

October 21, 2003

Mr. Joseph E. Venable
Vice President Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road
Killona, LA 70066-0751

SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - ISSUANCE OF
AMENDMENT RE: MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES (TAC NO.
MB6963)

Dear Mr. Venable:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 190 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 for the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated December 16, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated September 11, 2003.

The amendment revises the TSs by changing the current main steam isolation valve (MSIV) TS 3/4.7.1.5 to more closely reflect TS 3.7.2 contained in NUREG-1432, Revision 2, "Standard Technical Specification, Combustion Engineering Plants, ". In addition, this change removes the MSIVs from the scope of containment isolation valve TS 3/4.6.3 such that only TS 3/4.7.1.5 will apply to the MSIVs. These changes provide increased flexibility and clarity regarding the implementation of the TSs regarding MSIVs.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

N. Kalyanam, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate IV
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-382

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 190 to NPF-38
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC	PDIV-1 Reading	RidsNrrDlpmPdiv (HBerkow)
RidsNrrDlpmPdivLpdiv1 (RGramm)		RidsNrrPMNKalyanam
RidsNrrLADJohnson	RidsOgcRp	RidsAcrcAcnwMailCenter
G.Hill(2)	DRIP/RORP/TSS	JGolla (DSSA/SPLB)
RGiardina(DRIP/RORP)	RidsRgn4MailCenter (AHowell)	

Package No.: ML033010126 TS: ML033000014

ADAMS Accession No.: ML033010116

*No significant change from the SE input from SPLB dated 10/02/03,
which contains the concurrence for the three Tech Branches.

OFFICE	PDIV-1/PM	PDIV-1/LA	DSSA/SPLB*	DSSA/SPSB*	DIPM/IROB*	OGC	PDIV-1/SC
NAME	NKalyanam	DJohnson	DSolorio/RDennig/TBoyce			AFernandez	RGramm
DATE	10/07/03	10/07/03	10/02/03			10/18/03	10/20/03

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-382

WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 190
License No. NPF-38

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI) dated December 16, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated September 11, 2003, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.2. of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

- The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 190, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. EOI shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate IV
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 21, 2003

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 190

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-38

DOCKET NO. 50-382

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

VIII

3/4 6-19

3/4 7-9

Insert

VIII

3/4 6-19

3/4 7-9

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 190 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-38

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3

DOCKET NO. 50-382

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated December 16, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated September 11, 2003, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy or the licensee), requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3).

The proposed changes would revise the TSs by revising the current main steam isolation valve (MSIV) TS 3/4.7.1.5 to more closely reflect TS 3.7.2 contained in NUREG-1432, Revision 2, "Standard Technical Specification, Combustion Engineering Plants." In addition, this change will remove the MSIVs from the scope of containment isolation valve (CIV) TS 3/4.6.3 such that only TS 3/4.7.1.5 will apply to the MSIVs. These changes will provide increased flexibility and clarity regarding the implementation of the TSs regarding MSIVs.

The licensee attached a revised no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination with the supplement dated September 11, 2003. This revised NSHC determination contained minor wording changes as compared with the NSHC determination sent with the original application dated December 16, 2002, changes made to reflect the new TS changes, and provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the conclusions of the NSHC determination as published in the *Federal Register* on February 4, 2003, (68 FR 5671).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

As described in the Waterford 3 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the regulatory bases that apply to this license amendment request are NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan," Section 6.2.4, "Containment Isolation System;" 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B for leakage testing of containment isolation valves; American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI for Inservice Testing (closure time) of CIVs; and General Design Criterion 57, "Closed system isolation valves."

The basis the staff will use to determine if the changes are acceptable is conformance to the existing regulatory basis and the precedents that have been established by License Amendments 54 and 40 to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-87 and NPF-89 for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 (Comanche Peak). These license

amendments revised Section 3.7.1.5 of the Comanche Peak TSs to increase the allowed outage time (AOT) for one inoperable MSIV while in MODE 1, and to clarify requirements related to inoperable MSIVs while in MODES 2 and 3. Finally, consistency with the provisions of NUREG-1432 is considered to be sufficient basis for accepting proposed TS changes where plant-specific considerations are judged to be commensurate with the basis of the corresponding NUREG-1432 guidance.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

