8.2.
18.	Current PRB abbreviation	Changed PRB to ECGB.
19.	SRP-UDP format item	Organized existing text into numbered paragraphs.
20.	SRP-UDP format item	Changed review interface branch to Mechanical Engineering Branch (EMEB).
21.	Current PRB abbreviation	Changed PRB to ECGB.
22.	Current review branch name and abbreviation	Changed review interface branch to Plant Systems Branch (SPLB).
23.	Current PRB abbreviation	Changed PRB to ECGB.
24.	SRP-UDP format item	Changed review interface branch to SPLB.
25.	SRP-UDP format item	Changed review interface branch to Containment Systems and Severe Accident Branch (SCSB).
26.	Current PRB abbreviation	Changed PRB to ECGB.
27.	SRP-UDP format item	Changed review interface branch to SCSB.
28.	SRP-UDP format item	Changed review interface branch to Quality Assurance and Maintenance Branch (HQMB).
29.	Editorial	Changed "Section 17.0" to "Chapter 17."
30.	SRP-UDP format item	Moved sentence from subsection I.6.a(ii) to define review interface responsibilities for EMCB.
31.	Potential Impact 21732.	Added a review interface with proposed SRP Section 3.6.3 regarding application of leak-before-break to eliminate dynamic loads associated with pipe ruptures from the structural design basis.
32.	SRP-UDP format item	Moved sentence from subsection I.7 to define review interface responsibilities for EMCB.

SRP Draft Section 3.8.2
Attachment A - Proposed Changes in Order of Occurrence

Item	Source	Description
33.	SRP-UDP format item, Review Interfaces	Added a Review Interface to proposed SRP Section 19.2, "Severe Accident Containment Performance." (See Pls 24601 and 25314).
34.	Editorial	Simplified for clarity and readability.
35.	SRP-UDP format item	Changed PRB to EMCB.
36.	Editorial modification	Changed subsection numbers to letters to avoid confusion with numbered subsections that follow.
37.	Integrated Impacts 617 and 618	Added 10 CFR 50.34(f) to the Acceptance Criteria.
38.	Editorial	Provided correct citation format for the Code of Federal Regulations (global change for this section).
39.	Editorial modification	Corrected grammar and punctuation in the sentence.
40.	Integrated Impacts 617 and 618	Added 10 CFR 50.34(f) to the Acceptance Criteria.
41.	Editorial	Changed "GDC" to "General Design Criteria" to accommodate plural usage.
42.	Editorial	Added reference to RG 1.70. Deleted unnecessary reference callout, "(Ref. 3)."
43.	Editorial	Specified RG 1.70 as basis for staff review of SAR.
44.	Editorial modification	Changed heading in the table from "Code" to "Code/Guide" to describe the contents of the column more accurately.
45.	Editorial	Added "from" for clarity.
46.	Integrated Impact Nos. 617 and 618	Added loads Pg1, Pg2, and Pg3 to reflect design requirement contained in 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(A)(1) and 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(B)(1).
47.	Editorial	Deleted parenthetical acronym. LOCA defined previously in text.
48.	Integrated Impact No. 617	Added description and load combination equation to reflect design requirement of 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(B)(1).
49.	Integrated Impact No. 617	Added description and load combination equation to reflect design requirement of 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(B)(2).
50.	Integrated Impact No. 618	Added load combination equation to reflect design requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(A)(1).

SRP Draft Section 3.8.2
Attachment A - Proposed Changes in Order of Occurrence

Item	Source	Description
51.	Integrated Impact No. 618	Added load combination equation to reflect design requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(A)(1).
52.	Integrated Impact No. 620	Added a paragraph to subsection II.4.b to cover buckling of complex shells or buckling caused by internal pressure. This text was adapted from subsection 1110 of Code Case N-284 and from the last paragraph of the introduction to Appendix E of the ABWR FSER, NUREG-1503.
53.	Editorial	Corrected grammar in the sentence.
54.	Editorial	Corrected grammar in the sentence.
55.	Editorial	Modified to provide noun-verb agreement and to specify review interface branch.
56.	Note without modification to the SRP	As of June 1995, the staff position on inservice surveillance requirements for containments is near completion. The staff has made presentations to the CRGR and ACRS and is preparing a modification to 10 CFR 50.55a referencing ASME Code Section XI, Subsection IWE. A change to the SRP section will be appropriate when the modification to 10 CFR 50.55a is published.
57.	SRP-UDP format item	Changed review interface branch to EMCB.
58.	SRP-UDP format item	Added "Technical Rationale" to ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA and organized in numbered paragraph form to describe the bases for referencing GDC and 10 CFR provisions.
59.	SRP-UDP format item	Added lead-in sentence to "Technical Rationale."
60.	Editorial	Specified RG 1.70 as basis for staff review of SAR.
61.	Editorial	Changed "assures himself" to "verifies" to eliminate gender-specific reference.
62.	Editorial	Changed "assures himself" to "verifies" to eliminate gender-specific reference.
63.	Editorial	Changed "assures" to "ensures."
64.	Integrated Impacts Nos. 617 and 618	Added review procedure pertinent to design for hydrogen burning and metal-water reaction.
65.	Editorial	Changed "assure" to "ensure."

