

July 21, 2003

Dear Mr. Takahashi:

I am responding on behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to your e-mail, dated June 19, 2003, to Chairman Nils Diaz, in which you requested more information on the approved changes to the Design Basis Threat (DBT), and security personnel working hours, training, and qualification requirements. These approved changes were issued in three Orders to the applicable NRC licensees on April 29, 2003.

The DBT describes the adversary force composition and characteristics against which licensees design their physical protection systems and response strategies. NRC has defined two DBTs, one for radiological sabotage and the other for theft or diversion of nuclear material. Under NRC regulations, nuclear power reactor and selected fuel fabrication facility licensees must ensure that the physical protection plan for each site is designed and implemented to provide high assurance in defending against the DBT to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and common defense and security. These licensees are required to revise their security plans to protect against the DBTs. The details of the revised DBTs are sensitive security information and cannot be released to the public.

The Order regarding working hours imposes controls on the hours security force personnel can work at power reactor sites. The Order establishes requirements to limit security force personnel working hours to provide reasonable assurance that the effects of fatigue will not adversely impact the readiness of security officers in performing their duties. The Order allows for increases in work hours depending on the plant operating status and security threat conditions. This Order is publicly available on NRC's website at:

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/security/2003/ml030940198-ffd-04-29-03.pdf> .

The Order, you inquired about, describes additional requirements for enhanced training and qualification of armed security personnel at nuclear power reactor facilities. These additional measures include security drills and exercises appropriate for the protective strategies and capabilities required to protect the nuclear power plants against sabotage by an assaulting force. This Order requires more frequent firearms training and qualification under a broader range of conditions consistent with site-specific protective strategies. The details of the enhanced training requirements are sensitive security information, and cannot be released to the public.

Thank you for your interest in NRC's recent developments and enhancements in nuclear security. If you have any additional questions, please feel free to contact me at kdb@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Kevin Burke
Senior International Relations Officer
Office of International Programs

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