



APPENDIX E Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Programs At Other Generator/Storage Locations

Department of Energy
 Programmatic
 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management
 and
 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
 Environmental Restoration and
 Waste Management Programs
 Environmental Impact Statement
 Preliminary Final
 Volume 1
 Appendix E
 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Programs
 At Other Generator/Storage Locations
 March 24, 1995
 U.S. Department of Energy
 Office of Environmental Management
 Idaho Operations Office

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION	1-1
2. SNF MANAGEMENT AT ORIGINATING SITES	2-1
2.1 Overview of SNF Types, Inventories, and Generation Rates	2-1
2.1.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small-Quantity Storage	2-2
2.1.2 Domestic Licensed Research Reactors	2-6
2.1.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel	2-15
2.2 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program Plans and Alternatives	2-17
2.2.1 No Action	2-17
2.2.2 Decentralization	2-20
2.2.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis	2-21
2.2.4 Regionalization	2-22
2.2.5 Centralization	2-22
3. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENTS	3-1
3.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small-Quantity Storage	3-1
3.1.1 Brookhaven National Laboratory	3-1
3.1.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory	3-8
3.1.3 Sandia National Laboratories	3-15
3.1.4 Argonne National Laboratory - East	3-23
3.2 Domestic Research Reactors	3-33
3.2.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology Research Reactor	3-34
3.2.2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research Reactor	3-37
3.2.3 University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor	3-39
3.2.4 University of Michigan Ford Nuclear Reactor	3-41
3.2.5 University of Texas TRIGA	3-43
3.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel	3-45
3.3.1 West Valley Demonstration Project	3-46
3.3.2 Fort St. Vrain	3-52
3.3.3 B&W Lynchburg	3-58
4. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES	4-1
4.1 No Action	4-1
4.1.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small-Quantity Storage	4-1

4.1.2	Domestic Research Reactors	4-4
4.1.3	Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel	4-7
4.2	Decentralization	4-9
4.3	1992/1993 Planning Basis	4-10
4.4	Regionalization	4-10
4.5	Centralization	4-10
5.	CUMULATIVE IMPACTS	5-1
5.1	DOE Test and Experimental Reactors	5-1
5.1.1	Brookhaven National Laboratory	5-1
5.1.2	Los Alamos National Laboratory	5-2
5.1.3	Sandia National Laboratories	5-2
5.1.4	Argonne National Laboratory - East	5-2
5.2	Domestic Research Reactors	5-2
5.2.1	National Institute of Standards and Technology	5-2
5.2.2	Massachusetts Institute of Technology	5-3
5.2.3	Conclusion	5-3
5.3	Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel	5-3
6.	ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS THAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED	6-1
6.1	DOE Test and Experimental Reactors	6-1
6.2	Domestic Research Reactors	6-1
6.3	Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel	6-2
7.	IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENTS OF RESOURCES	7-1
7.1	DOE Test and Experimental Reactors	7-1
7.2	Domestic Research Reactors	7-1
7.3	Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel	7-2
TABLES		
2.1-1	Domestic non-DOE research reactors	2-7
2.1-2	Category 1 projected SNF inventories	2-12
2.1-3	Category 2 projected SNF inventories	2-13

1. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is performing a DOE-wide programmatic evaluation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management alternatives in order to determine appropriate means of managing existing and projected quantities of SNF from now until 2035. At the same time, the DOE is performing a site-specific assessment of the Idaho Engineering Laboratory (INEL) in order to determine how to manage environmental resources, waste management, and SNF at the INEL. Sites currently involved with the management of major fractions of DOE SNF (i.e., the Hanford Site, Savannah River Site, and INEL), sites being analyzed for management of SNF (Oak Ridge Reservation and Nevada Test Site) and sites involved with management of SNF from Naval Reactors are addressed in separate appendixes to this volume of the environmental impact statement (EIS).

This appendix addresses other DOE sites and locations which currently generate and/or manage small quantities of SNF. These facilities are presently storing and/or generating SNF, relatively small quantities of SNF which the DOE has taken title to, has possession of, or will take possession of at sometime in the future. These facilities, referred to as "originating sites," include the following:

- DOE, University, and Other Research and Test Reactors
- The following DOE facilities are addressed in this appendix:
 - Brookhaven National Laboratories
 - High Flux Beam Reactor
 - Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor
 - Los Alamos National Laboratory
 - Omega West Reactor
 - Chemistry-Metallurgy Research Facility
 - Sandia National Laboratories
 - Manzano Storage Structures
 - Annular Core Research Reactor
 - Sandia Pulse Reactor II and III and Critical Assembly
 - Hot Cell Facility
 - Special Nuclear Materials Storage Facility
 - Argonne National Laboratory - East
 - Alpha-Gamma Hot Cell

- Chicago Pile 5

In addition, the DOE has title to SNF from university and other domestic reactors. These facilities are identified and data provided on both the spent fuel in storage and estimates of the future generation rate of SNF at facilities. However, rather than address each of these university and other reactor facilities individually, representative facilities will be used where specific topics related to facilities, the SNF, or projected environmental impacts associated with the various fuel management alternatives.

- Commercial Power Reactor Fuels

The DOE has possession of 125 spent nuclear fuel assemblies and 20 complete sectioned spent nuclear fuel rods from various nuclear power plants that were used to support DOE-sponsored research and development programs. This SNF is currently in storage at either the West Valley Demonstration Project in West New York, or the B&W Lynchburg Technology Center in Campbell County, Virginia. In addition, according to the terms of a three-party agreement between the Services Company of Colorado, General Atomics, and the Atomic Energy Commission, the DOE has a commitment to provide dry storage at the INEL for eight segments of Fort St. Vrain spent fuel (approximately 1,920 spent fuel elements). Three of these SNF have been shipped to the INEL; the other five are currently being stored at the Fort St. Vrain site.

The DOE also has possession of other commercial SNF, including that from the Arkansas, Calvert Cliffs, Connecticut Yankee, Consolidated Edison, Cooper, H. B. Robinson, Monticello, Oconee, Peach Bottom, Point Beach, Quad Cities, Shippingport, Surry, and Three Mile Island reactors. These represent very small quantities of SNF and are currently stored at the Hanford Site, INEL, SRS, Reactor Facility at the INEL, or the ORR. This commercial SNF is addressed in the corresponding appendix for each of these sites and is not discussed in detail in this appendix.

Spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors which is currently at commercial reactor sites will fall under the purview of the DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management and is outside the scope of this EIS.

Although these facilities represent small sources of SNF, an evaluation has been conducted in order to consider the impacts at these originating sites along with the cumulative management of all DOE SNF.

Of the five SNF management alternatives being evaluated (Volume 1, Chapter 3), two alternatives that preclude the shipment of SNF (Alternative 1 - No Action and Alternative 2 - Decentralization) have a definable impact on the sites and facilities discussed in this appendix. Several facilities generating SNF have limited storage capacities, and/or the facilities are not licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to store SNF. The NRC may limit the quantity of fuel permitted to be stored onsite. Implementation of the No Action Alternative could mean that some of the facilities with limited SNF storage capacity would have to shut down. The impact on these facilities would be the need to construct additional onsite SNF storage capacity to continue safe operation. Expansion of SNF storage capacity is only viable provided space and adequate funding are available and expansion is approved through the NRC process.

In the case of the West Valley Demonstration Project, the SNF is currently being stored in accordance with the applicable DOE Orders. Extended storage of SNF at this site would require construction of a concrete pad for a dry storage facility. However, the DOE has an agreement with an agency of the State of New York to remove all SNF from the West Valley Demonstration Project. An extension to the schedule for removal of SNF has been requested by the DOE and the agreement with the state is being renegotiated.

The other alternatives, which involve the shipment of the SNF from the site at which it is generated to one or more DOE SNF interim storage facilities, reflect the current management at the generating facilities. Even though the selection of a site where the SNF is transported and stored may be different than the current planning basis, shipment to an interim storage location does not impact the facility or site at which the SNF is generated.

Section 2 of this appendix presents a description of SNF management at the originating sites, including an overview of the types and inventories for SNF in three major categories: test and experimental reactors; domestic research reactors; and nuclear power reactors. Section 3 presents summary descriptions of the potentially affected environments for each category, and Section 4 describes the environmental consequences of SNF management alternatives at these sites. Cumulative impacts are presented in Section 5, adverse impacts that cannot be avoided in Section 6, and irreversible and irretrievable commitments in Section 7.

2. SNF MANAGEMENT AT ORIGINATING SITES

2.1 Overview of SNF Types, Inventories, and Generation Rates

This appendix addresses the management of SNF at originating sites, defined as and experimental reactors, domestic research reactors, and certain nuclear power plant fuels now in storage. Specific discussions of the various sites are provided in following sections.

- DOE experimental reactors and small-quantity storage: These reactors and SN storage facilities are located on DOE-owned sites, such as Brookhaven National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories. These sites host a variety of research and development or production activities. These sites may include test or experimental reactors and storage of small quantities of SNF in different areas of the site.
- Domestic research reactors: The greatest variations in site characteristics associated with research reactors. Most sites are at colleges or universities, a few of them are sited at government and industrial facilities.
- Nuclear power plant spent fuel: The SNF in this category is not located at operating nuclear reactor facilities. The facilities housing the subject SNF are at the following sites: 1) the former West Valley fuel reprocessing site, 2) shutdown Fort St. Vrain nuclear power plant site (currently undergoing decommissioning), and 3) a commercial research laboratory (B&W Lynchburg Technology Center) located on a large rural site. The DOE also has possession of other commercial SNF, including that from the Arkansas, Calvert Cliffs, Con Yankee, Consolidated Edison, Cooper, Dresden H. B. Robinson, Monticello, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom, Point Beach, Quad Cities, Saxton, Shippingport, Surry, and Three Mile Island reactors. These represent very small quantities of SNF and are currently in storage at the Hanford Site, INEL, SRS, Naval Reactors Facility at the INEL, or the Savannah River. This commercial SNF is addressed in the corresponding appendix for each of these sites and is not discussed further in this appendix.

The SNFs addressed in this appendix are of varying sizes and design configurations. In general, nuclear fuel consists of an assembly of structural components, such as fuel rods, containing fissionable material. The fuel may be in the form of metal or a metal oxide, carbide, nitride) and may vary in the degree of enrichment of the uranium (enrichment). The structural materials may be aluminum, stainless steel, zirconium alloy, or other materials as ceramics. They form a barrier isolating the fuel (and fission products) from the coolant or storage facility environment as well as providing structural support for the geometry of the fuel. The components are arranged into a specific geometric configuration determined by the type of reactor and desired performance. This assembly of fuel-bearing components is referred to as a "fuel element" (also referred to in the nuclear industry as a fuel assembly).

For each of the major facility categories, the following subsections provide details on the quantities of SNF currently in storage and the quantities of additional SNF expected to be produced by the end of the year 2035.

2.1.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small-Quantity Storage

The Brookhaven National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories use test and experimental reactors for research and for small production of medical and other specific isotopes. In addition, small quantities of SNF are currently in storage at these sites as well as at Argonne National Laboratory. Estimates of SNF generated by these facilities, the amount expected to be generated through future operations and accommodations being undertaken at the present time to store the SNF located at these facilities are discussed in the following sections.

2.1.1.1 Brookhaven National Laboratory.

2.1.1.2.1 High Flux Beam Reactor-By mid-1995 there are projected to be 937

High Flux Beam Reactor elements (0).

241 MmlIM) in the reactor or in onsite wet storage. A total of 5,600 additional SNF elements (1.498 MTHM) are predicted to be produced if reactor continues operation through the year 2035 (Wichmann 1995a).

2.1.1.2.2 Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor-The Brookhaven Medical

Research Reactor is operating at the present time and has 36 elements (0.0034 MTHM) in the reactor or in onsite wet storage. Thirty-two additional SNF elements (0.0028 MTHM) expected to be produced by the year 2035 (Wichmann 1995a).

2.1.1.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory.

2.1.1.2.1 Omega West Reactor-The Omega West Reactor has been permanently

shut down.

This reactor is being decommissioned. There are no elements in the reactor, and all of the 86 elements (0.014 MTHM) are in temporary dry storage at the Chemistry and M Research Complex (Wichmann 1995a).

Additional reactor sites and critical facilities that are part of the Los Alamos Laboratory are listed below. Each contains some radioactive and fissionable material not routinely produce SNF (ANS 1988):

- Big Ten Critical Assembly
- Fast Burst Reactor - GODWA
- Fast Burst Reactor - SKUA
- Flattop Critical Assembly
- General Purpose Critical Assembly - COMET
- General Purpose Critical Assembly - HONEYCOMB
- General Purpose Critical Assembly - PLANET
- General Purpose Critical Assembly - VENUS
- General Purpose Critical Assembly Machine
- Solution High Energy Burst Assembly

2.1.1.3 Sandia National Laboratories. The Sandia National Laboratory reactors operate

as needed on a low duty cycle, so the fission product inventories remain low and lasts for the life of the reactor, eliminating routine generation of spent fuel. He few broken plates that are in storage, the SNF at Sandia National Laboratories is in the reactors (DOE 1993d).

The Sandia National Laboratories contain five SNF storage facilities: the Manzanillo Structures, the Annular Core Research Reactor Facility, the Sandia Pulse Reactor Facility, the Hot Cell Facility, and the Special Nuclear Materials storage facility (DOE 1993b).

2.1.1.3.1 Manzano Storage Structures-The Manzano Storage Structures are

reinforced concrete bunkers located in the southeast portion of Kirtland Air Force Base. Until

recently, when Sandia National Laboratories took responsibility for the site, the M facilities were operated and maintained by the Department of Defense. The Sandia National Laboratories currently use four structures for dry storage of reactor-irradiated nuclear fuel (DOE 1993b). There is a total of 0.025 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of SNF in storage at this facility (Wichmann 1995a).

2.1.1.3.2 Annular Core Research Reactor-The Annular Core Research Reactor is

a pool-type research reactor capable of steady-state, pulse, and tailored transient operation. The

Annular Core Research Reactor facility includes the reactor pool, one safe, and eight storage vaults, all located in the high-bay of Building 6588. The eight storage vault bay floor are used to securely store irradiated experiments containing a variety of

materials, but principally U-235. Materials from only three experiments containing irradiated nuclear materials are stored at the Annular Core Research Reactor (DOE 1). There are a total of 438 elements plus uranium from three experiments (for a total 0.04MTHM) in use or storage at these facilities (Wichmann 1995a).

In addition, DOE is considering using the Annular Core Research Reactor for promolybdenum-99. If the molybdenum -99 production mission is assigned to the Annular Research Reactor, the current reactor fuel would likely be removed and would need to be at the start of, or within a few years of starting, operation (SNL 1994).

2.1.1.3.3 Sandia Pulse Reactor Hand HI, and Critical Assembly- Three reactors

are in operation at the Sandia Pulse Reactor facility: Sandia Pulse Reactor II and Reactor III are unmoderated, fast-burst reactors capable of pulsed and steady-state. The Critical Assembly is a small, water-moderated reactor used to perform measure reactor parameters to benchmark the computer calculations and thereby refine the design of the planned space propulsion reactor. The yard storage holes are 19 stainless-steel type corner of the Sandia Pulse Reactor compound. These tubes are surrounded by a high-density concrete monolith. The yard holes are used to securely store irradiated experiments of a variety of nuclear materials, but principally U-235. All of the materials remain in containers, some of which consist of double containment. At the Special Nuclear Material storage facility, Sandia National Laboratories stores previously failed fuel elements from Pulse Reactor II and elements from experiments that have been exposed to short irradiation periods (DOE 1993b). There are a total of 43 elements (with a total of 0.37 MTHM) in use or storage at these facilities (Wichmann 1995a).

Future plans include bringing on-line an additional pulse reactor named Sandia Reactor IIIM. With this new reactor, a total of three pulse reactors would be located at Sandia National Laboratories' Technical Area V.

2.1.1.3.4 Hot Cell Facility-The Hot Cell Facility at Sandia National Laboratories is

a nonreactor nuclear facility housed in Building 6580 in Technical Area V. Research programs

at Sandia National Laboratories--material studies, fuel studies, and safety studies experiments containing radioactive materials be assembled and/or disassembled, samples prepared, and microscopic and chemical analyses performed. The principal storage facility for the Hot Cell Facility is Room 108, which is a heavily shielded room used previously as a preparation room next to the irradiation room of the Sandia Engineering Reactor, which has been defueled. There are a series of 13 storage holes under the Hot Cell Facility. Most of the holes are available to store irradiated material coming into or out of the Hot Cell Facility. The holes are currently in use. The other areas of the Hot Cell Facility are used for small amounts of material (DOE 1993b). There is a total of 0.009 MTHM of SNF in storage at the facility (Wichmann 1995a).

2.1.1.4 Argonne National Laboratory - East. The Alpha-Gamma Hot Cell Facility,

operated by the Materials Science Division, consists of a concrete-shielded, low-pressure atmosphere complex that was designed for the examination of irradiated plutonium fuel assemblies and related hardware (DOE 1993d). There are a total of four units of Experimental Breeder Reactor fuel, one canister containing remnants of commercial SNF, and 16 SNF elements from Oak Ridge (for a total of 0.081 MTHM) in storage (Wichmann 1995a).

The Chicago Pile 5 Building houses a heavy-water, moderated reactor whose fuel has been removed and shipped offsite. Currently, the Chicago Pile 5 is in the process of being decontaminated and decommissioned and contains only two highly enriched uranium target converter elements (DOE 1993d).

2.1.2 Domestic Licensed Research Reactors

Table 2.1-1 identifies 57 non-DOE facilities representing domestic, licensed, small power generators of SNF (NRC 1993a; ANS 1988). They include training, research, and test universities, commercial establishments, and several government installations; all (except the McClellan Air Force Base) have been licensed by the NRC. Although they are not DOE

Facilities, DOE has title to the SNF and has the responsibility for interim storage disposition.

In order to assess their SNF management capabilities, these 57 facilities have identified as belonging to one of three categories. These categories identify the characteristics of a facility relevant to the assessment of DOE-postulated SNF alternate three categories are:

Category 1 - Facilities that have limited onsite storage capacity compared amount of SNF projected to be generated at their facility by the year 2035

Category 2 - Facilities that do not routinely generate additional SNF

Category 3 - Facilities that no longer possess SNF onsite.

The category for each facility is identified in Table 2.1-1.

Table 2.1-1. Domestic non-DOE research reactors.

Licensee location	Reactor type	NRC Docket no.	Category
Aerotest San Ramon, CA	TRIGA (Indus)	50-228	2
Arkansas Tech Univ. Russellville, AR	TRIGA	50-606	2
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) Bethesda, MD	TRIGA	50-170	2
Brigham Young Univ. Provo, UT	L-77	50-262	3
Catholic University Washington, DC	AGN-201	50-77	3
Cintichem, Inc. Tuxedo, NY	Pool	50-54	3
Cornell University Ithaca, NY	TRIGA	50-157	2
Cornell University Ithaca, NY	ZPR	50-97	2
Dow Chemical Company Midland, MI	TRIGA	50-264	2
General Atomics San Diego, CA	TRIGA Mark I	50-89	2
General Atomics San Diego, CA	TRIGA Mark F	50-163	2
General Electric Co. Pleasanton, CA	NTR	50-73	1
Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, GA	Research HW	50-160	2
Idaho State University Pocatello, ID	AGN-201	50-284	2
Iowa State University Ames, IA	MTR-10 Pool	50-116	2
Kansas State University Manhattan, KS	TRIGA	50-188	1
Licensee location	Reactor type	NRC Docket no.	Category
McClellan Air Force Base McClellan, CA	SNRS	None	2
Manhattan College Riverdale, NY	Tank-ZPR	50-199	2
Massachusetts Institute Research of Technology Cambridge, MA	HW	50-20	1
N.S. Savannah Mount Pleasant, SC	PWR	50-238	3
NASA Plum Brook Sandusky, OH	NASA Tr. Tank	50-185	3
National Institute of Standards and	Test	50-184	1

Technology (NIST)			
Gaithersburg, MD			
North Carolina State U.	Pulstar	50-297	2
Raleigh, NC			
Ohio State University	Pool	50-150	2
Columbus, OH			
Oregon State University	TRIGA	50-243	2
Corvallis, OR			
Penn State University	TRIGA	50-5	2
University Park, PA			
Purdue University	Lockheed	50-182	2
West Lafayette, IN			
Reed College	TRIGA	50-288	2
Portland, OR			
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute	Critical Assembly	50-225	2
Troy, NY			
Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission	Pool	50-193	1
Narragansett, RI			
State Univ. of New York	Pulstar	50-57	1
Buffalo			
Buffalo, NY			
Texas A&M University	AGN-201	50-59	2
College Station, TX			
Texas A&M University	TRIGA	50-128	1
College Station, TX			
U.S. Geological Survey	TRIGA	50-274	1
Denver, CO			
University of Arizona	TRIGA	50-113	2
Tucson, AZ			
University of California	TRIGA	50-224	3
at Berkeley			
Berkeley, CA			
University of California	TRIGA	50-326	2
at Irvine			
Irvine, CA			
University of California	Educator	50-142	3
at Los Angeles			
Los Angeles, CA			
University of Florida	Argonaut	50-83	2
Gainesville, FL			
University of Illinois	LOPRA	50-356	1
Urbana, IL			
University of Kansas	Lockheed	50-148	3
Lawrence, KS			
University of Maryland	TRIGA	50-166	2
College Park, MD			
University of Mass.	GE Pool	50-223	2
at Lowell			
Lowell, MA			
University of Michigan	Pool	50-2	1
Ann Arbor, MI			
University of Missouri	Tank	50-186	1
Columbia			
Columbia, MO			
University of Missouri	Pool	50-123	2
Rolla			
Rolla, MO			
University of New Mexico	AGN-201	50-252	2
Albuquerque, NM			
University of Texas	TRIGA-Mark II	50-602	2
Austin, TX			

University of Utah	TRIGA	50-407	2
Salt Lake City, UT			
University of Virginia	Pool	50-62	1
Charlottesville, VA			
University of Washington	Argonaut	50-139	3
Seattle, WA			
University of Wisconsin	TRIGA	50-156	2
Madison, WI			
Veterans Admin. Medical	TRIGA	50-131	2
Center			
Omaha, NE			
Washington State U.	TRIGA	50-27	2
Pullman, WA			
Watertown Army	Pool	50-47	3
Materials Research			
Reactor			
Watertown, MA			
Westinghouse Zion	W Tank	50-22	3
Training Reactor			
Pittsburgh, PA			
Worcester Polytechnic	Pool	50-134	2
Institute			
Worcester, MA			

2.1.2.1 Reactors with Limited Storage Capacity. The sites in Category I have limited

storage capacity when compared to the amount of SNF that is projected to be generated. Table 2.1-2 lists the projected inventory as of June 1, 1995 with the corresponding amount of additional SNF that would be generated through 2035 is also provided in Table 2.1-2. **each of the Category 1 sites.** Assuming continuing operation of each reactor, the projected amount of additional SNF that would be generated through 2035 is also provided in Table 2.1-2.

To reduce the risk of theft or diversion of highly enriched uranium fuel and the consequences to public health, safety, and the environment from such theft or diversion, the NRC has imposed limitations on the use of highly enriched uranium fuel in domestic nonpower reactors. Unless the NRC has determined that the nonpower reactor has a unique purpose requiring the use of high enriched uranium fuel, each licensee will replace all highly enriched uranium fuel in its possession with available low enriched uranium fuel acceptable to the NRC. If federal government funding for conversion is not available, the conversion of high enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel may be deferred on an annual basis. A number of domestic research reactors are in the process of converting from highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel.

2.1.2.2 Reactors with Sufficient Storage Capacity. Licensed domestic research reactor

Reactor sites with sufficient SNF storage capacity are listed in Table 2.1-3. These Category 2 operating facilities with low fuel burnup rates, where the amount of SNF generated is expected to exceed the current onsite storage capacity. Some Category 2 sites are converting from highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel but have capacity to store this additional SNF onsite.

The projected inventory at each reactor site as of June 1, 1995 and the corresponding MTHM are presented in Table 2.1-3. The amount of SNF that is projected to be generated through the year 2035 is also listed in Table 2.1-3.

2.1.2.3 Reactors without SNF Onsite. The licensed domestic research reactors that are

no longer operating and have shipped all SNF offsite are identified as Category 3 sites. These sites either have been decommissioned or are in the process of decommissioning. The facilities have been decontaminated, although they may not have been completely decontaminated. **Table 2.1-2.** Category 1 projected SNF inventories.

Licensee location	Inventory as of June 1, 1995 Elements	MTHM	Future increases through 2035 Elements	MTHM
----------------------	---	------	--	------

Kansas State University Manhattan, KS	107	0.020	140	0.027
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA	66	0.021	480	0.150
National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD	186	0.04	1,160	0.300
Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission Narragansett, RI	57	0.030	160	0.222
State University of New York - Buffalo Buffalo, NY	25	0.493	5	0.100
Texas A&M (TRIGA) College Station, TX	186	0.030	378	0.060
U.S. Geological Survey Denver, CO	161	0.032	39	0.010
University of Illinois Urbana, IL	198	0.037	313	0.59
University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI	103	0.072	480	0.400
University of Missouri Columbia, MO	82	0.055	1,040	0.700
University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA	65	0.066	60	0.210

a. Source: Wichmann 1995a.

Note: Projected inventory as of June 1, 1995 is 0.896 MTHM.

Projected additional SNF generated through 2035 is 2.769 MTHM.

Table 2.1-3. Category 2 projected SNF inventories.

Licensee location	Inventory as of June 1, 1995 Elements	MTHM
Aerotest San Ramon, CA	91	0.015
Arkansas Tech. Univ. Russellville, AR	0	0
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute Bethesda, MD	95	0.018
Cornell University (TRIGA) Ithaca, NY	123	0.023
Cornell University (ZPR) Ithaca, NY	814d	1.7d
Dow Chemical Company Midland, MI	78	0.014
General Atomicsc San Diego, CA	263	0.058
GE Nuclear Test Reactor Plesanton, CA	8	0.008
Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, GA	50	0.030
Idaho State University Pocatello, ID	9d	0.011d

Iowa State University Ames, IA	27	0.024
McClellan Air Force Base McClellan, CA	90	0.015
Manhattan College Riverdale, NY	17d	0.019d
North Carolina State U. Raleigh, NC	34	0.428
Ohio State University Columbus, OH	24 and 638b	0.021
Oregon State University Corvallis, OR	96	0.017
Pennsylvania State Univ. University Park, PA	175	0.041
Purdue University West Lafayette, IN	13	0.002
Reed College Portland, OR	67	0.013
Rensselaer Polytechnic Instituteb Troy, NY	597d	0.388d
Licensee location	Inventory as of June 1, 1995 Elements	Future increase through 2035 Elements
Texas A&M - AGN-201 College Station, TX	9	0
University of Arizona Tucson, AZ	97	8
University of California Irvine	113	0
Irvine, CA		
University of Florida Gainesville, FL	23	22
University of Maryland College Park, MD	93	93
University of Mass. Lowell Lowell, MA	26	26
University of Missouri Rolla, MO	56	0
University of New Mexico Albuquerque, NM	9d	0
University of Texas Austin, TX	154	0
University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT	139	0
University of Wisconsin Madison, WI	228	0
Veterans Admin. Medical Center Omaha, NE	56	0
Washington State Univ. Pullman, WA	215	112
Worcester Polytechnic Institute Worcester, MA	27e	0
	MTHM	MTH
	0.011	0
	0.081	0.0
	0.021	0
	0.04	0.1
	0.016	0.0
	0.004	0.1
	0.269	0
	0.004d	0
	0.029	0
	0.026	0
	0.039	0
	0.001	0
	0.037	0.0
	0.022	0

a. Source: Wichmann 1995a and Wichmann 1995b.

b. Fuel pins, not reactor assemblies.

c. Reactor scheduled to shut down in 1998.

d. Contact-handled fuel/targets (i.e., with radiation levels low enough to permit

shielding or remote operations), even though slightly irradiated, are not included.

Note: The projected inventory as of June 1, 1995 is expected to be 1.323 MTHM an approximate total for the additional SNF projected to be generated through MTHM. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.

The SNF that originated at these sites has either been reprocessed or is stored and at DOE storage facilities.

2.1.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel

This subsection addresses spent nuclear power plant fuel that DOE has possession of or will take possession of sometime in the future. Currently this fuel is in storage at one of the West Valley Demonstration Project, the Fort St. Vrain nuclear power plant site, B&W Lynchburg Technology Center in Lynchburg, Virginia. In all cases, no new addition is being or will be added to existing SNF inventories.

2.1.3.1 West Valley Demonstration Project. The West Valley Demonstration Project is

located on the site of the first U.S. commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, was operated by Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., until 1972 (WVNS 1994).

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., shut down the reprocessing facility in 1972 in order to implement modifications for the purpose of increasing the facility's capacity. From 1972 to 1980, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., continued to accept a total of 750 SNF elements. However, it withdrew from the reprocessing business (WVNS 1994).

In 1980 Congress enacted Public Law 96-368, the West Valley Demonstration Project Act. The act directed the DOE to develop and demonstrate the technology for solidifying waste in storage at the West Valley Demonstration Project so that this waste would be suitable for transportation to and long-term disposal in a federal repository (WVNS 1994).

The owners of the 750 SNF elements still in storage at the West Valley facility were informed in 1981 that they would have to take back their SNF. By 1986, 62 elements had been returned to their respective owners; then, however, DOE took possession of the remaining 125 SNF elements (26.65 MTHM) under an agreement with Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. The DOE was to use these 125 elements to demonstrate the safe transportation and long-term storage of SNF in a dual-purpose cask. These 125 SNF elements are included in the inventory (Wichmann 1995a).

2.1.3.2 Fort St. Vrain. Fort St. Vrain, a 330 MWe (Megawatt electric) high-temperature

gas-cooled reactor power plant, went into operation in January 1979 and terminated operation in August 1989. It is currently undergoing decommissioning (FSV 1990a; NR 1990a).

Prior to August 1989 a three-party agreement was reached between the Public Service Company of Colorado (the owner of Fort St. Vrain), General Atomics (the reactor developer) and the DOE that called for the DOE to take possession of eight segments of approximately 125 SNF elements each of SNF from the Fort St. Vrain for dry storage at the INEL. SNF from Fort St. Vrain had been shipped to the INEL when a court action was initiated by the State of Idaho to stop any additional shipment of SNF to INEL.

In an effort to facilitate the continued decommissioning of the Fort St. Vrain, the Public Service Company of Colorado has decided to store the Fort St. Vrain's SNF in a modular vault dry storage system, which is a reinforced concrete and sheathed steel frame built on the Fort St. Vrain site immediately adjacent to but outside the fence around the Vrain site. The modular vault dry storage system, designed to house 1,482 high-temperature gas-cooled reactor SNF elements, 6 neutron source elements, and 37 keyhole top reflector elements, became operational in late 1991 (FSV 1990a). There are 1,464 elements (16 MTHM) currently in storage in the modular vault dry storage system (Wichmann 1995a).

2.1.3.3 B&W Lynchburg. The B&W facility in Lynchburg, Virginia, is engaged in

research and development on uranium fuels and the overall fuel cycle, and in the testing and testing of irradiated fuels (NRC 1987).

B&W Lynchburg currently has in storage at its facility 0.044 MTHM of SNF stored in canisters (Wichmann 1995a) consisting of 3 full-length fuel rods, 17 sectioned fuel rods, and a small quantity of fuel debris from Three Mile Island 2. All of this SNF material is

possession of the DOE and was provided to B&W under a DOE contract for Fuel Perform Improvements Programs. None of the activities ongoing at B&W Lynchburg could result generation of additional SNF for which the DOE has responsibility, since the facility reactors have been decommissioned (Wright 1993; ANS 1988).

2.2 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program Plans and Alternatives

The plans for management of SNF at originating sites, including generating and sites, or facilities generating small annual quantities of SNF, were determined by survey of the NRC licensees and others operating these sites. These plans, as they to be affected by the alternatives being assessed in this EIS, are presented in this

Availability of onsite SNF storage capacity is the primary consequence of DOE SNF management decisions for all originating sites. Of the five DOE SNF management alternatives only Alternative 1 (No Action - no SNF transportation) may not have been addressed NRC licensing process for an individual SNF originating site. DOE management plans alternatives which involve SNF transportation- would not affect the originating site management plans at the DOE facilities to which the SNF may be shipped are addressed sections of this EIS dealing with those DOE facilities. The alternate plans with re transportation are analyzed in Appendix I to Volume 1. Accordingly, the next few sections will focus primarily on the No Action Alternative and describe general information produced at the originating sites, including non-DOE facilities storing SNF.

2.2.1 No Action

The No Action Alternative is intended to evaluate the impact of storage of SNF current storage and originating sites. This means that all facilities which are generating SNF and intend to ship SNF to a DOE facility would maintain their SNF onsite. If the originating site has adequate storage capacity, operations at the site would continue. If SNF storage capacity is inadequate, new plans, including expansion of capacity or decreasing the rate of fuel burn-up, would have to be considered. Possible management plans are discussed more specifically in the following subsections.

Of the total of approximately 2,700 MTHM of SNF estimated as the total DOE inventory by 2035, approximately 51 MTHM of SNF is associated with the facilities addressed in appendix (Wichmann 1995a).

2.2.1.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small Quantity Storage. There is insufficient

onsite storage capacity at the High Flux Beam Reactor at Brookhaven National Laboratory store all of the SNF projected to be generated through the year 2035. If SNF shipment made to another DOE storage facility, at the current rate of generation the remaining storage space would be depleted in January 1996. There is a plan to install a storage existing wet storage facility that would add space for 162 elements. Even with this space would be depleted in 1998. If SNF could not be shipped by that time, the existing racks could be modified to provide additional space. There are no plans to the reactor in the near future (Carelli 1993).

2.2.1.2 Domestic Research Reactors. Based on current projections, the onsite storage

capacity of 11 of the 45 domestic research reactors would be exhausted before the year the No Action Alternative were to be implemented. All 11 of these facilities have been identified as Category 1.

Several of the facilities in Category 1 have indicated that they would consider options of increasing storage capacity if the No Action Alternative were to be implemented. One would consider reracking, one would consider expanding dry storage within the reactor building, and one would consider expanding wet storage within the reactor building, and one would be adding 200 square feet (18.6 square meters) of wet storage area outside the reactor building.

Any previously planned expansion of onsite SNF storage capacity at individual DOE facilities is addressed in site-specific NRC environmental assessments and thus is to be a consequence of the proposed actions under this EIS. The facilities that are planning to expand their SNF storage capacity include the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

At one of these facilities the expanded storage capacity is projected to be adequate by the year 2005. However, without SNF transportation through the year 2035, none of them would have adequate storage capacity. One of the facilities in Category 1 has offloaded enriched uranium fuel and would consider reracking but might elect to shut down in because of a lack of wet storage capacity (Jentz 1993).

All 34 facilities identified as Category 2 have sufficient SNF storage capacity to accommodate any of the DOE SNF alternatives. Two facilities may elect to shut down by the year 2005: one because it may not renew its license; the other because, without SNF offsite, it might not meet licensing limits on possession of uranium-235 after highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel. One facility, which expects to move from highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel, might elect to shut down by year 2005 if no offsite transportation were available, unless it can expand its SNF capacity. A few facilities have indicated that they will appeal the NRC-required conversion of highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel if no offsite transportation is available. Although several Category 2 facilities can operate practically indefinitely without question, how many of them would operate as planned if there were no SNF transportation through the year 2035. Many research reactors operate with variable core loadings, reusing partially depleted fuel elements as well as adding new fuel to the reactor.

2.2.1.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel. The No Action Alternative

neecessitating extended interim onsite storage of SNF would require a revision of the management program at the West Valley Demonstration Project. The need to revise this program is a result of the following (DOE 1993b):

The West Valley fuel pool is almost 30 years old and does not meet current design criteria.

The pool is single-walled, unlined, and lacks the capability for leak detection, presenting the potential for an undetected release to the environment.

Continued storage of fuel onsite would interfere with and for some areas preclude ongoing decontamination and decommissioning activities at the West Valley Demonstration Project facility from proceeding as planned.

The management of SNF at the West Valley Demonstration Project is to continue that of the existing spent fuel pool with no modifications.

Loss of access to the INEL for storage of its SNF has already resulted in the construction of new onsite SNF storage at Fort St. Vrain. However, under this alternative Public Service Company of Colorado would not achieve its goal of becoming free of radioactive materials by 1998 under this option.

Adequate storage capacity exists and the storage facilities are in adequate condition at the B&W Lynchburg Technology Center (DOE 1993b).

2.2.2 Decentralization

Alternative 2, Decentralization, is similar to the No Action Alternative except that offsite shipments are permitted as required to allow continued operation of the given facility. Decentralization is not expected to impose additional requirements for storing SNF at facilities included in this appendix above those already identified under the No Action Alternative. Planning at the sites receiving SNF shipments that would be allowed under this alternative is addressed in Appendixes A, B, and C. Intersite transportation impact is addressed in Appendix I to Volume 1.

2.2.2.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small Quantity Storage. Compared to the

restrictions imposed under the No Action Alternative, Decentralization does not change management plans at these DOE experimental reactors and small quantity storage facilities.

2.2.2.2 Domestic Research Reactors. The Decentralization Alternative is similar to the

No Action Alternative, except that limited offsite shipments are permitted as required to allow continued operation of the given facility. Under this alternative, the domestic research reactors are allowed to return to DOE any SNF in excess of their current onsite storage capacity. Additional storage capacity would not be required at these originating facilities.

decentralization does not affect existing SNF management plans at university research other facilities in the domestic research reactor group, except for possible rerout shipments to INEL or Savannah River Site.

2.2.2.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel. The Decentralization Alternative is

similar to the No Action Alternative, except that limited offsite shipments are permitted to allow continued operation of the given facility. The three facilities in this subsection are only storing SNF and do not generate additional SNF. Because SNF not be shipped offsite, SNF remaining at the site could interfere with the planned decontamination and decommissioning operations at West Valley Demonstration Project. This option, Public Service Company of Colorado would not achieve its goal of becoming a radioactive material by 1998.

2.2.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis

Alternative 3, 1992/1993 Planning Basis, would not be expected to change any existing management plans at the sites included in this appendix. Alternative 3 would permit shipment of SNF from the originating sites to DOE interim storage facilities at INEL Savannah River Site. Planning at these SNF-receiving sites is addressed in Appendix A and C. Interstate transportation impacts are analyzed in Appendix I to Volume 1.

2.2.3.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small Quantity Storage. Implementation of

this alternative could require a transition period of several years. Therefore, limited construction of temporary SNF storage facilities or acquisition of SNF transportation suitable for use as temporary dry storage containers, may be necessary until shipment to interim storage site(s) is accomplished.

2.2.3.2 Domestic Research Reactors, Alternative 3 does not affect the existing SNF

management plans at domestic research reactor facilities. Management of SNF at these sites would continue to follow the same plans as in the past.

2.2.3.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel Under Alternative 3, DOE plans to

ship the SNF currently in storage at the West Valley Demonstration Project to INEL North for storage. Implementation of this alternative would therefore preclude the additional action at the West Valley Demonstration Project related to providing a new SNF storage facility.

If Public Service Company of Colorado shipped the remaining fuel segments, the Vrain Site would be free of radioactive materials by 1998.

This alternative would have no impact on the management of the SNF material in at the B&W Lynchburg Technology Center.

2.2.4 Regionalization

Alternative 4, Regionalization, would not be expected to change any existing SNF management plans at the sites included in this appendix. Alternative 4 would permit shipment of SNF from the originating sites to regional DOE interim storage facilities at the SNF-receiving sites is addressed in Appendixes A, B, C, and F. Interstate transportation impacts are analyzed in Appendix I to Volume 1.

2.2.4.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small Quantity Storage. Implementation of

this alternative could require a transition period of several years. Therefore, limited construction of temporary SNF storage facilities or acquisition of SNF transportation suitable for use as temporary dry storage containers, may be necessary until shipment

interim storage site(s) is accomplished.

2.2.4.2 Domestic Research Reactors. Regionalization does not affect the existing SNF

management plans at domestic research reactor facilities, except for possible rerouting of shipments.

2.2.4.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel. The Regionalization Alternative for

SNF addressed in this appendix is the same as the 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative that the SNF would be sent to other locations. With the exception of INEL, facilities presently available for SNF storage at receiving sites considered under regionalization from West Valley Demonstration Project and Fort St. Vrain. The SNF would remain in storage at West Valley Demonstration Project and Fort St. Vrain until facilities are available at the selected regional SNF management sites.

2.2.5 Centralization

Alternative 5, Centralization, would not be expected to change any existing SNF management plans at the sites included in this appendix. Alternative 5 would permit shipment of SNF from the originating sites to centralized DOE interim storage facilities. Planning at the SNF-receiving sites is addressed in Appendixes A, B, C, and F. Interim transportation plans are analyzed in Appendix I to Volume 1.

2.2.5.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small Quantity Storage. Implementation of

this alternative could require a transition period of several years. Therefore, interim construction of temporary SNF storage facilities or acquisition of SNF transportation facilities suitable for use as temporary dry storage containers, may be necessary until shipment to interim storage site(s) is accomplished.

2.2.5.2 Domestic Research Reactors. Centralization does not affect the existing SNF

management plans of domestic research reactor facilities except for rerouting of SNF

2.2.5.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel. The Centralization Alternative for

SNF being addressed in this appendix is described as being the same as the 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative except that the SNF would be sent to other locations. With the exception of INEL, facilities are not presently available for SNF storage at receiving sites considered under centralization for SNF from West Valley Demonstration Project and Fort St. Vrain. The SNF would remain in storage at West Valley Demonstration Project and Fort St. Vrain until facilities are available for receipt of the SNF at the selected central SNF management site.

3. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENTS

Descriptions of those facilities generating and/or storing small quantities of fuel for which DOE has accepted responsibility are presented in this section. The subsections present environmental information for each of the three categories of sites: DOE Test and Experimental Reactors, Domestic Research Reactors, and Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Sites.

The wide variety of facilities and installations included in this category precludes definition of their affected environments in a consistent and uniform manner. The information available in existing facility documents used as the bases for this analysis varies with the nature of the installation and the requirements of the overseeing or regulatory agency.

3.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small-Quantity Storage

The DOE experimental reactors and small-quantity SNF storage facilities include category are located at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Lab Sandia National Laboratory, and Argonne National Laboratory - East. The facilities their environments are described in this section. Only those DOE sites at which sp fuel is currently generated and/or stored are discussed. Information on environmen that are not uniformly available in existing National Environmental Policy Act docu all four sites (including aesthetic and scenic resources, noise, traffic and transp utilities and energy) is not provided in this document.

3.1.1 Brookhaven National Laboratory

There are two reactors at the Brookhaven National Laboratory which generate SNF potentially affected by actions analyzed in this EIS: the 60 MW High Flux Beam Rea the 5 MW Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor (ANS 1988).

3.1.1.1 High Flux Beam Reactor. The 60 MW High Flux Beam Reactor is a heavy water

moderated and cooled research reactor which replaces an earlier 40 MW reactor. The Beam Reactor began operation in 1965. The High Flux Beam Reactor facility is compo five buildings located on the 5,265-acre (2,131-hectare) site of the Brookhaven Nat Laboratory. The distance from the reactor to the nearest site boundary is to the s feet (1288 meters). The spent nuclear fuel is stored in an 8-foot-wide, 43-foot-lo canal (2.4 meters wide, 13.2 meters long, 6.1 meters deep). Within the canal, the in storage racks, either in a 30-cell rack or in a long-term storage rack (Carelli

3.1.1.2 Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor. The Brookhaven Medical Research

Reactor is a 5 MW heterogeneous, thermal, tank type reactor which is light water mo cooled. The reactor, used for research, became fully operational in 1959. The Bro Medical Research Reactor is located in one building at the Brookhaven National Labo approximately 0.25 mile (0.4 kilometer) south of the High Flux Beam Reactor site. at the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor consists of a shelf, lined with boral sh upper part of the reactor vessel above the active core region. The shelf is locate (2.5 meters) of water and is considered critically safe when fully loaded. Like th Beam Reactor, there is no facility for dry storage at the Brookhaven Medical Resear (Carelli 1993).

3.1.1.3 Affected Environment at Brookhaven National Laboratory.

3.1.1.3.1 Land Use-The Brookhaven National Laboratory is located approximately

60.

1 miles (97 kilometers) east of New York City on Long Island, New York. The site i in a primarily suburban area. Land on the 5,265-acre (2,131-hectare) site is divid undeveloped natural areas and the developed areas that support the laboratory's sci research (BNL 1992c).

Regional land use includes a variety of residential, commercial, industrial, ag institutional, recreational, and public uses. Although agricultural and undevelope have been the dominant land uses in the region, development pressures for residenti commercial land uses have increased steadily in recent years (BNL 1992c).

3.1.1.3.2 Socioeconomics-The Brookhaven National Laboratory is located in

central Suffolk County just at the fringe of developed areas, in an area of rapidly population.

About 1.32 million persons reside in Suffolk County and about 410,000 persons reside in Brookhaven Township, within which the Laboratory is situated. Between 19 2040, population in Suffolk County is expected to increase 14.6 percent (DOC 1991a)

Approximately 8,000 persons reside within a half mile (0.8 kilometer) of the labora (BNL 1992b).

The population of Suffolk County is approximately 96 percent urban and has a su higher median family income than the rest of the state (DOC 1991c). Between 1970 a total employment in Suffolk County increased 103.8 percent (DOC 1992).

Dominant industries in the area include government, manufacturing, retail and s approximately 20 percent of earnings in Suffolk County coming from government spend 1992).

The Brookhaven National Laboratory is composed of a total staff of 3449 regular (BNL 1993a).

As reported in 1988, there were a total of 69 personnel working at the reactors This number included operators, experimenting scientists, and support personnel. W their main occupation, part of the duties of the operators and some support personn tasks associated with refueling, storing, inventorying, packaging, and shipping SNF

3.1.1.3.3 Cultural Resources-The Brookhaven National Laboratory has no

properties designated as National Historic Landmarks.

The Old Reactor Building (Building 701) and the Old Cyclotron Enclosure (Buildi are eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). Cam training trenches from World War I are also eligible for inclusion on the NRHP.

3.1.1.3.4 Geology-The Brookhaven National Laboratory site is in the upper part

of the Peconic River Valley, which is bordered by two lines of low hills.

These extend east and

west beyond the limits of the valley nearly the full length of Long Island and form prominent topographic features (ERDA 1977).

A maximum horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0.19 g at Brookhaven Nation Laboratory is estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur once every 20 (DOE 1994a). The seismic hazard information presented in this EIS is for general s hazard comparisons across DOE sites. Potential seismic hazards for existing and ne should be evaluated on a facility specific basis consistent with DOE orders and sta specific procedures.

No earthquake has yet been recorded in the Brookhaven National Laboratory area Modified Mercalli intensity in excess of III. Long Island lies in the Uniform Buil 2A (moderate) seismic hazard area. No active earthquake producing faults are known Long Island area (ERDA 1977).

3.1.1.3.5 Air Resources-In terms of meteorology, the laboratory can be

characterized, like most Eastern Seaboard areas, as a well-ventilated site.

The prevailing ground-

level winds are from the southwest during the summer, from the northwest during the about equally from these two directions during the spring and fall (BNL 1992b).

The mean annual temperature for the site during 1991 was 52.8yF (11.6yC), with temperatures ranging from 21.2yF (-6yC) to 83.8yF (28.8yC). The annual precipitati 1991 was 45.3 inches (115 centimeters), which is about 3.6 inches (9.0 centimeters) 40-year annual precipitation average of 48.4 inches (123 centimeters) (BNL 1992b).

The State of New York has adopted ambient air quality standards that specify ma permissible short- and long-term concentrations for various contaminants. These st generally the same as the national standards for criteria pollutants (NYSDEC 1977). County, in which the site is located, is classified as being in nonattainment of th the criteria pollutant ozone. The county is in attainment of standards for carbon particluates, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and lead (NYSDEC 1993).

3.1.1.3.6 Water Resources-The Brookhaven National Laboratory site lies on the

western rim of the shallow Peconic River watershed.

The marshy areas in the north and eastern

sections of the site are a portion of the Peconic River headwaters. The Peconic Ri

recharges and receives water from the groundwater aquifer, depending on the hydroge potential. In times of drought the river water typically recharges to groundwater, of normal to above normal precipitation, the river receives water from the aquifer

Groundwater flow in the vicinity of Brookhaven National Laboratory is controlled by factors. The main groundwater divide lies 1.25 to 5 miles (2 to 8 kilometers) south of Long Island Sound parallel to the Sound. This divide is known to shift 0.6 to 1.25 mile (1 to 2 kilometers), north to south. East of Brookhaven National Laboratory is a secondary groundwater divide that defines the southern boundary of the area contributing groundwater to the Peconic River. The exact location of the triple-point intersection of these two divides is not known and may be under Brookhaven National Laboratory. South of these divides, the groundwater moves southward to Great South Bay and to Moriches streams. In general, groundwater from the area between the two branches of the divide moves out eastward to the Peconic River. North of the divide, groundwater moves northward to Long Island Sound. Pressure of a higher water table to the west of the Brookhaven National Laboratory generally inhibits movement toward the west. Variability in the direction of flow at the Brookhaven National Laboratory site is a function of the hydraulic potential and is complicated by the presence of clay deposits that accumulate and perch water at several locations plus the pumping/recharge of groundwater that are part of Brookhaven National Laboratory operations. In general, groundwater in the northeast and northwest sections of the site flows toward the Peconic River. On the western portion of the site, groundwater flows toward the south, while along the southern and southeastern sections of the site it flows toward the south to southeast (BNL 1992b).

In all areas of the site, horizontal groundwater velocity is estimated to range from 1 to 45 inches (30 to 45 centimeters) a day. The site occupied by Brookhaven National Laboratory has been identified by the Long Island Regional Planning Board and Suffolk County as being a deep recharge zone for Long Island. This implies the precipitation and surface water recharges within this zone has the potential to replenish the lower aquifer systems (and/or Lloyd) which exist below the Upper Glacial Aquifer. The extent to which the Brookhaven National Laboratory site contributes to deep flow recharge is currently under evaluation. However, it is estimated that up to two-fifths of the recharge from rainfall moves into the aquifers. These lower aquifers discharge to the Atlantic Ocean (BNL 1992b).

The three aquifers (Upper Glacial, Magothy and Lloyd) underlying the Brookhaven National Laboratory comprise the Nassau/Suffolk Aquifer System, which has been designated a sole source aquifer by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. More detailed characterization information can be found in the Brookhaven National Laboratory Site Report (SAIC 1992).

3.1.1.3.7 Ecological Resources-Approximately 75 percent of Brookhaven National

Laboratory is primarily woodland.

Terrestrial habitats include pine plantations, moderately mature pitch pine/oak forest, predominantly deciduous forest, early successional shrub community, pine barrens shrub/sapling wetlands, and lawn areas (BNL 1993a).

The isolation of the Brookhaven National Laboratory site and its variety of wildlife have made it a refuge for a surprisingly diverse animal population. Thirty species have been recorded on site or within a 10-mile (16-kilometer) radius. All of these residents except for five summer-resident and two migrant species of bats. (BNL 1993)

About 400 non-extinct species of birds have been recorded on all of Long Island. Records have been kept, and at least 180 of these have been recorded on site. Thirty species are found throughout the year and all except six of these breed on site. Fifty species are summer residents. All except nine nest on site, four others probably nest elsewhere on Long Island, most nearby (BNL 1993).

In September 1990, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service confirmed that no Federal endangered species occur in the vicinity of Brookhaven National Laboratory. However, an endangered tiger salamander breeds in a pond in the southeast corner of the site (B

3.1.1.3.8 Public Health and Safety-The calculated effective dose equivalent

associated with effluent releases from the most recent reports for a 5-year period below (BNL 1993b, 1992a, 1992b, 1990, 1989).

The annual doses for each year are only a small fraction of the DOE Public Dose Limit of 100 millirem per year. The data are from laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.

Year	Airborne effluents (maximum site boundary)	Liquid effluents (maximum individual)
1988	0.113 millirem	0.15 millirem
1989	0.120 millirem	0.96 millirem
1990	0.067 millirem	0.85 millirem
1991	0.170 millirem	0.74 millirem
1992	0.097 millirem	0.91 millirem

The collective (population) dose equivalent (total population dose) beyond the boundary, within a radius of 50 miles (80 kilometers), attributed to laboratory operations for a 5-year period is presented below (BNL 1993b, 1992a, 1992b, 1990, 1989 are from all laboratory operations, including storage of SNF).

1988	2.5 person-rem
1989	3.2 person-rem
1990	1.8 person-rem
1991	3.6 person-rem
1992	3.2 person-rem

3.1.1.3.9 Waste Management-Brookhaven National Laboratory generates low-

level, low-level mixed and hazardous wastes, in conjunction with its activities as research center.

In 1992, the site generated approximately 508 tons (461 metric tons) of solid waste and 19.6 cubic yards (15 cubic meters) of liquid waste (DOE 1994b).

Brookhaven National Laboratory currently stores about 110 cubic yards (84 cubic low-level mixed waste and has no current or planned onsite treatment facilities. A streams are currently shipped to Hanford. These waste streams include organic liquid alkaline solutions, uranium hydride, cleaning/degreasing solvents, chromic acid clean and lead- and mercury-contaminated equipment (DOE 1993g).

In 1989, EPA listed BNL on the National Priorities Lists and in 1992 an Interagency Agreement was signed among DOE, EPA Region II, and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. Seven operable units have been identified for remedial investigation/feasibility studies and evaluated for suitable remedial action. They consist of various groupings (generally by area) of buildings and sumps, underground tanks, the sewage runoff and discharge areas, trichloroethylene and reactor spill area groundwater. Some contamination at the site was the result of U.S. Army practices 1947 (DOE 1993g).

3.1.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory

The Omega West Reactor, operated by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, is a heterogeneous, closed-tank research reactor normally functioning at a power level of 10 MW. The Omega West Reactor was operational from 1956 until December 1992, when it was shut down. This reactor is permanently shut down and is being decommissioned. All spent nuclear fuel consisting of 86 fuel elements, is in temporary storage at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Complex in Wing 9. They are being stored in old "Rover Project" casks which were once certified for transport of spent nuclear fuel. LANL has no permit for long-term storage of fuel.

3.1.2.1 Land Use. Los Alamos National Laboratory is located approximately 60 miles

(96 kilometers) north-northeast of Albuquerque, New Mexico. Los Alamos occupies an about 28,000 acres (11,000 hectares) located primarily in Los Alamos County in north Mexico, about 24 miles (39 kilometers) northwest of Santa Fe. The County of Los Alamos zoned the entire area of the lab Federal Land. Los Alamos National Laboratory has nine land use classifications for its operations. There are no prime farmlands on National Laboratory, although portions are designated as a National Environmental Reserve Park (DOE 1993a).

3.1.2.2 Socioeconomics. The civilian labor force in the region of interest grew 144

percent, increasing from 34,467 in 1970 to 84,107 in 1990. Total employment increased 31,155 to 79,846 between 1970 and 1990, an annual growth rate of 5 percent. The unemployment rates for 1970 and 1990 were 9.6 percent and 5.1 percent, respectively. In the same years, personal income increased from approximately \$324.7 million to \$2.3 billion (annual average of 10 percent), and per capita income increased from \$3,396 to \$15,319 (DOE 1993a).

Between 1975 and 1990, employment at Los Alamos National Laboratory increased from 5,094 to 7,622, representing 10 percent of the region of interest employment in 1990. In September 1992, employment at Los Alamos National Laboratory had increased to 7,450. The FY 1994 budget projects a reduction in expenditures at the site and a reduced employment (DOE 1993a).

In 1991, more than half of the Los Alamos National Laboratory workforce resided in unincorporated communities of Los Alamos and White Rock in Los Alamos County. Between 1970 and 1990, the population in the region of interest increased 61 percent to 151,000. In the same period, the New Mexico population increased 49 percent. The population in the county region of interest is projected to increase from an estimated 169,000 in 2000 to 2020, an annual rate of less than 1 percent (DOE 1993a).

Employment associated with SNF management such as routine operations of the facility including care and periodic inventories of the SNF amounts to about 1.3 person-year (Cruz 1995).

3.1.2.3 Cultural Resources. The prehistoric chronology for the Los Alamos National

Laboratory area consists of six broad time periods: Paleoindian (10,000-4000 B.C.) (5500 B.C.-A.D. 600), Early Developmental (A.D. 600-900), Late Developmental (A.D. 900-1110), Archaic (A.D. 1110-1325), and Classic (A.D. 1325-1600). Prehistoric site types in the vicinity of Los Alamos National Laboratory include large multiroom pueblos, pithouses, field houses, talus houses, cave kivas, shrines, towers, rockshelters, animal traps, water control features, agricultural fields and terraces, quarries, rock art, trail windbreaks, rock rings, and limited activity sites. Approximately 75 percent of Los Alamos National Laboratory has been inventoried for cultural resources. Coverage for some areas has been less than 100 percent; however, about 60 percent of Los Alamos National Laboratory has received 100 percent coverage. Over 975 prehistoric sites have been recorded; 75 percent of these sites are considered eligible or potentially eligible for the National Historic Places (DOE 1993a).

Native Americans in this area include those living in the San Ildefonso, San Juan, Clara, Nambe, Tesuque, Pojoaque pueblos east of Los Alamos, and the Jemez and Cochi pueblos. Native American resources on Los Alamos National Laboratory may consist of prehistoric sites with ceremonial features such as kivas, village shrines, petroglyphs, and other features of these site types or features would be of concern to local groups (DOE 1993a).

3.1.2.4 Geology. Los Alamos National Laboratory is located on the Pajarito Plateau.

The surface of the plateau is dissected by deep, southeast-trending canyons separating narrow mesas (DOE 1993a).

Los Alamos National Laboratory lies in the Uniform Building Code Zone 2B seismic area. The strongest earthquake in the last 100 years within a 50-mile (80-kilometer) radius is estimated to have a magnitude of 5.5 to 6 and a Modified Mercalli Intensity of VII. Studies suggest that several faults have produced seismic events with a magnitude of 6.5 to 7.0 in the last 500,000 years. Los Alamos National Laboratory operates a seismic hazards program which monitors seismicity through a seismic network and conducts studies in paleoseismology. Studies have determined the presence of three faults in the area that are considered defined by 10 CFR 100, Appendix A. These form the Pajarito fault system, which includes the Pajarito, Water Canyon, and Guaje Mountain faults. The Guaje Mountain fault had movement on it between 4,000 and 6,000 years ago. There is no evidence of movement along the fault system during historical times. The 100-year earthquake at Los Alamos is registered as having a magnitude of 5, with an event of magnitude 7 being the maximum reasonably foreseeable earthquake. These values are currently used in design considerations (DOE 1993a).

Maximum horizontal ground surface accelerations ranging from 0.17 to 0.25g at Los Alamos National Laboratory are estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur once in 100 years.

years (DOE 1994a). The seismic hazard information presented in this EIS is for general hazard comparisons across DOE sites. Potential seismic hazards for existing and new should be evaluated on a facility specific basis consistent with DOE orders and site specific procedures.

Geological concerns associated with the Los Alamos National Laboratory area include potential downslope movements in association with regional seismic activity. Although rockfalls commonly occur from the canyon rims, landslides are an unlikely hazard (DOE 1993a).

3.1.2.5 Air Resources. The climate at Los Alamos National Laboratory and in the

surrounding region is characterized as a semiarid tropical and subtropical steppe. Mountains deplete a large portion of the moisture from the maritime air masses from the Ocean, a condition that contributes to the semiaridness. The annual average temperature area is 56.2°F (13.4°C); average daily temperatures range from 22.3°F (-5.4°C) in January to 92.8°F (33.8°C) in July. The average annual precipitation in the area is 8.1 inches (20.6 centimeters). The average monthly precipitation ranges from 0.38 inch (0.97 centimeters) in November to 1.51 inches (3.84 centimeters) in August (DOE 1993a).

3.1.2.6 Water Resources. The major surface water body in the immediate vicinity of Los

Alamos National Laboratory is the Rio Grande east of the site. The primary surface features near Los Alamos National Laboratory are intermittent streams. Sixteen drainages pass through or start in the Los Alamos National Laboratory site. Most Los Alamos National Laboratory facilities are located well above the streambeds. Only those Technical Areas within canyons would be within the 500-year floodplain (DOE 1993a).

No surface water is withdrawn at Los Alamos National Laboratory for either drinking or facility operations. The water supply system for Los Alamos is based on a series of groundwater supply wells and springs (DOE 1993a).

Los Alamos, Sandia, and Mortandad canyons currently receive treated industrial effluent. Acid-Pueblo Canyon does not receive Los Alamos National Laboratory effluent. Surface waters in these canyons are not a source of municipal, industrial, or agricultural supply. Only during periods of heavy precipitation or snow melt would waters from Los Alamos, or Sandia Canyons extend beyond Los Alamos National Laboratory boundaries to reach the Rio Grande. In Mortandad Canyon, there has been no surface runoff to the laboratory's boundary since studies were initiated in 1960 (DOE 1993a).

