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May 30, 2003

Docket Nos.: 50-321
50-366

NL-03-1178

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Control Room AC System
Documentation of Teleconference Regarding a
Request for Enforcement Discretion

Ladies and Gentlemen:

During a telephone-conference on May 28, 2003 enforcement discretion was discussed with the NRC staff that would have extended the completion time for Plant Hatch (HNP) Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.5 D.1 for a period of 72 hours from 1:20 PM EDT on May 28, 2003 through 1:20 PM EDT on May 31. The Enclosure to this letter provides details of the topics discussed during this telephone conference, including the eleven specific items listed in section C.4.0 of NRC's manual on Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOED), revised November 2, 2001. During the telephone conference, actions were completed that resulted in the plant exiting TS Required Action Statement (RAS) 3.7.5.D.1. On a follow-up telephone conference, also on May 28, 2003 Southern Nuclear (SNC) confirmed for NRC that the RAS for TS 3.7.5.D.1 had been cleared. On that basis, SNC withdrew its request for enforcement discretion associated with the RAS.

Although approval of the request was not formally granted by NRC during the teleconferences, this letter is being submitted, as requested by NRC, to document the details of the teleconference, including a discussion of the circumstances leading to the determination that the NOED was not needed. The enclosure to this letter provides the requested discussion.

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This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted,

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY


for H. L. Sumner, Jr.

HLS/IFL/daj

Enclosure: Documentation of Teleconference Regarding Enforcement Discretion

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company
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Mr. G. R. Frederick, General Manager – Plant Hatch
Document Services RTYPE: CHA02.004

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator
Mr. S. D. Bloom, NRR Project Manager – Hatch
Mr. N. P. Garrett, Acting Senior Resident Inspector – Hatch

State of Georgia
Mr. L. C. Barrett, Commissioner – Department of Natural Resources

Enclosure

Documentation of Teleconference Regarding Enforcement Discretion

Documentation of Teleconference Regarding Enforcement Discretion

1. The TS or other license conditions that will be violated.

SNC Response:

The requested enforcement discretion was related to Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TS) Required Action Statement (RAS) 3.7.5.D.1

2. The circumstances surrounding the situation, including apparent root causes, the need for prompt action and identification of any relevant historical events.

SNC Response:

TS 3.7.5, Control Room AC System requires that three control room AC subsystems shall be OPERABLE. On May 28, 2003, the "A" subsystem of the control AC system was out of service for maintenance and the control room environment was being maintained by the "B" and "C" subsystems. At 1:20 AM EDT the "B" subsystem of the control room AC system was declared inoperable. The "B" subsystem had been manually shut down previously by control room personnel for normal control room environmental control, but did not restart when control room personnel subsequently manually initiated the subsystem. With two subsystems of the control room AC system not operable, TS 3.7.5 D was entered. The required action and completion time for RAS 3.7.5 D.1 is to be in MODE 3 in 12 hours.

During the telephone conference, plant actions were completed that resulted in restoring the "B" subsystem to OPERABLE status. With operability of the "B" subsystem restored, the 12-hour RAS was cleared, obviating the need for the requested enforcement discretion.

3. The safety basis for the request, including an evaluation of the safety significance and potential consequences of the proposed course of action. This evaluation should include at least a qualitative risk assessment using both risk insights and informed judgements, as appropriate.

SNC Response:

The safety significance of the requested action was discussed. SNC stated that there would be essentially no change in risk associated with the requested plant configuration since both the "B" and "C" subsystems were in operation. Two subsystems in service is the normal configuration. NRC requested that SNC provide risk data associated with the configuration. The following data addresses the NRC request:

Failure to Run Probabilities and Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) values for each Main Control Room Air Handling Unit are as follows. These values come from the Hatch average risk Cafta model (Rev 1) for Unit 1.

Air Handler Unit A (1Z41B003A)

Failure Probability = $2.0E-04$

RAW = 1.05

Air Handler Unit B (1Z41B003B)

Failure Probability = $2.0E-04$

RAW = 1.06

Air Handler Unit C (1Z41B003C)

Failure Probability = $2.0E-04$

RAW = 1.05

Incremental Conditional Core Damage Probability (ICCDP) and Incremental Conditional Large Early Release Probability (ICLERP) were calculated for the following conditions:

1. Base Case—A air conditioner out of service for maintenance; B and C air conditioners in operation.
2. Worst Case—A and B air conditioners are failed leaving only C air conditioner in operation.

The difference of the two cases was taken and multiplied by a $(3\text{Day} \div 365\text{Day})$ ratio to accommodate the requested NOED time.

The end results were that ICCDP and ICLERP were less than Regulatory Guide 1.177 values of $5.0E-7$ for ICCDP and $5.0E-8$ for ICLERP.

4. The justification for the duration of the noncompliance.

SNC Response:

The duration requested was defined by the schedule for completion of planned maintenance activity on the "A" subsystem to enhance its performance capability. The maintenance work schedule showed completion of work on the subsystem, including post-maintenance functional testing, late Friday, May 30, 2003. In order to assure that the "A" subsystem was restored to operable status and was placed in operation prior to expiration of the requested period of enforcement discretion, a period of 72 hours that would have extended to 1:20 PM EDT Saturday, June 1, 2003 was requested. With the "A" and "C" subsystems operable, the "B" subsystem could have then been removed from service for evaluation and maintenance as required. The safety basis to support the requested time period is described in the response to item 3, above.

5. The basis for the licensee's conclusion that the noncompliance will not be of potential detriment to the public health and safety and that no significant hazard consideration is involved.

