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TSB1 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL

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SSES MANUAL

Manual Name: TSB1

Manual Title: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL

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B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND The primary containment isolation instrumentation automatically initiates closure of appropriate primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs). The function of the PCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). Primary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a DBA.

The isolation instrumentation includes the sensors, relays, and instruments that are necessary to cause initiation of primary containment and reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) isolation. When the setpoint is reached, the sensor actuates, which then outputs an isolation signal to the isolation logic. Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of independent parameters. The input parameters to the isolation logics are (a) reactor vessel water level, (b) area ambient and emergency cooler temperatures, (c) main steam line (MSL) flow measurement, (d) Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System initiation, (e) condenser vacuum, (f) main steam line pressure, (g) high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) steam line Δ pressure, (h) SGTS Exhaust radiation, (i) HPCI and RCIC steam line pressure, (j) HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure, (k) reactor water cleanup (RWCU) differential flow and high flow, (l) reactor steam dome pressure, and (m) drywell pressure. Redundant sensor input signals from each parameter are provided for initiation of isolation. The only exception is SLC System initiation. In addition, manual isolation of the logics is provided.

Primary containment isolation instrumentation has inputs to the trip logic of the isolation functions listed below.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

1. Main Steam Line Isolation

Most MSL Isolation Functions receive inputs from four channels. The outputs from these channels are combined in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation of all main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). The outputs from the same channels are arranged into two two-out-of-two logic trip systems to isolate all MSL drain valves. The MSL drain line has two isolation valves with one two-out-of-two logic system associated with each valve.

The exceptions to this arrangement are the Main Steam Line Flow—High Function. The Main Steam Line Flow—High Function uses 16 flow channels, four for each steam line. One channel from each steam line inputs to one of the four trip strings. Two trip strings make up each trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an MSL isolation. Each trip string has four inputs (one per MSL), any one of which will trip the trip string. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. This is effectively a one-out-of-eight taken twice logic arrangement to initiate isolation of the MSIVs. Similarly, the 16 flow channels are connected into two two-out-of-two logic trip systems (effectively, two one-out-of-four twice logic), with each trip system isolating one of the two MSL drain valves.

2. Primary Containment Isolation

Most Primary Containment Isolation Functions receive inputs from four channels. The outputs from these channels are arranged into two two-out-of-two logic trip systems. One trip system initiates isolation of all inboard primary containment isolation valves, while the other trip system initiates isolation of all outboard primary containment isolation valves. Each logic closes one of the two valves on each penetration, so that operation of either logic isolates the penetration.

The exceptions to this arrangement are as follows. Hydrogen and Oxygen Analyzers which isolate Division I Analyzer on a Division I isolation signal, and Division II Analyzer on a Division II-isolation signal. This is to ensure monitoring capability is not lost. Chilled Water to recirculation pumps and Liquid Radwaste Collection System isolation valves

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND 2. Primary Containment Isolation (continued) —

where both inboard and outboard valves will isolate on either division providing the isolation signal. Traversing incore probe ball valves and the instrument gas to the drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breakers only have one isolation valve and receives a signal from only one division.

3., 4. High Pressure Coolant Injection System Isolation and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Isolation

Most Functions that isolate HPCI and RCIC receive input from two channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. Each of the two trip systems in each isolation group is connected to one of the two valves on each associated penetration.

The exceptions are the HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure—High and Steam Supply Line Pressure—Low Functions. These Functions receive inputs from four turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure and four steam supply pressure channels for each system. The outputs from the turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure and steam supply pressure channels are each connected to two two-out-of-two trip systems. Each trip system isolates one valve per associated penetration.

5. Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Isolation Function receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels. The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels are connected into two two-out-of-two trip systems. The Differential Flow—High, Flow—High, and SLC System Initiation Functions receive input from two channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. The temperature isolations are divided into three Functions. These Functions are Pump Area, Penetration Area, and Heat Exchanger Area. Each area is monitored by two temperature monitors, one for each trip system. These are configured so that any one input will trip the associated trip system. Each of the two trip systems is connected to one of the two valves on each RWCU penetration.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels. The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels are connected to two two-out-of-two trip systems. The Reactor Vessel Pressure—High Function receives input from two channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. Each of the two trip systems is connected to one of the two valves on each shutdown cooling penetration.

7. Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Isolation Function receives input from two reactor vessel water level channels. The Drywell Pressure-High Isolation Function receives input from two drywell pressure channels. The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels and drywell pressure channels are connected into one two-out-of-two logic trip system.

When either Isolation Function actuates, the TIP drive mechanisms will withdraw the TIPs, if inserted, and close the inboard TIP System isolation ball valves when the proximity probe senses the TIPs are withdrawn into the shield. The TIP System isolation ball valves are only open when the TIP System is in use. The outboard TIP System isolation valves are manual shear valves.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

The isolation signals generated by the primary containment isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closure of valves to limit offsite doses. Refer to LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)," Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for more detail of the safety analyses.

Primary containment isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref. 8) Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

The OPERABILITY of the primary containment instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time, where appropriate.

Allowable Values are specified for each Primary Containment Isolation Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between

CHANNEL

CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter reaches the setpoint, the associated device changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 consistent with the Applicability for LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment." Functions that have different Applicabilities are discussed below in the individual Functions discussion.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

The penetrations which are isolated by the below listed functions can be determined by referring to the PCIV Table found in the Bases of LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves."

Main Steam Line Isolation

1.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of the MSIVs and other interfaces with the reactor vessel occurs to prevent offsite dose limits from being exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function is one of the many Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation signals. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function associated with isolation is assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The isolation of the MSLs on Level 1 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded for a DBA.

Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 1 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1) to ensure that the MSLs isolate on a potential loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to prevent offsite doses from exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

1.b. Main Steam Line Pressure—Low

Low MSL pressure indicates that there may be a problem with the turbine pressure regulation, which could result in a low reactor vessel water level condition and the RPV cooling down more than 100°F/hr if the pressure loss is allowed to continue. The Main Steam Line Pressure—Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the pressure regulator failure (Ref. 2). For this event, the closure of the MSIVs ensures that the RPV temperature change limit (100°F/hr) is not reached. In addition, this Function supports actions to ensure that Safety Limit 2.1.1.1 is not exceeded. (This Function closes the MSIVs prior to pressure decreasing below 785 psig, which results in a scram due to MSIV closure, thus reducing reactor power to < 25% RTP.)

The MSL low pressure signals are initiated from four instruments that are connected to the MSL header. The instruments are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, each instrument is able to detect low MSL pressure. Four channels of Main Steam Line Pressure—Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Main Steam Line Pressure—Low trip will only occur after a 500 milli-second time delay to prevent any spurious isolations.

The Allowable Value was selected to be high enough to prevent excessive RPV depressurization. The Main Steam Line Pressure—Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 since this is when the assumed transient can occur (Ref. 2).

1.c. Main Steam Line Flow—High

Main Steam Line Flow—High is provided to detect a break of the MSL and to initiate closure of the MSIVs. If the steam were allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor would depressurize and the core could uncover. If the RPV water level decreases too far, fuel damage could occur. Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The Main Steam Line Flow—High Function is

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
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LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

1.c. Main Steam Line Flow—High (continued)—

directly assumed in the analysis of the main steam line break (MSLB) (Ref. 1). The isolation action, along with the scram function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46 and offsite doses do not exceed the 10 CFR 100 limits.

The MSL flow signals are initiated from 16 instruments that are connected to the four MSLs. The instruments are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, all four connected to one MSL would be able to detect the high flow. Four channels of Main Steam Line Flow—High Function for each unisolated MSL (two channels per trip system) are available and are required to be OPERABLE so that no single instrument failure will preclude detecting a break in any individual MSL.

1.d. Condenser Vacuum—Low

The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded due to the break.

The Condenser Vacuum—Low Function is provided to prevent overpressurization of the main condenser in the event of a loss of the main condenser vacuum. Since the integrity of the condenser is an assumption in offsite dose calculations, the Condenser Vacuum—Low Function is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating closure of the MSIVs. The closure of the MSIVs is initiated to prevent the addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the diaphragm installed to protect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident.

Condenser vacuum pressure signals are derived from four pressure instruments that sense the pressure in the condenser. Four channels of Condenser Vacuum-Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
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LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

1.d. Condenser Vacuum—Low (continued)

The Allowable Value is chosen to prevent damage to the condenser due to pressurization, thereby ensuring its integrity for offsite dose analysis. As noted (footnote (a) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 when all main turbine stop valves (TSVs) are closed, since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. Switches are provided to manually bypass the channels when all TSVs are closed.

1.e. Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature—High

Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel temperature is provided to detect a leak in the RCPB and provides diversity to the high flow instrumentation. The isolation occurs when a very small leak has occurred. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. However, credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as MSLBs.

Area temperature signals are initiated from thermocouples located in the area being monitored. Four channels of Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The reactor building main steam tunnel temperature trip will only occur after a one second time delay.

The temperature monitoring Allowable Value is chosen to detect a leak equivalent to approximately 25 gpm of water.

1.f. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the MSL isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
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LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

1.f. Manual Initiation (continued)

There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the MODES in which the MSL isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

Primary Containment Isolation

2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

2.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 2 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA.

2.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 1 supports actions to ensure the offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
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LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

2.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 (continued)

Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 1 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1) to ensure that the associated penetrations isolate on a potential loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to prevent offsite doses from exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits.

2.d. Drywell Pressure—High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment. The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Drywell Pressure—High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the FSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure instruments that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of Drywell Pressure—High per Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure—High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

2.e. SGTS Exhaust Radiation—High

High SGTS Exhaust radiation indicates possible gross failure of the fuel cladding. Therefore, when SGTS Exhaust Radiation High is detected, an isolation is initiated to limit the release of fission products. However, this Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the FSAR because other leakage paths (e.g., MSIVs) are more limiting.

The SGTS Exhaust radiation signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located in the SGTS Exhaust. Two channels of SGTS Exhaust Radiation—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is low enough to promptly detect gross failures in the fuel cladding.

2.f. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the primary containment isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the MODES in which the Primary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY
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LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)

High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation
Cooling Systems Isolation

3.a., 4.a. HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Δ Pressure—High

Steam Line Δ Pressure High Functions are provided to detect a break of the RCIC or HPCI steam lines and initiate closure of the steam line isolation valves of the appropriate system. If the steam is allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor will depressurize and the core can uncover. Therefore, the isolations are initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for these Functions is not assumed in any FSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks. However, these instruments prevent the RCIC or HPCI steam line breaks from becoming bounding.

The HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Δ Pressure — High signals are initiated from instruments (two for HPCI and two for RCIC) that are connected to the system steam lines. Two channels of both HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Δ pressure—High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The steam line Δ Pressure - High will only occur after a 3 second time delay to prevent any spurious isolations.

The Allowable Values are chosen to be low enough to ensure that the trip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLB event as the bounding event, and high enough to be above the maximum transient steam flow during system startup.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

3.b., 4.b. HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line A-Pressure—Low

Low MSL pressure indicates that the pressure of the steam in the HPCI or RCIC turbine may be too low to continue operation of the associated system's turbine. These isolations are for equipment protection and are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR. However, they also provide a diverse signal to indicate a possible system break. These instruments are included in Technical Specifications (TS) because of the potential for risk due to possible failure of the instruments preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref. 3).

The HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure—Low signals are initiated from instruments (four for HPCI and four for RCIC) that are connected to the system steam line. Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure—Low Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are selected to be high enough to prevent damage to the system's turbine.

3.c., 4.c. HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure—High

High turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure indicates that a release of steam into the associated compartment is possible. That is, one of two exhaust diaphragms has ruptured. These isolations are to prevent steam from entering the associated compartment and are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR. These instruments are included in the TS because of the potential for risk due to possible failure of the instruments preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref. 3).

The HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High signals are initiated from instruments (four for HPCI and four for RCIC) that are connected to the area between the rupture diaphragms on each system's turbine exhaust line. Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
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APPLICABILITY**

3.c., 4.c. HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure—High
(continued)

The Allowable Values is low enough to identify a high turbine exhaust pressure condition resulting from a diaphragm rupture, or a leak in the diaphragm adjacent to the exhaust line and high enough to prevent inadvertent system isolation.

3.d., 4.d. Drywell Pressure—High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB. The HPCI and RCIC isolation of the turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line is provided to prevent communication with the wetwell when high drywell pressure exists. A potential leakage path exists via the turbine exhaust. The isolation is delayed until the system becomes unavailable for injection (i.e., low steam supply line pressure). The isolation of the HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line by Drywell Pressure—High is indirectly assumed in the FSAR accident analysis because the turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line leakage path is not assumed to contribute to offsite doses and is provided for long term containment isolation.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure instruments that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Drywell Pressure—High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure—High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this is indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

3.e., 3.f., 3.g., 4.e., 4.f., 4.g., HPCI and RCIC Area and Emergency
Cooler Temperature—High

HPCI and RCIC Area and Emergency Cooler temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the associated system steam piping. The isolation occurs when a small leak has occurred and is diverse to the high flow instrumentation. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. These Functions are not assumed in any FSAR transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or MSL breaks.

Area and Emergency Cooler Temperature-High signals are initiated from thermocouples that are appropriately located to protect the system that is being monitored. Two Instruments monitor each area. Two channels for each HPCI and RCIC Area and Emergency Cooler Temperature-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The HPCI and RCIC Pipe Routing area temperature trips will only occur after a 15 minute time delay to prevent any spurious temperature isolations due to short temperature increases and allows operators sufficient time to determine which system is leaking. The other ambient temperature trips will only occur after a one second time delay to prevent any spurious temperature isolations.

The Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm, and high enough to avoid trips at expected operating temperature.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

3.h., 4.h. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the HPCI and RCIC systems' isolation logics that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for these Functions. They are retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is one manual initiation push button for each of the HPCI and RCIC systems. One isolation pushbutton per system will introduce an isolation to one of the two trip systems. There is no Allowable Value for these Functions, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of both HPCI and RCIC Manual Initiation Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since these are the MODES in which the HPCI and RCIC systems' Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation

5.a. RWCU Differential Flow—High

The high differential flow signal is provided to detect a break in the RWCU System. This will detect leaks in the RWCU System when area temperature would not provide detection (i.e., a cold leg break). Should the reactor coolant continue to flow out of the break, offsite dose limits may be exceeded. Therefore, isolation of the RWCU System is initiated when high differential flow is sensed to prevent exceeding offsite doses. A 45 second time delay is provided to prevent spurious trips during most RWCU operational transients. This Function is not assumed in any FSAR transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as MSLBs.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
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APPLICABILITY**

5.a. RWCU Differential Flow—High (continued)

The high differential flow signals are initiated from instruments that are connected to the inlet (from the recirculation suction) and outlets (to condenser and feedwater) of the RWCU System. Two channels of Differential Flow—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Differential Flow—High Allowable Value ensures that a break of the RWCU piping is detected.

5.b, 5.c, 5.d RWCU Area Temperatures—High

RWCU area temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the RWCU System. The isolation occurs even when small leaks have occurred and is diverse to the high differential flow instrumentation for the hot portions of the RWCU System. If the small leak continues without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. Credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or MSL breaks.

Area temperature signals are initiated from temperature elements that are located in the area that is being monitored. Six thermocouples provide input to the Area Temperature—High Function (two per area). Six channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The area temperature trip will only occur after a one second time to prevent any spurious temperature isolations.

The Area Temperature—High Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
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LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)

5.e. SLC System Initiation

The isolation of the RWCU System is required when the SLC System has been initiated to prevent dilution and removal of the boron solution by the RWCU System (Ref. 4). SLC System initiation signals are initiated from the two SLC pump start signals.

There is no Allowable Value associated with this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the SLC System initiation switch.

Two channels (one from each pump) of the SLC System Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE only in MODES 1 and 2, since these are the only MODES where the reactor can be critical, with the exception of Special Operations LCO 3.10.8, and these MODES are consistent with the Applicability for the SLC System (LCO 3.1.7).

As noted (footnote (b) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), this Function is only required to close the outboard RWCU isolation valve trip systems.

5.f. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some interfaces with the reactor vessel occurs to isolate the potential sources of a break. The isolation of the RWCU System on Level 2 supports actions to ensure that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with RWCU isolation is not directly assumed in the FSAR safety analyses because the RWCU System line break is bounded by breaks of larger systems (recirculation and MSL breaks are more limiting).

