

FERMI SEPTEMBER 2004 INITIAL LICENSE EXAM DYNAMIC SCENARIO COMMENTS

#	Source	Comment	Resolution
1.	Scenario No. 1 Scenario Outline	Event 2 is the only event that requires the SRO to evaluate Tech Specs. Per ROI 2003-16, Issue #8, all simulator operating tests given after November 1, 2003 require the SRO applicants to have at least 2 events that require the use of Tech Specs. To ensure that two Tech Sec entries are made, insert an additional malfunction after Event 3 of a small leak in the torus such that the TS lower limit of above minus 2 inches level is exceeded.	Inserted malfunction to start a small torus leak. Required entry into TS 3.6.2.2, suppression pool water level. In addition, required actions for torus sump level high. During the exam: noted additional TS 3.6.2.3 for RHR in suppression pool cooling which was not identified by the facility prior to exam. This TS was in addition to the existing TS issue with RHRSW pump malfunction.
2.	Scenario No. 1 Scenario Outline	For Event 2, delete "C(BOP)" since the BOP is NOT required to perform any control board actions (since RHRSW flow will already be within the proper range following the RHRSW Pump "B" trip).	Kept BOP for this malfunction. Identified that BOP is required to place the CMC switch to off. Minor but required by ARPs.
3.	Scenario No. 1 Scenario Outline	For Event 4, change "C(All)" to "C(BOP), C(SRO)" since the RO does NOT perform any control board actions associated with the startup of the "South" Reactor Feedpump (only the BOP does these actions).	Changed as recommended.
4.	Scenario No. 1 Scenario Outline	For Events 8, 10, and 11, add "C(SRO)" to the Event Type, since the SRO should get credit for all events.	After major malfunction, it is understood that SRO is credited for mitigation actions.
5.	Scenario No. 1 Scenario Outline	For Event 10, there is NO mention of the "E" and "W" Bypass valves failed closed on the ES-D-2 forms or the actions required due to the failure of these valves closed. If there are NO actions required due to these valve failures, then NO credit can be given for these malfunctions.	Noted as recommended. No credit for the bypass valve failures.
6.	Scenario No. 1 Event No. 1 Page 1 of 1	Level of Detail Comment: For the BOP, include the steps required by the BOP to place Division II of RHR in torus cooling using SOP 23.205.	Updated as recommended.
7.	Scenario No. 1 Event No. 2 Page 1 of 1	In the SRO portion of the actions required, add that TS 3.7.1 is a 30 day LCO.	Updated as recommended.
8.	Scenario No. 1 Event No. 2 Page 1 of 1	Change the flow range of RHRSW flow from 5250 to 6500 gpm to 5400 to 6300 gpm to reflect the proper range per procedure 23.208	Deleted, no requirement to do so.
9.	Scenario No. 1 Event No. 2 Page 1 of 1	Typo: At bottom of page in the "BOOTH OPERATOR ACTION" box, change "relav" to "relay".	Not a typo, the text box cut off the bottom end of y.
10.	Scenario No. 1 Event No. 3	Level of Detail Comment: For the BOP, include the steps required by the BOP to transfer the Hotwell level control system in accordance with 23.107, section 6.11.	Updated as recommended.
11.	Scenario No. 1 Event No. 4, 5, 6 Page 1 of 1	In the "Event Description" at the top of the page, change from "Hotwell Level Controller Failure" (which is the description for Event 3) to a description of Events 4, 5, and 6.	Attention to detail, typo errors by facility corrected.

