

ENERGY NORTHWEST

P.O. Box 968 ■ Richland, Washington 99352-0968

December 22, 2003
GO2-03-188

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: **COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397
60-DAY FOLLOW-UP REPORT REGARDING EVENT
NOTIFICATION #40273**

Dear Sir or Madam:

Transmitted herewith is the 60-day follow-up report for the subject event notification pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(2) in accordance with paragraph (a)(4) of that section.

Should you have any questions or desire additional information regarding this matter, please call Ms. CL Perino at (509) 377-2075.

Respectfully,



DW Coleman
Manager Regulatory Programs
Mail Drop PE20

Attachment

cc: BS Mallet - NRC - RIV
TC Poindexter - Winston & Strawn
NRC Sr. Resident Inspector - 988C (2)
BJ Benney - NRC - NRR
RN Sherman - BPA/1399
INPO Records Center
WB Jones - NRC RIV/fax
Director, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

IE74

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to rls1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Columbia Generating Station

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

00050397

PAGE (3)

1 OF 4

TITLE (4)

Vulnerability in a Safeguards System that Could Allow Unauthorized or Undetected Access to a Protected Area

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
10	23	2003	2003	011	00	12	22	2003	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
OPERATING MODE (9)		1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		100%	20.2201(b)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
			20.2201(d)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
			20.2203(a)(1)			50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	x 73.71(a)(4)
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)			50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73.71(a)(5)
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	Other
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.46(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	Specify in Abstract below or
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	in NRC Form 366A
			20.2203(a)(2)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(vi)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
			20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

RE Brownlee

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(509) 377-2085

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
--	---	----	-------------------------------	-------	-----	------

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On October 23, 2003, with Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) operating at 100% power, a vulnerability in a safeguards system was discovered that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to Columbia's protected or vital areas (ref: Event Notification Report 40273). The vulnerability existed due to a safeguards information (SGI) container being unlocked and unattended for approximately six days. The unlocked SGI container could have allowed access to site-specific technical details regarding the physical security system that could facilitate access to Columbia's protected or vital areas.

Subsequent to discovery of the vulnerability, the SGI container contents were reviewed and did not appear to be changed or altered. The SGI container is located in a records vault for which access is controlled with a combination lock. There was no evidence of forced entry into the records vault or the SGI container. In addition, the vulnerable condition did not result in an unauthorized or undetected entry into Columbia's protected or vital areas.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Columbia Generating Station	00050397	2003-011-00			2 OF 4

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On October 23, 2003, with Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) operating at 100% power, a vulnerability in a safeguards system was discovered that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to Columbia's protected or vital areas. The vulnerability existed due to a safeguards information (SGI) container being unlocked and unattended for a period of approximately six days. The unlocked container could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to site-specific technical details regarding the physical security system that could facilitate access to the protected and vital areas.

Subsequent to discovery of the vulnerability, the contents of the SGI container were reviewed and did not appear to be changed or altered. The SGI container is located in a records vault for which access is controlled with a combination lock. The vault entrance is in full view of records management specialists throughout the workday. The vault is open only when records management specialists are in the direct vicinity to view the vault. There was no evidence of forced entry into the records vault or the SGI container. In addition, the vulnerable condition did not result in an unauthorized or undetected entry into Columbia's protected or vital areas.

This 60-day follow-up written report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(2) and 10 CFR 73.71(a)(4). Regulatory Guide 5.62, Revision 1, Section 3.2, instructs licensees to use NRC Licensee Event Report form 366, and describes the report content that is sufficient for NRC analysis and evaluation. Because this event did not involve a security system failure or a threat related incident, only items 1 through 14 in section 3.2 of Regulatory Guide 5.62, Revision 1, are addressed below:

Date and Time of Event

The SGI container was left unlocked from approximately 1215 hours on Friday, October 17, 2003, to approximately 1415 hours on October 23, 2003, PDT.

Location of Actual or Threatened Event

The open SGI container is located in a plant records storage vault. The vault is in the records processing area of a building adjacent to Columbia's protected area and within the owner controlled area. The vault entrance is in full view of records management specialists throughout the workday. The vault is open only when records management specialists are in the direct vicinity to view the vault.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Columbia Generating Station	00050397	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 4
		2003-011-00			

Plant Operating Phase

At the time of event discovery, Columbia Generating Station was in Mode 1 and operating at 100% reactor power.

Safety Systems Threatened, Directly or Indirectly

Because the vulnerability did not result in an unauthorized entry into a protected or vital area, no safety systems were threatened.

Type of Security Force Onsite

Columbia Generating Station maintains a proprietary security force.

Number and Type of Personnel Involved

Two bargaining employees and a document designer were involved in this event. All three were safeguards approved for the container that was left unlocked.

Method of Discovery of Vulnerability

On October 23, 2003, a records management specialist was showing a document designer the location of the SGI container located inside the records vault. When the two employees approached the container, the records management specialist observed the combination lock lying on top of the container. The document designer informed an administrative services supervisor who confirmed the container was not locked, secured the container, and informed the Security Department.

Procedural Errors Involved

On October 17, 2003, a records management specialist left the SGI container unlocked and unattended. Leaving an unlocked SGI container unattended was a violation of security procedure SWP-SEC-02, "Protection of Safeguards Information."

Immediate Actions Taken in Response to the Vulnerability

Upon discovery of the combination lock lying on top of the SGI container, an administrative services supervisor secured the container and informed the Security Department. Security personnel inspected the container and determined that the contents of the container did not appear to be changed or altered.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Columbia Generating Station	00050397	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	4 OF 4
		2003-011-00			

Corrective Actions Taken or Planned

The employee responsible for leaving the SGI container unlocked is no longer approved to access SGI, and the combination to the SGI container has been changed. In addition, a time-out was conducted with administrative services personnel to stress the seriousness of this event, and the need to preclude the recurrence of a similar event. A two-person rule has been implemented which requires two people to verify that an SGI container has been opened or closed. Visible signs will also be placed on an SGI container to indicate when it is open or closed. Lastly, as a result of industry bench-marking, inventories will be maintained for SGI containers, and a log will be maintained when items are removed or restored to an SGI container.

Local, State, or Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Contacted

No local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies were contacted regarding this condition.

Description of Media Interest or Press Release

A press release was not issued regarding this condition and there has been no media interest.

Indication of Previous Similar Events

A similar event occurred at Columbia on May 15, 2003, as reported to the NRC by a 30-day follow-up report dated June 13, 2003.

Knowledgeable Contact

For questions or additional information the point of contact is Mr. Robert Brownlee at the Columbia Generating Station, who may be reached by telephone at (509)-377-2085.