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of

(continued)

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**APPLICABLE
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APPLICABILITY**

5.f. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 (continued)

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

5.g. RWCU Flow - High

RWCU Flow—High Function is provided to detect a break of the RWCU System. Should the reactor coolant continue to flow out of the break, offsite dose limits may be exceeded. Therefore, isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for this Function is not assumed in any FSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks.

The RWCU Flow—High signals are initiated from two instruments. Two channels of RWCU Flow—High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The RWCU flow trip will only occur after a second time delay to prevent spurious trips.

The Allowable Value is chosen to be low enough to ensure that the trip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLB event as the bounding event.

5.h. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the RWCU System isolation logic that are redundant to

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
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5.h. Manual Initiation (continued)

the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since these are the MODES in which the RWCU System Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

6.a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High Function is provided to isolate the shutdown cooling portion of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. This interlock is provided only for equipment protection to prevent an intersystem LOCA scenario, and credit for the interlock is not assumed in the accident or transient analysis in the FSAR.

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High signals are initiated from two instruments. Two channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the only MODES in which the reactor can be pressurized with the exception of Special Operations LCO 3.10.1; thus, equipment protection is needed. The Allowable Value was chosen to be low enough to protect the system equipment from overpressurization.

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BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
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LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

(continued)

6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some reactor vessel interfaces occurs to

begin isolating the potential sources of a break. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function associated with RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation is not directly assumed in safety analyses because a break of the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is bounded by breaks of the recirculation and MSL.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak (e.g., pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR Shutdown Cooling System.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. As noted (footnote (c) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), only two channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 (and must input into the same trip system), provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity is maintained. System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that has the potential for draining the reactor vessel through the system.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel.

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BASES

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APPLICABILITY**

6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 (continued)

In MODES 1 and 2, another isolation (i.e., Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path.

6.c Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals to RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation logic that is redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5, since these are the MODES in which the RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation automatic Function are required to be OPERABLE.

Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation

7.a Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose-limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
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LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

7.a Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3- (continued)

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can initiate an inadvertent isolation actuation. The isolation function is ensured by the manual shear valve in each penetration.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown.

7.b. Drywell Pressure - High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment. The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite does limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Drywell Pressure - High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the FSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell. Two channels of Drywell Pressure - High per Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can initiate an inadvertent actuation. The isolation function is ensured by the manual shear valve in each penetration.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure - High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note-1 allows penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated. Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to primary containment isolation instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

A.1

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours for Functions 2.a, 2.d, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b and 24 hours for Functions other than Functions 2.a, 2.d, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 5 and 6) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation), Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic isolation capability being lost for the associated penetration flow path(s). The MSL Isolation Functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. The other isolation functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that one of the two PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path can receive an isolation signal from the given Function. For Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.d, and 1.e, this would require both trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. For Function 1.c, this would require both trip systems to have one channel, associated with each MSL, OPERABLE or in trip. Therefore, this would require both trip systems to have one channel per location OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, 3.b, 3.c, 3.d, 4.b, 4.c, 4.d, 5.f, and 6.b, this would require one trip system to have two channels, each OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 2.e, 3.a, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g, 4.a, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g, 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 5.d, 5.e, 5.g, and 6.a, this would require one trip system to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. The Condition does not include the Manual Initiation Functions (Functions 1.f, 2.f, 3.h, 4.h, 5.h, and 6.c), since they are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action A.1) is allowed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1

Required Action C.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1 is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A or B and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours (Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2). Alternately, the associated MSLs may be isolated (Required Action D.1), and, if allowed (i.e., plant safety analysis allows operation with an MSL isolated), operation with that MSL isolated may continue. Isolating the affected MSL accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channel. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 6 hours.

The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

F.1

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the affected penetration flow path(s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels.

If it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the penetration flow path(s) could result in a reactor scram), Condition H must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for plant operations personnel to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s).

G.1

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the affected penetration flow path(s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels. The 24 hour Completion Time is acceptable due to the fact that these Functions are either not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the FSAR (Manual Initiation) or, in the case of the TIP System isolation, the TIP System penetration is a small bore (0.280 inch), its isolation in a design basis event (with loss of offsite power) would be via the manually operated shear valves, and the ability to manually isolate by either the normal isolation valve or the shear valve is unaffected by the inoperable instrumentation. It should be noted, however, that the TIP System is powered from an auxiliary instrumentation bus which has an uninterruptible power supply and hence, the TIP drive mechanisms and ball valve control will still function in the event of a loss of offsite power. Alternately, if it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the penetration flow path(s) could result in a reactor scram), Condition H must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

H.1 and H.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, or any Required Action of Condition F or G is not met and the associated Completion Time has expired, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

I.1 and I.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated SLC subsystem(s) is declared inoperable or the RWCU System is isolated. Since this Function is required to ensure that the SLC System performs its intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated SLC subsystems inoperable or isolating the RWCU System.

The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCU System.

J.1 and J.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path should be closed. However, if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to isolate the RHR Shutdown Cooling System (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the penetration flow path can be isolated). Actions must continue until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status or the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is isolated.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required

Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 5 and 6) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) when necessary.

SR 3.3.6.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria which are determined by the plant staff based on an investigation of a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, may be used to support this parameter comparison and include indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit, and does not necessarily indicate the channel is Inoperable.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)**

SR 3.3.6.1.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.

The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.2 is based on the reliability analysis described in References 5 and 6.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 provides a general exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. This exception is necessary because the design of instrumentation does not facilitate functional testing of all required contacts of the relays which input into the combinational logic. (Reference 11) Performance of such a test could result in a plant transient or place the plant in an undo risk situation. Therefore, for this SR, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the change of state of the relay which inputs into the combinational logic. The required contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.6.1.5. This is acceptable because operating experience shows that the contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

Note 2 provides a second specific exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. For Functions 2.e, 3.a, and 4.a, certain channel relays are not included in the performance of the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. These exceptions are necessary because the circuit design does not facilitate functional testing of the entire channel through to the coil of the relay which enters the combinational logic. (Reference 11) Specifically, testing of all required relays would require rendering the affected system (i.e., HPCI or RCIC) inoperable, or require lifting of leads and inserting test equipment which could lead to unplanned transients. Therefore, for these circuits, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the actuation of circuit devices up to the point where further testing could result in an unplanned transient. (References 10 and 12) The required relays not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.6.1.5. This exception

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.3.6.1.2 (continued)

is acceptable because operating experience shows that the devices not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

SR 3.3.6.1.3 and SR 3.3.6.1.4

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.3 is based on the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. The Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.4 is based on the assumption of an 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

It should be noted that some of the primary containment High Drywell pressure instruments, although only required to be calibrated on a 24 month Frequency, are calibrated quarterly based on other TS requirements.

SR 3.3.6.1.5

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed on PCIVs in LCO 3.6.1.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform portions of this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

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BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)**

SR 3.3.6.1.6

This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Testing is performed only on channels where the guidance given in Reference 9 could not be met, which identified that degradation of response time can usually be detected by other surveillance tests.

As stated in Note 1, the response time of the sensors for Functions 1.b, is excluded from ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME testing. Because the vendor does not provide a design instrument response time, a penalty value to account for the sensor response time is included in determining total channel response time. The penalty value is based on the historical performance of the sensor. (Reference 13) This allowance is supported by Reference 9 which determined that significant degradation of the sensor channel response time can be detected during performance of other Technical Specification SRs and that the sensor response time is a small part of the overall ISOLATION RESPONSE TIME testing.

Function 1.a and 1.c channel sensors and logic components are excluded from response time testing in accordance with the provisions of References 14 and 15.

As stated in Note 2, response time testing of isolating relays is not required for Function 5.a. This allowance is supported by Reference 9. These relays isolate their respective isolation valve after a nominal 45 second time delay in the circuitry. No penalty value is included in the response time calculation of this function. This is due to the historical response time testing results of relays of the same manufacturer and model number being less than 100 milliseconds, which is well within the expected accuracy of the 45 second time delay relay.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 7. This test may be performed in one measurement, or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are tested.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience that shows that random failures of instrumentation

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.1.6 (continued)

components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.3.
2. FSAR, Chapter 15.
3. NEDO-31466, "Technical Specification Screening Criteria Application and Risk Assessment," November 1987.
4. FSAR, Section 4.2.3.4.3.
5. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," July 1990.
6. NEDC-30851P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.
7. FSAR, Table 7.3-29.
8. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
9. NEDO-32291-A "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.
10. PPL Letter to NRC, PLA-2618, Response to NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-387/85-28 AND 50-388/85-23, dated April 22, 1986.
11. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9900: Technical Guidance, Standard Technical Specification Section 1.0 Definitions, Issue date 12/08/86.
12. Susquehanna Steam Electric Station NRC REGION I. COMBINED INSPECTION 50-387/90-20; 50-388/90-20, File R41-2, dated March 5, 1986.
13. NRC Safety Evaluation Report related to Amendment No. 171 for License No. NPF-14 and Amendment No. 144 for License No. NPF-22.
14. NEDO 32291-A, Supplement 1, "System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1999.

(continued)

BASES

REFERENCES
(continued)

15. NEDO 32291, Supplement 1, Addendum 2, "System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," September 5, 2003.
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B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND The secondary containment isolation instrumentation automatically initiates closure of appropriate secondary containment isolation valves (SCIVs) and starts the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System. The function of these systems, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1). Secondary containment isolation and establishment of vacuum with the SGT System within the assumed time limits ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment following a DBA, or are released outside primary containment, or are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE are maintained within applicable limits.

The isolation instrumentation includes the sensors, relays, and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of secondary containment isolation. When the setpoint is reached, the channel sensor actuates, which then outputs a secondary containment isolation signal to the isolation logic. Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of independent parameters. The input parameters to the isolation logic are (1) reactor vessel water level, (2) drywell pressure, (3) refuel floor high exhaust duct radiation - high, (4) refuel floor wall exhaust duct radiation - high, and (5) railroad access shaft exhaust duct radiation - high. Only appropriate ventilation zones are isolated for different isolation signals. Isolation signals for drywell pressure and vessel water level will isolate the affected Unit's zone (Zone I for Unit 1 and Zone II for Unit 2) and Zone III. Redundant sensor input signals from each parameter are provided for initiation of isolation. In addition, manual initiation of the logic is provided.

The Functions are arranged as follows for each trip system. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 and Drywell Pressure - High are each arranged in a two-out-of-two logic. The Refuel Floor High Exhaust Duct Radiation - High, Refuel Floor Wall Exhaust Duct Radiation - High and the Railroad Access Shaft Exhaust Duct Radiation - High are arranged into one-out-of-one trip systems. One trip

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)	system initiates isolation of one automatic isolation valve (damper) and starts one SGT subsystem (including its associated reactor building recirculation subsystem) while the other trip system initiates isolation of the other automatic isolation valve in the penetration and starts the other SGT subsystem (including its associated reactor building recirculation subsystem). Each logic closes one of the two valves on each penetration and starts one SGT subsystem, so that operation of either logic isolates the secondary containment and provides for the necessary filtration of fission products.
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and	The isolation signals generated by the secondary containment isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closure of valves and start the SGT System to limit offsite doses.
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APPLICABILITY	Refer to LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for more detail of the safety analyses.
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The secondary containment isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref. 7) Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions. Each Function must have the required number of OPERABLE channels with their setpoints set within the specified Allowable Values, as shown in Table 3.3.6.2-1. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time, where appropriate.

Allowable Values are specified for each Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter reaches the setpoint, the associated device changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip SAFETY ANALYSES, setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions when SCIVs and the SGT System are required.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation and initiation signals. The isolation and initiation systems on Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 support actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 (continued)

level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the High Pressure Coolant Injection/Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (HPCI/RCIC) Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1 and LCO 3.3.5.2), since this could indicate that the capability to cool the fuel is being threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS); thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, this Function is not required. In addition, the Function is also required to be OPERABLE during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) because the capability of isolating potential sources of leakage must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded if core damage occurs.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 will isolate the affected Unit's zone (i.e., Zone I for Unit 1 and Zone II for Unit 2) and Zone III.

2. Drywell Pressure—High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The isolation on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis. However, the Drywell Pressure—High Function associated with

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BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

2. Drywell Pressure - High (continued)

isolation is not assumed in any FSAR accident or transient analyses. It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure instruments that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of Drywell Pressure—High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude performance of the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure—High Function Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1) since this is indicative of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

The Drywell Pressure—High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the RCS; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. This Function is not required in MODES 4 and 5 because the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES.

Drywell Pressure - High will isolate the affected Unit's zone (i.e., Zone I for Unit 1 and Zone II for Unit 2) and Zone III.

3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Refuel Floor High Exhaust Duct, Refuel Floor Wall Exhaust Duct, and Railroad Access Shaft Exhaust Duct Radiation—High

High secondary containment exhaust radiation is an indication of possible gross failure of the fuel cladding due to a fuel handling accident. When Exhaust Radiation—High is detected, secondary containment isolation and actuation of the SGT System are initiated to limit the release of fission products as assumed in the FSAR safety analyses (Ref. 4).

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Refuel Floor High Exhaust Duct, Refuel Floor Wall Exhaust
Duct, and Railroad Access Shaft Exhaust Duct Radiation—High
(continued)

The Exhaust Radiation—High signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located on the ventilation exhaust ductwork coming from the refueling floor zones and the Railroad Access Shaft. The signal from each detector is input to an individual monitor whose trip outputs are assigned to an isolation channel. Eight channels of Refuel Floor High Exhaust Duct and Wall Exhaust Duct Radiation—High Function (four from Unit 1 and four from Unit 2) and two channels of Railroad Access Shaft Exhaust Duct Radiation - High Function (both from Unit 1) are available to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding.

The Refuel Floor Exhaust Radiation—High Functions are required to be OPERABLE during CORE ALTERATIONS, OPDRVs, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to a fuel handling accident) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded.

The Railroad Access Shaft Exhaust Duct Radiation - High Function is only required to be OPERABLE during handling of irradiated fuel within the Railroad Access Shaft, and above the Railroad Access Shaft with the Railroad Access Shaft Equipment Hatch open. This provides the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures resulting from dropped fuel assemblies which ensures that offsite dose limits are not exceeded.

Refuel Floor High and Wall Exhaust Duct and Railroad Access Shaft Exhaust Duct Radiation - High Functions will isolate Zone III of secondary containment.

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BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

8. Manual Initiation

A Manual Initiation can be performed for secondary containment isolation by initiating a Primary Containment Isolation. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, and during CORE ALTERATIONS, OPDRVs, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. These are the MODES and other specified conditions in which the Secondary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours for Function 2, and 24 hours for Functions other than Function 2, has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 5 and 6) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation), Condition C must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic isolation capability for the associated penetration flow path(s) or a complete loss of automatic initiation capability for the SGT System. A Function is considered to be maintaining secondary containment isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that one of the two SCIVs in the associated penetration flow path and one SGT subsystem (including its associated reactor building recirculation subsystem) can be initiated on an isolation signal from the given Function.

For the Functions with two logic trip systems (Functions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7), this would require one trip system to have the required channel(s) OPERABLE or in trip. The Condition does not include the Manual Initiation Function (Function 8), since it is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action A.1) is allowed.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

C.1, C.2.1, and C.2.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met, the ability to isolate the secondary containment and start the SGT System cannot be ensured. Therefore, further actions must be performed to ensure the ability to maintain the secondary containment function. Isolating the associated zone (closing the ventilation supply and exhaust automatic isolation dampers) and starting the associated SGT subsystem (including its associated reactor building recirculation subsystem) in emergency mode (Required Action C.1) performs the intended function of the instrumentation and allows operation to continue.

Alternately, declaring the associated SCIVs and SGT subsystem(s) (including its associated reactor building recirculation subsystem) inoperable (Required Actions C.2.1 and C.2.2) is also acceptable since the Required Actions of the respective LCOs (LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3) provide appropriate actions for the inoperable components.

One hour is sufficient for plant operations personnel to establish required plant conditions or to declare the associated components inoperable without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Secondary Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.2-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains secondary containment isolation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)**

channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 5 and 6) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the SCIVs will isolate the associated penetration flow paths and that the SGT System will initiate when necessary.

SR 3.3.6.2.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria which are determined by the plant staff based on an investigation of a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, may be used to support this parameter comparison and include indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit, and does not necessarily indicate the channel is Inoperable.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal checks of channel status during normal operational use of the displays associated with channels required by the LCO.

