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Callaway Plant

PO Box 620
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November 10, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Stop P1-137
Washington, DC 20555-0001

ULNRC-05089

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Ladies and Gentlemen:

DOCKET NUMBER 50-483
CALLAWAY PLANT UNIT 1
UNION ELECTRIC CO.
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-30
Special Report on the Inoperability of Unit Vent High Range Radiation Monitor

The enclosed Special Report is submitted in accordance with Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section 16.3.3.4, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Limiting Condition for Operation. On October 22, 2004, the Unit Vent Mid and High Range monitors were declared Inoperable and this report documents the cause of the inoperability, the actions taken to restore the monitors to an Operable status, and the preplanned alternate monitoring methods established during the time of Inoperability.

This letter does not contain new commitments.

Sincerely,

Keith D. Young

Keith D. Young
Manager, Regulatory Affairs

Enclosure

IE22

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Special Report: Inoperability of GTRE0021B

During quarterly Surveillance testing of the Unit Vent Radiation Monitor on October 22, 2004, the Mid/High Range Channel flow control circuit failed to achieve the required sample flow necessary for isokinetic sampling. Troubleshooting ultimately determined that the failure was due to improper reassembly of a filter canister located between the Mid/High Vacuum Pump discharge and the Mid/High Range Detector Chambers. The design of this filter relies on a tapered flange between both the canister body and canister lid which compresses a sealing o-ring when coupled together using a constricting steel band. Following discovery of the failure mechanism investigation revealed that the faulty reassembly occurred on October 5, 2004 when the filter was last replaced. Performance of the quarterly Surveillance was not coordinated with the filter replacement activity delaying the identification of faulty reassembly. The canister was properly reassembled and a tight seal was verified by achieving correct flow characteristics for the Mid/High Range flow control circuit. On October 28, 2004, the Mid/High Range Unit Vent Radiation Monitor was declared Operable and returned to service.

During the performance of the quarterly Surveillance on October 22, 2004, the preplanned alternate method of monitoring was instituted in accordance with plant procedures. This constituted monitoring Unit Vent releases in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in the event an emergency were to occur and would rely upon data supplied by field monitoring teams. This alternate method remained in effect until the problem was corrected on October 28, 2004.