Indiana Michigan
Power Company
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INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER

April 28, 2003

AEP:NRC:3000

Docket Nos.: 50-315
50-316

J. E. Dyer, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
RGN-III/ORA
801 Warrenville Road
Lisle, IL 60532-4351

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2
RESPONSE TO APRIL 24, 2003, FISH INTRUSION EVENT

As the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff is aware, on April 24, 2003, at 3:48 a.m., Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M) declared an alert at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP). A large influx of alewives led to a manual trip of both units and reduced cooling flow to safety-related equipment. I&M is primarily focused on maintaining the plant in a safe condition and is continuing to aggressively investigate this event. In light of the significance of this event and the ongoing 95002 inspections, I&M is providing a summary of the actions planned and underway.

CNP Unit 1 is currently in cold shutdown. CNP Unit 2 is currently in hot shutdown, proceeding to cold shutdown. I&M will not recommence power operation on either unit until the staff has been briefed concerning completion of the following seven actions:

1. Open and inspect the ESW strainer baskets. Evaluate the adequacy of the ESW strainer basket design, maintenance and inspection practices, and repair and revise as required.

2. Open, inspect, and clean, as required, the safety-related heat exchangers serviced by ESW.

3. Perform a root cause analysis of the event, including the effect of foreign material on ESW system operation. Perform an assessment of this event with respect to the August 2001 ESW degraded flow event.

4. Repair damage to the traveling water screens resulting from this event.

5. Augment the procedural guidance for the operation of the plant under abnormal lake conditions.

6. Evaluate the adequacy of operator response and emergency plan performance during this event.

7. Evaluate the safety significance of this event.

I&M will continue the ongoing evaluation of design improvements for CNP traveling water screens. I&M will also evaluate methods to detect and mitigate the effect of future alewife influxes. Further, as we presented to the staff on April 10, 2003, during our end-of-cycle/regulatory performance meeting and in response to the 95002 inspection, CNP is continuing with improvements to address the CNP corrective action program implementation issues. Interim actions include issuance of a corrective action stop work order on March 11, 2003, and the establishment of a Corrective Action Closure Board.

I&M will keep the staff informed about progress on these actions. Should questions arise regarding this plan of action, please contact Ms. Pamela B. Cowan, Manager of System Engineering, at (269) 466-2549.

Sincerely,

A. C. Bakken, III
Senior Vice President

BM/dmb

Attachment

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ATTACHMENT TO AEP:NRC:3000

COMMITMENTS

The following table identifies those actions committed to by Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M) in this document. Any other actions discussed in this submittal represent intended or planned actions by I&M. They are described to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.

Commitment	Date
I&M will not recommence power operation on either unit until the staff has been briefed concerning completion of the following seven actions: 1. Open and inspect the essential service water (ESW) strainer baskets. Evaluate the adequacy of the ESW strainer basket design, maintenance and inspection practices, and repair and revise as required. 2. Open, inspect, and clean, as required, the safety-related heat exchangers serviced by ESW. 3. Perform a root cause analysis of the event, including the effect of foreign material on ESW system operation. Perform an assessment of this event with respect to the August 2001 ESW degraded flow event. 4. Repair damage to the traveling water screens resulting from this event. 5. Augment the procedural guidance for the operation of the plant under abnormal lake conditions. 6. Evaluate the adequacy of operator response and emergency plan performance during this event. 7. Evaluate the safety significance of this event.	Unit 1 – Mode 2 Unit 2 – Mode 2