The main aquifer consists mainly of sediments of the Santa Fe Group. Nearly all groundwater at Los Alamos National Laboratory is obtained from deep wells that produce from this aquifer. The Bandelier Tuff, a volcanic unit that lies above the Santa Fe Group, contains fractures that yield small amounts of water to springs. A minor amount of groundwater at Los Alamos National Laboratory is obtained from springs. The aquifers that lie beneath Los Alamos National Laboratory are considered Class II aquifers, having current sources of water and water with other beneficial uses (DOE 1993a).

The water in the main aquifer moves slowly from the major recharge area in the discharge springs in White Rock Canyon along the Rio Grande. The depth to the aquifer from about 1,200 feet (365 meters) on the west to about 600 feet (183 meters) on the east, the total saturated thickness penetrated by production wells ranges up to at least 1,700 feet (518 meters) (DOE 1993a).

3.1.2.7 Ecological Resources. Terrestrial habitats within undeveloped areas of Los

Los Alamos National Laboratory supports six major vegetative communities: juniper-grass, pine-juniper, ponderosa pine, mixed conifer, spruce-fir, and subalpine grassland. Areas within Los Alamos National Laboratory provide habitat for a diversity of terrestrial species. Los Alamos National Laboratory was designated a National Environmental Research Park in 1976 (DOE 1993a).

National Wetland Inventory maps indicate that wetlands within Los Alamos National Laboratory are restricted to several canyons containing the Rio Grande or its tributaries. Of the wetlands shown on the National Wetland Inventory maps have been designated as temporary or seasonal (DOE 1993a).

Aquatic habitats on Los Alamos National Laboratory are limited to the Rio Grande and several springs and intermittent streams in the canyons. These habitats currently receive National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-permitted wastewater discharges. For

species of fish are known to inhabit the roughly 6-mile (10-kilometer) reach of the between Los Alamos National Laboratory and Chochiti Lake. The springs and streams site support limited, if any, aquatic life (DOE 1993a).

Seventeen federally listed or New Mexico-listed threatened, endangered, or candidate species potentially occur in the vicinity of Los Alamos National Laboratory. Four species have been observed on Los Alamos National Laboratory, including the bald eagle (*Haliaeetus leucocephalus*) (a federally listed endangered species that roosts along Grande); the peregrine falcon (*Falco peregrinus*) (a federally listed endangered species historically nests in the northeast corner of Los Alamos National Laboratory); the goshawk (*Accipiter gentilis*) (A Federal candidate Category 2 species that forages in the corner of Los Alamos National Laboratory); and the giant helleborine orchid (*Epipactis*) (a state-listed endangered species that occurs near springs in White Rock Canyon). Other species occur in close proximity to Los Alamos National Laboratory and are likely to be affected by site activities (DOE 1993a).

3.1.2.8 Public Health and Safety. The total maximum individual dose to a member of

the public associated with both gaseous and liquid effluents from the most recent 5-year period is presented below (LANL 1993, 1992, 1990, 1989, 1988). The annual doses to the public are only a fraction of the DOE Public Dose Limit of 100 millirem per year. The data are from all laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.

1987	6.1 millirem
1988	6.2 millirem
1989	3.9 millirem
1990	3.1 millirem
1991	4.4 millirem

The population collective effective dose equivalent attributable to laboratory operations within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of the laboratory for a 5-year period is presented below (LANL 1993, 1992, 1990, 1989, 1988). The data are from all laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.

1987	3.5 person-rem
1988	2.2 person-rem
1989	3.1 person-rem
1990	3.1 person-rem
1991	1.1 person-rem

3.1.2.9 Waste Management. Current low-level radioactive waste management activities

at Los Alamos National Laboratory may require expansion of the existing landfill at Los Alamos National Laboratory. A portion of the proposed expansion area for the existing landfill is contaminated by a chemical plume from the hazardous chemical disposal site, which requires further development. DOE is considering the expansion to ensure continued operation of the landfill and to provide safe management of low level radioactive waste and to provide safe management of wastes (DOE 1993a).

Waste minimization has been implemented by Los Alamos National Laboratory's Environmental Management Division using programmatic controls such as source reduction, inventory control, product substitution, and waste exchange programs. A Waste Minimization and Pollution Prevention Awareness Plan was completed in 1991. Major waste generating operations have been prioritized by severity of hazard and volume in order to determine which systems to address. Also, halogenated solvent substitution has been evaluated in a number of research processes (DOE 1993a).

3.1.3 Sandia National Laboratories

Sandia National Laboratories, headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico, maintain facilities in three locations: Albuquerque, New Mexico; Livermore, California; and Nevada. The facilities discussed in this document refer only to the Albuquerque location adjacent to the city of Albuquerque, New Mexico. The site is approximately 6.5 miles (10.5 kilometers) southeast of downtown Albuquerque. Sandia National Laboratories consists of 3,360 hectares on Kirtland Air Force Base allocated to DOE.

Sandia National Laboratories use facilities at five Technical Areas and a Test Area (DOE 1993a).

- Technical Area I--Administration, site support, technical support, component development, research, energy programs, microelectronics, defense programs, exploratory systems.
- Technical Area II--Testing of explosive components.
- Technical Area III--Testing and simulation of a variety of natural and induced environments, including two rocket sled tracks, two centrifuges, and a radi facility.
- Technical Area IV--A remote site for pulsed power sciences such as X-ray, gamma and particle beam fusion accelerators.
- Technical Area V--A remote area for experimental and engineering reactors and particle accelerators.
- Coyote Test Field--Land parcels scattered throughout the Coyote Test Field testing.

The Sandia National Laboratories contain five SNF storage facilities: the Manzanillo Structures, the Annular Core Research Reactor Facility, the Sandia Pulse Reactor Facility, the Hot Cell Facility, and the Special Nuclear Materials storage facility (DOE 1993b).

3.1.3.1 Manzanillo Storage Structures. The Manzanillo Storage Structures are reinforced

concrete bunkers located in the southeast portion of Kirtland Air Force Base. Until when the Sandia National Laboratories took responsibility for the site, the Manzanillo were operated and maintained by the Department of Defense. The Sandia National Laboratories currently use four structures for dry storage of reactor irradiated nuclear materials. The two types of bunkers which Sandia National Laboratories utilize are reinforced concrete bunkers with an earth covering, and reinforced concrete bunkers bored into the mountain. The average storage space available is 1800 square feet (167 square meters). A ring road runs around the mountain and provides access to all of the bunkers. The ventilation is natural (DOE 1993b).

3.1.3.2 Annular Core Research Reactor. The Annular Core Research Reactor is a pool-

type research reactor capable of steady-state, pulse, and tailored transient operation. The reactor has a large central irradiation cavity (primary experiment location) that encloses the core, two interchangeable, fuel-ringed external cavities, an unfueled external neutron radiography facilities. The Annular Core Research Reactor facility includes a pool, one safe, and eight dry floor storage vaults, all located in the high-bay of the reactor. The Annular Core Research Reactor is used primarily for testing electronics and for safety research. The eight storage vaults on the high-bay floor are used to store irradiated experiments containing a variety of nuclear materials, but principally uranium and plutonium. Materials from only three experiments containing reactor irradiated nuclear materials are stored at the Annular Core Research Reactor (DOE 1993b).

3.1.3.3 Sandia Pulse Reactor II and III, and Critical Assembly. Three reactors are

operated at the Sandia Pulse Reactor facility; Sandia Pulse Reactor II and Sandia Pulse Reactor III are unmoderated, fast-burst reactors capable of pulsed and steady-state operation. They are designed to produce a neutron energy spectrum similar to that produced from a nuclear reactor. The primary experiment location for each reactor is a central cavity that extends to the core. The principal use of the reactors is to irradiate electronic devices requiring high fluence and/or high dose rates. The Critical Assembly is a small, water-moderated reactor used to perform measurements of key reactor parameters to benchmark the computer calculations and thereby refine the designs for a planned space propulsion reactor. The yard storage vaults are 19 stainless-steel types located in a corner of the Sandia Pulse Reactor compound. They are surrounded by a high-density concrete monolith. The vaults are used to store irradiated experiments containing a variety of nuclear materials, but principally uranium and plutonium. The materials reside in their own containers, some of which have double containment (DOE 1993b).

3.1.3.4 Hot Cell Facility. The Hot Cell Facility at Sandia National Laboratories is a

nonreactor nuclear facility that is housed in Building 6580 in Technical Area V. The

Facility includes the Hot Cell, the Glove Box Laboratory, Radiochemistry Laboratory support facilities in rooms 101, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 113A. This facility is designed to permit safe handling and experimentation with Special Materials, both irradiated and unirradiated. Research programs at Sandia National (material studies, fuel studies, and safety studies) require that experiments contain materials be assembled and/or disassembled, samples prepared, and microscopic and chemical analyses performed. The principal storage facility for the Hot Cell Facility is Room a heavily shielded room used previously as a preparation room next to the irradiation the Sandia Engineering Reactor which has been defueled. There are a series of 13 slots under the Hot Cell Facility Monorail that are available to store irradiated material or out of the Hot Cell Facility. Only one of the holes is currently in use. The other Hot Cell Facility are used for storing minor amounts of material (DOE 1993b).

3.1.3.5 Special Nuclear Material Storage Facility. At this dry storage facility, Sandia

National Laboratories stores previously failed fuel elements from Sandia Pulse Reactor elements from experiments that have been exposed to short irradiation periods. The facility also provides for a loading area, a maintenance area, and an administrative office. The ventilation consists of a forced air filtered system (DOE 1993b).

3.1.3.6 Affected Environment at Sandia National Laboratories.

3.1.3.6.1 Land Use-Sandia National Laboratories are located approximately

6.5 miles (10.5 kilometers) southeast of downtown Albuquerque, New Mexico. There are prime farmlands on Sandia National Laboratories (DOE 1993a).

3.1.3.6.2 Socioeconomics-The civilian labor force in the region of interest grew

132 percent, increasing from 133,798 in 1970 to 310,252 in 1990.

Total employment increased

from 124,605 to 293,905 between 1970 and 1990, an annual growth rate of 4 percent. Unemployment rates for 1970 and 1990 were 6.9 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively. In the same years, personal income increased from approximately \$1.3 billion to \$9.4 billion (average of 10 percent), and per capita income increased from \$3,438 to \$15,992 (DOE

Between 1970 and 1990, employment levels at Sandia National Laboratories increased from 6,440 to 7,536, representing 3 percent of the region of interest employment in 1990. Mission requirements have historically led to fluctuations in employment levels over the years. For example, employment decreased to 5,542 in 1975 and increased to 7,051 by 1985. By September 30, 1992, employment levels at Sandia National Laboratories had increased to 7,536. The prepared Fiscal Year 1994 budget projects a reduction in expenditures at the site due to reduced employment. The reduction in work force associated with the budget reduction is only estimated at this time (DOE 1993a).

Between 1970 and 1990, the population in the region of interest increased 58 percent to 589,131. During the same period, the population of New Mexico increased 49 percent to 1,811,000. The population in the three-county region of interest is projected to increase from 682,000 in 2000 to 771,000 by 2020, an annual rate of less than 1 percent (DOE 1993).

As reported in 1988, there were a total of 21 personnel working at the reactors. This number included operators, experimenting scientists, and support personnel. With their main occupation, part of the duties of the operators and some support personnel are tasks associated with refueling, storing, inventorying, packaging, and shipping SNF.

3.1.3.6.3 Cultural Resources-The prehistoric chronology for the Sandia National

Laboratories area consists of three broad time periods: Paleoindian (10,000-5500 B.C.), Archaic

(5500 B.C.-A.D. 1), and Anasazi (A.D. 1600). Prehistoric site types include pueblo villages, rockshelters, hunting blinds, agricultural terraces, quarries, lithic and lithic scatters, and hearths. About 22 percent of Sandia National Laboratories/DOE land has been intensively inventoried for cultural resources; another 28 percent has

intensive surveys. Because techniques and procedures varied greatly between project areas, most surveys are not considered adequate. All five DOE Technical Areas have been intensively surveyed; no prehistoric sites were recorded. Sixty-four prehistoric sites were recorded in DOE-owned or controlled lands beyond the five Technical Areas. About 8 of these sites are considered eligible for the National Register of Historic Places.

Native Americans in this area include those living on the Sandia Pueblo, north of Albuquerque, and the Isleta Pueblo, south of Kirtland Air Force Base. Native American resources on Sandia National Laboratories/DOE-controlled lands may consist of prehistoric features with ceremonial features such as kivas, village shrines, petroglyphs, or burials; or features would be of concern to local groups (DOE 1993a).

3.1.3.6.4 Geology-Sandia National Laboratories lie on a sequence of sedimentary,

igneous, and Precambrian basement rocks.

The northern and western sections of Sandia

National Laboratories rest on Miocene to Quaternary gravels, sands, silts, and clay in the basin formed by uplift of the mountains to the east. The eastern portion of Sandia National Laboratories is underlain primarily by Precambrian rocks (DOE 1993a).

The eastern portion of Sandia National Laboratories is cut by the Tijeras, Hubbs, Sandia, and Manzano faults. Both the Tijeras and Sandia faults, which intersect on the site, are considered capable faults (DOE 1993a).

Sandia National Laboratories lies in the Uniform Building Code 2B seismic hazard zone. The facility is situated in a region of high seismic activity but low magnitude and Available records indicate that more than 1,100 earthquakes have occurred during the past 100 years. However, during the past century, only three have caused damage at Albuquerque. Intensities have been as high as a Modified Mercalli Intensity of VII, which can cause damage (DOE 1993a).

Possible geological concerns include potential ground shaking and rupturing associated with regional seismic activity and the two capable faults intersecting on the site. Studies indicate that a nondamaging earthquake (Modified Mercalli Intensity less than III) is expected every 2 years, with a damaging event every 100 years (DOE 1993a).

A maximum horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0.28g at Sandia National Laboratories is estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur once every 2000 years. The seismic hazard information presented in this EIS is for general seismic hazard across DOE sites. Potential seismic hazards for existing and new facilities should be evaluated on a facility specific basis consistent with DOE orders and standards and site specific conditions.

3.1.3.6.5 Air Resources-The climate at Sandia National Laboratories and in the

surrounding region is characteristic of a semiarid steppe.

The annual average temperature in the

area is 56.2°F (13.4°C); temperatures vary from an average daily minimum of 22.3°F in January to an average daily maximum of 92.8°F (33.8°C) in July. The average annual precipitation is 8.1 inches (20.6 centimeters) (DOE 1993a).

3.1.3.6.6 Water Resources-Sandia National Laboratories are located within the

Kirtland Air Force Base on the Albuquerque East Mesa.

The mesa slopes gently southwest to

the Rio Grande, the primary drainage channel for the area. The average flow of the Rio Grande is 1,008 cubic feet (28.5 cubic meters) per second. No perennial streams flow through the Sandia National Laboratories area. The two primary surface channels at Sandia National Laboratories are Tijeras Arroyo and the smaller Arroyo del Coyote. The Arroyo del Coyote joins the Tijeras Arroyo to discharge into the Rio Grande approximately 5 miles (8 kilometers) from the edge of Kirtland Air Force Base. Both arroyos flow intermittently during spring snowmelt following thunderstorms. Springs in the eastern mountains provide a perennial flow to the Tijeras Arroyo. Most of this flow evaporates or percolates into the soil before reaching Kirtland Air Force Base (DOE 1993a).

High peak flows of short duration characterize floods in the area. High-intensity thunderstorms produce the greatest flows, but the probability of flooding is not high at Kirtland Air Force Base. The southeast corner of Technical Area IV and the east end of Technical Area II lie within the 500-year floodplain of Tijeras Arroyo (DOE 1993a).

Sandia National Laboratories lie within the north-south trending Albuquerque basin principal aquifer of the Albuquerque basin is the Valley Fill aquifer. The Valley unconsolidated and semiconsolidated sands, gravels, silts, and clays that vary in thickness from a few feet (meters) adjacent to the mountain ranges to over 21,000 feet (6,400 meters) 5 miles (8 kilometers) southwest of Kirtland Air Force Base airfield. The Valley Fill is considered a Class IIa aquifer, having a current source of drinking water and water beneficial uses. (DOE 1993a)

The regional water table is separated by a fault complex that divides the area into a region on the west side of the complex and a shallower region on the east side. The groundwater ranges from 50 to 100 feet (15 to 30 meters) on the east side of the fault and from 380 to 500 feet (115 to 150 meters) on the west side. Based on available data, the apparent direction of groundwater flow west of the fault complex is generally to the northwest. The direction of groundwater flow east of the fault complex typically is to the east of the fault system (DOE 1993a).

3.1.3.6.7 Ecological Resources-Most undeveloped lands within Technical Areas I

and III of Sandia National Laboratories support grassland vegetation.

Terrestrial wildlife using

grassland habitats on Sandia National Laboratories are typical of similar habitats in New Mexico. The size and diversity of wildlife populations are thought to be limited by the availability of water. An inventory of wildlife species on Kirtland Air Force Base (Sandia National Laboratories) has been recently updated (DOE 1993a).

No wetland inventories have been performed for Sandia National Laboratories, and National Wetland Inventory maps have been published. Several springs exist on Kirtland Air Force Base, including Sol se Mete Spring, Coyote Springs, and G Spring. These are located within canyons and arroyos. No springs exist in Technical Areas I through V, and none within permitted land to which Sandia National Laboratories has access (DOE 1993a).

Potential aquatic habitat within Kirtland Air Force Base is limited to arroyos and the few springs associated with them. The nearest major perennial aquatic habitat is the Rio Grande, approximately 5 miles (8 kilometers) to the west (DOE 1993a).

No federally listed threatened or endangered species are known to occur on Sandia National Laboratories. The peregrine falcon (*Falco peregrinus*), a federally listed endangered species, could potentially occur in the mountainous areas of Kirtland Air Force Base surrounding Sandia National Laboratories, but the likelihood is low because of the unsuitability of the habitat for this species. The grama grass cactus (*Pediocactus papyracanthus*), a Federal Candidate Category 2 and state-listed endangered species, is known to occur in grasslands at Kirtland Air Force Base similar to those occurring on Sandia National Laboratories. The Mexican spotted owl (*Eudermis maculatum*), also a Federal Candidate Category 2 and state-endangered species, has a low probability of occurrence on Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia National Laboratories is within the breeding range of several Federal Candidate bird species (DOE 1993a).

3.1.3.6.8 Public Health and Safety-The annual dose to a maximally exposed

individual due to release of gaseous radionuclides from laboratory operations from a 5-year period is presented below (SNL 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989).

The data are from all

laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.

1988	0.00034 millirem
1989	0.00088 millirem
1990	0.0020 millirem
1991	0.0014 millirem
1992	0.0034 millirem

The estimated population dose to persons living within a 50-miles (80-kilometer) radius surrounding the laboratory due to release of gaseous radionuclides from laboratory operations from reports for a 5-year period is presented below (SNL 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989). The data are from all laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.

1988	0.039 person-rem
1989	0.097 person-rem
1990	0.82 person-rem
1991	0.052 person-rem
1992	0.020 person-rem

3.1.3.6.9 Waste Management-Low-level radioactive waste at Sandia National

Laboratories is generated in both technical and remote test areas as a result of re development activities.

Most of the low-level radioactive waste consists of contaminated equipment and combustible decontamination materials and cleanup debris. All general level radioactive waste is temporarily stored at generator sites or above ground in containers at the Technical Area III disposal site. All low-level radioactive waste currently onsite pending approval of transport by commercial carriers offsite for b 1993a).

Mixed wastes include radioactively contaminated oils and solvents and radioactively contaminated or activated lead or other heavy metals. Other mixed wastes may be generated as a result of weapons tests (DOE 1993a).

3.1.4 Argonne National Laboratory - East

The Argonne National Laboratory - East stores reactor irradiated nuclear materials in the Alpha-Gamma Hot Cell (Building 212, Wing F), the Chicago Pile 5 Building, and analytical laboratories within Building 205. The principal mission (past and present) of the Hot Cell is research on the behavior of materials, fuel, and structures used in nuclear reactors. Chicago Pile 5 houses a shut-down, heavy-water, moderated reactor whose fuel has been removed and shipped offsite. Currently Chicago Pile 5 is in the process of being decommissioned and contains only two highly enriched uranium targets (i.e., conversion elements). Building 205 contains analytical laboratories that perform analyses on geological samples coming from the Alpha-Gamma Hot Cell (DOE 1993b).

3.1.4.1 Land Use. The laboratory and support facilities occupy about a 200-acre

(81-hectare) tract; 1,700 acres (688 hectares) within the site perimeter are devoted to landscaped areas. The DuPage County Forest Preserve District operates 2,040-acre (826-hectare) green belt forest preserve, known as the Waterfall Glen Forest Preserve, which surrounds the site. Much of this forest preserve was formerly Argonne National Laboratory property but was deeded to the Forest Preserve District in 1973 for use as a public area, nature preserve, and demonstration forest. In the past few years, a number of parks have been constructed to the north and northwest of the laboratory. Also, many commercial establishments and a large number of dwelling units have been constructed within a few miles (kilometers) of Argonne National Laboratory. Before being occupied by Argonne National Laboratory, most of the site was wooded and the remaining land was used for agriculture (ANL-E 1993a).

3.1.4.2 Socioeconomics. Argonne National Laboratory is located within the Chicago

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, which comprises six Illinois and two Indiana counties around the southwest corner of Lake Michigan. The population between 1970 and 1990 in the region increased 1.2 percent from 6,491,300 to 6,568,800 people. During this time the population increased 2.9 percent. Data sources for this information include U.S. Census, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Department of Energy documents (DOC 1992).

The nearby areas of Will and Cook Counties have generally developed at a considerably lower rate than has the DuPage County area, except along the Illinois Waterway where development has taken place. Included within a 50-mile (80-kilometer) radius are parts of Lake and Porter Counties in Indiana, and all of DuPage, Will, Cook, Kendall, and Kane Counties in Illinois (DOC 1992).

Beyond the forest preserve at Argonne National Laboratory's perimeter, the population density is low, except for a high-density residential area--over 15 units per acre (3.7 hectares) and about 4,500 residents--beginning some 650 yards (600 meters) east of the DuPage County's growth rate has been the highest of any metropolitan Illinois county. The total number of housing units within the region equaled 2,548,736. Cook County contains the largest percentage of the region's housing units (DOC 1991b).

With its workforce of about 4,700 persons, Argonne National Laboratory is one of the largest employers in DuPage County. Employees commute to Argonne National Laboratory from throughout the region.

from distances as far as 30 miles (50 kilometers); thus the payroll is spread over However, nearby villages, notably Lemont and Downers Grove, do house high numbers of Argonne National Laboratory employees. About 50 percent of Argonne National Laboratory employees reside within 10 miles (16 kilometers) of the site. The laboratory also of its utilities, outside services, equipment, and supplies locally (DOC 1992).

Employment associated with SNF management such as routine operations of the facility including care and periodic inventories of the SNF amounts to about 0.5 person-year (Neimark 1995).

3.1.4.3 Cultural Resources. The ANL-E site has no properties designated as National

Historic Landmarks or listed on the National Register of Historic Places.

In 1992, 26 archaeological properties had been recorded at ANL-E. One site has been evaluated as being potentially eligible for the National Register, 19 sites are not eligible, and 6 sites have not been evaluated (ANL-E 1993a).

The Illinois State Historic Preservation Agency has not evaluated the ANL-E site to contain additional unidentified archaeological or architectural resources. The ANL-E site to contain traditional cultural resources of interest to Native Americans has not been evaluated (ANL-E 1993a).

3.1.4.4 Geology. The topography at ANL-E is generally gently rolling; the average

elevation is 725 feet (221 meters) above sea level. Slopes of consequence are found adjacent to streams and near the southern edge of the site, where the fall into the River Valley begins (ANL-E 1993b). The geology of the Argonne National Laboratory consists of about a 100-foot-thick (30-meter-thick) deposit of glacial till on top of bedrock. The bedrock at Argonne National Laboratory is the Niagaran and Alexandrian dolomite of Silurian age (about 400 million years old). These formations are underlain by Maquoketa shale of Ordovician age, and older dolomites and sandstones of Ordovician and Cambrian age. The beds are nearly horizontal (ANL-E 1993b).

The Niagaran and Alexandrian dolomite are about 200 feet (60 meters) thick in the Argonne National Laboratory area, and are widely used in DuPage County as a source of groundwater. The Maquoketa shale separates the upper dolomite aquifer from the underlying sandstone and dolomite aquifers. This shale retards hydraulic connection between the lower aquifers; the lower aquifer has a much lower piezometric level and does not appear to be affected by pumpage from the overlying Silurian bedrock (ANL-E 1993a).

A capable fault is one that has had movement at, or near, the ground surface at within the past 35,000 years or recurring movement within the past 500,000 years (1 Appendix A). A few minor earthquakes have occurred in northern Illinois, believed caused by isostatic adjustments of the Earth's crust in response to glacial unloading. Areas of seismic activity are present at moderate distances from ANL-E, including the Madrid Fault zone in the St. Louis area of southwestern Missouri, the Wabash Valley along the southern Illinois-Indiana border, and the Anna region of western Ohio. Ground motions induced by near and distance seismic sources are expected to be minimal at the Laboratory (ANL-E 1993a).

A maximum horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0.15g at Argonne National Laboratory - East is estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur once every 100 years (DOE 1994a). The seismic hazard information presented in this EIS is for general hazard comparisons across DOE sites. Potential seismic hazards for existing and new facilities should be evaluated on a facility specific basis consistent with DOE orders and standard specific procedures.

No active volcanoes are considered to be in the ANL-E region (Keller 1979). The potential for damage from volcanic activity is minimal.

The major soil type present at ANL-E is Morley silt loam. This soil covers approximately 70 percent of the site. Stream valley soils, including the Askum, Peotone, and Saw loams, cover approximately 15 percent of the site, urban land soils approximately 10 percent, and other minor soils the remaining 5 percent (Mapes 1979).

3.1.4.5 Air Resources. The regional climate around Argonne National Laboratory is

characterized as being continental, with relatively cold winters and hot summers. The region is subject to frequently changing weather as storm systems move from the Great Plains

east. The weather is slightly modified by Lake Michigan, which is about 22 miles (east-northeast of the Laboratory (ANL-E 1993a).

Meteorological data presented here were compiled from the National Weather Service Station at the O'Hare International Airport in Chicago and from the meteorological operated at ANL-E. The prevailing winds for the airport are from the south and south a northeast component. The frequency of calm winds, defined as those less than 2 m hour (1 meter per second), was approximately 4 percent. The 1992 average wind rose ANL-E site is very similar to this pattern, with prevailing winds from the west to more significant northeast component. In 1992, the percentage of calm winds at ANL approximately 3 percent (ANL-E 1993a).

The amount of rainfall recorded in 1992, 31.5 inches (80.01 centimeters), was identical to the site's historical average of 31.48 inches (79.95 centimeter). The recorded during 1992 were also similar to the site's long-term averages. The coldest during 1992 were January and December, with monthly averages of 27.9yF (-2.3yC) and (-2.2yC), respectively. The warmest months were July and August, with monthly average 68.5yF (20.3yC) and 66.9yF (19.4yC), respectively (ANL-E 1993a).

The area experiences about 40 thunderstorms annually. Occasionally, these storms accompanied by hail, damaging winds, or tornadoes. From 1957 to 1969 there were 37 tornadoes in the state, with more than 65 percent occurring in the spring months. Theoretical probability of a tornado strike at Argonne is 8.54×10^{-4} each year, or interval of 1 tornado every 1,200 years. The Argonne National Laboratory site was hit by tornadoes in 1976 and 1978, with minor damage to power lines, roofs, and trees.

The State of Illinois has adopted ambient air quality standards that specify maximum permissible short- and long-term concentrations of various contaminants (State of Illinois and Regulations 1992). These standards are the same as the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for criteria pollutants (NAAQS; 40 CFR 50). In addition to standards for criteria pollutants, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency has made applicable all rules promulgated by the EPA relating to National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act (40 USC 7412, 7601a).

The ANL-E site and the surrounding counties are classified by the EPA as severe nonattainment areas for the criteria pollutant ozone (O₃). All other surrounding counties are in attainment of the remaining National Ambient Air Quality Standards for criteria pollutants: nitrogen dioxide (NO₂), sulfur dioxide (SO₂), lead (Pb), particulate matter 10 microns in diameter (PM₁₀) and carbon monoxide (CO) (with the exception of the Lake Township in southeast Chicago, which is listed as a moderate nonattainment area for (ANL-E 1993b).

3.1.4.6 Water Resources.

Surface Water - The ANL-E is in the Des Plaines River drainage basin 24 miles (39 km) west of Lake Michigan and is on the northern margin of the Des Plaines River valley. The largest onsite stream is Sawmill Creek, which originates north of the site and enters the Des Plaines River about 1.25 miles (2.01 kilometers) southeast from the center of the site. Streams originate onsite and combine to form Freund Brook, which discharges into the Des Plaines River. Most of ANL-E is drained by Freund Brook. The Des Plaines River flows south about 30 miles (48 kilometers) until it joins with the Kankakee River to form the Illinois River (ANL-E 1993a). As noted in National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, December 1992 (1992) the ANL-E region has no federally designated wild and scenic rivers.

Flow in Sawmill Creek, upstream from the ANL-E wastewater outfall, averaged 6.3 feet (0.18 cubic meters) per second in 1992. Flow in the Des Plaines River near the outfall averaged approximately 900 feet³ (25.5 meters) per second (ANL-E, 1991). In addition, ANL-E is not in the 500-year floodplain. The floodplain areas are largely confined to a strip (61 meters) of the surface streams (ANL-E 1993a).

The potable and site water supplies are obtained from groundwater (ANL-E 1993b). The first downstream location where surface water is used for drinking is at Alton, on the Des Plaines River, about 370 miles (595 kilometers) from ANL-E. The first downstream location where surface water is used for drinking is at Alton, on the Mississippi River, about 370 miles (595 kilometers) from ANL-E (ANL-E 1993b).

The ANL-E has nine National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitted outfalls, most of which discharge directly or indirectly to Sawmill Creek (ANL-E 1991).

In addition to this outfall monitoring, surface water bodies in the region are monitored for radioactive and nonradioactive parameters. In 1990, measurable levels of americium-241, californium-249, californium-252, cesium-137, curium-242, curium-244, plutonium-238, plutonium-239, strontium-90, and tritium were detected in Sawmill Creek.

downstream from the only small fraction of the DOE-derived concentration guides for (DOE Order 5400.5). Dilution in the Des Plaines River reduced the concentration of measured radionuclides to levels below their respective detection limits. Streams in the ANL-E region are routinely sampled for radionuclides at 3 onsite and 10 offsite. These samples are not routinely analyzed for chemical constituents (ANL-E 1991).

Groundwater - The ANL-E vicinity uses two principal aquifers for its water supply. The upper aquifer is the Niagara and Alexandria dolomite, which is about 200 feet (61 m) in the region and has a potentiometric surface between 500 and 100 feet (152 and 30 m) below ground (ANL-E 1993b). Water flows through this unit in a southern direction (ANL-E 1991). No aquifers in the region are considered sole source aquifers under the Safe Drinking Water Act regulations (EPA 1994).

The ANL-E receives its potable water supply from four wells in the Niagara dolomite aquifer. These wells are approximately 300 feet (91 meters) deep and provide hard water that requires treatment before use (ANL-E 1993b). Treated sanitary and laboratory waste from the ANL-E are combined and discharged into Sawmill Creek. This effluent averaged 0.83 million gallons (3.1 million liters) per day (ANL-E 1993a).

Groundwater is monitored for radioactive and nonradioactive parameters at 32 ANL-E locations. Groundwater in the four onsite drinking water wells is also monitored for radioactive and nonradioactive parameters, as required by the Safe Drinking Water Act. In 1990, concentrations were less than the limits established by the Safe Drinking Water Act except for electrical conductivity, total dissolved solids and turbidity. The average concentration of tritium was approximately 1 percent of the EPA Primary Drinking Water Standard of 20,000 picocuries per liter. The site was removed from service in 1990 (ANL-E 1991).

3.1.4.7 Ecological Resources. The Argonne National Laboratory site lies within the

Prairie Peninsula Section of the Oak-Hickory Forest Region. The Prairie Peninsula is a section of oak forest, oak openings, and tall-grass prairie occurring on glacial parts of northwestern Indiana, southern Wisconsin, and parts of other states. Forests in the Argonne National Laboratory-East region are predominantly oak-hickory. Other forested areas consist of maple, red oak, and basswood (ANL-E 1993a).

The mixture of vegetational communities (open fields, deciduous forests, pine plantations, wetlands, and mowed rights-of-way), coupled with a large degree of protection from human intrusion, makes the Argonne National Laboratory site an effective refuge for many animals. These animals are characteristically found in open fields, forests, and other communities in the Midwest. Also, other bird species use the Argonne National Laboratory as a stopover during spring and fall migrations. By far, the most numerous animals are the small invertebrates (ANL-E 1993b).

The site is inhabited by fallow deer, (Dama dama), eastern cottontail rabbit, opossum, raccoon and squirrels. Although fallow deer have several color varieties, only the white occurs at Argonne. Invertebrate fauna consist primarily of dipteran larvae, crayfish larvae, and midge larvae. Few fish are present due to the low summer flows and high temperatures. Wetlands include a cattail marsh and wooded swamp habitat (ANL-E 1993b).

An opinion rendered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service indicated that the only listed endangered or threatened vertebrate species likely to be present in the vicinity of the Argonne National Laboratory site is the Indiana bat (*Miotis sodalis*). An unconfirmed sighting of an Indiana bat in nearby waterfall Glen Forest Preserves indicates that the bat may use the ANL-E site. In addition, a September 1980 update of the "Red Book" for the North-Central Region lists the federally endangered bald eagle (*Haliaeetus leucocephalus*) as wintering in Will County. Both American and Arctic subspecies of the peregrine falcon (*Falco peregrinus* and *F. p. tundrius*) and Kirtland's warbler (*Dendroica kirtlandii*) migrate through northeastern Illinois and thus might occasionally be found on or near the Argonne National Laboratory site. All three of these bird taxa are on the Federal endangered species list (ANL-E 1993b).

At least two plant species proposed for Federal endangered/threatened designation are known to occur in counties near the Argonne National Laboratory site and therefore are present here. These are *Thysanotus americana*, found on wet prairies in Cook County; and *Cardamine*, a plant of wet woodlands recorded in Will County (ANL-E 1993b).

3.1.4.8 Public Health and Safety. The highest annual dose received by an offsite

resident from a combination of the separate airborne and direct exposure pathways from the most recent reports for a 5-year period is presented below (ANL-E 1993a, 1992, 1991).

1989). The annual doses are only a fraction of the DOE Public Dose Limit of 100 mrem per year. The data are from all laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.

1988	0.66 millirem
1989	0.49 millirem
1990	0.41 millirem
1991	0.29 millirem
1992	0.34 millirem

The total annual population dose to the entire area within a 50-mile (80-kilometer) of the laboratory for a 5-year period is presented below (ANL-E 1993a, 1992, 1991). The data are from all laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.

1988	25 person-rem
1989	17 person-rem
1990	15 person-rem
1991	15 person-rem
1992	17 person-rem

3.1.4.9 Waste Management. Activities conducted at ANL-E generate a variety of

radioactive and hazardous waste streams (DOE 1994b).

The ANL-E reports 10 mixed waste streams in the inventory of operations waste. eight are low-level mixed waste streams and two are mixed transuranic waste streams. ANL-E currently stores about 2.5 cubic yards (1.9 cubic meters) of mixed transuranic projects that 2.1 yards³ (1.6 meters³) of additional transuranic wastes will be generated by the end of 1997. This waste will be processed as necessary (characterized, repackaged, immobilized) to meet the waste acceptance criteria of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (DOE 1993e).

The ANL-E has no facilities for treating low-level mixed waste and transuranic waste. ANL-E currently stores about 125 cubic yards (96 meters³) of low-level transuranic waste. ANL-E includes low-level waste and transuranic waste reclassified as low-level transuranic waste. Roughly 30 meters³ (39 cubic yards) of low-level transuranic waste are projected to be generated through the end of 1997 (DOE 1993e).

Two major, unused facilities at ANL-E are undergoing environmental restoration. Laboratory expects to complete removal of the Experimental Boiling Water Reactor by the end of Fiscal Year 1995 and to complete the conversion of the CP-5 reactor building to interim safe storage condition during Fiscal Year 1994 (DOE 1993f).

3.2 Domestic Research Reactors

The environments of domestic research reactors that may be affected by SNF activities described in this section. Representative environments of sites generating and storing SNF are described as a basis for assessing the 57 reactor sites identified in Subsection 2.2. This approach was selected to permit enveloping the characteristics of the large number of sites covered. Additionally, it is recognized that the programmatic SNF analyses in this section are intended to be site specific. Site-specific environmental information has already been provided to the NRC and analyzed as part of the facility licensing process.

Domestic research reactors are located in a wide variety of environmental settings from relatively densely populated urban areas to rural/semirural university campuses and industrial parks. To provide reasonably representative descriptions of potentially diverse environments for these diverse installations, environmental information has been provided for 5 of the 11 Category 1 reactor sites. These five reactor sites encompass the diverse reactor types and power level as well as diverse environmental settings.

As reported in 1988, there were a total of 268 personnel working at the 11 Category 1 reactors (ANS 1988). This number included operators, experimenting scientists, and support personnel. While not their main occupation, part of the duties of the operators and support personnel include tasks associated with refueling, storing, inventorying, and shipping SNF.

Environmental information is provided for those facilities whose ability to store SNF is limited when compared to their fuel burnup rate. For those operating facilities providing adequate storage for their SNF, projected to be generated through 2035, there would be no incremental impacts on the surrounding environment. Accordingly, no environmental impact studies have been performed and no information is provided in this section.

The environmental information for each of these reactors has been presented as

their license applications to the NRC and has been assessed by that agency as part licensing process for each facility. The environmental impacts of expanded storage these facilities are expected to be minimal (although other effects on the institut may be extensive). Information on environmental factors that are not affected by t storing SNF at these sites (including cultural resources, aesthetic and scenic reso resources, noise, traffic and transportation, utilities and energy, materials and w is not provided in this document.

Data on the calculated doses to the general public resulting from effluents fro licensed research reactors is not available, since their license and reporting requ not the same as those for DOE facilities. At the time of the reports (1987-1993), release limits in 10 CFR 20 (specified as maximum permissible concentrations) were dose limit of 500 millirem per year to a hypothetical member of the public. The co assumptions made in calculating the 10 CFR 20 concentration limits were that the pe drank the water and breathed the air released from the licensed facility. The lice reactors proved to the NRC that the dose limit of 500 millirem per year for the gen was being met by maintaining the release concentrations at the site boundary below maximum permissible concentration limits specified in 10 CFR 20. In reality, the a received by any member of the public was well below the prescribed limit of 500 mil year because 1) no individual drinks the water discharged in the sewer systems from facilities, 2) no individual stands at the closest downwind location for 24 hours a year, and 3) the radioactivity concentrations at the site boundary are well below t concentration limits.

As of 1993, licensed research reactors are required to meet the dose limits spe EPA in 40 CFR 61 of 10 millirem per year to the maximum exposed individual from air effluents. In addition, as of 1994, the licensed research reactors are required to new 10 CFR 20, in which exposure to any member of the public from all pathways is 1 100 millirem per year.

3.2.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology Research Reactor

The National Institute of Standards and Technology research reactor, formerly k National Bureau of Standards Reactor, is a highly enriched, heavy-water-cooled and vessel-type reactor. The National Institute of Standards and Technology reactor re Atomic Energy Commission provisional license in 1967 to operate at 10 MW. On May 1 the NRC upgraded the National Institute of Standards and Technology research reacto to operate for 20 years at up to 20 MW (NRC 1983).

The spent fuel storage pool, located in the basement of the confinement buildin store spent fuel under filtered, demineralized water until the fuel is shipped offs storage pool cooling system is installed to dissipate the decay heat from elements pool. Storage racks are provided to store both full fuel elements and cut fuel pie geometry. Boral or stainless steel spacers are placed between elements as required criticality. The storage rack arrangement ensures that the fuel in the pool remain (NRC 1983).

The National Institute of Standards and Technology site is a 576-acre tract of Montgomery County, Maryland, approximately 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) southwest of the Gaithersburg, Maryland. According to the 1990 census, the population of Gaithersbu 39,542 (Rand 1992). The general area is a combination of residential and rural. T population centers are Gaithersburg, adjacent to the site, and Rockville, 5 miles (southeast of the site. The National Institute of Standards and Technology site is approximately 20 miles (32 kilometers) northwest of the center of the District of C National Institute of Standards and Technology campus is bounded on the east by a m interstate highway (I-270), on the north and west by Maryland Route 124, and on the by Muddy Branch Road. The area adjacent to the reactor building is occupied by a p the reactor cooling tower, and roads. Thus, the area within a 500-foot (152-meter) reactor building stack is not readily available for the construction of new buildin for future development of the National Institute of Standards and Technology site d include any new buildings within 500 feet (152 meters) of the reactor stack. The s nearest to the National Institute of Standards and Technology reactor is approximat (0.4 kilometer) southwest of the reactor. The nearest offsite residential or comme about 1,500 feet (457 meters) to the southeast of the reactor (NRC 1983).

During the period 1955-1967, 28 tornadoes were reported in a 2 degree latitude-square containing the site. The computed recurrence interval for a tornado at the Institute of Standards and Technology site is about 2000 years. Numerous tropical

tornadoes and hurricanes have affected the area. In the period from 1871 to 1978, 20 tornadoes or hurricanes have passed within 100 miles (160 kilometers) of the site.

There is no known major fault in the site vicinity (Seismic Zone 1). There is a relationship between mapped faults and the moderate seismicity in the region. The potential earthquake for the area was estimated to result in a maximum ground acceleration of 0.07 g at the reactor site. The effects of stresses developed by 0.1 g earthquake have been evaluated, and it was demonstrated that the confinement building and reactor would remain intact and maintain their capability (NRC 1983).

A summary of the radioactive material released in airborne and liquid effluents from the National Institute of Standards and Technology from the most recent reports for a 5-year period is presented below (NIST 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989).

Year	Airborne effluents		Liquid effluents into sanitary sewer	
	Argon-41	Tritium	Tritium	Other beta-gamma emitters
1988	900 Ci	393 Ci	5.1 Ci	0.0026 Ci
1989	328 Ci	461 Ci	2.9 Ci	0.0039 Ci
1990	687 Ci	309 Ci	2.2 Ci	0.0011 Ci
1991	971 Ci	251 Ci	1.8 Ci	0.0016 Ci
1992	665 Ci	351 Ci	1.5 Ci	0.0004 Ci

3.2.2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research Reactor

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor is a tank-type, light-water moderated, heavy-water reflected, plate fuel, research and training reactor. The MIT Reactor received its 5 MW operating license June 9, 1958 and was designed to have a heavy-water moderated and cooled core utilizing curved plate elements, highly enriched in uranium-235. The major revision of the core design occurred in 1970 (MIT 1981, 1970).

The reactor building is a steel, gas-tight, 70-foot (21.3-meter) internal diameter (15.2-meter) high, domed right cylinder with 2-foot (0.6-meter) thick concrete shield on the inside. The reactor building basement contains an 8-foot (2.4-meter) diameter, (6-meter-deep) spent fuel storage tank of demineralized water. The containment building has air conditioning and multiple filter ventilation system which exhausts to a 150-foot stack.

Irradiated fuel elements can be stored in any of the following locations:

- In the reactor core
- In the cadmium-lined fuel storage ring (holds 27 SNF elements) attached to the shroud, or briefly in a three-element rack in the core tank used during transport of spent fuel out of the core tank
- In 22 steel-lined dry storage holes, 5 inches (13 centimeters) in diameter, in the reactor top biological shield
- In the spent fuel storage tank in the basement of the reactor building
- In the fuel element transfer flask or other proper shield within the containment building

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor is located a few blocks north of the main Massachusetts Institute of Technology campus in Cambridge, Massachusetts and is 1,200 feet (610 meters) from the Charles River, which separates Cambridge from Boston. According to the 1990 census, Cambridge had a population of 95,802 (Rand 1992). The Reactor is located in the midst of a heavily industrialized section of Cambridge. The reactor building measures approximately 280 feet in length by 150 feet in width (85 meters by 46 meters) and is adjacent to the Albany Railroad tracks, used exclusively for freight traffic, run parallel to the reactor exclusion area. Although the site boundary comes nearest to the reactor on the side facing the railroad tracks, the closest point of normal public occupancy near the reactor is on the Albany Street side at approximately 120 feet (37 meters). (MIT 1970)

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Meteorology Department has stated that the conditions for the reactor site should vary only slightly from those at Logan Airport in Boston. The area atmospheric conditions vary from highly stable situations with little unstable periods with strong winds in excess of 47 miles (75.6 kilometers) per hour. Drainage from the reactor site is into the Charles River and on into Boston Harbor and Massachusetts Bay. The drainage in this section of Cambridge is such that after a breaking 20 inches (0.5 meter) of rain fell in 48 hours, the Charles River did not flood, nor was the area inundated (MIT 1970).

The Cambridge area lies in the Boston Basin which has been relatively free of earthquakes.

in the past 150 years but had several earthquakes in the preceding centuries. The located in Seismic Zone 2. The most severe shock with a probable epicenter near Ca occurred in 1755 with a Rossi-Forel intensity of 9 (equivalent to Modified Mercalli or X). Partial or total destruction of some buildings occurred. Since 1817, no ea Rossi-Forel intensity of more than 5 (equivalent to Modified Mercalli Intensity VI) reported near Boston (MIT 1970).

A summary of the radioactive material released in airborne and liquid effluents Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research Reactor from the most recent reports year period is presented below (MIT 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988). Liquid radioact generated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research Reactor facility ar only to the sanitary sewer serving the facility. All releases were in accordance w Specifications 3.8-1 and 10 CFR 20. All activities were substantially below the li 10 CFR 20.303. Gaseous radioactivity is discharged to the atmosphere from the cont building exhaust stack. All gaseous releases were in accordance with the Technical and all nuclides were below the limits of 10 CFR 20. The information is reported b from July 1 of the previous year to June 30 of the current year.

Year	Airborne	Liquid effluents	
	effluents	into sanitary sewer	
	Argon-41	Tritium	Other beta-
		gamma emitters	
1988	2627 Ci	0.071 Ci	0.0011 Ci
1989	1529 Ci	0.107 Ci	0.0034 Ci
1990	543 Ci	0.059 Ci	0.0220 Ci
1991	684 Ci	0.115 Ci	0.0071 Ci
1992	728 Ci	0.023 Ci	0.0137 Ci

3.2.3 University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor

The University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor is a 10 MW tank in pool li moderated and cooled research reactor. The reactor uses plate-type fuel containing enriched uranium-235. The core forms an annular fuel region which is pressurized a forced convection. The University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor received a license October 11, 1966 and initially operated at 5 MW. The reactor power was inc 10 MW in 1974 (UMC 1965; NRC 1991b).

The reactor is housed in a five-level, poured-concrete, gas-tight containment b is in the center of the Research Reactor Facility, a one-level building of poured-c and brick construction. The reactor vessel is located eccentrically within an open (3 meters) in diameter and 30 feet (9 meters) deep. Permanent SNF storage is provi the biological shield, in a pool separated from the reactor by a massive submerged (UMC 1965).

The University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor currently has 44 fuel elem the core, 20 SNF elements in wet storage and none in dry storage. Without offsite SNF, the University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor's storage capacity of 120 would be filled by June 1996. Before this could occur, NRC approval would be requi the reactor's uranium-235 possession limit above 165 pounds (75 kilograms). Incea storage capacity could be achieved by reracking and building a new wet-storage area reactor building. However, there are no plans to expand the current SNF storage ca (Jentz 1993).

The University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor Facility is located within (0.344-square-kilometer) Research Park about 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) southwest of t campus of the University of Missouri, south of the main business district of the ci Boone County, Missouri. According to the 1990 census, the population of Columbia w (Rand 1992). The nearest permanent residence is approximately 1,000 feet (305 mete the reactor. There are a number of small industrial activities in the area, but fo agriculture is the leading activity.

Wind speeds up to 50 miles (80 kilometers) per hour are not uncommon at Columbi Ninety-four-mile-per-hour (151-kilometer-per-hour) winds have an average recurrence 100 years; winds of 105 miles (169 kilometers) per hour have an average recurrence 200 years. The frequency of tornadoes is so low that it is difficult to estimate t the event. In most of the Midwest, there are an average 2.5 tornadoes per year in 10,000 square-mile (25,900-square-kilometer) area. Surface drainage from the site to enter Hinkson Creek, which drains to Perche Creek and then to the Missouri River (UMC 1961).

Columbia's position within the stable area of Missouri (Seismic Zone 1) and the history of the area indicate that the probability of seismic damage to the area is

A summary of the radioactive material released in airborne and liquid effluents University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor from the most recent reports for a period is presented below (UMC 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988). The information is for fiscal year, from July 1 of the previous year to June 30 of the current year.

Year	Airborne effluents		Liquid effluents into sanitary sewer	
	Argon-41	Tritium	Tritium	Other beta-gamma emitters
1988	813 Ci	14.5 Ci	0.077 Ci	0.0080 Ci
1989	920 Ci	2.8 Ci	0.0352 Ci	0.0085 Ci
1990	590 Ci	2.3 Ci	0.555 Ci	0.0385 Ci
1991	520 Ci	15.0 Ci	0.1600 Ci	0.0250 Ci
1992	440 Ci	0.73 Ci	0.2094 Ci	0.0488 Ci

3.2.4 University of Michigan Ford Nuclear Reactor

The University of Michigan's Ford Nuclear Reactor is a pool-type heterogeneous 2-megawatt-thermal reactor that is light-water cooled and moderated. The Ford Nucl has been operated since 1957 and received a 20-year license renewal from the NRC on 1985 (NRC 1985c). Its principal function is for teaching, research, activation, and (NRC 1985d).

The reactor is located in a windowless, four-story reinforced concrete building approximately a 70-foot (21.3-meter) cube. The reactor room, designed to restrict equipped with its own ventilation system and exhaust stack (NRC 1985d).

The Ford Nuclear Reactor site situated on the North Campus, which is about 1.75 (2.8 kilometers) northeast of the old University of Michigan campus. The North Campus tract of nearly 900 acres (3.64 square kilometers), approximately 1.5 miles (2.4 kilometers) northeast of the center of Ann Arbor. According to the 1990 census, the population of Ann Arbor was 109,592 (Rand 1992). The University of Michigan controls all the 1500 feet (457 meters) of the reactor site, with the exception of a small portion of right-of-way along Glacier Way to the southeast and the Arborcrest Cemetery, located (244 meters) to the east of the site. The reactor exclusion area consists of all the (152 meters) to the east, 1000 feet (305 meters) to the west and north, and 1200 feet (366 meters) to the south (NRC 1985d).

The reactor building and the contiguous Phoenix Memorial Laboratory are located center of the North Campus area. The following guidelines were used by the university developing the North Campus area: (1) only laboratory and research buildings will be constructed within 50 feet (15 meters) of the reactor and (2) no housing or other buildings containing housing facilities will be erected within 1500 feet (457 meters) of the reactor. Therefore, all buildings, except the reactor and laboratory buildings, are generally closed during normal school hours only. The closest permanent residences are about 1500 feet (457 meters) from the Ford Nuclear Reactor facility (NRC 1985d).

The heaviest rainfall intensity occurs in connection with thundershower activity. The heaviest recorded 24-hour period of rainfall was approximately 5 inches (13 centimeters) intensities as high as 1.2 inches (3 centimeters). occur with a frequency of once every 54 inches (33 to 137 centimeters). Annual totals have ranged from 54 inches (33 to 137 centimeters). The heaviest recorded snowfall for a single day (15.7 centimeters). The highest wind velocity recorded in the Ann Arbor area was 6 miles per hour (27 meters per second). Michigan lies at the northeastern edge of the nation's frequency belt for tornadoes. For the past decade, Michigan has averaged nine tornadoes per year, 90 percent of which have been in the southern half of the lower peninsula (NRC 1985d).

The University of Michigan Ann Arbor site, within the Central Stable Region, is characterized by a relatively low level of seismic activity (Seismic Zone 1). Recent interpretations of geophysical investigations suggest that different areas of the Central Stable Region exhibit different levels of seismic activity. For instance, Barstow et al. (1977) earthquake frequency map for the eastern United States that places Ann Arbor in a zone of 8-15 earthquakes per 4500 square miles (11,660 square kilometers), with Modified Mercalli Intensities of III or greater, have occurred during the time period 1800-1977. The location experienced a frequency of 32-63 earthquakes per 4500 square miles (11,660 square kilometers) with Modified Mercalli Intensity III or greater for the same time period. The Michigan Basin area, in general, is considered to have had no more than 0-3 earthquakes

4,500 square miles (11,660 square kilometers) of Modified Mercalli Intensity III or seismicity map developed by the Geological Survey of the State of Michigan shows the time period from 1872-1967, only 34 earthquakes were felt (reported) in the entire Michigan. A U.S. Geological Survey seismicity map of the State of Michigan shows a 83 earthquakes in the state since 1872. The nearest of these to Ann Arbor (March 1 Modified Mercalli Intensity IV) was about 30 miles (48 kilometers) away. Only six have been reported within 60 miles (96 kilometers) of Ann Arbor. The risk of damage earthquakes to well-designed structures is relatively low for the Ann Arbor area. earthquake intensity/magnitude potential is relatively low for the Michigan region, no known structures in the Ann Arbor area capable of causing earthquakes (NRC 1985d).

A summary of the radioactive material released in airborne and liquid effluent Ford Nuclear Reactor from the most recent reports for a 5-year period is presented (UMI 1994, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990).

Year	Airborne effluents Argon-41	Liquid effluents into sanitary sewer Tritium	Other beta- gamma emitters
1989	31 Ci	0.051 Ci	0.18 Ci
1990	35 Ci	0.069 Ci	0.48 Ci
1991	41 Ci	0.079 Ci	0.11 Ci
1992	39 Ci	No discharges	
1993	39 Ci	No discharges	

3.2.5 University of Texas TRIGA

The University of Texas General Atomic TRIGA Mk-II Reactor replaces an earlier Mk-I reactor which had been in operation on the main campus in Austin, Texas since TRIGA Mk-II is a 1.1 MW heterogeneous, pool-type reactor incorporating solid uranium zirconium hydride fuel-moderator elements with an enrichment of 19.7 percent uranium. The University of Texas TRIGA core is similar to most other TRIGA reactors operated throughout the world as well as the United States. It received its NRC operating January 17, 1992 (NRC 1985a, 1992).

The University of Texas TRIGA Mk-II Reactor facility is housed in the Nuclear Engineering Teaching Laboratory on the east tract of the Balcones Research Center about 7 miles (11.3 kilometers) north of the University of Texas main campus, in the City of Austin County. According to the 1990 census, the City of Austin had a population of 465,600 (1992). Residential areas are located from 0.8 to 1.3 miles (1.3 to 2.1 kilometers) from the reactor facility. Most areas adjacent to the research center are developed for mixed residential and industrial activities. Major activities in the area are from the University of Texas campus at Austin and the State of Texas government and the business district of the Austin (NRC 1985a).

Destructive wind and damaging hailstorms are infrequent. On rare occasions, direct tropical storms affect the city with strong winds and heavy rains. Tornado activity occurs roughly one event per year per 1000 square miles (2,600 square kilometers), or 4 x 10⁻⁴ for an area of 333 square feet (30.8 square meters), which is roughly equal to the size of the area. Water drainage at the immediate site is primarily related to the potential for occurrence of extreme rainfall rates. Surface water runoff from the Balcones Research Center site is drained into the Shoal Creek Watershed except for the extreme northeast region, which drains into the Walnut Creek watershed. The facility is located in the region with drainage into the Walnut Creek watershed. It is situated at an elevation above the local area flood plain, and is located nearly equidistant 0.5 mile (0.8 kilometers) from the drainage easements of both watersheds. Thus no significant general site area flood is anticipated (NRC 1985a).

The University of Texas TRIGA reactor site is located in a zone where no damage from earthquakes is expected (Seismic Zone 1). This does not mean, however, that the area is aseismic. The Austin region has experienced three (recorded) earthquakes within a (92.6-kilometer) radius since the late nineteenth century:

- May 1, 1873--Manor earthquake with epicentral Modified Mercalli Intensity I
- January 5, 1887--Paige earthquake with epicentral Modified Mercalli Intensity II
- October 9, 1902--Creedmore earthquake with epicentral Modified Mercalli Intensity IV-V.

Other regions in central and east Texas have experienced earthquakes of epicentral Modified Mercalli Intensity V and possibly VI. Damage from an Modified Mercalli Intensity V

earthquake is limited to cracked plaster and damage to chimneys. Structures of good construction are not expected to experience damage from intensities below Modified Mercalli Intensity V. Therefore, when state-of-the-art engineering practices for general structures of good construction are adhered to, seismic excitations from earthquakes of Modified Mercalli Intensity V are not expected to affect the integrity of the reactor (NRC 1985a).

The University of Texas TRIGA reactor recently became operational, with its first criticality occurring in March 1992. There is no history of releases and exposures for this reactor.

3.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel

In this section, the environments of three facilities housing power reactor SNF managed by DOE are described. These facilities are the West Valley Demonstration Project in New York State; the Fort St. Vrain SNF Storage Facility in Colorado; and the B&W Reactor Technology Center in Virginia. General environmental concerns related to these facilities and their operation have been addressed either during their initial licensing/permitting or during a subsequent amendment process. Information on environmental factors that are not uniformly available in existing NEPA documentation for all three sites (noise, traffic, energy, and waste management) are not provided in this document.

3.3.1 West Valley Demonstration Project

The West Valley Demonstration Project consists of numerous structures and facilities. The Fuel Receiving & Storage facility, located adjacent to the original fuel reprocessing facility where SNF management activities at the West Valley Demonstration Project are currently performed. The Fuel Receiving & Storage facility consists of the following buildings (WVNS 1993).

- Fuel Receiving & Storage Building - This building contains the spent fuel pool, unloading pool, cask decontamination area, cask and fuel handling equipment, and spent fuel pool water treatment system.
- The water treatment system maintains a water quality that ensures visual clarity for underwater operations and that degradation of the SNF is minimized.
- The spent fuel pool provides shielding from irradiated fuel and ensures that assemblies are maintained in a critically safe geometry. The pool is about 100 feet deep and was not designed with a liner or a leak detection system, nor were the walls designed to withstand a design-basis earthquake.
- Radwaste Process Building - This building houses the equipment for the Radwaste Treatment System, including the high integrity containers used to store spent fuel and filter media, as well as shields for those containers.
- Recirculation Ventilation Building - This building houses the ventilation equipment for the Fuel Receiving & Storage building including fans, filters, heaters, and humidity controls.

The Western New York Nuclear Service Center is located in the town of Ashford, Cattaraugus County, in rural western New York State, approximately 31 miles (50 kilometers) south of Buffalo and 24.5 miles (40 kilometers) inland (east) of Lake Erie. The West Valley Demonstration Project site consists of a 220-acre (88-hectare) tract which is located within the 3,345-acre (1,341-hectare) Western New York Nuclear Service Center, (WVNS 1993).

3.3.1.1 Land Use. Regional land use is predominantly agricultural, with some scattered

residential areas. The communities of West Valley, Riceville, Ashford, Hollow, and Springville are located within 5 miles (8 kilometers) of the West Valley Demonstration Project. The proximity of the city of Buffalo, Lake Erie, and Lake Ontario influence land use in the region (WVNS 1992a).

3.3.1.2 Socioeconomics. The West Valley Demonstration Project comprises Cattaraugus

and Erie Counties in the State of New York. These counties collectively account for about 10 percent of the site's employee residential distribution. Most West Valley Demonstration Project employees live in Erie County. Total employment in the region increased 14.4 percent from 1970 and 1990. During the same period, total population in the region decreased 12 percent. Personal income in 1990 for Cattaraugus and Erie County residents was \$13,698 and \$15,698, respectively.

respectively (DOC 1992). The total number of housing units within the region is 43. The number of regular employees working at West Valley Demonstration Project is personnel. Employment associated with SNF management at West Valley amounts to 9 p years per year (Connors 1995).

3.3.1.3 Cultural Resources. The cultural resources of 360 acres (145 hectares) that may

be affected by future West Valley Demonstration Project Plans and/or West Valley Demonstration Project completion and Western New York Nuclear Service Center closure have been investigated. No recorded extant historic structures are located within or adjacent to the study area, but seven recorded prehistoric sites are within a 1.5-mile (2.4-kilometer) study area described below. There are no structures or prehistoric sites within the town of Ashford that are listed on the New York State Register of Historic Places or the National Register of Historic Places (WVNS 1994).

3.3.1.4 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources. The natural landscape in the area consists of

rolling wooded hillsides, a mix of actively used agricultural fields, inactive farm brush, and rural homesites. Large portions of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center are relatively undisturbed and consist of a mixture of abandoned agricultural areas at various stages of ecological succession, forested tracts, and wetlands. The terrain in the area of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center is not unique in landforms, vegetation, expanses of water, or land use (WVNS 1993).