Current TSs (CTS) include requirements for the MSIVs in TS 3/4.7.1.5, "Main Steam Isolation Valves," and also in TS 3/4.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves." In addition to the MSIV's function to isolate the steam generators, they also serve a containment isolation valve function. With this change request, the licensee is proposing to consolidate all TS requirements for the MSIVs into MSIV TS 3/4.7.1.5. This change would, therefore, delete the MSIV requirements from CIV TS 3/4.6.3 and add these to TS 3/4.7.1.5. Combustion Engineering Standard Technical Specifications (STS) include requirements for the MSIVs in both locations. This Safety Evaluation will, therefore, provide an evaluation of the proposed changes in light of the requested removal of MSIV requirements from CIV TS 3/4.6.3.

CTS Limiting Condition For Operation (LCO) 3.7.1.5 reads:

PLANT SYSTEMS

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

MODE 1

With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

MODES 2, 3, and 4

With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, subsequent operation in MODE 2, 3, or 4 may proceed provided:

- a. The isolation valve is maintained closed.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 4.0 seconds when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.

Proposed Technical Specification LCO 3.7.1.5 reads:

PLANT SYSTEMS

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES (MSIVs)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.5 Two MSIVs shall be OPERABLE

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, and
MODES 2, 3, and 4 except when all MSIVs are closed and deactivated.

ACTION:

MODE 1

With one MSIV inoperable, restore the valve to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or be in STARTUP within the next 6 hours.

MODES 2, 3, and 4

With one MSIV inoperable, close the valve within 8 hours and verify the valve is closed once per 7 days. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

Note: Required to be performed for entry into MODES 1 and 2 only.

4.7.1.5 Each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. By verifying full closure within 4.0 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
- b. By verifying each MSIV actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal at least once per 18 months.

The licensee proposes to change CTS 3/4.7.1.5 for MSIVs to include the applicable requirements of CTS 3/4.6.3 for CIVs and to more closely reflect the logic of the STS as follows:

3.1 Change to TS Title

It is proposed that the title line, "MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES," be modified by adding "(MSIVs)" at the end. This change is also proposed to be made on index page VIII.

Evaluation: This is a change consistent with the format of NUREG-1432 and has no effect on the intent or purpose of the TS. This change is acceptable.

3.2 Change to LCO 3.7.1.5

LCO 3.7.1.5 currently states, "Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE." The licensee is proposing this to be changed to read, "Two MSIVs shall be operable."

Evaluation: This change is consistent with the format of NUREG-1432 and is equivalent to the current wording because the Waterford 3 design incorporates exactly two MSIVs. Therefore, this change is acceptable.

3.3 Change to APPLICABILITY

TS 3/4.7.1.5 (Two MSIVs shall be OPERABLE) is currently applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. The licensee is proposing that the MODES of APPLICABILITY be revised to MODE 1, and MODES 2, 3, and 4 except when all MSIVs are closed and deactivated.

Evaluation: In MODES 2, 3, and 4, OPERABILITY of the MSIVs is not required if both MSIVs are closed and deactivated. The licensee stated that MSIVs in this CONDITION will be closed and deactivated under administrative control. The requirement to deactivate the valve is a consolidation from CIV TS 3/4.6.3. With both MSIVs closed in these MODES, the LCO and SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS are not needed and are not required to assure safe operation of the plant because the MSIVs are in their safety function position. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432 except for the inclusion of MODE 4. The inclusion of MODE 4 here is a consolidation from CIV TS 3/4.6.3 and satisfies that requirement. Therefore, the staff finds this change acceptable.

3.4 Change to ACTION, MODE 1

The MODE 1 ACTION statement currently states, "With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours." The licensee is proposing that this statement be revised to read, "With one MSIV inoperable, restore the valve to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or be in STARTUP within the next 6 hours."

Evaluation: The proposed ACTION increases the AOT to 8 hours, making the AOT less restrictive. However, as indicated in NUREG-1432, the staff has determined that an 8-hour

restoration time for the main steam isolation safety function is reasonable, considering the low likelihood of an accident occurring during this short time period that would require closure of the MSIVs. Also, this AOT is conservative with respect to AOT requirements for the containment isolation function of the MSIVs. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432 and with the 8 hour AOT that was approved for Comanche Peak. The staff finds this change acceptable.

