

October 28, 2002

## **SHEARON HARRIS FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION**

### **POTENTIAL ISSUES FROM FIRST WEEK OF INSPECTION**

1. For a fire at the B chiller, auxiliary building 261 ft. level (in fire zone 1-A-4-CHLR and in SSA analysis area 1-A-BAL-B2), AOP-36 directs operators to operate the B chiller. This is not consistent with the SSA. (AR 00075258)
2. For a fire at 480V MCC 35A, auxiliary building 261 ft. level (in fire zone 1-A-4-COM-E and in SSA analysis area 1-A4-BAL-B5), AOP-36 sends an operator to MCC 35A to open two breakers to prevent spurious operation of charging system MOVs. Reliance on operator actions in the room that is on fire is not allowed by NRC requirements. (Similar to licensee self-assessment AR 00073540, which states that due to smoke, fumes, etc, not all sub-zones of fire area 1-A-BAL may be accessible to perform the required manual actions.)
3. ESR-0100087, completed around 1/02, changed charging pump min-flow to go to the VCT (and not directly to the charging pump suction). The SSA and AOP-36 were apparently not updated. Consequently, for a fire in most areas of the auxiliary building 261 ft. level (in fire area 1-A-BAL, sub-area 1-A-BAL-B and SSA analysis area 1-A-BAL-B), after AOP-36 aligns charging pump suction from the boric acid storage tank using gravity feed and isolates the VCT, the VCT will apparently overfill and approximately 60 gpm of RCS water will spill into the auxiliary building. (No AR yet, licensee is still considering this NRC question)
4. For a fire in the auxiliary building 261 ft. level (fire sub-area 1-A-BAL-B), the SSA and AOP-36 differed regarding actions to take if boric acid storage tank (BAT) level indication is lost (use the RWST or the BAT for charging pump suction?). (AR 00075065)
5. A fire in the turbine building can disable the motor-driven fire pump and also disable auto-start of the diesel-driven fire pump. Local manual start of the diesel fire pump for this fire area is not proceduralized. (AR 00075339)
6. For a fire in the auxiliary building 261 ft. level (fire sub-area 1-A-BAL-B), AOP-36 incorrectly sends an operator to the wrong MCC in the wrong room to open the breaker for valve 1CS-218 (charging pumps discharge header cross-connect) to prevent spurious operation of the MOV. The breaker is actually on MCC 1A35-SA, but AOP-36 incorrectly states that it is on MCC 1B35-SB. (AR 00075337)

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