3.3.1.5 Geology. The West Valley Demonstration Project is located within the

Cattaraugus highlands, which is a transitional zone between the Appalachian Plateau and the Great Lakes Plain (WVNS 1993).

No fold or fault of any consequence is recognized within the site. The Clarendon Structure is the closest active "capable" earthquake (fault)-producing feature known in the region. It is approximately 23 miles (37 kilometers) from the site (WVNS 1993) and has experienced a moderate amount of relatively minor seismic activity. During its ground motion at the site probably has not exceeded a Modified Mercalli Intensity of 0.05g. It is estimated that the maximum earthquake on the Linden Structure would produce an earthquake of Modified Mercalli Intensity of VI with a maximum horizontal acceleration of approximately 0.12g at the site. The Clarendon-Linden Zone is located approximately 18 miles (29 kilometers) east of the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVNS 1993).

The West Valley Demonstration Project region has no active volcanoes (Keller 1993). The major soil types at the West Valley Demonstration Project include the well-drained gravelly loam, the poorly drained Erie silt loam, and the poorly drained Mahoning silt loam.

3.3.1.6 Air Resources. A 200 feet (60-meter) onsite meteorological tower is operated by

DOE at the West Valley Demonstration Project. A review of the West Valley Demonstration Project tower's 1992 data indicates that the prevailing wind was from the south-southwest with a mean wind speed of 5.4 miles per hour (2.4 meters per second). The precipitation for 1992 was 7.1 inches (18 centimeters) above the annual average of 40.9 inches (104 centimeters). Onsite 1992 wind data and National Weather Service wind data collected at Buffalo do not compare well, thereby indicating that Buffalo airport is not representative for conditions at the West Valley Demonstration Project.

The state of New York has adopted national ambient air quality standards. The West Valley Demonstration Project is in a Class II Prevention of Significant Deterioration area. The nearest Class I Prevention of Significant Deterioration area is the Edwin B. Forsyth Wildlife Refuge, approximately 300 miles (483 kilometers) southeast of the site.

3.3.1.7 Water Resources. The West Valley Demonstration Project is located in the

Cattaraugus Creek drainage basin, which is part of the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence watershed. All surface drainage from the West Valley Demonstration Project is to Buttermilk Creek.

flows into Cattaraugus Creek and ultimately into Lake Erie (WVNS 1992a). Cattaraugus is used for swimming, canoeing, and fishing. Although limited irrigation water for course greens and tree farms is taken from Cattaraugus Creek, no public water supply from the creek downstream of the site. The West Valley Demonstration Project has a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitted outfalls that discharge to Brook (WVNS 1992a).

The West Valley Demonstration Project site has two aquifers, but neither is highly permeable. The Cattaraugus Creek Basin aquifer system is a sole source aquifer under Safe Drinking Water Act regulations (EPA 1994). Groundwater beneath the West Valley Demonstration Project is not used for process or drinking water. The site receives supply from surface water. Offsite water supplies north of the site and south of Cattaraugus Creek derive mainly from springs and shallow dug wells (WVNS 1992a).

More detailed aquifer characterization information can be found in the West Valley Demonstration Project Safety Analysis Report for Project Overview and General Information (WVNS-SAR-001 (WVNS 1993).

3.3.1.8 Ecological Resources. The West Valley Demonstration Project lies within the

Humid Temperature Domain, Warm Continental Division (Bailey 1994). The West Valley Demonstration Project is in a transitional zone between the Appalachian Plateau to the east and the Great Lakes Plain to the north and west (WVNS 1992b). The West Valley Demonstration Project is equally divided between forest land and abandoned farmland (WVNS 1993).

Native vegetation, removed by previous agricultural activity, is becoming reestablished if left undisturbed, will slowly revert by successional stages to a climax hardwood forest (WVNS 1992b).

Terrestrial wildlife is abundant within the Western New York Nuclear Services Center surrounding areas because of the mixture of open areas and forested lands as well as the Center's protected nature (WVNS 1992b). Fifty-four species of mammals potentially inhabit the site (22 have been recorded onsite). The most common mammal is the white-tailed (Odocoileus virginianus), which is also the most abundant game species in the region; hunting is prohibited. Other common game and furbearer species include raccoon (Procyon lotor), muskrat (Ondatra zibethica), red fox (Vulpes fulva), gray fox (Urocyon cinereus), woodchuck (Marmota monax), mink (Mustela vison), beaver (Castor canadensis), eastern cottontail (Sylvilagus floridanus), red squirrel (Tamiasciurus hudsonicus), and gray (Peromyscus carolinensis) (WVNS 1992b).

The various old-field, deciduous, and coniferous woodlands, marshes, reservoirs within the Western New York Nuclear Services Center provide a diversity of habitats and a wide variety of birds. Bird species at the West Valley Demonstration Project include upland and summer residents, migrants, and visitants. The abundance of upland meadow ecosystems within the Western New York Nuclear Services Center provides a unique habitat for several New York protected birds (WVNS 1992b).

Aquatic communities at the Western New York Nuclear Services Center include common shiners, eastern blacknose dace, common white sucker, and bluegill sunfish (WVNS 1992b).

Total wetland area is approximately 35 acres (14 hectares). The general types of wetlands on the West Valley Demonstration Project can be described as palustrine, emergent, and forested (WVNS 1993a).

A riparian area on Cattaraugus Creek is recognized by New York State as a Habitat Significant for Wildlife (WVNS 1992b; WVNS 1993). Canada geese and other waterfowl have been observed periodically using the onsite reservoirs during migration (WVNS 1992b).

3.3.1.9 Transportation. Transportation in the Western New York Nuclear Service

The Center vicinity is primarily served by the highway system. Roads in Cattaraugus County are classified as roads, except for those in Olean and Salamanca, located 38 miles (61 kilometers) and 42 kilometers, respectively, south of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center. The State classifies rural roads as interstate, principal arterial, minor arterial, major collector, and local. Rock Springs Road, next to the Western New York Nuclear Service Center on the west, is a local road that serves as the site-access road and connects with about 2.5 miles (4 kilometers) west of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center. Route 219 connects with Interstate 90 (the New York State Thruway) approximately 25 miles (40 kilometers) north and with Interstate 17 (the Southern Tier Expressway) approximately 29 miles (46 kilometers) south of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WVNS 1993b).

Rail service to the Western New York Nuclear Service Center is provided by the Pittsburgh Division of the CSX Railroad, located 0.6 mile (1 kilometer) east of the York Nuclear Service Center. A rail spur connects the West Valley Demonstration Project to the CSX (WVNS 1993a).

The Buffalo International Airport is located approximately 31 miles (50 kilometers) east of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center. A general aviation airport, Olean Municipal Airport, is approximately 20 miles (32 kilometers) southeast of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WVNS 1993a).

3.3.1.10 Public Health and Safety. Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. developed an

environmental surveillance program in March 1963 before beginning fuel reprocessing. The program was intended to establish onsite background levels of gross radiological activity in surface water and air. The West Valley Demonstration Project began groundwater monitoring in 1982 (WVNS 1994).

Fallout data show the environmental levels of deposition at West Valley to have been within the nationwide normal range of the Radiation Alert Network measurements. Gross beta measurements in air taken at West Valley also were within the normal range of such measurements taken throughout the United States. Levels of airborne particulates and deposition at the Western New York Nuclear Service Center perimeter have consistently been indistinguishable from the natural background.

The calculated total dose associated with airborne and liquid effluents release from the West Valley Demonstration Project for a 6-year period are presented below (WVNS, 1994). Annual doses for each year are only a fraction of the DOE public dose limit of 100 mrem per year.

Year	Maximum Individual at Site Boundary EDE	Collective Dose Within 50-Miles (80-km)
1988	0.11 millirem	0.031 person-rem
1989	0.08 millirem	0.065 person-rem
1990	0.25 millirem	0.058 person-rem
1991	0.06 millirem	0.015 person-rem
1992	0.05 millirem	0.011 person-rem
1993	0.03 millirem	0.072 person-rem

3.3.2 Fort St. Vrain

Between 1979 and 1989 a high temperature gas-cooled reactor was in operation at the Fort St. Vrain site. In 1989, the Fort St. Vrain reactor was permanently shut down. At the time, Public Services Company of Colorado, the owner of Fort St. Vrain, proceeded with plans to decommission the Fort St. Vrain powerplant. To facilitate the decommissioning, the reactor was to be removed from the site. However, implementation of an agreement between the DOE and the Public Services Company of Colorado which would have provided for the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at the INEL was blocked, requiring the Public Services Company of Colorado to provide storage for the SNF from the Fort St. Vrain reactor. The SNF from the Fort St. Vrain reactor is being stored in an independent spent fuel storage installation located on the Fort St. Vrain site (FSV 1990b).

The Fort St. Vrain site is located in Weld County in northeastern Colorado, approximately 3.5 miles (5.6 kilometers) northwest of the town of Platteville, 0.5 mile (0.8 kilometers) south of the South Platte River, and 35 miles (56 kilometers) north of Denver. The Fort St. Vrain site consists of 2,798 acres (1,132 hectares). About 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) north of the site is the confluence of the South Platte River and St. Vrain Creek. St. Vrain Creek flows in a northerly direction and passes within approximately 0.75 mile (1.2 kilometers) west of the site at its nearest approach (NRC 1991c; PSC 1994).

3.3.2.1 Land Use. Most of the land in the immediate area of the Fort St. Vrain site is

disturbed, agricultural land. Its agricultural value is enhanced by a number of irrigation canals fed by surface water diversions from the South Platte River and St. Vrain Creek. The predominant use of the land, surface water, and groundwater is agricultural (NRC 1991c).

3.3.2.2 Socioeconomics. The immediate area surrounding the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear

Generating Station site is rural, with many communities within commuting distance. Community is Platteville. Larger cities in the vicinity include Boulder, Denver, E Collins, Greeley, Longmont, Loveland, and Lyons (NRC 1991a).

The population density in the vicinity of the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating low. The nearest residence is more than 2,600 feet (0.8 kilometer) north-northwest. The number of residents living within 1 mile (1.6 kilometer) of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation site (based on projections from 1980 census data) is 39; the projection for the year 2012 is 40. However, 1990 figures indicate populations are changing at a low rate, less than 1 percent per year, and consequently the projections will not change significantly (NRC 1991a).

Based on the 1980 census, the population within a 5-mile (8-kilometer) radius of that time was 3,148, with 1,662 residing in the town of Platteville. The projected population for the year 2012 (through the 20-year license) for this same area is 4,526, with 3,040 residing in Platteville (FSV 1990a).

At the present time there are approximately 230 personnel working at the Fort St. Vrain site. Of these approximately 16 full time equivalent personnel work on the Fort St. Vrain storage facility (Holmes 1995).

3.3.2.3 Cultural Resources. There are no known archaeological, cultural, or historical

resources within, adjacent to, or in the immediate vicinity of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation site. The nearest landmarks fitting any of these designations are more than 3.2 kilometers from the site. They include (NRC 1991a):

- The Dent site, an archaeological excavation with mammoth remains left by prehistoric Indians, situated about 4.5 miles (7.2 kilometers) northeast of Fort St. Vrain
- The original Fort St. Vrain, located 2.5 miles (4 kilometers) northeast of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation site
- Fort Vasquez, located 4 miles (6.4 kilometers) southeast of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, and listed on the National Register of Historic Places
- Fort Jackson, situated 8 miles (12.8 kilometers) southeast of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation site.

3.3.2.4 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources. The topography at the Independent Spent

Fuel Storage Installation site is flat. It is situated on the high plains, overlooking the Front Range, which rises about 20 miles (32 kilometers) to the west, and by the Front Range crest, which rises to 14,255 feet (4,345 meters) (Longs Peak) about 45 miles (72 kilometers) to the west. The Front Range crest due west of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation site is the most easterly section of the continental divide in the Front Range Mountains. The divide runs along ridges at an altitude of approximately 12,000 feet (3,658 meters) to a high point of 13,327 feet (4,062 meters) (McHenry's Peak) (NRC 1991a).

3.3.2.5 Geology. The Fort St. Vrain site is located on the east flank of the Colorado

Front Range, a complexly faulted anticlinal arch. Numerous faults and smaller folds are superimposed on the arch and are related to the uplift of the Front Range which began in the Late Cretaceous and continued into the Tertiary. In addition to the axes of the synclinal folds, two groups of high angle faults have been recognized: a series of faults along the front that extend in a generally northwest-southeast direction from the Precambrian Paleozoic-Mesozoic sediments, and northeast-southwest-oriented faults observed primarily in the mines located east of Boulder (NRC 1991a).

The Fort St. Vrain site has not experienced any observed earthquake activity (Seismicity Zone 1). A field examination and photo interpretation of the area provided no evidence of recent movement along any of the known faults. The closest area of recent activity is about 25 miles (40 kilometers) south of the site. Between April 1962 and May 1967, there were approximately 1,130 earthquake events in this area with magnitudes ranging from 1.0 to 5.0 on the Richter Scale. The 5.0 earthquake produced ground accelerations in the Vrain Valley of 0.002 to 0.001 g. An earthquake with a Modified Mercalli intensity of VII (slight to moderate damage to structures) occurred on November 7, 1882, and was felt throughout Colorado and Southern Wyoming. Due to the sparse population in the epicentral region, the assignment of intensity may in actuality be an underestimate. A reasonable guess for its Richter magnitude

implying that most of the strain energy released by earthquakes of Colorado in the was released in this one earthquake (NRC 1991a).

3.3.2.6 Air Resources. The general climate around the Fort St. Vrain site is typical of

the Colorado eastern-slope plains region. The weather is generally mild. Most sea characterized by low humidity and sunny days, with occasional brief storms bringing to the area. Thermal radiation losses resulting from lack of cloud cover provide c variation in temperature from night to day. In this semiarid region, the precipita to 15 inches (25 to 38 centimeters) a year, mostly from thunderstorms in late sprin Snowfall is significant; however, the snow cover is usually melted in a few days. humidity averages about 40 percent during the day and 65 percent at night (NRC 1991

Meteorological conditions in the local area include a preponderance of stable meteorological conditions and rather low wind speeds. Wind speeds generally range miles per hour (0.45 to 3.2 meters per second) 80 percent of the time. Wind direct rather evenly distributed, although there is a preponderance of winds from the sout northeast quadrants. Seasonally, winds tend to be strongest in the late winter and season with high chinook frequency, and again in the summer, when thunderstorms occ frequently. Strong winds, especially under chinook conditions, have been observed occasions in easter Colorado. The chinook winds are strongest immediately to the e mountain ridge and diminish rapidly over the plains with increasing distance from t (NRC 1991a).

The region typically experiences five tornadoes per year per 10,000 square mile square kilometers), with peak tornado activity occurring during the month of June. the National Weather Service, Weld County has had 117 tornadoes during the period 1 A study of tornadoes in the area concluded that 100 mile (160 kilometer) per hour w constitute maximum forces to be expected at Fort St. Vrain (NRC 1991a).

Northeastern Colorado has moderate thunderstorm activity. The region near Fort averages 50 days a year in which thunder and lightning occur. The majority of thes thunderstorms are present from late spring through the summer (NRC 1991a).

3.3.2.7 Water Resources. The topography in the immediate vicinity of the site is

relatively flat and water use is primarily agricultural. Its distribution is throu irrigation ditches. The nearest major surface water features are the South Platte 0.5 mile (0.8 kilometer) east of the site, and the St. Vrain Creek, about 0.75 mile west of the site. Local surface water diversions from these rivers, which feed irr support agriculture, are somewhat closer, about 0.33 mile (0.5 kilometer) east and site, and about 0.4 mile (0.64 kilometer) to the north. The net local topography, the direction of surface runoff, slopes slightly to the northeast toward the South This trend is interrupted by the irrigation ditches. There are no liquid discharge storage facility (NRC 1991a).

3.3.2.8 Ecological Resources. Wildlife indigenous to the area include several species of

ducks and geese, the mourning dove, cottontail rabbit, fox squirrel, and to a lesse bobwhite quail, ring-necked pheasant, deer, and antelope. The most abundant fish s include the white sucker, carp, notropis, creek chub, and, to a lesser extent, seve perch (NRC 1991a).

With most of the land dominated by agriculture, natural vegetation is minimal. trees found along roads, in hedgerows, and around farm houses are cottonwood. Tree the river area are primarily cottonwoods, willows, and Russian olives. Typical gra found in river bottom areas include gnat heads, golden weed, snake weed, Smith gras grass, foxtail and big bluestem. The site does not have readily visible evidence o but is now overrun with plants which are typically indigenous to disturbed land; pl include Russian thistle, cocklebur, Canada thistle, dandelion, and poor-man's peppe (NRC 1991a).

The only threatened or endangered animal species known to occur within the area project are the bald eagle and the peregrine falcon. However, this land has not be as a critical habitat for these or any other species. The black-footed ferret, als be found as a transient within the region, but requires a permanent habitat which i prairie dogs. Prairie dogs are not present at the site (NRC 1991a).

3.3.2.9 Transportation. There are no airports within the immediate vicinity of the

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation site. Stapleton International is about kilometers) south of the site. County roads with their associated rights-of-way are exclusion area boundary or provide access to the generating station (County Roads 2 1/2, respectively). A railroad spur connects the site to the Union Pacific Railroad located about 2 miles (3.2 kilometers) to the west (NRC 1991a).

3.3.2.10 Public Health and Safety. Results from an Independent Spent Fuel Storage

Installation Site Background Radiation Study, completed by Colorado State University in 1990, including the mean integral exposure rate of 0.34 mR per day, were consistent with those acquired for the area during previous years of sampling by the Fort St. Vrain Radio Environmental Monitoring Program. With the exception of cesium-137, whose average activity concentration of 0.18 pCi/g is consistent with regional levels due to global statistically significant concentrations of activation or fission products were determined (NRC 1991a).

The design of the modular vault dry store system is such that its operation does not involve any water or other liquid discharges, generate any chemical, sanitary, or solid waste, or any radioactive materials in solid, gaseous, or liquid form during normal operation. The radiological exposure pathway associated with the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation is direct irradiation of nearby residents and site workers. The highest nearest resident dose for any year is about 0.1 mrem. The highest collective dose committed to the population within 5 miles (8 kilometers) of the Independent Spent Fuel Installation will not exceed 0.45 person-rem (NRC 1991a).

3.3.3 B&W Lynchburg

B&W Lynchburg maintains a large nuclear fuels research facility at its Mount Airy site. This site is about 925 acres (374 hectares) in an area with the research facility within a (1.6-hectare) fenced area. Numerous support facilities are located outside and adjacent to the fenced area. The research facility is in Campbell County, Virginia near the James River, approximately 4 miles (6.4 kilometers) east of the city of Lynchburg (NRC 1987).

Building A was constructed in 1956 and housed the Lynchburg pool reactor and the Experiment Facility. This facility has been decommissioned (NRC 1987).

Building B contains a hot cell facility with its associated operations area, a transfer canal and storage pool, and various laboratories associated with the examination of radioactive materials. It also houses a demineralizer for the cleanup of the pool (NRC 1987).

Building C was used as a plutonium fuels development laboratory and for research and development of processes for other nuclear fuels. It is undergoing decommissioning.

Building J and its Annex are used for solid waste storage. High, intermediate, and low-level wastes may be stored here. Irradiated fuel wastes are being stored until they are disposed of in accordance with the provisions in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NRC 1987).

3.3.3.1 Land Use. Land use in Campbell and Amherst counties is dominated by farming

and forestry. Although the site lies in an agricultural region, very few of the agricultural characteristics attributed to the region occur within 5 miles (8 kilometers) because of unfavorable terrain. The region is characterized by mixed land use consisting of areas of farmland (crop and pasture) interspersed within large tracts of forested land (NRC 1986).

3.3.3.2 Socioeconomics. The Lynchburg Research Center and the nearby City of

Lynchburg are centrally located within the area of Amherst, Appomattox, Bedford, and Albemarle counties. The combined population of these counties and Lynchburg is about 180,000 (NRC 1986).

The Lynchburg area's commercial and industrial interests provide a large percentage of the area's economy.

employment in the four-county area. Although farming and forestry activities dominate use in the region, they provide less than 1 percent of the economic activity and very little permanent employment. Other principal commercial, industrial, and population centers that influence the four-county area or may be slightly influenced by B&W operations are Charlottesville, Richmond, and Danville (NRC 1986).

The Lynchburg Research Center has about 180 employees, and the other facilities at the B&W site employ about 2,200. The total employment on the B&W site is only about 3 percent of the 69,000 persons employed in the Lynchburg Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. B&W operation is an important, although not critical, source of employment in the region (NRC 1986).

3.3.3.3 Cultural Resources. A review of the Federal Register reveals that the only historic

site on the National Register of Historic Places located within 5 miles (8 kilometers) of the B&W facilities is the 19th-century Mt. Athos Plantation, which is across the road to the west. There are numerous historic places between 5 and 25 miles (8 kilometers and 40 kilometers) from the B&W site, particularly in Bedford County and Lynchburg to the west. The best known historic site is the Appomattox Court House National Historic Park, about 15 miles (24 kilometers) to the east (NRC 1986).

3.3.3.4 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources. The topography of the plant site is generally

rolling with gentle slopes. The nominal river elevation is 470 feet (143 meters) above mean sea level. The dominant topographic feature of the site is a hill located approximately one-third of the way across the property, the crest of which rises to 693 feet (211 meters) above mean sea level. The hill includes a large area of relatively flat floodplain adjacent to the river. The highest elevation in the vicinity of the site is the top of Mt. Athos, where the elevation is 890 feet (271 meters) above mean sea level (NRC 1986).

3.3.3.5 Geology. The James River Basin of Virginia includes portions of four

physiographic provinces characterized by distinct land forms and physical features. The provinces, located west to east, are Valley and Ridge, Blue Ridge, Piedmont, and Coastal Plain. The Western or inner Piedmont, where the B&W property lies, is an upland characterized by scattered hills, some of mountainous dimensions, lying eastward from the foot of the Blue Ridge (NRC 1986).

No important mineral resources have been identified at the B&W site, and U.S. Geological Survey topographic maps do not indicate any significant surface or underground minerals within 5 miles (8 kilometers) of the site (NRC 1986).

The B&W site is located in a western part of the central Virginia cluster region classified as Zone 2 on the Seismic Risk Map of the United States. This zone corresponds to an intensity of VII according to the Modified Mercalli scale, which implies building damage such as extent of fallen chimneys and cracked walls. During the period 1758 through 1968, earthquakes with epicenters in Virginia were reported. The largest earthquake was a probable epicenter in Giles County, approximately 100 miles (160 kilometers) west of the site. A maximum intensity of VIII was estimated in the epicentral region, but an intensity of V-VI was estimated at the plant site. The second largest earthquake was in 1875, with a maximum epicentral intensity of VII more than 50 miles (80 kilometers) east of the site. The estimated intensity at the site was V. No other earthquakes have been recorded with intensities at the site greater than the 1875 or 1897 occurrences (NRC 1986).

3.3.3.6 Air Resources. The climate of the Lynchburg area is influenced by cold and dry

polar continental air masses in the winter and warm and humid gulf maritime air masses in the summer. Extremes in weather conditions in the area are rare. The mean temperature is 56.7°F (13.7°C), with normal average temperatures ranging from 76.3°F (24.6°C) in July to 36.0°F (3.6°C) in December. Rainfall amounts at Lynchburg can be expected to reach 40.3 inches (102.4 centimeters) in any given year. The monthly rates are nearly uniform except for a higher rate during the summer months. Snowfall in the Lynchburg area generally occurs during the months of December and March. The mean yearly snowfall total is 19.4 inches (49.3 centimeters). Winds at Lynchburg are predominant from the southwest with a mean

of 8 miles per hour (3.6 meters per second). Mean relative humidity values in Lynchburg at 7:00 am, 1:00 pm, and 7:00 pm are 78, 51, and 62 percent, respectively. Heavy fog (less than 1,320 feet or 400 meters) can be expected to occur at the site on the average per year (NRC 1986).

Severe weather at the Lynchburg Research Center is generally limited to thunder with a low probability of tornadoes. Climatological data show that the mean number of thunderstorms occurring at Lynchburg is 22 per year. According to methods for estimating tornado occurrence presented by Thom, the probability of a tornado's actually striking is 3.0×10^{-4} per year, with a recurrence interval of 3,333 years (NRC 1986).

The B&W Lynchburg Research Center is located in the Central Virginia Air Quality Control Region, where the air is classified by the Environmental Protection Agency as "less than national standards" for total suspended particulates and sulfur dioxide. The Lynchburg also meets the national standards for total suspended particulates and sulfur dioxide. For carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, and hydrocarbons, the Air Quality Control Region cannot be classified because data are not available (NRC 1986).

3.3.3.7 Water Resources. A relatively large forested floodplain exists between the

normal elevation of the James River and the estimated highest flood state at the site. Lynchburg Research Center structures are located in the floodplain, plant operation impact floodplain features (NRC 1986).

The James River is formed about 96 miles (154 kilometers) upstream of the site at the confluence of the Jackson and Cowpasture Rivers. The James River flows generally southeast from the Valley and Ridge Province to the Atlantic Ocean through the Hampton Roads and Chesapeake Bay. On the basis of records for two U.S. Geological Survey gauging stations, one about 20 miles (32 kilometers) upstream and the other about 21 miles (34 kilometers) downstream of the site, the annual average flow rate of the river is estimated to be about 3900 cubic feet per second (110 cubic meters per second). The water surface elevation at the site at the average flow rate is approximately 470 feet above mean sea level (NRC 1986).

Eleven great floods of the James River occurred at the plant site in 1771, 1795, 1889, 1913, 1930, 1936, 1969, 1972, and 1985. The 1795 flood had the highest flood state of 535 feet or 163 meters above mean sea level at Lynchburg and 494 feet (151 meters) above mean sea level at the site (estimated). The largest recent flood occurred in November 1985. It had a flood state of 534 feet (163 meters) above mean sea level at Lynchburg (NRC 1986).

The Standard Project Flood determined by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the James River would produce a discharge rate of 10,705 m³/s (378,000 cfs) and a flood state of 153 meters) above mean sea level at the site (NRC 1986).

Because the elevation of the plant floors at the Lynchburg Research Center is 525 feet (180 meters) above mean sea level, which is 95 feet (29 meters) above the maximum high water flood state or 37 feet (26 meters) above the Standard Project Flood elevation, James River flooding would not affect the research and development facility at the Lynchburg Research Center (NRC 1986).

Measurements in potable wells located in the river floodplain near the B&W Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant in the northeast corner of the site indicate that the groundwater ranges between 440 and 460 feet (134 and 140 meters) above mean sea level, which is 3 to 5 meters) below surface elevation at the annual average flow rate. Because of the impermeability of the silt and clay topsoils, neither the water in surface soils nor the groundwater has a major effect on the groundwater supply or quality. B&W obtains about 100,000 gallons (380 cubic meters per day) from the above-mentioned wells for drinking and industrial use. An average of 19,300 gallons per day (73 cubic meters per day) is used at the Lynchburg Research Center. Continuous pumping tests on these wells indicate a plentiful supply of groundwater. Therefore, it is not likely that the performance at nearby residential areas is affected by B&W's operations (NRC 1986).

3.3.3.8 Ecological Resources. Natural climax vegetation in the region is classified as

oak-hickory-pine (*Quercus-Carya-pinus*) forest. Dominant species include white oak (*Q. alba*), red oak (*Q. stellata*), hickory (*Carya* spp.), shortleaf pine (*P. echinata*) and loblolly pine. Common species include tulip poplar (*Liriodendron tulipifera*), sweetgum (*Liquidambar styraciflua*), dogwood (*Cornus florida*), and several other species of oak, hickory, and pine (NRC 1986).

The great diversity of plants and vegetative communities in the site vicinity provides

variety of habitats for wildlife. There are approximately 24 species of mammals, 1 birds, 19 species of reptiles, and 17 species of amphibians expected to occur in the area. Species in the vicinity of the site that are economically important include e.g., white-tailed deer (*Odocoileus virginianus*) and black bear (*Ursus americanus*), *canadensis*), red fox (*Vulpes vulpes*), and beaver (*Castor canadensis*); and mourning macroura) and several species of water fowl (NRC 1986).

The aquatic biota of the James River in the vicinity of the Lynchburg Research generally characteristic of that of a moderately polluted river. Examination of phytoplankton communities downstream of the site at Cartersville shows reasonably diverse communities consisting of green, yellow-green (diatoms) and blue-green algae during the late summer. Phytoplankton communities during the fall, winter, and early summer consisted almost of a few species of yellow-green algae (NRC 1986).

Most of the fish in the James River in the vicinity of the Lynchburg Research Center are primarily members of the minnow, sucker, sunfish, perch, and catfish families. Species families range from common to uncommon. There is no commercial fishery in the vicinity of the Lynchburg Research Center site (NRC 1986).

Federally and state-listed threatened and endangered animal species whose former geographic ranges include central Virginia and the B&W site are the bald eagle (*Haliaeetus leucocephalus*), American peregrine falcon (*Falco peregrinus*), gray bat (*Myotis grisescens*), Indiana bat (*Myotis sodalis*), Virginia big-eared bat (*Plecotus townsendi*) and eastern cougar (*Felis concolor cougar*). There have been no reports of these species observed on the site or its vicinity (NRC 1986).

There are no species of rare or endangered fish or mollusks known to occur in the James River in the vicinity of the site (NRC 1986).

3.3.3.9 Transportation. The site is bounded on three sides by the James River and on

the fourth side by Virginia State Route 726. The site is serviced by a spur of the road which runs through the B&W property. The site is also conveniently located for truck automobile access, because only about 2 miles (3.2 kilometers) from the plant, State Route 726 connects with U.S. Highway 460, a major link between Roanoke and Richmond (NRC 1986).

3.3.3.10 Public Health and Safety. The total-body dose rate for the vicinity of

Lynchburg is approximately 107 millirem per year. This dose rate includes 43 millirem from cosmic rays, 45.6 millirem per year from terrestrial sources, and 18 millirem from internal emitters (NRC 1986).

4. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF SPENT NUCLEAR

FUEL MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

This section presents the projected impacts of implementing the programmatic alternative for management of SNF for which DOE has accepted present or future responsibility. Management activities evaluated in this section only include those actions identified at originating sites to be implemented should the No Action Alternative be adopted, as described in Section 2. SNF management activities planned independently of this EIS are addressed in this EIS only if they are directly affected or altered as a result of the programmatic SNF management alternative in this EIS. Only Alternative 1, No Action, has any potential for affecting some of the management activities addressed in this Appendix. Thus only the environmental consequences of SNF management activities at originating sites under Alternative 1 will be discussed here. For the other alternatives, the environmental consequences of SNF transportation from originating sites are analyzed in Appendix I to Volume 1. The environmental consequences at the DOE facilities receiving the SNF originating from any facilities in this Appendix are addressed in Alternatives B, C and F.

4.1 No Action

4.1.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small-Quantity Storage

The DOE's reactors at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories would not be affected by the No Action Alternative through the year 2005. Between 2006 and 2035, however, implementation alternative might require modifications of SNF management activities at the reactor

4.1.1.1 Brookhaven National Laboratory. The High Flux Beam Reactor at the

Brookhaven National Laboratory is planned to continue to operate for the foreseeable future. The presently planned installation of a storage rack in the existing wet storage facility for 162 additional storage locations, will be depleted in 1998. It is expected that the existing racks will be modified to provide additional storage capacity in the event SNF cannot be shipped at that time (Carelli 1993).

Fuel storage capacities at the Brookhaven National Laboratory High Flux Beam Reactor would be severely taxed if the No Action Alternative were selected. Selection of the No Action Alternative could result in the eventual shutdown of the High Flux Beam Reactor as filling the existing SNF storage capacity. Implementation of the No Action Alternative is expected to have no operational impact on the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor (1993).

There is no safety analysis or technical specification limit on the number of elements so the proposed addition of a new storage rack should be accompanied by a new criticality analysis (DOE 1993c).

The fuel canal is unlined and there is no continuous and accurate way of measuring detection. However, alarms for high and low water level are in the control room and level is regularly monitored. Records are maintained for canal water additions, and increased amounts of canal makeup water can be detected. The canal has been sealed against evaporation about every 5 years to measure leakage, and no leakage problems have ever been detected. Also, there are groundwater monitoring wells near the High Flux Beam Reactor are sampled twice per year, and no significant amounts of radionuclides have ever been detected. No known damaged fuel is presently stored in the fuel canal (DOE 1993c).

The fuel canal water monitoring program is adequate to control corrosion and to the release of fission products. In addition, corrosion surveillance coupon sample photographs and evaluated yearly since stored in the canal in 1977. These photographs shown no corrosion damage (DOE 1993c).

In view of the absence of any substantive difference in SNF management operations attributable to the No Action Alternative, effluent releases and their associated impacts are expected to be the same as those currently being experienced there.

Potential impacts on the Nassau/Suffolk Aquifer System as a result of SNF management alternatives described in this EIS are expected to be small. If the fuel canal were to leak, water impacts would be expected, but monitoring measures would mitigate impacts by early detection of leaks.

For the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor, which has sufficient SNF storage capacity, the No Action Alternative would cause no environmental consequences--other than those that have already been addressed and accepted under the siting and operation approval process.

4.1.1.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory. The Omega West Reactor at Los Alamos

National Laboratory is permanently shut down. It is being decommissioned. The SNF is in temporary storage at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research complex. Although at present stored fuel elements do not present a health or safety hazard, storage of fuel at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research complex presents a potential radiological hazard at that facility. Los Alamos National Laboratory does not have the capability to store, handle or monitor fuel for any extended length of time. The Rover casks contain no monitoring device and storage of spent fuel is not addressed in the current Chemistry and Metallurgy Research complex authorization. It is recommended that the fuel be relocated as soon as practical.

For the other Los Alamos National Laboratory facilities that have sufficient SNF storage capacity, the No Action Alternative would cause no environmental consequences--other than those that have already been addressed and accepted under the siting and operation approval process.

4.1.1.3 Sandia National Laboratories. Each of the reactors at Sandia National

Laboratories is designed so that the uranium fuel source essentially lasts the design life of the reactor. Consequently, none of the reactors require periodic refueling or discharge. Therefore, the No Action Alternative would cause no environmental consequences--other than those that have already been addressed and accepted under the siting and operational process for these facilities at Sandia National Laboratories (DOE 1993d).

4.1.1.4 Argonne National Laboratory - East. Essentially all of the SNF at the Argonne

National Laboratory site in Illinois is contained in the Alpha-Gamma Hot Cell Facility. The Alpha-Gamma Hot Cell Facility is an operating hot cell where fuel development programs have been conducted for 29 years. The SNF located there is a combination of material in the stored residues from past programs (DOE 1993d).

The condition of the stored SNF is generally good and would be an issue only if and when chemical state dictates that it must be treated before it will be acceptable at an interim storage site or a final repository. Likewise, the physical condition of the SNF is good considering its 29-year age. The SNF is contained within the hot cell, which precludes release into the environment except under the most extremely low-probability events (DOE 1993d).

4.1.2 Domestic Research Reactors

In Section 2.2.1.2, it was noted that SNF storage facilities at 34 domestic research reactors would not be overloaded under the No Action Alternative (i.e., no off-site SNF transport would be implemented). For those sites, the adoption of the No Action Alternative would produce only incremental impacts on the environment.

This conclusion is supported by NRC determinations in a number of licensing actions related to requested increases in possession limits for U-235 in fuel at research reactors. In these licensing actions, the NRC has determined that there is no significant impact on the environment from normal operation or accidents associated with the increases in the possession limits for U-235 at those reactor sites. The possession or storage of fuel at the reactor sites is not considered by the NRC to be a significant activity as indicated by the following examples of their findings.

In 1993, the NRC performed a safety evaluation in response to the University of Missouri request for a temporary increase in the license possession limit for U-235 to 60 kilograms. In regard to potential accidents the NRC determined: "There are no accidents in this type of research reactor associated with the storage of spent fuel with the Technical Specifications. The maximum hypothetical accident of complete failure of product release of four fuel plates in the reactor core is not affected by increased stored fuel. Because the fuel will be stored in accordance with the Technical Specifications, accidents previously evaluated are not changed and no new or different kind of accident is created. Therefore, the staff concludes that the temporary increase in the possession limit for U-235 is acceptable."

In regard to environmental considerations of this possession increase, the NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amount of fuel, no significant change in the types, or any effluents that may be released offsite, and no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(b). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment." (NRC 1993b)

In 1991, in performing a safety evaluation in response to an earlier University of Missouri request for a temporary increase in the license possession limit for a larger amount from 60 to 75 kilograms, the NRC reached the same determinations and conclusions as in the 1993 licensing action. (NRC 1991b)

In response to the request from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology request to extend a temporary increase in the possession limit of U-235 of 41 kilograms until 1994, the NRC performed an evaluation and made identically the same determination as quoted above for the University of Missouri license amendment. (NRC 1991d)

The NRC, in its Environmental Assessment for the Training and Research Reactor at the University of Lowell, stated: "Accidents ranging from the failure of experiments to core damage and fission product release considered possible result in doses that are within the 10 CFR Part 20 guidelines and are considered negligible with respect to the environment."

concludes that there will be no significant environmental impact associated with the research reactors or critical facilities designed to operate at power levels of 2 M that no environmental impact statements are required to be written for the issuance construction permits or operating licenses for such facilities." (NRC 1985b)

In the Environmental Impact Statement for the University of Texas, TRIGA Mark I reactor, it was stated: "Storage, processing and disposal of fuel elements is not significant activity of this facility." (NRC 1984)

Of the 11 domestic research reactors that are projected to exhaust their storage capacity within their existing structures beyond what had been planned. Only one indicated that it might elect to create an 18.6-square-meter (200-square-foot) storage structure. An addition of this small size would be expected to have a impact on the previously disturbed environment.

A small number of these facilities could request deferral of their directed conversion of highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel. The environmental consequences of such an action would derive from extending the risks of theft or diversion of high enriched uranium fuel which the U.S. Government has tried to reduce by mandating the conversion (NRC 1993).

An unidentified number of the research reactors may elect to discontinue operation during the next 40 years. Storage of the SNF onsite at a reactor facility that would be decommissioning would interfere with the radiological surveys conducted to ensure that the reactor site is returned to the pristine conditions that existed before the reactor operation.

The consequences of premature shutdown of any of these reactors, attributable to implementation of the No Action Alternative, would include the loss of service which would be scheduled to provide. These consequences of implementing the No Action Alternative could include, for example:

- Loss of education and training for some nuclear engineers and scientists
- Loss of trace analysis capability supporting solar cell material research, atmospheric pollutants, detection of trace metals in foods, and analysis of artifacts
- Loss of specific materials research capability relating to hydrogen in metal hydrides, amorphous magnetic materials, and biomolecular polymers
- Loss of specific nuclear medicine and radiation therapy.

Any changes in radioactive (or other) releases or exposures to the public or to the environment would be inconsequential. More detailed analyses of radiation exposures and other consequences would be provided in site-specific NRC licensing documents before implementation of changes in these facilities that were made necessary by an SNF transportation moratorium.

4.1.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel

4.1.3.1 West Valley Demonstration Project. It has been determined that continued use

of the SNF storage pool in the Fuel Receiving & Storage building at the West Valley Demonstration Project is not a viable option for extended periods of time. Therefore, alternative concepts for storing West Valley Demonstration Project SNF are being evaluated by the DOE. The options being considered at West Valley include dry storage, wet storage involving refurbishing of a portion of the existing spent fuel storage pool, and continued use of the existing facility.

Dry storage is projected to require a maximum area of 0.003 square kilometer (0.0007 square mile), a square plot of land about 54 meters [177 feet] on each side. This area would include the actual storage facility, approach pads, and perimeter fence. The largest base pad for any of the dry storage concepts would measure 9.1 by 15.2 meters (30 by 50 feet) and between 0.61 and 1.22 meters (2 and 4 feet) thick (WVDP 1993).

The wet storage concept and No Action Alternative assume the continued use (either modified or as is) of the existing spent fuel storage pool. These options should have no measurable impact on the West Valley Demonstration Project site. The actions taken to transfer the spent fuel from the storage pool to the on-site dry storage facilities would not have those taken to transfer this SNF to the INEL or any other DOE facility. Therefore, there would be no additional environmental impact resulting from these fuel transfer activities.

Potential impacts on the Cattaraugus Creek Basin Aquifer System as a result of the management alternatives described in this EIS are expected to be small.

Keeping the SNF in dry storage on-site would result in both on-site and off-site impacts that would not occur if the fuel were shipped off-site once it was removed from the

Storing the fuel dry in sealed containers would not result in the production of rad or gaseous effluents or solid radioactive wastes. The source of the on-site and of doses is direct radiation from the dry spent fuel storage facility. Estimates have developed for these doses, because a storage concept has not been selected.

The 125 fuel assemblies in the Fuel Receiving and Storage Facility have been in over 20 years. Their total heat generation rate is less than 9 kilowatt and fission inventory should have reached a near steady state condition. Conservative calculation report estimate that failure of all 125 fuel assemblies would result in an 42 mrem and an on-site dose of 2.1 rem (DOE 1993c).

Doses and solid waste generation volumes resulting from implementation of the N Alternative would remain the same as the current operation at the West Valley Demon Project. The calculated annual effective dose equivalent resulting from the total including wet storage of SNF at the West Valley Demonstration Project are as follow 1994)

Maximum individual off-site dose from 1.6×10^{-4} mrem/year
gaseous releases
Maximum individual off-site dose from 1.1×10^{-2} mrem/year
liquid releases

4.1.3.2 Fort St. Vrain. The Fort St. Vrain facility has already constructed an

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation for interim storage (with a 40 year des the SNF from the Fort St. Vrain power plant. Onsite storage will have no additiona the Fort St. Vrain site (FSV 1990a). However, under this alternative, Public Servi Colorado would not achieve its goal of becoming free of radioactive materials by 19 option.

4.1.3.3 B&W Lynchburg Technology Center. The Lynchburg Technology Center

received the SNF between 1980 and 1987 as part of a "high-burnup" research program by the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy. The experiments were completed in 1989 and th program was officially terminated in 1992. Since that time, the Lynchburg Technolo has stored this fuel under contract to DOE (DOE 1993c).

The DOE-owned spent fuel rods that are stored in the spent fuel storage pool ar and in good condition. Water quality is also good and is maintained by passing thr particulate filters and resin beds. No chemistry controls have been needed. In ad not present in the pool and biological contamination has not been observed (DOE 199

There are no routine inspections of the condition of spent fuel rods that have sectioned and placed in dry storage. However, some of the fuel stored in this faci recently repackaged and moved; this fuel and its containers are known to be in good Other evidence that the integrity of spent fuel storage containers has been maintai condition is routine monitoring of groundwater, direct radiation, and smearable con of which indicate that leakage of radionuclides is not occurring (DOE 1993c).

Groundwater and other radionuclide monitoring have not indicated any radionucli releases from the SNF storage facilities at the B&W Lynchburg Technical Center. Th currently no reason to suspect that spent fuel storage containers will degrade in t a manner that would result in a release of fission products. This facility is rout and relicensed by the NRC every 5 years. Hence, any developing storage problems wo likely be dealt with and corrected under the direction of the NRC (DOE 1993c).

4.2 Decentralization

The Decentralization Alternative is similar to the No Action Alternative except off-site shipments would occur from university and domestic non-DOE research reacto Impacts of transportation are described in Appendix I to Volume 1. Some DOE facili be upgraded/replaced and additional on-site storage capacity would be required at s facilities. Essentially, there are no differences from the No Action Alternative, from transportation, facility upgrade, and new construction.

At Brookhaven National Laboratory High Flux Beam Reactor, some land disturbance be anticipated from the installation of additional SNF storage capacity, whether we However, any such disturbance is expected to occur in previously disturbed on-site

4.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis

The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative would permit the shipment of the SNF c in storage or being generated at the originating sites. With the implementation of Planning Basis Alternative, as in past practice, SNF would continue to be shipped f originating sites to a DOE receiving site. The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternativ expected to have essentially no incremental impact on the originating sites. Impac transportation are described in detail in Appendix I to Volume 1. The alternative SNF by barge from Brookhaven National Laboratory is also described in Appendix I to 1.

4.4 Regionalization

The Regionalization Alternative would be the same as the 1992/1993 Planning Bas Alternative, except for the difference in destinations. Implementation of the Regi Alternative would permit the shipment of SNF from originating sites to regional DOE storage facilities. The Regionalization Alternative would be expected to have esse incremental impact on the originating sites. Impacts of transportation are describ Appendix I to Volume 1.

4.5 Centralization

The Centralization Alternative would be the same as the 1992/1993 Planning Basi Alternative, except for the difference in destinations. Implementation of the Cent Alternative would permit the shipment of SNF from originating sites to a central DO storage facility. The Centralization Alternative would be expected to have essenti incremental impact on the originating sites. Impacts of transportation are describ Appendix I to Volume 1.

5.0 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS

This section describes the cumulative environmental impacts of the alternatives generating and storing SNF at the originating sites addressed in this Appendix. Th on DOE SNF Alternative 1, No Action, under which all SNF would remain at the origin facility. For the individual originating facilities, the cumulative impact is defi the incremental impacts of SNF management under the No Action Alternative and the i of the other operations at the facility's reactor(s) or other activities involving materials. For the other alternatives, the SNF cumulative impact at the originatin essentially would end with the removal of the SNF from the site. The cumulative im intersite SNF transportation alternatives on transportation routes and affected com analyzed programmatically in Volume 1, Appendix I. The cumulative impacts at the D facilities receiving SNF are addressed in Appendixes A, B, C and F.

5.1 DOE Test and Experimental Reactors

Under the No Action Alternative, the cumulative environmental impacts at DOE te experimental reactors are derived from past environmental impacts as obtained from operating reports, and estimated future impacts based on extrapolation to the year impacts.

5.1.1 Brookhaven National Laboratory

It is expected that the High Flux Beam Reactor and Brookhaven Medical Research would continue to operate, for all SNF management alternatives except No Action. I storage were to be required on-site to accommodate High Flux Beam Reactor SNF throu current impacts would be somewhat increased by the impacts of building and operatin

additional facility. Although the nature of that facility has not been determined, impacts are expected to be negligibly small. Should the facility propose substanti appropriate NEPA documentation would be prepared in accordance with existing enviro regulations.

5.1.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory

Omega West Reactor at the Los Alamos National Laboratory is permanently shut do is being decommissioned. The spent fuel is in temporary dry storage at the Chemist Metallurgy Research complex, and resulting impacts are negligible. The spent fuel relocation. Cumulative impacts would not change under any alternative.

5.1.3 Sandia National Laboratories

The cumulative environmental impacts would not change from those currently expe at Sandia National Laboratories from the operation of the reactors and storage of s quantities of SNF.

5.1.4 Argonne National Laboratory - East

The cumulative environmental impacts would not change from those currently expe from the storage of small quantities of SNF.

5.2 Domestic Research Reactors

Under the No Action Alternative, the cumulative environmental impacts at domest research reactors are a composite of past environmental impacts as obtained from an operating reports, and estimated future impacts based on extrapolation to the year impacts. The following facility-specific cumulative environmental impacts have bee representative of all domestic research reactor facilities that could be affected b

5.2.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology

Implementation of the No Action Alternative would result in the shutdown of the Bureau of Standards Reactor in October 1996 due to the inability to store additiona environmental radiological impact of such action would be a reduction of radioactiv doses below those of full power operation. On-site SNF storage would meet existing design criteria. There would be no other change in the cumulative environmental im for the adverse socioeconomic impacts as a result of the loss of services and knowl reactor operations.

A scenario of continued operation, assuming timely reissuance of the operating including compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act, would bound the cu environmental impacts under any of the DOE-postulated SNF alternatives.

5.2.2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

As with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Massachusetts I Technology research reactor would be expected to shut down in response to the No Ac Alternative because of limited SNF storage capacity. Thus, a scenario of continued assuming timely reissuance of the operating license, would bound the cumulative env impacts under any of the DOE-postulated SNF alternatives.

5.2.3 Conclusion

For all domestic research reactors, the SNF management alternatives, including Action Alternative, would not increase the cumulative impacts of the originating si current values. Some of the facilities could not be able to continue normal operat

No Action Alternative and could be forced to shut down due to the lack of SNF storage. Reactors licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission are not under DOE control. Additional storage space could be constructed under the No Action Alternative. However, for the negative socioeconomic impacts attributable to the loss of services and knowledge resulting from such shutdowns, other site-specific cumulative impacts would not be

5.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel

The implementation of any one of DOE's five SNF management alternatives would have additional environmental consequences beyond those already evaluated for the Fort St. Vrain and B&W Lynchburg facilities.

The situation is similar for the West Valley Demonstration Project, except that it has entered into an agreement with the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority which calls for the removal of SNF from the West Valley Demonstration Project. Implementation of the No Action and Decentralization Alternatives would result in SNF remaining at the West Valley Demonstration Project. If the fuel remains at the West Valley Demonstration Project, the SNF may be managed in a new dry storage facility. Once in dry storage, there will be no releases of radioactive effluents and an indistinguishable radiation exposure to the environs in excess of that which would occur were the SNF moved as scheduled, and in the payment of storage costs by DOE to the State of New York.

6.0 ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

THAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED

Unavoidable adverse impacts addressed here are limited to those occurring as a result of DOE Alternative 1 (No Action) at the originating facilities discussed in this Appendix. The alternatives consider normal shipment of SNF from the originating site, with only the routes and the receiving site possibly being subjected to unavoidable adverse impacts transferred SNF. Any adverse impacts at the originating sites are thus precluded for transportation alternatives. Possible unavoidable adverse impacts on transportation are analyzed in Volume 1, Appendix I. Possible unavoidable adverse impacts at the DOE facilities that receive SNF are addressed in Appendixes A, B, C and F.

6.1 DOE Test and Experimental Reactors

The adverse effects that may be unavoidable caused by implementation of the No Action Alternative would be associated with the possible premature, long-term shutdown of the Flux Beam Reactor at Brookhaven National Laboratory. The consequences of this shutdown would be cessation of site specific activities involving unique experiments. These are needed for understanding materials structures, biological processes, and the behavior of conducting materials. Shutdown would also cause the loss of jobs associated with the experiments and supporting site activities.

6.2 Domestic Research Reactors

The adverse effects that may be unavoidable at domestic research reactors caused by implementation of the No Action Alternative would be associated with the possible premature, long-term shutdown of several reactors. The consequences of these shutdowns, discussed in Section 4.1.2, would be cessation of site-specific research and education activities in the loss of jobs associated with these activities at these sites.

6.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel

Implementation of the No Action Alternative could result in adverse consequences that would be unavoidable at the West Valley Demonstration Project. Should this alternative be selected, an adverse impact that may be unavoidable would be continued on-site and off-site radiological exposures beyond the scheduled fuel removal date as a result of radioactive effluent direct radiation.

Since the Public Services Company of Colorado has already responded to the No A Alternative by licensing and constructing an independent spent nuclear fuel storage its Fort St. Vrain site, no additional consequences or additional adverse consequences incurred there.

7.0 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE

COMMITMENTS OF RESOURCES

The assessment of the activities undertaken at the SNF originating sites as a condition of the implementation of all alternatives indicates that only minor irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources would be required.

7.1 DOE Test and Experimental Reactors

If the Decentralization Alternative were to be implemented, the Brookhaven National Laboratory would expect to be required to identify some way to store the SNF generated by the High Flux Beam Reactor through the year 2035. Several scenarios are possible, but have not been decided upon at this time. One possible SNF management scenario is to install additional storage accommodations. Limited quantities of construction materials and fuel for construction equipment would be required if this scenario were selected.

Implementation of the No Action Alternative would not result in any irreversible and irretrievable commitments at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories or Argonne National Laboratory - East.

Implementation of any of the other proposed alternatives for SNF would not result in additional irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources at the DOE test and experimental reactors.

7.2 Domestic Research Reactors

There are no substantial new irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources at domestic research reactors with the implementation of any of the proposed SNF alternatives for generating and storing SNF. If, under the No Action Alternative, any NRC-licensed reactor should elect to modify its SNF storage capabilities, a site-specific license amendment would be required. If the storage facilities were expanded, there would be a commitment of resources for materials and fuel to operate construction equipment. The other DOE SNF alternatives involve no commitment of resources at domestic research reactor facilities.

7.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel

Implementation of the Decentralization Alternative could result in irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources at the West Valley Demonstration Project site. If this alternative were selected, this commitment of resources would result from the construction of materials and fuels used to provide alternative on-site SNF storage capability. These commitments cannot be quantified, however, until it is determined whether existing storage capacity would be modified or a new SNF storage facility would be constructed.

Implementation of any of the other proposed alternatives for SNF would not result in additional irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources at the commercial facilities.

References

- ANL-E (Argonne National Laboratory-East), 1993a, Argonne National Laboratory-East Site Environmental Report ANL9315 for Calendar Year 1992.
- ANL-E (Argonne National Laboratory-East), 1993b, Laboratory Integrated Facilities Plan for FY 1993, JOST-106-G-TOO4, Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, University of Chicago.
- ANL-E (Argonne National Laboratory-East), 1992, Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 1991.

- Environment and Waste Management Program, Argonne, Illinois, May, p. 121.
- ANL-E (Argonne National Laboratory-East), 1991, Site Environmental Report for Calen Environment and Waste Management Program, Argonne, Illinois, July, p. 121.
- ANL-E (Argonne National Laboratory-East), 1990, Site Environmental Report for Calen Environment and Waste Management Program, Argonne, Illinois, April, pp. 98-99.
- ANL-E (Argonne National Laboratory-East), 1989, Site Environmental Report for Calen Environment and Waste Management Program, Argonne, Illinois, April, pp. 92-93.
- ANS (American Nuclear Society), 1988, Research, Training, Test and Production React United States of America, third edition, Reed Robert Burn (ed.), published by t Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois.
- Bailey, R. G. 1994, Ecoregions of United States, Map sheet, Scale 1:7,500,000, 2d e Department of Agriculture, Forest Service.
- BNL (Brookhaven National Laboratory), 1993a, Brookhaven National Laboratory 1993 Te Information Document, Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy.
- BNL (Brookhaven National Laboratory), 1993b, Site Environmental Report for Calendar Safety and Environmental Protection Division, Upton, Long Island, New York, May 205.
- BNL (Brookhaven National Laboratory), 1992a, Site Environmental Report for Calendar Safety and Environmental Protection Division, Upton, Long Island, New York, Jan 79.
- BNL (Brookhaven National Laboratory), 1992b, Site Environmental Report for Calendar Safety and Environmental Protection Division, Upton, Long Island, New York, Sep pp. 1-11; 80-83.
- BNL (Brookhaven National Laboratory), 1992c, Safety and Environmental Protection Di Environmental Report for Calendar Year 1991, BNL-52347, Prepared for the U.S. D Energy, Upton, New York, September.
- BNL (Brookhaven National Laboratory), 1990, Site Environmental Report for Calendar Safety and Environmental Protection Division, Upton, Long Island, New York, Dec pp. 57-60.
- BNL (Brookhaven National Laboratory), 1989, Site Report for Calendar Year 1988, Saf Environmental Protection Division, Upton, Long Island, New York, June, pp. 4748
- Carelli, J. 1993, Brookhaven National Laboratories, Upton, New York, Response to Sp Questionnaire for INEL Els - Pan I and II, November 8.
- Connors, B., 1995, West Valley Nuclear Services Company, personal cornmunication wi Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding ~Number of Pers and Personnel Involved with Storage of SNF," March 3
- Cruz, C., 1995, DOE Albuquerque Operations Office, personal communication with T. J Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaiihersburg, Maryland, regarding "Number of Perso Involved with Storage of SNF," March 6.
- DOC (U.S. Department of Commerce), 1992, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Econ Analysis 1992, Regional Economic Information System, May.
- DOC (U.S. Department of Commerce), 1991a, Region and County Projections, November.
- DOC (U.S. Department of Commerce), 1991b, 1990 Census of Population and Housing Sum 1A.
- DOC (U.S. Department of Commerce), 1991c, Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Popu Housing, Summary Tape File 3A, September.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1994a, Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evalua Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities, DOE-STD-1020-94, U.S. Department Washington, D.C., April
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1994b, Office of Secretary Annual Report on Waste and Waste Minimization Progress 1991-1992, DOEIS-OLOS, February.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993a, Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Asse Volume 1, Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Program, DOE/EA-0792, U.S. Departmern of Energy, Office of Defense Programs, Deputy Assistant Secretary fo Complex Reconfiguration, Washington, D.C., June, pp. 3-56; 3-57; 4-68; 4-70 to 4-904-114; 4-117; 4-118; 4-1204-122; 4-123; 4-125 to 4-128; 4-132; 4-135.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993b, Spent Nuclear Fuel Working Group Report on and Storage of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel and Other Reactor Irradiated Materials and Their Environmental, Safety and Health Vulnerabilities, Volume I, Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., Noyember, pp. 31, 32.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993c, Spent Fuel Working Group Report on Inventor Storage of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel and Other Reactor Irradiated Nuc and their Environmental, Safety and Health Vulnerabilities, Vol. II, Washington November, pp. 4-1 to 4A; 5-1; 5-2; 5-4; 10-1 and 10-3.

- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993d, Spent Fuel Working Group Report on Inventor Storage of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel and Other Reactor Irradiated Nuc and their Environmental, Safety and Health Vulnerabilities, Vol. III, Washington November, p. 1 and 3.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993e, Interim Mixed Waste Inventory Report: Waste Treatment Capacities, and Technologies, Vol. 3, Section 14.1, DOE/NBM-1 100, Ap
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993f, Installation Summaries, Vol. 2 of En vironm Restoration and Waste Management Five-year Plan, Fiscal Years 1994-1998, DOE/S-January.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993g, Interim Mixed Waste Inventory Report: Waste Treatment Capacities, and Technologies, DOE/NBM-1 100, Vol. 3, Section 22.1, Ap
- EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) 1994. Designated Sole Source Aquifers Na Fact Sheet with Designated Aquifers and Pending Petitions listed. Washington, D Groundwater Protection, January.
- ERDA (Energy Research & Development Administration), 1977, Final Environmental Impa Statement, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Environment and Safety Division, Jul 40; 2-50 to 2-60; 2-67 to 2-75; 2-78.
- FSV (Fort St.Vrain) 1990a, ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) Safr Revision 0, Fort St.Vrain, Denver, Colorado, June 22, pp. 1.1-1 to 1.1-51.2-1 t 2.1-1 to 2.1-24.2-1; 4.2-54.2-9; 5.1-1-5.3-1; 5.4-1, 7.4-1 to 7.4-2; 7.5-1 to 7
- FSV (Fort St.Vrain) 1990b, ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) Envi Revision 0, FortSt.Vrain, Denver, Colorado, June 22, pp. 1.1-11.2-1; 2.1-16.1-1 9.1-1 to 9.1-3; 9.2-1.
- Holmes, M., 1995, Public Service Company of Colorado, personal communication with T Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Number of Perso and Personnel Involved with Storage of SNF," March 2.
- Jentz, T.L., 1993, Domestic Research Reactor Responses to Spent Nuclear Fuel Dispos Questionnaire, 2Y99-SNF-008, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Marylan
- Keller, 1979, Environmental Geology 2d ed, Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publi Company.
- LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory), 1993, Environmental Surveillance at Los Alam 1991, Environmental Protection Group, Los Alamos, New Mexico, August, pp. V-i t
- LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory), 1992, Environmental Surveillance at Los Alam 1990, Environmental Protection Group, Los Alamos, New Mexico, March, pp. 111-1
- LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory), 1990, Environmental Surveillance at Los Alam 1989, Environmental Protection Group, Los Alamos, New Mexico, December, pp. 21-
- LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory), 1989, Environmental Surveillance at Los Alam 1988, Environmental Protection Group, Los Alamos, New Mexico, June, pp. 19-27.
- LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory), 1988, Environmental Surveillance at Los Alam 1987, Environmental Protection Group, Los Alamos, New Mexico, April, pp. 17-24.
- Mapes, D.R., 1979, Soil Survey of DuPage and Part of Cook Counties, Illinois, U.S. Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, May.
- LMIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 1992, MIT Research Reactor Annual Rep for the Period July 1, 1991-June 30, 1992, Reactor Staff, August, pp. 24-26, 28
- MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 1991, MIT Research Reactor Annual Repo Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Period July 1, 1990 June 30, 1991, Reacto August, pp. 25-27, 29.
- MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 1990, MIT Research Reactor Annual Repo Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Period July 1, 1989-June 30, 1990, Reacto August, pp. 24-26, 23.
- MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 1989, MIT Research Reactor Annual Repo Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Period Ju4 1, 1988-June 30, 1989, Reactor August, pp. 27-29, 31.
- MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 1988, MIT Research Reactor Annual Repo Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Period July 1, 1987-June 30, 1988, Reacto August, pp. 22-24, 26.
- MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 1981, Cambridge, Massachusetts, letter L. Clark, Jr. to J. R. Miller, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, regarding "SAR Revision No. 21 and License No. R-37 Amendment Request, Docket 5 May 14, pp. SAR 9.9 to 9.12; SAR 9.20; 3-36 to 3-39; SER 1-3.
- MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 1970, Safety Analysis Report for the M Reactor (MITR-II), MITNE-1 15, Depart:ment of Nuclear Engineering, Cambridge, Massachusetts, October.