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BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**
(continued)

SR 3.3.6.2.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.

This SR is modified by a Note that provides a general exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. This exception is necessary because the design of instrumentation does not facilitate functional testing of all required contacts of the relay which input into the combinational logic. (Reference 8) Performance of such a test could result in a plant transient or place the plant in an undo risk situation. Therefore, for this SR, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the change of state of the relay which inputs into the combinational logic. The required contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.6.2.5. This is acceptable because operating experience shows that the contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of References 5 and 6.

SR 3.3.6.2.3 and SR 3.3.6.2.4

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequencies of SR 3.3.6.2.3 and SR 3.3.6.2.4 are based on the assumption of a 92 day and an 24 month calibration interval, respectively, in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.2.5
(continued)

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed on SCIVs and the SGT System in LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3, respectively, overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform portions of this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.3.
 2. FSAR, Chapter 15
 3. FSAR, Section 15.2.
 4. FSAR, Sections 15.7.
 5. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation", July 1990.
 6. NEDC-30851P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.
 7. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993. (58 FR 32193)
 8. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9900: Technical Guidance, Standard Technical Specification Section 1.0 Definitions, Issue date 12/08/86.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)

BASES

BACKGROUND The function of the SCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1). Secondary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment following a DBA, or that are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE or take place outside primary containment, are maintained within the secondary containment boundary.

The OPERABILITY requirements for SCIVs help ensure that an adequate secondary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. These isolation devices consist of either passive devices or active (automatic) devices. Manual valves or dampers, de-activated automatic valves or dampers secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), and blind flanges are considered passive devices.

Automatic SCIVs close on a secondary containment isolation signal to establish a boundary for untreated radioactive material within secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents.

Other non-sealed penetrations which cross a secondary containment boundary are isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary containment barrier to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for which the secondary containment boundary is required are a loss of coolant accident (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 2). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events, but the boundary

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES
(continued)**

established by SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System before being released to the environment.

Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

LCO

SCIVs that form a part of the secondary containment boundary are required to be OPERABLE. Depending on the configuration of the secondary containment only specific SCIVs are required. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The automatic isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Table B 3.6.4.2-1.

The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are deactivated and secured in their closed position, or blind flanges are in place. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Table B3.6.4.2-2. Penetrations closed with sealants are considered part of the secondary containment boundary and are not considered penetration flow paths.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued) limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.

The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV.

A.1 and A.2

In the event that there are one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to secondary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration, and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time is very low.

For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, but no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that the affected penetration remains isolated.

Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two SCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to devices located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

B.1

With two SCIVs in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 4 hours. The method of isolation must

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time, is very low.

The Condition has been modified by a Note stating that Condition B is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

C.1 and C.2

With one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time. The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting secondary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3.

In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated.

The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one SCIV. For penetration flow paths with two SCIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

D.1 and D.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1, E.2, and E.3

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1, E.2, and E.3 (continued)

Required Action E.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.6.4.2.1

This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification (typically visual) that those required SCIVs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

Since these SCIVs are readily accessible to personnel during normal operation and verification of their position is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the SCIVs are in the correct positions.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these SCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

A second Note has been included to clarify that SCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open.

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)**

SR 3.6.4.2.2

SCIVs with maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.2.4-1 are tested every 92 days to verify that the isolation time is within limits to demonstrate OPERABILITY. Automatic SCIVs without maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.4.2-1 are tested under the requirements of SR 3.6.4.2.3. The isolation time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses.

SR 3.6.4.2.3

Verifying that each automatic required SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents. This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a secondary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.
 2. FSAR, Section 15.
 3. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
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Table B 3.6.4.2-1
Secondary Containment Ventilation System
Automatic Isolation Dampers
(Page 1 of 1)

Reactor Building Zone	Valve Number	Valve Description	Type of Valve	Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds)
I	HD-17586 A&B	Supply System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	10.0
I	HD-17524 A&B	Filtered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	10.0
I	HD-17576A&B	Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	10.0
II	HD-27586 A&B	Supply System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	10.0
II	HD-27524 A&B	Filtered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	10.0
II	HD-27576 A&B	Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	10.0
III	HD-17564 A&B	Supply System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	14.0
III	HD-17514 A&B	Filtered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	6.5
III	HD-17502 A&B	Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	6.0
III	HD-27564 A&B	Supply System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	14.0
III	HD-27514 A&B	Filtered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	6.5
III	HD-27502 A&B	Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	6.0
N/A	HD-17534A	Zone 3 Airlock I-606	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-17534B	Zone 3 Airlock I-611	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-17534C	Zone 3 Airlock I-707	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-17534D	Zone 3 Airlock I-803	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-17534E	Zone 3 Airlock I-805	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-17534F	Zone 3 Airlock I-617	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-17534H	Zone 3 Airlock I-618	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534A	Zone 3 Airlock II-606	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534C	Zone 3 Airlock II-707	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534D	Zone 3 Airlock II-803	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534E	Zone 3 Airlock II-805	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534G	Zone 3 Airlock C-806	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534H	Zone 3 Airlock II-618	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534I	Zone 3 Airlock II-609	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A

Table B 3.6.4.2-2
Secondary Containment Ventilation System
Passive Isolation Valves or Devices
(Page 1 of 1)

Device Number	Device Description	Area/Elev	Required Position
X-28-2-3000	Utility Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell	Yard/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-2-44	SDHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling	Yard/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-2-45	SDHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling	Yard/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-2-46	Temporary Chiller to RBCW	Yard/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-2-47	Temporary Chiller to RBCW	Yard/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-2-48	Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bay	Yard/670	Capped
X-33-2-3000	Utility Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell	Yard/670	Blind Flanged
X-28-2-3000	Utility Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell	28/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-2-48	Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bay	29/670	Capped
X-33-2-3000	Utility Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell	33/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-3-54	Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area	27/683	Blind Flanged
X-29-3-55	Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area	27/683	Blind Flanged
X-29-5-95	Temporary Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW	29/749	Blind Flanged
X-29-5-96	Temporary Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW	29/749	Blind Flanged
X-29-5-91	Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW	33/749	Blind Flanged
X-29-5-92	Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW	33/749	Blind Flanged
X-29-5-97	Utility Penetration from Unit 1 RR Bay to Unit 2 Elev. 749	33/749	Capped
X-27-6-42	Diamond Plate Cover over Floor Penetration	27/779'	Installed
X-27-6-92	Instrument Tubing Stubs	27/779'	Capped
X-29-7-4	1" Spare Conduit Threaded Plug	29/818'	Installed
X-30-6-72	Instrument Tubing Stubs	30/779'	Capped
X-30-6-1002	Stairwell #214 Rupture Disc	30/779'	Installed Intact
X-30-6-1003	Airlock II-609 Rupture Disc	30/779'	Installed Intact
X-25-6-1008	Airlock I-606 Rupture Disc	25/779'	Installed Intact
X-29-4-102	Penetration at Door 433	29/719'	Blind Flange Installed
X-29-4-103	Penetration at Door 433	29/719'	Blind Flange Installed
X-29-4-102	Penetration at Door 433	33/719'	Blind Flange Installed
X-29-4-103	Penetration at Door 433	33/719'	Blind Flange Installed
1S2104	N ₂ Purge Line to U1 Containment Spectacle Flange	29/683'	Blind Side Installed
2S2104	N ₂ Purge Line to U2 Containment Spectacle Flange	34/672'	Blind Side Installed
XD-17513	Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone III HVAC Supply	29/799'	Position is dependent on Railroad Bay alignment
XD-17514	Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone III HVAC Exhaust	29/719'	Position is dependent on Railroad Bay alignment
187388	RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Iso Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
187389	RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Iso Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
187390	RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Drain Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
187391	RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Drain Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110176	SDHR Supply Drain Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110186	SDHR Discharge Drain Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110180	SDHR Supply Vent Vlv	29/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110181	SDHR Discharge Fill Vlv	27/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110182	SDHR Discharge Vent Vlv	27/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110187	SDHR Supply Fill Vlv	29/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
210186	SDHR Supply Drain Vlv	33/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
210187	SDHR Supply Vent Vlv	33/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
210191	SDHR Discharge Vent Vlv	30/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
210192	SDHR Discharge Drain Vlv	30/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
210193	SDHR Discharge Vent Vlv	33/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System

BASES

BACKGROUND The SGT System is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup" (Ref. 1). The safety function of the SGT System is to ensure that radioactive materials that leak from the primary containment into the secondary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) are filtered and adsorbed prior to exhausting to the environment.

The SGT System consists of two redundant subsystems, each with its own set of dampers, filter train, and a reactor building recirculation fan and associated dampers and controls.

Each filter train consists of (components listed in order of the direction of the air flow):

- a. A demister;
- b. An electric heater;
- c. A prefilter;
- d. A high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter;
- e. A charcoal adsorber;
- f. A second HEPA filter; and
- g. A centrifugal fan.

The sizing of the SGT System equipment and components is based on handling an incoming air mixture at a maximum of 125°F. The internal pressure of the secondary containment is maintained at a negative pressure of 0.25 inches water gauge when the system is in operation. Maintenance of a negative pressure precludes direct outleakage.

The demister is provided to remove entrained water in the air, while the electric heater reduces the relative humidity of the airstream to less than 70% (Ref. 2). The prefilter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

removes fine particulate matter and protects the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorber removes gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter collects any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.

The SGT System automatically starts and operates in response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system. Following initiation in each division, the associated filter train fan starts. Upon verification that both subsystems are operating, the redundant subsystem may be shut down.

The SGT System also contains a cooling function to remove heat generated by fission product decay on the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers during shutdown of an SGT subsystem. The cooling function consists of two separate and independent filter cooling modes per SGT subsystem. The two cooling modes are:

- 1) Outside air damper and the filter cooling bypass damper open, allowing outside air to flow through the shutdown SGT subsystem's filter train and exit via the opposite SGT subsystem's exhaust fan.
- 2) Outside air damper opens and the SGT exhaust fan of the shutdown SGT subsystem starts. This configuration draws outside air through the shutdown SGT subsystem's filter train and exits via the associated SGT subsystem's exhaust fan.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The design basis for the SGT System is to mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accidents (Ref. 2). For all events analyzed, the SGT System is shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

LCO

Following a DBA, a minimum of one SGT subsystem is required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for two OPERABLE subsystems ensures operation of at least

(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued)

one SGT subsystem in the event of a single active failure. A SGT subsystem is considered OPERABLE when it has an OPERABLE set of dampers, filter train, one reactor building recirculation fan and associated dampers, and associated controls, including instrumentation. (The reactor building recirculation fans and associated dampers are not dedicated to either SGT subsystem. As a result, when any one reactor building recirculation division is not OPERABLE, one arbitrarily determined SGT subsystem is not operable. This interpretation only applies if both divisions of Secondary Containment Isolation logic are operable). This includes the components required for at least one of the two SGTS filter cooling modes.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT System in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status in 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT System and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT filter train should immediately be placed in operation. This action ensures that the remaining filter train is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities must not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1

If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT system may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. The 4 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining the SGT System contribution to secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring SGT OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where SGT is inoperable is minimal.

E.1 and E.2

If at least one SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1, F.2, and F.3

When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action F.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS** SR 3.6.4.3.1

Operating each SGT filter train for ≥ 10 continuous hours ensures that both filter train are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation with the heaters on (automatic heater cycling to maintain temperature) for ≥ 10 continuous hours every 31 days eliminates moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with the requirements of Reference 4.

SR 3.6.4.3.2

This SR verifies that the required SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.6.4.3.3

This SR verifies that each SGT subsystem starts on receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. Therefore, the Frequency was found to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.4.3.4

This SR verifies that both cooling modes for each SGT subsystem are available. Although both cooling modes are tested, only one cooling mode for each SGT subsystem is required for an SGT subsystem to be considered OPERABLE. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was found to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

- REFERENCES
1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41.
 2. FSAR, Section 6.5.1
 3. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements,
July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
 4. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2.
-

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.2 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System

BASES

BACKGROUND The ESW System is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from equipment, such as the diesel generators (DGs), residual heat removal (RHR) pump coolers, and room coolers for Emergency Core Cooling System equipment, required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. Upon receipt of a loss of offsite power or loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal, ESW pumps are automatically started after a time delay.

The ESW System consists of two independent and redundant subsystems. Each of the two ESW subsystems is made up of a header, two pumps, a suction source, valves, piping and associated instrumentation. The two subsystems are separated from each other so an active single failure in one subsystem will not affect the OPERABILITY of the other subsystem. A continuous supply of water is provided to ESW from the Service Water System for the keepfill system. This supply is not required for ESW operability.

Cooling water is pumped from the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) by the ESW pumps to the essential components through the two main headers. After removing heat from the components, the water is discharged to the spray pond (UHS) by way of a network of sprays that dissipate the heat to the atmosphere or directly to the UHS via a bypass valve.

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES**

Sufficient water inventory is available for all ESW System post LOCA cooling requirements for a 30 day period with no additional makeup water source available. The ability of the ESW System to support long term cooling is assumed in evaluations of the equipment required for safe reactor shutdown presented in the FSAR, Chapters 4 and 6 (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively).

The ability of the ESW System to provide adequate cooling to the identified safety equipment is an implicit assumption for the safety analyses evaluated in References 1 and 2. The ability to provide onsite emergency AC power is dependent on the ability of the ESW System to cool the DGs. The long term cooling capability of the RHR and core spray pumps is also dependent on the cooling provided by the ESW System.

The ESW System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
(Ref. 3)

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO

The ESW subsystems are independent of each other to the degree that each has separate controls, power supplies, and the operation of one does not depend on the other. In the event of a DBA, one subsystem of ESW is required to provide the minimum heat removal capability assumed in the safety analysis for the system to which it supplies cooling water. To ensure this requirement is met, two subsystems of ESW must be OPERABLE. At least one subsystem will operate, if the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

A subsystem is considered OPERABLE when it has two OPERABLE pumps, and an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the UHS and transferring the water to the appropriate equipment and returning flow to the UHS. If individual loads are isolated, the affected components may be rendered inoperable, but it does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the ESW System. Because each ESW subsystem supplies all four required DGs, an ESW subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it supplies at least three of the four DGs provided no single DG does not have an ESW subsystem capable of supplying flow.

An adequate suction source is not addressed in this LCO since the minimum net positive suction head of the ESW pumps is bounded by the Residual Heat Removal Service Water System requirements (LCO 3.7.1, "Residual Heat Removal System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)").

The ESW return loop requirement, in terms of operable UHS return paths or UHS spray capacity, is also not addressed in this LCO. UHS operability, in terms of the return loop and spray capacity is addressed in the RHRSW/ UHS Technical Specification (LCO 3.7.1, "Residual Heat Removal Service Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)"). The design basis calculations for the UHS assume post-accident ESW return flow through the spray bypass valve on one return loop until a UHS temperature is reached whereby realignment of appropriate ESW heat loads to the spray loop is required. This realignment is manual and can be done several hours or more after accident initiation.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the ESW System is required to be OPERABLE to support OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the ESW System. Therefore, the ESW System is required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the ESW System is determined by the systems it supports.

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.8.1, be entered and Required Actions taken if the inoperable ESW subsystem results in inoperable DGs (i.e., the supply from both subsystems of ESW is secured to the same DG). This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 because the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.2 do not adequately compensate for the loss of a DG (LCO 3.8.1) due to loss of ESW flow.

A.1

With one ESW pump inoperable in each subsystem, both inoperable pumps must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE ESW pumps are adequate to perform the ESW heat removal function; however, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure could result in loss of ESW function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the remaining ESW heat removal capability and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period.

B.1

With one or both ESW subsystems not capable of supplying ESW flow to two or more DGs, the capability to supply ESW to at least three DGs from each ESW subsystem must be restored within 7 days. With the units in this condition, the remaining ESW flow to DGs is adequate to maintain the full capability of all DGs; however, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure could result in loss of the multiple DGs. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the fact that all DGs remain capable of responding to an event occurring during this time period.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

C.1

With one ESW subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition B, the ESW subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE ESW subsystem is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE ESW subsystem could result in loss of ESW function.

The 7 day Completion Time is based on the redundant ESW System capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem, the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period, and is consistent with the allowed Completion Time for restoring an inoperable Core Spray Loop, LPCI Pumps and Control Structure Chiller.