FERMI SEPTEMBER 2004 INITIAL LICENSE EXAM DYNAMIC SCENARIO COMMENTS

12.	Scenario No. 1 Event No. 4, 5, 6 Page 1 of 1	Level of Detail Comment: For the RO, include the steps required by the RO to insert the CRAM array.	Updated as recommended.
13.	Scenario No. 1 Event No. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 Page 1 of 2 and Page 2 of 2	In the "Event Description" at the top of the page, change from "Hotwell Level Controller Failure" (which is the description for Event 3) to a description of Events 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11.	Facility error corrected.
14.	Scenario No. 1 Event No. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 Page 1 of 2 and Page 2 of 2	Make a notation that the steps with asterisks (*) are Critical Tasks.	It is understood that these steps are critical, as marked with (*).
15.	Scenario No. 2 Scenario Outline	For Event 1, delete "N(BOP)" since the BOP does NOT have significant actions to perform during the increase in reactor power (the BOP only has a monitoring function during the power increase).	Updated as recommended. Inserted specific normal evolution for BOP. See item 27.
16.	Scenario No. 2 Scenario Outline	For Event 3 there are NO RO actions on the control board that can be credited for a failure of CRD FCV-F002A closed. There are only local operator actions to shift the FCV. Change the malfunction to a failure of the CRD FCV controller in AUTO such that manual control is required to be taken. This malfunction would thus change to "I(RO), I(SRO)".	Changed malfunction as recommended to allow control board mitigating operation by RO.
17.	Scenario No. 2 Scenario Outline	For Event 5, change the Event Type from "M(All)" to "C(All)" for the Loss of Offsite Power. Also, make Event 6 part of Event 5 (i.e., Loss of Offsite Power with Loss of EDG 12.	Updated as recommended.
18.	Scenario No. 2 Scenario Outline	For Event 6, add "C(SRO)" to the Event Type, since the SRO should get credit for all events.	Changed to all. Also, after major malfunction it is understood SRO also responsible for mitigating actions and credited as necessary.
19.	Scenario No. 2 Scenario Outline	For Event 8, there are NO RO control board actions required for the RHR Pump "A" trip. Delete this malfunction and add a new malfunction of a failure closed of valve E1150-F016B, "DIV 2 RHR DW SPRAY OTBD ISO VLV", such that the use of the drywell spray from the crosstie line will be required.	Malfunction changed as recommended.
20.	Scenario No. 2 Event No. 4 Page 1 of 1	Since there are NO actions required to be performed by the RO (and only verifications), then credit for the RO can NOT be given for this event.	Corrected as noted above, by changing malfunction that requires RO actions.
21.	Scenario No. 2 Event No. 4 Page 1 of 1	Since there are NO actions required to be performed by the BOP (and only verifications), then credit for the BOP can NOT be given for this event. Change malfunction so that one of the three actions that the BOP is required to verify fails to occur, and the BOP is required to manually take action to place the equipment in the required position.	Event numbers changed, this is of event 5, Rad Monitor. Changed malfunction as recommended.

FERMI SEPTEMBER 2004 INITIAL LICENSE EXAM

DYNAMIC SCENARIO COMMENTS

22.	Scenario No. 2 Event No. 5, 6, 7, and 8 (Both pages)	Editorial: There are 2 pages associated with these Events, but both are labeled "Page 1 of 1". Change so that the first page is labeled "Page 1 of 2" and the second page is labeled "Page 2 of 2".	Error corrected.
23.	Scenario No. 2 Event No. 5, 6, 7, and 8 (Both pages)	Editorial: In the "Event Description" at the top of the page, change so that "Steamleak in Drywell" is listed after "Trip of EDG during startup", so that the events are listed in the proper numerical order as per the scenario outline.	Corrected.
24.	Scenario No. 2 Event No. 5, 6, 7, and 8 (First Page)	For the BOP, add steps to perform the following using 20.300 series procedures: - Add steps to restore power back to Bus 72CF. - Add steps to crosstie Bus 72CF to Bus 72F.	Changed to correct initial conditions to reflect EDG 11 rather than EDG 13 being OOS. Noted steps to check 71CF transferred to alternate power source.
25.	Scenario No. 2 Event No. 5, 6, 7, and 8 (First Page)	For the SRO, add an asterisk (to denote a Critical Task for the SRO) to "Direct RO to place RHR in Torus Spray prior to Drywell pressure reaching 9 psig in accordance with 23.205."	Incorrect, prior to Torus pressure reaching 9 psig. is part of critical step for initiating Drywell sprays prior to reaching DWSIL.
26.	Scenario No. 2 Event No. 5, 6, 7, and 8 (Both pages)	Make a notation that the steps with asterisks (*) are Critical Tasks.	Understood that (*) is considered as critical steps.
27.	Scenario No. 2 Event No. 2	Inserted a normal evolution for the BOP to take actions to prepare the reactor feed pump turbine as a replacement for a power increase with rods. However, during validation noted that the actions were all verify and could not give credit to the BOP. Recommended steps for drain valve manipulations as part of the warm up as sufficient for a normal for BOP.	Changed as recommended. But, during exam administration noted that the drain valves were already open in contrast to what was expected during the validation. Required the facility to continue with the evolution until steps in the same procedure for turbine warm up required valve manipulations to insert steam and start rolling the turbine. Identified during the exam administration and directed corrections during exam by chief examiner.
28.	Both Scenarios	Noted no end point for scenario.	Post exam changes, adequately noted that at the discretion of the chief examiner the scenario will be terminated.