- Neimark, L., 1995, Argonne National Laboratory, personal communication with T. Jent NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Number of Personnel Involved SNF," March 3.
- New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 1993, Division of Air Resources, New York State Air Quality Report Ambient Air Monitoring System. DAR-93-1.
- New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 1977, "Air Quality Standards," Environmental Conservation. Title 6, Chapter III, Part 257.
- NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), 1993, National Institute of Technology (NBSR) Operations Report #45 for January 1, 1992-December 31, 1992, Radiation Division, March. p. 6.
- NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), 1992, National Institute of Technology (NBSR) Operations Report #44 for January 1, 1991-December 31, 1991, Radiation Division, March, p. 9.
- NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), 1991, National Institute of Technology (NBSR) Operations Report #43 for January 1, 1990-December 31, 1990, Radiation Division, March, p. 8.
- NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), 1990, National Institute of Technology (NBSR) Operations Report #42 for January 1, 1989-December 31, 1989, Radiation Division, March, p. 8.
- NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), 1989, National Institute of Technology (NBSR) Operations Report #41 for January 1, 1988-December 31, 1988, Radiation Division, April, p. 10.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1993a, Non-Power Reactors and Decommissioning Project Directorate, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C., October.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1993b, Safety Evaluation by the Office of Reactor Regulation Supporting Amendment No. 24 to Facility License No. R-103, Docket No. 50-186, The University of Missouri at Columbia, July 21.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1992, Safety Evaluation Report Related to Construction Permit and Operating License for the Research Reactor at the University of Missouri, NUREG-135, Supplement No. 1, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, January, pp. 4-6; 9-1.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1991a, Environmental Assessment Related to Construction and Operation of the Fort St. Vrain Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility, Docket No. 72-9 (50-267), Washington, D.C., February, pp. 1-2; 4-5; 11-23; 25-26; 3841.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1991b, Safety Evaluation by the Office of Reactor Regulation Related to Amendment 21 to Facility Amended License No. R-103, University of Missouri-Columbia, Docket No. 50-186, Washington, D.C., May 8.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1991c, Safety Evaluation Report for Public Law 102-555 Safety Analysis Report for Fort St. Vrain Independent Spent Fuel Installation, Docket 72-9, Washington, D.C., October, pp. 1-1; 1-6 to 1-91-11 to 1-2-2; 24; 2-74 to 2-78; 5-1.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1991d, Safety Evaluation by the Office of Reactor Regulation Supporting Amendment No. 26 to Facility Operating License No. R-103, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Docket No. 50-20, December 9.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1987, Safety Evaluation Report Related to License Renewal for the Babcock & Wilcox Company Naval Nuclear Fuel Division, Naval Research Laboratory, Lynchburg, Virginia, Docket No. 70-824, Washington, D.C., July 18.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 1986, Environmental Assessment for Renewal of Materials License No. SNM-778, Docket No. 70-824, Babcock and Wilcox Lynchburg Center, NUREG-1227, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, December 22.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1985a, Safety Evaluation Report Related to Construction Permit and Operating License for the Research Reactor at the University of Missouri, NUREG-135, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C., May, pp. 1-3; 2-6; 3-2; 3-6; 4-1; 9-12.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1985b, Environmental Assessment for the Training and Research Reactor of the University of Lowell, License No. R-125, Docket No. 50-186, University of Michigan, Docket No. 50-20, July 29.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 1985c, University of Michigan Docket No. 50-20, July 29.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 1985d, Safety Evaluation Report Related to Construction Permit and Operating License for the Training and Research Reactor at the University of Missouri, Docket No. 50-2, NUREG-1138, July.

- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1984, Environmental Impact, University of TRIGA Mark II, July.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1983, Safety Evaluation Report Related to Renewal and Power Increase for the National Bureau of Standards Reactor, NUREG-Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington September.
- NYSERDA (New York State Energy Research and Development Authority) and DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1986, agreement Between NYSEDA & DOE on U.S. Department Spent Nuclear Fuel Located at the Western New York Nuclear Service Center, West York, July.
- PSC (Public Service Company of Colorado) 1994, Comments on the DOE's Draft EIS on Management and INEL Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs, P Public Service Company of Colorado, Platteville, Colorado, September.
- Rand McNally, 1992, 1992 Rand McNally Commercial Atlas and Marketing Guide, 123rd e
- SAIC (Science Applications International Corporation), 1992 Brookhaven National Lab Baseline Report, January 1992, pp. 2-1 to 2-11.
- State of Illinois Rules and Regulations 1992. "Title 35: Environmental Protection; S Pollution; Chapter 1: Pollution Control Board; Subchapter 1: Air Quality Stand Standards and Measurements", July.
- SNL (Sandia National Laboratory), 1994, Medical Isotope Production Program, NEPA I SNA-94-047, November.
- SNL (Sandia National Laboratories) 1993, 1992 Environmental Monitoring Report, San Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, September, pp. 5-28.
- SNL (Sandia National Laboratories) 1992, 1991 Environmental Monitoring Report, San Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, November, pp. 5-23.
- SNL (Sandia National Laboratories) 1991, 1990 Environmental Monitoring Report, San Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, May, pp. 5-24.
- SNL (Sandia National Laboratories) 1990, 1989 Environmental Monitoring Report, San Laboratories, Mbuquerque, New Mexico, May, pp. 5-17/18.
- SNL (Sandia National Laboratories) 1989, 1988 Environmental Monitoring Report, Sand Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, May, pp. 18 and 19.
- UMC (University of Missouri/Columbia), 1992, University of Missouri Research Reacto Annual Report, Reactor Staff, Columbia, Missouri, August, pp. VIII-1 - VIII-2.
- UMC (University of Missouri/Columbia), 1991, University of Missouri Research Reacto Annual Report, Reactor Staff, Columbia, Missouri, August, pp. VIII-1 - VIII-2.
- UMC (University of Missouri/Columbia), 1990, University of Missouri Research Reacto Annual Report, Reactor Staff, Columbia, Missouri, August, pp. VIII-1 - VIII-2.
- UMC (University of Missouri/Columbia), 1989, University of Missouri Research Reacto Annual Report, Reactor Staff, Columbia, Missouri, August, pp. VIII-1 - VIII-3.
- UMC (University of Missouri/Columbia), 1988, Urniversity of Missouri Research Reacto Annual Report, Reactor Staff, Columbia, Missouri, August, pp. VIII-1 - VIII-2.
- UMC (University of Missouri/Columbia), 1965, University of Missouri Research Reacto Hazards Summary Report, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, July.
- UMC (University of Missouri/Columbia) 1961, Preliminary Hazards Report, University Research Reactor, Columbia, Missouri, March.
- UMI (University of Michigan), 1994, Report of Reactor Operations, January 1, 1993 t 1993, Ford Nuclear Reactor, Michigan Memorial - Phoenix Project, The University Ann Arbor, March, pp. 17-21.
- UMI (University of Michigan), 1993, Report of Reactor Operations, January 1, 1992 t 1992, Ford Nuclear Reactor, Michigan Memorial - Phoenix Project, The University Ann Arbor, March, pp. 15-18.
- UMI (University of Michigan), 1992, Report of Reactor Operations, January 1, 1991 t 1991, Ford Nuclear Reactor, Michigan Memorial - Phoenix Project, The University Ann Arbor, March, pp. 13-17.
- UMI (University of Michigan), 1991, Report of Reactor Operations, January 1, 1990 t 1990, Ford Nuclear Reactor, Michigan Memorial - Phoenix Project, The University Ann Arbor, March, pp. 15-19.
- UMI (University of Michigan), 1990, Report of Reactor Operations, January 1, 1989 t 1989, Ford Nuclear Reactor, Michigan Memorial - Phoenix Project, The University Ann Arbor, March, pp. 14-18.
- U.S. Geological Survey 1992. National Wild and Scenic River System. Scale map, 1:5, 38077-BQ-NA-05M-00. Produced in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Agricu Service, and Department of Interior Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildli National Park Service, Reston, Virginia, December.

Wichmann, T.L., 1995a, U.S. Department of Energy - Idaho Operations Office, Letter regarding "Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory Data," OPE-EIS.95.028, February 1.
 Wichtmann, T.L., 1995b, U.S. Department of Energy - Idaho Operations Office, Letter regarding "Transmittal of SNF and INEL EIS Project Independent Verification of Nuclear Fuel Inventory," OPE-EIS-95. 102, March 6.
 WVNS (West Valley Nuclear Services) Company, 1994, West Valley Demonstration Project Environmental Report Calendar Year 1993 (DE-ACO7-31NE44139), May.
 WVNS (West Valley Nuclear Services) Company, 1993, Project Overview and General Information Vol. 1 of West Valley Demonstration Project: Safety Analysis Report, WVNS-SAR-0 Prepared for Department of Energy, August.
 WVNS (West Valley Nuclear Services) Company, 1992a, West Valley Demonstration Project Environmental Report for Calendar Year 1991, Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy Idaho Field Office, West Valley Project Office, West Valley, New York, May.
 WVNS (West Valley Nuclear Services) Company, 1992b, Ecological Resources of the West Valley Nuclear Service Center, Vol. XI, WVDP-EIS-0010, December.
 Wright, R., 1993, B&W, memo to A. Jensen, B&W, regarding "DOE Fuel at B&W's Lynchburg Technology Center," September.

APPENDIX F Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Programs

Department of Energy Programmatic
 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management
 and
 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
 Environmental Restoration and
 Waste Management Programs
 Final Environmental Impact Statement
 Volume 1
 Appendix F
 Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation
 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Programs
 April 1995
 U.S. Department of Energy
 Office of Environmental Management
 Idaho Operations Office

1. APPENDIX F INTRODUCTION

This appendix addresses the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at two Department of Energy sites, the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and the Oak Ridge Reservation. These sites are being considered to provide a reasonable range of alternative settings for future SNF management activities could be conducted. These locations are not currently involved in management of large quantities of SNF; NTS has none, and ORR has only small quantities. But NTS and ORR do offer experience and infrastructure for the handling, processing and storage of radioactive materials, and they do exemplify a broad spectrum of environmental parameters. This broad spectrum of environmental parameters will provide perspective on whether and how such location attributes may relate to potential environmental impacts. Consideration of these two sites will permit a programmatic decision to be made on an assessment of the feasible options without bias to the current storage sites.

This appendix is divided into three parts. Part One is the Appendix F introduction. Part Two contains chapters one through five for the NTS, as well as the NTS references and acronyms and abbreviations in Chapter 7. Part Three contains chapters one through three for the ORR, as well as the ORR references in chapter six and abbreviations and acronym Chapter 7. A Table of Contents, List of Figures, and List of Tables are included in Part Three. This approach permitted the inclusion of both sites in one appendix while maintaining chapter numbering consistent with Volume 1 and Appendices A, B, and C.

Currently, no SNF is stored at the NTS and only small quantities of SNF generated at research reactors at ORR are stored there. In order to receive, handle, and store fuel from other DOE sites on an interim basis, new facilities would need to be constructed.

NTS and ORR. Since the basic facilities to receive and handle the spent fuel, as well as safety-related and emergency containment, cleanup, and recanning facilities, are equivalent for all alternatives being considered, only the size of the storage facilities for each alternative, with the Centralization Alternative requiring the largest storage facilities, is discussed in Chapter 3, only the Centralization Alternative for spent fuel storage at NTS or ORR is analyzed quantitatively in this volume; the Regionalization Alternative is evaluated qualitatively. The results of this appendix are then summarized in Volume 2.

NEVADE TEST SITE

1. INTRODUCTION	2.1-1
2. NEVADA TEST SITE BACKGROUND	2.2-1
2.1 Overview	2.2-1
2.1.1 Site Description	2.2-1
2.1.2 Site History	2.2-4
2.1.3 Nevada Operations Office Mission	2.2-5
2.1.4 Nevada Test Site Management	2.2-6
2.1.5 Yucca Mountain Project	2.2-6
2.2 Regulatory Framework	2.2-7
2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program	2.2-8
3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL ALTERNATIVES	2.3-1
3.1 Description of Management Alternatives	2.3-1
3.1.1 Alternative 1 - No Action	2.3-
3.1.2 Alternative 2 - Decentralization	2.3-
3.1.3 Alternative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis	2.3-
3.1.4 Alternative 4 - Regionalization	2.3-
3.1.5 Alternative 5 - Centralization	2.3-
3.2 Comparison of Alternatives	2.3-
4. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT	2.4-1
4.1 Overview	2.4-1
4.2 Land Use	2.4-1
4.3 Socioeconomics	2.4-4
4.3.1 Region of Influence	2.4-4
4.3.2 Regional Economic Activity and Population	2.4-5
4.3.3 Public Service, Education and Training, and Housing Infrastructure	2.4-8
4.4 Cultural Resources	2.4-11
4.4.1 Archaeological Sites and Historic Structures	2.4-11
4.4.2 Native American Resources	2.4-11
4.4.3 Paleontological Resources	2.4-12
4.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources	2.4-12
4.6 Geologic Resources	2.4-13
4.6.1 General Geology	2.4-13
4.6.2 Geologic Resources	2.4-20
4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards	2.4-24
4.7 Air Resources	2.4-29
4.7.1 Climatology	2.4-29
4.7.2 Air Monitoring Networks	2.4-31
4.7.3 Air Releases	2.4-33
4.7.4 Air Quality	2.4-37
4.8 Water Resources	2.4-42
4.8.1 Surface Water	2.4-42
4.8.2 Groundwater	2.4-47
4.9 Ecological Resources	2.4-57
4.9.1 Terrestrial Resources	2.4-57
4.9.2 Wetlands	2.4-61
4.9.3 Aquatic Resources	2.4-61
4.9.4 Threatened and Endangered Species	2.4-62
4.10 Noise	2.4-65
4.11 Traffic and Transportation	2.4-66
4.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety	2.4-67
4.12.1 Doses	2.4-69
4.12.2 Health Effects	2.4-69

4.13	Utilities and Energy	2.4-71
4.13.1	Water Consumption	2.4-71
4.13.2	Electrical Consumption	2.4-72
4.13.3	Fuel Consumption	2.4-72
4.13.4	Wastewater Disposal	2.4-73
4.14	Materials and Waste Management	2.4-73
4.14.1	Transuranic Waste	2.4-76
4.14.2	Mixed Low-Level Wastes	2.4-76
4.14.3	Low-Level Waste	2.4-80
4.14.4	Hazardous Waste	2.4-80
4.14.5	Sanitary Waste	2.4-83
4.14.6	Hazardous Materials	2.4-83
4.14.7	Non-hazardous Waste	2.4-84
5.	ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES	2.5-1
5.1	Overview	2.5-1
5.2	Land Use	2.5-1
5.2.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-1
5.2.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-2
5.3	Socioeconomics	2.5-2
5.3.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-4
5.3.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-9
5.3.3	Mitigation Measures	2.5-9
5.4	Cultural Resources	2.5-9
5.4.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-9
5.4.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-1
5.5	Aesthetics and Scenic Resources	2.5-10
5.5.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-10
5.5.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-11
5.6	Geologic Resources	2.5-11
5.6.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-11
5.6.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-11
5.7	Air Resources	2.5-12
5.7.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-12
5.7.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-15
5.8	Water Resources	2.5-19
5.8.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-19
5.8.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-24
5.9	Ecological Resources	2.5-24
5.9.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-25
5.9.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-27
5.10	Noise	2.5-27
5.10.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-28
5.10.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-28
5.11	Traffic and Transportation	2.5-28
5.11.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-29
5.11.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-30
5.12	Occupational and Public Health and Safety	2.5-30
5.12.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-31
5.12.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-34
5.13	Utilities and Energy	2.5-34
5.13.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-34
5.13.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-36
5.14	Materials and Waste Management	2.5-36
5.14.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-36
5.14.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-40
5.15	Facility Accidents	2.5-40
5.15.1	Historical SNF Accidents at NTS	2.5-41
5.15.2	Methodology	2.5-41
5.15.3	No Action Alternative	2.5-44
5.15.4	Centralization Alternative	2.5-44
5.15.5	Decentralization Alternative	2.5-58
5.15.6	1992/1993 Planning and Basis Alternative	2.5-58
5.15.7	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-61
5.15.8	Emergency Preparedness and Plans	2.5-61

5.16	Cumulative Impacts and Impacts from Connected or Similar Actions	2.5
5.16.1	Centralization Alternative	2.5-63
5.16.2	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-69
5.17	Adverse Environmental Effects That Cannot Be Avoided	2.5-69
5.17.1	Overview	2.5-69
5.17.2	Centralization Alternative	2.5-69
5.17.3	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-70
5.18	Relationship Between Short-Term Use of the Environment and the Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity	2.5-70
5.19	Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources	2.5-71
5.19.1	Overview	2.5-71
5.19.2	Centralization Alternative	2.5-71
5.19.3	Regionalization Alternative	2.5-71
5.20	Potential Mitigation Measures	2.5-72
5.20.1	Pollution Prevention	2.5-72
5.20.2	Potential Mitigation Measures	2.5-72
6.	REFERENCES	2.6-1
7.	ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	2.7-1
	FIGURES	
2.1-1	Nevada Test Site regional map	2.2-2
2.1-2	Nevada Test Site map	2.2-3
4.2-1	Land use at the Nevada Test Site	2.4-2
4.6-1	Location of Nevada Test Site in relation to regional fault zones	2.4-14
4.6-2	Stratigraphic column of the Nevada Test Site	2.4-16
4.6-3	Schematic cross sections portraying the geologic complexity of NTS	2.4-17
4.6-4	Geologic map of the NTS	2.4-18
4.6-5	Approximate location of proposed facility in relation to major faults at NTS	2.4-21
4.6-6	Geologic terrains and mining districts of the Nevada Test Site	2.4-23
4.6-7	Location of the NTS in relation to the Nevada Seismic Belt, the Intermountain Seismic Belt, and the Southern Nevada East-West Seismic Belt	2.4-25
4.6-8	Historical seismicity of the Southern Great Basin from 1868 through 1993 for M>5	2.4-26
4.7-1	1990 10-meter (33 feet) wind rose patterns for the NTS	2.4-32
4.7-2	Source of radiation exposure, unrelated to NTS operations, to individuals in the vicinity of NTS	2.4-40
4.8-1	NTS hydrologic basins and surface drainage direction	2.4-44
4.8-2	Groundwater hydrologic units, hydrographic areas, and well locations of the Nevada Test Site	2.4-49
4.8-3	NTS regional potentiometric surface map	2.4-51
4.8-4	Areas of potential groundwater contamination at the NTS	2.4-54
4.9-1	Plant communities on Nevada Test Site	2.4-58
4.14-1	Existing treatment, storage, and disposal units at the NTS	2.4-75
4.14-2	Flow diagram for waste generation at the NTS	2.4-77
4.14-3	Flow diagram for waste shipment, receipt, and disposal at the NTS	2.4-78
5.3-1	Total employment effects, NTS Centralization Alternative	2.5-5
5.15-1	Typical isodose lines for an airplane crash into dry cell accident with 50 percent meteorology for northeastern Area 5 of the NTS	2.5-59
	TABLES	
3.2-1	Comparison of alternatives for the NTS	2.3-8
4.3-1	Aggregate regional economic and demographic indicators for the NTS	2.4-9
4.7-1	Nuclear test release summary - 1992 at the NTS site	2.4-35
4.7-2	Airborne radionuclide emissions for 1992 at the NTS	2.4-36
4.7-3	Total nonradiological emission rates at Nm for permitted sources	2.4-38
4.7-4	Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from NTS operations during 1992	2.4-39
4.7-5	Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable regulations and guidelines at the Nm	2.4-63
4.9-1	Federally and state-listed threatened, endangered, and other special status species that may be found in the vicinity of the Nevada Test Site	2.4-63
4.14-1	Baseline waste management for 1995 at the NTS	2.4-79
5.3-1	Socioeconomic effects - centralization of SNF at Nevada Test Site	2.5-6

5.7-1	Annual airborne radionuclide emission source terms for proposed Nm SNF facility operational phase	2.5-13
5.7-2	Total annual nonradioactive emissions for the SNF storage facility at the NTS	2.5-14
5.7-3	Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from proposed SNF storage facility plus 1995 baseline operations at the NTS	2.5-16
5.7-4	Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable regulations and guidelines at Nm for proposed SNF facility plus current operations	2.5-17
5.7-5	Calculated annual maximum concentrations for hazardous air pollutants at NTS, onsite and offsite	2.5-18
5.14-1	Ten-year cumulative estimated waste generation for SNF alternatives at the NTS	2.5-37
5.15-1	Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at 95 percent meteorology	2.5-45
5.15-2	Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at 50 percent meteorology	2.
5.15-3	Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at 95 percent meteorology	2.5-4
5.15-4	Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at 50 percent meteorology	2.
5.15-5	Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis health effects and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at 95 percent meteorology	2.
5.15-6	Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis health effects and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at 50 percent meteorology	2.
5.15-7	Estimated radionuclide releases for a fuel assembly breach accident at the NTS	2.
5.15-8	Estimated radionuclide releases for a dropped fuel cask accident at the NTS	2.
5.15-9	Estimated radionuclide releases for a severe impact and fire accident at the NTS	2.5-
5.15-10	Estimated radionuclide releases for a wind-driven missile impact into a storage cask at the NTS	2.5-55
5.15-11	Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry storage facility at the NTS	2.5-
5.15-12	Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry cell facility at the NTS	2.5-57
5.15-13	Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into an SNF water pool at the Nm	2.5-57
5.15-14	Secondary impacts of the Centralized Alternative accidents at NTS	2.5-60

#1. INTRODUCTION

This part assesses the impacts of construction and operation of proposed spent (SNF) facilities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is being evaluated for the because of the area available, the isolation of population centers, the apparently environmental parameters, previous U.S. Department of Energy activities involving r materials at the site, and the planned long-term government control of the site.

This part is organized as follows. Chapter 1 is the introduction, Chapter 2 se the area under analysis by providing an overview of the NTS and discussions of the Framework and SNF Management Program, and Chapter 3 explains the SNF alternatives b considered at the site.

Chapter 4 describes the human and natural environment that could be affected as of the introduction of an SNF facility at the NTS. Environmental parameters such a

resources, socioeconomics, biological resources and air quality are examples of the characterized.

Chapter 5 enumerates the environmental consequences that might be anticipated, cumulative impacts, the unavoidable adverse impacts, the relationship between short and long-term productivity, the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources, possible mitigation measures that might be anticipated if an SNF facility were built. Chapter 6 contains the references used to develop this part of the Environmental Impact Statement. Chapter 7 contains the abbreviations and acronyms used in this Part.

2. NEVADA TEST SITE BACKGROUND

2.1 Overview

2.1.1 Site Description

The Nevada Test Site (NTS), located in the southeastern portion of Nevada, is owned by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) as the on-continent test site for nuclear weapons. The site encompasses approximately 1,350 square miles (3,500 square kilometers). It is surrounded on the north, east, and west by the Nellis Air Force Base (NAFB) Bombing and Gunnery Range. Together with the Tonopah Test Range, these three properties provide a 65-mile (24- to 104-kilometer) buffer zone between the test areas and public lands. The U.S. Department of Land Management owns land on the southern and southwestern borders of the NTS. Las Vegas is approximately 65 miles (104 kilometers) from the southeast corner of the site (Figure 2.1-1) (DOE/NV 1991a; USAF et al. 1991).

The NTS is a large, open area, tightly controlled, with the infrastructure to contain hazardous and radioactive materials. Security at the NTS consists of security using four-wheel drives, patrolling the site. The perimeter of the site is not fenced. Guards and electronic security measures are in place for secure areas. Approximately 95 percent of the site is unused or is used as a buffer zone for ongoing programs or projects (DOE/NV 1991a; USAF et al. 1991).

The NTS is broken into numbered test areas to simplify the distribution, use, and management of resources (Figure 2.1-2). Area 22, the site's main entrance, is located on the southeast corner of the site and contains the Desert Rock airstrip. Area 23, adjacent to Area 22, contains the Mercury base camp, which houses administrative operations and general support activities. Offices for the DOE, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Defense Nuclear Agency, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and all supporting contractors of these organizations are located in this area. Other facilities in this area include the cafeteria, recreation and housing. Area 5 (Frenchman Flat) was used in the past for nuclear testing. Area 9 is the site of Figure 2.1-1. Nevada Test Site regional map. Figure 2.1-2. Nevada Test Site map showing the portion of the testing occurs. This facility provides control over and execution of nuclear detonations at the NTS. Also in Area 6 there is a new work camp which is used for nuclear weapons and craft support. Other areas located on the NTS are the valley of the Yucca Flat (Area 8 and 9), the Rainier Mesa (Area 12), which is the center of DoD/Defense Nuclear Agency activities, and the Pahute Mesa (Areas 19 and 20) (DOE/NV 1991a; ERDA 1977; USAF et al. 1991). Area 5 will be housing the proposed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) facility. Figure 2.1-2 shows the approximate location of the proposed SNF facility. The actual location will be determined for site-specific environmental documentation.

2.1.2 Site History

Prior to 1951, the land which is now occupied by the NTS was used for mining and agriculture. Primarily, mining was for low grades of copper, lead, silver, gold, mercury, and uranium. Although there were short periods of mining success at the site, the area was abandoned over time. Grazing ended in 1955 when the Federal government acquired the water and grazing rights of two ranches which were operating on what is now the NTS (ERDA 1977).

Since January 1951, the land now occupied by the NTS has been the primary location for nuclear weapons testing in the United States. Land was withdrawn from the NAFB Bombing and Gunnery Range in 1952 to form the NTS. Subsequent withdrawals occurred in 1958 and 1962. A Memorandum of Understanding between NAFB and the NTS in 1967 allowed the

use of Pahute Mesa by the NTS (DOE/NV 1991a; USAF et al. 1991).

Most of the tests performed at the NTS in the 1950s were atmospheric tests. After nuclear tests were carried out intermittently until a voluntary moratorium ended on October 1958. The first full-scale nuclear detonation occurred in 1957 in a sealed Testing resumed in September 1961 following the ending of the moratorium. Atmospheric testing ended in the summer of 1963 following the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty 1962, all testing has occurred underground. Two methods have been used for underground testing since 1963: vertical shafts (from the valley of Yucca Flat to the top of the horizontal tunnels (Rainer Mesa) (DOE/NV 1991a; ERDA 1977; USAF et al. 1991).

In addition to underground testing, between 1962 and 1968, earth-cratering tests were conducted as part of the Plowshare Program. This program explored peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. Other tests which have occurred on the NTS have included the B Experiment (1960s) and the open air nuclear reactor, nuclear engine, and nuclear fuel (1959-1973). Much of the nuclear testing has been conducted on the NTS by the LANL, SNL and, through the Defense Nuclear Agency, the DoD. Non-nuclear testing has included hazardous material spills. Other activities which occur on the NTS are the storage of low-level radioactive wastes and mixed wastes (DOE/NV 1991a; ERDA 1977; USAF et al. 1991).

As part of DOE's program to establish a national repository for high-level radioactive waste, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conducted an evaluation of the effects of radioactive heat from radioactive decay on granite rock formations. The project, known as Spent Climax, stored 11 spent fuel elements from the Florida Power & Light Company and 6 heat simulators in specially designed and constructed holes in the Climax tunnel, 1 mile northeast corner of the NTS in Area 15. The SNF, in hermetically sealed canisters, was emplaced in the granite formation, stored for approximately 3 years, retrieved, and transferred, in 1986, to INEL for further testing (DOE/NV 1983, 1986a).

2.1.3 Nevada Operations Office Mission

The missions of the NTS and/or the DOE Nevada Operations Office include:

- Maintaining the capability to conduct underground nuclear weapons tests.
- Conducting all programs related to nuclear emergencies and threats.
- Supporting arms control, treaty verification, and non/proliferation weapons technology.
- Supporting research activities as part of being designated a National Environmental Research Park.
- Conducting tests for the Liquefied Gaseous Fuels Spill Testing Program.
- Supporting studies in alternate energy sources and environmental management research and development, and testing.
- Ensuring that all operations are conducted in compliance with all environmental safety, and health laws, regulations, standards, agreements, and DOE Orders (DOE/NV 1993b, 1992a, 1991a; ERDA 1977).

2.1.4 Nevada Test Site Management

The DOE Nevada Operations Office is currently administering NTS operations. There are multiple contractor support. The major support contractors are Reynolds Electrical Engineering Co., Inc., the prime contractor; EG&G Energy Measurements, Inc., the electrical and instrumentation support contractor; Raytheon Services Nevada, the architect-engineer support contractor; and Wackenhut Services, Inc., the site security contractor.

2.1.5 Yucca Mountain Project

The DOE Office of Civilian Waste Management is conducting a program for siting the nation's first geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive waste. The Yucca Mountain Site has been designated by the U.S. Congress as a candidate site. Although Yucca Mountain is located outside the western boundary of the NTS, a portion of the NTS has been assigned as part of the potential repository site. Access is accomplished through the NTS and Yucca Mountain Project field offices and support facilities are located in Area 25 (DOE/NV 1993b). Currently, Yucca Mountain is being characterized to study its suitability as a geological repository. The characterization study includes

borings and analyses of meteorological, geological, hydrological, geochemical, eros and socioeconomics conditions. Upon completion of the characterization study, the may recommend Yucca Mountain to the U.S. President as viable site for a repository (DOE 1988b).

2.2 Regulatory Framework

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, as a provides Federal agency decision makers with a process to systematically consider t environmental consequences of agency decisions. The DOE has prepared this environm impact statement (EIS) in conformance with the requirements of this Act to evaluate potential impacts of programmatic decisions on the management of SNF. This EIS will the necessary background, data, and analyses to help decision makers understand the environmental consequences of each alternative.

On October 22, 1990, the DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Regist (FR 1990a) announcing its intent to prepare a programmatic EIS addressing environme restoration and waste management (including SNF management) activities across the e Complex. On October 5, 1992, the DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal R (FR 1992) announcing its intent to prepare an EIS addressing environmental restorat waste management and SNF activities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. further programmatic discussion of this topic, see Volume 1.

Significant Federal and state environmental and nuclear materials management la applicable to the NTS. The Federal laws are listed in Volume 1, Section 7.3. The Nevada laws are listed alphabetically below:

- Air Pollution Control Law (Title 40 Chapter 445)
- Air Quality Regulations (Title 40 Chapter 445)
- Disposal of Hazardous Waste (Title 40 Chapter 444)
- Disposal of Radioactive Material (Title 40 Chapter 459)
- Facilities for the Management of Hazardous Waste (Title 40 Chapter 444)
- Regulation of Highly Hazardous Substances (Title 40 Chapter 459)
- Solid Waste Disposal Act (Title 40 Chapter 444)
- Storage Tanks (Title 40 Chapter 459)
- Underground Injection Control (Title 40 Chapter 445)
- Water Pollution Control Law (Title 40 Chapter 445)
- Water Pollution Regulations (Title 40 Chapter 445)

2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program

Currently, spent nuclear fuel is not generated, received, reprocessed, or store therefore, a SNF management program does not currently exist for activities at the (DOE 1993). There are no current or foreseeable environmental, safety, or health v at the NTS associated with SNF (DOE 1993). Selection of the No-Action Alternative adversely affect the operations or any planned facility modifications at the NTS.

3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL ALTERNATIVES

3.1 Description of Management Alternatives

This chapter describes the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management alternatives eva the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for Appendix F that are applicable to the Nevad Site (NTS). DOE did not consider the Nevada Test Site to be a preferred site for t management of spent nuclear fuel in the Draft EIS because of the State's current ro site for the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project. DOE's identification of alternatives also indicates that DOE does not consider the Nevada Test Site as a pr for spent nuclear fuel management in the Final EIS. For the purposes of conducting NEPA analysis, the NTS provides a contrast to other potential sites because it repr that has no existing SNF management infrastructure. The NTS does not currently gen store any SNF. Hence, of the five alternatives discussed in this Programmatic Envi Impact Statement (EIS), only two, Regionalization and Centralization, are applicabl The other three alternatives -- No Action, Decentralization, and the 1992/1993 Plan

are not applicable to the NTS since they affect or involve only sites which current store SNF.

3.1.1 Alternative 1 - No Action

The No Action Alternative is restricted to the minimum actions necessary for the safe and secure management of SNF. As defined, this alternative stipulates no SNF or from DOE facilities. The NTS does not currently generate or store any SNF and would not receive any SNF under this alternative. Therefore, this alternative is not applicable and is not analyzed or discussed further in this or subsequent chapters for the NTS.

3.1.2 Alternative 2 - Decentralization

Decentralization involves storage of SNF at or close to generation sites, with shipments to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) and Savannah River Site as necessary to permit continued operation. Since the NTS does not generate or store SNF and would not receive any SNF under this alternative, it is not applicable to the NTS and is not analyzed or discussed further in this or subsequent chapters for the NTS.

3.1.3 Alternative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis

The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative is DOE's documented 1992/1993 plan for management of DOE and Naval SNF. Since the NTS does not generate or store any SNF and would not receive any SNF under this alternative, it is not applicable to the NTS and is not analyzed or discussed further in this or subsequent chapters for the NTS.

3.1.4 Alternative 4 - Regionalization

3.1.4.1 Overview. The Regionalization Alternative consists of two subalternatives.

Subalternative A would distribute existing and new SNF between the Hanford Site, INEL, and SRS by SNF type. Under Subalternative B, SNF would be distributed to either an eastern or western regional site based on geographical location. SNF east of the Mississippi River would be shipped to the eastern region site (i.e., SRS or Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR)). SNF west of the Mississippi River would be shipped to the western regional site (i.e., Hanford, INEL). Additionally, all Naval SNF would be shipped to only one of the sites, but not both. The alternative to the SRS as the eastern regional site, and the NTS would be the alternative to both the Hanford Site and INEL as the western regional site.

3.1.4.2 Regionalization Subalternative B. The following fuels would be transported to

the NTS for storage under the Regionalization Subalternative B:

- Naval-type SNF (if selected)
 - All, including from the INEL, shipyards, and prototypes
- Hanford Production SNF
 - From western sites including the Hanford Site
- Graphite SNF
 - From western sites including the INEL and Public Service of Colorado
- DOE-Owned Commercial SNF
 - From western sites including the Hanford and INEL
- Experimental - Stainless steel SNF
 - From western sites including the Hanford, INEL, Foreign Research Reactors, and non-DOE domestic research reactors
- Experimental - Zirconium SNF
 - From western sites including the INEL
- Experimental - Other
 - From western sites.
- SRS Production and Aluminum SNF
 - From western sites including INEL, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)

Foreign Research Reactors, and non-DOE domestic research reactors

All SNF presently in storage at DOE facilities would arrive at the NTS stabilized to the extent necessary for safe transportation. However, this SNF might be uncanned, stabilized, prepared, and recanned at the NTS to ensure safe interim storage. Non-DOE domestic, Foreign Research Reactors, and Naval SNF would be shipped in the necessary form for safe transportation but not necessarily canned. This fuel would be prepared, and canned at the NTS to ensure safe interim storage. All fuel would be a minimum of 120 days prior to shipping and 5 years before being placed in dry storage. Additionally, if the NTS is selected for the Expanded Core Facility, Naval SNF would be examined at the NTS before being turned over for interim storage management.

The NTS currently has no facilities that are suitable for receiving, canning, and supporting the research activities necessary for the safe management of SNF. As a SNF management complex would be built at the NTS under the Regionalization Subalternative B. The SNF management complex would include the following:

- SNF receiving and canning facility
- Technology development facility
- Interim dry storage area
- Expanded Core Facility similar to the one at the INEL (if selected for Naval Receipt).

The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from and prepare the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility to cool SNF before it is placed into dry storage, as necessary. The technology development facility would investigate the applicability of dry storage technologies and pilot development for disposal of the various types of SNF. The interim dry storage area would consist of passive storage modules designed to safely store the SNF for 40 years. If the NTS is selected for Naval fuel receipt, Naval SNF would be examined at the Expanded Core Facility prior to being turned over for interim storage management.

The SNF management complex which would be built at the NTS under the Regionalization Alternative would have the same components as that built under the Centralization Alternative. However, the dry storage component would be somewhat smaller due to the smaller SNF inventory that would be transported to the NTS under the Regionalization Alternative. Other components of the SNF management complex would be the same general size as those built under the Centralization Alternative. This is because the inventories of new SNF which would be sent to the NTS under the Regionalization and Centralization Alternatives would be very similar. Additionally, since the major portion of the potential radiologic releases and waste generation rates are associated with these components, the Regionalization Alternative will not be analyzed separately. This alternative will be compared to the Centralization Alternative in a semiquantitative manner.

If the NTS is not chosen as the western regional site, the Regionalization Alternative would not be applicable to the NTS.

3.1.5 Alternative 5 - Centralization

3.1.5.1 Overview. Under Centralization, all existing and new SNF would be shipped to

one site. There are five Centralization options considered in this PEIS; Option A - INEL, Option B - INEL, Option C - SRS, Option D - ORR, Option E - NTS. If the NTS was chosen as the centralization site, all SNF currently stored at the HS, INEL, SRS, ORR, and at sites currently storing DOE fuel would be transferred to the NTS.

3.1.5.2 Centralization Alternative Option E. The following fuels would be transported to

the NTS for storage under the Centralization Alternative Option E:

- Naval-type SNF
 - From the INEL and shipyards
- Hanford Production SNF
 - From the Hanford Site
- Graphite SNF
 - From the INEL and Public Service of Colorado
- DOE-Owned Commercial SNF
 - From Hanford, INEL, West Valley Demonstration Project, and B&W Lynchburg
- Experimental - Stainless Steel SNF

- From Hanford, INEL, SRS, FRR, and non-DOE domestic research reactors
- Experimental - Zirconium SNF
 - From the INEL and SRS
- Experimental - Other
 - From the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)
- SRS Production and Aluminum SNF
 - From the INEL, SRS, ORNL, LANL, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Foreign Research Reactors, and non-DOE domestic research reactors.

All SNF presently in storage at DOE facilities would arrive at the NTS stabilized, canned to the extent necessary for safe transportation. However, this SNF may need uncanned, stabilized, prepared, and recanned at the NTS to ensure safe interim storage. Non-DOE domestic research reactor, Foreign Research Reactor, and Naval SNF would be shipped in a state necessary for safe transportation but not necessarily canned. They would be stabilized, prepared, and canned at the NTS to ensure safe interim storage. All SNF would be cooled for a minimum of 120 days prior to shipping and 5 years before being placed in storage. Additionally, Naval SNF would be examined at the NTS before being turned over to interim storage management.

The NTS currently has no facilities that are suitable for receiving, canning, and supporting the research activities necessary for the safe management of SNF. As a SNF management complex would be built at the NTS under the Centralization Alternative Option E. The SNF management complex would include the following:

- SNF receiving and canning facility
- Technology development facility
- Interim dry storage area
- Expanded Core Facility similar to the one at the INEL.

The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from the reactors and prepare the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility to cool SNF before it is placed into dry storage, as necessary. The technology development facility would investigate the applicability of dry storage technologies and pilot development for disposal of the various types of SNF. The interim dry storage area would consist of passive storage modules designed to safely store the SNF for 40 years. The facility would be examined at a new Expanded Core Facility constructed at the NTS prior to being turned over for interim storage management.

The SNF management complex which would be built at the NTS under the Centralization Alternative would have the same components as those built under the Regionalization Alternative. However, the dry storage component would be somewhat larger under the Centralization Alternative due to the somewhat greater SNF inventory that would be stored at the NTS under this alternative. The other components of the SNF management complex would be the same general size as those built under the Regionalization Alternative because the inventories of new uncanned fuel which would be sent to the NTS under the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives would be very similar. Additionally, the portion of the potential radiological and chemical releases and waste generation associated with these components, and would not be significantly different for the alternatives. Therefore, this alternative will be used as the basis for a semi-quantitative comparison with the Regionalization Alternative.

If the NTS is not chosen as the centralization site, the Centralization Alternative would not be applicable to the NTS.

3.2 Comparison of Alternatives

Table 3.2-1 shows a comparison of the alternatives. The Regionalization Alternative column does not include the requirements of the Naval Expanded Core Facility, although this facility may be constructed at the site under this alternative. The Centralization Alternative column does include the requirements of the Naval Expanded Core Facility, which are in Volume 1, Appendix D, since this facility will be built at the site under this alternative. **Table 3.2-1. Comparison of alternatives for the NTS.**

Parameter

Land for new facilities (acres)
 Site area (acres)
 Percent of site area
 SNF-related employment

Baseline site employment
 Percent of baseline site employment
 Estimated cancer fatalities in 80-km population per year, SNF management operationsc
 Estimated cancer fatalities in 80-km population per year, other site operations
 Estimated probability of cancer fatalities in a maximally exposed individual per year, SNF management operationsc
 Estimated probability of cancer fatalities in a maximally exposed individual per year, other site operations
 Estimated probability of cancer fatality in average worker per year, SNF management operationsc
 Estimated maximum probability of cancer fatality in average worker per year, other site operations
 Water use (million gallons) per year, SNF management
 Baseline water use (million gallons) per year, site operations
 Percent of baseline site water use
 Electricity use (megawatt-hours) per year, SNF management
 Baseline electricity use (megawatt-hours) per year, site operations
 Percent of baseline site electricity use
 Sewage discharge (million gallons) per year, SNF management
 Baseline sewage discharge (million gallons) per year, site operations
 Parameter

Percent of baseline site sewage discharge
 High-level waste (cubic meters) per year, SNF management
 Transuranic waste (cubic meters), SNF management
 Mixed waste (cubic meters), SNF management
 Low-level waste (cubic meters), SNF management
 Estimated maximum cancer fatalities in 80-km population from maximum risk accident
 Frequency of occurrence (number per year)d
 Estimated maximum risk of cancer fatalities in 80-km population from maximum risk accident (cancer fatalities per year)d
 Estimated maximum worker cancer fatalities from maximum risk accidentd
 Frequency of occurrence (number per year)d
 Estimated maximum risk of worker cancer fatalities from maximum risk accident (cancer fatalities per year)d

- a. Centralization Option includes the Naval Expended Core Facility results from Vo
- b. Annual Average SNF direct construction and operation jobs over the 10-year peri
- c. Excludes baseline site operations.
- d. Centralization Option is the same as the Regionalization Option for the SNF Man include the Naval Expended Core Facility accident analyses results from Volume 1, A

4. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

4.1 Overview

This chapter describes the existing environmental conditions in areas potential a programmatic decision to site spent nuclear fuel (SNF) facilities at the Nevada T under the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives. Topics were selected fo based upon their potential to be affected by the alternatives. Each topic is addre detail necessary to serve as a baseline for assessment of potential environmental c Chapter 5.

4.2 Land Use

The NTS occupies an area of approximately 1,350 square miles (3,500 square kilo southern Nevada, in a sparsely populated desert area approximately 65 miles (104 ki

northwest of Las Vegas. The NTS is almost entirely surrounded by other federally owned lands which buffer it from lands open to the public. The NTS is bordered by the Nellis Air Force (NAFB) Bombing and Gunnery Range on the north, east, and west, and by Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands on the south and southwest (DOE/NV 1993a,b).

Existing land use on the NTS falls into four general categories: Testing Areas Buffer/Reserved Areas; Industrial/Research Areas; and Waste Management Areas. According to the latest NTS land use map (Figure 4.2-1), approximately 50 percent of the land on the buffer/reserved area for ongoing programs or projects (DOE/NV 1993a).

Land bordering the site to the north, east, and west is located on the NAFB Bombing and Gunnery Range and is primarily vacant, unused, or used for a buffer zone. Land bordering the site to the south and southwest is owned by the BLM and is used for recreation, grazing management, or wildlife management (DOE/NV 1993a,b).

The NTS is located in an area of sparsely vegetated desert. Beyond the federal lands which surround the NTS, principal land uses in Nye County in the vicinity of

Figure 4.2-1. Land use at the Nevada Test Site. include mining, grazing, agricultural land uses occur beyond the immediate vicinity of the NTS, in fertile valley regions Owens and San Joaquin to the west of the site, the Virgin River to the east of the Pahrump to the south of the site, the Moapa River to the southeast of the site, and Alamo to the northeast of the site (DOE/NV 1993b).

Clark County, to the southeast of the NTS, consists of approximately 7900 square miles (20,220 square kilometers) of which about 95 percent is owned by the federal government (ULI 1992). Primary land uses on these federal lands include grazing, mining, and agriculture. The remaining 5 percent of the county supports residential, state and local government industrial, and retail land uses (Clark County Regional Transportation Commission 1991).

Currently, Nye County does not have a zoning ordinance; therefore, no zoning exists for NTS lands. The NTS is required to comply with State of Nevada regulations for air pollution, safety, and transportation, and with Nye County traffic regulations and ordinances (DOE/NV 1993b). Of the total area within Nye County, only a small number of isolated areas are under private ownership and therefore subject to general plan guidelines (NEEDA 1992).

Numerous national, state, and local public recreation areas exist within the NTS (Figure 2.1-1). Outdoor recreational areas include the Death Valley National Monument (12 miles (19 kilometers) to the west/southwest, and the Desert National Wildlife Refuge (approximately 25 miles (40 kilometers) east. (Portions of the Desert National Wildlife Refuge are located within NAFB Bombing and Gunnery Range and are as close as 2 miles (3 kilometers) to the NTS). State parks near the site include; the Red Rock Canyon Recreation Lands, approximately 40 miles (64 kilometers) to the southeast; Spring Mountain Ranch State Park, approximately 50 miles (80 kilometers) southeast; and the Floyd R. Lamb State Park, approximately 45 miles (72 kilometers) southeast (BLM 1990).

Other recreational areas include numerous campsites, picnic areas, and sports grounds of the site in the Toiyabe National Forest, approximately 25 miles (40 kilometers) north of the site in the spring and fall months (DOE/NV 1993a,b,c).

The NTS is a controlled area with public access limited to through traffic on U.S. 93 and on Lathrop Wells Road (DOE/NV 1993b).

The proposed SNF site is in the northeast portion of Area 5, located in the southern part of the NTS. This area is currently designated as the Low-Level Waste Facility Area and Buffer/Reserved Area land use categories. This area was also designated as a Nuclear Test Area in the latest NTS Future Land Use Plan (DOE/NV 1993a).

To the east of Area 5, the NTS is bordered by the NAFB Bombing and Gunnery Range which provides a buffer zone of approximately 50 miles (80 kilometers) between the NTS and lands open to the public. Beyond the NAFB Bombing and Gunnery Range land, land use east of the NTS are primarily mining, grazing, and agriculture (BLM 1990; DOE/NV 1993a).

There are no on-site areas that are subject to Native American Treaty rights or prime or unique farmland.

4.3 Socioeconomics

4.3.1 Region of Influence

The socioeconomic information presented in this Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) discusses the baseline conditions in a Region of Influence comprising

and Clark Counties, Nevada. This is the region potentially affected by the principal indirect socioeconomic effects of actions on the NTS. This Region of Influence includes the current residential distribution of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and contractor personnel employed by the NTS, the probable location of offsite contractor operations, the probable location of labor and capital supporting indirect economic activity linked to the NTS.

The residential distribution of most of the DOE and contractor personnel employed at the NTS reflects existing commuting patterns and attractiveness of area communities. A survey of NTS worker residential distributions in 1988 revealed that 86 percent lived in Clark County, 10 percent in Nye County (DOE 1988a). In Clark County, most NTS employees reside in the Las Vegas vicinity.

The two-county Region of Influence includes several communities located within a time of approximately 1 hour from the NTS, including Boulder City and the Las Vegas area (includes the "incorporated places" of Henderson, Las Vegas, and North Las Vegas; a "census-designated places" of East Las Vegas, Enterprise, NAFB Bombing and Gunnery Paradise, Spring Valley, Sunrise Manor and Winchester) in Clark County, and Pahrump and Beatty in Nye County (DOE/NV 1993a,b).

4.3.2 Regional Economic Activity and Population

Regional economic linkage supporting production activity at the NTS occurs primarily in Clark County, where most of the offsite supporting contractors and the labor and capital supporting indirect economic activity linked to the NTS are located.

4.3.2.1 Clark County (Las Vegas Metropolitan Statistical Area(1)). Clark County is

composed of five incorporated cities (Las Vegas, Henderson, North Las Vegas, Boulder City, and Mesquite) and large expanses of unincorporated land, some of which are experiencing growth. The area experiencing the majority of the county's development is the Las Vegas area (ULI 1992). In addition, 95 percent of the total area within the county is owned by the federal government and includes several state parks, vast stretches of desert, and military reservations.

Economic conditions in southern Nevada since the mid-1980s have grown continuously. Economic growth has accelerated relative to national trends due to an expansion in gaming markets, relocation of retirees to southern Nevada, expansion of local infrastructure, and additional unplanned investment to house new families in the region. The overall growth pattern is forecasted to gradually change the current robust expansion to moderate growth.

1. At the time of the 1990 census, Clark County and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Statistical Area were synonymous. The Census Bureau redefined the Las Vegas Metropolitan Statistical Area to include Mohave County, Arizona. However, the numbers provided here reflect the 1990 census definition.

growth conditions, as seen in the United States (The Center for Business and Economic Research 1992).

The economy in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Statistical Area is driven by growth in the hotel and gaming industry. Because of its orientation toward tourism and convention, the economy is highly service oriented. Service employment in the Las Vegas area is substantially higher than the relative national share, accounting for nearly 45 percent of total employment, with hotels and gaming accounting for approximately 30 percent of the service sector. Manufacturing employment accounts for 21 percent, and government and construction each account for an additional 10 percent (ULI 1992). Construction employment has increased over 130 percent since 1980, with 32,000 jobs in that sector in 1993 particularly due to the building of a number of casinos in Clark County (DOE/NV 1993a). The industrial market has a modest growth in the construction sector, causing a 50 percent increase in new construction activity between 1990 and 1992. Growth in the industrial market is expected to continue to demand outpacing new construction (ULI 1992). Manufacturing employment is increasing steadily (7 percent from 1992 to 1993); however, this sector comprises only a 2.8 percent of total employment (DOE/NV 1993a), still well below the national average.

Between 1980 and 1990, Clark County added an average of 15,000 jobs per year. By the end of 1991 another 19,000 jobs had been added to the employment base for 1990, for a total of 388,000 jobs (ULI 1992). In September 1992, employment in the Las Vegas area reached 399,900. Despite the national recession during 1990-1992, the number of existing jobs in the Las Vegas area increased rapidly, averaging an 8.1 percent gain during that period (DOE/NV 1993a).

The number of existing jobs in the Las Vegas area is projected to continue to increase.

the next several years. The State of Nevada Employment Security Research Department estimated there would be a total of 125,190 new jobs in the Las Vegas area between 1996, an increase of approximately 6 percent annually (DOE/NV 1993a).

The unemployment rate reached a low of 4.9 percent in 1990 and increased to 7.5 as of June 1993 (DOE/NV 1993a). The increase in unemployment reflected the fact that in-migration of labor exceeded the growth in employment opportunities. However, the unemployment level is expected to decrease with new hotel, gaming, and amusement projects opening at the end of 1993 (DOE/NV 1993a).

Most of the population in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Statistical Area is centered in the Las Vegas Valley, with six population groupings in the area: the Las Vegas Valley, Indian Springs, Laughlin, Mesquite, and the Moapa Valley (DOE/NV 1993b). In 1990, the population of the metropolitan statistical area totaled 735,000, growing at a rate annually from 1980 (ULI 1992). This rate of growth, however, is lower than that of the 1980s. The population of the metropolitan statistical area was estimated at over 800,000 in August 1993, an increase of nearly 8 percent annually since 1990 (DOE/NV 1993b).

4.3.2.2 Nye County. The employment level in Nye County (11,310 jobs) is low relative

to Clark County, and includes opportunities in the services, mining, and government (DOE/NV 1993b).

Nye County is sparsely populated, with the two largest population groupings being unincorporated communities of Pahrump and Tonopah. The populations of Pahrump and Tonopah in 1990 were 7,424 and 3,616 (62 percent and 20 percent of the county total respectively) (DOE/NV 1993b).

Tourist (and business traveler) activity is an important part of the Nye County communities along U.S. Route 95; however, in each community, mining is the major, and dominant, economic force.

In the 1970s and 1980s, nuclear weapons testing at the NTS dominated the Nye County economy when described in terms of employment by place of work. Most of the Nye County residents commute to Mercury or forward areas from the Las Vegas Valley, and most food and other services are provided at federally subsidized facilities onsite. However, some Nye County businesses do provide NTS support services. In the context of the Yucca Mountain review oversight program, Nye County and DOE have engaged in efforts that could lead to greater employment and procurement opportunities for Nye County residents and businesses (NEEDA 1993).

4.3.2.3 Nevada Test Site. The NTS work force supports engineering design,

construction, and operation of the site and includes people employed by DOE and people employed by DOE contractors. The total NTS work force in 1993 included nearly 4,000 located at the NTS and an additional 5,000 jobs in the Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV 1993a). As of January 1994, the work force totaled 8,563 (3,286 on NTS, 3,000 in Las Vegas, and 2,277 in the rest of Nevada or other areas). There is currently no employment at NTS (DOE/NV 1994a).

4.3.2.4 Aggregate Regional Economic and Demographic Baseline. For the purposes of

establishing a regional baseline to assess potential impacts for the programmatic action, Section 5.3, regional economic and demographic data for Clark and Nye counties were aggregated to form one region (Table 4.3-1).

The total population of this Region of Influence is projected to be 998,093 in 1995 and to grow at an annual average rate of 2.7 percent, reaching 1,281,666 persons in 2004. The labor force of the Region of Influence is projected to grow at an annual average rate of 2.7 percent, reaching 792,309 persons in 2004. The total employment in the Region of Influence is projected to grow at an annual average rate of approximately 3.1 percent from 552,400 in 1995 to 734,589 jobs in 2004.

4.3.3 Public Service, Education and Training, and Housing Infrastructure

4.3.3.1 Police and Fire. The NTS's fire protection capacity is structured to accommodate

current mission requirements, with a self-contained firefighting department response suppression and prevention. Other services include rescue, hazardous material response of fire personnel, fire prevention inspections, installation of all fire extinguishers, fire prevention awareness programs. In addition, the DOE has signed an agreement with Nye County Fire Department will assist the Clark County Fire Department in case of emergency at the NTS (DOE/NV 1993a).

The Las Vegas Fire Department is spending \$9.7 million to build three new fire stations in the northwest area of the city to support growing public service demand in this area.

Table 4.3-1. Aggregate regional economic and demographic indicators for the NTS.

Years	Regional employment	Regional labor force	Regional population
1995	552,439	595,851	998,093
1996	573,279	618,329	1,033,234
1997	594,916	691,666	1,069,422
1998	617,450	665,968	1,107,037
1999	640,822	691,175	1,145,711
2000	665,060	717,317	1,185,766
2001	681,956	735,538	1,209,316
2002	699,258	754,197	1,233,372
2003	716,971	773,299	1,257,672
2004	734,589	792,309	1,281,666
2005	752,356	811,483	1,305,461
Average Annual Growth Rate	3.1%	3.1%	2.7%

a. Sources: Nye County Board of Commissioners (1993); The Center for Business and Economic Research (1992).

Note: Aggregate region includes Clark and Nye Counties. Labor force projection developed for this study.

County Fire Department plans to add two new fire departments within the next 5 years. A mutual agreement between the Clark County Fire Department and all surrounding fire departments to assist in any fire emergency when necessary (DOE/NV 1993a).

Law enforcement at the NTS is provided by the Nye County Sheriff. Security enforcement established to accommodate the requirements of NTS's mission, is the responsibility of a contractor. Regional law enforcement services are provided principally by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Las Vegas ranks fourth nationally in metropolitan areas in police per capita, with 1 per 277 population (DOE/NV 1993a).

4.3.3.2 Health Care. The NTS has a self-contained medical center that provides limited

emergency treatment. Health care in the Las Vegas metropolitan area is provided through full-service hospitals, with 3.44 hospital beds per 1,000 population. A major new facility is scheduled to open in 1994 to accommodate demand (DOE/NV 1993a).

4.3.3.3 Education and Training. The Clark County School District provides education

services for the families of the majority of the employees who work at the NTS. Enrollment in the Clark County School District was approximately 122,000 students in 1992 and was 136,000 students in 1993. An average student/teacher ratio of 22.32 is reported for elementary school grades K-6; the student/teacher ratio is not reported for other grades (DOE/NV 1993a).

Higher education and training resources provided by the NTS include the support by the DOE Contractor Education and Training Departments, with technical training in such areas as Radiation Protection Training, Radiological Response Training, Environmental Health Training (which includes Hazardous Waste, Site Operation, and Emergency Response support NTS's mission. In addition, there are a number of vocational, training, and education institutions in the Las Vegas metropolitan area (DOE/NV 1993a).

Since 1990, southern Nevada has experienced tremendous growth in school enrollment. To accommodate the influx of students, the school district was able to negotiate the largest increase in Nevada history along with regular allocations from the Nevada legislature (DOE/NV 1993a).

4.3.3.4 Housing. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of housing units in Clark County

increased by 84 percent, from approximately 174,000 to approximately 320,500. The market continues to flourish, as the demand for new housing has consistently exceed (ULI 1992). The increase in demand is attributable to the influx of retirees and o population.

Residential building permits, which peaked in 1988 at 26,400 units, declined to in 1991. Between 1991 and 1995, the number of permits issued is expected to averag units per year (ULI 1992). Demand is projected to outpace supply over the next 5 y the strong projections for population and employment (ULI 1992).

4.4 Cultural Resources

4.4.1 Archaeological Sites and Historic Structures

For approximately 12,000 years, people have inhabited the lands now comprising site. The availability of surface water was the primary determinant governing the human occupation on these lands. On what is now the NTS, access to surface water w springs located in canyons and at the bases of mountains and mesas. Therefore, the little evidence of human occupation in valleys or playas where surface water source unavailable, including the Frenchman Flat area where the proposed SNF site would be (DOE/NV 1993b).

Three cultural resource surveys were conducted in the vicinity of the proposed archaeological sites were recorded but neither was considered potentially eligible the National Register of Historic Places (DRI 1991, 1989, 1987). As a result, no p historic resources are expected to be located on the proposed SNF site.

4.4.2 Native American Resources

The Southern Paiute and Shoshone Native American tribes are known to have inhab southern Nevada including parts of what is now the NTS. These tribes are known to with sites located in the northern portions of NTS including the Pahute and Rainier However, no known Native American resources are located within the proposed SNF sit (DRI 1986a).

4.4.3 Paleontological Resources

The NTS is characterized by alluvium-filled, topographically closed valleys sur ranges composed of Paleozoic sedimentary rocks and Tertiary volcanic tuffs and lava igneous rocks do not contain fossils, the deposits might contain late Pleistocene t vertebrate fossils (Sandia National Laboratories 1982).

4.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources

Visual or scenic resources comprise the natural and manmade features that give environment its aesthetic qualities. These features form the overall impression th receives of an area or its landscape character.

Scenic resources at the NTS are set in a landscape which is a transition area b Mojave Desert and the Great Basin, with vegetation ranging from grasses and creosot the lower elevations to juniper, pinyon pine and sagebrush in elevations above 5,00 (1,524 meters) (DOE/NV 1993b). The topography of the NTS consists of a series of m ranges arranged in a north-south orientation separated by broad valleys (DOE/NV 199 topography is also characterized by the presence of numerous craters produced by pa testing at the NTS. Of the three principal valleys located within the NTS, Frenchm surrounds the proposed location of the SNF site (BLM 1990). Access to the NTS is Route 95, which runs in an east-west direction along the south side of the NTS at M (BLM 1990). The Mercury Highway, which runs north from the Mercury Base Camp, is a restricted access road that is not available for public access (Figure 2.1-2).

The proposed SNF site at the NTS is set along the east side of the Mercury High Area 5, within the Frenchman Flat. The proposed SNF site is located in the vicinity existing Radioactive Waste Management Site. The land cover in this area is typical vegetation.

The viewshed surrounding the NTS consists of unpopulated to sparsely populated and rural lands. Since the NTS is surrounded to the east, north and west by the NA and Gunnery Range and to the south by lands controlled by the BLM, the only public the interior of the NTS are from U.S. Route 95. Since the southern boundary of the ringed by various mountain ranges, including the Spector Range, Striped Hills, Red and the Spotted Range, views to the interior of the site are generally limited to the Valley and the Mercury Base Camp (BLM 1990).

Low sensitivity exists when the public can be expected to have little or no changes in the landscape. Little value may be ascribed to the views, or they may be others in the area. In general, due to the mixture of industrial uses, open desert access, the NTS could be classified as having low visual sensitivity.

4.6 Geologic Resources

This section provides a description of the general geology, geologic resources, and volcanic hazards at the NTS and surrounding area. This section also describes impacts to the geology and geologic resources that have resulted from past and present conducted at the NTS.