D.1 and D.2

If the ESW subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or both ESW subsystems are inoperable for reasons other than Condition A and B (i.e., three ESW pumps inoperable), the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.7.2.1

Verifying the correct alignment for each manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each ESW subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ESW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be automatically realigned to its accident position within the required time.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.7.2.1 (continued)

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that isolation of the ESW System to components or systems may render those components or systems inoperable, but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the ESW System. As such, when all ESW pumps, valves, and piping are OPERABLE, but a branch connection off the main header is isolated, the ESW System is still OPERABLE.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

SR 3.7.2.2

This SR verifies that the automatic valves of the ESW System will automatically switch to the safety or emergency position to provide cooling water exclusively to the safety related equipment during an accident event. This is demonstrated by the use of an actual or simulated initiation signal. This SR also verifies the automatic start capability of the ESW pumps in each subsystem.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, this Frequency is concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter 4.
 2. FSAR, Chapter 6.
 3. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132)
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B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the ECCS instrumentation is to initiate appropriate responses from the systems to ensure that the fuel is adequately cooled in the event of a design basis accident or transient.

For most anticipated operational occurrences and Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), a wide range of dependent and independent parameters are monitored.

The ECCS instrumentation actuates core spray (CS), low pressure coolant injection (LPCI), high pressure coolant injection (HPCI), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), the diesel generators (DGs) and other features described in the DG background. The equipment involved with each of these systems with exception of the DGs and other features, is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS—Operating."

Core Spray System

The CS System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level Low, Low, Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure - High concurrent with Reactor Pressure - Low. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four redundant instruments. The initiation logic for one CS loop is arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice network using level and pressure instruments which will generate a signal when:

- (1) both level sensors are tripped, or
- (2) two high drywell pressure sensors and two low reactor vessel pressure sensors are tripped, or
- (3) a combination of one channel of level sensor and one of the other channels of high drywell pressure sensor together with its associated low reactor vessel pressure sensor (i.e., Channel A level sensor and Channel C high drywell pressure sensor and low reactor vessel pressure sensor).

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND

Core Spray System (continued)

Once an initiation signal is received by the CS control circuitry, the signal is sealed in until manually reset. The logic can also be initiated by use of a manual push button (one push button per subsystem). Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the CS pumps are started 15 seconds after initiation signal if normal offsite power is available and 10.5 seconds after diesel generator power is available.

The CS test line isolation valve, which is also a primary containment isolation valve (PCIV), is closed on a CS initiation signal to allow full system flow assumed in the accident analyses and maintain primary containment isolated. The CS System also monitors the pressure in the reactor to ensure that, before the injection valves open, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below the CS System's maximum design pressure. The variable is monitored by four redundant instruments. The instrument outputs are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

Low Pressure Coolant Injection System

The LPCI is an operating mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, with two LPCI subsystems. The LPCI subsystems may be initiated by automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level Low, Low, Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure - High concurrent with Reactor Pressure - Low. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four instruments in two divisions. Each division is arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice network using level and pressure instruments which will generate a signal when:

- (1) both level sensors are tripped, or
- (2) two high drywell pressure sensors and two low reactor vessel pressure sensors are tripped, or
- (3) a combination of one channel of level sensor and one of the other channel of high drywell pressure sensor together with its associated low reactor vessel pressure sensor (i.e., Channel A level sensor and Channel C high drywell and low reactor vessel pressure sensor).

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND

Low Pressure Coolant Injection System (continued)

The initiation logic is cross connected between divisions (i.e., either start signal will start all four pumps and open both loop's injection valves). Once an initiation signal is received by the LPCI control circuitry, the signal is sealed in until manually reset. The cross division start signals for the pumps affect both the opposite division's start logic and the pump's 4KV breaker start logic. The cross division start signal to the opposite division's start logic is for improved reliability. The cross division start signals to the pump's 4KV breaker start logic is needed to ensure specific control power failures do not prevent the start of an adequate number of LPCI pumps.

Upon receipt of an initiation signal, all LPCI pumps start after a 3 second time delay when normal AC power is lost and standby diesel generator power is available. If normal power is available, LPCI pumps A and B will start immediately and pumps C and D will start 7.0 seconds after initiation signal to limit loading of the offsite sources.

The RHR test line and spray line are also isolated on a LPCI initiation signal to allow the full system flow assumed in the accident analyses and for those valves which are also PCIVs maintain primary containment isolated.

The LPCI System monitors the pressure in the reactor to ensure that, before an injection valve opens, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below the LPCI System's maximum design pressure. The variable is monitored by four redundant instruments. The instrument outputs are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

Logic is provided to close the recirculation pump discharge valves to ensure that LPCI flow does not bypass the core when it injects into the recirculation lines. The logic consists of an initiation signal (Low reactor water level and high drywell pressure in a one out of two taken twice logic) from both divisions of LPCI instruments and a pressure permissive. The pressure variable is monitored by four redundant instruments. The instrument outputs are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

High Pressure Coolant Injection System

The HPCI System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 or Drywell Pressure—High. Each of these variables is monitored by four redundant instruments. The instrument outputs are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic for each Function.

The HPCI System also monitors the water level in the condensate storage tank (CST). HPCI suction is normally maintained on the CST until it transfers to the suppression pool on low CST level or is manually transferred by the operator. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal source. Upon receipt of a HPCI initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position) unless the suppression pool suction valve is open. If the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. Two level switches are used to detect low water level in the CST. Either switch can cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction valve to close. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other automatically closes.

The HPCI provides makeup water to the reactor until the reactor vessel water level reaches the Reactor Vessel Water Level—High, Level 8 trip, at which time the HPCI turbine trips, which causes the turbine's stop valve, minimum flow valve, the cooling water isolation valve, and the injection valve to close. The logic is two-out-of-two to provide high reliability of the HPCI System. The HPCI System automatically restarts if a Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 signal is subsequently received.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Automatic Depressurization System

The ADS may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs when signals indicating Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1; Drywell Pressure—High or ADS Drywell Bypass Actuation Timer; confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3; and CS or LPCI Pump Discharge Pressure—High are all present and the ADS Initiation Timer has timed out. There are two instruments each for Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 and Drywell Pressure—High, and one instrument for confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 in each of the two ADS trip systems. Each of these instruments drives a relay whose contacts form the initiation logic.

Each ADS trip system includes a time delay between satisfying the initiation logic and the actuation of the ADS valves. The ADS Initiation Timer time delay setpoint is chosen to be long enough that the HPCI system has sufficient operating time to recover to a level above Level 1, yet not so long that the LPCI and CS Systems are unable to adequately cool the fuel if the HPCI fails to maintain that level. An alarm in the control room is annunciated when either of the timers is timing. Resetting the ADS initiation signals resets the ADS Initiation Timers. The ADS also monitors the discharge pressures of the four LPCI pumps and the four CS pumps. Each ADS trip system includes two discharge pressure permissive instruments from both CS pumps in the division and from either of the two LPCI pumps in the associated Division (i.e., Division 1 LPCI pumps A or C input to ADS trip system A, and Division 2 LPCI pumps B or D input to ADS trip system B). The signals are used as a permissive for ADS actuation, indicating that there is a source of core coolant available once the ADS has depressurized the vessel. With both CS pumps in a division or one of the LPCI pumps operating sufficient flow is available to permit automatic depressurization.

The ADS logic in each trip system is arranged in two strings. Each string has a contact from each of the following variables: Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1; Drywell Pressure—High; or Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer. One of the two strings in each trip system must also have a confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3. All contacts in both logic strings must close, the ADS initiation timer must time out, and a

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND

Automatic Depressurization System (continued)

loop of CS or LPCI pump discharge pressure signal must be present to initiate an ADS trip system. Either the A or B trip system will cause all the ADS relief valves to open. Once the Drywell Pressure—High signal, the ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer, or the ADS initiation signal is present, it is individually sealed in until manually reset.

Manual inhibit switches are provided in the control room for the ADS; however, their function is not required for ADS OPERABILITY (provided ADS is not inhibited when required to be OPERABLE).

Diesel Generators and Other Initiated Features

The DGs may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure—High. The DGs are also initiated upon loss of voltage signals (Refer to the Bases for LCO 3.3.8.1, "Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation," for a discussion of these signals.) The initiation logic is arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice network using level and pressure instruments which will generate a signal when:

- (1) both level sensors are tripped, or
- (2) both high drywell pressure sensors are tripped, or
- (3) a combination of one level sensor and one high drywell pressure sensor is tripped.

DGs A and B receive their initiation signal from CS system initiation logic Division I and Division II respectively. DGs C and D receive their initiation signals from either LPCI systems initiation logic Division I or Division II. The DGs can also be started manually from the control room and locally from the associated DG room. The DG initiation signal is a sealed in signal and must be manually reset. The DG initiation logic is reset by resetting the associated ECCS initiation logic. Upon receipt of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) initiation signal, each DG is automatically

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND

Diesel Generators and Other Initiated Features (continued)

started, is ready to load in approximately 10 seconds, and will run in standby conditions (rated voltage and speed, with the DG output breaker open). The DGs will only energize their respective Engineered Safety Feature buses if a loss of offsite power occurs. (Refer to Bases for LCO 3.3.8.1.).

In addition to DG initiation, the ECCS instrumentation initiates other design features. Signals from the CS System logic initiate (1) the reset of two Emergency Service Water (ESW) timers, (2) the reset of the degraded grid timers for the 4kV buses on both units, (3) LOCA load shed schemes, and (4) the trip of Drywell Cooling equipment. Signals from the LPCI System logic initiate (1) the reset of two Emergency Service Water (ESW) timers, (2) the trip of turbine building chillers, and (3) the trip of reactor building chillers. The ESW pump timer reset feature assures the ESW pumps do not start concurrently with the CS or LPCI pumps. If one or both ESW pump timer resets in a division or reactor building/turbine building chiller trips are inoperable; two offsite circuits with the 4kV buses aligned to their normal configuration are required to be OPERABLE. If one or both ESW pump timer resets in a division or reactor building/turbine building chiller trips are inoperable; the effects on one offsite circuit have not been analyzed; and therefore, the offsite circuit is assumed not to be capable of accepting the required loads during certain accident events. The ESW pump timer reset is not required in MODES 4 and 5 because concurrent pump starts, on a LOCA signal, of the ESW pumps (initiated by the DG start circuitry) with CS or LPCI pumps cannot occur in these MODES.

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The actions of the ECCS are explicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. The ECCS is initiated to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding by limiting the post LOCA peak cladding temperature to less than the 10 CFR 50.46 limits.

(continued)

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ECCS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the ECCS instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each ECCS subsystem must also respond within its assumed response time. Table 3.3.5.1-1, footnotes (b) and (c), are added to show that certain ECCS instrumentation Functions are also required to be OPERABLE to perform DG initiation and actuation of other Technical Specifications (TS) function.

Allowable Values are specified for each ECCS Function specified in the table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter reaches the setpoint, the associated device changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner

(continued)

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provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

An exception to the methodology described to derive the Allowable Value is the methodology used to determine the Allowable Values for the ECCS pump start time delays and HPCI CST Level 1 – Low. These Allowable Values are based on system calculations and/or engineering judgement which establishes a conservative limit at which the function should occur.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions that may require ECCS (or DG) initiation to mitigate the consequences of a design basis transient or accident. To ensure reliable ECCS and DG function, a combination of Functions is required to provide primary and secondary initiation signals. The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Systems

1.a, 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The low pressure ECCS and associated DGs are initiated at Level 1 to ensure that core spray and flooding functions are available to prevent or minimize fuel damage. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ECCS during the transients analyzed in References 2. In addition, the Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

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1.a. 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1
(continued)

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to allow time for the low pressure core flooding systems to activate and provide adequate cooling.

The initiation logic for LPCI pumps and injection valves is cross connected such that either division's start signal will start all four pumps and open both loop's injection valves. This cross division logic is required in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, redundancy in the initiation circuitry is not required. Therefore, in MODES 4 and 5 for LPCI, only one division of initiation logic is required.

DGs C and D which are initiated from the LPCI LOCA initiation are cross connected such that both DGs receive an initiation signal from both Divisions of the LPCI LOCA initiation circuitry. This cross connected logic is only required in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, redundancy in the DG initiation circuitry is not required. Therefore, in MODES 4 and 5 for DGs C and D only one division of ECCS initiation logic is required.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS or DG(s) are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS and DG initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS—Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems; LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources—Operating"; and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources—Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

(continued)

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1.b, 2.b. Drywell Pressure—High

High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The low pressure ECCS (provided a concurrent low reactor pressure signal is present) and associated DGs, without a concurrent low reactor pressure signal, are initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure—High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure—High Function, along with the Reactor Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function, is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as practical and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment. The Drywell Pressure—High Function is required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS or DG is required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Thus, four channels of the CS and LPCI Drywell Pressure—High Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS and DG initiation. In MODES 4 and 5, the Drywell Pressure—High Function is not required, since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the primary containment to Drywell Pressure—High setpoint. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems and to LCO 3.8.1 for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

1.c, 1.d, 2.c, 2.d Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—Low

Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. The low reactor pressure permissive is provided to prevent a high drywell pressure condition which is not accompanied by low reactor pressure, i.e. a false LOCA signal, from disabling two RHR pumps on the other unit. The low reactor steam dome pressure permissive also ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these

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1.c, 1.d, 2.c, 2.d Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—Low
(continued)

subsystems' maximum design pressure. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS during the transients analyzed in Reference 2. In addition, the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense the reactor dome pressure.

The pressure instruments are set to actuate between the Upper and Lower Allowable Values on decreasing reactor dome pressure.

The Upper Allowable Value is low enough to ensure that the reactor dome pressure has fallen to a value below the Core Spray and RHR/LPCI maximum design pressures to preclude overpressurization.

The Lower Allowable Value is high enough to ensure that the ECCS injection prevents the fuel peak cladding temperature from exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

DGs C and D which are initiated from the LPCI LOCA initiation are cross connected such that both DGs receive an initiation signal from both Divisions of the LPCI LOCA initiation circuitry. This cross connected logic is only required in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, redundancy in the DG initiation circuitry is not required. Therefore, in MODES 4 and 5 for DGs C and D only one division of ECCS initiation logic is required.

Four channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—Low Function are required to be OPERABLE only when the ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

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1.e, 2.f. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the appropriate ECCS logic to provide manual initiation capability and are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There is one push button for each of the CS and LPCI subsystems (i.e., two for CS and two for LPCI).

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the low pressure ECCS function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons. Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function (one channel per subsystem) is required to be OPERABLE only when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

**2.e. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—Low (Recirculation
Discharge Valve Permissive)**

Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for recirculation discharge and bypass valves closure. This ensures that the LPCI subsystems inject into the proper RPV location assumed in the safety analysis. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing the valves during the transients analyzed in Reference 2. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 2).

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—Low signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense the reactor dome pressure.

The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that the valves close prior to commencement of LPCI injection flow into the core, as assumed in the safety analysis.

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**2.e. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—Low (Recirculation
Discharge Valve Permissive) (continued)**

Four channels of the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 with the associated recirculation pump discharge valve open. With the valve(s) closed, the function instrumentation has been performed; thus, the Function is not required. In MODES 4 and 5, the loop injection location is not critical since LPCI injection through the recirculation loop in either direction will still ensure that LPCI flow reaches the core (i.e., there is no significant reactor steam dome back pressure).

HPCI System

3.a Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, the HPCI System is initiated at Level 2 to maintain level above the top of the active fuel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE analyzed in Reference 2. Additionally, the Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with HPCI is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 2).

The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The HPCI Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value is chosen to be consistent with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable value.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

(continued)

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3.b. Drywell Pressure—High

High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB. The HPCI System is initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure—High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure—High Function, along with the Reactor Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function, is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 4). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible to be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

Four channels of the Drywell Pressure—High Function are required to be OPERABLE when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for the Applicability Bases for the HPCI System.

3.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level—High, Level 8

High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventory exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no danger to the fuel. Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to trip the HPCI turbine to prevent overflow into the main steam lines (MSLs). The Reactor Vessel Water Level—High, Level 8 Function is not assumed in the accident and transient analyses. It was retained since it is a potentially significant contributor to risk.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—High, Level 8 signals for HPCI are initiated from two level instruments. Both Level 8 signals are required in order to trip HPCI. This ensures that no single instrument failure can preclude an HPCI initiation or trip. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—High, Level 8 Allowable Value is chosen to prevent flow from the HPCI System from overflowing into the MSLs.

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3.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level—High, Level 8 (continued)

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—High, Level 8 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

3.d. Condensate Storage Tank Level—Low

The Condensate Storage Tank-Low signal indicates that a conservatively calculated NPSH-available limit is being approached.