SRP Draft Section 3.8.2
Attachment A - Proposed Changes in Order of Occurrence

Item	Source	Description
66.	Integrated Impact # 1345	Added information relating to the Staff's acceptance in the evolutionary FSERs an exemption to eliminate the OBE from seismic design requirements.
67.	SRP-UDP Guidance, Implementation of 10 CFR 52	Added standard paragraph to address application of Review Procedures in design certification reviews.
68.	Editorial	Changed to eliminate gender-specific reference.
69.	Editorial	Provided "SER" as initialism for "safety evaluation report."
70.	Integrated Impacts Nos. 617 and 618	Added reference to 10 CFR 50.34(f).
71.	Integrated Impacts Nos. 617 and 618	Added evaluation finding to reflect design requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(f).
72.	SRP-UDP format item	Renumbered evaluation findings to accommodate addition of new item 1.
73.	Editorial	Changed "assuring" to "ensuring."
74.	Editorial	Changed "assuring" to "ensuring."
75.	Editorial correction	Changed "assuring" to "ensuring."
76.	SRP-UDP Format Item, Implement 10 CFR 52 Related Changes	To address design certification reviews a new paragraph was added to the end of the Evaluation Findings. This paragraph addresses design certification specific items including ITAAC, DAC, site interface requirements, and combined license action items.
77.	SRP-UDP Guidance, Implementation of 10 CFR 52	Added standard sentence to address application of the SRP section to reviews of applications filed under 10 CFR Part 52, as well as Part 50.
78.	SRP-UDP Guidance	Added standard paragraph to indicate applicability of this section to reviews of future applications.
79.	Integrated Impact No. 620	Added RG 1.84 to references. RG 1.84 cites ASME Code Case N-284 as an acceptable code case for consideration of buckling of metal containments.
80.	Integrated Impact No. 619	Corrected title of GDC 4.
81.	Integrated Impacts 617 and 618	Added reference for 10 CFR 50.34(f).
82.	Editorial	Simplified format for the Code of Federal Regulations.
83.	Editorial modification	Added column heading for clarification.

SRP Draft Section 3.8.2
Attachment A - Proposed Changes in Order of Occurrence

Item	Source	Description
84.	Editorial modification	Substituted direct citation of footnote 4 of the table (9 entries) in place of the superscripted star (*) in the original table, for clarification.
85.	Editorial modification	Included citation of footnote 8 (2 entries) that was omitted from the original table.
86.	Editorial modification	Added text to heading to clarify the application of the notes.
87.	Editorial modification	Modified footnote 4 of the table to eliminate reference to the "*" symbol in the table, for clarification. Citations in the table will now refer to footnote 4 directly.

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SRP Draft Section 3.8.2
Attachment B - Cross Reference of Integrated Impacts

Integrated Impact No.	Issue	SRP Subsections Affected
617	10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(B)(1) addresses containment structure loading produced by an inadvertent full actuation of postaccident inerting hydrogen control system. Load combinations should be added to SRP Section 3.8.2 to address these loadings.	AREAS OF REVIEW, subsection I.3.j ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA, subsections II.3.a and II.3.b REVIEW PROCEDURES, subsection III.5 EVALUATION FINDINGS, subsection IV.1 REFERENCES
618	10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(A)(1) requires that integrity of steel containments be maintained during an accident that releases hydrogen generated from 100% clad metal-water reaction accompanied by hydrogen burning or the added pressure from postaccident inerting. Load combinations should be added to SRP Section 3.8.2 to address these loadings.	AREAS OF REVIEW, subsection I.3.k ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA, subsection II.3.a and II.3.c REVIEW PROCEDURES, subsection III.5 EVALUATION FINDINGS, subsection IV.1 REFERENCES
619	Revise title of GDC 4.	REFERENCES, VI.
620	Incorporate staff position on shell buckling acceptance criteria.	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA, subsections II.4.b and II.4.d REFERENCES, VI.4
621	Revise SRP Section 3.8.2 to address the concern of Generic Issue B-5.	No change based on this Integrated Impact.
1199	Revise the Acceptance Criteria and Review Procedures to incorporate the requirements from proposed rulemaking 59 FR 979.	This is a placeholder integrated impact and will not be processed further.

SRP Draft Section 3.8.2
Attachment B - Cross Reference of Integrated Impacts

Integrated Impact No.	Issue	SRP Subsections Affected
1242	Revise the SRP to incorporate the new and revised requirements from proposed rulemaking 59 FR 52255.	This is a placeholder integrated impact and will not be processed further.
1345	In SECY 93-087, the staff proposed additional guidance and positions for the design of structures, systems, and components when the OBE is eliminated. In the SRM for SECY 93-087 the Commission approved specific staff positions and criteria for elimination of the OBE.	REVIEW PROCEDURES

SRP Draft Section 3.8.2
Attachment B - Cross Reference of Integrated Impacts