4.6.1 General Geology

As shown on Figure 4.6-1, the NTS is located east and north of the Walker Lane-Valley Shear Zone (Eckel 1968). Walker Lane is a northwest-trending belt of right-lateral faulting that disrupts the regional structural grain in the southwestern part of the Great Basin along the California-Nevada border. The Las Vegas Valley shear zone is a concealed zone of right-lateral faulting along the north side of the Las Vegas Valley (DOE 1988b). Whether the Walker Lane-Valley Shear Zone comprises a continuous single fault or two faults is debated. Most geologists consider it to be a single fault system, which in the NTS area is bounded by the Basin and Range Physiographic Province.

Figure 4.6-1. Location of Nevada Test Site in relation to regional fault zones. The local geology of the NTS is characterized by mountain ranges composed of Precambrian and Paleozoic sedimentary and Tertiary volcanic tuffs and lavas that surround alluvium-filled, topographically isolated basins. A generalized stratigraphic column of the area is shown on Figure 4.6-2 (Sandia National Laboratory 1982). Figure 4.6-2 also shows the six aquifers and four aquitards of the NTS (see Section 4.8). A schematic cross section illustrating NTS geology is shown on Figure 4.6-3 (DOE 1986). A geologic map of the NTS is shown as Figure 4.6-4 (DOE/NV 1993b).

The sedimentary rocks are complexly folded and faulted and are comprised mainly of carbonates (dolomite and limestone) in the upper and lower parts of the column and of shales and sandstones in the middle section. Above the approximately 4,000 meters of Precambrian to Cambrian clastic deposits are approximately 4,300 meters (14,000 feet) of Cambrian through Devonian carbonates, 2,400 meters (8,000 feet) of Mississippian shales and sandstones, and 900 meters (3,000 feet) of Pennsylvanian to Permian limestones (Sandia National Laboratory 1982).

The volcanic rocks in the NTS area are predominantly Tertiary tuffs that are highly fragmented. Although there are minor amounts of Tertiary basalts and a few scattered Mesozoic granite plutons in the area (Sandia National Laboratory 1982), the Tertiary tuffs comprise 70 percent of the rocks exposed at the surface (Eckel 1968).

The valleys formed between steeply dipping faults that have become filled with alluvium comprise approximately 30 percent of the area (Eckel 1968). This generally unconsolidated alluvium is derived from erosion of nearby hills composed of Tertiary and Paleozoic rocks in thickness from 600 to 900 meters (2,000 to 3,000 feet) (DOE/NV 1992c). Soils are cemented by calcium carbonate (caliche) and/or clays. The alluvial materials are sorted and finer grained toward the center of the basins. The sediments in the plateaus (flooded undrained desert basins that, at times, become shallow lakes) consist of lacustrine deposits up to several tens of meters (feet) thick. Near the range front, the alluvium is generally composed of angular rubble, with individual clasts commonly a foot or more in diameter surrounded by a matrix of silt, sand, and gravel (Sandia National Laboratory 1982).

Figure 4.6-2. Stratigraphic column of the Nevada Test Site. Figure 4.6-3. Schematic cross section of the Nevada Test Site.

mostly between 10 and 20 degrees), normal faults (faults with downward displacement of the rock that lies above the fault), and strike-slip faults (nearly vertical fault shear zones) (DOE/NV 1992c). The faults located at NTS are shown on Figure 4.6-5 (DOE/NV 1993b). Thrust faulting in the NTS area occurs as three major thrust faults with total displacement along this fault system ranging from 40 to 48 kilometers (25 to 30 miles). Normal faults in the NTS area exist in both ranges and valleys and generally strike northwest, while a set of younger and potentially active faults strike north. The structure to the NTS is the Walker Lane-Las Vegas Valley Shear Zone (see Figure 4.6-6). Estimates of horizontal displacement along this shear zone range from 40 to 160 kilometers (25 to 100 miles) (Sandia National Laboratory 1982).

At the NTS, recent displacement has occurred along several faults as a consequence of underground nuclear explosions. This displacement is not attributable to naturally occurring seismic activity. Fault displacements are thought to have occurred as a result of vibrations produced by the explosions, the vibrations produced by the explosions, or a combination of these factors (Eckel 1968).

Faults are designated as capable if they have exhibited movement at or near the surface at least once within the past 35,000 years or movement of a recurring nature within the past 500,000 years (CFR 1993a). Almost all of the natural fault movement in the NTS occurred several million years ago. However, movement along Yucca Fault, a north-south striking fault known in the northeast portion of the NTS (see Figure 4.6-5), is believed to have occurred sometime during the last tens of thousands to 250,000 years (Leedom 1994; Sandia National Laboratory 1982). Given the broad range of time during which displacement along Yucca Fault is believed to have occurred, Yucca Fault may or may not be an NR fault (Leedom 1994).

4.6.2 Geologic Resources

Gold, tungsten, and molybdenum may exist in carbonate rocks near igneous intrusions and regional thrust faults, or other faults at the NTS. In other areas, these deposits

Figure 4.6-5. Approximate location of proposed facility in relation to major faults at the NTS is assessed as having only a low to moderate potential for the occurrence of skarn (contact metamorphic rock rich in iron) deposits and/or polymetallic replacement and very low potential for the discovery of gold in these types of rocks. Magnetite occurs in rocks at the NTS, but they are not extensive and have very low resource potential. Figure 4.6-6 shows the possible location of the SNF storage facility in relation to the types of geologic resources as well as to locations of mining districts (USAF et al. 1991).

Gold and silver may exist at NTS in Tertiary volcanic rocks or in sedimentary rocks near volcanic or intrusive centers. Based on limited information, however, NTS is assessed as having a low to moderate potential for the development of precious metal deposits in these rocks. It is estimated that one small to medium-sized precious metals deposit might have been developed within the NTS had the area remained open to mineral development (USAF et al. 1991).

Much of the alluvial areas along the lower flanks of the ranges within the NTS contain sand and gravel reserves. These materials, however, do not have any unique value over sand and gravel material occurring in other areas throughout southern Nevada (USAF et al. 1991).

Zeolitized rocks (various hydrous silicates occurring as secondary minerals in volcanic rocks) underlie most of the volcanic rocks and the alluvial basins at the NTS. Clinoptilolite, either alone or in mixtures, are the most common zeolites in these deposits. Ferrierite, chabazite, and analcime also occur. Zeolite deposits in Nevada that have been developed for exploitation are lakebed deposits that have been altered to zeolites under water-saturated conditions. Zeolites are used in water softeners, detergent builders, and catalysts. Very little information is available on the tonnage and grade of these deposits. The widespread occurrence of zeolite deposits, however, requires that the deposits at NTS be assigned a low to moderate potential for development (USAF et al. 1991).

Barite is also known to occur at the NTS. The barite occurs in veins associated with mercury, antimony, and lead mineralization. These veins cut Devonian carbonate rocks. However, the barite veins at the NTS are small and impure, and do not represent a significant barite resource (USAF et al. 1991).

Figure 4.6-6. Geologic terrains and mining districts of the Nevada Test Site. Fluorite bodies within Paleozoic sedimentary rock. However, little is known about this occurrence; therefore, the NTS is assumed to have a very low to moderate potential for the development of fluorite resources (USAF et al. 1991).

4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards

The NTS lies on the southern margin of the Southern Nevada East-West Seismic Belt connects the north-trending Nevada Seismic Belt, about 160 kilometers (100 miles) the site with the north-trending Intermountain Seismic Belt about 240 kilometers (150 miles) to the east. The location of these seismic belts are shown on Figure 4.6-7. The pattern of earthquakes in the western United States is marked by relatively brief episodes of activity in areas that may have been relatively inactive for hundreds and perhaps thousands of years (DOE 1986).

The southern Nevada region is generally characterized as an area of moderate seismic activity (DOE/NV 1993b). The proposed SNF management site is located on the eastern margin of a region considered to have a moderate seismic-activity level. Earthquakes in southern Nevada and the California desert have registered on the NTS seismic network.

Prior to the installation of a seismic network within a 160-kilometer (100-mile) radius of the site in 1978 and 1979, 12 earthquakes (including one series of earthquakes) with Richter magnitudes (M) of equal to or greater than 6.5 were reported within a 400-kilometer radius of the site (DOE/NV 1994b). One of the largest and nearest of the earthquakes to NTS was the 1872 Owens Valley shock (M = 8.25), located approximately 150 kilometers (93 miles) from the site. Figure 4.6-8 shows the location of the pre-network earthquakes with magnitudes greater than or equal to 5 that have occurred near the NTS (DOE 1988b). Recorded seismic activity prior to 1978 in the vicinity of the NTS also includes two earthquakes with M equals 4.5 near Massachusetts Mountain (located just north of the proposed SNF site) and in Frenchman Flat (located in the southeast corner of the NTS, an area that includes the proposed SNF storage site) (DOE/NV 1994b).

Figure 4.6-7. Location of the NTS in relation to the Nevada Seismic Belt, the Intermountain Seismic Belt, and the California Seismic Belt.

Figure 4.6-8. Historical Seismicity of the Southern Great Basin from 1868 through 1979.

Between 1978 and 1981, no earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 4.3 were recorded. Since 1981, a magnitude 5.6 earthquake was recorded near Little Skull Mountain (located in the southwest corner of the NTS) in 1992 at a depth of 12 kilometers (7.5 miles). A magnitude 3.5 earthquake was recorded southeast of the town of Mercury on the NTS (DOE/NV 1994b). However, there is some uncertainty in the seismic sources for many earthquakes recorded by the seismic monitoring network in the area, because underground nuclear surface drilling, and explosions to support geophysical investigations may produce signals (DOE 1986).

The most probable source for seismic activity within the area where the SNF storage facility would be located is the Cane Spring Fault (see Figure 4.6-5). This fault is thought to be the source of the magnitude 4.3 Massachusetts Mountain earthquake discussed above. The maximum credible earthquake associated with the Cane Springs Fault is expected to be a magnitude 6.7 earthquake. The recurrence interval for this magnitude earthquake is estimated to be 10,000 to 30,000 years (DOE/NV 1993a).

Predictions of future seismicity and faulting, however, are complicated by a number of factors. Because the recurrence interval for large earthquakes on a Basin and Range fault can be thousands of years, epicenter maps of historic earthquakes or evidence of Holocene faulting alone may not be reliable indicators of future or long-term seismicity. Another complication is that when long fault zones in normal fault regimes fail, they may break along segments shorter than the entire length. Large (M greater than 7) earthquakes in the western United States tend to be followed by aftershocks lasting about a century and then seismic activity returns to a low level for centuries or thousands of years. Based on this concept, recurrence estimates based on historic or current earthquake distributions may not be directly applicable to identifying the most likely locations of future large earthquakes (DOE 1986).

From the historical seismicity of the southern Great Basin (two earthquakes of magnitude 7 or greater and length of active faults, a maximum magnitude of M equals 7 to 8 is inferred for the Yucca Mountain region. Estimates of recurrence intervals for major earthquakes in the region (M is greater than or equal to 7) are on the order of 25,000 years; for magnitudes greater than or equal to 6, recurrence intervals are on the order of 2,500 years; and for magnitudes of greater than or equal to 5, recurrence intervals are on the order of 1,000 years (DOE 1986).

Ground motion acceleration resulting from earthquakes may cause damage to buildings and other structures. Ground motion acceleration is represented by the unit (g), which is the acceleration due to the force of the earth's gravitational field and is approximately 986 centimeters per square second (DOE/NV 1993a). A maximum horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0.34g at the NTS is estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur every 2,000 years (DOE 1994). The seismic hazard information presented in this EIS is a general seismic hazard comparison across DOE sites. Potential seismic hazards for new facilities should be evaluated on a facility specific basis consistent with DOE

standards and site specific procedures.

The Massachusetts Mountain earthquake associated with the Cane Spring Fault (th probable source for seismic activity in the area of the proposed SNF storage facili above occurred on August 5, 1971 and produced a peak ground motion acceleration of The maximum credible earthquake associated with the Cane Spring Fault is expected t a peak acceleration of 0.67 g (DOE/NV 1993a).

Volcanic activity in the area is evident in the geologic record by the presence tuffs and scattered granitic plutons deposited during the Tertiary period and basal during the late Pliocene and Pleistocene epochs (DOE 1988b).

The potential for renewed silicic volcanism is suggested by the youngest (7- to old) major silicic volcanic center in the area, the Black mountain center, located northwest corner of the NTS. However, the occurrence of silicic volcanism near the the next 10,000 years is considered unlikely due to: no silicic volcanism in the s Great Basin during at least the past 6 million years, the decrease of silicic volca the central and southern parts of the Great Basin during the past 10 million years, restriction of silicic volcanism to the margins of the Great Basin during the Quate 2 million years). If silicic volcanism were to occur, the most likely effect at NT deposition of air-fall tuff from eruptions of silicic centers near the western marg Basin, as happened at least twice during the Pleistocene. Such volcanism could res deposition of fine-grained volcanic ash in layers ranging from a few millimeters to centimeters thick (DOE 1988b).

The possibility of future basaltic volcanism near the NTS is suggested by Quate volcanism, notably in the Crater Flat basalt field, just west of the southwest corn However, future basaltic eruptions would likely be small and short-lived judging fr Quaternary record of basaltic volcanism due to: magma volumes for eruptions in the the NTS during the past 8 million years being generally less than 1.0×10^8 cubic m cubic feet), and of short duration; a low rate of magma generation in the south-cen Basin during the late Cenozoic as reflected by the small-volume, basalt eruptive cy region; and the lack of geologic or geochemical patterns indicating that the rates the southern Great Basin are increasing, that such rates might increase in the futu basaltic activity could evolve into more voluminous types of basalt fields. The pr penetration of a repository at Yucca Mountain by basaltic volcanism was calculated studies of volcanic deposits in the vicinity. According to these calculations, the is estimated as 3.3×10^{-10} to 4.7×10^{-8} (DOE 1988b).

4.7 Air Resources

Because the transport of airborne effluents is affected by meteorological condi climatology at the NTS is discussed in this section. A summary of air monitoring n then included. Finally, the most recent air quality data available are presented.

4.7.1 Climatology

The climate at the NTS and the surrounding region is characterized by high sola limited precipitation, low relative humidity, and large diurnal temperature ranges. elevations have a climate typical of the Great Basin.

NTS is situated at the edge of the Mojave Desert, and the arid climate is typic Great Basin. The Sierra Nevada Mountains of California and the series of mountains 1,830 meters (6,000 feet) in height immediately west and north of the NTS have a ma influence on the climate. The prevailing upper level winds are from the west; most moisture associated with Pacific Ocean storms falls on the western slopes of the Si East of the Sierra Nevada, at locations such as the NTS, very little precipitation

The Weather Services Office at the NTS monitors meteorological data from numero observation sites within and in the vicinity of the NTS. The nearest National Weat full-time meteorological monitoring station is at McCarran International Airport, L

At Area 6 of the NTS, the average daily maximum/minimum temperatures during the month of January are 10.6yC/-6.1yC (51yF/21yF). The average daily maximum/minimum temperatures are 35.6yC/13.9yC (96yF/57yF) in July. At Las Vegas, the coldest temp record is -13.3yC (8yF) and the warmest temperature on record is 46.7yC (116yF).

The average annual precipitation at Area 6 is 15 centimeters (6 inches). Preci amounts for each month are generally less than 1.3 centimeters (0.5 inch). At Las greatest precipitation recorded in a 24-hour period is 6.6 centimeters (2.59 inches

of 14 thunderstorm days occur each year, with maximum occurrence in July and August. Thunderstorms occasionally become severe. Tornadoes are extremely rare in Nevada. average relative humidity at 4 AM in Las Vegas is 40 percent. The average relative 4 PM is 20 percent.

Low-level surface winds at the NTS are influenced by the large-scale weather patterns interacting with the mountain ranges, which generally run from north to south. Prevailing winds are from the south during the summer and north during the winter. The general downward slope in the terrain from north to south across the NTS results in a diurnal reversal from the south during the day to the north during the night. At Area 6, the annual wind speed is 11 kilometers per hour (7 miles per hour). Occasionally, storms associated with storms will exceed 82 kilometers per hour (50 miles per hour). The most common in the spring. At Las Vegas, the peak wind gust on record is 145 kilometers per hour (90 miles per hour). Strong winds interacting with dry soil conditions are responsible for occasional duststorms or sandstorms.

Wind direction and speed are major factors in planning and conducting nuclear atmospheric transport is the primary potential route of contamination to onsite and offsite populations. Figure 4.7-1 presents 10-meter (33-foot) wind roses for the NTS. The wind roses indicate that there are differences in prevailing wind directions across the NTS. Mountain slopes and valleys are major determinants in these localized variations (DOE/NV 1993c; National Climatic Data Center 1991).

Atmospheric dispersion improves as the wind speed increases, conditions become unstable, and the depth of the mixing height increases. The transport and dispersion of radioactive material are direct functions of air movement. Transport directions and speeds are the general patterns of air flow (and by the nature of the terrain), whereas the dispersion of airborne material is governed by small-scale, random eddies of the atmosphere (i.e., turbulence). Turbulence is indicated by atmospheric stability classification. Data for Desert Rock for calendar year 1990 indicated that atmospheric conditions were unstable (Stability Classes A through C) approximately 25 percent of the time, neutral (Class D) approximately 37 percent of the time, and stable (Classes E through G) approximately 38 percent of the time for that year.

4.7.2 Air Monitoring Networks

4.7.2.1 Radiological Monitoring Network. DOE Order 5400.1, General Environmental

The Environmental Protection Program, established the onsite environmental protection program requirements, authorities, and responsibilities for DOE operations. At the NTS, radiological effluents originate from tunnels, underground test sites, and facilities where materials are stored, or discharged. Airborne radiological effluents at the NTS have the greatest potential for reaching the public. There are two radiological monitoring programs for potential radioactive effluents associated with the NTS, one onsite and the other offsite (DOE/NV 1993c).

Figure 4.7-1. 1990 10-meter (33 foot) wind rose patterns for the NTS. The onsite monitoring network includes: 17 samplers collecting atmospheric moisture for trace gas analysis; 10 samplers collecting air samples for noble gas analysis; 63 water sampling locations in wells, springs, reservoirs, and ponds onsite; and 187 locations where thermoluminescent dosimeters are positioned for measurement of external gamma exposures (DOE/NV 1993c).

The offsite radiological monitoring program is conducted around the NTS by the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Environmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory in Las Vegas, under an interagency agreement. This program consists of several extensive environmental sampling, radiation detection, and dosimetry networks. In 1992, the Surveillance Network was made up of 30 continuously operating sampling locations within the NTS and 77 standby stations (operating one week each quarter) in all states west of the Mississippi River. During 1992, no airborne radioactivity related to current nuclear operations at the NTS was detected on any sample from this network (DOE/NV 1993c).

4.7.2.2 Nonradiological Monitoring Network. Nonradiological environmental monitoring

NTS operations involved only onsite monitoring because there were no nonradiological hazardous material discharges offsite.

4.7.3 Air Releases

4.7.3.1 Radiological. The majority of radioactive effluents at NTS in 1992 originated

from underground nuclear tests designed and conducted by two national laboratories Defense Nuclear Agency. The Los Alamos National Laboratory of Los Alamos, New Mexico and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory of Livermore, California conducted to support of DOE nuclear testing program objectives. Sandia National Laboratories of Albuquerque, New Mexico supported tests conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency, which uses the NTS as a nuclear testing facility under an agreement with DOE (DOE/NV 1993).

The presence of plutonium as an airborne, radioactive effluent at NTS in 1992 is due to previous atmospheric tests and tests in which nuclear devices were detonated explosives (called "safety shots"). These latter tests spread low-fired plutonium northeastern areas of the NTS. Three decades after the conclusion of the atmospheric program, higher than normal levels of plutonium in the air are still detected in some areas. Because of operational activities and vehicular traffic in Area 3 some of the plutonium airborne and elevated levels of plutonium have been detected in Area 3 for several years (DOE/NV 1993c).

Six underground nuclear tests were conducted at the NTS during 1992. A list of these tests and a summary of environmental monitoring observations for each of these are provided in Table 4.7-1.

Air emissions from nuclear testing operations consisted primarily of radioactive tritium and tritium released during posttest drillback, mineback, or sampling operations following the 1992 underground nuclear tests. None of the tests resulted in a prompt release (release of radioactive materials within 60 minutes of the nuclear test). Onsite support included monitoring emissions during the six nuclear tests. Testing included recording, evaluating, and reporting radiological conditions prior to, during, and after each test with provisions for aerial monitoring teams to detect airborne releases (DOE/NV 1993c).

Following each test, when control of the test area was released by the DOE Contingency survey personnel obtained radiation measurements using portable detection instruments. During the postevent drillback and mining activities, continuous environmental surveillance was maintained in the work area. For containment of radioactive releases to the atmosphere during drillback, systems were employed to trap radioactive particles.

Radioactive waste management sites are located in Areas 3 and 5. These sites are DOE defense waste disposal sites (DOE/NV 1993c).

NTS airborne radionuclide emissions for 1992 are presented in Table 4.7-2.

4.7.3.2 Nonradiological. Air emissions from the NTS originate from concrete batch

plants, aggregate crushing and processing, surface disturbance, fire training exercises, etc.

Table 4.7-1. Nuclear test release summary - 1992 at the NTS Site.

Event name	Test org.	Hole/ area no.	Location	Date/ time of event	Prompt release?	Telemetry measurement	
						Start	Stop
Junction	LANL	U19bg	Pahute	03/26/92	No	03/26/92	03/26/92
		Area 19	Mesa	0830 hrs		0830 hrs	0830 hrs
Diamond	DNA	U12p.05	Rainier	04/30/92	No	04/30/92	05/01/92
Fortune		Area 12	Mesa	0930 hrs		0930 hrs	1400 hrs
Victoria	LANL	U3kv	Yucca	06/19/92	No	06/19/92	06/19/92
		Area 3	Basin	0945 hrs		0945 hrs	1500 hrs
Galena	LLNL	U9cv	Yucca	06/23/92	No	06/23/92	06/23/92
		Area 9	Basin	0800 hrs		0800 hrs	2200 hrs
Hunters	DNA	U12n.24	Rainier	09/18/92	No	09/18/92	09/18/92
Trophy		Area 12	Mesa	1000 hrs		1001 hrs	1300 hrs

Divider	LANL	U3ml Area 3	Yucca Basin	09/23/92 0804 hrs	No	09/23/92 0804 hrs	09/ 094
Distant ZenithDNA		U12p.04 Area 12	Rainier Mesa	09/19/91 0930 hrs	No	1992 releases included: 1.	

a. Source: DOE/NV 1993c.

Table 4.7-2. Airborne radionuclide emissions for 1992 at the NTS.

Event or facility
name (airborne
releases)

	Tritiumb	Argon-37c	Argon-39	Krypton-85	Xenon-127d	X
Area 3, DIVIDER						
Area 3f						
Area 5, RWMSf	6 x 10 ⁻¹					
Area 6g						
Area 12,						
N Tunnel	4.9 x 10 ⁻²	7.9 x 10 ⁻¹	8.1 x 10 ⁻⁵	1.3 x 10 ⁻²	5.7 x 10 ⁻⁶	2
P Tunnel	3.6 x 10 ⁻¹	2.1 x 10 ⁻⁰		1.3 x 10 ⁻⁰		
Area 19 and 20, Pahute Mesad						
				2.8 x 10 ⁺²		
Total	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁰	2.9 x 10 ⁻⁰	8.1 x 10 ⁻⁵	2.8 x 10 ⁺²	5.7 x 10 ⁻⁶	2

a. Source: DOE/NV 1993c.

b. Total includes 4.9 x 10⁻² Ci of molecular HT from Hunter's Trophy. Remainder i

c. Ar-37 with 35 day half-life not in GENII. Decays to stable Cy-37.

d. Xe-127 with 36.4 day half-life not in GENII. Decays to stable I-127.

e. Xe-127m with 8 day half-life not in GENII. Decays to stable Xe-129.

f. Calculated from air sampler data.

g. Assumes all radioactivity on Anti-C clothing is I-131 and all becomes airborne vehicle operations, boilers, and fuel storage. The concrete batch plants, aggregate processing facilities, and surface disturbance activities are sources of particulate activities are largely intermittent and occur in support of specific testing programs. Fire training exercises consist of periodic open burning in designated areas with a materials conducted by fire and emergency personnel several times per year. Motor operations and boilers are the largest sources of air pollutants at the NTS; motor consume gasoline, while boilers, construction equipment, and other diesel engines c fuel. A continuous, nonradiological air monitoring network is not in place at the (USAF et al. 1991). Table 4.7-3 presents the maximum allowable nonradiological emi for those NTS sources which require permits.

4.7.4 Air Quality

4.7.4.1 Radiological. Onsite surveillance of airborne particulates, noble gases, and

tritiated water vapor indicated onsite concentrations that were generally not stati from background concentrations. External gamma exposure monitoring in 1992 indicat the gamma environment within the NTS remained consistent with that of previous year gamma monitoring stations displayed expected results, ranging from the background l predominant throughout the NTS to the types of exposure rates associated with known contaminated zones and radiological material storage facilities. Results of 1992 o

environmental surveillance indicated no NTS-related radioactivity was detected at a sampling station, and there were no apparent net exposures detectable by the offsite network (DOE/NV 1993c).

The GENII environmental transport and dose assessment model (PNL 1988) was used to calculate the effective dose equivalents (EDE) resulting from the airborne radionuclides presented in Table 4.7-2. These results are summarized in Table 4.7-4. The maximum at the NTS boundary is 1.1×10^{-2} millirem. This is 1.1×10^{-1} percent of the corresponding Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants. The collective EDEs to the estimated population of 15,100 persons within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the proposed SNF facility is 10^{-3} person-rem, which is 1.2×10^{-4} percent of the natural background radiation dose to the population. Background radiation doses are presented in Figure 4.7-2.

Table 4.7-3. Total nonradiological emission rates at NTS for permitted sources.

Pollutant	Emission rate (g/s)
Carbon monoxide	b
Nitrogen dioxide	b
Particulate matter (PM ₁₀)	2.8
Sulfur dioxide	4.5
Lead	b

a. Source: Engineering Science, Inc. (1990).

b. No pollutant sources indicated.

Table 4.7-4. Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from NTS operations during 1992.

	Maximally exposed individual dose	Collective dose to the population within 80 km of NTS sources
Dose	1.1×10^{-2} mrem	5.2×10^{-3} person-rem
NESHAP standard	10 mrem per year	--
Percentage of NESHAP	1.1×10^{-1}	--
Natural background dose	278 mrem per year	4190 person-rem per year
Percentage of natural background dose	4.0×10^{-3}	1.2×10^{-4}

a. Sources: 1992 Radionuclide emissions from DOE/NV 1993c GENII Model (PNL 1988) used to predict EDE. Natural background dose from DOE/NV 1993c.

b. The maximum boundary dose is to the hypothetical individual who remains in the area continuously during the year at the NTS boundary.

c. Based on an estimated population of 15,100 persons within 80 km of the proposed facility in 1995.

Figure 4.7-2. Sources of radiation exposure, unrelated to NTS operations, to individuals.

4.7.4.2 Nonradiological. Air quality rules and regulations applicable to the NTS are

governed by the Clean Air Act, the Nevada Revised Statutes, and the Nevada Administrative Code. The EPA administers the Federal regulations developed to implement the Clean Air Act and the Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources is responsible for the Federal and state regulations. Air quality in a given location is described as the concentration of various pollutants in the atmosphere, generally expressed in units per cubic meter ($-g/m^3$).

The Clean Air Act directed the EPA to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for those pollutants, termed criteria pollutants, that pose the greatest threat to public health in the United States. The six criteria pollutants are ozone, carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, and particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter of 10 microns or less, referred to as PM₁₀. The Clean Air Act Amendments authorized the EPA to designate geographic regions not in compliance with NAAQS as nonattainment areas. The NTS is located within the Nevada Air Quality Control Region 147, which

attainment with respect to the NAAQS for the criteria pollutants (CFR 1993b; Engine Science, Inc. 1990). The nearest nonattainment areas to the Nevada Test Site Spent Fuel site are in Clark County, which includes an area in the Las Vegas planning area designated serious for PM₁₀ and an area in Las Vegas that is designated moderate for carbon monoxide (CFR 1993b).

Under the Clean Air Act, clean air areas are divided into classes. National park and wilderness areas receive mandatory Class I protection. Very little pollution occurs in Class I areas. The only Class I area in Nevada, the Jarvis-Wadsworth Wilderness Area, is approximately 480 kilometers (300 miles) from the NTS, in the northwest corner of Nevada. The nearest Class I areas to the NTS are the Grand Canyon National Park, approximately 171 kilometers (107 miles) to the southeast, and Sequoia National Park approximately 171 kilometers (107 miles) to the west-southwest. The NTS is located in a Class II area, as are many areas across the country.

In addition to the criteria pollutants which are regulated under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards and under various emission standards, hazardous air pollutants are regulated under Title III of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 directed the EPA to determine maximum achievable control technologies which would be used as the basis for emission limits for hazardous air pollutants.

Engineering Science, Inc. of Pasadena, California conducted an air quality study in 1990. The study examined air quality compliance of the NTS with applicable Federal and state air quality standards. The study encompassed an air emissions inventory, ambient air monitoring, and air pollution source testing at various sources. Based on the data from the ambient air monitoring stations established for the study, air quality at the NTS meets applicable Federal and state standards. The results of background monitoring performed by Engineering Science, Inc. are summarized in Table 4.7-5. This is the most recent analysis of NTS ambient air quality.

Air dispersion modeling was performed to determine the maximum concentrations of criteria pollutants. These results are also summarized in Table 4.7-5. The "total maximum concentrations" in Table 4.7-5 would result if all permitted sources at the NTS operated at the maximum allowable capacity. All pollutant concentrations from this scenario of existing emissions at the NTS are below applicable regulations.

4.8 Water Resources

This section provides a description of the surface water and groundwater at the surrounding area. The section also describes the existing impacts to surface water and groundwater that have resulted from past and present operations at the NTS.

4.8.1 Surface Water

The drainage basins and the generalized directions of surface water flow near the NTS are shown in Figure 4.8-1 (USAF et al. 1991). The boundary lines of the drainage basin are principally along topographic divides (DOE 1988b). Figure 4.8-1 also shows other surface water features.

Table 4.7-5. Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable

Criteria pollutant	Averaging time	Most stringent regulation or guideline (-g/m ³)	Maximum background concentration (-g/m ³)	Maximum concentration (-g/m ³)
Carbon monoxide	8-hour	10,000	2,290	2,290
	1-hour	40,000	2,748	2,748
Nitrogen dioxide	Annual	100	c	c
Lead	Calendar quarter	1.5	c	c
Particulate matter (PM ₁₀) ^d	Annual	50	c	c
	24-hour	150	78.3	78.3
Sulfur dioxide	Annual	80	c	c
	24-hour	365	39.3	39.3
	3-hour	1,300	65.4	65.4
Hazardous air pollutants				
b	b	b	b	b

a. Sources: Maximum background concentration provided by Engineering Science, Inc contribution computed by Halliburton NUS.

b. No sources indicated.

c. Not measured.

d. All suspended particulate matter is assumed to be PM10.

Figure 4.8-1. NTS hydrologic basins and surface drainage direction. Almost all st data have been collected. The average annual runoff within the hydrographic areas Valley Basin in Nye County was estimated at less than 164 million gallons (620,000 per area (DOE 1988b)).

The ephemeral character of streamflow has also limited the onsite monitoring of water quality. Water samples were, however, collected from the main channel of For and two of its principal tributaries (Drill Hole Wash and Busted Butte Wash) during runoff and flooding in 1984. Due to unknown factors such as compositional variability any quantitative interpretation is unwarranted (DOE 1988b).

Throughout the NTS, perennial surface water originates solely from springs, and restricted to source pools at some large springs. Because of the extreme aridity of most of the spring discharge travels a short distance before evaporating or infiltrating the ground (DOE 1986). Thus, dry washes may be the principal sources of potential groundwater recharge inputs in the area (DOE 1988b). In addition, playas on NTS, including Frenchman Lake located in Area 5 and Yucca Lake to the northwest of Area 5, may retain standing water for hours to weeks following intense precipitation events. These playas are the only natural surface water features in the vicinity of Frenchman and Yucca Flat. The direction of movement of water accumulated in playas is generally upward due to high evapotranspiration (DOE/OFE 1994). However, accumulated runoff in Frenchman Lake and Yucca Lake reportedly serves to recharge the valley fill aquifer (DOE 1988b).

Despite the arid climate, which includes high annual average potential evaporation, average annual precipitation, and infrequent storms, surface runoff does occur. Runoff from storms that occur most commonly in winter and occasionally in autumn and spring from localized thunderstorms that occur mostly during the summer (DOE 1988b). The ephemeral streams resulting from heavy precipitation fill the normally dry washes. Runoff may occur where the water exceeds the capacity of the channels. In contrast to the terminal playas, which may retain standing water for days or weeks after severe storms (DOE 1988b), playas in Kawich Valley and Gold Flat collect and dissipate the runoff from the northern Pahute Mesa (ERDA 1977). Summer floods usually do not accumulate to cause regional but their intensive character renders them potentially destructive over limited areas (DOE 1988b).

The western half and southernmost part of the NTS have channel systems which carry runoff beyond NTS boundaries during infrequent, very intense storms. Fortymile Canyon is the largest of these systems, originating on Pahute Mesa in the northwestern part of the NTS. Within the NTS, Fortymile Canyon and its tributaries are restricted to canyons. Flood-prone areas surround Fortymile Wash, a major tributary within Fortymile Canyon. The other major NTS tributaries to the Amargosa River are Tonopah Wash, which flows southwesterly from Jackass Divide in the south-central part of the NTS into the Amargosa Valley, and Rock Valley, which drains from the southernmost part of the NTS westward and then southward to Ash Meadows in the east-central portion of the Amargosa Desert (ERDA 1977).

The Amargosa River originates in Oasis Valley and continues southeastward through Amargosa Desert past Death Valley Junction, then southward another 45 miles (82 kilometers) where it turns northwestward and terminates in Death Valley. The river carries floodwater following cloudbursts or intense storms but is normally dry, except for a few short periods when it contains water from springs (DOE 1988b).

Two watersheds, Fortymile Canyon and Jackass Flats, have the potential of endangering offsite public health and safety due to flooding. Regional peak-flood flow equations for the southern Nevada area indicate that the 100-year peak flow from the Fortymile Canyon is approximately 13,000 cubic feet (370 cubic meters) per second and 8,200 cubic feet (230 cubic meters) per second from the Jackass Flats drainage (USAF et al. 1991).

In summary, the potential exists for sheet flow and channelized flow through ephemeral washes from intense precipitation events to cause localized flooding throughout the

however, no comprehensive floodplain analysis has been conducted on the NTS to delineate 100- and 500-year floodplains associated with NTS drainages. No flood studies have been conducted for the proposed SNF facility in Area 5; a flood assessment was for the Radioactive Waste Management Site in NTS Area 5 on Frenchman Flat, located southwest of the proposed SNF Site. This study determined that the southwest corner of the Radioactive Waste Management Site is located in Federal Emergency Management Agency AO (100-year flood zone with depths between 1 and 3 feet [0.3 and 0.9 meter]) of the Wash Alluvial Fan. The remainder of the Radioactive Waste Management Site is located in Zone X of the Halfpint Alluvial Fan (100-year flood zone with depths less than 1 foot [0.3 meter]). Areas to the north, south, and east of the Radioactive Waste Management Site are in Zone X or Zone AO (DOE/NV 1993d). These suggest that the proposed SNF facility may encompass areas in Zone X and/or areas in Zone AO associated with the Halfpint Fan. Probable maximum flood analyses are known to have been performed only for the vicinity of Yucca Mountain to aid in flood protection design for Yucca Mountain facility (DOE 1988b).

Underground nuclear testing has resulted in the release of radioactive material to the surface. There is the potential for 100-year floods to transport these contaminant boundaries of the NTS. Quantitative estimates of this potential cannot be determined without additional studies (USAF et al. 1991).

There are no National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for the NTS, as there are no wastewater discharges to onsite or offsite surface water. NTS wastewaters are discharged to sewage lagoons or to septic tank/leach field systems. Wastewater discharges at NTS are conducted in accordance with permits issued by the State of Nevada (DOE/NV 1993c).

4.8.2 Groundwater

Generally, the hydrogeology at the NTS is characterized by great depths to the water table and slow velocity of movement of water in the saturated and unsaturated zones (DOE/NV 1992c). Depth to groundwater varies from about 660 feet (200 meters) beneath the valleys in the southern part of the NTS to more than 1,640 feet (500 meters) beneath the Mesas. The depth of the water table below Area 5 is approximately 800 feet (244 meters) below the land surface (DOE/NV 1993c). Locally, there are perched water tables at shallow depths (USAF et al. 1991). Perched aquifers have been reported at depths of 70 feet (21 meters) in the southwestern part of Frenchman Flat (RSN 1993). In the eastern portions of the NTS, the water table occurs generally in the alluvium and volcanic rocks above the regional basement (DOE/NV 1993c).

The NTS lies within the Death Valley Groundwater System, which is a large and diverse area encompassing southern Nevada and adjacent parts of California composed of many mountain ranges and topographic basins that are hydraulically connected at depth. Groundwater within the system travels toward Death Valley, although much of it is discharged before reaching it. Groundwater in the Death Valley system does not enter neighboring groundwater systems (DOE 1986). The Death Valley Groundwater System is divided into groundwater subbasins. The boundaries of these subbasins have been estimated from potentiometric levels, geologic controls of subsurface flow, discharge areas, and flow paths (DOE 1988b). As shown in Figure 4.8-2, the three groundwater subbasins of the NTS are Ash Meadows, Alkali Flat Furnace Creek Ranch, and Oasis Valley. Groundwater beneath the eastern part of the NTS is in the Ash Meadows Subbasin. Most of the western NTS is in the Alkali Flat Furnace Creek Ranch Subbasin. Groundwater beneath the northwestern corner of the NTS occurs in the Oasis Valley Subbasin (DOE/NV 1993c, 1).

Six major aquifers occur in the area. In decreasing order of age of the geology in which they are found, they are: Cambrian through Devonian lower carbonate aquifer, Pennsylvanian and Permian upper carbonate aquifer, Tertiary bedded tuff aquifer, Tertiary welded tuff aquifer, Tertiary lava flow aquifer, and Tertiary and Quaternary valley fill aquifer (Eckel 1968) (see Figure 4.6-2). The hydrologic and geologic properties of these aquifers are described in the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Plan [DOE 1988b] for a thorough description of the hydraulic properties of the major hydrostratigraphic units based on studies at the NTS. For example, the carbonate aquifers and the welded tuff aquifer store water chiefly along fractures. In contrast, the valley fill aquifer stores and transmits water through interstitial openings. Additionally, in places in the lower carbonate aquifer, flow is diverted laterally and vertically because of fault displacements that have blocked flow in the lower carbonate aquifer against less permeable rocks. Where the flow is blocked, it causes the water table to rise to the land surface, causing springs (DOE 1986).

Figure 4.8-2. Groundwater hydrologic units, hydrographic areas, and well locations
The lower carbonate and valley fill (alluvial) aquifers are the main sources of groundwater in the eastern part of the NTS (DOE 1986). Groundwater withdrawals in the area of proposed SNF management facilities are principally from the valley fill aquifer of the Flat hydrographic area (DOE 1988b). The other four units in the area have relative permeabilities that tend to retard the flow of groundwater. These units are called (DOE 1986). In decreasing order of age of the geologic units that form them, these are: Precambrian through lower Cambrian lower clastic aquitard, Devonian through Mississippian upper clastic aquitard, Tertiary tuff aquitard, and Tertiary lava flow (Eckel 1968) (see Figure 4.6-2).

Figure 4.8-3 is a regional groundwater potentiometric surface map of the NTS (DOE/NV 1993d). The map does not show perched groundwater. However, perched groundwater does occur at NTS, principally associated with the aquitards underlying (Eckel 1968).

In general, regional groundwater flow is from the north and northeast toward the discharge area near Ash Meadows in the Amargosa Desert (see Figure 4.8-2 and 4.8-3) western portions of the area, the regional flow is from the northwest to the south (DRI 1986b). Deep regional movement of groundwater south of the NTS occurs chiefly in the lower carbonate aquifer. Because of geologic structure, flow paths in the lower aquifer are complex and poorly defined. Groundwater from the Ash Meadows Subbasin is the water entering Devil's Hole, which supports the only known population of the desert pupfish, a federally listed endangered species. The decline of the species has been low water levels caused by decreasing groundwater levels (ERDA 1977).

Groundwater recharge to the Ash Meadows Subbasin occurs primarily from precipitation over the mountainous areas in the northern, eastern, and southern portions of the basin (DOE 1988b). As mentioned above, this recharge generally travels vertically through the zone (unsaturated zone) and the overlying aquifers to the underlying carbonate aquifer. Specifically, in the eastern half of the NTS, groundwater flows toward the major valley deflecting downward to join the regional flow in the carbonate aquifers. Beneath the Frenchman flats, vertical flow through the underlying volcanic rocks is impeded by

Figure 4.8-3. NTS regional potentiometric surface map. zeolitized tuffs, resulting in vertical flow in the uppermost portions of the vadose zone in the area of Frenchman generally upward toward the surface, due to an evapotranspiration rate which is 15% less than precipitation (DOE/OFE 1994). Site characterization data for Area 5 indicate vertical flow direction in the vadose zone is upward from 0 to 250 feet (0 to 75 meters) land surface. In the next interval (250 to 600 feet [75 to 180 meters]), a downward flow of 10 feet/1,000 years (3 meters/1,000 years) has been calculated. At a depth of 600 feet (180 to 250 meters), a zone of equilibrium (a zone of no vertical movement) is present at the water table (Johnejack et al. 1994).

Analyses have also been conducted in order to determine the travel time of water in the vicinity of Area 5 and Frenchman Flat to the regional water table. Modeling studies of the Radioactive Waste Management Site at Area 5 indicate that the travel time from the water table is on the order of thousands of years (DOE/NV 1993c). Specifically, the travel time from Area 5 to the regional water table is estimated to range from 19,000 to 113,000 years (USAF et al. 1991). The Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Plan (DOE) describes in detail the hydraulic properties of the various units comprising the unsaturated zone based on studies at Yucca Mountain.

Three types of groundwater chemistry exist at the NTS and in its vicinity: (1) potassium bicarbonate, which generally occurs in the tuff and valley fill aquifers of tuff detritus; (2) calcium and magnesium bicarbonate, which generally occurs in the valley fill aquifers composed chiefly of carbonate detritus; and (3) mixed, defined as having the chemical characteristics of both type 1 and type 2 (DOE 1986).

The hydrogeologic units which supply potable water to the NTS have been classified as Class IIA (currently a source of drinking water) and IIB (potentially a source of drinking water) in accordance with the EPA's guidelines for groundwater classification (DOE/NV 1993). Aquifers at the NTS have been designated as sole source aquifers.

In general, the quality of NTS groundwater is suitable for most purposes and generally meets EPA secondary standards for major cations and anions and the primary standard for deleterious constituents. Specifically, groundwater in the Ash Meadows Subbasin has dissolved solids concentration ranging between 275 and 450 milligrams per liter (mg/L) (DOE/NV 1993a). Summary groundwater quality data for the period 1957 to 1990 for Well 5c, Well UE5c, and Army Well 1 which serve Area 5 reveal a pH range of 7.6 to 8.7; calcium (2.4 to 44.0 mg/L); sodium (38.1 to 129.0 mg/L); chloride (9.1 to 23.2 mg/L); sulfate (0 to 55.1 mg/L); and silica (0 to 55.1 mg/L) (DRI 1993).

Contamination by radionuclides occurs below the water table as well as in the zone above it. This contamination is a result of underground nuclear testing. A environmental survey of the NTS also identified a number of potential sources of groundwater contamination. These included wastewater discharges, hazardous- or mixed-waste disposal sites, solid waste landfills and trenches receiving potentially hazardous waste, and over waste spill or release sites (USAF et al. 1991).

Underground nuclear testing has primarily occurred in the areas of Yucca Flat, Flat, Pahute Mesa, Rainier Mesa, and Shoshone Mountain. Nuclear detonations at or water table have resulted in groundwater contamination. The principal confirmed or contaminants from these tests include various radionuclides (primarily tritium) and a number of NTS waste disposal and testing facilities, including injection wells, various waste storage facilities or disposal sites, have caused contamination of the groundwater. Contaminants of concern include radionuclides, organic compounds, heavy metals (primarily lead), and hydrocarbons as well as various residues from plastics, drilling muds, and other materials (DOE/NV 1993e). Figure 4.8-4 depicts the areas with known or suspected groundwater vadose zone contamination. Groundwater contamination characterization activities are in progress at NTS; at present, no contaminant plume maps are available, and available groundwater quality data are not useful for the purposes of site-wide characterization comparison with established criteria.

Groundwater contamination could be transported toward the NTS boundary by one of the regional groundwater flow systems. Groundwater flow velocities in these systems range from 6 and 600 feet (1.8 and 183 meters) per year. Because of sorption, however, most non-tritium radionuclides would move at a much slower rate. The groundwater travel time from the NTS to the boundary is approximately 300 years.

Figure 4.8-4. Areas of potential groundwater contamination at the NTS. NTS to the south. Radioactive decay during this time, coupled with dilution should reduce radioactivity concentrations to well below regulatory limits (USAF et al. 1991). Thus, there are no effects on public health and safety, nor are any expected in the future.

The NTS derives its complete water supply from the groundwater aquifers underlying the site. Water supply has been developed and is managed on the basis of five service areas that support the different NTS operating areas. Given the wastewater disposal practices and the depth to the groundwater system, it is reasonable to assume that all of the water consumed on the NTS is from the groundwater (USAF et al. 1991). Recent annual water use at the NTS has been substantially from the 1980's. In 1989, NTS annual water withdrawal was 1.117 billion gallons (4.22 million cubic meters) (Leppert 1993). In 1992, NTS annual water withdrawal was 2.25 billion gallons (8.5 million cubic meters) (Leppert 1993).

In 1993, 14 wells were utilized for the NTS water supply (DOE/NV 1994c). A small portion of the NTS receives its water from 5 onsite wells drilled in the Alkali Flat-Furnace Subbasin (DOE 1988b). Most of the NTS receives its water from 9 onsite wells drilled in the Ash Meadows Subbasin, which encompasses Area 5 (DOE/NV 1994c). These 9 wells have a combined production capacity of 1,813 million gallons per year (6.86 million cubic meters) (DOE/NV 1993a).

Area 5, which encompasses the proposed SNF facility site, is located within NTS service area C. Wells 5b, 5c, and UE5c serve the fire protection, construction, and other needs of Area 5 facilities (DOE/NV 1993b). Wells 5b and 5c are completed in alluvium (valley fill aquifer) with total completion depths of 900 and 1,200 feet (274 and 366 meters) below land surface, respectively. Well UE5c is completed in volcanic rock (exact depth unknown) with a total depth of 2,682 feet (817 meters) below land surface (DOE 1988b; DOE/NV 1993b; DRI 1993).

Groundwater for construction and operation of the SNF management facilities would be drawn from the Frenchman Flat hydrographic area of the Ash Meadows Subbasin. Much of the land within the Ash Meadows Subbasin is under Federal jurisdiction and has been withdrawn from the public domain (DOE 1988b). Little of the total groundwater of the subbasin is privately appropriated or used.

The perennial yield of the Ash Meadows Subbasin greatly exceeds water withdrawals by DOE and all other users. For more than thirty years water withdrawals from the Frenchman Flat hydrographic area have exceeded the estimated precipitation recharge for that area (DOE 1988b). This study also indicates that withdrawals have caused no decline in water level (DOE 1988b). However, it should be noted that numerous conditions tend to preclude the accurate measurement of static water levels (Winograd 1970). Because of hydrogeologic complexities, regional groundwater flow at the NTS is not constrained by hydrographic basins which are defined by local topography (USAF et al. 1991). Therefore, potential groundwater overdrafts in the Frenchman Flat basin indicated by previous estimates are likely made up by untapped groundwater from neighboring hydrographic areas.

Water in southern Nevada (excluding the Las Vegas area) is used chiefly for irrigation to a lesser extent for livestock, municipal needs, and domestic supplies. Almost all water is pumped from the ground, although some springs supply water to establishments in Death Valley and other areas south of the NTS. Springs in Oasis Valley near Beatty are a significant source of water for public and domestic needs and for irrigation (DOE City of Las Vegas obtains approximately 80 percent of its water from the Colorado River; the remaining 20 percent is withdrawn from groundwater sources). There are no plans to develop new water supply sources in the near future. (Las Vegas Valley Water District 1994).

The principal water users in the area closest to the NTS are in the Amargosa Desert around the Town of Amargosa Valley and in the Pahrump Valley. Aquifers in the Pahrump Valley could support up to about 16,900 residents with no decline in usable storage. Local effects, such as land subsidence and well interference, could result from such development. The mining industry in southern Nevada also uses a small amount of water for processing. Water for this purpose is supplied from nearby shallow wells or trucked from nearby towns. Many of the mines currently recycle process water, which reduces the demand (DOE 1986).

The volume of groundwater underlying the NTS (as well as the estimated volume of contaminated groundwater) that has been removed from direct access to the general public is rather large. The impaired groundwater will likely remain unusable for an extended period. The significance of the loss of access to the NTS groundwater is diminished by the fact that if access were provided, the water underlying portions of the NTS might not be usable for other purposes (USAF et al. 1991).

4.9 Ecological Resources

The NTS lies within the transition area between the Mojave Desert and the Great Basin. As a result, flora and fauna characteristics of both occur on the NTS. The NTS covers approximately 1,350 square kilometers (1,350 square miles) of which only 0.55 percent is developed (DOE 1991).

NTS has completed numerous studies on the effects of nuclear testing on the environment. A summary, studies (including ongoing surveys) have shown that there may be a correlation between radioactive testing and the decline of vegetation present in an area. As a result, there may not have the necessary vegetation for food and cover, thus changing the fauna of those areas (USAF et al. 1991).

The following section describes the ecological resources at the NTS, including wetlands, aquatic ecology, and threatened and endangered species. Information is presented on special status species other than threatened and endangered species such as Federal Candidate and state-listed species.

4.9.1 Terrestrial Resources

Plant communities on the NTS have been classified according to the dominant shrub. Approximately 700 taxa, representing about 70 families, have been identified on the NTS (ERDA 1976; DOE/NV 1993b, 1991b). Figure 4.9-1 presents the general plant communities identified there.

Figure 4.9-1. Plant communities on Nevada Test Site. The Mojave Desert is located at elevations between 1,219 and 1,524 meters (4,000 and 5,000 feet). The dominant plant community is creosote bush (*Larrea tridentata*). A community of creosote bush occurs in the southern portion of the NTS, in Jackass Flats and Frenchman Flat (DOE/NV 1991b, 1986b; ERDA 1976; FWS 1992).

The transitional zone between the Mojave Desert and the Great Basin occurs at elevations between 1,219 and 1,524 meters (4,000 and 5,000 feet). The dominant plant communities associated with the transition zone are: blackbrush (*Coleogyne ramosissima*), desert cholla (*Yucca elaeagnifolia*), and hopsage (*Grayia spinosa*). In general, these communities are found in bajadas and in closed basins within Jackass Flats and Yucca Flat (DOE/NV 1991b, 1986b; ERDA 1976).

The Great Basin is located within the northern two-thirds of NTS at elevations between 1,524 and 2,134 meters (5,000 and 7,000 feet). The dominant plant communities are big sagebrush (*Artemisia tridentata*) and black sagebrush (*Artemisia nova*), saltbush (*Atriplex canescens*), and desert shrub (*Quercus laevis*). In areas with elevations above 1,830 meters (6,000 feet), collectively called the mountains, hills, and mesas, the dominant plant communities are singleleaf pinyon (*Pinus monophylla*) and Utah juniper (*Juniperus osteosperma*). In general, these communities are found at Thirsty Canyon, Yucca Playa, Rainier Mesa, and Yucca Mountain (DOE/NV 1991b, 1986b; ERDA 1976).

ERDA 1976).

There is a recent trend of nonnative plant species establishing themselves in a disturbance at the NTS. Cheatgrass (*Bromus tectorum*), an annual grass, occurs at e above 1,524 meters (5,000 feet). Downey chess (*Bromus rubens*), another annual gras becoming established in the mid-elevations. Russian thistle (*Salsola iberica* and S appears in areas where the native vegetation has been removed and the soil composit changed (DOE/NV 1991b, 1988; ERDA 1976).

Like vegetation, animals on the NTS are representative of both the Mojave Deser Great Basin and the associated transition zone. There are over 30 species of reptil amphibians, 190 species of birds, and 50 species of mammals on the NTS (DOE/NV 1993 ERDA 1976). Many animals utilize man-made reservoirs and natural springs and seeps NTS. Sewage ponds have also become an important resource for wildlife.

Reptiles and amphibians on the NTS include 1 species of desert tortoise, 14 spe lizards, and 17 species of snakes. In addition, the NTS is within the range of the spadefoot toad (*Scaphiopus intermontanus*), but this amphibian has not been identifi NTS (DOE/NV 1993b; ERDA 1976; Medica 1990).

Birds on the NTS are often migratory and seasonal residents. The most widely d species include the black-throated sparrow (*Amphispiza bilineata*), house finch (*Car mexicanus*), red-tailed hawk (*Buteo jamaicensis*), common raven (*Corvus corax*), logge (*Lanius ludovicianus*), mockingbird (*Mimus polyglottos*), ash-throated flycatcher (*My cinerascens*), and mourning dove (*Zenaida macroura*) (DOE/NV 1993b; ERDA 1976; Greger 1991).

The most abundant group of mammals on the NTS are rodents. Carnivores include (*Canis latrans*), kit fox (*Vulpes macrotis*), badger (*Taxidea taxus*), bobcat (*Lynx ru lion* (*Felis concolor*), and long-tailed weasel (*Mustella frenata*). Large mammals on the mule deer (*Odocoileus hemionus*), pronghorn (*Antilocapra americana*), desert big (*Ovis canadensis*), and wild horse (*Equus caballus*). Hunting, grazing, and fishing on the NTS (DOE/NV 1993b, 1986b; ERDA 1976; Medica and Saethre 1990).

In general, the portion of Frenchman Flat in Area 5 (i.e., north and east of Me Highway) within which the proposed SNF facility would be located is within the creosote community. This plant community is characteristic of the Mojave Desert. Pre-activ completed for the Radioactive Waste Management Site, which is in the general area o proposed SNF facility, found the dominant vegetation to include creosote bush, spin white bursage, desert thorn, and Nevada joint-fir (*Ephreda nevadensis*) (EG&G 1993, 1990, 1989).

The distribution of animals within the portion of Area 5 being considered for t SNF facility is not as well documented as for the rest of the NTS. However, specie within 5 kilometers (3.1 miles) of the Liquefied Gaseous Fuels Spill Test Facility reptiles, 17 bird species, and 14 mammals (Hunter et al. 1991). The Liquified Gase Spill Test Facility is located within similar habitat approximately 7.6 kilometers of the proposed facility. There are no water sources located within the portion of considered for the proposed SNF facility.

4.9.2 Wetlands

There are several natural springs on the NTS that feed flowing streams (Greger Romney nda). Some of these extend for 91 meters (300 feet) before infiltration and cause them to dry up. Vegetation along these channels consists of willow (*Salix* sp (*Tamarix* sp.)). Reservoirs on the site which are fed by groundwater from wells have wetland vegetation such as tamarisk, cattail (*Typha* sp.), and bulrushes (*Scirpus* sp (Elle 1992). A wetland delineation, as defined by the 1987 U.S. Army Corps of Engi wetlands Delineation Manual (U.S. COE 1987), has not been performed for any of thes (DOE/NV 1993b; Elle 1992), and National Wetlands Inventory maps are not available f NTS.

The portion of Area 5 under consideration for the SNF facility does not have an springs, seeps, or wetland vegetation (DOE/NV 1993b; Greger and Romney nda).

4.9.3 Aquatic Resources

Potential aquatic habitat on the NTS includes surface drainages, playas, man-ma reservoirs, and springs. Permanent surface water sources are limited to a few smal There are two dry lake beds (playas) located in the eastern (Yucca Flat) and so

(Frenchman Flat) portions of the NTS. Runoff from the eastern half of the NTS flow surface drainages to onsite playas and can collect for a few days to a few months. areas of the NTS drain offsite via arroyos and dry stream beds that carry water onl intense or persistent rainstorms. These surface drainages and playas are unable to permanent fish populations (ERDA 1976; Greger and Romney nda).

Reservoirs resulting from discharge of well water located on the NTS support th introduced species of fish: bluegill (*Lepomis macrochirus*), goldfish (*Carassius au golden shiner* (*Notemigonus crysoleucas*). Springs located throughout the site do no populations (Elle 1992). There are no springs, seeps, or other permanent water bod proposed SNF Site; however Cane Spring is located in Area 5, southwest of the propo Site (Greger and Romney nda).

4.9.4 Threatened and Endangered Species

Table 4.9-1 presents a list of federally and state-listed species that may be f vicinity of NTS.

There are no known plants which have been listed as threatened or endangered un Endangered Species Act (16 USC 1531-1534) on NTS. However, the U.S. Fish and Wildl Service has identified candidate species for listing, 11 of which may occur on or i the NTS. Ten of these are Candidate Category 2 species, meaning that information i that they may be appropriate for listing as endangered or threatened but more infor needed. One species, the Beatley milk-vetch, is a Candidate Category 1 species (DOE/NV 1993b, 1991c; EG&G 1993; USAF et al. 1991). This species has been identifi Pahute Mesa (Hunter et al. 1988). A Candidate Category 1 species is one for which substantial information indicating that it is appropriate for listing as endangered Four Candidate Category 2 species (camissona, black wooly-pod, cymopterus, and Beat phacelia) have been identified in Frenchman Flat, although none of these was identi surveys conducted near the proposed SNF facility site (EG&G 1993; Tetrattech 1993).

Two listed reptile species on or in the vicinity of NTS are of concern. The ch Federal Candidate Category 2 species which may occur on NTS. The desert tortoise i federally listed threatened species known to occur on NTS (DOE/NV 1993b; EG&G 1993) the desert tortoise and the chuckwalla are listed as reptile species of Frenchman F (DOE/NV 1986b).

Table 4.9-1. Federally and state-listed threatened, endangered, and other special that may be found in the vicinity of the Nevada Test Site.

Common name	Scientific name	Status ^b Fed.
Plants		
Amargosa penstemon	<i>Penstemon fruticiformis</i> ssp. <i>amargosae</i>	C2
Beardtonguec	<i>Penstemon pahutensis</i>	C2
Beatley milkvetchc	<i>Astragalus beatleyae</i>	C1
Beatley phaceliac	<i>Phacelia beatleyae</i>	C2
Black wooly-podc	<i>Astragalus funerus</i>	C2
Camissoniac	<i>Camissonia megalantha</i>	C2
Cymopterus ^c	<i>Cymopterus ripleyi</i> var. <i>saniculoides</i>	C2
Green-gentianc	<i>Frasera pahutensis</i>	C2
Kingston bedstrawc	<i>Galium hilendiae</i> ssp. <i>kingstonense</i>	C2
Mojave fishhook cactus ^c	<i>Sclerocactus polyancistrus</i>	NL
White bear desert-poppyc	<i>Arctomecon merriamii</i>	C2
Birds		
Bald eagled	<i>Haliaeetus leucocephalus</i>	E
Golden eaglec	<i>Aquila chrysaetos</i>	NL
Ferruginous hawkc	<i>Buteo regalis</i>	C2
Loggerhead shrikec	<i>Lanius ludovicianus</i>	C2
Mountain ploverc	<i>Charadrius montanus</i>	C2
Peregrine falcond,e	<i>Falco peregrinus</i>	E
Western least bittern	<i>Ixobrychus exilis hesperis</i>	C2
Western snowy ploverc	<i>Charadrius alexandrinus nivosus</i>	C2
White-faced ibisc	<i>Plegadis chihi</i>	C2
Reptiles		
Chuckwalla	<i>Sauromalus obesus</i>	C2
Desert tortoisec	<i>Gopherus agassizit</i>	T

		Mammals	
Spotted bat	Euderma maculatum		C2
Pygmy rabbit	Branchylgus idahoensis		C2
		Fish	
Devils Hole pupfishd,f	Cyprinodon diabolis		E

a. Sources: CFR (1993c,d); ERDA (1976); EG&G (1993); DOE/NV (1986b); FR (1991, 19 Hunter et al. (1988); NV DCMR (1992); Tetrattech (1993).

b. Status codes:

C1 Federal candidate - Category 1 (probably appropriate to list)
 C2 Federal candidate - Category 2 (possibly appropriate to list more study requi
 CE State critically endangered by authority of NRS 527.270 (State Division of Fo
 CY State protected by authority of NRS 527.60-.120 under the Nevada Cacti and Yucc
 E Endangered
 NL Not listed
 T Threatened
 P State protected by NAC 503.050

c. Species recorded on the NTS.

d. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Recovery Plan exists for this species.

e. Peregrine falcon seen on the NTS; however not identified to subspecies level.

f. Only known location of this species is outside the NTS 24 miles (39 km) southwe
 included here due to potential offsite groundwater impacts.