Normally the suction valves between HPCI and the CST are open and, upon receiving a HPCI initiation signal, water for HPCI injection would be taken from the CST. However, if the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. This ensures that an adequate suction head for the pump and an uninterrupted supply of makeup water is available to the HPCI pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valves must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes. The Function is implicitly assumed in the accident and transient analyses (which take credit for HPCI) since the analyses assume that the HPCI suction source is the suppression pool.

Condensate Storage Tank Level—Low signals are initiated from two level instruments. The logic is arranged such that either level switch can cause the suppression pool suction valves to open and the CST suction valve to close. The Condensate Storage Tank Level—Low Function Allowable Value is high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST.

Two channels of the Condensate Storage Tank Level—Low Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

(continued)

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3.e. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channel introduces signals into the HPCI logic to provide manual initiation capability and is redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There is one push button for the HPCI System.

(continued)

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3. e. Manual Initiation (continued)

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the HPCI function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push button.

One channel of the Manual Initiation Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the HPCI System is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

Automatic Depressurization System

4.a, 5.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accident analyzed in Reference 1. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Two channels input to ADS trip system A, while the other two channels input to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

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4.a, 5.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1
(continued)

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to allow time for the low pressure core flooding systems to initiate and provide adequate cooling.

4.b, 5.b Drywell Pressure – High

High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB. Therefore, ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure—High is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accidents analyzed in Reference 2. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Drywell Pressure—High signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

Four channels of Drywell Pressure—High Function are only required to be OPERABLE when ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Two channels input to ADS trip system A, while the other two channels input to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.c, 5.c. Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer

The purpose of the Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer is to delay depressurization of the reactor vessel to allow the HPCI System time to maintain reactor vessel water level. Since the rapid depressurization caused by ADS operation is one of the most severe transients on the reactor vessel, its occurrence should be limited. By delaying initiation of the ADS Function, the operator is given the chance to monitor the success or failure of the HPCI System to maintain water level, and then to decide whether or not to allow ADS to initiate, to delay initiation further by

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4.c. 5.c. Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer
(continued)

recycling the timer, or to inhibit initiation permanently. The Automatic Depressurization whether or not to allow ADS to initiate, to delay initiation. System Initiation Timer Function is assumed to be OPERABLE for the accident analyses of Reference 1 that require ECCS initiation and assume failure of the HPCI System.

There are two Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer relays, one in each of the two ADS trip systems. The Allowable Value for the Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer is chosen so that there is still time after depressurization for the low pressure ECCS subsystems to provide adequate core cooling.

Two channels of the Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. (One channel inputs to ADS trip system A, while the other channel inputs to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.d. 5.d. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function is used by the ADS only as a confirmatory low water level signal. ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 signals. In order to prevent spurious initiation of the ADS due to spurious Level 1 signals, a Level 3 signal must also be received before ADS initiation commences.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from two level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The Allowable Value for Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 is selected at the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value for convenience. Refer to LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," for the Bases discussion of this Function.

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4.d, 5.d. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 (continued)

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. One channel inputs to ADS trip system A, while the other channel inputs to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.e, 4.f, 5.e, 5.f. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Pressure - Low

The Pump Discharge Pressure—High signals from the CS and LPCI pumps are used as permissives for ADS initiation, indicating that there is a source of low pressure cooling water available once the ADS has depressurized the vessel. Pump Discharge Pressure—High is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting ADS initiation during the events analyzed in Reference 1 with an assumed HPCI failure. For these events the ADS depressurizes the reactor vessel so that the low pressure ECCS can perform the core cooling functions. This core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Pump discharge pressure signals are initiated from twelve pressure instruments, two on the discharge side of each of the four LPCI pumps and one on the discharge of each of CS pumps. In order to generate an ADS permissive in one trip system, it is necessary that only one LPCI pump or one CS subsystem indicate the high discharge pressure condition. The Pump Discharge Pressure—High Allowable Value is less than the pump discharge pressure when the pump is operating in a full flow mode and high enough to avoid any condition that results in a discharge pressure permissive when the CS and LPCI pumps are aligned for injection and the pumps are not running. The actual operating point of this function is not assumed in any transient or accident analysis.

Twelve channels of Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Pressure—High Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Two CS channels associated with CS pumps A and C and four LPCI channels associated with LPCI pumps A and C are required for trip system A. Two CS channels associated with CS pumps B and D and four LPCI channels

(continued)

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4.e, 4.f, 5.e, 5.f. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection
Pump Discharge Pressure – Low (continued)

associated with LPCI pumps B and D are required for trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.g, 5.g. Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure
Bypass Actuation Timer

One of the signals required for ADS initiation is Drywell Pressure—High. However, if the event requiring ADS initiation occurs outside the drywell (e.g., main steam line break outside containment), a high drywell pressure signal may never be present. Therefore, the Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer is used to bypass the Drywell Pressure—High Function after a certain time period has elapsed. Operation of the Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer Function is not assumed in any accident analysis. The instrumentation is retained in the TS because ADS is part of the primary success path for mitigation of a DBA.

There are four Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer relays, two in each of the two ADS trip systems. The Allowable Value for the Automatic Depressurization System Low Water Level Actuation Timer is chosen to ensure that there is still time after depressurization for the low pressure ECCS subsystems to provide adequate core cooling.

Four channels of the Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer Function are required to be OPERABLE only when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.h, 5.h. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the ADS logic to provide manual initiation capability and are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There are two push buttons for each ADS trip system for a total of four.

(continued)

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4.h, 5.h. Manual Initiation (continued)

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the ADS functions as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons. Four channels of the Manual Initiation Function (two channels per trip system) are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to ECCS instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable ECCS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable ECCS instrumentation channel.

A.1

Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

(continued)

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ACTIONS (continued)

B.1, B.2, and B.3

Required Actions B.1 and B.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s). Required Action B.1 features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c (e.g., low pressure ECCS). The Required Action B.2 system would be HPCI. For Required Action B.1, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if (a) one Function 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, or 2.b is inoperable and untripped with only one offsite source OPERABLE, or (b) one or more Function 1.a or Function 2.a channels in both divisions are inoperable and untripped, or (c) one or more Function 1.b or Function 2.b channels in both divisions are inoperable and untripped, or (d) one or more Function 1.c or Function 2.c channels in both divisions are inoperable and untripped.

For (a) above (Function 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, or 2.b is inoperable and untripped with only one offsite source OPERABLE), the ESW pump timer resets may not receive a reset signal and the Reactor Building chillers, Turbine Building chillers and the Drywell cooling equipment may not receive a trip signal. Without the reset of the ESW pump timers and without the trip of the Reactor Building and Turbine Building chillers, the OPERABLE offsite circuit may not be capable of accepting starts of the ESW pumps concurrently with CS or LPCI pumps. For this situation, both the OPERABLE offsite circuit and the DG, that would not be capable of starting, should be declared inoperable. ACTIONS required by LCO 3.8.1 "AC Sources Operating" or LCO 3.8.2 "AC Sources Shutdown" should be taken or disable the affected reactor building/turbine building chillers and disable the affected ESW pumps automatic initiation capability and take the ACTIONS required by LCO 3.7.2 "ESW System".

For the Drywell cooling equipment trip, inoperability of this feature would require that the associated drywell cooling fans be declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.6.3.2 "Drywell Air Flow System".

With two offsite sources OPERABLE and one Function 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a or 2.b inoperable and untripped, sufficient ECCS equipment is available to meet the design basis accident analyses.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

For (b), (c) and (d) above, for each Division, since each inoperable channel would have Required Action B.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected portion of the associated system of low pressure ECCS, DGs, and associated features to be declared inoperable. However, since channels in both Divisions are inoperable and untripped, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both subsystems, this results in the affected portions in the associated low pressure ECCS and DGs being concurrently declared inoperable.

For Required Action B.2, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function 3.a or two Function 3.b channels are inoperable and untripped in the same trip system. In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour allowance of Required Action B.3 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with the inoperable, untripped channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour. As noted (Note 1 to Required Action B.1), Required Action B.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the low pressure ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action B.3) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. There is no similar Note provided for Required Action B.2 since HPCI instrumentation is not required in MODES 4 and 5; thus, a Note is not necessary. Notes are also provided (Note 2 to Required Action B.1 and the Note to Required Action B.2) to

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

delineate which Required Action is applicable for each Function that requires entry into Condition B if an associated channel is inoperable. This ensures that the proper loss of initiation capability check is performed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that a redundant feature in both Divisions (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. For Required Action B.2, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCI System cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable, untripped channels for the associated Function in the same trip system. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action B.3. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

C.1 and C.2

Required Action C.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s).

Required Action C.1 features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.d, 2.d, and 2.e (i.e., low pressure ECCS). Redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if either (a) two or more Function 1.d channels are inoperable such that the trip system loses initiation capability, (b) two or more Function 2.d channels are inoperable in the same trip system such that the trip system loses initiation capability, or (c) two or more Function 2.e channels are inoperable affecting LPCI pumps in different subsystems. In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour allowance of Required Action C.2 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with the inoperable channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour. Since each inoperable channel would have Required Action C.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected portion of the associated system to be declared inoperable. However, since channels for both low pressure ECCS subsystems are inoperable (e.g., both CS subsystems), and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both subsystems, this results in the affected portions in both subsystems being concurrently declared inoperable. For Functions 1.d, 2.d, and 2.e, the affected portions are the associated low pressure ECCS pumps. As noted (Note 1), Required Action C.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of automatic initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5.

Note 2 states that Required Action C.1 is only applicable for Functions 1.d, 2.d, and 2.e. Required Action C.1 is not applicable to Functions 1.e, 2.f, and 3.f (which also require entry into this Condition if a channel in these Functions is inoperable), since they are the Manual Initiation Functions and are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed. Required Action C.1 is also not applicable to

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

Function 3.c (which also requires entry into this Condition if a channel in this Function is inoperable), since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function (two-out-of-two logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 3 and considered acceptable for the 24 hours allowed by Required Action C.2.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action C.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the same feature in both subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would either cause the initiation or it would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2

Required Action D.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic component initiation capability for the HPCI System. Automatic component initiation capability is lost if two Function 3.d channels are inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic suction swap), the 24 hour allowance of Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 is not appropriate and the HPCI

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 continued)

System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour after discovery of loss of HPCI initiation capability. A Note identifies that Required Action D.1 is only applicable if the HPCI pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool, since, if aligned, the Function is already performed. This allows the HPCI pump suction to be realigned to the Suppression Pool within 1 hour, if desired.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action D.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCI System cannot be automatically aligned to the suppression pool due to two inoperable, untripped channels in the same Function. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1 or the suction source must be aligned to the suppression pool per Required Action D.2.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip performs the intended function of the channel (shifting the suction source to the suppression pool). Performance of either of these two Required Actions will allow operation to continue. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2, Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken.

E.1 and E.2

Required Action E.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within similar ADS trip system A and B Functions result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the ADS. Redundant automatic initiation capability

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1 and E.2 (continued)

is lost if either (a) one Function 4.a channel and one Function 5.a channel are inoperable and untripped, (b) one Function 4.b channel and one Function 5.b channel are inoperable and untripped, or (c) one Function 4.d channel and one Function 5.d channel are inoperable and untripped.

In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 96 hour or 8 day allowance, as applicable, of Required Action E.2 is not appropriate and all ADS valves must be declared inoperable within 1 hour after discovery of loss of ADS initiation capability.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action E.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the ADS cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within similar ADS trip system Functions as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 8 days has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status if both HPCI and RCIC are OPERABLE. If either HPCI or RCIC is inoperable, the time is shortened to 96 hours. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 8 days to 96 hours, the 96 hours begins upon discovery of HPCI or RCIC inoperability. However, the total time for an inoperable, untripped channel cannot exceed 8 days. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 96 hours to 8 days, the "time zero" for beginning the 8 day "clock" begins upon discovery of the inoperable, untripped channel. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action E.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1 and E.2 (continued)

inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken.

F.1 and F.2

Required Action F.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within similar ADS trip system Functions result in automatic initiation capability being lost for the ADS. Automatic initiation capability is lost if either (a) one Function 4.c channel and one Function 5.c channel are inoperable, (b) a combination of Function 4.e, 4.f, 5.e, and 5.f channels are inoperable such that both ADS trip systems lose initiation capability, or (c) one or more Function 4.g channels and one or more Function 5.g channels are inoperable.

In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 96 hour or 8 day allowance, as applicable, of Required Action F.2 is not appropriate, and all ADS valves must be declared inoperable within 1 hour after discovery of loss of ADS initiation capability. The Note to Required Action F.1 states that Required Action F.1 is only applicable for Functions 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g, 5.c, 5.e, 5.f, and 5.g. Required Action F.1 is not applicable to Functions 4.h and 5.h (which also require entry into this Condition if a channel in these Functions is inoperable), since they are the Manual Initiation Functions and are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 96 hours or 8 days (as allowed by Required Action F.2) is allowed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action F.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the ADS cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within similar ADS trip system Functions as described in the paragraph above. The

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

F.1 and F.2 (continued)

1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 8 days has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status if both HPCI and RCIC are OPERABLE (Required Action F.2). If either HPCI or RCIC is inoperable, the time shortens to 96 hours. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 8 days to 96 hours, the 96 hours begins upon discovery of HPCI or RCIC inoperability. However, the total time for an inoperable channel cannot exceed 8 days. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 96 hours to 8 days, the "time zero" for beginning the 8 day "clock" begins upon discovery of the inoperable channel. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

G.1

With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the associated supported feature(s) may be incapable of performing the intended function, and those associated with inoperable untripped channels must be declared inoperable immediately.

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each ECCS instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)**

6 hours as follows: (a) for Function 3.c and 3.f; and (b) for Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function or redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 3) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ECCS will initiate when necessary.

In addition, for Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, and 2.b, the 6 hour allowance is acceptable provided both offsite sources are OPERABLE.

SR 3.3.5.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected channel failure is limited to 12 hours; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria which are determined by the plant staff based on an investigation of a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties may be used to support this parameter comparison and include indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit, and does not necessarily indicate the channel is Inoperable.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.5.1.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analyses of Reference 3.

This SR is modified by a Note that provides a general exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. This exception is necessary because the design of instrumentation does not facilitate functional testing of all required contacts of the relay which input into the combinational logic. (Reference 5) Performance of such a test could result in a plant transient or place the plant in an undo risk situation. Therefore, for this SR, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the change of state of the relay which inputs into the combinational logic. The required contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.5.1.5. This is acceptable because operating experience shows that the contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

SR 3.3.5.1.3 and SR 3.3.5.1.4

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check that verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.5.1.3 is based upon the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.5.1.4 is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.3.5.1.5

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.1, LCO 3.5.2, LCO 3.8.1, and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to complete testing of the assumed safety function. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST tests the operation of the initiation logic up to but not including the first contact which is unique to an individually supported feature such as the starting of a DG.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform portions of this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.3.
 2. FSAR, Chapter 15.
 3. NEDC-30936-P-A, "BWR Owners' Group Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation, Part 2," December 1988.
 4. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 32193).
 5. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9900: Technical Guidance, Standard Technical Specification Section 1.0 Definitions, Issue date 12/08/86.
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B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The primary containment isolation instrumentation automatically initiates closure of appropriate primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs). The function of the PCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). Primary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a DBA.

The isolation instrumentation includes the sensors, relays, and instruments that are necessary to cause initiation of primary containment and reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) isolation. When the setpoint is reached, the sensor actuates, which then outputs an isolation signal to the isolation logic. Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of independent parameters. The input parameters to the isolation logics are (a) reactor vessel water level, (b) area ambient and emergency cooler temperatures, (c) main steam line (MSL) flow measurement, (d) Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System initiation, (e) condenser vacuum, (f) main steam line pressure, (g) high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) steam line Δ pressure, (h) SGTs Exhaust radiation, (i) HPCI and RCIC steam line pressure, (j) HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure, (k) reactor water cleanup (RWCU) differential flow and high flow, (l) reactor steam dome pressure, and (m) drywell pressure. Redundant sensor input signals from each parameter are provided for initiation of isolation. The only exception is SLC System initiation. In addition, manual isolation of the logics is provided.

Primary containment isolation instrumentation has inputs to the trip logic of the isolation functions listed below.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

1. Main Steam Line Isolation

Most MSL Isolation Functions receive inputs from four channels. The outputs from these channels are combined in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation of all main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). The outputs from the same channels are arranged into two two-out-of-two logic trip systems to isolate all MSL drain valves. The MSL drain line has two isolation valves with one two-out-of-two logic system associated with each valve.

