



Entergy Operations, Inc.  
River Bend Station  
5485 U.S. Highway 61  
P. O. Box 220  
St. Francisville, LA 70775  
Tel 225 336 6225  
Fax 225 635 5068

Rick J. King  
Director  
Nuclear Safety Assurance

May 6, 2003

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: River Bend Station  
Docket No. 50-458  
License No. NPF-47  
Licensee Event Report 50-458 / 03-002-00

File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

RBG-46119  
RBF1-03-0075

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, enclosed is the subject Licensee Event Report.  
There are no commitments in this document.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. Leavins for".

RJK/dhw  
enclosure

JEZ

Licensee Event Report 50-458 / 03-002-00  
May 6, 2003  
RBG-46119  
Page 2 of 2

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region IV  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400  
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Sr. Resident Inspector  
P. O. Box 1050  
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center  
E-Mail

Mr. Jim Calloway  
Public Utility Commission of Texas  
1701 N. Congress Ave.  
Austin, TX 78711-3326

Mr. Prosanta Chowdhury  
Program Manager – Surveillance Division  
Louisiana DEQ  
Office of Radiological Emergency Planning and Response  
P. O. Box 82215  
Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2215

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of  
digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to [bis1@nrc.gov](mailto:bis1@nrc.gov), and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1) River Bend Station						DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050- 458			PAGE (3) 1 OF 3		
TITLE (4) Secondary Containment Door Failure Due to Malfunction of Door Assist Device											
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
03	07	2003	2003	002	00	05	06	2003		05000	
OPERATING MODE (9)			1			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10)			87%			20.2201(b)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		
						20.2201(d)			20.2203(a)(4)		
						20.2203(a)(1)			50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		
						20.2203(a)(2)(i)			50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)		
						20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)		
						20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.46(a)(3)(ii) X		
						20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		
						20.2203(a)(2)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		
						20.2203(a)(2)(vi)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		
						20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		
									50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)		
									50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)		
									50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)		
									50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)		
									50.73(a)(2)(vii)		
									50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
									50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)											
NAME J.W. Leavines, Manager - Licensing						TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 225-381-4642					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU- FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU- FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX		
B	NF	DR	Overly Door Co.	YES							
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)						EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)			MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).				NO				06	30	2003
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)											
<p>On March 7, 2003, at approximately 2:31 p.m. CST, the door assist device (DAD) on a secondary containment door in the auxiliary building failed, blocking the door open for a period of 78 minutes. At the time, the reactor was operating at approximately 87 percent power in end-of-cycle coastdown. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(c) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of secondary containment. The failure analysis of the DAD is still in progress. A full analysis and corrective action plan will be provided in a supplement to this LER. There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public. Engineering evaluations have shown that, had a design basis accident occurred while the condition existed, the main control room, exclusion area boundary, and low population zone doses would have remained within the limits of 10CFR50.67.</p>											

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
River Bend Station	050-458	2003	- 002	- 00	2 OF 3

**NARRATIVE** (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

**REPORTED CONDITION**

On March 7, 2003, at approximately 2:31 p.m. CST, the door assist device (DAD) on a secondary containment door in the auxiliary building failed, blocking the door (\*\*DR\*\*) open for a period of 78 minutes. At the time, the reactor was operating at approximately 87 percent power in end-of-cycle coastdown. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(c) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of secondary containment.

**INVESTIGATION and IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION**

Three secondary containment doors used for personnel access to the auxiliary building are equipped with assist devices that ease the opening of the door against differential pressure. The ventilation system draws a slight negative pressure in the building when operating normally, and in this condition, the doors may be opened manually without the use of the assist devices. When the standby gas treatment (GTS) system is operating, the differential pressure is greater, such that the doors are difficult to open. The assist device incorporates a gear-operated jack that opens the door far enough to break the differential pressure, allowing the door to be fully opened by hand.

At the time of the event, the GTS system was running for a surveillance test, causing the differential pressure across the doors to be higher than normal. At 2:31 p.m., the door was opened by a station employee using the assist device. An apparent internal failure of the assist device caused the jack to stick in the extended position. The jack could not be retracted, thus the door could not be fully closed. Approximately 78 minutes later, the assist device was removed, and the door was successfully closed. The assist device is not necessary for the safety function of the door, and it has not been re-installed pending completion of the failure analysis.

**CAUSAL ANALYSIS**

The failure analysis of the DAD is still in progress. A full analysis and corrective action plan will be provided in a supplement to this LER.

**PREVIOUS OCCURRENCE EVALUATION**

A similar event occurred on August 8, 2000, as reported in LER 50-458/00-011-00. An evaluation of the effectiveness of the corrective actions taken for that event will be provided in a supplement to this LER.

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
		2003	- 002	- 00	
River Bend Station	050-458	2003	- 002	- 00	3 OF 3

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

## SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

During the time the door was blocked open, the plant continued to operate normally. There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public. Engineering evaluations have shown that, had a design basis accident occurred while the condition existed, the main control room, exclusion area boundary, and low population zone doses would have remained within the limits of 10CFR50.67.

(NOTE: Energy Industry Component Identification codes are annotated as (\*\*XX\*\*).)