Note: Nevada Department of Wildlife utilizes the Federal threatened and endangered

The distribution and abundance of the desert tortoise have been extensively res
 latest research for the NTS as a whole was completed in 1991 (DOE/NV 1991c). A bio
 opinion from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was completed in 1992 for NTS activ
 planned for 1992 through 1995 (FWS 1992). The desert tortoise is known to exist in
 southern portion of the NTS, but its abundance on the NTS is considered to be very
 (DOE/NV 1991c). The northern extent of its range is from Massachusetts Mountain th
 Control Point Hills and Mid Valley to Topopah Valley and west to the NTS boundary
 (DOE/NV 1991c).

Two bird species which could occur on or within the vicinity of NTS are federal
 endangered species. These are the American peregrine falcon and the bald eagle. T
 American peregrine falcon has been sighted on the NTS in the past but not recently
 (DOE/NV 1991c; ERDA 1976). Bald eagles may also occur on the NTS, but sightings ha
 been reported in recent literature (DOE/NV 1986b; EG&G 1993; ERDA 1976;
 Hunter et al. 1991). Six other bird species, all of which are Federal Candidate Ca
 species, are known to occur on or within the vicinity of NTS (DOE/NV 1991c; EG&G 19
 Recent surveys of Area 5 (which contains the proposed SNF Site) have not identified
 these species (DOE/NV 1986b; EG&G 1993, 1991, 1990, 1989). However, birds listed a
 common to Frenchman Flat include the golden eagle and loggerhead shrike (DOE/NV 198
 Tetrattech 1993).

There are two Federal Candidate Category 2 mammal species identified as potenti
 occurring in the vicinity of the NTS. Neither the spotted bat nor the pygmy rabbit
 observed during recent pre-activity surveys for the area (EG&G 1993; USAF 1993). T
 also not listed as mammals occurring in Frenchman Flat (DOE/NV 1986b; Tetrattech 199

There are no known fish species indigenous to the NTS. However, it is importan
 that the only known location of the Devils Hole pupfish, a federally listed endange
 approximately 39 kilometers (24 miles) southwest of the NTS. The decline of this s
 been attributed to low water levels caused by decreasing groundwater levels (ERDA 1
 USAF et al. 1991).

Pre-activity surveys for threatened and endangered species have recently been c
 for the Radioactive Waste Management Site located in Area 5 near the proposed SNF f
 The primary purpose of these surveys was to identify live tortoise, scat, burrows,
 Although these surveys have found few tortoise or their sign, each new activity on
 undergo pre-activity surveys for the desert tortoise (DOE/NV 1991c; EG&G 1993, 1991
 addition, these surveys look for other listed species. Recent surveys have not ide

listed or candidate species in the portion of Area 5 surrounding the Radioactive Waste Management Site, which is near the proposed SNF Site (EG&G 1993, 1991).

4.10 Noise

The major noise sources at the NTS occur primarily in developed operational areas and include various facilities, equipment and machines (e.g., cooling towers, transform pumps, boilers, steam vents, paging systems, construction and materials-handling equipment vehicles), aircraft operations, and testing. No NTS environmental noise survey data at the NTS boundary, away from most facilities, noise from most sources is barely different from background noise levels. Some disturbance of wildlife activities might occur as a result of operational activities and construction activities.

Existing NTS-related noise sources of importance to the public are those from transportation of people and materials to and from the NTS. These sources include buses, private vehicles, helicopters, and airplanes. In addition, some air cargo is transported via commercial air transport through the McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas attributed to the NTS operations.

The State of Nevada and Nye County have not established any regulations that specify acceptable community noise levels with the exception of prohibitions on nuisance noise.

During a normal week, about 3,300 employees travel to the NTS each day. Most employees commute using the contracted bus service and a small portion commute in government vehicles. Both government-owned and private trucks pick up and deliver materials at the NTS. Most of the private vehicles, buses, and trucks travel to and from the site each day via U.S. Route 95. The contribution of the NTS operations to traffic volumes along U.S. Route 95, especially during peak traffic periods, affects noise levels at residences along the route.

4.11 Traffic and Transportation

Traffic congestion is measured by level of service. Level of Service A represents free flow of traffic. Level of Service B is in the range of stable flow, but the presence of traffic stream begins to be noticeable. Level of Service C is in the range of stable flow marks the beginning of the range of flow in which the operation of individual users is significantly affected by interactions with others in the traffic stream. Level of Service D represents high-density but stable flow. Level of Service E represents operating conditions near the capacity level. Level of Service F is used to define forced or breakdown traffic. The calculated Level of Service are for discrete locations along a segment. Level of Service will most likely be worse in urban areas and better in rural areas along with the route.

The Region of Influence for the following analysis includes site roads and regional roads in Nye and Clark counties.

Vehicular access to the NTS is provided by U.S. Route 95 to the south, with off-ramp access to the northeast provided via Nevada State Route 375. Baseline traffic along segment access to the NTS contributes to differing service level conditions. Nevada State Route 95 are projected to remain at Level of Service A. No major improvements are presently scheduled for those segments providing immediate access to the NTS (NDOT 1993). Regional roads and local roads providing access to NTS are presented in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 respectively.

Future background traffic (defined as all future traffic not attributable to the NTS facilities) is projected to contribute to differing service-level conditions for the year 2001 was selected for analysis because that is when the impacts from the NTS facilities would be highest. All local and regional roads are projected to operate at Level of Service A.

The Level of Service was calculated using average daily traffic counts (NDOT 1993) standard parameters (ITE 1991; Rand McNally 1993; TRB 1985).

The public transit serves the heavily populated regions of Clark County. Contrary to the NTS. There is no public transportation system serving the NTS; however, approximately 70 buses a day transport employees to and from the site. The nearest major railroad, Union Pacific, located approximately 50 miles (80 kilometers) east of the NTS. A 9-mile (15-kilometer) standard-gauge railroad serves Area 25 of the NTS but does not connect to the Union Pacific (ERDA 1977). No navigable waterways within the Region of Influence are capable of accommodating waterborne transportation of material shipments to the NTS.

McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas provides jet air passenger and cargo service from both national and local carriers. It is outside the Region of Influence. Small

airports are located throughout the Region of Influence. Desert Rock Airstrip, the airport, is located near Mercury.

4.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety

Health impacts to the public from activities on the NTS are minimal as a result of administrative and design controls to minimize releases of pollutants to the environment to achieve compliance with permit requirements, e.g., air emissions and National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit requirements. The effectiveness of these controls is verified through the use of monitoring and inspections. Health impacts to the public during normal operations at the NTS via inhalation of air containing radioactive pollutants released to the atmosphere, immersion in this air, and ingestion of food by these pollutants. Risks to public health from other possible pathways such as contaminated soil are low relative to these pathways.

Health impacts to NTS workers during normal operations may include those from inhalation of the workplace atmosphere, consumption of potable water, direct exposure, and possible contact with hazardous materials associated with work assignments. The potential for health impacts varies from facility to facility and from worker to worker, and available information is insufficient to allow a meaningful estimation and summation of these impacts. However, workers are protected from hazards specific to the workplace through appropriate training, equipment, monitoring, and management controls. NTS workers are also protected by occupational standards that limit atmospheric and drinking water concentrations of hazardous chemicals and that also limit radiation exposure. Monitoring ensures that these standards are not exceeded. Additionally, DOE requirements (DOE Order 3790.1B) ensure that conditions in the workplace are as free as possible from recognized hazards that could likely to cause illness or physical harm. Therefore, worker health conditions at the NTS are expected to be substantially better than required by standards.

Health effects from radiation are presented here as the risk of fatal cancer. The ratio of the health risk estimator (risk of fatal cancer per rem of exposure) for the public is 5.0×10^{-4} for fatal cancers. The corresponding estimator for exposures to workers is 4.0×10^{-4} .

The DOE Nevada Field Office published a Waste Minimization and Pollution Prevention Awareness Plan in June 1991 to reduce the quantity and toxicity of hazardous, mixed, and radioactive wastes generated at DOE/NV facilities. The plan is designed to reduce pollutant releases to the environment and thus increase the protection of employees and the public. All DOE/NV contractors and NTS users that exceed the EPA criteria for small quantity generators are establishing their own waste minimization and pollution prevention programs that are implemented by the DOE/NV plan. Contractor programs ensure that minimization activities are in accordance with Federal, state, and local environmental regulations, and DOE Orders (DOE/NV 1993c).

Additional goals include the promotion and use of nonhazardous materials, establishing a baseline of waste generation data, calculations of annual reductions of wastes generated, implementation of recycling programs. Goals also include incorporation of waste minimization concepts and technologies in planning and design of new processes and facilities, and modification of existing facilities. A waste minimization task force composed of representative DOE/NV contractor and NTS user has been established to coordinate DOE/NV waste minimization and pollution awareness activities (DOE/NV 1993c).

4.12.1 Doses

4.12.1.1 Radiological Doses. Every individual is affected by natural and other

background radiation. The major sources of background radiation exposure to individuals in the vicinity of the NTS are shown in Figure 4.7-2. All annual doses to individuals from background radiation are expected to remain constant over time.

Releases of radionuclides to the environment from NTS operations provide another source of radiation exposure to people in the vicinity of the NTS. Table 4.7-2 summarizes radionuclides and quantities released in curies during baseline NTS operations. The committed doses to the public resulting from these releases are given in Table 4.7-4. Compared to those from natural background radiation, these doses are very small. The doses are less than 1 percent of the most restrictive standard given in DOE Order 5400.5.

Workers at the NTS receive the same dose as the general population from background radiation.

radiation but also receive an additional dose from working in the facilities. The average and maximally exposed workers due to operation in 1991 (assumed representat 1995 operations), were approximately 5 and 500 millirem, respectively; the total dose to workers was about 4 person-rem (DOE/NV 1992c). The maximum dose is well within the limit of 5,000 millirem per year specified in DOE Order 5480.11 and in 10 CFR 835.

4.12.1.2 Nonradiological Doses. Every individual is also affected by background

concentration of nonradiological pollutants. The maximum background concentrations of criteria pollutants which have been measured is provided in Table 4.7-5. The maximum DOE site contribution concentration was then computed, as discussed in Section 4.7.

4.12.2 Health Effects

4.12.2.1 Radiological. The fatal cancer risk to the maximally exposed member of the

public due to the radiological emissions from NTS baseline operations in 1995 would be 5.5×10^{-9} . The same risk estimator projects 2.6×10^{-6} excess fatal cancer to the 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the NTS. These values would be approximately $2.2 \times 10^{-1} \times 10^{-4}$, respectively, during the 40 years of SNF facility operations.

Because of the different age distribution of a working population, the health risks for workers are somewhat lower than for members of the general public. As a result of baseline operations at the NTS, these estimators predict a fatal cancer risk of 2.0×10^{-6} for a maximally exposed worker, and 1.6×10^{-3} excess fatal cancer among all workers. That by an average worker would be 2.0×10^{-6} . Over the 40-year operating life of the plant facility, and assuming a particular worker during this time, these values would be 6.4×10^{-2} , and 8.0×10^{-5} , respectively.

4.12.2.2 Nonradiological. As discussed in Section 4.7, the maximum existing DOE site

contribution of criteria nonradiological air pollutants were computed. In Table 4.7-5, the existing maximum concentration (which adds the maximum existing DOE site contribution and maximum background concentration) is presented. The total existing maximum concentration values represent the highest concentrations to which members of the public would be exposed. In every case where information was available, the highest concentration was less than the applicable health-based standard.

4.12.2.3 Health Effects Studies. The epidemiologic studies concerning the NTS have

been concentrated on the health effects in soldiers and children associated with nuclear weapons rather than on plant emissions (Beck and Krey 1983; Bross and Bross 1987; Caldwell et al. 1979; Lyon et al. 1979; Rallison et al. 1990; and others). The results regarding the observed incidence and deaths in exposed children are contradictory, with some studies reporting excess and others reporting no excess. The validity of the analytical methods used in some of these studies are subject to various opinions. For soldiers, the results for leukemia and polycythemia vera differed between two studies relating to nuclear tests but reanalyses showed leukemia, respiratory, and other cancers to be associated only with exposure to higher doses, e.g., more than 300 millirem for leukemia cases.

In March 1990, the Secretary of Energy announced that DOE would turn over responsibility for analytical epidemiologic research on long-term health effects on workers at DOE and surrounding communities to the Department of Health and Human Services and direct that worker health and exposure data be released. A Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of Health and Human Services was signed in January 1991. The Department of Health and Human Services is now conducting the ongoing health effects research program to develop a data base on workers, DOE has initiated an Epidemiologic Surveillance Program and a Health-Related Records Inventory.

4.13 Utilities and Energy

4.13.1 Water Consumption

There are 14 active wells which supply water to the NTS. Figure 4.8-2 in Section 4.8 shows the location of these wells. These 14 wells combined had a capacity of 387 liters (6,139 gallons per minute) in 1993 (DOE/NV 1993a). From 1988 to 1993, water use at the NTS varied from a high of 134 liters per second (2,125 gallons per minute) in 1989 to a low of 60 liters per second (949 gallons per minute) in 1993 (DOE/NV 1994c; Leppert 1993). Water usage projections to 1995 are unavailable; however, significant changes in the water level are not anticipated.

There are also a number of deactivated wells located on the NTS. These wells could provide additional water supply capacity if they were reactivated (Leppert 1993). It has been estimated that the activation of these wells could increase the available water supply by 85 liters (1,342 gallons per minute). Other methods to increase production of water could include increasing pump sizes or installing new wells (DOE/NV 1993a).

The proposed SNF site would be located in Area 5. There are four wells located in Area 5 of which supply potable water. These two wells have a capacity of 38 liters per second (595 gallons per minute) (DOE/NV 1994c; 1993b). A third well in the area is currently used to supply water for construction activities. The fourth well has been deactivated (DOE/NV 1993b). In 1993, Area 5 used approximately 12 liters per second (191 gallons per minute) of water, including the well used for construction purposes. Water usage is not expected to change substantially from 1993 to 1995 (DOE/NV 1994c; Leppert 1994).

4.13.2 Electrical Consumption

The NTS obtains electrical power from the Nevada Power Company and Valley Electric Association. Each company provides an independent 138 kilovolt transmission line to the NTS. The capacity of these transmission lines, with scheduled upgrades, is approximately 1,000 megavolt-amperes. The local utilities' 138 kilovolt transmission grids have adequate capacity within a 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the NTS to serve an additional 75 megavolt-amperes load. In addition, the local utilities' proposed expansion of their existing 230 kV systems would make capacity in excess of 200 megavolt-amperes available within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius (DOE/NV 1993a).

From 1989 to 1993, the annual consumption of electricity ranged from a high of 1,764,440 megawatt hours in 1989 to a low of 144,521.5 megawatt hours in 1993. The peak demand ranged from a high of 38.4 megavolt-amperes in 1989 to a low of 30.9 megavolt-amperes in 1993 (Leppert 1993; Thornton 1994). In 1995, the annual consumption of electricity is projected to be 1,764,440 megawatt hours, with a peak demand of 39.5 megavolt-amperes. The institutional energy management practices can regulate the peak demands of various NTS activities so that the maximum peak capacity is not exceeded. The predicted increase in overall electricity for 1995 is attributable to the increased requirements for the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project; the usage for the rest of the NTS is predicted to continue the trend (Thornton 1994).

The Frenchman Flat Substation, located in Area 5, has a capacity of 12.5 megavolt-amperes (Thornton 1994). A 34.5 kilovolt line from this substation feeds the loads at Area 5, the Tweezer facility, and the east side of the test areas used by LANL (DOE/NV 1993b). The peak demand on the substation was 5.2 megavolt-amperes. This demand is not anticipated to change substantially from 1993 to 1995 (Thornton 1994).

4.13.3 Fuel Consumption

The majority of the energy used at the NTS is provided by electricity, but diesel fuel and oil are used to provide heat in some facilities and backup power.

4.13.4 Wastewater Disposal

Currently, there are no wastewater disposal facilities in Area 5. Septic systems are used in some parts of the NTS for sanitary wastewater disposal. These septic systems discharge effluent to percolation/evaporation stabilization ponds. These ponds, however, are only used for disposal of wastewater not generated by any manufacturing processes.

4.14 Materials and Waste Management

The operations conducted at the NTS have resulted in generation of low-level radioactive waste, hazardous waste, mixed waste (radioactive and hazardous combined), and sanitary (nonhazardous, nonradioactive solid waste). In addition, the NTS stores mixed transuranic waste received from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This section discusses the treatment, storage, and disposal of waste at the NTS.

DOE currently operates two disposal facilities in Areas 3 and 5 at the NTS for radioactive waste generated by DOE defense facilities. The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site also serves as a interim storage area for LLNL transuranic wastes which are shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico for final disposal. The Area 3 also accepts mixed waste, which contains both low-level radioactive waste and hazardous waste only if the waste was generated on the NTS.

All hazardous wastes generated at the NTS are disposed of offsite at commercial facilities approved and permitted by the EPA. Hazardous wastes are temporarily stored at the NTS in full compliance with Federal, state, and local requirements.

Mixed waste disposal facilities are presently operating under interim status, pending completion of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permitting process. Operation of the low-level radioactive waste and mixed waste disposal sites and the transuranic waste storage site are supported by an environmental monitoring program which indicates waste is being safely contained in the near-surface environment in which it is disposed. The radioactive and mixed-waste disposal facilities are mainly shallow land burial. Figure 4.14-1 shows the location of the waste management facilities at the NTS (DOE 1992b).

The DOE Nevada Operations Office developed and implemented a Waste Minimization and Pollution Prevention Awareness Plan to reduce the quantity and toxicity of hazardous and radioactive wastes generated at the NTS. The plan is designed to reduce the potential pollutant releases to the environment. The objectives of the waste minimization and pollution prevention program are to:

- Identify processes generating waste streams
- Characterize and track each waste stream
- Identify, evaluate, and implement applicable waste minimization technologies
- Set numerical goals and schedules after the initial assessment of technologies and economic feasibility
- Establish an employee pollution prevention awareness and training program.

Additional goals include the promotion and use of nonhazardous materials, establishment of a baseline of waste generation data, calculations of annual reductions of wastes generated, implementation of recycling programs, and incorporation of waste minimization and pollution prevention technologies in planning and design of new processes and facilities and in upgrades of existing facilities.

The NTS manages the following waste categories: mixed transuranic waste, mixed radioactive waste, low-level waste, hazardous waste, sanitary waste, and nonhazardous waste. The NTS does not currently manage high-level waste or SNF. The NTS waste management activities include onsite treatment, onsite storage, onsite disposal, and preparation for appropriate offsite disposal. Additionally, the NTS uses and manages an onsite inventory of hazardous materials, including drums, boxes, and other containers.

Figure 4.14-1. Existing treatment, storage, and disposal units at the NTS. Some mixed waste is managed onsite, while some is shipped offsite for treatment, storage, and disposal.

Waste generation rates presented for each of the waste categories for the NTS for 1993 are shown in Table 4.14-1. Waste generation rates unless otherwise stated and are assumed representative of the 1993 baseline year. Table 4.14-1 presents the baseline waste management for 1995 for the waste categories currently managed at the NTS. In addition, the table presents available storage capacity and waste disposition.

4.14.1 Transuranic Waste

Transuranic waste from the Rocky Flats Plant and mixed-transuranic waste from LLNL are stored at the NTS at the transuranic waste storage cell located in Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. The transuranic waste has been characterized and repackaged, and mixed-transuranic waste has been placed in a RCRA-permitted storage area consisting of 55-gallon drums and steel boxes stored on wooden pallets fixed upon a curbed asphalt surface. Approximately 204,663 kilograms (451,201 pounds) with a total volume of 612 cubic meters.

cubic yards) of transuranic waste are stored at the NTS (DOE/NV 1994d). The NTS ex additional transuranic or mixed-transuranic wastes to be stored at this unit.

4.14.2 Mixed Low-Level Wastes

The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site contains Pit 3, which is an active low-level waste management unit. Pit 3 is the only active landfill cell within the Radioactive Waste Management Site for which a RCRA permit is being sought. Pit 3 i unlined, trapezoidal shaped pit occupying 3.42×10^4 square meters (8.46 acres) wit capacity of 1.29×10^5 cubic meters (1.69×10^5 cubic yards). The estimated dispos mixed low-level waste remaining at this facility is 9.03×10^4 cubic meters (1.19×10^5 cubic yards) (DOE/NV 1992b).

A RCRA permit is being sought for a proposed Mixed Waste Disposal Unit in the a immediately north of Pit 3 in the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. This M

Figure 4.14-2. Flow diagram for waste generation at the NTS. Figure 4.14-3. Flo

Waste type	Volume generated or disposed of (m3)	Available disposal space (m3)	Disposition
Transuranic waste and mixed-transuranic waste	0	8,296	Interim onsi storage
Low-level waste	10,845	438,359	Onsite dispo
Mixed low-level waste	0	90,240	Onsite dispo
Hazardous waste	252	91	90-day pad
Sanitary waste	1.1×10^4 b	c	Onsite dispo

a. Sources: DOE/NV (1994d, 1992c).

b. 1992 data.

c. Current disposal space adequate.

Waste Disposal Unit would occupy 2.1×10^5 square meters (52 acres) and consist of cells. The estimated disposal space for mixed waste in this proposed unit is appro 10^5 cubic meters (1.58×10^5 cubic yards) (DOE/NV 1992b).

In May 1990, mixed waste disposal operations ceased due to EPA issuance of the Disposal Restrictions of RCRA. Active mixed waste disposal operations will commenc interim status in Pit 3 upon completion of NEPA documentation and an approved Waste Analysis Plan (DOE/NV 1993c). No mixed low-level waste has been received, generate disposed of at the NTS since 1991 (DOE/NV 1994d, 1993c,f).

4.14.3 Low-Level Waste

Two low-level waste disposal facilities are in operation at the NTS: Area 5 Rad Waste Management Site and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (DOE/NV 1992). The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site receives low-level waste generated at and other DOE facilities and occupies approximately 2.9 square kilometers (730 acre). The waste is disposed of in large-diameter shafts, trenches, and shallow pits. The low-level waste disposed of at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site between 1991 was 3.96×10^5 cubic meters (5.8×10^5 cubic yards). Average annual low-level for this period was 1.3×10^4 cubic meters (1.7×10^4 cubic yards). During 1993, a $x 10^4$ cubic meters (1.4×10^4 cubic yards) of low-level waste was disposed of at th (DOE/NV 1994d).

4.14.4 Hazardous Waste

The primary facilities that generate or manage nonradioactive hazardous wastes or store nonradioactive hazardous materials are the Liquified Gaseous Fuels Spill T the Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site, the tunneling facilities and operations, and underground storage tanks.

The Liquified Gaseous Fuels Spill Test Facility is located on Frenchman Lake in This location provides a remote, environmentally acceptable setting for atmospheric

hazardous materials and toxic substances for investigative purposes. The facility tank farm, spill area, wind tunnel, and pads for conducting small volume spill test also includes a control building that houses data acquisition and recording instrument command and control computer, and support personnel. A total of 17 spill tests were at the facility in Area 5. Discharges from the test facility occur at a controlled measured volume of hazardous test fluid released on a surface especially prepared to meet test requirements. Personnel monitor and record operating data, close-in and downwind meteorological data, and downwind gaseous concentration levels. Spills involving hazardous acid were conducted in 1991 and the results monitored (DOE/NV 1992c).

The Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site consists of an impervious concrete pad with a 6-inch curb to contain spillage and to protect the pad from precipitation runoff; a separate curbed area is provided for noncompatible wastes. A roof protects from rain and weathering effects; there is also a fire detection system (DOE/NV 1992). A separate operating entity at NTS is a potential satellite accumulation area for hazardous waste. A satellite accumulation area is allowed to accumulate up to 208.2 liters (55 gallons) of waste or 0.95 liter (1 quart) of acutely hazardous waste. Within 3 days of reaching quantities, the waste is transferred to the Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site. If unknown or if an offsite treatment, storage and disposal facility wishes to confirm a waste stream, samples are collected for characterization (DOE/NV 1992d).

When the waste containers are transferred to the Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site, they are checked for proper labeling and an accumulation date is assigned to each container. The EPA-permitted treatment, storage, and disposal facility is contacted prior to the 90-day limit to collect and remove the accumulated wastes from the NTS (DOE/NV 1992d).

Nuclear devices were tested in horizontal tunnels mined into Rainier Mesa at the NTS. Tests were conducted in zeolitized volcanic tuffs, which act as a perching layer for infiltrating from the mesa surface. During normal tunneling operations, fractures in the tuff are intercepted creating artificial springs in the tunnels. Periodically, the water is intercepted creating artificial springs in the tunnels. Periodically, the radionuclides from previous underground nuclear tests are drained out of the tunnels into evaporation ponds or washes. Tunneling and related operations also may have released compounds and heavy metals to the tunnel effluent. Presently, sampling of the tunnel effluent is being conducted to characterize the effluent. The objectives of the project include determining the types and concentrations of radionuclides, metals, and organic compounds in the effluent from U12t, U12e, and U12n tunnels. Variations of discharge volumes and chemical contamination are also being examined (DOE/NV 1992c).

There is a site-wide inventory of 115 underground storage tanks at the NTS. There are 24 underground storage tanks containing petroleum products that were removed, closed, or temporarily taken out of service in 1991 in accordance with state statutes as well as underground storage tanks which were temporarily closed in 1991 while awaiting upgrade (DOE/NV 1992c).

As part of the 1991 underground storage tank activities, all tanks to be upgraded had samples taken from the tank ends to identify any soil contamination prior to reconstruction. To date, overfill releases from underground storage tanks located at 12, and 23 gasoline stations were observed and necessitated additional soil sampling. Underground storage tanks that were planned to be upgraded (except a tank containing hazardous material) were also pressure tested for leaks. All tanks passed the test limit of 0.2 gallon per hour (DOE/NV 1992c).

Numerous underground storage tanks have been identified throughout the site as "Undetermined Activity Status." The contents of some of these underground storage tanks are classified as "H?" which indicates that the contents are presumed to be hazardous.

The types of possible wastes found on the surface of the NTS include radionuclide compounds, metals, hydrocarbons, and residues from plastic, epoxy, and drilling mud. Petroleum production related and therefore considered hazardous under Subtitle C of RCRA. A wide variety of surface facilities, such as injection wells, leach fields, sumps, and facilities, tunnel ponds and muck piles, and storage tanks, may have contaminated the surface and the shallow unsaturated zone of the NTS. Because of the great depths to ground water in the arid climate, it is assumed that the potential for mobilization of surface and subsurface contamination is minimal. However, contaminants entering carbonate bedrock Rainier Mesa tunnel ponds, contaminated wastes injected into deep wells, and wastes entering subsurface craters have the potential to reach the regional water table. Pilo is being installed during 1992 to support the RCRA permitting process (DOE/NV 1992c).

Annual generation or disposal of hazardous waste at the NTS was approximately 2,329.6 cubic yards during 1993. Available storage space on the 90-day pad was approximately 91 cubic meters (119 cubic yards) (DOE/NV 1994d).

4.14.5 Sanitary Waste

Sanitary wastes are expected to be generated at the current rates for several years in the future, then decline assuming the present moratorium on underground weapons testing. Sanitary wastes are disposed of in septic tanks/leach fields, sumps, or in ponds, and wastes are disposed of in landfills at various locations on the site. The NTS currently has 13 sewage discharge permits: Area 2, Area 6 (5), Area 22, Area 23, Area 25 (4), and (DOE/NV 1993c). Approximately 9.1×10^3 cubic meters (11,902 cubic yards) of sanitary wastes were generated at the NTS during 1991 and 1.1×10^4 cubic meters (14,388 cubic yards) in 1992 (DOE/NV 1993c). Sufficient disposal space is available at the NTS for current

4.14.6 Hazardous Materials

Polychlorinated biphenyls, pesticides, and asbestos have been or currently are at the NTS. These wastes and materials are managed in addition to the approximately 9 kilograms (100 tons) of RCRA-regulated nonradioactive hazardous wastes generated at the NTS, the approximately 218,000 kilograms (240 tons) of non-RCRA-regulated hazardous waste generated annually at the NTS, and the wastes and materials managed at the facility discussed previously.

By the end of 1991, all known polychlorinated biphenyl transformers and other equipment had been either reclassified or appropriately disposed of, and three polychlorinated biphenyl-contaminated transformers and regulators were under the 90-day period for reclassification. Successful reclassification of these three polychlorinated biphenyl transformers will complete the reclassification or disposal of all known polychlorinated and polychlorinated biphenyl contaminated transformers at the NTS (DOE/NV 1992c).

No unusual environmental activities relating to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act occurred in 1991 at the NTS. Pesticides are stored in an approved facility located in Area 23. Pesticide usage includes insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides. Insecticides are applied twice a month at the food service areas, herbicides are applied once a year, and all other pesticides are applied on an as-requested basis. General-use pesticides are used for most applications, although restricted-use herbicides and rodenticides are used on occasion (DOE/NV 1992c).

The Area 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Facility is a thermal treatment unit for conventional explosives. Explosives detonated at the facility include Defense Materiel Agency materials and waste explosives from Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co., Inc. operations, the Wackenhut Firing Range (used by the NTS security force), and the national laboratories. No radioactive or radioactive-contaminated materials are detonated at the Area 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit.

The unit encompasses approximately 0.08 square kilometer (20 acres) of land located between Frenchman Flat and Yucca Flat, with four graded areas. Only one of these areas is used for detonation. Magazines are used to store detonation materials and explosives. Approximately 80 to 90 percent of the explosives detonated at the Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit during the past 10 to 12 years have been water-gel explosives; the primary waste was gelatin-based dynamite. Other explosives detonated include small amounts of trinitrotoluene (TNT), RDX (hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazine) personnel armor ammunition (from past military operations at NTS), and black powder (DOE/NV 1992c).

4.14.7 Non-hazardous Waste

Solid wastes are regulated through State of Nevada regulations NAC 444 and Federal regulations 40 CFR 241, 257, and 258. Solid wastes generated include used petroleum, uncontaminated tunnel muck, drilling fluids, cement and grout wastes, construction sludge from wastewater lagoons, septic tank and chemical toilet sludge, and animal waste. The NTS has several sanitary landfills and construction landfills in operation; several have been closed or abandoned (DOE 1990).

Some wastes not regulated under RCRA will be stored at the Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site. These nonregulated wastes are shipped offsite along with the RCRA waste to a treatment, storage, and disposal facility. Only non-RCRA hazardous wastes that are disposed of at the NTS landfill will be stored at the Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site offsite shipment. Any drum containing nonregulated wastes will carry a label so that

contents of the drum will be entered on a space provided on the label. Wastes in it include but are not limited to epoxies, photochemicals, spent antifreeze, and oils that do not carry EPA codes.

Recycling of paper, metals, glass, plastics, and cardboard has already resulted decrease in quantities of waste and is expected to result in significant decreases years (DOE/NV 1992b).

5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

5.1 Overview

This chapter describes the potential environmental consequences from the construction and operation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) facilities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) under Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives. Potential environmental consequences are assessed to the extent necessary to support a programmatic decision concerning the proposed SNF facilities. More detailed considerations of potential environmental consequences would be performed as necessary prior to initiating construction or operation of the

5.2 Land Use

5.2.1 Centralization Alternative

Construction and operation of SNF facilities under this alternative would require disturbance of approximately 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer), including buffer area. The proposed SNF site for program activities would be consistent with existing nearby land use policies and plans. The current land use designations for this area are L Facility Management and Buffer/Reserved Area. Use of this area for program activities also be consistent with future land use plans (DOE/NV 1993a).

Use of the proposed site for the construction and operation of SNF facilities could be irreversible or irretrievable land use impacts in those areas currently under Buffer. However, the placement of SNF facilities at this location would be consistent with draft future land use plan, which designates this portion of Area 5 as a Non-Nuclear (DOE/NV 1993a). Therefore, no mitigation measures are proposed.

5.2.2 Regionalization Alternative

As under the Centralization Alternative, use of the proposed site for construction and operation of SNF facilities under the Regionalization Alternative would be consistent with existing land uses and with all applicable land use policies and plans. Impacts would be of a different character to those described for the Centralization Alternative, except that there would be reduced land requirements under this alternative.

5.3 Socioeconomics

Socioeconomics as addressed in this Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement encompasses the interaction of economic, demographic, and social conditions. Economic consequences (e.g., capital requirements to support SNF research and development activities, affect business activities, market structures, procurement methods, and dissemination of commodities within and between regions. Demographic consequences (e.g., in-migration of specialized human resources to support the SNF Management Program) affect size, distribution, and composition of the population, labor force, and the housing market in the region. Social consequences (e.g., capacity modifications of public infrastructure to support SNF facilities) affect the overall quality of life enjoyed by the residents of a community (Murdock and Leach). These conditions are potentially affected either directly or indirectly by actions of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) SNF Management Program.

The importance of actions is relative to the affected region. A region can be defined as a dynamic socioeconomic system, where physical and human resources, technology, social and economic institutions, and natural resources interrelate to create new products, processes, and services.

services to meet consumer demands. The measure of a region's ability to support this depends on its ability to respond to changing economic, demographic, and social conditions.

Potential socioeconomic effects are addressed only to the extent that they are with the natural or physical environment. Direct effects include those impacts that are the action and occur at the same time and place. Indirect effects include those impacts by the action that are later in time or farther removed in distance but still are reasonably foreseeable (i.e., offsite) (CFR 1993e). Direct and indirect effects are presented from 1995 through 2005, and qualitatively through 2035.

Socioeconomic effects are quantified for regional economic activity and potential socioeconomic impacts to individual communities, such as public infrastructure housing, are discussed qualitatively to address programmatic issues.

Economic impact projections include direct and indirect jobs. Direct jobs are needed to construct or support the operation of the SNF management complex at the N. Indirect jobs are created throughout the regional economy within the Region of Influence as a result of procurement for materials, services, and other commodities, and induced economic consumer spending. These direct and indirect impacts reflect both construction and phase demands, which may occur concurrently or independently throughout the project period. Indirect jobs were projected using parameters from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Input-Output Modeling System.

Two scenarios were analyzed to account for two potential distributions of the construction efforts. The construction effort consists of fabricating various structures, its own construction labor need and a duration of either three or five years. The Average Scenario averages the labor requirements of a structure for the duration of construction. The total construction effort for all structures, in labor years, is the same for both scenarios. Therefore, for structures with a three year construction duration, the Peak Scenario has labor needs for the first two years and then a substantial reduction for the third year. The Average Scenario has a constant labor requirement for the three years. Likewise, for structures with a five year construction duration, the Peak Scenario has a high labor need for the first two years, then a lower need for the remaining three years, while the Average Scenario has a constant requirement for all five years. Because the total construction labor year requirement is the same for both scenarios, the Average Scenario will have a lower requirement than the Peak Scenario in the first two years, then will have a higher requirement in the remaining construction years.

Regional population projections reflect the potential change in population resulting from an increase in regional economic activity. Detailed assumptions regarding immigration with the SNF Management Program were not developed, given the programmatic scope of analysis. Potential immigration effects resulting from direct job creation are presented qualitatively where appropriate.

5.3.1 Centralization Alternative

The upper and lower bounds of construction and operation-related jobs generated at the facilities for both scenarios under the Centralization Alternative from 1995 to 2005 are shown in Figure 5.3-1 and tabulated in Table 5.3-1. In its initial phase, the Centralization Alternative may create 54 jobs (25 direct, 29 indirect) over a 5-year period beginning in 1995 through the year 1999 to support project planning, engineering design, personnel operations training, and environmental permitting and compliance. Construction is expected to begin in year 2000, requiring a total of 4,351 direct jobs (5,041 indirect jobs). In that year, the Peak Scenario requires 1,587 construction laborers, while the Average Scenario needs 1,346. There is no operational labor required for this time period. In 2002, after two years of construction, the Peak Scenario decreases its construction labor requirements to 92 while the Average Scenario maintains its 1,346 laborers. Additionally, 300 operational jobs are needed, raising the total of SNF workers to 1,228 for the Peak Scenario and 1,646 for the Average Scenario. By 2003, the buildings with three year construction durations have been completed; therefore, both the Peak and Average Scenario construction labor requirements decline to 125 and 157, respectively. Operation labor requirements remain at 300 workers. Total SNF labor requirements are 425 workers for the Peak Scenario and 457 for the Average Scenario. In 2004, construction labor needs for both scenarios remains at their previous levels but operational personnel increase. Total SNF labor requirements are 612 workers in the Peak Scenario and 644 workers in the Average Scenario. By 2005, all construction has been completed and operational personnel have increased to the full staff labor requirement of 800 workers.

The Peak Scenario reaches its maximum construction labor with 1,587 direct jobs

total jobs created) over a 2-year period from years 2000 through 2001. The Average would have its maximum construction labor with 1,346 direct jobs (2,906 total jobs).
 Figure 5.3-1. Total employment effects, NTS centralization alternative. Table 5.3

Years	Time period	1995 - 1999	2000, 2001	2002	2003	2004	2005 +
Operations							
Direct jobs	25	0		300	300	487	800
Indirect jobs	29	0		344	344	559	918
Total jobs	54	0		644	644	1,046	1,718
Construction							
Direct jobs							
Peak	0	1,587		928	125	125	0
Average	0	1,346		1,346	157	157	0
Indirect jobs							
Peak	0	1,839		1,076	145	145	0
Average	0	1,560		1,560	182	182	0
Total jobs							
Peak	0	3,426		2,004	270	270	0
Average	0	2,906		2,906	339	339	0
Total							
Direct jobs							
Peak	25	1,587		1,228	425	612	800
Average	25	1,346		1,646	457	644	800
Indirect jobs							
Peak	29	1,839		1,420	489	704	918
Average	29	1,560		1,904	526	741	918
Total jobs							
Peak	54	3,426		2,648	914	1,316	1,718
Average	54	2,906		3,550	983	1,385	1,718
Population Change							
Peak	91	5,664		(1,084)	(2,379)	547	540
Average	91	4,804		896	(3,522)	547	447

3-year period from years 2000 through 2002. Operation requirements would be minor when engineering and administrative services are assumed to be in demand to accommodate project requirements. Ancillary SNF complex operations, such as utilities and reprocessing development activities, are assumed to begin in 2004, taper off into 2005, and remain constant through 2035. The maximum total SNF management direct jobs under either construction scenario would occur in 2002 with 1,346 construction jobs for the Average and 300 operation jobs. Implementation of the Centralization Alternative would increase the projected average annual rate of growth rate for both regional population and employment 1995 through 2005 by 0.02 percent.

Regional businesses and the work force would benefit from increased competition for contract procurement and jobs. Most of this activity is anticipated to be captured in Clark County, with a smaller share occurring in Nye County. However, the impact to the regional economy represents only a portion of the total economic activity generated by the Centralization Alternative. For instance, purchases of specialized materials and technology acquisition occur even outside the State of Nevada. It has been estimated that about 50 percent of NTS expenditures occur within the State of Nevada (Nye County Board of Commissioners). This leakage would result in the associated economic benefits accruing outside of the regional economy.

Most of the population change in the Region of Influence above the baseline for the project would be due to in-migration of labor and households to support SNF management activity. It is likely that most of the SNF operation work force would be supplied by SNF personnel relocating from DOE sites where SNF inventories were stored before shipment to the project. They are familiar with the processes, technologies, and research. Other demands for jobs not related to SNF management would be accommodated by the regional labor market. The regional labor market could accommodate most of the construction requirements, with the exception of very specialized tasks. Construction employment in Clark County is twice the national average. As the population continues to grow, demand on public infrastructure grows as well. These projects will result in continued growth in construction activity (Las Vegas Review Journal et al. 1993).

To assess potential population and housing impacts, an in-migration rate per job was estimated using a ratio between projected employment and population figures (Table

This ratio was applied to the number of total (direct and indirect) jobs created by management activities at the NTS, resulting in the total estimated number of person into the Region of Influence per job created (Table 5.3-1).

With initial operation in 1995 under the both scenarios (Table 5.3-1) a total o could migrate into the Region of Influence. The number of persons coming in would largest for the years 2000 through 2001, (5,664 in-migrants for the Peak Scenario a the Average Scenario) the period when construction starts. In the final phases of people would migrate out of the Region of Influence. However, the number of in-mig would increase in the years 2004 and 2005, as more of the SNF management operations After 2005, in-migration due to SNF management activities would cease, since SNF ma activities would not create any more jobs.

Construction of the SNF complex could result in a temporary increase in housing Nye County. The demand for both the rental market and short-term lodging could inc The demands on housing would fluctuate over time, based on the various construction peak employment levels, the level of local sub-contracting, and any decision by a c develop temporary housing arrangements near the job site. Within Nye County, the c of Tonopah and Beatty would probably experience the most impacts related to housing Both communities support fairly large inventories of temporary housing. While such are favorable for local lodging operators and landlords, they could compete with to demands (Nye County Board of Commissioners 1992).

Overall socioeconomic impacts to Clark County could be absorbed within the proj expansion of the county's economy, local infrastructure, public service, and real e development.

5.3.2 Regionalization Alternative

Socioeconomic impacts resulting from the Regionalization Alternative are expect similar to those for the Centralization Alternative. The construction and operatio each alternative would be the same; therefore, the same issues identified for the C Alternative would apply. Labor requirements might be reduced slightly for the Regi Alternative. Although the volume of SNF stored would be less for the Regionalizati Alternative, an economy of scale occurs for both alternatives, so that differences capital between the two alternatives would be minimized.

5.3.3 Mitigation Measures

5.3.3.1 Coordination with Local Jurisdictions. To reduce construction- and operation-

related impacts, possible coordination with local communities could address potenti from increased labor and capital requirements. The knowledge of the extent and eff growth due to SNF management activities could greatly enhance the ability of affect jurisdictions to plan effectively. Effective planning would address changes in lev housing, infrastructure, utilities, transportation, and public services and finance

5.3.3.2 Enhance Labor Force Availability. To alleviate potential impacts associated with

the in-migration of labor, local labor force availability could be increased throug employment training and referral systems currently provided by the NTS. The goal o systems would be to reduce the potential for in-migration of labor to support SNF m activities.

5.4 Cultural Resources

5.4.1 Centralization Alternative

Under the Centralization Alternative, the construction of SNF facilities is not require the disturbance of more than 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) on the NTS. known historical, archeological, paleontological, or Native American traditional si proposed area or its vicinity. Therefore, no impacts to cultural resources are exp

ground disturbance, noise, or air emissions during construction and operation of the facilities. Consultation with the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) project implementation is required under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. The SHPO may recommend that further archaeological studies be conducted throughout the construction area to verify that there are no archaeological sites or disturbance.

5.4.2 Regionalization Alternative

Under the Regionalization Alternative, the location of the SNF facilities would be the same but could be reduced in area. As with the Centralization Alternative, impacts are anticipated.

5.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources

5.5.1 Centralization Alternative

The proposed SNF facilities under the Centralization Alternative, when fully constructed and under operation, would consist of a series of industrial buildings set within a site on the proposed 90-acre (0.36 square-kilometer) site. The facility would have the industrial buildings ranging in height from one to three stories. The maximum height of buildings contained within the site would not exceed 42 feet (13 meters) above ground. The proposed SNF site is located within a valley over 10 miles (16 kilometers) from U.S. Route 95, separated by intervening hills and mountains, including Red Mountain, the Spotted R. Specter Range, Hampel Hill and Skull Mountain. The site would not be visible from outside the NTS or the Nellis Air Force Base Bombing and Gunnery Range. Therefore, impacts to aesthetics and scenic resources are not anticipated.

5.5.2 Regionalization Alternative

Under the Regionalization Alternative, proposed SNF facilities could be reduced in size and intensity of operations from the Centralization Alternative. Environmental effects on aesthetics and scenic resources could also be less than that of the Centralization Alternative.

5.6 Geologic Resources

This section describes any incremental or additional impacts on geology and geologic resources that would result from the construction and operation of the new facility with the storage of SNF at the NTS. Seismic and volcanic hazards are discussed in Section 5.6.2.

5.6.1 Centralization Alternative

As discussed in Section 4.6.2, precious metal deposits may exist in certain igneous and volcanic or sedimentary rocks at the NTS. Figure 4.6-5 shows the proposed SNF facility in relation to these types of geologic terranes as well as to the locations of mining districts. Although the proposed SNF facilities would not be located within a mining district, they are situated on Tertiary volcanic or sedimentary rocks near volcanic or intrusive centers. The geologic terrane where small to medium-size precious metal deposits could be developed. However, because the NTS would likely remain closed to mining operations, the impacts on precious metal deposits that might exist at the NTS would not change if the proposed facility were to be sited there.

In addition, destruction of unique geologic features are not expected to occur from construction and operation of a new SNF storage facility nor are mass movement and sediment runoff from land disturbances.

5.6.2 Regionalization Alternative

Impacts to geology and geological resources under the Regionalization Alternative generally be as described for the Centralization Alternative.

5.7 Air Resources

Both radiological and nonradiological air emissions impacts from the proposed S are discussed in this section.

5.7.1 Centralization Alternative

5.7.1.1 Emissions.

5.7.1.1.1 Radiological Emissions-There would be no radiological emissions from

construction of the proposed SNF facilities.

The total annual airborne radionuclide releases from operation of the proposed SNF facilities are provided in Table 5.7-1.

5.7.1.1.2 Nonradiological Emissions-During construction of the proposed SNF

facilities, short-term emissions, such as fugitive dust and heavy equipment exhaust would be temporary and only affect receptors close to construction areas.

Fugitive dust

emissions would be minimized by curtailing soil-disturbing activities during high w operation of the proposed SNF facilities, criteria and hazardous air pollutants wou The total annual emissions from all modules associated with the proposed SNF facili listed in Table 5.7-2.

5.7.1.2 Air Quality.

5.7.1.2.1 Radiological-The GENII environmental transport and dose assessment

model (PNL 1988) was used with 1990 meteorological data from Desert Rock Army Airfi determine effective dose equivalents from the radiological emissions listed in Tabl 7-1. A

population of 15,100 persons was estimated to be within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of SNF facilities. It was also assumed that 1995 operations at the NTS would result i baseline radiological emissions as the 1992 operations at the NTS. The most recent comprehensive radiological emissions report at the NTS was based on 1992 operations

Table 5.7-1. Annual airborne radionuclide emission source terms for proposed NTS SNF facility operational phase.

Isotope	Release rate (Ci/yr) ^{b,c}
Tritium	7.9×10^{-1}
Carbon-14	1.2×10^0
Manganese-54	2.2×10^{-8}
Cobalt-60	4.2×10^{-8}
Krypton-85	1.0×10^4
Strontium-90	3.3×10^{-6}
Yttrium-90	2.0×10^{-6}
Ruthenium-106	1.1×10^{-5}
Antimony-125	3.4×10^{-4}
Iodine-129	1.0×10^{-1}
Cesium-134	6.2×10^{-8}
Cesium-137	4.8×10^{-5}

a. Source: Johnson (1994).

b. 2.0×10^{-6} Ci/yr of Barium-137m, from Wet Storage, is not in GENII. Barium-137m, with a half-life of 2.55 min, decays to Barium-137, which is stable.

c. 7.5×10^{-8} Ci/yr of Thallium-208, from Wet Storage, is not in GENII. Thallium-208, with a half-life of 3.10 min, decays to Lead-208, which is stable.

Table 5.7-2. Total annual nonradioactive emissions for the SNF storage facility at

Criteria pollutants	Release rate (kg/yr)
Carbon monoxide	1.7×10^3
Particulate matter (PM ₁₀) ^b	1.0×10^{-3}
Nitrogen oxides	5.5×10^3
Sulfur dioxide	1.3×10^2
Lead	5.0×10^{-9}

Hazardous air pollutants	Release rate (kg/yr)
Selenium compounds	1.6×10^{-4}
Mercury compounds	5.1×10^{-1}
Chlorine	3.5×10^3
Hydrogen fluoride	1.6×10^1
Cadmium compounds	2.9×10^{-7}
Cobalt, chrome, antimony, and nickel compounds	2.0×10^{-10}

a. Source: Johnson (1994).

b. All suspended particulate matter is assumed to be PM₁₀.

Table 5.7-3 summarizes the sum of the baseline and the incremental contribution proposed SNF facilities to the effective dose equivalents of the maximum site bound and, collectively, to the population within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of the proposed SNF facilities. These combined effective dose equivalents for operation of the proposed SNF facilities are less than 1 percent of the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants standard and less than 1 percent of the natural background radiation.

5.7.1.2.2 Nonradiological-The Industrial Source Complex Short Term air

dispersion model (EPA 1992) was used with 1990 meteorological data from Desert Rock Airfield to determine pollutant concentrations resulting from the Centralization Alternative nonradiological emissions listed in Table 5.

5.7-2. A maximum emissions baseline was established to characterize conditions that could result if all sources operated to the maximum by permit conditions. It was also assumed that 1995 operations at the NTS would result in the same baseline nonradiological emissions as the 1990 operations at the NTS. The most comprehensive nonradiological emissions report at the NTS was based on 1990 operational results of modeling are in Table 5.7-4, where a comparison of the existing DOE site concentration is compared to the existing DOE site contribution concentration plus SNF contribution. The increases in pollutant concentrations from operation of the SNF facilities would be negligible in magnitude. The concentrations of pollutants with the inclusion of the proposed SNF facilities would remain within regulatory guidelines.

The calculated atmospheric maximum concentrations at the site boundary and off-site proposed SNF facilities are presented in Table 5.7-5. The maximum concentrations at the boundary reflect exposure to a maximally exposed individual, whereas the maximum on-site concentrations reflect exposure to a worker.

5.7.2 Regionalization Alternative

As with the Centralization Alternative, construction of the proposed SNF facilities under the Regionalization Alternative would not result in radiological air emissions, but could result in minor, temporary emissions of fugitive dust. These emissions could be slightly less than the Centralization Alternative, since the extent of construction disturbance would

Table 5.7-3. Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from proposed SNF facility plus 1995 baseline operations at NTS.

	Maximally exposed individual doseb	Collective dose to population within 80 km of NTS sources
Dose	1.3×10^{-1} mrem per yearc	8.7×10^{-2} person-remd
NESHAP standard	10 mrem per year	--
Percentage of NESHAP standard	1.3	--
Natural background dose	278 mrem per year	4190 person-rem per year
Percentage of natural background dose	4.7×10^{-2}	2.1×10^{-3}

- a. Effective dose equivalents computed using GENII (PNL 1988).
- b. The maximum boundary dose is to the hypothetical individual who remains in the continuously during the year at the NTS boundary.
- c. The SNF facility contributes 1.2×10^{-1} millirem to this dose.
- d. The SNF facility contributes 8.2×10^{-2} person-rem to this dose.

Table 5.7-4. Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable for proposed SNF facility plus current operations.

Criteria pollutant	Averaging time	Most stringent regulation or guideline (-g/m3)	Maximum background concentration (-g/m3)	Total existing maximum concentration (-g/m3)	Total maximum concentration (-g/m3)
Carbon dioxide	8-hour	10,000	2,290	2,290	2290.
	1-hour	40,000	2,748	2,748b	2754.
Nitrogen dioxide	Annual	100	a	b	0.20
Lead	Calendar quarter	1.5	a	b	3.7 x
Particulate matter (PM10)c	Annual	50	a	0.43	0.43
	24-hour	150	78.3	84.9	84.9
Sulfur dioxide	Annual	80	a	1.1	1.1
	24-hour	365	39.3	55.2	55.2
	3-hour	1,300	65.4	170.3	170.3
Hazardous air pollutants					
Selenium	8-hour	4.8	a	b	2.18
Mercury compounds	8-hour	0.2	a	b	2.18
Chlorine compounds	8-hour	71.4	a	b	1.52
Hydrogen fluoride	8-hour	59.5	a	b	3.70
Cadmium compounds	8-hour	1.2	a	b	1.81
Cobalt, chromium, antimony, and nickel compoundsg	8-hour	1.2	a	b	5.5 x

- a. Not measured.
- b. No sources indicated.
- c. All suspended particulate matter is assumed to be PM10.
- d. Criteria pollutant regulations are National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Hazardous pollutant regulations are Nevada Ambient Air Quality Standards.

e. Includes background concentration plus existing DOE facilities impact concentration baseline concentration.

f. Includes background concentration plus existing DOE facilities impact concentration facilities impact concentration.

g. Individual emission rates were not specified for each of cobalt, chrome, antimony compounds. Only a total emission rate for all four was provided. Therefore, the maximum standard for any of the four compounds, 1.2 -g/m³ for cobalt, was used.

Table 5.7-5. Calculated annual maximum concentrations for hazardous air pollutants onsite and offsite.

Hazardous air pollutant	Maximum annual average concentration onsite (-g/m ³)	Maximum annual average concentration offsite
Selenium compounds	6.03 x 10 ⁻⁸	1.20 x 10 ⁻⁸
Mercury compounds	6.03 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.20 x 10 ⁻⁴
Chlorine compounds	4.2 x 10 ⁻¹	8 x 10 ⁻²
Hydrogen fluoride	1.02 x 10 ⁻³	2.04 x 10 ⁻⁴
Cadmium compounds	5.01 x 10 ⁻¹⁰	1.0 x 10 ⁻¹⁰
Cobalt, chromium, antimony and nickel compounds	1.50 x 10 ⁻¹⁰	3.00 x 10 ⁻¹¹
Lead	1.21 x 10 ⁻¹¹	2.40 x 10 ⁻¹²

a. All impacts from proposed source only. No hazardous air pollutant emissions in available for existing sources.

The same types of radiological and nonradiological air emissions from operation proposed SNF facilities would occur under the Regionalization Alternative as under Centralization Alternative. However, the magnitudes could be lower. As with the Centralization Alternative, the combined dose equivalents from the operation of the proposed SNF facilities would be less than 1 percent of the NESHAP and less than 1 percent of the natural background radiation. The concentrations of non-radiological air emissions from the operation proposed SNF facilities under this alternative would remain within all applicable regulatory guidelines (EPA 1992; PNL 1988).

5.8 Water Resources

Construction and operation of the SNF modules could affect surface and groundwater resources. Potential environmental impacts to surface water and groundwater resources during construction include depletion of groundwater supplies, floodplain encroachment, and water sedimentation from erosion runoff occurring after land clearing. Potential operational impacts could include depletion of groundwater supplies and diminished surface water and/or groundwater quality resulting from wastewater discharges from normal operations.

5.8.1 Centralization Alternative

Separate discussions are provided for surface water quantity, surface water quality, groundwater quantity and groundwater quality.

5.8.1.1 Surface Water Quantity. Existing activities on the NTS derive their water supply

from groundwater sources, and the same would be true for construction and operation proposed SNF facilities. Therefore, construction and operation of the proposed SNF facilities would have no impact on surface water availability in the region. In addition, under operating conditions, there would be no wastewater discharges to Area 5 watercourse that could affect surface water flow characteristics.

Stormwater runoff associated with construction and operation of the proposed SNF facilities is expected to have a negligible impact on surface water quantity. During construction, stormwater management techniques would be employed to attenuate runoff. The impact of stormwater runoff on the ephemeral character of Area 5 watercourses during operation would be minimal.

SNF facilities is also expected to be negligible. A site drainage and stormwater management system consisting of a perimeter drainage ditches and a retention pond would be included of the SNF facilities (Johnson 1994). This system would provide for control of runoff erosion, which otherwise could affect Area 5 watercourses or the SNF facilities.

As discussed in Section 4.8.1, analyses of available data indicate that the area by the proposed SNF facility may lie in flood Zone X (100-year flood zone with depths 1 foot [0.30 meter]) and/or Zone AO (100-year flood zone with depths between 1 and [0.30 and 0.9 meter]) associated with the Halfpint Alluvial Fan. Accordingly, the facility would have to be located and constructed to minimize floodplain impacts and to avoid floodplains to the maximum extent possible, as required by Executive Order 11988 (Floodplain Management) and DOE Orders. Site-specific surveys would be performed to determine flooding elevations more accurately.

5.8.1.2 Surface Water Quality. The proposed SNF facility in the northeast portion of

Area 5 is not served by the NTS sanitary sewer system. A number of NTS facilities contained sanitary sewer systems. The nearby Radioactive Waste Management Site does own septic tank and leach field system to dispose of sanitary wastewater (DOE/NV 1994). The proposed SNF facilities would have a sanitary sewer system comprised of a sewage treatment facility equipped with a sewage treatment and ejection pump system with a programmable controller and software. A pressurized sanitary sewer line would be provided to the lagoon at the facility (Johnson 1994). This system would be adequate to accommodate estimated 9,863 gallons (37,335 liters) per day of sanitary wastewater generated by the facilities and personnel. This system would be operated in accordance with State of Nevada permitting requirements.

The proposed SNF facilities are designed to generate no liquid releases of waste hazardous chemicals or radiological characteristics related to SNF management operations. These facilities would be constructed using state-of-the-art technologies including containment, and leak detection and water balance monitoring equipment. The normal operation of the proposed SNF facilities is not expected to affect the quality of air on or near the NTS.

During construction, 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) would be disturbed, all of which were previously undisturbed areas. This would create the potential for increased sediment runoff from construction activities would be controlled by implementing soil control measures, which would result in negligible effects to surface water quality.

In addition, as stated in Section 4.8.1, existing onsite contaminants may be transported beyond the facility boundary during flooding (USAF et al. 1991). Therefore, a potential exists for some incremental transportation and dispersion of any additional contaminants that might result from the construction or operation of the SNF facilities. This potential cannot be determined without additional studies, any additional contamination would be unlikely, due to the design of the containment structures and leak detection at the SNF facilities.

5.8.1.3 Groundwater Quantity. Operation of the SNF facilities would require

approximately 9,863 gallons (37,335 liters) per day. This translates to an additional 3,600,000 gallons (13,627 cubic meters) of water used at the NTS per year. It is assumed that the demand of the SNF facilities would be supplied via the existing NTS Area 5 supply water distribution system. If this scenario should be demonstrated to be infeasible, a water supply and distribution system consisting of two 8-inch-diameter wells supplying 250,000-gallon (946,333-liter) aboveground storage tanks would be constructed to serve the facility complex (Johnson 1994).

Water withdrawals to support the proposed SNF facilities would likely be from the Frenchman Flat hydrographic area of the Ash Meadows Subbasin. In 1993, 176 million (666,000 cubic meters) of groundwater was withdrawn by DOE from the Frenchman Flat hydrographic area. An additional 3.6 million gallons (14,000 cubic meters) per year would be required for SNF operations. The recharge due to precipitation in the Frenchman Flat hydrographic area was estimated to be 32.6 million gallons (123,000 cubic meters) per year. This recharge estimate was exceeded for more than thirty years with no decline in static water levels (DOE 1988b). Accurate measurement of static water levels are, however, precluded by numerous conditions on the NTS (Winograd 1970). More detailed analyses of perennial and total water withdrawal from the hydrographic area would be required if the NTS

chosen as a site for SNF management facilities, but because the estimated perennial been exceeded for more than thirty years with no measurable decline in static water likely that increased water use for the SNF Management Facility could be sustained.

Because of hydrogeologic complexities, a regional groundwater flow at the NTS is constrained by the hydrographic basins which are defined by local topography (USAF et al. 1991). Therefore any potential groundwater overdrafts in the Frenchman hydrographic area indicated by previous yield estimates are likely made up by untapped groundwater from neighboring hydrographic areas. Localized impacts could occur if perennial yield of Frenchman Flat hydrographic area is exceeded. Potential impacts depletion of water stored locally in the regional aquifer, removal of that groundwater potential uses, and the potential modification of the rate and direction of contamination resulting from underground nuclear testing. The complex issues of groundwater contamination and use are being addressed in the Resource Management Plan being prepared in conjunction with the NTS site-wide EIS.

The vast majority of groundwater not withdrawn from the Frenchman Flat hydrographic area, and the Ash Meadows Subbasin as a whole, is discharged at Ash Meadows. Using water withdrawal data, NTS annual withdrawal from the Ash Meadows Subbasin would increase by 1% or 3.6 million gallons (14,000 cubic meters) to approximately 370 million (1.4 million cubic meters) if the proposed SNF facilities were sited on NTS. This withdrawal would have little impact on the subbasin as a whole as its perennial yield to be 12 to 18 billion gallons (46 to 68 million cubic meters) (DOE 1988b; USAF et al. 1993b). Water from the groundwater systems which pass beneath the NTS annually discharge approximately 8.8 billion gallons (33 million cubic meters) to the deserts southwest (DOE/NV 1993b). Annual groundwater withdrawal for SNF operations would amount to 0 percent of this discharge. No impacts to down-gradient users and discharge areas were expected due to the small volume of water required and the vast amount of water in the groundwater system.

Dewatering is not expected to be necessary to construct the SNF facility complex due to the relatively great depth to groundwater across the NTS. Although perched water table conditions at depths of 70 feet (21 meters) have been reported for Frenchman Flat, excavation activities are expected to occur in the vadose zone. Consequently, their effect on groundwater quantity due to construction dewatering of wastewater with hazardous chemical or radiological characteristics related to SNF management activities.