The exceptions to this arrangement are the Main Steam Line Flow—High Function. The Main Steam Line Flow—High Function uses 16 flow channels, four for each steam line. One channel from each steam line inputs to one of the four trip strings. Two trip strings make up each trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an MSL isolation. Each trip string has four inputs (one per MSL), any one of which will trip the trip string. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. This is effectively a one-out-of-eight taken twice logic arrangement to initiate isolation of the MSIVs. Similarly, the 16 flow channels are connected into two two-out-of-two logic trip systems (effectively, two one-out-of-four twice logic), with each trip system isolating one of the two MSL drain valves.

2. Primary Containment Isolation

Most Primary Containment Isolation Functions receive inputs from four channels. The outputs from these channels are arranged into two two-out-of-two logic trip systems. One trip system initiates isolation of all inboard primary containment isolation valves, while the other trip system initiates isolation of all outboard primary containment isolation valves. Each logic closes one of the two valves on each penetration, so that operation of either logic isolates the penetration.

The exceptions to this arrangement are as follows. Hydrogen and Oxygen Analyzers which isolate Division I Analyzer on a Division I isolation signal, and Division II Analyzer on a Division II isolation signal. This is to ensure monitoring capability is not lost. Chilled Water to recirculation pumps and Liquid Radwaste Collection System isolation valves where both inboard and outboard valves will isolate on either

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND

2. Primary Containment Isolation (continued)

division providing the isolation signal. Traversing incore probe ball valves and the instrument gas to the drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breakers only have one isolation valve and receives a signal from only one division.

3., 4. High Pressure Coolant Injection System Isolation and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Isolation

Most Functions that isolate HPCI and RCIC receive input from two channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. Each of the two trip systems in each isolation group is connected to one of the two valves on each associated penetration.

The exceptions are the HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure—High and Steam Supply Line Pressure—Low Functions. These Functions receive inputs from four turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure and four steam supply pressure channels for each system. The outputs from the turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure and steam supply pressure channels are each connected to two two-out-of-two trip systems. Each trip system isolates one valve per associated penetration.

5. Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Isolation Function receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels. The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels are connected into two two-out-of-two trip systems. The Differential Flow—High, Flow—High, and SLC System Initiation Functions receive input from two channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. The temperature isolations are divided into three Functions. These Functions are Pump Area, Penetration Area, and Heat Exchanger Area. Each area is monitored by two temperature monitors, one for each trip system. These are configured so that any one input will trip the associated trip system. Each of the two trip systems is connected to one of the two valves on each RWCU penetration.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels. The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels are connected to two two-out-of-two trip systems. The Reactor Vessel Pressure—High Function receives input from two channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. Each of the two trip systems is connected to one of the two valves on each shutdown cooling penetration.

7. Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Isolation Function receives input from two reactor vessel water level channels. The Drywell Pressure-High Isolation Function receives input from two drywell pressure channels. The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels and drywell pressure channels are connected into one two-out-of-two logic trip system.

When either Isolation Function actuates, the TIP drive mechanisms will withdraw the TIPs, if inserted, and close the inboard TIP System isolation ball valves when the proximity probe senses the TIPs are withdrawn into the shield. The TIP System isolation ball valves are only open when the TIP System is in use. The outboard TIP System isolation valves are manual shear valves.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

The isolation signals generated by the primary containment isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closure of valves to limit offsite doses. Refer to LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)," Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for more detail of the safety analyses.

Primary containment isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref. 8) Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

The OPERABILITY of the primary containment instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints. The OPERABILITY of the primary containment instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time, where appropriate.

Allowable Values are specified for each Primary Containment Isolation Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL

CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter reaches the setpoint, the associated device changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 consistent with the Applicability for LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment." Functions that have different Applicabilities are discussed below in the individual Functions discussion.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

The penetrations which are isolated by the below listed functions can be determined by referring to the PCIV Table found in the Bases of LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves."

Main Steam Line Isolation

1.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of the MSIVs and other interfaces with the reactor vessel occurs to prevent offsite dose limits from being exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function is one of the many Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation signals.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function associated with isolation is assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The isolation of the MSLs on Level 1 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded for a DBA.

Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 1 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1) to ensure that the MSLs isolate on a potential loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to prevent offsite doses from exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits.

(continued)

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1.b. Main Steam Line Pressure—Low

Low MSL pressure indicates that there may be a problem with the turbine pressure regulation, which could result in a low reactor vessel water level condition and the RPV cooling down more than 100°F/hr if the pressure loss is allowed to continue. The Main Steam Line Pressure—Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the pressure regulator failure (Ref. 2). For this event, the closure of the MSIVs ensures that the RPV temperature change limit (100°F/hr) is not reached. In addition, this Function supports actions to ensure that Safety Limit 2.1.1.1 is not exceeded. (This Function closes the MSIVs prior to pressure decreasing below 785 psig, which results in a scram due to MSIV closure, thus reducing reactor power to < 25% RTP.)

The MSL low pressure signals are initiated from four instruments that are connected to the MSL header. The instruments are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, each instrument is able to detect low MSL pressure. Four channels of Main Steam Line Pressure—Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Main Steam Line Pressure—Low trip will only occur after a 500 milli-second time delay to prevent any spurious isolations.

The Allowable Value was selected to be high enough to prevent excessive RPV depressurization. The Main Steam Line Pressure—Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 since this is when the assumed transient can occur (Ref. 2).

1.c. Main Steam Line Flow—High

Main Steam Line Flow—High is provided to detect a break of the MSL and to initiate closure of the MSIVs. If the steam were allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor would depressurize and the core could uncover. If the RPV water level decreases too far, fuel damage could occur. Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The Main Steam Line Flow—High Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the main steam line break (MSLB) (Ref. 1). The isolation action, along with the scram function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak

(continued)

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1.c. Main Steam Line Flow—High (continued)

cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46 and offsite doses do not exceed the 10 CFR 100 limits.

The MSL flow signals are initiated from 16 instruments that are connected to the four MSLs. The instruments are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, all four connected to one MSL would be able to detect the high flow. Four channels of Main Steam Line Flow—High Function for each unisolated MSL (two channels per trip system) are available and are required to be OPERABLE so that no single instrument failure will preclude detecting a break in any individual MSL.

1.d. Condenser Vacuum—Low

The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded due to the break.

The Condenser Vacuum—Low Function is provided to prevent overpressurization of the main condenser in the event of a loss of the main condenser vacuum. Since the integrity of the condenser is an assumption in offsite dose calculations, the Condenser Vacuum—Low Function is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating closure of the MSIVs. The closure of the MSIVs is initiated to prevent the addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the diaphragm installed to protect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident.

Condenser vacuum pressure signals are derived from four pressure instruments that sense the pressure in the condenser. Four channels of Condenser Vacuum—Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is chosen to prevent damage to the condenser due to pressurization, thereby ensuring its integrity for offsite dose analysis. As noted (footnote (a) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 when all main turbine stop valves (TSVs) are closed, since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. Switches are provided to manually bypass the channels when all TSVs are closed.

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(continued)**

1.e. Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature—High

Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel temperature is provided to detect a leak in the RCPB and provides diversity to the high flow instrumentation. The isolation occurs when a very small leak has occurred. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. However, credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as MSLBs.

Area temperature signals are initiated from thermocouples located in the area being monitored. Four channels of Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The reactor building main steam tunnel temperature trip will only occur after a one second time delay.

The temperature monitoring Allowable Value is chosen to detect a leak equivalent to approximately 25 gpm of water.

1.f. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the MSL isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the MODES in which the MSL isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

(continued)

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Primary Containment Isolation

2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown.

2.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 2 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and

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2.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 (continued)

are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA.

2.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 1 supports actions to ensure the offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 1 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1) to ensure that the associated penetrations isolate on a potential loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to prevent offsite doses from exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits.

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2.d. Drywell Pressure—High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment. The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Drywell Pressure—High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the FSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure instruments that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of Drywell Pressure—High per Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure—High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

2.e. SGTS Exhaust Radiation—High

High SGTS Exhaust radiation indicates possible gross failure of the fuel cladding. Therefore, when SGTS Exhaust Radiation High is detected, an isolation is initiated to limit the release of fission products. However, this Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the FSAR because other leakage paths (e.g., MSIVs) are more limiting.

The SGTS Exhaust radiation signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located in the SGTS Exhaust. Two channels of SGTS Exhaust Radiation—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is low enough to promptly detect gross failures in the fuel cladding.

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(continued)

2.f. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the primary containment isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the MODES in which the Primary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation
Cooling Systems Isolation

3.a., 4.a. HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Δ Pressure—High

Steam Line Δ Pressure High Functions are provided to detect a break of the RCIC or HPCI steam lines and initiate closure of the steam line isolation valves of the appropriate system. If the steam is allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor will depressurize and the core can uncover. Therefore, the isolations are initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for these Functions is not assumed in any FSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks. However, these instruments prevent the RCIC or HPCI steam line breaks from becoming bounding.

The HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Δ Pressure — High signals are initiated from instruments (two for HPCI and two for RCIC) that are connected

(continued)

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3.a., 4.a. HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Δ Pressure—High (continued)

to the system steam lines. Two channels of both HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Δ pressure—High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The steam line Δ Pressure - High will only occur after a 3 second time delay to prevent any spurious isolations.

The Allowable Values are chosen to be low enough to ensure that the trip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLB event as the bounding event, and high enough to be above the maximum transient steam flow during system startup.

3.b., 4.b. HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure—Low

Low MSL pressure indicates that the pressure of the steam in the HPCI or RCIC turbine may be too low to continue operation of the associated system's turbine. These isolations are for equipment protection and are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR. However, they also provide a diverse signal to indicate a possible system break. These instruments are included in Technical Specifications (TS) because of the potential for risk due to possible failure of the instruments preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref. 3).

The HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure—Low signals are initiated from instruments (four for HPCI and four for RCIC) that are connected to the system steam line. Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure—Low Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are selected to be high enough to prevent damage to the system's turbine.

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3.c., 4.c. HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm
Pressure—High

High turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure indicates that a release of steam into the associated compartment is possible. That is, one of two exhaust diaphragms has ruptured. These isolations are to prevent steam from entering the associated compartment and are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR. These instruments are included in the TS because of the potential for risk due to possible failure of the instruments preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref. 3).

The HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure—High signals are initiated from instruments (four for HPCI and four for RCIC) that are connected to the area between the rupture diaphragms on each system's turbine exhaust line. Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure—High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values is low enough to identify a high turbine exhaust pressure condition resulting from a diaphragm rupture, or a leak in the diaphragm adjacent to the exhaust line and high enough to prevent inadvertent system isolation.

3.d., 4.d. Drywell Pressure—High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB. The HPCI and RCIC isolation of the turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line is provided to prevent communication with the wetwell when high drywell pressure exists. A potential leakage path exists via the turbine exhaust. The isolation is delayed until the system becomes unavailable for injection (i.e., low steam supply line pressure). The isolation of the HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line by Drywell Pressure—High is indirectly assumed in the FSAR accident analysis because the turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line leakage path is not assumed to contribute to offsite doses and is provided for long term containment isolation.

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3.d., 4.d. Drywell Pressure—High (continued)

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure instruments that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Drywell Pressure—High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure—High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this is indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

**3.e., 3.f., 3.g., 4.e., 4.f., 4.g., HPCI and RCIC Area and
Emergency Cooler Temperature—High**

HPCI and RCIC Area and Emergency Cooler temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the associated system steam piping. The isolation occurs when a small leak has occurred and is diverse to the high flow instrumentation. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. These Functions are not assumed in any FSAR transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or MSL breaks.

Area and Emergency Cooler Temperature—High signals are initiated from thermocouples that are appropriately located to protect the system that is being monitored. Two instruments monitor each area. Two channels for each HPCI and RCIC Area and Emergency Cooler Temperature—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The HPCI and RCIC Pipe Routing area temperature trips will only occur after a 15 minute time delay to prevent any spurious temperature isolations due to short temperature increases and allows operators sufficient time to determine which system is leaking. The other ambient temperature trips will only occur after a one second time delay to prevent any spurious temperature isolations.

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3.e., 3.f., 3.g., 4.e., 4.f., 4.g., HPCI and RCIC Area and
Emergency Cooler Temperature—High (continued)

The Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm, and high enough to avoid trips at expected operating temperature.

3.h., 4.h. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the HPCI and RCIC systems' isolation logics that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for these Functions. They are retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is one manual initiation push button for each of the HPCI and RCIC systems. One isolation pushbutton per system will introduce an isolation to one of the two trip systems. There is no Allowable Value for these Functions, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of both HPCI and RCIC Manual Initiation Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since these are the MODES in which the HPCI and RCIC systems' Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation

5.a. RWCU Differential Flow—High

The high differential flow signal is provided to detect a break in the RWCU System. This will detect leaks in the RWCU System when area temperature would not provide detection (i.e., a cold leg break). Should the reactor coolant continue to flow out of the break, offsite dose limits may be exceeded. Therefore, isolation of the RWCU System is initiated when high differential flow is sensed to prevent exceeding offsite doses. A 45 second time delay is provided to prevent spurious trips during most RWCU operational transients. This Function is not assumed in any

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5.a. RWCU Differential Flow—High (continued)

FSAR transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as MSLBs.

The high differential flow signals are initiated from instruments that are connected to the inlet (from the recirculation suction) and outlets (to condenser and feedwater) of the RWCU System. Two channels of Differential Flow—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Differential Flow—High Allowable Value ensures that a break of the RWCU piping is detected.

5.b, 5.c, 5.d RWCU Area Temperatures—High

RWCU area temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the RWCU System. The isolation occurs even when small leaks have occurred and is diverse to the high differential flow instrumentation for the hot portions of the RWCU System. If the small leak continues without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. Credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or MSL breaks.

Area temperature signals are initiated from temperature elements that are located in the area that is being monitored. Six thermocouples provide input to the Area Temperature—High Function (two per area). Six channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The area temperature trip will only occur after a one second time to prevent any spurious temperature isolations.

The Area Temperature—High Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm.

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5.e. SLC System Initiation

The isolation of the RWCU System is required when the SLC System has been initiated to prevent dilution and removal of the boron solution by the RWCU System (Ref. 4). SLC System initiation signals are initiated from the two SLC pump start signals.

There is no Allowable Value associated with this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the SLC System initiation switch.

Two channels (one from each pump) of the SLC System Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE only in MODES 1 and 2, since these are the only MODES where the reactor can be critical, with the exception of Special Operations LCO 3.10.8, and these MODES are consistent with the Applicability for the SLC System (LCO 3.1.7).

As noted (footnote (b) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), this Function is only required to close the outboard RWCU isolation valve trip systems.

5.f. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some interfaces with the reactor vessel occurs to isolate the potential sources of a break. The isolation of the RWCU System on Level 2 supports actions to ensure that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with RWCU isolation is not directly assumed in the FSAR safety analyses because the RWCU System line break is bounded by breaks of larger systems (recirculation and MSL breaks are more limiting).

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of

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5.f. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 (continued)

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

5.g. RWCU Flow - High

RWCU Flow—High Function is provided to detect a break of the RWCU System. Should the reactor coolant continue to flow out of the break, offsite dose limits may be exceeded. Therefore, isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for this Function is not assumed in any FSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks.

The RWCU Flow—High signals are initiated from two instruments. Two channels of RWCU Flow—High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The RWCU flow trip will only occur after a second time delay to prevent spurious trips.

The Allowable Value is chosen to be low enough to ensure that the trip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLB event as the bounding event.

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5.h. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the RWCU System isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since these are the MODES in which the RWCU System Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

6.a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High Function is provided to isolate the shutdown cooling portion of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. This interlock is provided only for equipment protection to prevent an intersystem LOCA scenario, and credit for the interlock is not assumed in the accident or transient analysis in the FSAR.

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High signals are initiated from two instruments. Two channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the only MODES in which the reactor can be pressurized with the exception of Special Operations LCO 3.10.1; thus, equipment protection is needed. The Allowable Value was chosen to be low enough to protect the system equipment from overpressurization.

