

August 15, 2003

Mr. Robert L. Clark  
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject: Follow-up Summary of Close-Out of August 14, 2003  
Unusual Event Classification  
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation  
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant  
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Clark:

In accordance with NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 reporting requirements which requires a written summary of "close-out or class reduction conditions", the attached close-out summary for the August 14, 2003 Unusual Event classification is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Thomas Harding, 585-771-3384.

Very truly yours,

  
Robert C. Mecredy

attachment

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U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

## Attachment to close-out of August 14, 2003 Unusual Event Classification

On August 14, 2003, with the plant at 100% power, a major electrical grid disturbance occurred at approximately 1611 hours EDT. This disturbance caused degraded frequency and voltage conditions on the incoming offsite power feeding the facility. An automatic reactor trip occurred and all emergency systems operated as expected. Due to the uncertainty regarding stability of the offsite power, an unusual event was declared in accordance with plant procedure EPIP 1-0, "Ginna Station Event Evaluation and Classification". This was declared under Emergency Action Level (EAL) criteria 6.1.1, (Loss of ability to supply power to the safeguard trains from circuits 751 and 767 for greater than 15 minutes). At approximately 1646 hours EDT offsite notifications were made in accordance with plant procedure EPIP 1-5, "Notifications".

When the grid instabilities were diagnosed, the onsite emergency diesel generators were manually started, loaded, and subsequently supplied emergency power to vital station electrical loads.

Power was subsequently stabilized on circuits 751 and 767.

At approximately 2108 hours EDT on August 14, 2003 offsite grid power and frequency had been demonstrated stable and reliable. Vital station electrical loads were transferred back to offsite power sources and the unusual event was terminated.