5.8.1.4 Groundwater Quality. As previously mentioned, the proposed SNF facilities are

designed to have no liquid release to the environment. However, for the purpose of resource analysis, a conservative release scenario was evaluated to identify the potential environmental consequences of a liquid release to the environment under normal operating conditions. The release scenario was evaluated for information purposes only, as no operating releases are planned for the proposed facility. The scenario consisted of a potential liquid release to the environment under normal operating conditions such as undetected secondary containment failure or piping leak. The scenario was evaluated using conservative estimates of the sensitivity of actual leak detection systems and operational term data from similarly functioning facilities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). The conservative estimates for the hypothetical release included a point release of 5 gallons (19 liters) per day to the environment over the course of 1 month. The release rate and durations were considerably greater than existing leak detection system sensitivity surveillance activities, and radiological surveys. Source terms were derived at the confidence level from 8 years of operational data at the INEL Fluorine and Storage the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.

The point source release as described above has been conservatively assumed to a depth of 40 feet (12 meters) below land surface (the bottom of the Wet Storage Basin Receiving/Canning Facility). As detailed in Section 4.8.2, this is well within the underlying Area 5 at Frenchman Flat. Vertical flow in the uppermost portions of the zone at Area 5 is generally upward toward the surface, due to an extremely high evapotranspiration rate relative to precipitation. Site characterization data for that the vertical flow direction in the vadose zone is upward from 0 to 75 meters (75 to 180 meters [250 to 600 feet]) below land surface. In the next interval (75 to 180 meters [250 to 600 feet]), a downward rate of 3 meters/1,000 years (10 feet/1,000 years) has been calculated. At a depth of 180 to 244 meters (600 to 800 feet), a zone of equilibrium is present above the water table (a vertical movement). These data, combined with the relatively extensive depth to the water table (244 meters [800 feet]) and extreme travel times to the water table, indicate that the release described above would be highly unlikely to reach the saturated zone. The release

remain indefinitely in the vadose zone beneath the proposed SNF facilities, where i present a persistent source of contamination but would not affect groundwater quali

5.8.2 Regionalization Alternative

Potential impacts to surface water and groundwater from construction and operat proposed SNF facilities under the Regionalization Alternative would generally be as the Centralization Alternative. However, the quantity of groundwater withdrawn to operation of the proposed facilities could be less.

5.9 Ecological Resources

The Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives could potentially affect ec resources primarily through the alteration or loss of habitat. Potential impacts t aquatic resources and threatened and endangered species are described below for bot alternatives.

Radiation doses received by terrestrial biota from waste management activities expected to be similar to those received by humans. Although guidelines have not b established for acceptance limits for radiation exposure to species other than huma generally agreed that the limits established for humans are also conservative for o (NRC 1979). Evidence indicates that no other living organisms have been identified likely to be substantially more radiosensitive than humans (Casarett 1968; National Sciences 1972). Additionally, work areas where potential radiation exposure is hig monitored site workers utilize protective equipment, have controlled access measure entry by biota. Thus, so long as exposure limits protective of humans are not exce substantial radiological impact on populations of biota would be expected as a resu management activities at the proposed SNF facility.

5.9.1 Centralization Alternative

Under this alternative, 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of the creosote bush p community would be disturbed during construction. The area disturbed would include construction laydown areas, grading, and new buildings. In addition, disturbance w expected along access roads and other rights of way which have not been included in acres. This plant community is common to the southern portion of NTS. To obviate to this plant community, ground-disturbing activities would be kept to a minimum. also serve to reduce the number of non-native species, such as Russian thistle, to However, non-native species would probably become established in some areas, for ex along the access road.

Impacts to wildlife would occur as a direct result of habitat loss and/or an in increased human presence. There could be a decrease in the number of small mammals reptiles during the construction period due to ground-disturbing activities. More species would be able to move to other areas on the NTS during construction. Depen the carrying capacity of these areas, there could be increased competition for food resources. After construction activities are complete, it is expected that species developed areas would become established.

Impacts to birds protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act are expected to during construction, since there are no water sources at the proposed site. Howeve prior to construction may be required by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Durin there may be an increase in migratory birds utilizing the area due to the increase sources.

There would be no impact on wetlands or aquatic habitats due to the constructio facility because these habitats do not exist in the area. The operation of the pro facilities would increase water sources for wildlife species due to retention ponds lagoon area. This could bring an increase in species, especially migratory birds, habitats. The addition of new species to the area would impact upon the general ec increasing diversity of species. Since these areas would be within fenced enclosur expected that the larger mammals would be unable to directly utilize these water so

Noise and activity associated with construction would be expected to have short on most wildlife. Studies on the effects of noise on wildlife have shown varying r different species. Responses include becoming frightened and running away, alterin

or breeding patterns, changing home ranges (often decreasing them), or adapting to and activity (EPA 1980). These effects would continue indefinitely during the operation of the proposed SNF facilities.

Potential impacts to threatened and endangered species would be the direct result of increased human presence and the loss or alteration of habitat. Any Federal Candidate state-protected species on the site would result in further consultation with the U.S. Wildlife Service and the Nevada State Forester. Mitigation plans would be developed in cooperation with the appropriate agencies if any of these species were identified on site.

Although positive identification of most of the species listed on Table 4.9-1 has been made during prior studies, the addition of water sources to the area could increase the habitat for some endangered, threatened, or candidate bird species. These might include the bald eagle, peregrine falcon, ferruginous hawk, and golden eagle, and species that inhabit water areas such as shorebirds (mountain plover, western least bittern, vesper sparrow, and white faced ibis). An increase in loggerhead shrikes may occur due to that which would be erected around the facility and would serve as posts for this bird.

The project area is located within the range of the desert tortoise, a federally threatened species. Recent pre-activity surveys for other nearby projects have not found desert tortoise in the general area of the project site. However, a pre-activity survey would be needed to determine the presence or absence of the desert tortoise species of concern. If present, the desert tortoise could be impacted during construction of proposed SNF facilities due to increased vehicular traffic, construction of trenches and other temporary construction excavations. Prior to and during construction activity on the areas and removal of tortoises within the fence would decrease the potential to the desert tortoise. All activities with this species must be completed by a qualified person.

5.9.2 Regionalization Alternative

Impacts under this alternative are expected to be generally the same as under the Centralization Alternative. The major difference between the two is the total area disturbed. The Regionalization Alternative is expected to involve construction of a fence and, therefore, to require disturbance of less land.

5.10 Noise

As discussed in Section 4.10, noises generated on the NTS do not propagate offsite that impact the general population. Thus, the NTS noise impacts for both the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives would be limited to those resulting from the transport of personnel and materials to and from the site, which affect the nearby communities, resulting from onsite sources which may affect some wildlife near these sources. Traffic noise on wildlife near SNF management facilities under the Centralization or Regionalization Alternatives would be addressed in a project-specific environmental assessment.

The transportation noises are a function of the size of the work force (e.g., a larger work force would result in increased employee traffic and corresponding increases in truck and rail, and a decreased work force would result in decreased employee traffic and corresponding decreases in deliveries). The analysis of traffic noise took into account the major roadway which provides access to the NTS. Vehicles used to transport employees on roadways would be the principal sources of community noise impacts near the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives.

This analysis used the day-night average sound level to assess community noise, by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 1982, 1974) and the Federal Interagency Committee on Noise (FICON 1992). The change in the day-night average sound level from the baseline noise level for each alternative was estimated based on the projected change in employment and traffic levels from the baseline levels. The baseline is comparable to activity at the NTS for 1993. The combination of construction and operation employment was considered. The traffic noise analysis considered U.S. Route 95, which employees use to travel to the NTS from Las Vegas. Changes in noise level below 3 decibels would not be expected to result in a change in community reaction (FICON 1992).

5.10.1 Centralization Alternative

Under the Centralization Alternative, the projected NTS work force would increase about 48 percent of existing onsite employment in the years 2000 to 2002, the peak period, and decrease thereafter (Section 5.3). There would be a corresponding increase in private vehicle, and bus trips. The day-night average sound level at 50 feet (15 m) from U.S. Route 95 would be expected to increase by about 1 decibel. No change in expected community reaction to noise along this route. No mitigation efforts are necessary.

5.10.2 Regionalization Alternative

Under the Regionalization Alternative, traffic noise impacts would be the same as the Centralization Alternative.

5.11 Traffic and Transportation

The proposed SNF management activities would involve a small increase in the number of employees commuting to the NTS and the transportation of SNF and hazardous chemical waste to the NTS. This section summarizes potential transportation impacts due to the proposed facilities on the NTS.

5.11.1 Centralization Alternative

5.11.1.1 Levels of Service. Levels of service were calculated for construction and operation of the SNF facility at the NTS.

The maximum reasonably foreseeable scenario for construction and operations occurs when the combined number of employees and population at their highest. This would occur in 2001, when there would be 3,426 employees and a projected baseline population in the Region of Influence of 1,209,316. The Region of Influence includes Nye and Clark counties. Direct employees associated with the proposed SNF facility generate direct trips in the Region of Influence. These trips are distributed to the Region of Influence road network according to percentages based on a traffic flow between the areas where employees historically have lived. Increases in baseline population and indirect employees generate indirect trips in the Region of Influence. These trips are distributed on the current average daily traffic per present population in the region of influence segment. Direct and indirect average daily traffic are added and a new level of service is determined. Construction and operation employees contribute little to the future traffic; they represent such a small percentage of the Region of Influence population growth. None of the future baseline levels of service would change due to SNF-related impacts.

5.11.1.2 Rail Transportation. The generic facility design would require rail access for

Naval fuel delivery. The rail spur would most likely be built from the Union Pacific mainline approximately 50 miles (80 kilometers) east of the NTS. Impacts from construction and operation of the rail spur would be evaluated in detail if the site were selected for the facility.

5.11.1.3 Transportation Impacts of Hazardous Chemicals. It is assumed that the

hazardous chemicals required and hazardous waste generated by the proposed SNF facility operation would be transported by truck. The onsite transportation impacts for the chemicals and wastes shipments are calculated based on the assumptions that they do not have any incident free impacts, the material would not leak during transport, only risk of fatalities, and the material spill of entire contents is bound by the risk evaluation. The Expanded Core Facility, considered under facility accidents.

The total distance for onsite shipment of these hazardous chemicals is assumed to be the maximum site boundary distance from the proposed SNF facility to the nearest highway on the unit risk factor (Cashwell et. al. 1986), occupational and non-occupational considering a rural setting the onsite transportation risks are calculated, assuming no shipments.

The maximum one-way distance from the site to the NTS gate by which trucks would deliver hazardous wastes is 20 miles (32 kilometers). Based on 1.5×10^{-8} accident fatalities per kilometer per shipment, 4.0×10^{-4} accident occupational fatalities a 40-year period. Based on 5.3×10^{-8} accident non-occupational fatalities per kilometer shipment 1.4×10^{-3} accident non-occupational fatalities are estimated over a 40-year

5.11.1.4 Transportation Impacts of Radioactive SNF. The definition of offsite

transportation include transportation of radioactive material from the shipping facility storage facility at the receiving site; therefore, local transportation does not see the onsite transportation impacts due to radioactive material shipment.

5.11.2 Regionalization Alternative

The impacts due to the Regionalization Alternative would be less than those of the Centralization Alternative due to the smaller size of the facility and the small waste expected.

5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety

The Waste Minimization and Pollution Prevention Awareness Plan at the NTS would be implemented within the SNF Management Program. While more chemicals per year would be used, health impacts to the public would continue to be minimal as a result of administrative design controls to minimize releases of radioactive and chemical pollutants to the environment and to achieve compliance with permit requirements and applicable standards. Workers would continue to be protected from hazards specific to the workplace through appropriate protective equipment, monitoring, management controls, and occupational standards to limit atmospheric and drinking water concentrations of potentially hazardous chemicals and limit radiation exposures. This would include protection from wastes generated from increased use of the chemicals needed to accommodate spent fuel storage and from releases associated with this storage. The NTS Emergency Preparedness Plan would continue to be as designed to minimize or mitigate the impact of any emergency upon the health and safety of employees and the public.

Health effects from radiation are presented here as the risk of fatal cancer. The ratio of their health risk estimator (risk of fatal cancer per rem of exposure) for the public is 5.0×10^{-4} for fatal cancers. The coefficient estimator for exposures to workers is 4.0×10^{-4} .

5.12.1 Centralization Alternative

This section evaluates the impacts to human health resulting from both contaminant emissions and direct exposures associated with the proposed SNF facility under the Centralization Alternative. Pathways assessed include inhalation of air, ingestion of food, and submersion in plumes, and direct exposure.

5.12.1.1 Radiological Doses. Releases of additional radionuclides to the environment

from operations at the proposed SNF facilities are summarized in Table 5.7-1. The committed doses to the public resulting from the proposed SNF facilities plus baseline in 1995 are provided in Table 5.7-3. The doses would be approximately 1 percent of the restrictive health standard, and less than 0.1 percent of the natural background radiation dose to the maximally exposed member of the public is assumed to remain constant over the 40-year operational lifetime of the SNF; the population dose would increase slightly (3 percent) due to population growth during this 40-year period.

Doses to SNF facility workers are assumed to be similar to those presently received by major DOE facility Waste Processing/Management personnel. Based on data for the years through 1991 for the Hanford Site, INEL and the Savannah River Site (SRS) (DOE 1992) estimated that the average dose to a worker from annual SNF operations at the NTS would be approximately 40 millirem and the maximum dose would be about 3,000 millirem. Assuming 800 persons were involved at the peak of these operations, the total worker dose for

SNF operations would be approximately 32 person-rem. Adding the baseline contribution total dose to all workers at the NTS would be about 36 person-rem.

5.12.1.2 Nonradiological Doses. Releases of additional nonradiological airborne

pollutants from operations at the proposed SNF facilities are summarized in Table 5.7-5. Concentrations from these releases have been calculated and are presented in Tables 5.7-5.

5.12.1.3 Radiological Health Effects. The fatal cancer risk to the most exposed member

of the public due to operation of the proposed SNF facilities would be 5.9×10^{-8} . The cancer risk to the most exposed member of the public due to operation of the proposed facilities plus baseline operations (1995 levels) would be 6.5×10^{-8} , over 40 years storage duration), the risk to this individual would be approximately 2.6×10^{-6} . The number of fatal cancers to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the proposed SNF facilities would be 4.4×10^{-5} for the operation of SNF facilities plus baseline operations and 1.8×10^{-3} for the operation of the SNF facilities without baseline operations. The number of incremental fatal cancers from total NTS operations to the public during the estimate storage duration would be approximately 1.8×10^{-3} . The number of fatal cancers from all causes that normally be expected to occur during this same time period to the 80-kilometer population is 1,500.

The calculation of the number of health effects to SNF workers from annual operations is based on somewhat lower risk estimators than for the general public. The estimator as the result of different age distributions among workers and members of the public of fatal cancer to the average worker is estimated to be 1.6×10^{-5} . The corresponding maximally exposed worker is estimated to be 1.2×10^{-3} . An excess of 0.013 fatal cancers to all SNF facility workers is projected from peak annual operations. It is projected to radiation over the lifetime of SNF operations could result in an excess of 0.40 among these workers and an increased risk of 6.4×10^{-4} to an individual worker who over this time period. The risks and numbers of excess fatal cancers, both from annual and lifetime operations, would be increased by about 15 percent if the impacts to workers with baseline activities (Section 4.12.2.1) were included. The health effects due to doses to a noninvolved worker, i.e., an NTS worker involved in activities other than those on the order of 1 percent of the occupational exposure to an SNF worker, based on the SRS and INEL sites.

5.12.1.4 Nonradiological Health Effects. As indicated in Table 5.7-4, the concentrations

of all measured nonradiological pollutants at the NTS together with the inclusion of the Proposed Action would remain well within the health-based regulatory guidelines. The incremental pollutant concentrations from the Proposed Action would be negligible, compared to baseline concentrations; no adverse health effects from these pollutants would be anticipated.

The calculated maximum atmospheric concentrations of hazardous chemicals at the boundary and onsite for the proposed action are presented in Table 5.7-5. The maximum concentrations at the site boundary are used to evaluate an exposure to a maximally exposed individual, whereas the maximum onsite concentrations could result in an exposure to a maximally exposed individual. Of the potential hazardous chemicals identified for the proposed action, cadmium, nickel, and chromium VI (chrome) are carcinogens for which a total cancer risk was calculated. The remaining seven chemicals are noncarcinogens for which a hazard index was calculated. A hazard index value greater than 1 indicates a potential for adverse health effects.

Based on the maximum hazardous chemical concentrations at the site boundary, the fatal cancer risk and the hazard index to the maximally exposed member of the public would be only 5.4×10^{-13} and 2.5×10^{-3} , respectively. Based on the maximum concentrations at the site boundary, the lifetime fatal cancer risk and hazard index to a worker would be only 2.7×10^{-12} and 2.5×10^{-3} , respectively. This indicates that there would be virtually no health impacts from releases.

5.12.1.5 Industrial Safety. The measures of impacts for workplace hazards used in this

analysis are (1) total reportable injuries and illnesses and (2) non-exposure-related impacts.

the work place.

Based on hazard rates for personnel of DOE and its contractors, it is estimated injuries and illnesses would be reported and 0.48 fatality would occur from all SNF activities. It is further estimated that 807 injuries and illnesses would be reported and 0.48 fatality would occur among SNF workers during lifetime operations.

5.12.2 Regionalization Alternative

Under the Regionalization Alternative, the radiological and nonradiological dose operation of the proposed SNF facilities at the NTS could generally be lower than that described under the centralization alternative. Any corresponding health effects may decrease.

5.13 Utilities and Energy

Direct changes in utility demand as a result of the Centralization and Regional Alternatives were compared, depending on available data, against either projected 1 or the peak usage for the years 1988 through 1992 for each utility resource. Since NTS is projected to decrease, this comparison is conservative. Impacts to provisions are considered to occur if the demand for a utility is equal to or exceeds the available within the designated Region of Influence. For the purpose of analysis, the Region for each resource is defined as the area served by the utility provider responsible for service demands of the NTS.

5.13.1 Centralization Alternative

5.13.1.1 Water Consumption. For the Centralization Alternative, approximately

0.43 liter per second (6.85 gallons per minute) of water would be required to operate modules within the facility (Harr 1994). The 14 active wells had a capacity of 387 second (6,139 gallons per minute) in 1993 (DOE/NV 1993a). The SNF facilities would use 0.1 percent of this amount. NTS wells would operate at 35 percent of total capacity. 1989 peak water usage of 134 liters per second (2,125 gallons per minute) was combined with SNF facility requirements.

The active wells at Area 5 have a capacity of 38 liters per second (595 gallons per minute) (DOE/NV 1994c). The SNF facilities under the Centralization Alternative would require 1 percent of this amount. Water usage in Area 5 would increase to approximately 33 percent of the pump yield if the 1993 water usage of 12 liters per second (191 gallons per minute) in Area 5 is combined with the SNF facility requirements under the Centralization Alternative.

5.13.1.2 Electrical Consumption. Under the Centralization Alternative, the SNF

facilities would require approximately 23,000 megawatt hours of electricity per year and approximately 2.63 megavolt-amperes average demand (Harr 1994). The annual consumption of electricity of the SNF facilities would be approximately 12 percent of the 1995 annual consumption of electricity at NTS. The average electric demand of the SNF facilities represent 6 to 7 percent of the projected 1995 peak electrical capacity of NTS. The electric demand of the SNF facilities, combined with the peak electric demand of 39.5 megavolt-amperes, would utilize 94 to 105 percent of the transmission lines' capacity. The 2.63 megavolt-amperes required for the SNF facility represents approximately 61 percent of the operating capacity of the substation at Area 5. The energy requirements of the SNF facilities under the Centralization Alternative combined with the 1993 electric demand on the Flat substation would utilize 63 percent of the substation capacity. It might be necessary to construct additional transmission lines or another substation to support the SNF facilities.

5.13.1.3 Fuel Consumption. Energy requirements for the SNF facilities under the

Centralization Alternative were calculated assuming electrical power purchased from the primary source of energy; however, fossil fuels may be used to power backup generators.

during construction activities. The amount of fuel that would be required for these would have little effect on fossil fuel usage at the NTS site.

5.13.1.4 Wastewater Disposal. Under the Centralization Alternative, approximately

0.43 liter per second (6.85 gallons per minute) of wastewater would be generated (H Currently, Area 5 has no wastewater facilities. A sewage treatment facility would be constructed for the SNF facilities under the Centralization Alternative.

5.13.2 Regionalization Alternative

The proposed SNF facilities under the Regionalization Alternative could consume water, electricity, and fuel than under the Centralization Alternative. Less waste would be generated; however, a sewage treatment facility would still need to be constructed.

5.14 Materials and Waste Management

Operation of the proposed SNF facilities would contribute transuranic, solid low-level waste, and sanitary waste as a consequence of transport, receipt, unloading, handling, and storage at the NTS. Under the SNF program, sources of potential contaminants would continue to be the construction support and site operation activities.

SNF storage activities would require the use of chemicals, and the majority of the waste would be expected to eventually become waste. Provisions would have to be made for the storage of the chemical raw materials used within the SNF complex as well as the waste materials from use. It was conservatively assumed that all chemical raw materials used by SNF would become hazardous wastes. Table 5.14-1 presents the estimated waste generation by waste classification for each of the two alternatives (Centralization and Regionalization) for the two options (wet storage and dry storage).

5.14.1 Centralization Alternative

The Centralization Alternative would generate the greatest amount of waste from the SNF complex, since it is the alternative that contributes the larger amount of spent nuclear fuel to be stored. On an annual basis, the amount of waste generated by the SNF complex for the Centralization Alternative would generally be greater than under the Regionalization Alternative. The capacity of the SNF complex is the factor that determines the amount of waste generated. Table 5.14-1. Ten-year cumulative estimated waste generation for SNF alternatives at the NTS (m³).

Time Period	1995-2004	2005-2014	2015-2024	2025-2034
Centralization Alternative				
Wet Storage Option				
Transuranic waste	160	160	160	160
Low-level waste	1,950	1,950	1,950	1,950
Hazardous waste	7.4 x 10 ¹	7.4 x 10 ¹	7.4 x 10 ¹	7.4 x 10 ¹
Sanitary waste	1.2 x 10 ⁵	1.2 x 10 ⁵	1.2 x 10 ⁵	1.2 x 10 ⁵
Dry Storage Option				
Low-level waste	76	76	76	76
Sanitary waste	1.9 x 10 ⁴	1.9 x 10 ⁴	1.9 x 10 ⁴	1.9 x 10 ⁴
Regionalization Alternative				
Wet Storage Option				
Transuranic waste	<160	<160	<160	<160
Low-level waste	<1,950	<1,950	<1,950	<1,950
Hazardous waste	<7.4 x 10 ¹	<7.4 x 10 ¹	<7.4 x 10 ¹	<7.4 x 10 ¹
Sanitary waste	<1.2 x 10 ⁵	<1.2 x 10 ⁵	<1.2 x 10 ⁵	<1.2 x 10 ⁵
Dry Storage Option				
Low-level waste	<76	<76	<76	<76
Sanitary waste	<1.9 x 10 ⁴	<1.9 x 10 ⁴	<1.9 x 10 ⁴	<1.9 x 10 ⁴

Source: Harr (1994).

5.14.1.1 Wet Storage Option.**5.14.1.1.1 Transuranic Waste-A small quantity (16 cubic meters, or 20.**

9 cubic

yards) of transuranic waste would be generated per year due to the recovery and purification of transuranic products from the wet storage option (Harr 1994). Placement of this waste in a transuranic waste storage cell would have minimal impact on the current transuranic management at the NTS.

5.14.1.1.2 Low-Level Waste-The wet storage option would contribute liquid low-

level waste as a result of its interim storage in water.

This underwater storage would require filtered and deionized water to prevent possible corrosion problems with fuel element storage hardware; further waste would be generated from deionizer resin regeneration backflushing, and chemical cleaning of the filter. An estimated 195 cubic meters (228 cubic yards) per year of low-level waste would be generated due to operation of the wet storage facility. Placement of this waste into the Radioactive Waste Management Site would be required (see subsection 4.15.3). This quantity of low-level waste represents a minor addition to the management of low-level waste at the NTS.

5.14.1.1.3 Hazardous Waste-Installation of the SNF complex would require

additional management of hazardous wastes, including the placement of satellite storage within the SNF complex and more frequent offsite shipments of hazardous waste.

An evaluation

of the impact that the additional hazardous wastes generated by the wet storage option would be conducted as part of the required National Environmental Policy Act evaluation.

Additional hazardous waste accumulated would be transferred to the Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site, collected, and removed to an offsite EPA-permitted treatment, storage, and disposal facility. The potential for hazardous waste to adversely affect the environment as a result of an accidental spill would be limited due to the great depth to groundwater and the climate, thereby minimizing the likelihood of migration of surface and shallow subsurface contamination. Similarly, any leaks from new underground or aboveground storage tanks would have limited potential to affect the environment (DOE/NV 1992c).

It is estimated that the wet storage option would generate approximately 7.4 cubic meters (9.7 cubic yards) of hazardous waste annually. This quantity of hazardous waste would have minimal impact to the management of hazardous wastes at the NTS.

5.14.1.1.4 Sanitary Waste-The SNF wet storage option would generate

approximately 1.

2 x 10⁴ cubic meters (15,696 cubic yards) of sanitary waste annually. This quantity of sanitary waste would double the current sanitary waste disposal quantity. This would require construction of additional septic/leach field capacity and/or additional lagoon capacity, creating the need for additional land area for sanitary waste disposal.

5.14.1.2 Dry Storage Option. Unless a hazardous material were added to the fuel at the

point of origination, hazardous material or mixed hazardous wastes would not be expected to be produced at a dry storage facility. With administrative controls applied at the site to prevent hazardous material from coming in, the generation of mixed hazardous waste would be reduced or precluded. Any hazardous liquid and solid waste produced at the dry storage facility would be collected in a satellite accumulation area located inside the facility. Materials would be stored onsite unless offsite storage and disposal facilities were licensed to accept the waste.

Nonradioactive hazardous waste, such as oils, solvents, gloves, rags, and other materials associated with plant operation and maintenance, would be stored onsite until there

containers for shipment to an approved offsite treatment, storage, and disposal facility (Hale 1994).

5.14.1.2.1 Low-Level Waste-The low-level radioactive contaminated waste stream

would result mainly from wastes generated during the decontamination operations of crane, and contaminated areas, from disposed personal protective equipment and clothing would be used and disposed of during decontamination operations, and from the filter exchange resins used to decontaminate the decontamination liquids.

This waste would be sent to the waste packaging unit, where it would be compacted into drums for disposal. Old lids removed in the canning process would be collected and placed into solid waste (Hale 1994). Approximately 7.6 cubic meters (9.9 cubic yards) of low-level waste generated annually from the dry storage facility. This quantity of low-level waste minimal impact to the management of low-level waste at the NTS.

5.14.1.2.2 Sanitary Waste-Sanitary sewage is the only liquid effluent to be

released from the facility.

The SNF dry storage option would generate approximately 1.9×10^3 cubic meters (2.5×10^3 cubic yards) of sanitary waste annually. This quantity of would double the current sanitary waste disposal quantity at the NTS. This would require construction of additional septic/leach field capacity and/or additional sewage lag creating the need for additional land area for sanitary waste disposal.

5.14.2 Regionalization Alternative

The Regionalization Alternative would generate less waste from the SNF facility than the Centralization Alternative, since it would contribute the smaller amount of SNF. The handling capacity of the SNF complex determines the amount of waste generation. Whether the wet storage option or dry storage option, the wastes generated would be those presented for the Centralization Alternative. Therefore, Table 5.14-1 presents estimated waste generation for SNF for this alternative as less than that generated by the Centralization Alternative. The impacts presented for each of the waste categories for the Centralization Alternative apply to the Regionalization Alternative as well.

5.15 Facility Accidents

A potential exists for accidents at facilities associated with the handling, in storage of spent nuclear fuel at the NTS. Accidents can be categorized into events abnormal (for example, minor spills), events a facility was designed to withstand, and events a facility is not designed to withstand. These categories are termed abnormal, design basis, and beyond design basis accidents, respectively. Summarized here are consequences of potential accidents for a member of the public at the nearest site boundary and at the nearest to the collective population within 80 kilometers (50 miles), for workers, and for the public. See Section 5.11 for a summary of the assessment of transportation accidents.

A review of the historical record of accidents at the NTS is summarized in the section. Methods used to assess potential future events are summarized in Section 5.15.2. Evaluations of accident impacts by alternative are summarized in Section 5.15.3. A summary comparison of accident impacts by alternative is given in Section 3.2. A supporting documentation for the accident impacts is given in a separate report (HN).

This section examines the various activities that have been performed to assess for accidents and their consequences for workers and the public for each alternative. Potential reasonably foreseeable accidents over the 40-year period are described with accidents. Secondary impacts of accidents pertaining to cultural resources, economically endangered species, water resources, and ecology are also addressed. This section addresses emergency preparedness plans that have been established to mitigate the primary and effects of accidents.

5.15.1 Historical SNF Accidents at NTS

There have been no SNF operations in the past several years at the NTS upon which to base an accident history.

5.15.2 Methodology

There are no facilities currently at the NTS for receiving, handling and storage that can be used as a basis for accident analysis. In the absence of suitable design data for proposed SNF facilities during this stage of the SNF Management Program upon which to base an accident analysis, the approach makes use of accident scenarios and associated data that have been analyzed and documented for similar facilities. They include spent nuclear fuel at INEL, the Hanford Site, SRS, and Naval sites.

5.15.2.1 Assumptions and Approach. A number of postulated accidents for similar

facilities have been selected to serve as a common basis for estimating accident consequences for workers and the public at the NTS. Although the accident scenarios, source terms, assumptions are similar to those for other sites, the estimated consequences are unique at the NTS because of site differences in modeling parameters pertaining to distances to sensitive receptors and population centers, population distributions, and meteorology. The GENII code was used to estimate accident consequences for the general public and for individuals within the site boundary, based on both 50 percent and 95 percent meteorology. Accident consequences and risk are described in terms of dose, latent cancer fatalities, and health effects for workers, for an individual at the site boundary, for a transient individual nearest public access, and for the public residing out to 80 kilometers (50 miles) from the proposed SNF facility. The estimated frequency of each selected accident is based on reference source documentation.

The probability of an airplane crash into the facility is considered very small because there are no nearby airports with large aircraft activity. For calculational purposes, the probability of such an accident is conservatively estimated at 10^{-6} per year. Potential accidents include an airplane crash into the SNF facilities and the estimated consequences have been analyzed.

The secondary impacts of accidental releases of radioactive and hazardous materials have also been addressed in a qualitative manner. Secondary impacts pertain to effects of accidents on land use, endangered species, water resources, cultural resources, and ecology.

5.15.2.2 Accident Screening. The potential accidents associated with existing SNF

facilities and operations were screened to determine which ones to include in the accident analysis for the NTS. The source documentation for this effort was primarily Appendixes C, and D of Volume 1 that were selected by a screening process for existing SNF facilities. Initiating events were reviewed, including natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes and human-initiated events (e.g., human error, equipment failures, fires, explosive events and terrorism). Accidents associated with Expanded Core Facility (ECF) operations were analyzed separately, and the results are documented in Appendix D. For the NTS, maximum reasonably foreseeable criticality and nonradiological accidents are associated with ECF. The potential for a criticality exists while the fuel is in dry storage, during the wet storage pool. Although the probability of any criticality is very low, a maximum criticality of 1×10^{19} fissions was postulated in the ECF wet pool as a basis for maximum reasonably foreseeable consequences of a criticality.

The selected accidents include beyond-design-basis events in order to reflect the range of accident consequences that envelop all other accidents having a reasonable probability of occurrence. They also include other accidents with lower consequences and typical probabilities of occurrence, to show a range of accident types and consequences. The accidents included in this set are reasonably foreseeable, meaning that there are one or more events that will lead to their occurrence, and the sequence with the highest probability of occurrence is greater than 1×10^{-7} per year. Accidents falling outside of this envelope, such as meteorite impact, have been judged unreasonable because the probability of occurrence is less than 1×10^{-7} per year.

5.15.2.3 Accident Prevention and Mitigation. Under the Centralization and

Regionalization Alternatives, the proposed SNF facilities at the NTS will be of new construction and incorporate the latest technology for safety. The accidents postulated for SNF facilities are based on operations and safety analyses that have been performed at existing SNF facilities. One of the major design goals for the proposed SNF facilities is to reduce risk to facility personnel and to public health and safety relative to that associated with functions at existing SNF facilities. Significant improvements would exist between the new SNF facilities and those for the current facilities in reducing total risk. These would include changes in design to current DOE structural criteria and to planned throughput and storage capacity.

The SNF facilities would be designed to comply with current Federal, state, and DOE Orders, and industrial codes and standards. This would provide facilities that are resistant to the effects of severe natural phenomena, including earthquakes, floods, high winds, as well as credible events as appropriate to the site, such as fires and man-made threats to its continuing structural integrity for containing materials.

An emergency preparedness plan will also be prepared to lower the potential consequences of an accident to workers and the public. All workers receive evacuation training and orderly personnel movement away from high-risk areas. Plans and arrangements with local authorities will also be in place to evacuate the general public that may be exposed to hazardous materials that are accidentally released.

5.15.3 No Action Alternative

There are currently no SNF operations at NTS. The No Action Alternative is not applicable for NTS.

5.15.4 Centralization Alternative

There is a potential for the accidental release of radioactive substances during stages of SNF handling operations and storage. The operations begin with the receipt and shipment by truck or rail carrier followed by the unloading of the shipping cask from the transport vehicle. If the SNF requires cooling, the cask is placed into an unloading facility where the SNF is withdrawn from the cask, moved to a temporary wet storage basin, and placed in a fuel rack. Some SNF that does not require cooling will be handled in a special cell and undergo canning and/or characterization. SNF that does not have to be cooled and does not require canning and/or characterization will be loaded into a dry storage canister, transferred to a cask and transported to modular above-grade dry storage. Accidents that may occur during these handling operations and storage may involve the release of radioactive material through air or water pathways. The cause of accidents may be due to internal initiators, human error, terrorism, and equipment failure or external initiators, such as an aircraft crash at the facility.

5.15.4.1 Radiological Impacts. The set of accidents described below have been chosen

to envelop the consequences of potential accidents for the proposed SNF facilities. Although other accidents may occur, their estimated consequences are bounded by the set of accidents chosen. The probability of occurrence would be less than 1×10^{-6} per year for the accidents were to occur, the dose and risk would be as shown in Tables 5.15-1 and 5.15-2 for 50 percent and 95 percent meteorology, respectively. Similarly, cancer fatalities are shown in Tables 5.15-3 and 5.15-4, and the health effects are shown in Tables 5.15-5 and 5.15-6 for 50 percent and 95 percent meteorology, respectively.

5.15.4.1.1 Fuel Assembly Breach-Physical damage and breach of a fuel assembly

could accidentally occur from its being dropped, from objects falling on it, or from being cut.

The fuel-cutting accident that has been postulated to occur at SRS SNF facilities is described in Table 5.15-1. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose and risk for 95 percent meteorology.

Accident	Frequency	Dose	95 Percent m
----------	-----------	------	--------------

scenario	(per year)	MEI ^a (rem)	NPAI ^b (rem)	Worker ^c (rem)	Population (person-rem)
Fuel assembly breach	1.6 x 10 ⁻¹ d	2.0 x 10 ⁻³	1.9 x 10 ⁻⁵	1.5 x 10 ⁻³	1.3 x 10 ⁰
Dropped fuel cask	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ e	1.3 x 10 ⁰	2.7 x 10 ⁻²	4.7 x 10 ⁰	2.8 x 10 ²
Severe impact and fire	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ f	9.3 x 10 ⁰	9.9 x 10 ⁻²	3.5 x 10 ⁰	5.8 x 10 ³
Wind-driven missile impact into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	3.5 x 10 ⁻³	3.2 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.2 x 10 ⁻²	5.7 x 10 ⁻¹
Airplane crash into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ f	1.5 x 10 ⁰	7.7 x 10 ⁻²	1.2 x 10 ¹	5.6 x 10 ²
Airplane crash into dry cell facility	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ f	1.2 x 10 ¹	2.4 x 10 ⁻¹	2.3 x 10 ¹	7.0 x 10 ³
Airplane crash into water pool	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ f	2.2 x 10 ⁻²	1.4 x 10 ⁻⁴	2.4 x 10 ⁻²	5.8 x 10 ¹

a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Dose received from inhalation, external,

b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Dose received from inhalation and

c. Dose received from inhalation and external pathways.

d. The value is <1.6 x 10⁻¹. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed

e. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁴. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed

f. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁶. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed
Table 5.15-2. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose and at 50 percent meteorology.

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Dose				50 Percent meteorology	
		MEI ^a (rem)	NPAI ^b (rem)	Worker ^c (rem)	Population ^d (person-rem)		
Fuel assembly breach	1.6 x 10 ⁻¹ e	5.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	2.9 x 10 ⁻⁷	4.7 x 10 ⁻⁵	3.4 x 10 ⁻²		
Dropped fuel cask	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ f	3.2 x 10 ⁻²	4.1 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.5 x 10 ⁻¹	6.9 x 10 ⁰		
Severe impact and fire	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	2.3 x 10 ⁻¹	1.5 x 10 ⁻³	1.1 x 10 ⁻¹	1.4 x 10 ²		
Wind-driven missile into dry storage area	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	8.7 x 10 ⁻⁵	4.7 x 10 ⁻⁶	3.7 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.3 x 10 ⁻²		
Airplane crash into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	3.7 x 10 ⁻²	1.2 x 10 ⁻³	3.9 x 10 ⁻¹	1.4 x 10 ¹		
Airplane crash into dry cell facility	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	3.1 x 10 ⁻¹	3.7 x 10 ⁻³	7.4 x 10 ⁻¹	1.7 x 10 ²		

Airplane crash 1.0 x 10⁻⁶ g 5.6 x 10⁻⁴ 2.0 x 10⁻⁶ 7.4 x 10⁻⁴ 1.4 x 10⁰
into water pool

- a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Dose received from inhalation, external, a
 - b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Dose received from inhalation and e
 - c. Dose received from inhalation and external pathways.
 - d. Dose received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
 - e. The value is <1.6 x 10⁻¹. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed t
 - f. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁴. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed t
 - g. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁶. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed t
- Table 5.15-3.** Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer f
Test Site at 95 percent meteorology.

95 Percent meteorology

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Cancer fatalities			
		MEI ^a	NPAI ^b	Worker ^c	Popula ^d
Fuel assembly breach	1.6 x 10 ⁻¹ e	9.8 x 10 ⁻⁷	9.3 x 10 ⁻⁹	6.0 x 10 ⁻⁷	6.6 x 10 ⁻⁷
Dropped fuel cask	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ f	6.4 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.4 x 10 ⁻⁵	1.9 x 10 ⁻³	2.8 x 10 ⁻³
Severe impact and fire	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	4.7 x 10 ⁻³	5.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	1.4 x 10 ⁻³	5.8 x 10 ⁻³
Wind-driven missile impact into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	1.7 x 10 ⁻⁶	1.6 x 10 ⁻⁷	4.9 x 10 ⁻⁶	2.9 x 10 ⁻⁶
Airplane crash into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	7.4 x 10 ⁻⁴	3.9 x 10 ⁻⁵	4.8 x 10 ⁻³	5.6 x 10 ⁻³
Airplane crash into dry cell facility	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	6.1 x 10 ⁻³	1.2 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.8 x 10 ⁻²	7.0 x 10 ⁻²
Airplane crash into water pool	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	1.1 x 10 ⁻⁵	7.1 x 10 ⁻⁸	9.6 x 10 ⁻⁶	5.8 x 10 ⁻⁶

- a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Radiation exposure received from inhalati
 - b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from i
 - c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
 - d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathway
 - e. The value is <1.6 x 10⁻¹. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed
 - f. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁴. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed
 - g. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁶. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed
- Table 5.15-4.** Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer f
Test Site at 50 percent meteorology.

50 Percent me

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Cancer fatalities			
		MEI ^a	NPAI ^b	Worker ^c	Popu
Fuel assembly breach	1.6×10^{-1} e	2.5×10^{-8}	1.4×10^{-10}	1.9×10^{-8}	1.7
Dropped fuel cask	1.0×10^{-4} f	1.6×10^{-5}	2.1×10^{-7}	6.0×10^{-5}	3.5
Severe impact and fire	1.0×10^{-6} g	1.2×10^{-4}	7.5×10^{-7}	4.5×10^{-5}	1.4
Wind-driven missile impact into dry storage	1.0×10^{-5}	4.4×10^{-8}	2.4×10^{-9}	1.5×10^{-7}	6.7
Airplane crash into dry storage	1.0×10^{-6} g	1.8×10^{-5}	6.0×10^{-7}	1.6×10^{-4}	6.8
Airplane crash into dry cell facility	1.0×10^{-6} g	1.5×10^{-4}	1.9×10^{-6}	3.0×10^{-4}	1.7
Airplane crash into water pool	1.0×10^{-6} g	2.8×10^{-7}	1.0×10^{-9}	3.0×10^{-7}	7.0

- a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Radiation exposure received from inhalat
- b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from
- c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
- d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathwa
- e. The value is $<1.6 \times 10^{-1}$. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed
- f. The value is $<1.0 \times 10^{-4}$. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed
- g. The value is $<1.0 \times 10^{-6}$. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed

Table 5.15-5. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis health Site at 95 percent meteorology.

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Total health detriment ^a				95 Percent m
		MEI ^b	NPAI ^c	Worker ^d	Pop	
Fuel assembly breach	1.6×10^{-1} f	1.4×10^{-6}	2.1×10^{-10}	8.4×10^{-7}	9.7	
Dropped fuel cask	1.0×10^{-4} g	9.3×10^{-4}	3.0×10^{-7}	2.6×10^{-3}	4.1	
Severe impact and fire	1.0×10^{-6} h	6.8×10^{-3}	1.1×10^{-6}	2.0×10^{-3}	8.5	
Wind-driven missile impact into dry storage	1.0×10^{-5}	2.5×10^{-6}	3.4×10^{-9}	6.9×10^{-6}	4.2	
Airplane crash into dry st	1.0×10^{-6} h	1.1×10^{-3}	8.8×10^{-7}	6.7×10^{-3}	8.2	
Airplane crash into dry cel facility	1.0×10^{-6} h	8.9×10^{-3}	2.7×10^{-6}	2.6×10^{-2}	1.0	
Airplane crash into water	1.0×10^{-6} h	1.6×10^{-5}	1.5×10^{-9}	1.3×10^{-5}	8.5	

- a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). The estimated number of cancer fataliti

- b. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
- c. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from
- d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
- e. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
- f. The value is $<1.6 \times 10^{-1}$. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed
- g. The value is $<1.0 \times 10^{-4}$. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed
- h. The value is $<1.0 \times 10^{-6}$. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed
- Table 5.15-6.** Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis health effects at 50 percent meteorology.

50 Perc

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Total health detriment ^a		
		MEI ^b	NPAI ^c	Worker ^d
Fuel assembly breach	1.6×10^{-1} f	3.7×10^{-8}	1.4×10^{-8}	2.6×10^{-8}
Dropped fuel cask	1.0×10^{-4} g	2.3×10^{-5}	2.0×10^{-5}	8.4×10^{-5}
Severe impact and fire	1.0×10^{-6} h	1.7×10^{-4}	7.2×10^{-5}	6.2×10^{-5}
Wind-driven missile impact into dry storage	1.0×10^{-5}	6.4×10^{-8}	2.3×10^{-7}	2.1×10^{-7}
Airplane crash into dry storage	1.0×10^{-6} h	2.7×10^{-5}	5.6×10^{-5}	2.2×10^{-5}
Airplane crash into dry cell facility	1.0×10^{-6} h	2.2×10^{-4}	1.8×10^{-4}	4.2×10^{-4}
Airplane crash into water pool	1.0×10^{-6} h	4.1×10^{-7}	1.0×10^{-7}	4.1×10^{-7}

- a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). The estimated number of cancer fatalities, caused by radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
- b. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
- c. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
- d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
- e. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
- f. The value is $<1.6 \times 10^{-1}$. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be
- g. The value is $<1.0 \times 10^{-4}$. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be
- h. The value is $<1.0 \times 10^{-6}$. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be chosen as representative of the fuel assembly breach accident (E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 1983). During normal SRS operations, the inert, non-uranium-containing extremities of spent nuclear fuel elements are cut off in the repackaging basin before the elements are bundled. The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-7. The estimated frequency of occurrence for this accident is 1.6×10^{-1} per year, based on SRS operating experience. Because of anticipated differences in operations and facilities at the NTS, however, the frequency is expected to be much less than 1.6×10^{-1} per year.

5.15.4.1.2 Dropped Fuel Cask-The dropped fuel cask accident that has been

postulated to occur at the Hanford Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix A) is chosen representative of the dropped fuel cask/fuel handling accident for the new Central Alternative facility at NTS.

This accident is initiated when a fuel cask is dropped and overturned in the fuel transfer area. Broken fuel elements spill out of the cask, within the away from the pool. It is assumed that the shipping cask ruptures, exposing all of fuel elements in three canisters: 42 fuel elements, each containing 22.5 kilograms fuel. The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-8. The probability is estimated to be less than 1×10^{-4} per year.

5.15.4.1.3 Severe Impact and Fire-The severe impact and fire accident that has

been postulated to occur at the Hanford Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix A) is chosen representative of the severe impact and fire/onsite transportation accident for the Centralization Alternative facility at NTS.

This accident assumes an unspecified initiating event that subjects the fuel assemblies to a severe impact, breach of the transport cask, During the accident, the fuel pins rupture on impact or upon heating in the fire, within an hour before being extinguished. Volatiles, particulates, and noble gases are released to the atmosphere. The source term for a release of 540 curies is shown in Table 5.15-9. The estimated probability of occurrence for this accident, reflecting the fact that the site would be new, is less than 1×10^{-6} per year.

5.15.4.1.4 Wind-driven Missile Impact into Storage Casks-The wind-driven

missile impact into storage casks accident that has been postulated to occur at the Reactors Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the wind-driven missile impact into storage casks accident.

Table 5.15-7. Estimated radionuclide releases for a fuel assembly breach accident at the NTS.

Radionuclide	Release (Ci)
Iodine-131	7.1×10^{-2}
Iodine-133	1.4×10^{-30}
Krypton-85	1.8×10^2
Xenon-133m	1.1×10^{-8}
Xenon-133	1.1×10^0

a. Source: E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1983).

Table 5.15-8. Estimated radionuclide releases for a dropped fuel cask accident at the NTS.

Radionuclide	Release (Ci)	
	Onsite (2 hours)	Offsite (8 hours)
Plutonium-236	1.3×10^{-8}	5.4×10^{-8}
Plutonium-238	2.9×10^{-3}	1.2×10^{-2}
Plutonium-239	6.7×10^{-3}	2.7×10^{-2}
Plutonium-240	3.5×10^{-3}	1.4×10^{-2}
Plutonium-241	2.7×10^{-1}	1.1×10^0
Plutonium-242	1.3×10^{-6}	5.1×10^{-6}
Americium-241	5.7×10^{-3}	2.3×10^{-2}
Curium-244	2.8×10^{-4}	1.1×10^{-3}
Europium-154	5.4×10^{-3}	2.1×10^{-2}
Cesium-134	7.9×10^{-3}	3.2×10^{-2}
Cesium-137	4.5×10^{-1}	1.8×10^0
Cerium-144	1.7×10^{-3}	6.8×10^{-3}
Praseodymium-144	1.7×10^{-3}	6.8×10^{-3}
Praseodymium-144m	2.0×10^{-5}	8.1×10^{-5}
Promethium-147	1.2×10^{-1}	4.9×10^{-1}

Antimony-125	7.3×10^{-3}	2.9×10^{-2}
Tellurium-125m	1.8×10^{-3}	7.3×10^{-3}
Ruthenium-106	3.2×10^{-3}	1.3×10^{-2}
Strontium-90	3.5×10^{-1}	1.4×100
Yttrium-90	3.5×10^{-1}	1.4×100

a. Source: Volume 1, Appendix A, Table A-1.

Table 5.15-9. Estimated radionuclide releases for a severe impact and fire accident at the NTS.

Radionuclide	Release (Ci)
Tritium	4.6×10^1
Krypton-85	4.0×10^2
Strontium-90	2.7×10^{-2}
Ruthenium-106	1.3×10^0
Cesium-134	1.7×10^1
Cesium-137	8.0×10^1
Plutonium-238	8.9×10^{-4}
Plutonium-239	1.6×10^{-3}
Plutonium-240	1.8×10^{-3}
Plutonium-241	7.3×10^{-2}
Americium-241	1.0×10^{-3}

a. Source: Volume 1, Appendix A, Table A-14.

missile accident for the new Centralization Alternative facility at NTS. This accident by natural phenomena, a major wind storm or tornado in excess of facility design basis scenario, a large object is propelled by the wind into a storage container, causing seal to be breached. No fuel damage results from the impact because of the strength containers used. The source term is based on the spent nuclear fuel corrosion film of the original corrosion film on the fuel is released from the cask to the atmosphere. The source term is shown in Table 5.15-10. The probability of this event is estimated 1×10^{-5} per year, based on a design basis tornado probability of 1×10^{-3} per year impact with damage probability of less than 1×10^{-2} .

5.15.4.1.5 Airplane Crash Into Dry Storage-The airplane crash into dry storage

accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval Reactors Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the airplane crash into the dry storage for the new Centralization Alternative facility at NTS.

This accident initiated by an airplane crash into the SNF dry storage facility. The accident is postulated to cause damage to the storage cask. Due to the severity of the impact, the cask seal is assumed to be breached resulting in damage to the fuel and the release of corrosion products, located on the exterior, to the environment. The impact also causes a fire and a release of fission products. It is assumed that 1 percent of all of the fuel units stored inside the cask are damaged by the impact or by the fire, and that those fission products are available for release. Fission products, 100 percent of the noble gases, 3 percent of the halogens, 1.1 percent of cesium, and 0.1 percent of the remaining solids are released to the environment. All of the original corrosion products from the fuel units are released from the cask to the atmosphere. The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-11. The probability of this accident is small and is assumed to be less than 1×10^{-6} per year.

5.15.4.1.6 Airplane Crash into Dry Cell Facility-The airplane crash into the dry

cell facility accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval Reactors Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the airplane crash into the characterization cell accident for the new Centralization Alternative facility at NTS. This

accident is initiated by an airplane crash into the dry cell facility. The accident causes significant damage to the building, resulting in the loss of containment and

Table 5.15-10. Estimated radionuclide releases for a wind-driven missile impact in storage cask at the NTS.

Radionuclide	Release (Ci)
Cobalt-60	9.58×10^{-2}

Iron-55	1.76×10^{-1}
Cobalt-58	3.54×10^{-2}
Manganese-54	5.98×10^{-3}
Iron-59	5.11×10^{-4}

a. Source: Volume 1, Appendix D, Section F.1.4.2.2.1.

Table 5.15-11. Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry stor at the NTS.

Radionuclide	Release (Ci)
Cesium-134	2.6×10^1
Cesium-137	3.6×10^1
Plutonium-238	5.9×10^{-2}
Barium-137m	3.1×10^0
Strontium-90	3.1×10^0
Cerium-144	7.2×10^0
Niobium-95	4.4×10^0
Yttrium-90	3.1×10^0
Ruthenium-106	6.1×10^{-1}

a. Source: Volume 1, Appendix D, Section F.1.4.2.2.2.

systems. The fuel units inside the dry cell are damaged by the impacts and fire. results in the release of corrosion products to the environment. For this accident percent of the fuel units stored inside the dry cell are assumed to be damaged by e impact or the resultant fire and those fission products would be available for rele fission products available for release, 100 percent of the noble gases, 3 percent o 1.1 percent of the cesium, and 0.1 percent of the remaining solids are released to environment. Ten percent of the available corrosion products are released to the e The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-12. The probability of th estimated to be less than 1×10^{-6} per year.

5.15.4.1.7 Airplane Crash into Water Pool-The airplane crash into the SNF water

pool accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval Reactors Site (referen Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the airplane crash into the SNF water po for the new Centralization Alternative facility at NTS.

This externally initiated accident occurs

when an airplane crashes into an SNF water pool and damages the fuel units stored t Fission products and corrosion products are released from the fuel units into the w the pool water is not released to the environment. The presence of the pool water a release of gaseous fission products to the atmosphere. In this accident scenario the fuel units stored inside the pool are postulated to be damaged and those fissio available for release. Of the available fission products, 100 percent of the noble 25 percent of the halogens are released to the pool water. Due to the presence of there is a reduction of the halogen release by a factor of 10 prior to release to t The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-13. The probability of th estimated to be less than 1×10^{-6} per year.

5.15.4.2 Nonradiological Hazards. The two bounding accidents involving nonradiological

hazards are a chemical spill and fire and a diesel fuel fire. Both of these accide with the Expanded Core Facility operations and the accident frequencies and impacts addressed in Volume 1, Appendix D. The analyses of these accidents considered the workers on the site as well as to the offsite population. The impacts were measure potential heath effects due to exposure to toxic chemicals released during these ac the ECF at this site will be a new design and construction, it will incorporate all Table 5.15-12. Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry fac public in the event of an accident.

5.15.4.3 Secondary Impacts. In the event of an accidental release of radioactive

substances, there is a potential for secondary impacts to cultural resources, endan water resources, and public and agricultural land use, the ecology in the vicinity national defense, and local economics. In order to assess the impacts, a severe ac resulting release of radioactive material were evaluated. The accident chosen for an airplane crash into the Centralization Alternative canning and characterization Utilizing the 50 percent meteorology and the typical flat topography of the propose the dispersion of radioactive material and the resulting dose were calculated. Fig shows the isodose lines ranging from 870 millirem per year down to 87 millirem per is approximately equivalent to cosmic and terrestrial background radiation. The fa between the accident site and the 87 millirem per year line is 8,000 feet (2,400 me Therefore, in order to minimize the potential impact of an accident on the non-NTS and the public, the SNF facility should be located at least 8,000 feet (2,400 meter boundary. Given the available space within Area 5 and the large buffer zone surrou proposed SNF site and the NTS, the final siting location could easily accommodate t constraint. This design constraint could be applied to other environmental resour final siting process. The secondary impacts in other environmental resources which accommodated as easily are summarized below. Table 5.15-14 presents a summary of t postulated severe accident secondary impacts on the environment, economy, and natio defense. The evaluation was performed using 50 percent meteorology.

5.15.5 Decentralization Alternative

The Decentralization Alternative is not applicable for the NTS.

5.15.6 1992/1993 Planning and Basis Alternative

There are currently no SNF operations at NTS. The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alt is not applicable for NTS.

Figure 5.15-1. Typical Isodose lines for an airplane crash into a dry cell accide
Table 5.15-14. Secondary impacts of the Centralized Alternative accidents at NTS.

Environmental or Impact

social factor

Land Use

Possible minor impact. The dispersion of radioactive material would be limited within the NTS boundaries. The major NTS facilities in the vicinity of the proposed SNF site include the Radioactive Waste Management Site and the Liquified Gaseous Fuels Spill Test Facility.

Cultural Resource

Possible minor impact. Surveys conducted for other Area 5 activities have indicated only scattered artifacts in the vicini the proposed SNF site. No major prehistoric/historic sites are anticipated to be located in the vicinity of the proposed SNF site. Access to any random artifacts found during the accident investigation and cleanup would have to be restricted until radioactive decay had occurred.

Aesthetic and
Scenic Resources

No impact. The area of contamination does not envelop aesthetic and scenic resources.

Water Resources

No impact. The nuclear testing program has dispersed radioactive material in the vicinity of the proposed SNF site during aboveground nuclear tests. Due to the great depths of the groundwater, the groundwater was not contaminated. It is anticipated that an accident would not alter the pathways to the groundwater.

Ecological

Possible impact. Many threatened or endangered plants and animals, except fish species, are potentially on or near the NTS

Resources

Treaty Rights

No impact. There are no onsite areas subject to Native American Treaty rights.

National Defense

No impact. The area of contamination does not envelop U.S. military or defense industry facilities.

Economic Impacts

Possible minor impact. The dispersion of radioactive material would be limited within the NTS boundaries. The major NTS

facilities in the vicinity of the proposed SNF site include the Radioactive Waste Management Site and the Liquified Gaseous Fuels Spill Test Facility.

5.15.7 Regionalization Alternative

Under the Regionalization Alternative, new facilities would be constructed and SNF. Details for the new facilities have not been defined, but it is reasonable to would be similar to but with less throughput and storage requirements than those ne Centralization Alternative. Due to smaller throughput and storage requirements, th for accidents (i.e., probability of occurrence) will be similar to but less than th the Centralization Alternative. The accident consequences would be similar for bot Consequently, it is reasonable to assume the accident consequences and risks descri Centralization Alternative envelop the Regionalization Alternative.

5.15.8 Emergency Preparedness and Plans

DOE has issued a series of Orders specifying the requirements for emergency pre (DOE Orders 5500.1A, 5500.2A, 5500.3, draft 5500.3A, 5500.4, and 5500.9), and each has established an emergency management program. These programs are developed and maintained to ensure adequate response for most accident conditions and to provide framework to readily extend response efforts for accidents not specifically conside emergency management program incorporates activities associated with planning, prep and response.

Officials at each DOE site have specified the emergency preparedness requiremen DOE facilities under their jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the relevant DO existing facilities have emergency plans and procedures that either implement the D requirements or are integrated with the site planning.

The Nevada Operations Office Emergency Preparedness Plan is designed to minimiz mitigate the impact of any emergency upon the health and safety of employees and th The plan integrates all emergency planning into a single entity to minimize overlap duplication, and to ensure proper responses to emergencies not covered by a plan or The plan is based upon the concept that the Manager, Nevada Operations Office, has capability to manage, counter, and recover from an emergency occurring within the N Operations Office responsibility.

The Nevada Operations Office plan provides for (1) identification and notificat personnel for any emergency that may develop during operational or nonoperational h (2) the receipt of warnings, weather advisories, or any other information that may advance warning of a possible emergency; and (3) prearranged actions which may be t minimize the effect of the emergency. The plan is based upon current Nevada Operat vulnerability assessments, resources, and capabilities regarding emergency prepared

5.16 Cumulative Impacts and Impacts from Connected or

Similar Actions

The NTS already contains several major DOE and non-DOE facilities, unrelated to that would continue to operate throughout the operating life of the proposed SNF ma facilities. The activities associated with these existing facilities produce enviro consequences that have been included in the baseline environmental conditions (Chap against which Sections 5.1 through 5.15 have assessed the environmental consequence Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives. This section uses the environment conditions presented in Chapter 4 to assess potential cumulative impacts from the p management facilities, if constructed at the NTS, plus other reasonably foreseeable

In addition to the proposed SNF management facilities, reasonably foreseeable a considered in this cumulative impact assessment include the proposed Expanded Core (described in Volume 1, Appendix D), activities included in the present Five-Year P Master Plan for the NTS (DOE/NV 1993b), and the potential geologic repository at th Mountain site. Major programmatic initiatives consist of constructing the followin site improvements for a new consolidated testing area sponsored by Los Alamos and L Livermore National Laboratories; a Transuranic Waste Certification Building; refurb expansion of several existing facilities; construction of several small office buil

assessment and remediation projects; several roadway upgrading or improvement projects; several flood control projects; and several utility installation or upgrade projects. A number of communications, security, and safety improvements identified in the Master Plan are under consideration throughout the NTS.

Specifically with respect to Area 5, a number of projects are proposed (DOE/NV). Continued use of the Radioactive Waste Management Site and the Spill Test Facility. Providing storage for transuranic waste and hazardous waste prior to offsite disposal is proposed. Additional projects have also been proposed to provide utility and infrastructure upgrades and improvements. These projects include replacing the Frenchman Flat power substation and a number of construction projects for water Service Area C including the Yucca Flat and Frenchman Flat water systems, and adding additional tanks and water to the area. Nearby proposals identified for Area 6 include following a formal, expanded land-use plan for the Control Point, Yucca Lake, and the Construction Facilities.

The potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site, which could involve construction and operation of a geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste on NTS land and other federal land on the western boundary of the NTS, is also considered in the cumulative impacts analysis. Considering the relatively isolated location of the NTS offsite activities (other than the potential geologic repository at Yucca Mountain), the impacts are of limited scope.

The following cumulative impacts analysis considers the potential incremental effects of the proposed SNF management facilities and the proposed Expanded Core Facility in addition to the potential incremental impacts from activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan, a Master Plan, the potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site, and from future activities. The impacts are assessed in a more qualitative manner.

5.16.1 Centralization Alternative

Separate analyses of potential cumulative impacts from the Centralization Alternative against the environmental baseline conditions presented in Chapter 4 are provided below.

5.16.1.1 Land Use. Construction of the proposed SNF management facilities would

require the dedication of approximately 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of undeveloped land on the NTS. Construction of the proposed Expanded Core Facility would require the dedication of an additional 30 acres (0.12 square kilometer) of undeveloped land, increasing the requirement to 120 acres (0.48 square kilometer). This represents less than 1 percent of the roughly 450,000 acres (1,800 square kilometers) of undeveloped land remaining on the NTS (3,500 square kilometers). Additional unknown areas of undeveloped land, consisting of parcels of under 100 acres (0.4 square kilometer), might have to be dedicated to so-called "small" activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan and Master Plan. Many of these proposed activities do not require the dedication of undeveloped land. Land on the southwestern part of the NTS has already been allocated for the potential Yucca Mountain repository and current site characterization for a potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site.