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6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some reactor vessel interfaces occurs to begin isolating the potential sources of a break. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function associated with RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation is not directly assumed in safety analyses because a break of the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is bounded by breaks of the recirculation and MSL.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak (e.g., pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR Shutdown Cooling System.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. As noted (footnote (c) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), only two channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 (and must input into the same trip system), provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity is maintained. System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that has the potential for draining the reactor vessel through the system.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel.

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6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 (continued)

In MODES 1 and 2, another isolation (i.e., Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path.

6.c Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals to RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation logic that is redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5, since these are the MODES in which the RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation automatic Function are required to be OPERABLE.

Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation

7.a Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
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LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

7.a Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 (continued)

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can initiate an inadvertent isolation actuation. The isolation function is ensured by the manual shear valve in each penetration.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown.

7.b. Drywell Pressure - High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment. The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Drywell Pressure - High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the FSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell. Two channels of Drywell Pressure - High per Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can initiate an inadvertent actuation. The isolation function is ensured by the manual shear valve in each penetration.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure - High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated. Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to primary containment isolation instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

A.1

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours for Functions 2.a, 2.d, 6.b, 7.a and 7.b and 24 hours for Functions other than Functions 2.a, 2.d, 6.b, 7.a and 7.b has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 5 and 6) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation), Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic isolation capability being lost for the associated penetration flow path(s). The MSL Isolation Functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. The other isolation functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that one of the two PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path can receive an isolation signal from the given Function. For Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.d, and 1.e, this would require both trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. For Function 1.c, this would require both trip systems to have one channel, associated with each MSL, OPERABLE or in trip. Therefore, this would require both trip systems to have one channel per location OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, 3.b, 3.c, 3.d, 4.b, 4.c, 4.d, 5.f, and 6.b, this would require one trip system to have two channels, each OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 2.e, 3.a, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g, 4.a, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g, 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 5.d, 5.e, 5.g, and 6.a, this would require one trip system to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. The Condition does not include the Manual Initiation Functions (Functions 1.f, 2.f, 3.h, 4.h, 5.h, and 6.c), since they are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action A.1) is allowed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

C.1

Required Action C.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1 is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A or B and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours (Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2). Alternately, the associated MSLs may be isolated (Required Action D.1), and, if allowed (i.e., plant safety analysis allows operation with an MSL isolated), operation with that MSL isolated may continue. Isolating the affected MSL accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channel. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 6 hours.

The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the affected penetration flow path(s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels.

If it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the penetration flow path(s) could result in a reactor scram), Condition H must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for plant operations personnel to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s).

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

G.1

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the affected penetration flow path(s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels. The 24 hour Completion Time is acceptable due to the fact that these Functions are either not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the FSAR (Manual Initiation) or, in the case of the TIP System isolation, the TIP System penetration is a small bore (0.280 inch), its isolation in a design basis event (with loss of offsite power) would be via the manually operated shear valves, and the ability to manually isolate by either the normal isolation valve or the shear valve is unaffected by the inoperable instrumentation. It should be noted, however, that the TIP System is powered from an auxiliary instrumentation bus which has an uninterruptible power supply and hence, the TIP drive mechanisms and ball valve control will still function in the event of a loss of offsite power. Alternately, if it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the penetration flow path(s) could result in a reactor scram), Condition H must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

H.1 and H.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, or any Required Action of Condition F or G is not met and the associated Completion Time has expired, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

I.1 and I.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated SLC subsystem(s) is declared inoperable or the RWCU System is isolated. Since this Function is required to ensure that the SLC System performs its intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated SLC subsystems inoperable or isolating the RWCU System.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

I.1 and I.2 (continued)

The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCU System.

J.1 and J.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path should be closed. However, if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to isolate the RHR Shutdown Cooling System (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the penetration flow path can be isolated). Actions must continue until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status or the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is isolated.

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 5 and 6) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) when necessary.

SR 3.3.6.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.3.6.1.1 (continued)

channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria which are determined by the plant staff based on an investigation of a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties may be used to support this parameter comparison and include indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit, and does not necessarily indicate the channel is Inoperable.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.6.1.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.

The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.2 is based on the reliability analysis described in References 5 and 6.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 provides a general exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. This exception is necessary because the design of instrumentation does not facilitate functional testing of all required contacts of the relays which input into the combinational logic. (Reference 11) Performance of such a test could result in a plant transient or place the plant in an undo risk situation. Therefore, for this SR, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the change of state of the relay which inputs into the combinational logic. The required contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC

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BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.3.6.1.2 (continued)

SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.6.1.5. This is acceptable because operating experience shows that the contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

Note 2 provides a second specific exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. For Functions 2.e, 3.a, and 4.a, certain channel relays are not included in the performance of the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. These exceptions are necessary because the circuit design does not facilitate functional testing of the entire channel through to the coil of the relay which enters the combinational logic. (Reference 11) Specifically, testing of all required relays would require rendering the affected system (i.e., HPCI or RCIC) inoperable, or require lifting of leads and inserting test equipment which could lead to unplanned transients. Therefore, for these circuits, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the actuation of circuit devices up to the point where further testing could result in an unplanned transient. (References 10 and 12) The required relays not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.6.1.5. This exception is acceptable because operating experience shows that the devices not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

SR 3.3.6.1.3 and SR 3.3.6.1.4

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.3 is based on the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. The Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.4 is based on the assumption of an 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

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**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.3.6.1.3 and SR 3.3.6.1.4 (continued)

It should be noted that some of the Primary Containment High Drywell pressure instruments, although only required to be calibrated as a 24 month Frequency, are calibrated quarterly based on the TS requirements.

SR 3.3.6.1.5

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed on PCIVs in LCO 3.6.1.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform portions of this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.6.1.6

This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Testing is performed only on channels where the guidance given in Reference 9 could not be met, which identified that degradation of response time can usually be detected by other surveillance tests.

As stated in Note 1, the response time of the sensors for Function 1.b is excluded from ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME testing. Because the vendor does not provide a design instrument response time, a penalty value to account for the sensor response time is included in determining total channel response time. The penalty value is based on the historical performance of the sensor. (Reference 13) This allowance is supported by Reference 9 which determined that significant degradation of the sensor channel response time can be detected during performance of other Technical Specification SRs and that the sensor response time is a small part of the overall ISOLATION RESPONSE TIME testing.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.6.1.6 (continued)

Function 1.a and 1.c channel sensors and logic components are excluded from response time testing in accordance with the provisions of References 14 and 15.

As stated in Note 2, response time testing of isolating relays is not required for Function 5.a. This allowance is supported by Reference 9. These relays isolate their respective isolation valve after a nominal 45 second time delay in the circuitry. No penalty value is included in the response time calculation of this function. This is due to the historical response time testing results of relays of the same manufacturer and model number being less than 100 milliseconds, which is well within the expected accuracy of the 45 second time delay relay.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 7. This test may be performed in one measurement, or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are tested.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience that shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.3.
2. FSAR, Chapter 15.
3. NEDO-31466, "Technical Specification Screening Criteria Application and Risk Assessment," November 1987.
4. FSAR, Section 4.2.3.4.3.
5. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," July 1990.

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BASES

REFERENCES
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6. NEDC-30851P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.
 7. FSAR, Table 7.3-29.
 8. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132)
 9. NEDO-32291P-A "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.
 10. PPL Letter to NRC, PLA-2618, Response to NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-387/85-28 AND 50-388/85-23, dated April 22, 1986.
 11. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9900: Technical Guidance, Standard Technical Specification Section 1.0 Definitions, Issue date 12/08/86:
 12. Susquehanna Steam Electric Station NRC REGION I COMBINED INSPECTION 50-387/90-20; 50-388/90-20, File R41-2, dated March 5, 1986.
 13. NRC Safety Evaluation Report related to Amendment No. 171 for License No. NPF-14 and Amendment No. 144 for License No. NPF-22.
 14. NEDO 32291-A, Supplement 1 "System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1999.
 15. NEDO 32291, Supplement 1, Addendum 2, "System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," September 5, 2003.
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B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND. The secondary containment isolation instrumentation automatically initiates closure of appropriate secondary containment isolation valves (SCIVs) and starts the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System. The function of these systems, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1). Secondary containment isolation and establishment of vacuum with the SGT System within the assumed time limits ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment following a DBA, or are released outside primary containment, or are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE are maintained within applicable limits.

The isolation instrumentation includes the sensors, relays, and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of secondary containment isolation. When the setpoint is reached, the channel sensor actuates, which then outputs a secondary containment isolation signal to the isolation logic. Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of independent parameters. The input parameters to the isolation logic are (1) reactor vessel water level, (2) drywell pressure, (3) refuel floor high exhaust duct radiation - high, (4) refuel floor wall exhaust duct radiation - high, and (5) railroad access shaft exhaust duct radiation - high. Only appropriate ventilation zones are isolated for different isolation signals. Isolation signals for drywell pressure and vessel water level will isolate the affected Unit's zone (Zone I for Unit 1 and Zone II for Unit 2) and Zone III. Redundant sensor input signals from each parameter are provided for initiation of isolation. In addition, manual initiation of the logic is provided.

The Functions are arranged as follows for each trip system. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 and Drywell Pressure - High are each arranged in a two-out-of-two logic. The Refuel Floor High Exhaust Duct Radiation - High, Refuel Floor Wall Exhaust Duct Radiation - High and the Railroad Access Shaft Exhaust Duct Radiation - High are arranged into one-out-of-one trip systems. One trip

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BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

system initiates isolation of one automatic isolation valve (damper) and starts one SGT subsystem (including its associated reactor building recirculation subsystem) while the other trip system initiates isolation of the other automatic isolation valve in the penetration and starts the other SGT subsystem (including its associated reactor building recirculation subsystem). Each logic closes one of the two valves on each penetration and starts one SGT subsystem, so that operation of either logic isolates the secondary containment and provides for the necessary filtration of fission products.

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The isolation signals generated by the secondary containment isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closure of valves and start the SGT System to limit offsite doses.

Refer to LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for more detail of the safety analyses.

The secondary containment isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref. 7) Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions. Each Function must have the required number of OPERABLE channels with their setpoints set within the specified Allowable Values, as shown in Table 3.3.6.2-1. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time, where appropriate.

Allowable Values are specified for each Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.

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**APPLICABLE
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APPLICABILITY,
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Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter reaches the setpoint, the associated device changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip SAFETY ANALYSES, setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions when SCIVs and the SGT System are required.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation and initiation signals. The isolation and initiation systems on Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 support actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water

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BASES

**APPLICABLE
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LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 (continued)

level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the High Pressure Coolant Injection/Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (HPCI/RCIC) Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1 and LCO 3.3.5.2), since this could indicate that the capability to cool the fuel is being threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS); thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, this Function is not required. In addition, the Function is also required to be OPERABLE during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) because the capability of isolating potential sources of leakage must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded if core damage occurs.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 will isolate the affected Unit's zone (i.e., Zone I for Unit 1 and Zone II for Unit 2) and Zone III.

2. Drywell Pressure—High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The isolation on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis. However, the Drywell Pressure—High Function associated with

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2. Drywell Pressure - High (continued)

isolation is not assumed in any FSAR accident or transient analyses. It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure instruments that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of Drywell Pressure—High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude performance of the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure—High Function Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1) since this is indicative of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

The Drywell Pressure—High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the RCS; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. This Function is not required in MODES 4 and 5 because the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES.

Drywell Pressure - High will isolate the affected Unit's zone (i.e., Zone I for Unit 1 and Zone II for Unit 2) and Zone III.

3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Refuel Floor High Exhaust Duct, Refuel Floor Wall Exhaust Duct, and Railroad Access Shaft Exhaust Duct Radiation—High

High secondary containment exhaust radiation is an indication of possible gross failure of the fuel cladding due to a fuel handling accident. When Exhaust Radiation—High is detected, secondary containment isolation and actuation of the SGT System are initiated to limit the release of fission products as assumed in the FSAR safety analyses (Ref. 4).

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**3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Refuel Floor High Exhaust Duct, Refuel Floor Wall Exhaust
Duct, and Railroad Access Shaft Exhaust Duct Radiation—High**
(continued)

The Exhaust Radiation—High signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located on the ventilation exhaust ductwork coming from the refueling floor zones and the Railroad Access Shaft. The signal from each detector is input to an individual monitor whose trip outputs are assigned to an isolation channel. Eight channels of Refuel Floor High Exhaust Duct and Wall Exhaust Duct Radiation—High Function (four from Unit 1 and four from Unit 2) and two channels of Railroad Access Shaft Exhaust Duct Radiation - High Function (both from Unit 1) are available to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding.

The Refuel Floor Exhaust Radiation—High Functions are required to be OPERABLE during CORE ALTERATIONS, OPDRVs, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to a fuel handling accident) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded.

The Railroad Access Shaft Exhaust Duct Radiation - High Function is only required to be OPERABLE during handling of irradiated fuel within the Railroad Access Shaft, and above the Railroad Access Shaft with the Railroad Access Shaft Equipment Hatch open. This provides the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures resulting from dropped fuel assemblies which ensures that offsite dose limits are not exceeded.

Refuel Floor High and Wall Exhaust Duct and Railroad Access Shaft Exhaust Duct Radiation - High Functions will isolate Zone III of secondary containment.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

8. Manual Initiation

A Manual Initiation can be performed for secondary containment isolation by initiating a Primary Containment Isolation. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, and during CORE ALTERATIONS, OPDRVs, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. These are the MODES and other specified conditions in which the Secondary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours for Function 2, and 24 hours for Functions other than Function 2, has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 5 and 6) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation), Condition C must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic isolation capability for the associated penetration flow path(s) or a complete loss of automatic initiation capability for the SGT System. A Function is considered to be maintaining secondary containment isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that one of the two SCIVs in the associated penetration flow path and one SGT subsystem (including its associated reactor building recirculation subsystem) can be initiated on an isolation signal from the given Function.

For the Functions with two logic trip systems (Functions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7), this would require one trip system to have the required channel(s) OPERABLE or in trip. The Condition does not include the Manual Initiation Function (Function 8), since it is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action A.1) is allowed.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

C.1, C.2.1, and C.2.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met, the ability to isolate the secondary containment and start the SGT System cannot be ensured. Therefore, further actions must be performed to ensure the ability to maintain the secondary containment function. Isolating the associated zone (closing the ventilation supply and exhaust automatic isolation dampers) and starting the associated SGT subsystem (including its associated reactor building recirculation subsystem) in the emergency mode (Required Action C.1) performs the intended function of the instrumentation and allows operation to continue.

Alternately, declaring the associated SCIVs and SGT subsystem(s) (including its associated reactor building recirculation subsystem) inoperable (Required Actions C.2.1 and C.2.2) is also acceptable since the Required Actions of the respective LCOs (LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3) provide appropriate actions for the inoperable components.

One hour is sufficient for plant operations personnel to establish required plant conditions or to declare the associated components inoperable without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Secondary Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.2-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains secondary containment isolation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)**

channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 5 and 6) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the SCIVs will isolate the associated penetration flow paths and that the SGT System will initiate when necessary.

SR 3.3.6.2.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria which are determined by the plant staff based on an investigation of a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties may be used to support this parameter comparison and include indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit, and does not necessarily indicate the channel is Inoperable.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal checks of channel status during normal operational use of the displays associated with channels required by the LCO.

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)**

SR 3.3.6.2.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.

This SR is modified by a Note that provides a general exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. This exception is necessary because the design of instrumentation does not facilitate functional testing of all required contacts of the relay which input into the combinational logic. (Reference 8) Performance of such a test could result in a plant transient or place the plant in an undo risk situation. Therefore, for this SR, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the change of state of the relay which inputs into the combinational logic. The required contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.6.2.5. This is acceptable because operating experience shows that the contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of References 5 and 6.

SR 3.3.6.2.3 and SR 3.3.6.2.4

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequencies of SR 3.3.6.2.3 and SR 3.3.6.2.4 are based on the assumption of a 92 day and an 24 month calibration interval, respectively, in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**
(continued)

SR 3.3.6.2.5

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed on SCIVs and the SGT System in LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3, respectively, overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform portions of this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.3.
 2. FSAR, Chapter 15
 3. FSAR, Section 15.2.
 4. FSAR, Sections 15.7.
 5. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," July 1990.
 6. NEDC-30851P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.
 7. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993. (58 FR 32193)
 8. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9900: Technical Guidance, Standard Technical Specification Section 1.0 Definitions, Issue date 12/08/86.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)

BASES

BACKGROUND The function of the SCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1). Secondary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment following a DBA, or that are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE or take place outside primary containment, are maintained within the secondary containment boundary.