Also, the proposed ACTION requires the plant to be in STARTUP (MODE 2) within 6 hours if restoration of the inoperable valve is not accomplished in 8 hours. This is an apparent less restrictive change because the CTS requires the plant to be in HOT STANDBY (MODE 3) within 6 hours if the inoperable MSIV is not restored to OPERABLE within its allowable time limit. However, the proposed change will require the plant to go to a MODE that exits the requirements of the ACTION statement. The provisions of the ACTIONS are no longer applicable once the MODE in which the ACTIONS are required is exited. The current ACTIONS for MODE 1 are not applicable once the plant reaches MODE 2, and the plant has the full 6 hours (currently provided to reach MODE 3) to reach MODE 2. Once the plant reaches MODE 2, a separate ACTION applies. These actions also satisfy the containment isolation safety function of the MSIVs and are in fact more restrictive. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432 and with Comanche Peak, therefore, the staff finds this portion of the proposed change acceptable.

3.5 Change to MODES 2, 3, and 4 ACTION

The licensee is proposing that the ACTION statement be revised to read, "With one MSIV inoperable, close the valve within 8 hours and verify the valve is closed once per 7 days. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable."

Evaluation: The current MODES 2, 3, and 4 ACTION directs closure of the inoperable MSIV if one of two is inoperable and permits continued operation. Two inoperable MSIVs is addressed by TS 3.0.3. The proposed MODES 2, 3, and 4 ACTION will permit continued operation with one inoperable MSIV as long as the inoperable MSIV is closed within 8 hours. This change is less restrictive.

The current ACTION requires valve closure to be performed immediately and does not allow the 8 hour restoration/closure time of the proposed ACTION. The licensee is proposing this 8-hour time period to allow some time for repair of the MSIVs with the plant hot. The likelihood of an accident occurring that would require closure of the MSIVs in this time period is small. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432 and with Comanche Peak, except for the inclusion of MODE 4. The inclusion of MODE 4 is a consolidation of CIV requirements. These actions also satisfy the containment isolation safety function of the MSIVs and are in fact more restrictive. The staff finds this change acceptable.

The current ACTION for an inoperable MSIV in MODES 2, 3, or 4 requires the MSIV to be maintained closed. The proposed ACTION retains this requirement (with 8 hour restoration time discussed above) and adds an ACTION for the affected MSIV to be verified closed once per 7 days. This change is conservative with regard to plant safety because it ensures that the inoperable valve remains in its safety function position. The change is also consistent with

NUREG-1432 and with Comanche Peak, and bounds the analogous requirement for CIVs which is to verify closure once per 31 days. For these reasons, the staff finds the change to be acceptable.

3.6 Change to SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.7.1.5 currently states, "Each main steam line isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 4.0 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5." The licensee is proposing to revise this SR by adding a Note and an additional requirement. Proposed new SR 4.7.1.5 will read:

Note: Required to be performed for entry into MODES 1 and 2 only.

4.7.1.5 Each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. By verifying full closure within 4.0 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
- b. By verifying each MSIV actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal at least once per 18 months.

Evaluation: The proposed change adds a Note that requires the SRs to be performed only for entry into MODES 1 and 2. The addition of this Note constitutes an apparent relaxation of current requirements for both the main steam and containment isolation functions since the proposed SR will allow entry into MODE 3 or 4 with the SR not performed for both MSIVs. This is requested, however, to allow testing at hot conditions which more closely simulates valve performance assumed in the safety analysis and may therefore enhance safety. The proposed change is consistent with NUREG-1432. As stated in NUREG-1432, "This test is conducted in MODE 3, with the unit at operating temperature and pressure. This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, in order to establish conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated." The staff finds this change acceptable.

Consolidating the CIV requirements with the MSIV requirements could potentially permit operation in MODES 3 and 4 without the MSIVs tested to satisfy containment isolation requirements. This is because the SR for the CIVs is applicable for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, while the SR for the MSIVs is applicable, due to the added Note, only for entry into MODES 1 and 2, as discussed above. However, it is highly unlikely that operation would be sustained in either MODE 3 or 4 for a duration that would permit exceeding the inservice testing frequency of the CIVs. The staff finds the provision, as stated by the Note in proposed SR 4.7.1.5 that the SR is required to be performed for entry into MODES 1 and 2 only, acceptable. Therefore, the staff finds the consolidation of the SRs for the containment isolation safety function and the main steam isolation safety function of the MSIVs into SR 4.7.1.5 to be acceptable.

