

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-03-016B

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of possible safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region II staff (Atlanta, Georgia) on this date.

Facility

Tennessee Valley Authority
Sequoyah Unit 1
Soddy-Daisy, TN
Dockets/License: 50-327 / DPR-77

Licensee Emergency Classification

	Notification of Unusual Event
X	Alert
	Site Area Emergency
	General Emergency
	Not Applicable

Subject: Update on Alert at Sequoyah Unit 1 - AIT Downgraded to a Special Inspection

A NRC Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) reported to the site on Friday, August 29 to determine the facts surrounding the turbine and manual reactor trip of August 28 and the subsequent licensee Alert declaration. The AIT assessed the licensee response to the event and reviewed the sequence of events to assess why the reactor apparently did not automatically trip following a turbine generator trip. The team verified that operators promptly and conservatively manually tripped the reactor when the transient became evident before any reactor protection system (RPS) setpoints were reached. The team verified that the RPS had operated as designed in response to the manual trip and did shutdown the reactor.

The team subsequently verified that the inadvertent generator trip that initiated the transient did not call for an immediate turbine or automatic reactor trip signal. An isolation valve in a line supplying a turbine control pressure switch was found to have been incorrectly left closed. This isolated pressure switch, in conjunction with routine turbine testing being conducted just prior to the event, initiated the transient which resulted in a generator trip without initiating a turbine trip or a resultant automatic reactor trip signal. The turbine subsequently automatically tripped as a result of the manual reactor trip. The licensee is continuing to investigate the cause of the isolated pressure switch.

Since the RPS was not called upon to trip the reactor or turbine and because RPS worked when actuated manually, the potential safety implications of this transient were assessed by NRC staff to be significantly less than originally indicated. Therefore, following NRC management briefings on Saturday August 30, the AIT was downgraded to a Special Inspection.

A public exit for the inspection team is being scheduled for this week.

This information presented herein has been discussed with the licensee/State and is current as of 10:00 a.m., September 2, 2003.

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