The OPERABILITY requirements for SCIVs help ensure that an adequate secondary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. These isolation devices consist of either passive devices or active (automatic) devices. Manual valves or dampers, de-activated automatic valves or dampers secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), and blind flanges are considered passive devices.

Automatic SCIVs close on a secondary containment isolation signal to establish a boundary for untreated radioactive material within secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents.

Other non-sealed penetrations which cross a secondary containment boundary are isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary containment barrier to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for which the secondary containment boundary is required are a loss of coolant accident (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 2). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events, but the boundary
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(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES
(continued)**

established by SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System before being released to the environment.

Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

LCO

SCIVs that form a part of the secondary containment boundary are required to be OPERABLE. Depending on the configuration of the secondary containment only specific SCIVs are required. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The automatic isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Table B 3.6.4.2-1.

The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are deactivated and secured in their closed position, or blind flanges are in place. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Table B3.6.4.2-2. Penetrations closed with sealants are considered part of the secondary containment boundary and are not considered penetration flow paths.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued) limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.

The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV.

A.1 and A.2

In the event that there are one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to secondary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration, and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time is very low.

For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, but no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that the affected penetration remains isolated.

Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two SCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to devices located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

B.1

With two SCIVs in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 4 hours. The method of isolation must

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time, is very low.

The Condition has been modified by a Note stating that Condition B is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

C.1 and C.2

With one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time. The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting secondary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3.

In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated.

The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one SCIV. For penetration flow paths with two SCIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

D.1 and D.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1, E.2, and E.3

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1, E.2, and E.3 (continued)

Required Action E.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.6.4.2.1

This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification (typically visual) that those required SCIVs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

Since these SCIVs are readily accessible to personnel during normal operation and verification of their position is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the SCIVs are in the correct positions.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these SCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

A second Note has been included to clarify that SCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open.

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)**

SR 3.6.4.2.2

SCIVs with maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.2.4-1 are tested every 92 days to verify that the isolation time is within limits to demonstrate OPERABILITY. Automatic SCIVs without maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.4.2-1 are tested under the requirements of SR 3.6.4.2.3. The isolation time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses.

SR 3.6.4.2.3

Verifying that each automatic required SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents. This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a secondary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.
 2. FSAR, Section 15.
 3. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
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Table B 3.6.4.2-1
Secondary Containment Ventilation System
Automatic Isolation Dampers
(Page 1 of 1)

Reactor Building Zone	Valve Number	Valve Description	Type of Valve	Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds)
I	HD-17586 A&B	Supply System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	10.0
I	HD-17524 A&B	Filtered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	10.0
I	HD-17576A&B	Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	10.0
II	HD-27586 A&B	Supply System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	10.0
II	HD-27524 A&B	Filtered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	10.0
II	HD-27576 A&B	Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	10.0
III	HD-17564 A&B	Supply System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	14.0
III	HD-17514 A&B	Filtered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	6.5
III	HD-17502 A&B	Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	6.0
III	HD-27564 A&B	Supply System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	14.0
III	HD-27514 A&B	Filtered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	6.5
III	HD-27502 A&B	Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers	Automatic Isolation Damper	6.0
N/A	HD-17534A	Zone 3 Airlock I-606	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-17534B	Zone 3 Airlock I-611	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-17534C	Zone 3 Airlock I-707	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-17534D	Zone 3 Airlock I-803	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-17534E	Zone 3 Airlock I-805	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-17534F	Zone 3 Airlock I-617	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-17534H	Zone 3 Airlock I-618	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534A	Zone 3 Airlock II-606	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534C	Zone 3 Airlock II-707	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534D	Zone 3 Airlock II-803	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534E	Zone 3 Airlock II-805	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534G	Zone 3 Airlock C-806	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534H	Zone 3 Airlock II-618	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A
N/A	HD-27534I	Zone 3 Airlock II-609	Automatic Isolation Damper	N/A

Table B 3.6.4.2-2
Secondary Containment Ventilation System
Passive Isolation Valves or Devices
(Page 1 of 2)

Device Number	Device Description	Area/Elev.	Required Position
X-28-2-3000	Utility Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell	Yard/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-2-44	SDHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling	Yard/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-2-45	SDHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling	Yard/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-2-46	Temporary Chiller to RBCW	Yard/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-2-47	Temporary Chiller to RBCW	Yard/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-2-48	Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bay	Yard/670	Capped
X-33-2-3000	Utility Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell	Yard/670	Blind Flanged
X-28-2-3000	Utility Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell	28/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-2-48	Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bay	29/670	Capped
X-33-2-3000	Utility Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell	33/670	Blind Flanged
X-29-3-54	Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area	27/683	Blind Flanged
X-29-3-55	Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area	27/683	Blind Flanged
X-29-5-95	Temporary Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW	29/749	Blind Flanged
X-29-5-96	Temporary Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW	29/749	Blind Flanged
X-29-5-91	Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW	33/749	Blind Flanged
X-29-5-92	Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW	33/749	Blind Flanged
X-29-5-97	Utility Penetration from Unit 1 RR Bay to Unit 2 Elev. 749	33/749	Capped
X-27-6-42	Diamond Plate Cover over Floor Penetration	27/779'	Installed
X-27-6-92	Instrument Tubing Stubs	27/779'	Capped
X-29-7-4	1" Spare Conduit Threaded Plug	29/818'	Installed
X-30-6-72	Instrument Tubing Stubs	30/779'	Capped
X-30-6-1002	Stairwell #214 Rupture Disc	30/779'	Installed Intact
X-30-6-1003	Airlock II-609 Rupture Disc	30/779'	Installed Intact
X-25-6-1008	Airlock I-606 Rupture Disc	25/779'	Installed Intact
X-29-4-102	Penetration at Door 433	29/719'	Blind Flange Installed
X-29-4-103	Penetration at Door 433	29/719'	Blind Flange Installed
X-29-4-102	Penetration at Door 433	33/719'	Blind Flange Installed
X-29-4-103	Penetration at Door 433	33/719'	Blind Flange Installed
1S2104	N ₂ Purge Line to U1 Containment Spectacle Flange	29/683'	Blind Side Installed
2S2104	N ₂ Purge Line to U2 Containment Spectacle Flange	34/672'	Blind Side Installed
XD-17513	Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone III HVAC Supply	29/799'	Position is dependent on Railroad Bay alignment
XD-17514	Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone III HVAC Exhaust	29/719'	Position is dependent on Railroad Bay alignment
187388	RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Iso Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
187389	RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Iso Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
187390	RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Drain Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
187391	RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Drain Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110176	SDHR Supply Drain Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110186	SDHR Discharge Drain Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve

Table B 3.6.4.2-2
Secondary Containment Ventilation System
Passive Isolation Valves or Devices
(Page 2 of 2)

187388	RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Iso Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
187389	RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Iso Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
187390	RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Drain Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
187391	RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Drain Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110176	SDHR Supply Drain Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110186	SDHR Discharge Drain Vlv	29/670	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110180	SDHR Supply Vent Vlv	29/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110181	SDHR Discharge Fill Vlv	27/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110182	SDHR Discharge Vent Vlv	27/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
110187	SDHR Supply Fill Vlv	29/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
210186	SDHR Supply Drain Vlv	33/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
210187	SDHR Supply Vent Vlv	33/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
210191	SDHR Discharge Vent Vlv	30/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
210192	SDHR Discharge Drain Vlv	30/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve
210193	SDHR Discharge Vent Vlv	33/749	Closed Manual Isolation Valve

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System

BASES

BACKGROUND The SGT System is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup" (Ref. 1). The safety function of the SGT System is to ensure that radioactive materials that leak from the primary containment into the secondary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) are filtered and adsorbed prior to exhausting to the environment.

The SGT System consists of two redundant subsystems, each with its own set of dampers, filter train, and a reactor building recirculation fan and associated dampers and controls.

Each filter train consists of (components listed in order of the direction of the air flow):

- a. A demister;
- b. An electric heater;
- c. A prefilter;
- d. A high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter;
- e. A charcoal adsorber;
- f. A second HEPA filter; and
- g. A centrifugal fan.

The sizing of the SGT System equipment and components is based on handling an incoming air mixture at a maximum of 125°F. The internal pressure of the secondary containment is maintained at a negative pressure of 0.25 inches water gauge when the system is in operation. Maintenance of a negative pressure precludes direct outleakage.

The demister is provided to remove entrained water in the air, while the electric heater reduces the relative humidity of the airstream to less than 70% (Ref. 2). The prefilter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

removes fine particulate matter and protects the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorber removes gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter collects any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.

The SGT System automatically starts and operates in response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system. Following initiation in each division, the associated filter train fan starts. Upon verification that both subsystems are operating, the redundant subsystem may be shut down.

The SGT System also contains a cooling function to remove heat generated by fission product decay on the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers during shutdown of an SGT subsystem. The cooling function consists of two separate and independent filter cooling modes per SGT subsystem. The two cooling modes are:

- 1) Outside air damper and the filter cooling bypass damper open, allowing outside air to flow through the shutdown SGT subsystem's filter train and exit via the opposite SGT subsystem's exhaust fan.
- 2) Outside air damper opens and the SGT exhaust fan of the shutdown SGT subsystem starts. This configuration draws outside air through the shutdown SGT subsystem's filter train and exits via the associated SGT subsystem's exhaust fan.

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES**

The design basis for the SGT System is to mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accidents (Ref. 2). For all events analyzed, the SGT System is shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

LCO

Following a DBA, a minimum of one SGT subsystem is required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for two OPERABLE subsystems ensures operation of at least

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

one SGT subsystem in the event of a single active failure. A SGT subsystem is considered OPERABLE when it has an OPERABLE set of dampers, filter train, one reactor building recirculation fan and associated dampers, and associated controls, including instrumentation. (The reactor building recirculation fans and associated dampers are not dedicated to either SGT subsystem. As a result, when any one reactor building recirculation division is not OPERABLE, one arbitrarily determined SGT subsystem is not operable. This interpretation only applies if both divisions of Secondary Containment Isolation logic are operable). This includes the components required for at least one of the two SGTS filter cooling modes.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT System in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status in 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT System and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT filter train should immediately be placed in operation. This action ensures that the remaining filter train is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities must not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1

If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT system may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. The 4 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct

the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining the SGT System contribution to secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring SGT OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where SGT is inoperable is minimal.

E.1 and E.2

If at least one SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1, F.2, and F.3

When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action F.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.4.3.1

Operating each SGT filter train for ≥ 10 continuous hours ensures that both filter train are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation with the heaters on (automatic heater cycling to maintain temperature) for ≥ 10 continuous hours every 31 days eliminates moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with the requirements of Reference 4.

SR 3.6.4.3.2

This SR verifies that the required SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.6.4.3.3

This SR verifies that each SGT subsystem starts on receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. Therefore, the Frequency was found to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.4.3.4

This SR verifies that both cooling modes for each SGT subsystem are available. Although both cooling modes are tested, only one cooling mode for each SGT subsystem is required for an SGT subsystem to be considered OPERABLE. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was found to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

- REFERENCES**
1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41.
 2. FSAR, Section 6.5.1
 3. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements,
July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
 4. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2.
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B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.2 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The ESW System is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from equipment, such as the diesel generators (DGs), residual heat removal (RHR) pump coolers, and room coolers for Emergency Core Cooling System equipment, required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. Upon receipt of a loss of offsite power or loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal, ESW pumps are automatically started after a time delay.

The ESW System consists of two independent and redundant subsystems. Each of the two ESW subsystems is made up of a header, two pumps, a suction source, valves, piping and associated instrumentation. The two subsystems are separated from each other so an active single failure in one subsystem will not affect the OPERABILITY of the other subsystem. A continuous supply of water is provided to ESW from the Service Water System for the keepfill system. This supply is not required for ESW operability.

Cooling water is pumped from the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) by the ESW pumps to the essential components through the two main headers. After removing heat from the components, the water is discharged to the spray pond (UHS) by way of a network of sprays that dissipate the heat to the atmosphere or directly to the UHS via a bypass valve.

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES**

Sufficient water inventory is available for all ESW System post LOCA cooling requirements for a 30 day period with no additional makeup water source available. The ability of the ESW System to support long term cooling is assumed in evaluations of the equipment required for safe reactor shutdown presented in the FSAR, Chapters 4 and 6 (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively).

The ability of the ESW System to provide adequate cooling to the identified safety equipment is an implicit assumption for the safety analyses evaluated in References 1 and 2. The ability to provide onsite emergency AC power is dependent on the ability of the ESW System to cool the DGs. The long term cooling capability of the RHR and core spray pumps is also dependent on the cooling provided by the ESW System.

The ESW System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
(Ref. 3)

(continued)

BASES

LCO

The ESW subsystems are independent of each other to the degree that each has separate controls, power supplies, and the operation of one does not depend on the other. In the event of a DBA, one subsystem of ESW is required to provide the minimum heat removal capability assumed in the safety analysis for the system to which it supplies cooling water. To ensure this requirement is met, two subsystems of ESW must be OPERABLE. At least one subsystem will operate, if the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

A subsystem is considered OPERABLE when it has two OPERABLE pumps, and an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the UHS and transferring the water to the appropriate equipment and returning flow to the UHS. If individual loads are isolated, the affected components may be rendered inoperable, but it does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the ESW System. Because each ESW subsystem supplies all four required DGs, an ESW subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it supplies at least three of the four DGs provided no single DG does not have an ESW subsystem capable of supplying flow.

An adequate suction source is not addressed in this LCO since the minimum net positive suction head of the ESW pumps is bounded by the Residual Heat Removal Service Water System requirements (LCO 3.7.1, "Residual Heat Removal System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)").

The ESW return loop requirement, in terms of operable UHS return paths or UHS spray capacity, is also not addressed in this LCO. UHS operability, in terms of the return loop and spray capacity is addressed in the RHRSW/ UHS Technical Specification (LCO 3.7.1, "Residual Heat Removal Service Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)"). The design basis calculations for the UHS assume post-accident ESW return flow through the spray bypass valve on one return loop until a UHS temperature is reached whereby realignment of appropriate ESW heat loads to the spray loop is required. This realignment is manual and can be done several hours or more after accident initiation.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the ESW System is required to be OPERABLE to support OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the ESW System. Therefore, the ESW System is required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the ESW System is determined by the systems it supports.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.8.1, be entered and Required Actions taken if the inoperable ESW subsystem results in inoperable DGs (i.e.; the supply from both subsystems of ESW is secured to the same DG). This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 because the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.2 do not adequately compensate for the loss of a DG (LCO 3.8.1) due to loss of ESW flow.

A.1

With one ESW pump inoperable in each subsystem, both inoperable pumps must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE ESW pumps are adequate to perform the ESW heat removal function; however, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure could result in loss of ESW function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the remaining ESW heat removal capability and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period.

B.1

With one or both ESW subsystems not capable of supplying ESW flow to two or more DGs, the capability to supply ESW to at least three DGs from each ESW subsystem must be restored within 7 days. With the units in this condition, the remaining ESW flow to DGs is adequate to maintain the full capability of all DGs; however, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure could result in loss of the multiple DGs. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the fact that all DGs remain capable of responding to an event occurring during this time period.

C.1

With one ESW subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition B, the ESW subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE ESW subsystem is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE ESW subsystem could result in loss of ESW function.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

The 7 day Completion Time is based on the redundant ESW System capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem, the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period, and is consistent with the allowed Completion Time for restoring an inoperable Core Spray Loop, LPCI Pumps and Control Structure Chiller.

D.1 and D.2

If the ESW subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or both ESW subsystems are inoperable for reasons other than Condition A and B (i.e., three ESW pumps inoperable), the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.7.2.1

Verifying the correct alignment for each manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each ESW subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ESW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be automatically realigned to its accident position within the required time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that isolation of the ESW System to components or systems may render those

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.7.2.1 (continued)

components or systems inoperable, but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the ESW System. As such, when all ESW pumps, valves, and piping are OPERABLE, but a branch connection off the main header is isolated, the ESW System is still OPERABLE.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

SR 3.7.2.2

This SR verifies that the automatic valves of the ESW System will automatically switch to the safety or emergency position to provide cooling water exclusively to the safety related equipment during an accident event. This is demonstrated by the use of an actual or simulated initiation signal. This SR also verifies the automatic start capability of the ESW pumps in each subsystem.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, this Frequency is concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter 4.
 2. FSAR, Chapter 6.
 3. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132)
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