Removing the MSIVs from the scope of current CIV SR 4.6.3.1 will introduce an apparent, less restrictive condition in that they will no longer be included among valves that are required by SR 4.6.3.1 to be "demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance..." However, the licensee stated that the Entergy Quality Assurance Program Manual establishes requirements, based on 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, to have a test control

program that includes post-maintenance testing. This requirement, in conjunction with SR 4.0.2 and TS 3.0.5, ensures that appropriate testing is performed prior to returning a component to service, and the proposed change is, therefore, acceptable.

The proposed change adds a SR that verifies each MSIV actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal at least once per 18 months. This change is more restrictive because it adds a new SR to TS 3/4.7.1.5. This change ensures that automatic closure capabilities are proven for OPERABILITY of the MSIVs and is consistent with NUREG-1432 for both MSIVs and CIVs, and with current Waterford 3 CIV requirements. The staff finds the adoption of this requirement acceptable.

3.7 Technical Requirements Manual Changes

The MSIVs are currently listed in the licensee's Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) on Table 3.6-2, "Containment Isolation Valves." Valves listed in this table are subject to the requirements of TS 3/4.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves." The proposed changes discussed above will consolidate the requirements associated with the MSIVs for both main steam line isolation and containment isolation into TS 3/4.7.1.5. This change will be implemented by the licensee upon approval of the proposed changes to TS 3/4.7.1.5 by removing the MSIVs from TRM Table 3.6-2. The licensee stated that consolidation of the MSIV OPERABILITY requirements under one TS is consistent with the treatment of the Waterford 3 main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs) which are addressed by a single TS approved by License Amendment 167, issued on September 5, 2000. The MSIVs and the MFIVs both close upon receipt of a main steam isolation signal and serve a containment isolation function. The licensee stated that the MSIVs, like the MFIVs, will continue to be listed as CIVs in FSAR Table 6.3-32 and will continue to comply with all CIV requirements as they currently do except that TS 3/4.6.3 will no longer apply to them. The staff acknowledges this concurrent change to the Waterford 3 TRM.

3.8 TS 3/4.6.3 Administrative Change

TS 3/4.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves," currently contains a footnote that states, "Containment Spray Valves CS-125 A and/or B may be left in the Open position until startup (prior to entering Mode 4) following Refueling Outage 6." Refueling Outage 6 was completed in April of 1994. This interim position was added to the TSs by License Amendment 86, issued on October 1, 1993, to address OPERABILITY concerns with CS-125A(B) identified during Cycle 6. The staff acknowledges this administrative change to delete an interim position that has expired.

4.0 SUMMARY

Based on the evaluation of the proposed changes to TS 3/4.7.1.5 and the TRM as discussed above, the staff concludes that the proposed revision more closely reflects the logic and intent of STS 3.7.2, that MSIV OPERABILITY will continue to be insured by the proposed changes, and that applicable regulatory requirements continue to be met for the function of the MSIVs as CIVs. The revision to TS 3/4.7.1.5 and the TRM described above is, therefore, acceptable.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (68 FR 5671, dated February 4, 2003). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: J. Golla

Date: October 21, 2003

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

cc:

Mr. Michael E. Henry, State Liaison Officer
Department of Environmental Quality
Permits Division
P.O. Box 4313
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-4313

Vice President, Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P. O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Director
Nuclear Safety Assurance
Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road
Killona, LA 70066-0751

Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway
P. O. Box 651
Jackson, MS 39205

General Manager Plant Operations
Waterford 3 SES
Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road
Killona, LA 70066-0751

Licensing Manager
Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road
Killona, LA 70066-0751

Winston & Strawn
1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-3502

Resident Inspector/Waterford NPS
P. O. Box 822
Killona, LA 70066-0751

Regional Administrator, Region IV
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

Parish President Council
St. Charles Parish
P. O. Box 302
Hahnville, LA 70057

Executive Vice President
& Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P. O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Chairman
Louisiana Public Services Commission
P. O. Box 91154
Baton Rouge, LA 70825-1697