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December 15, 2003

Docket No.: 50-424

NL-03-2464

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

**Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Licensee Event Report 1-2003-002
Ruptured Steam Hose Coupling Leads to Manual Steam Line Isolation**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby submits a Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Licensee Event Report (LER) for a condition that occurred on October 22, 2003.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.

Sincerely,

Jeffrey T. Gasser

JTG/KWK/daj

Enclosure: LER 1-2003-002

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Mr. J. D. Woodard, Executive Vice President
Mr. W. F. Kitchens, General Manager – Plant Vogtle
Mr. M. Sheibani, Engineering Supervisor – Plant Vogtle
Document Services RTYPE: CVC7000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator
Mr. S. D. Bloom, NRR Project Manager – Vogtle
Mr. J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector – Vogtle

IE22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not

1. FACILITY NAME Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 1	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000-424	3. PAGE 1 OF 3
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4. TITLE
RUPTURED STEAM HOSE COUPLING LEADS TO MANUAL MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
10	22	03	2003	002	00	12	15	2003		05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										05000

9. OPERATING MODE 2	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § : (Check all that apply)									
10. POWER LEVEL 2	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)						
	20.2201(d)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)						
	20.2203(a)(1)	50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	73.71(a)(4)						
	20.2203(a)(2)(i)	50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73.71(a)(5)						
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	OTHER						
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.46(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	Specify in Abstract below						
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	or in NRC Form 366A						
	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)							
	20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER	
NAME Mehdi Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (706) 826-3209

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
A	SB	CPLG	Dixon	No					

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED				15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE			
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO			MONTH	DAY	YEAR

16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On October 22, 2003, personnel were attempting to vent the bonnet cavities and equalize pressure on either side of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). In the South Main Steam Valve Room (SMSVR), a high pressure hose was connected to piping outside of double isolation valves for the Loop 4 Train B MSIV drain line. The inside drain line isolation valve was fully opened, the outside drain line isolation valve was partially opened, and a rubber seal at the first hose connection blew out. Steam exiting from this connection blocked the doorway to the room and also prevented the drain line isolation valves from being closed. Personnel phoned the control room and asked that the MSIV be closed. The Unit Shift Supervisor (USS) ordered a manual main steam line isolation (MSLI), which occurred at 0256 EDT, and personnel safely exited the SMSVR.

The cause of this event was the use of inadequately rated hose couplings. The proper high pressure hose and couplings are being procured.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL YEAR	REVISION NUMBER	
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 1	05000-424	2003	-- 002	-- 00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) because an unplanned actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF) occurred when the main steam line isolation function was manually initiated.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of this event, Unit 1 was in Mode 2 (Startup) at 2% of rated thermal power, coming out of a refueling outage.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On October 22, 2003, personnel had entered both the North and South Main Steam Valve Rooms to vent the bonnet cavities and equalize pressure on either side of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) per procedure 13601-1, "Steam Generator and Main Steam System Operation." In the South Main Steam Valve Room (SMSVR), a high pressure hose was connected to piping outside of double isolation valves for the Loop 4 Train B MSIV drain line. The inside drain line isolation valve was fully opened, the outside drain line isolation valve was partially opened, and a rubber seal at the first hose coupling blew out. Steam exiting from this connection blocked the doorway to the room and also prevented the drain line isolation valves from being closed. Personnel phoned the control room and asked that the MSIV be closed. Due to the background noise, the Unit Shift Supervisor (USS) was unsure which loop was involved, but understood a steam leak was occurring. In addition, the USS knew that closing only the one valve would allow back leakage to occur. Therefore, at 0256 EDT, the USS ordered a manual main steam line isolation (MSLI) which closed all MSIVs and bypass steam isolation valves (BSIVs), and personnel safely exited the SMSVR.

After recovery from the MSLI, control room personnel opened the BSIVs to equalize the pressure around the MSIVs. Upon attempting to open the MSIVs, all opened successfully with the exception of the Loop 2 Train B MSIV. After bonnet pressure was reduced, this valve was also opened.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event is that the hose couplings used were not rated for the steam pressure encountered in the valve bonnet.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

All MSIVs and BSIVs isolated as required and the MSLI occurred as designed when actuated. No personnel injuries occurred as a result of this event. Control room personnel responded appropriately to initiate the MSLI to protect personnel. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

This event does not represent a safety system functional failure.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Adequately rated hoses/hose couplings will be procured by February 20, 2004, for future use when performing this evolution.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- 1) Failed Components:
 ½", 300 psi, hose coupling manufactured by Dixon Valve and Coupling Company, Part # PF16 (male) and Part # PHL16 (female).
- 2) Previous Similar Events:
 None
- 3) Energy Industry Identification System Code:
 Main Steam System – SB