SNC Response:

As discussed in the response to item 3, above, with two subsystems in operation, the actual plant configuration is no different from the configuration required by the Technical Specifications. Consequently, the plant risk model would show minimal change in risk as a result of operating in the requested configuration. In brief, because a new or different mode of operation was not requested, and because no change in operational configuration was contemplated, noncompliance with the subject RAS would not have been of potential detriment to the public health and safety and would not have constituted a significant hazards consideration.

6. The basis for the licensee's conclusion that the noncompliance will not involve adverse consequences to the environment.

SNC Response:

For the same reasons set forth in the response to item 5, the requested noncompliance would not have involved adverse consequences to the environment.

7. Any proposed compensatory measures.

SNC Response:

During the telephone conference, SNC discussed the following compensatory measures with NRC. Should the NOED be granted, SNC would

- a) Place caution tags on the "B" and "C" subsystems controls, alerting operations personnel to leave the "B" subsystem in operation and to manage control room environmental conditions via the "C" subsystem. In practice this is performed by switching the "C" subsystem on and off.
- b) Prepare a Temporary Modification that would be available for use on the "B" subsystem as a contingency should the subsystem stop operation during the requested time period and not restart by operation of the control switch. The Temporary Modification would jumper a seal-in relay that is used in starting the subsystem. This relay performs no other function and does not change states based on other signals. Thus, the relay is not a factor in the performance of the safety-related function of the subsystem. The apparent causes of the failure of the "B" subsystem to start on demand relate to this relay.
- c) Maintenance work on support systems relevant to the "B" and "C" subsystems would be curtailed during the requested time period, or until the "A" subsystem was restored to operable status and in service.

8. A statement that the request has been approved by the facility organization that normally reviews safety issues (Plant On-site Review Committee, or its equivalent).

SNC Response:

The requested time frame and the compensatory measures described in response to item 7 were reviewed and approved by the Plant Review Board.

9. **The request must specifically address which of the NOED criteria for appropriate plant conditions specified in Section B is satisfied and how it is satisfied.**

SNC Response:

The request was for a "normal" NOED pursuant to Section B.2.1, Item 1.a, related to avoidance of unnecessary transients as a result of compliance with a TS RAS, thus minimizing potential safety consequences and operational risks. By providing enforcement discretion related to the RAS, the operational evolution of performing a simultaneous dual unit shutdown would be avoided. Because the RAS was exited prior to expiration of the required completion time, the enforcement discretion was not required.

10. **If a follow-up license amendment is required, both the written NOED request and the license amendment request must be submitted within 2 working days. The licensee's amendment request must describe and justify the exigent circumstances (see 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6)).**

SNC Response:

Item 10 is not applicable for this request.

11. **For severe weather or other natural phenomena-related NOEDs, the licensee's request must be sufficiently detailed for the staff to evaluate the likelihood that the event could affect the plant, the capability of the ultimate heat sink, on-site and off-site emergency preparedness status, access to and from the plant, acceptability of any increased radiological risk to the public and the overall public benefit. In addition to items 1-10 above, as appropriate, the licensee must provide:**

- a. **details of the basis and nature of the emergency; potential consequences of compliance with the license conditions to the plant and the emergency situation. The licensee must provide the name, organization and telephone number of the official who made the emergency assessment**
- b. **status, and potential challenges to off-site and on-site power sources, and the impact of the emergency on plant safety.**
- c. **demonstrated actions taken to avert and/or alleviate the emergency situation, including steps taken to avoid being in the noncompliance, as well as efforts to minimize grid instabilities (e.g., coordinating with other utilities and the load dispatcher organization for buying additional power or for cycling load, or shedding interruptible industrial or non-emergency loads).**

SNC Response:

Item 11 is not applicable for this request.

Additional Questions from May 28, 2003 conference call.

NRC – Has the “B” subsystem been stopped and restarted since it began operating?

Answer – No, it has continued to operate since it began operation during maintenance diagnostic checks.

NRC – Does Hatch have confidence that the “B” subsystem will continue to operate for the requested 72 hour extension?

Answer – Yes, the relay that is considered to be the cause of the failure to restart is only required for restart and now that the “B” subsystem is operating it should continue to operate. A Temporary Modification has been approved to facilitate the restart of “B” in the event it is stopped.

NRC – Are there any indications of other concerns with the “B” subsystem?

Answer – No, the relay is considered to be the cause of the “B” failure to restart.

NRC – Has the relay been checked for operations other than restart?

Answer – The relay is for restart.

NRC – What if the control room temperature gets too cold again?

Answer – The “C” subsystem will be cycled to control temperature.

NRC- Are there compensatory measures in the event of failure of “B?”

Answer – If the Temporary Modification does not result in a restart, the Required Action will be for both Hatch units to be shutdown.

NRC – Is the relay required to cycle “B” on and off?

Answer – The relay is only used for restart after a manual shutdown. It is not required to cycle “B” due to load.

NRC – In modeling, is only one subsystem required?

Answer – Normally two are required.

NRC – Discuss the interface with the Filtration system.

Answer – The Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) system is operable and other modes of operation (Pressurization and Purge) are available. Filtration is not modeled in PRA.

NRC – Is the relay a lock in, or seal-in interlock relay? Are there other signals which could prevent its operation?

Answer – The relay is a normally energized seal-in relay after start up.

NRC – What is the effect on risk of taking one subsystem out of service?

Answer – The PRA analysis is from an equipment reliability perspective rather than operator comfort.

NRC – With two subsystems operating, is there any change to risk from the TS requirement?

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Answer – No, there is no change to risk.

NRC – Is the Temporary Modification a compensatory measure?

Answer – Yes, in the event of a trip to “B” and failure to restart, the TM would be used to attempt a restart.

NRC – Will maintenance activities continue on “B” and “C” subsystems?

Answer – No, until the “A” subsystem is returned to service.