Considering the large area of undeveloped land on the NTS, the cumulative dedication of land to all reasonably foreseeable activities on the NTS would not likely serve to further reduce the availability of land on the NTS for future development. Large areas of undeveloped land are available for development off of the NTS, and any future offsite development coupled with proposed onsite development discussed above is not likely to create regional land shortages that could severely limit future regional development.

5.16.1.2 Occupational and Public Health. The annual collective effective dose

equivalent from the existing NTS facilities to the population within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of the NTS is 0.0052 person-rem. Added to this baseline, operation of the proposed SNF management facilities might contribute an additional 0.082 person-rem, increasing the total effective dose to 0.087 person-rem.

The annual collective effective dose equivalent from the existing NTS facilities to the maximally exposed individual at the site boundary is 0.011 millirem per year. Operation of the proposed SNF management facilities might contribute an additional 0.12 millirem per year, resulting in a cumulative annual dose of 0.13 millirem per year to this maximally exposed individual.

The total annual baseline worker dose seen from normal NTS operations is about

rem. The total annual SNF management facility worker dose is expected to be roughly 32 person-rem. Hence, the cumulative annual dose might be 36 person-rem.

Over the planned 40-year operational lifetime of the SNF management facility, a population dose of 3.5 person-rem will be observed from continuous operation of the NTS facilities and the SNF management facility. This equates to a risk of fatal cancer of 4.4×10^{-5} over the 40-year span. For the maximally exposed individual, the total 40-year period equates to a risk of fatal cancer of 2.6×10^{-6} . For the SNF management facility, the total dose over the 40-year span corresponds to a risk of fatal cancer of 6.4×10^{-6} .

Additional radiological impacts are not expected from operation of the proposed Core Facility. Analysis has shown that the dose to all individuals considered (workers and individuals) from Expanded Core Facility operations might be much less than one millirem per year.

5.16.1.3 Noise. Increases in noise levels from construction and operation of the SNF

management facilities and the Expanded Core Facility would be limited to temporary, construction noise and small increases in traffic noise occurring along various access roads at the NTS due to increases in employment. Because of the NTS's large size and sparsely populated surroundings, any cumulative noise levels generated on the NTS by the proposed SNF management facilities, the proposed Expanded Core Facility, the potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site, and activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan and Master Plan would not propagate offsite at levels that would impact the general population. Although cumulative offsite noise level attributed to future offsite activities can not be estimated, potential incremental addition attributable to the proposed SNF management facilities would be minimal. Minor increases in traffic noise on U.S. Route 95 could be possible due to increased activity on and near the NTS.

5.16.1.4 Groundwater and Surface Water Resources. Operation of the proposed SNF

management facilities would require the withdrawal of an estimated 3.6 million gallons (13.6 million liters per year) of groundwater from the Ash Meadows Subbasin. Operation of the proposed Expanded Core Facility would require the withdrawal of an estimated additional 2.5 million gallons per year (9.5 million liters per year) from that subbasin, resulting in a combined withdrawal of an estimated 6.1 million gallons per year (23.1 million liters per year). The water demands for the potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site would be met by the Alkali Flat Furnace Creek Ranch Subbasin and therefore would not contribute to cumulative water withdrawals from the Ash Meadows Subbasin. Information concerning water demands of activities in the Five-Year Plan, Master Plan, or future offsite activities is not available.

Although total withdrawals of groundwater from the Ash Meadows Subbasin have not exceeded the subbasin perennial yield, localized withdrawals of groundwater in the Flat hydrographic area of the Ash Meadows Subbasin have exceeded the estimate of precipitation recharge for the area. This recharge estimate was exceeded for more than 10 years with no decline in static water levels. Accurate measurement of static water levels, however, precluded by numerous conditions on the NTS. Because of hydrogeologic complexity, regional groundwater flow at the NTS is not constrained by the hydrographic basins defined by local topography. Therefore any potential groundwater overdraft in the Flat hydrographic area indicated by previous yield estimates are likely to be made up by groundwater from neighboring hydrographic basins. Localized impacts could occur if the perennial yield of Frenchman Flat hydrographic area is exceeded. Potential impacts include depletion of water stored locally in the regional aquifer, removal of that groundwater for other potential uses, and the potential modification of the rate and direction of contamination resulting from underground nuclear testing. The complex issues of groundwater contamination and use are being addressed in the Resource Management Plan being prepared in conjunction with the NTS site-wide EIS.

5.16.1.5 Biotic Resources. Construction of the proposed SNF management facilities

Construction of the proposed SNF management facilities would require the disturbance of approximately 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of supporting flora and fauna characteristic of the ecotone between the Mohave Desert and the Great Basin. Construction of the proposed Expanded Core Facility would require the disturbance of an additional 30 acres (0.12 square kilometer) of desert habitat, resulting in a total disturbance of 120 acres (0.48 square kilometer).

combined conversion of 120 acres (0.48 square kilometer) of terrestrial habitat to Additional areas of desert habitat would be lost during construction of activities Five-Year Plan and Master Plan, during construction of the potential geologic repos Yucca Mountain site, and during future offsite construction activities. Considerin extent of desert habitat on and surrounding the NTS, the cumulative loss of desert be minimal.

The NTS lies within the range of the desert tortoise, a federally listed threat the desert tortoise occurred in areas subject to development, tortoises could be in construction activities. The proposed SNF management facilities (and the proposed Core Facility) would be constructed at the edge of the tortoise's range, however, a been found in the affected area. Habitat losses due to construction of the propose management facilities and other proposed onsite and offsite construction activities a slight cumulative loss of habitat for the desert tortoise. The U.S. Fish and Wil would be consulted in accordance with Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act prior construction of the potential SNF management facilities to ensure that any potentia effect on desert tortoise populations would be minimal. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife would also have to be similarly notified and given an opportunity to comment prior construction of the potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site and pr other major construction activities.

5.16.1.6 Air Quality. The potential cumulative air emissions from the proposed SNF

management facilities and the proposed Expanded Core Facility would not result in a exceedance of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards or Nevada state criteria. would be no exceedance of Federal National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Po or DOE radiological standards. Air emissions from the other planned activities hav been defined.

5.16.1.7 Socioeconomics. Operation of the proposed SNF management facilities might

generate up to 800 new jobs during the year 2005 and beyond. Operation of the prop Expanded Core Facility might generate up to 562 additional jobs during that year, r combined increase of up to 1,362 new jobs. The 7,091 jobs presently forecasted for the year 2005 might be increased by 19 percent, to as much as 8,453 jobs. The 752, presently forecasted for the surrounding area in the year 2005 might be increased b percent, to as much as 753,718 jobs. Additional employment increases could also re potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site, activities proposed in th Plan and Master Plan, and new offsite activities, but specific estimates are not av

The cumulative effect of the employment increases discussed above would depend actions at the NTS and throughout the regional economy. These employment increases cause minor fluctuations in employment and housing demands. However, activities at generally have a relatively modest effect on long-term regional economic growth and in Clark County because of the implicit growth projections in the services and reta driving long-term growth in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Statistical Area. Additiona years the shutdown of nuclear testing activities at the NTS has caused employment l These losses have not been considered in long-term employment forecasts. If nuclea activities do not resume at the NTS, the projected employment increases noted above offset by employment losses.

5.16.1.8 Transportation. An estimated 4.0×10^{-4} and 1.4×10^{-3} accident occupational

fatalities and accident nonoccupational fatalities might occur over the 40-year lif proposed SNF management facilities due to the transportation of hazardous material facilities. This does not include fatalities due to leakage of hazardous waste. S not available for the other planned activities.

5.16.1.9 Waste Management. Operation of the proposed SNF management facilities

would generate an estimated 203 cubic meters (266 cubic yards) per year of low leve an estimated 16 cubic meters (21 cubic yards) per year of transuranic waste. Opera proposed Expanded Core Facility would generate an additional 425 cubic meters (556

yards) of low level waste (for a combined total by both facilities of 628 cubic met yards)) but would not generate any additional transuranic waste. No other radioact including high level waste or mixed waste, would be generated by either facility. data for the potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site or for offsit activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan and Master Plan is not available. All wa by the proposed SNF management facilities and other planned activities on the NTS w treated and disposed of in accordance with all applicable Federal and state regulat

5.16.1.10 Other Resources. The absence of impacts, or very minimal impacts, from the

proposed SNF management facilities to cultural resources, aesthetic and scenic reso utilities, and geologic resources ensures that their potential contribution to cumu affecting these resources would be negligible.

5.16.2 Regionalization Alternative

Because impacts from the proposed SNF management facilities under the Regionali Alternative would be equal to or less than those under the Centralization Alternati potential cumulative impacts would also be equal or less. Generally, the Regionali Alternative requires less construction and smaller scale operations, and the potent cumulative impacts is therefore less.

5.17 Adverse Environmental Effects That Cannot Be Avoided

5.17.1 Overview

This chapter discusses potentially unavoidable adverse impacts to the environme from construction and operation of the proposed SNF facilities at the NTS under the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives. Unavoidable adverse impacts are i cannot be mitigated by changes in project design, operation, or construction, or by measures.

5.17.2 Centralization Alternative

Operation of the proposed SNF facilities at the NTS under the Centralization Al would increase the radiation dose rate to the maximally exposed individual by 0.12 resulting in only a minimal increase in cancer risk. The number of fatal cancers p operations on the NTS from existing sources and the SNF facilities would be 4.4×1

Construction of the proposed SNF facilities would require the disturbance of ap 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of undeveloped land. Although this represents les percent of the undeveloped land on NTS, it would eliminate potential terrestrial wi including habitat potentially suitable for the federally listed desert tortoise. I the dedication of a small land parcel potentially suitable for other construction p similar land parcels are abundant on the NTS.

Operation of the proposed SNF facilities would require the withdrawal of an est 3.6 million gallons (13.6 million liters) per year of groundwater from the Ash Mead Existing localized withdrawals of groundwater from Frenchman Flat hydrographic area subbasin already exceed the estimate of precipitation recharge for the area. Howev withdrawal from the Ash Meadows Subbasin does not exceed its total perennial yield. withdrawn would therefore not be discharged at Ash Meadows and the other discharge the deserts southwest of NTS.

The potential impacts from the Centralization Alternative to the other environm resources discussed in Chapter 5 are not unavoidable adverse impacts.

5.17.3 Regionalization Alternative

Potential unavoidable adverse impacts associated with the Regionalization Alter resemble those discussed above for the Centralization Alternative. The extent of t could be less due to the reduced land requirements, reduced extent of construction

and reduced scale of operations.

5.18 Relationship Between Short-Term Use of the Environment

and the Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity

Implementation of any of the SNF management alternatives would cause some adverse impacts to the environment and permanently commit certain resources. These resource use of the environment and those associated with construction and operation of the management facilities.

The proposed alternatives for SNF management would require the short-term use of resources including energy, construction materials, and labor in order to achieve the safety managing SNF to minimize the risk to workers, the public, and the environment.

Development of new SNF interim management facilities would commit lands to those from the time of construction through the cessation of operations, at which time they could be converted to other uses or decontaminated, decommissioned, and the site returned to original land use.

5.19 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources

5.19.1 Overview

This chapter discusses the irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources from the use of materials that can not be recovered or recycled, or that must be converted to irrecoverable forms.

5.19.2 Centralization Alternative

Construction and operation of SNF facilities under the Centralization Alternative require commitments of electrical energy, fuel, concrete, steel, sand, gravel and minerals chemicals. Groundwater to operate the SNF facilities would not be discharged in the southwest of NTS. More detailed analyses would be required to determine irreversible effects on localized groundwater availability. The land dedicated to the SNF facilities become available for other rural uses following closure and decommissioning.

5.19.3 Regionalization Alternative

Irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources associated with the Regionalization Alternative would resemble those discussed above for the Centralization Alternative. The extent of these resource commitments could be less, due to the reduced land requirement and reduced scale of operations.

5.20 Potential Mitigation Measures

5.20.1 Pollution Prevention

The DOE Nevada Field Office (DOE/NV) published a Waste Minimization and Pollution Prevention Awareness Plan in June 1991 to reduce the quantity and toxicity of hazardous and radioactive wastes generated at DOE/NV facilities. The plan is designed to reduce possible pollutant releases to the environment and thus increase the protection of the public. All DOE/NV contractors and NTS users that exceed the EPA criteria for quantity generators are establishing their own waste minimization and pollution prevention awareness programs that are implemented by the DOE/NV plan. Contractor programs ensure that waste minimization activities are in accordance with Federal, state, and local laws and regulations, and DOE Orders (DOE/NV 1993c).

Additional goals include the promotion and use of nonhazardous materials, establishment of a baseline of waste generation data, calculations of annual reductions of wastes, implementation of recycling programs. Goals also include incorporation of waste management concepts and technologies in planning and design of new processes and facilities, a

of existing facilities. A waste minimization task force composed of representative contractor and NTS user has been established to coordinate DOE/NV waste minimization pollution awareness activities (DOE/NV 1993c).

5.20.2 Potential Mitigation Measures

Potential impact avoidance and mitigation measures are addressed in Chapter 5, through 15 as appropriate.

6. REFERENCES

- Beck, H. L. and P. W. Krey, 1983, "Radiation Exposures in Utah from Nevada Nuclear Volume 220, pp. 18-24.
- BLM (U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management), 1990, Map of the
- Bross, I. D. and N. S. Bross, 1987, "Do Atomic Veterans Have Excess Cancer? New Re for the Healthy Soldier Bias," American Journal of Epidemiology, Volume 126, No 1050.
- Caldwell, C. G., D. B. Kelley, & C. W. Heath Jr., 1980, "Leukemia Among Participant Maneuvers at a Nuclear Bomb Test, A Preliminary Report," Journal of American Me Association, Volume 244, No. 14, pp. 1575-1578.
- Casarett, A. P., 1968, Radiation Biology, first edition, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall
- Cashwell, J. W., K. S. Neuhauser, P. C. Reardon and G. W. McNair, 1986, Transportat Commercial Radioactive Waste Management Program, SAND 85-2715, TTC-0633, Sand National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April.
- Center for Business and Economic Research, 1992, Economic and Demographic Projectio Water Purveyors in Southern Nevada: 1990-2030, Las Vegas, Nevada, October.
- CFR (Code of Federal Regulations), 1993a, 10 CFR 100, "Reactor Site Criteria, Appen and Geologic Setting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," Office of the Federal Washington, D.C., July.
- CFR (Code of Federal Regulations), 1993b, 40 CFR 81.329, "Designation of Areas for Planning Purposes, Subpart C, Section 107 Attainment Status Designations, Nevad Federal Register, Washington, D.C., July.
- CFR (Code of Federal Regulations), 1993c, 50 CFR 17.11, Fish and Wildlife Service, Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered and Threatened Wildlife," Office of Register, Washington, D.C., August.
- CFR (Code of Federal Regulations), 1993d, 50 CFR 17.12, Fish and Wildlife Service, Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered and Threatened Plants," Office of th Register, Washington, D.C., August.
- CFR (Code of Federal Regulations), 1993e, 40 CFR 1508.8 through 1508.14, "Council o Quality, Regulations on Implementing National Environmental Policy Act Procedur the Federal Register, Washington, D.C., July.
- Clark County Regional Transportation Commission, 1992, Planning Variables Report: 1 County, Nevada, adopted December 10.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1994, DOE-STD-1020 Natural Phenomena Hazards Desig Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities, U.S. Department of Ene D.C., April.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993, Spent Fuel Working Group Report on Inventory the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel and Other Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Materi

Environmental, Safety, and Health Vulnerabilities, DOE ZZ 700, Volume 1, U.S. D Energy, Washington, D.C., November.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1992, Safety Performance Measurement System - Annual Database 1989-1991, U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environment, Safety, and Health, Washington, D.C.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1990, Compliance Assessment of the Nevada Test Site, U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environment, Safety, and Health, Washington, D.C., January.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1988a, Section 175 Report: Secretary of Energy's Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 175 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as Amended, Office of Radioactive Waste Management, Washington, D.C., December.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1988b, Site Characterization Plan, Yucca Mountain Research and Development Area, Nevada, DOE/RW-0199, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Washington, D.C., December.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1986, Environmental Assessment, Yucca Mountain Site Research and Development Area, Nevada, DOE/RW-0073, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Washington, D.C., May.

DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1994a, Report Nevada Test Site Related and Other Nevada Related Employment, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, January.

DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1994b, Communication to the Whitaker, U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, regarding Geology Appendix F, Part Two of Preliminary Draft SNF EIS, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, January 28.

DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1994c, Water Usage Data, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada.

DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1994d, Memorandum from the Nevada Test Site to W. Russell, U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, regarding management, March 18.

DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1993a, Technical Information Package Proposal for Reconfiguration of Nuclear Weapons Complex at the Nevada Test Site, Volumes 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, September.

DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1993b, FY 1993 NTS Technical Information Package - Volumes 1 and 2, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, September.

DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1993c, Annual Site Environmental Report - 1992 - Volume I, DOE/NV/10630-66, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, September.

DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1993d, Flood Assessment of the 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site and the Proposed Hazardous Waste Storage Unit at the DOE/Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, January.

DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1993e, Groundwater Protection and Management Program Plan for the DOE Nevada Field Office, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, February 19.

DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1993f, 1992 Annual Report on Generation and Waste Minimization Progress as Required by SEN-37-92 and DOE Order 5400.1, Nevada Test Site, NV (Draft), Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, January.

- DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1992a, DOE NEWS Press NV-92-42, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, April 14.
- DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1992b, RCRA Part B Per Application, for Waste Management Activities at the Nevada Test Site - Volumes Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, July.
- DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1992c, U.S. Department Nevada Field Office Annual Site Environmental Report - 1991, DOE/NV/10630-33, N Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, September.
- DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1992d, Eighth Quarterl Action Report for the Period of July 1 - September 30, 1992, Nevada Operations Nevada.
- DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy/Nevada Operations Office), 1991a, Environmental R and Waste Management Plan, Fiscal Years 1993 - 1997, DOE/NV-336, Nevada Operati Las Vegas, Nevada, August.
- DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1991b, U.S. Department Nevada Operations Office Annual Site Environmental Report - 1990, DOE/NV/10630- Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, September.
- DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1991c, Biological Asse Effects of Activities of the U.S. Department of Energy Field Office, Nevada and Desert Tortoise, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, July.
- DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1988, Status of the Fl on the Nevada Test Site - 1988, DOE/NV/10630-29, Nevada Operations Office, Las Nevada.
- DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1986a, DOE NEWS Press NV-86-28, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, May 13.
- DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1986b, Environmental A the LGF Spill Test Facility at Frenchman Flat, Nevada Test Site, DOE/EA-3009, N Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada.
- DOE/NV (U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office), 1983, DOE NEWS Press R NV-83-39, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, April 28.
- DOE/OFE (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fossil Energy), 1994, Environmental As Hazardous Materials Testing at the Liquified Gaseous Fuels Spill Test Facility, Nevada Test Site, DOE-EA-0864, Office of Fossil Energy, Washington, D.C., March
- DRI (Desert Research Institute), 1993, Groundwater Chemistry at the Nevada Test Sit Preliminary Interpretations, DOE/NV/10845-16, Water Resources Center, Desert Re Institute, Reno, Nevada, March.
- DRI (Desert Research Institute), 1991, Cultural Resources Reconnaissance Short Repo Primary Well Locations, Three Alternate Well Locations, One Trench Location, an around the Radioactive Waste Management Site, SR092091-1, Desert Research Insti Nevada.
- DRI (Desert Research Institute), 1989, Cultural Resources Reconnaissance Short Repo Waste Accumulation Facility, SR081889-1, Desert Research Institute, Reno, Nevad
- DRI (Desert Research Institute), 1987, Cultural Resources Reconnaissance of Frenchm Active Waste Site Expansion, SR111287-1, Desert Research Institute, Reno, Nevad
- DRI (Desert Research Institute), 1986a, An Overview of Cultural Resources on Pahute Mesas on the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Technical Report No. 45, Des Institute, Reno, Nevada.

- DRI (Desert Research Institute), 1986b, Integrated Geochemical and Hydraulic Analysis Site Ground Water Systems, Desert Research Institute, Reno, Nevada, May.
- Eckel, E. B. (ed.), 1968, Nevada Test Site, Memoir 110, The Geologic Society of America, Colorado.
- EG&G, 1993, Pre-Activity Survey Report for GCP Wells ER-5-1, EG&G Energy Measurements, Las Vegas, Nevada, November 18.
- EG&G, 1991, Pre-Activity Survey Report for Proposed Wells and Trenches at RWMS, EG&G Energy Measurements, Las Vegas, Nevada, August 30.
- EG&G, 1990, Memo from Thomas P. O'Farrell, EG&G, to Les Monroe, U.S. Department of Energy, regarding "Desert tortoise survey at the Radioactive Waste Management Site," EG&G Energy Measurements, Las Vegas, Nevada, April 6.
- EG&G, 1989, Memo from Thomas P. O'Farrell, EG&G, to Bob Bivona, U.S. Department of Energy, regarding "Pre-Activity Survey report for the Hazardous Waste Accumulation Facility," EG&G Energy Measurements, Las Vegas, Nevada, August 24.
- E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1983, Safety Analysis - 200-Area, Savannah River Plant Operations, DPSTSY-200-1H, Volume 2, Savannah River Laboratory, Aiken, South Carolina.
- Elle, D. R., 1992, U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, Chaconas, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Biological Information for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for the Nuclear Complex Reconfiguration," February 19.
- Engineering Science, Inc., 1990, Project Report of Air Quality Study at the Nevada Test Site, Engineering Science, Pasadena, California, November 30.
- EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards), 1992, Industrial Source Complex (ISC2) Dispersion Models - ISC2 Short Term (ISCST2) Model, EPA 450/4-92-008A, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, March.
- EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Noise Abatement and Control), 1982, Noise Impact Analysis, EPA-550/9-82-105 (PB82-219205), Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., April.
- EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Noise Abatement and Control), 1971, Noise and Wildlife and Other Animals - Review of Research since 1971, EPA 550/9-71-001, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., July.
- EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 1974, Information on Levels of Environmental Protection Requisite to Protect Public Health and Welfare with an Adequate Margin of Safety, EPA 004 (PB-239429), Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., March.
- ERDA (Energy Research and Development Administration), 1977, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, ERDA-1551, Energy Research and Development Administration, Washington, D.C., September.
- ERDA (Energy Research and Development Administration), 1976, Ecology of the Nevada Test Site, Narrative Summary and Annotated Bibliography, Energy Research & Development Administration, Las Vegas, Nevada, May.
- FICON (Federal Interagency Committee on Noise), 1992, Federal Agency Review of Selected Noise Analysis Issues, Federal Interagency Committee on Noise, Washington, D.C.
- FR (Federal Register), 1992, 57 FR 193, "Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Activities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory," Department of Energy, Monday October 5, pp. 45773-45777.
- FR (Federal Register), 1991, 56 FR 225, "Notice of Review, Endangered and Threatened Species," Department of Energy, Monday October 5, pp. 45773-45777.

- Plants, Animal Candidate Review for Listing as Threatened or Endangered," Depart United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Thursday November 21, pp. 58804-58836.
- FR (Federal Register), 1990a, 55 FR 204, "Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environm Statement on the Department of Energy's Proposed Integrated Environmental Resto and Waste Management Program and to Conduct Public Scoping Meetings," Departmen Energy, Monday October 22, pp. 42693-42698.
- FR (Federal Register), 1990b, 55 FR 35, "Notice of Review, Endangered and Threatene Plants, Plant Taxa Candidate Review for Listing as Threatened or Endangered," D Interior, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Wednesday February 21, pp. 6
- FWS (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), 1993, "Candidate Species of Nevada," U.S. Fis Service Nevada State Office, Nevada, updated December 1.
- FWS (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), 1992, Letter from D. Harlow, U.S. Fish and Wi N. Aquilina, U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, regarding "Bi on Nevada Test Site Activities," U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Reno Field Off May 20.
- Greger P. D., 1991, Bird List for the Nevada Test Site, Base Environmental Complian Program, University of California, Los Angeles, Mercury, Nevada, July 18.
- Greger, P. D. and E. Romney, n.d. ., Wildlife Utilization of National Springs and Sources at the Nevada Test Site - Draft, Base Environmental Compliance and Moni University of California, Los Angeles, Mercury, Nevada.
- Hale, D., 1994, Internal Technical Report - Description of a Generic Spent Nuclear for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, EGG-WM-11230, EG&G Idaho, Idaho Falls, Idaho, March 10.
- HNUS (Halliburton NUS Corporation), 1995, Accident Analysis of Spent Nuclear Fuel S Oak Ridge Reservation and Nevada Test Site, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithe Maryland, March.
- Harr, E. C., 1994, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, memorandum U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, Idaho Falls, Idaho, regardi Final Report generic facility information," March 22.
- Hunter, R., K. Dyka, T. Webb, and P. Hopkin, 1988, Status of Astragalus Beatleyae P Nevada Test Site in 1988.
- Hunter, R. B., M. B. Saethre, P. A. Medica, P. D. Greger, and E. M. Romney, 1991, B the Impact Zone of the Liquefied Gaseous Fuels Spill Test Facility in Frenchman DOE/NV/10630-15, Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc., Las Vegas, Nevada
- ITE (Institute of Transportation Engineers), 1991, "Trip Generation, 5th Edition", Transportation Engineers, Washington, D.C.
- Johnejack, K. R., L. G. Dever, L. J. O'Neill, D. O. Blout, M. J. Sully, S. W. Tyler Emer, and D. P. Hammermeister, 1994, Significance of Water Fluxes in a Deep Ari Vadose Zone to Waste Disposal Strategies, Reynolds Electrical and Engineering C Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, and Desert Research Institute, Nevada.
- Johnson, V., 1994, U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations, Memorandum to T. W EIS Project Manager, regarding "F-Team Final Report, Predecisional Draft," Marc
- Las Vegas Review Journal, Nevada Development Authority, and First Interstate Bank o Las Vegas Perspective, Nevada Development Authority, Las Vegas, Nevada.
- Las Vegas Valley Water District, 1994, Water Resources, Las Vegas, Nevada.
- Leedom, S., 1994, Communication from S. Leedom, U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Op

Office, regarding "Comments on Draft SNF EIS," Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, May 25.

Leppert, J., 1994, Communication from John Leppert, U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Office, to Kevin Folk, Halliburton NUS, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Waste Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, April 1.

Leppert, J., 1993, Communication from John Leppert, U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Office, to Julie Schilling, Halliburton NUS, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Data," Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, December 10.

Lyon, J. L., M. R. Klauber, J. W. Gardner, and K. S. Udall, 1979, "Childhood Leukemia With Fallout From Nuclear Testing," The New England Journal of Medicine, Volume 397-402.

Medica P. A., 1990, Reptile List for the Nevada Test Site, Base Environmental Compliance Monitoring Program, University of California, Los Angeles, Mercury, Nevada, April 25.

Medica, P. A. and M. B. Saethre, 1990, Mammal List for the Nevada Test Site, Base Environmental Compliance and Monitoring Program, University of California, Los Angeles, Mercury, Nevada, April 25.

Murdock, S. H. and F. L. Leistritz, 1979, Energy Development in the Western United States Rural Areas, New York: Praeger Publishers.

National Academy of Sciences 1972, The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Level Radiation, Washington, D.C., November.

National Climatic Data Center, 1991, Local Climatological Data Annual Summaries for Western Region, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Asheville, North Carolina.

NCRP (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements), 1987, Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the Population of the United States, Bethesda, Maryland, September.

NDOT (Nevada Department of Transportation), 1992, State of Nevada, Program/Project Division, PSMS Work Program Schedule, Carson City, Nevada, January 17.

NEEDA (Nye/Esmeralda Economic Development Authority), 1993, Nye County Overall Economic Development Plan, Nye County, Nevada, July 23.

NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1979, Environmental Standard Review Plans for Environmental Review of Construction Permit Applications for Nuclear Power Plant 0555, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C., May.

NV DCNR (Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources), 1992, Protection and Propagation of Selected Species of Flora, Critically Endangered Species List, Nevada Forestry, Carson City, Nevada, December 18.

Nye County Board of Commissioners, 1993, Baseline Economic and Demographic Projections 2010 Nye County and Nye County Communities, Planning Information Corporation, Denver, Colorado, May 25.

Nye County Board of Commissioners, 1992, A Socioeconomic Assessment of the Proposed Spur - Draft, Planning Information Corporation, Denver, Colorado, December 15.

PNL (Pacific Northwest Laboratory), 1988, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiation Software System, PNL-6584/UC-600, Software Version 1.485 (December 3, 1990), Richland, Washington, December.

Rallison, M. L., T. M. Lotz, M. Bishop, W. Divine, K. Haywood, J. L. Lyon, and W. S. "Cohort Study of Thyroid Disease Near the Nevada Test Site: A Preliminary Report," Physics, Volume 59, Number 5, pp. 739-746.

- Rand McNally, 1993, Road Atlas, Chicago.
- RSN (Raytheon Services Nevada), 1993, Summary of Natural Resources That Potentially Human Intrusion at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site DOE/Nevada Test County, Nevada, Raytheon Services Nevada, Las Vegas, Nevada, August.
- Rush, F. E., 1970, Water Resources - Reconnaissance Series Report 54 "Regional Group in the Nevada Test Site Area, Nye, Lincoln, and Clark Counties, Nevada", State Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, Division of Water Resources, Nevada.
- Sandia National Laboratories, 1982, Geology of the Nevada Test Site and Nearby Area Nevada, Sandia Report SAND82-2207, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, N October.
- Tetrattech, 1993, Memorandum from Terri S. West, Tetrattech, San Bernardino, California Dabak, Tetrattech, regarding "NTS Trip Report," August 26.
- Thornton, K., 1994, U.S. DOE, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas Nevada, communication Jacaruso, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Utili NTS," April 7.
- TRB (Transportation Research Board), 1985, Highway Capacity Manual, Special Report Research Council, Washington, D.C.
- ULI (Urban Land Institute), 1992, ULI Market Profiles: 1992, Washington, D.C.: The Institute.
- USAF (U.S. Air Force), 1993, Environmental Assessment for Southern Nevada Relay Node 8W918NV, Air Force Materiel Command Electronics System Center, Hanscomb Air Force Massachusetts, March 5.
- U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Department of Interior (USAF et al.), 1991, Speeches Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, September.
- U.S. COE (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), 1987, Corps of Engineers Wetlands Delineation Technical Report Y-87-1, U.S. Department of the Army Corps of Engineers, Washington Winograd, I. J., 1970, "Noninstrumental Factors Affecting Measurement of Static Water Deeply Buried Aquifers and Aquitards, Nevada Test Site," Ground Water, 8, 2. pp

7.0 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

oC	degrees Celsius
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
Ci	curie(s)
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EIS	environmental impact statement
ECF	Expendable Core Facility
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
yF	degrees Fahrenheit
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
g	gram
gal	gallon(s)
hr	hour
INEL	Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
kg	kilogram
km	kilometer
kv	kilovolt
y	liter
m	meter
m3	cubic meter

mi	mile
mi2	square mile
min	minute
mph	miles per hour
mR	milliroentgen
mrem	millirem
MTHM	metric tons of heavy metal
MW	Megawatt
nCi	nanocurie
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NTS	Nevada Test Site
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
ORR	Oak Ridge Reservation
PCB	polychlorinated biphenyl
pCi	picocurie(s)
PEIS	Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
PM10	particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter
ppm	parts per million
RCRA	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
SNF	spent nuclear fuel
SRS	Savannah River Site
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
ug	micrograms
USGS	U.S. Geological Survey
yr	year

OAK RIDGE RESERVATION

1.	INTRODUCTION	3.1-1
2.	OAK RIDGE RESERVATION SITE BACKGROUND	3.2-1
2.1	Overview	3.2-1
2.1.1	Site Description	3.2-1
2.1.2	Site History	3.2-5
2.1.3	Mission	3.2-6
2.1.4	Oak Ridge Reservation Operations Management	3.2-6
2.2	Regulatory Framework	3.2-7
2.3	Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program	3.2-8
2.3.1	Building 3525 - Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory	
2.3.2	Building 4501 - High Level Radiochemical Laboratory	3.2-10
2.3.3	Building 7920 - Radiochemical Engineering Development Center	
2.3.4	Dry Storage Facilities 7823A, 7827, and 7829	3.2-10
2.3.5	Research Reactors	3.2-12
3.	SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL ALTERNATIVES	3.3-1
3.1	Description of Management Alternatives	3.3-1
3.1.1	Alternative 1 - No Action	3.3-1
3.1.2	Alternative 2 - Decentralization	3.3-2
3.1.3	Alternative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis	3.3-3
3.1.4	Alternative 4 - Regionalization	3.3-3
3.1.5	Alternative 5 - Centralization	3.3-6
3.2	Comparison of Alternatives	3.3-9
4.	AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT	3.4-1
4.1	Overview	3.4-1
4.2	Land Use	3.4-1
4.3	Socioeconomics	3.4-6
4.3.1	Region of Influence	3.4-6
4.3.2	Regional Economic Activity and Population	3.4-6
4.3.3	Public Service, Education and Training, and Housing Infrastructure	
4.4	Cultural and Paleontological Resources	3.4-11

4.4.1	Archeological Sites and Historic Structures	3.4-11
4.4.2	Native American Resources	3.4-11
4.4.3	Paleontological Resources	3.4-12
4.5	Aesthetics and Scenic Resources	3.4-12
4.6	Geologic Resources	3.4-14
4.6.1	General Geology	3.4-14
4.6.2	Geologic Resources	3.4-20
4.6.3	Seismic and Volcanic Hazards	3.4-21
4.7	Air Resources	3.4-25
4.7.1	Climatology	3.4-25
4.7.2	Air Monitoring Networks	3.4-29
4.7.3	Air Releases	3.4-29
4.7.4	Air Quality	3.4-32
4.8	Water Resources	3.4-38
4.8.1	Surface Water	3.4-38
4.8.2	Groundwater	3.4-44
4.9	Ecological Resources	3.4-47
4.9.1	Terrestrial Resources	3.4-48
4.9.2	Wetlands	3.4-51
4.9.3	Aquatic Ecology	3.4-51
4.9.4	Threatened and Endangered Species	3.4-53
4.10	Noise	3.4-56
4.11	Traffic and Transportation	3.4-58
4.12	Occupational and Public Health and Safety	3.4-61
4.12.1	Atmospheric Emissions and Doses	3.4-62
4.12.2	Groundwater/Surface Water Contamination and Doses	3.4-62
4.12.3	External Gamma Radiation	3.4-64
4.12.4	Radiation Dose and Health Effects Summary	3.4-64
4.12.5	Health Effects Studies	3.4-65
4.12.6	Chemical Dose and Health Effects Summary	3.4-66
4.13	Utilities and Energy	3.4-67
4.13.1	Water Consumption	3.4-67
4.13.2	Electrical Consumption	3.4-68
4.13.3	Fuel Consumption	3.4-68
4.13.4	Wastewater Disposal	3.4-68
4.14	Materials and Waste Management	3.4-69
4.14.1	Transuranic Waste	3.4-72
4.14.2	Mixed Low-Level Waste	3.4-72
4.14.3	Low-Level Waste	3.4-83
4.14.4	Hazardous Waste	3.4-83
4.14.5	Industrial Solid Waste	3.4-83
4.14.6	Hazardous Materials	3.4-83
5.	ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES	3.5-1
5.1	Overview	3.5-1
5.2	Land Use	3.5-1
5.2.1	Centralization Alternative	3.5-1
5.2.2	Regionalization Alternative	3.5-2
5.3	Socioeconomics	3.5-2
5.3.1	Centralization Alternative	3.5-4
5.3.2	Regionalization Alternative	3.5-9
5.3.3	Mitigation Measures	3.5-10
5.4	Cultural and Paleontological Resources	3.5-10
5.4.1	Centralization Alternative	3.5-10
5.4.2	Regionalization Alternative	3.5-10
5.5	Aesthetics and Scenic Resources	3.5-11
5.5.1	Centralization Alternative	3.5-11
5.5.2	Regionalization Alternative	3.5-11
5.6	Geologic Resources	3.5-11
5.7	Air Resources	3.5-12
5.7.1	Releases	3.5-13
5.7.2	Air Quality	3.5-17
5.8	Water Resources	3.5-19
5.8.1	Surface Water Quantity	3.5-22
5.8.2	Surface Water Quality	3.5-23

5.8.3	Groundwater Quantity	3.5-25
5.8.4	Groundwater Quality	3.5-25
5.9	Ecological Resources	3.5-26
5.9.1	Centralization Alternative	3.5-26
5.9.2	Regionalization Alternative	3.5-28
5.10	Noise	3.5-28
5.11	Traffic and Transportation	3.5-30
5.11.1	Centralization Alternative	3.5-30
5.11.2	Regionalization Alternative	3.5-32
5.12	Occupational and Public Health and Safety	3.5-32
5.12.1	Centralization Alternative	3.5-32
5.12.2	Regionalization Alternative	3.5-36
5.13	Utilities and Energy	3.5-36
5.13.1	Centralization Alternative	3.5-37
5.13.2	Regionalization Alternative	3.5-38
5.14	Materials and Waste Management	3.5-38
5.14.1	Methodology	3.5-39
5.14.2	Materials and Waste Management	3.5-39
5.15	Facility Accidents	3.5-42
5.15.1	Historical SNF Accidents at ORR	3.5-43
5.15.2	Methodology	3.5-43
5.15.3	No Action Alternative	3.5-47
5.15.4	Centralization Alternative	3.5-56
5.15.5	Decentralization Alternative	3.5-70
5.15.6	1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative	3.5-73
5.15.7	Regionalization Alternative	3.5-73
5.15.8	Emergency Preparedness and Plans	3.5-73
5.16	Cumulative Impacts and Impacts from Connected or Similar Actions	3.5
5.16.1	Centralization Alternative	3.5-75
5.16.2	Regionalization Alternative	3.5-80
5.17	Adverse Environmental Effects That Cannot Be Avoided	3.5-80
5.17.1	Overview	3.5-80
5.17.2	Centralization Alternative	3.5-80
5.17.3	Regionalization Alternative	3.5-81
5.18	Relationship Between Short-Term Use of the Environment and the Maintenance of Long-Term Productivity	3.5-81
5.19	Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources	3.5-82
5.19.1	Overview	3.5-82
5.19.2	Centralization Alternative	3.5-82
5.19.3	Regionalization Alternative	3.5-83
5.20	Potential Mitigation Measures	3.5-83
5.20.1	Pollution Prevention	3.5-83
5.20.2	Potential Mitigation Measures	3.5-83
6.	REFERENCES	3.6-1
7.	ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	3.7-1
FIGURES		
2.1-1	Oak Ridge Reservation Regional Map	3.2-2
2.1-2	Oak Ridge Reservation Site and Transportation	3.2-3
4.2-1	Generalized Land Use at the Oak Ridge Reservation	3.4-3
4.2-2	Recreation Areas in the Vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation	3.4-4
4.6-1	Generalized Map of the Southern Appalachian Geologic Provinces Showing the Location of the Oak Ridge Reservation	3.4-15
4.6-2	Geologic Map of the Oak Ridge Reservation	3.4-16
4.6-3	Stratigraphy of the ORR on the Whiteoak Mountain and Copper Creek Thrust Sheets	3.4-17
4.6-4	Generalized Geologic Profile Beneath the Oak Ridge Reservation	3.4-18
4.6-5	Oak Ridge - Site Specific Uniform Hazard Response Spectra for Horizontal Rock Motion	3.4-24
4.7-1	Wind Roses for Y-12 West Tower (@10 and 60m) for 1992 at ORR	3.4-27
4.7-2	Sources of Radiation Exposure, Unrelated to Oak Ridge Reservation Operations, to Individuals in the Vicinity of ORR	3.4-35
4.8-1	Locations of the Clinch River and Tributaries on the Oak Ridge Reservation	3.4-40
4.9-1	Oak Ridge Reservation Plant Communities	3.4-49

4.11-1	Oak Ridge Reservation Regional Transportation Map	3.4-59
4.14-1	Flow Diagram of Y-12 Plant Storage and Disposal Units at ORR	3.4-70
4.14-2	Flow Diagram of K-25 Waste Storage Units at ORR	3.4-73
4.14-3	Flow Diagram of ORNL Waste Treatment Units and Storage and Disposal Units at ORR	3.4-75
5.3-1	Total Employment Effects - ORR Centralization Alternative	3.5-5
5.15-1	Isodose Lines for an Airplane Crash into Dry Cell Accident with 50 Percent Meteorology at Oak Ridge Reservation	3.5-71
TABLES		
2.3-1	Oak Ridge Reservation SNF Storage Facilities	3.2-11
3.2-1	Comparison of alternatives at the Oak Ridge Reservation	3.3-10
4.3-1	Aggregate regional economic and demograph indicators for ORR	3.4-10
4.7-1	Radioactive atmospheric emissions from the ORR during 1992	3.4-30
4.7-2	Nonradiological emissions at ORR	3.4-33
4.7-3	Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from ORR operations during 1992	3.4-34
4.7-4	Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable regulations and guidelines at the ORR	3.4-36
4.8-1	1992 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System noncompliance at the ORR	3.4-43
4.9-1	Federally and state-listed threatened, endangered, and other special-status species that potentially occur on or in the vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation	3.4-54
4.10-1	City of Oak Ridge maximum allowable noise limits applicable to the ORR	3.4-57
4.12-1	Summary of estimated radiation dose to public from 1992 operations at ORR	3.4-63
4.14-1	Projected 1995 transuranic waste management activities at the ORR (ORNL complex)	3.4-77
4.14-2	Baseline transuranic waste management activities as of 1995 at the ORR (ORNL complex)	3.4-78
4.14-3	Projected 1995 mixed low-level waste management activities at the ORR	
4.14-4	Baseline mixed low-level waste management activities as of 1995 at the ORR	
4.14-5	Projected 1995 low-level waste management activities at the ORR	3.4-84
4.14-6	Baseline low-level waste management activities as of 1995 at the ORR	
4.14-7	Projected 1995 hazardous waste management activities at the ORR	3.4-88
4.14-8	Baseline hazardous waste management activities as of 1995 at the ORR	
4.14-9	Projected 1995 industrial solid waste management activities at the ORR	
4.14-10	Baseline industrial solid waste management activities as of 1995 at the ORR	
5.3-1	Socioeconomic effects - Centralization of SNF at Oak Ridge Reservation	3.5-6
5.7-1	Isotopic release additions due to SNF management facility presence at ORR	
5.7-2	Total annual nonradioactive emissions for the SNF management facility at ORR	3.5-16
5.7-3	Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from ORR operations and the proposed SNF management facility	3.5-18
5.7-4	Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable regulations and guidelines at ORR and proposed SNF management facility plus current operations	3.5-20
5.7-5	Calculated annual maximum concentrations for hazardous air pollutants at ORR for offsite receptors	3.5-21
5.12-1	Critical Interim Storage Facility impacts on radiation dose and cancer risks at ORR	3.5-34
5.14-1	Ten-year cumulative estimated waste generation for SNF alternatives at the ORR	3.5-40
5.15-1	Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis dose and risk	

	estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95 percent meteorology	3.5-48
5.15-2	Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50 percent meteorology	3.5-49
5.15-3	Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95 percent meteorology	3.5-50
5.15-4	Summary of No Action Alternative accident cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50 percent meteorology	3.5-51
5.15-5	Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis health effects and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95 percent meteorology	
5.15-6	Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis health effects and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50 percent meteorology	
5.15-7	Estimated radionuclide releases for the High Flux Isotope Reactor fuel pool dam drop accident at ORR	3.5-55
5.15-8	Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95 percent meteorology	
5.15-9	Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50 percent meteorology	
5.15-10	Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95 percent meteorology	
5.15-11	Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50 percent meteorology	
5.15-12	Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis health effects and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95 percent meteorology	
5.15-13	Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis health effects and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50 percent meteorology	
5.15-14	Estimated radionuclide releases for a fuel assembly breach accident at ORR	3.5-64
5.15-15	Estimated radionuclide releases for a dropped fuel cask accident at ORR	
5.15-16	Estimated radionuclide releases for a severe impact and fire accident at ORR	3.5-65
5.15-17	Estimated radionuclide releases for a wind-driven missile impact into a storage cask at ORR	3.5-67
5.15-18	Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry storage facility at ORR	3.5-67
5.15-19	Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry cell facility at ORR	3.5-69
5.15-20	Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into an SNF water pool at ORR	3.5-69
5.15-21	Secondary impacts of Centralization Alternative accidents at the ORR	

#1. INTRODUCTION

This part assesses the impacts of construction and operation of proposed spent n (SNF) facilities at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). The ORR is being evaluated for facilities because of the area available, the apparently suitable site environment previous U.S. Department of Energy activities involving radioactive materials at the planned long-term government control of the site.

This appendix is organized as follows. Chapter 1 is the introduction, Chapter 2 stage for the area under analysis by providing an overview of the ORR and a discussion of the Regulatory Framework and the SNF Management Program, and Chapter 3 explains the SNF alternatives being considered at the site.

Chapter 4 describes the human and natural environment that could be affected as

of the introduction of an SNF facility at the ORR. Environmental parameters such as resources, socioeconomics, biological resources, and air quality are examples of those characterized.

Chapter 5 enumerates the environmental consequences that might be anticipated, summarizes the cumulative impacts, describes unavoidable adverse impacts, and describes irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources that might be anticipated if were built at the ORR. Chapter 6 contains the references used to develop this part of the environmental impact statement. Chapter 7 contains a list of abbreviations and acronyms for this part of the environmental impact statement.

2. OAK RIDGE RESERVATION SITE BACKGROUND

2.1 Overview

2.1.1 Site Description

The Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) is located on approximately 34,667 acres (140 square kilometers) of federally owned land within the incorporated city limits of Oak Ridge (see Figure 2.1-1). The City of Oak Ridge and the ORR lie between the Cumberland and Southern Appalachian mountain ranges. Knoxville is located approximately 25 miles (40 kilometers) southeast of the ORR and is the largest city in the area. The population of the five counties surrounding the ORR. The area around Knoxville is a heavily populated, highly developed urban area, whereas the area surrounding the ORR is sparsely populated, with the exception of the city of Oak Ridge, which is considered to have medium density. The two main land uses in the five counties surrounding the ORR are forestry and agriculture.

Within the ORR there are three primary complexes: the Y-12 Plant, the K-25 Site (formerly the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant), and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) (see Figure 2.1-2). Currently these facilities are being used for research, development, and production.

The Y-12 Plant is located on the eastern portion of the ORR known as Bear Creek. The Y-12 Plant serves as a key manufacturing technology center for the development and demonstration of unique materials, components, and services of importance to DOE and the nation. This mission is accomplished through the reclamation and storage of nuclear waste, the manufacture of components to the nation's defense capabilities, support to national programs, and services provided to other customers as approved by DOE (MMES 1994a).

The K-25 Site is located on the northwestern portion of the ORR. Its mission is to serve as a base of operation for the Energy Systems Environmental Restoration and Waste Management programs, thus serving as the "platform" for the restoration of the environment and cleanup of DOE wastes through leadership and central management of the Environmental Restoration programs.

Figure 2.1-1. Oak Ridge Reservation regional map. Figure 2.1-2. Oak Ridge Reservation site map. The ORR is managed for DOE by Energy Systems, other elements of the Federal Government, and the public. The Toxic Substances Control Act incinerator is managed by and located on Site (MMES 1994a).

The ORNL is located in the southern portion of the ORR. The primary mission of ORNL is to perform leading edge research and development in support of nonweapons roles (MMES 1994a). The ORNL uses test and experimental reactors to perform research and small-scale radioisotope production activities. The amount of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated by these facilities, the amount expected to be generated through the year 2035, and accommodations being undertaken at the present time to store the fuel currently being generated are discussed in the following sections.

The buildings located off the ORR but owned and/or operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are 1) the Scarboro Facility, 2) the Central Training Facility, 3) the Transportation Safeguards Division Maintenance Facility, and 4) some ancillary and administrative facilities and structures. The majority of the facilities used by DOE for protection and security groups are located within the plant's boundary. Other offices include the DOE Oak Ridge Operations Office, the DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information, the Oak Ridge Associated Universities facilities, the American Museum of Natural History, the prime contractor's "Townsite" facilities, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Atmospheric Turbulence and Diffusion Laboratory, and others. With the exception of the Federal Office Building and space leased from the private sector,

are located on DOE-owned land.

The proposed site of the SNF management facility is located on 100 acres (0.40 kilometer) of land designated as the West Bear Creek Valley site (see Figure 2.1-2) (La Grone 1994; MMES 1994b). The proposed SNF storage facility will require 90 of acres (0.36 of the 0.40 square kilometer) set aside for the facility (Johnson, V. 1

The proposed SNF management facility is on Bear Creek Road adjacent to the Clin River on the west end of the ORR. The westernmost boundary of the proposed SNF facility is less than 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) from the ORR boundary. Across Bear Creek Road from the proposed SNF management facility there is a privately owned industrial park (MMES 1

2.1.2 Site History

The ORR was originally purchased in the early 1940s to house the large-scale production of fissionable material for the first nuclear weapon in the world. The original tract purchased was 56,833 acres (230 square kilometers). Portions of the original tract were used to build the City of Oak Ridge for the people who constructed and operated the ORR. Residential and business areas of the city were sold, and the ORR has been reduced to its present size.

ORNL began in 1943 as the Clinton Laboratories, a pilot plant for testing and development of the plutonium-239 production and chemical separations processes. Major facilities at ORNL included the X-10 Graphite Reactor, a chemical pilot plant, and numerous support laboratories and shops. The ORNL's initial mission was fulfilled by 1945, but because of its unique capabilities, new research and development programs were initiated in energy and environmental technology (DOE 1988).

Since 1945 emphasis at ORNL has been on exploration of the use of nuclear scientific technology, which continues as a major component of research and development of the laboratory. A number of additional nuclear reactors and supporting facilities have operated at ORNL since the original mission associated with the Manhattan Project. Research and development in nuclear science and technology is supported currently by one operating research reactor, the High Flux Isotope Reactor. ORNL has proposed the Advanced Neutron Source, which would take over many of the tasks now carried out by the High Flux Isotope Reactor (Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).

In 1943 the Y-12 Plant was constructed as part of the Manhattan Project. The Y-12 separated fissionable isotopes of uranium-235 by the electromagnetic process, which was used to produce the world's first atomic bomb, detonated on August 5, 1945 (MMES 1990; DOE 1987). Over time Y-12 has developed into a highly sophisticated nuclear weapons component manufacturing and development engineering organization and currently is used for weapons disassembly.

The Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, now the K-25 Site, was used to produce enriched uranium for U.S. nuclear weapons. It also provided an industrial toll enrichment service in which uranium was enriched for use in nuclear-powered reactors around the world. The Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant was permanently shut down.

2.1.3 Mission

The missions of the primary plant complexes within ORR are:

- Energy Research and Development at ORNL.
- Reclamation and Storage of Nuclear Material, Manufacturing of Defense Hardware and National Security, Technology Transfer, and Work for Others Programs at ORNL.
- Environmental Restoration and Waste Management at the K-25 Site (MMES 1994a)

The mission of ORNL includes services that only research reactors provide, including 1) production of transuranium isotopes used in basic research, medical, defense, and industrial applications, 2) neutron scattering research to determine fundamental structure and properties of materials, 3) production of unique isotopes for medical treatment and research, 4) special commercial isotopes, and 5) irradiation of structural and fuel materials for testing of reactors and advanced nuclear reactors (Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).

2.1.4 Oak Ridge Reservation Operations Management

Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., operates the major facilities at the ORR (the K-25 Site, and ORNL). They are under contract to and administered by the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation Operations Office. Current missions and functions can be grouped into the following categories:

categories: defense production activities; environmental management activities; other activities; and work for others.

2.2 Regulatory Framework

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 USC 4321-4347, as amended) provides Federal agency decision makers with a process to systematically consider the environmental consequences of agency decisions. The DOE has prepared this environmental impact statement (EIS) in conformance with the requirements of NEPA to evaluate the impacts of programmatic decisions on the management of SNF. This EIS provides the background, data, and analyses to help decision makers understand the potential environmental consequences of each alternative.

On October 22, 1990, the DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register (FR 1990) announcing its intent to prepare a programmatic EIS addressing environmental restoration and waste management (including SNF management) activities across the complex. On October 5, 1992, the DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register (FR 1992) announcing its intent to prepare an EIS addressing environmental restoration, waste management and SNF activities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. For further programmatic discussion of this topic, see Volume 1.

Significant state environmental and nuclear materials management laws applicable to ORR include the following (listed alphabetically):

- Air Pollution Control Regulations (Chapter 1200-3)
- Air Quality Act (Title 68 Chapter 201-101)
- Emergency Rules--Hazardous Substance Remedial Action (Chapter 1200-1-13)
- Emission Standards and Monitoring Requirements for Additional Control Areas (Chapter 1200-3-19)
- Hazardous Substance Site Remedial Action (Chapter 1200-1-13)
- Hazardous Waste Management (Chapter 1200-1-11)
- Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste (Chapter 1200-3-16)
- New Source Performance Standards (Chapter 1200-3-16)
- Prevention of Hazards and Pollution (Chapter 1200-1-6)
- Rules and Regulations Applied to Tennessee Codes Annotated -69-1-1 (Chapter 1200-4-8)
- Solid Waste Processing and Disposal (Chapter 1200-1-7)
- Underground Storage Tank Program (Chapter 1200-1-15)
- Visible Emission Regulations (Chapter 1200-3-5)
- Volatile Organic Compound (Chapter 1200-3-18)

2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program

In the past, reactor-irradiated nuclear materials, which include SNF and reactor target material, have been stored prior to reprocessing activities to recover plutonium and other isotopes. In the past several years, however, the DOE has either phased out or stopped its reprocessing of these materials. With this change, reactor-irradiated materials were being stored for longer periods of time than originally planned. The question of reactor-irradiated nuclear materials and the conditions of storage for the material has been a question throughout DOE facilities.

In an effort to assess whether extended storage conditions for reactor-irradiated materials are safe (i.e., whether protection exists for workers, the public, and the environment), the DOE commissioned a study. This assessment also grouped any vulnerabilities of conditions into three categories where management attention could be directed: less than 1 to 5 years, and greater than 5 years. In November 1993, the DOE published the Spent Nuclear Fuel Working Group Report on Inventory and Storage of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel. The report, titled "Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Materials and Their Environmental, Safety and Health Vulnerabilities," hereafter referred to as the Spent Fuel Working Group Report, is a result of the efforts (DOE 1993b; 1994b).

As a result of the Spent Fuel Working Group Report, a Plan of Action to Resolve Spent Nuclear Fuel Vulnerabilities was also commissioned to address what was discovered in the Working Group Report. Phase I of the Plan of Action to Resolve Spent Nuclear Fuel Vulnerabilities was published in February 1994. Phase II and Phase III were issued in June and October 1994, respectively. To address the vulnerabilities identified in the Spent Fuel Working Group Report, individual action plans were developed to reflect the DOE's strategy.

urgency, concern for worker protection, commitment to minimize environmental impact need for compatible long-term solutions.

The ORR was assessed as part of the Spent Fuel Working Group Report. SNF located at the ORR is currently stored in facilities at the ORNL. The SNF at ORR is primarily from research or experimental reactors that are operating or have operated at ORNL. SNF left over from research on fuel elements removed from commercial or demonstration reactors utilized by DOE predecessor agencies for advancement of nuclear science are present. In the past, most of the SNF from the Oak Ridge research and experimental was chemically processed to recover fissile materials at Savannah River Site (Brown Hoel 1994).

This section describes the status of the SNF at the ORR using the information from the Spent Fuel Working Group Report, the Plan of Action to Resolve Spent Nuclear Fuel Vulnerabilities, the Spent Fuel Inventory Data developed for the SNF EIS, and through ORR. If fuel can be contact handled, it has not been listed in the Spent Fuel SNF. The SNF management program at ORR utilizes 10 facilities for storage. These and their SNF contents are summarized on Table 2.3-1.

2.3.1 Building 3525 - Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory

This two-story brick structure was built in 1963 and contains hot cells. The facility continues to be disassembly and examination of irradiated fuel and components. Building contains 1 unit of research reactor fuel in the form of fuel samples and targets (D Wichmann 1995a, b).

2.3.2 Building 4501 - High-Level Radiochemical Laboratory

Constructed in 1951, this facility contains centrally located hot cells support laboratories capable of handling radioactive materials. SNF is in dry storage at Building 4501 contains 0.006 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of DOE-owned commercial fuel (DOE 1993b; Wichmann 1995a, b).

2.3.3 Building 7920 - Radiochemical Engineering Development Center

The Radiochemical Engineering Development Center is a multipurpose hot cell facility with equipment, shielding, and containment provisions to safely process and store significant quantities of highly radioactive targets. This facility was specifically built to prepare and receive fuel from the High Flux Isotope Reactor. Building 7920 contains 0.024 MTHM of research fuel in the form of fuel samples in dry storage (DOE 1993b; Wichmann 1995a, b).

2.3.4 Dry Storage Facilities 7823A, 7827, and 7829

Now closed to further storage, these shielded, retrievable storage facilities are dry wells placed in the ground in Solid Waste Storage Area 5 North. They vary from 20 to 76 centimeters in diameter and from 10 to 15 feet (3 to 4.6 meters) deep. Wells are placed on a concrete pad and are held in place by concrete collars or slabs surrounded by dirt. Spent fuel and other materials were placed in the wells beginning in 1963. Table 2.3-1. Oak Ridge Reservation SNF Storage Facilities.

Facility name	Material stored at facility	Heavy metal mass (MTHM)
High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) Pool	HFIR fuel	0.45
Bulk Shielding Reactor (BSR) Pool	BSR & ORR fuel	0.01
Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE)	MSRE fuel	0.037
Bldg. 4501	Misc. LWR fuels	0.006
Tower Shielding Reactor (TSR)	TSR fuel	0.0092
Facility 7823A	Misc. fuel	0.0008
Facility 7827	Misc. fuel	0.0837

Facility 7829	Peach Bottom	0.0137
Bldg. 7920	Dresden-1 fuels	0.024
Bldg. 3525	Misc. fuels	
Solid Waste Storage Area	KEMA Suspension Test Reactor	0.037
6	fuels	

Source: Wichmann (1995a,b)

a. See Section 2.3.5.6.

Facility 7823A contain 0.0008 MTHM; facility 7827 contains 0.0837 MTHM; and facility 7829 contains 0.0137 MTHM. Activities to address the vulnerabilities in these facilities include: 1) transferring the fuel, 2) adding a new inner liner and relocating fuel in modified overpacking any fuel in suspect condition. These activities are expected to be completed by year 1996 (DOE 1994b; 1993b; Wichmann 1995a, b).

2.3.5 Research Reactors

Six existing reactors and one planned reactor are expected to be generating and operating at the ORNL. They are the High Flux Isotope Reactor (currently operating), the Tower Shielding Reactor No. II (shut down in 1992), the Bulk Shielding Reactor (shut down in 1987), the Oak Ridge Research Reactor (shut down in 1987), the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (shut down in 1969), the KEMA Suspension Test Reactor, and the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor (planned to start up in 2002 or 2003) (ANS 1988).

2.3.5.1 High Flux Isotope Reactor. The High Flux Isotope Reactor is a beryllium-

reflected, light water cooled and moderated, flux-trap-type reactor. The reactor uses fuel clad fuel plates containing highly enriched uranium-235. The reactor became operational in 1970 and its current power level is 85 megawatts. Reactor missions include production of medical and industrial applications, neutron-scattering experiments, and various material irradiation experiments (ANS 1988; DOE 1993b).

The High Flux Isotope Reactor is operating. At the present time there are 62 fuel assemblies amounting to 0.45 MTHM from the research reactor fuel in onsite wet storage. The High Flux Isotope Reactor currently does not use onsite dry storage. If the reactor operation through the year 2035, the predicted SNF production will be an additional 1.58 MTHM. (Holt 1993; ORNL 1992a; Wichmann 1995a, b).

Onsite storage at the reactor facility would have to be expanded to accommodate the projected SNF generation rate. At the present time, reracking the existing storage and installing modular dry-storage units at the High Flux Isotope Reactor are being considered. During the installation of the dry-storage units, the potential for future expansion of storage is expected to continue indefinitely (ORNL 1992a).

In the past, SNF assemblies were shipped in casks via truck to the Savannah River Site. The baseline plan is to continue shipments there. However, the Savannah River Site has limited space and plans to accept only 20 fuel assembly shipments from the High Flux Isotope Reactor. If shipment of SNF to another DOE storage facility is precluded or the commencement of reracking at the High Flux Isotope Reactor is not approved by the DOE, the reactor would be required to shut down because the present pool storage racks cannot accommodate additional fuel after early 1995 (Clark 1994).

2.3.5.2 Tower Shielding Reactor No. II and Tower Shielding Facility Building 7708.

The 1 megawatt Tower Shielding Reactor No. II is a light water moderated, movable target research reactor which was shut down in 1992. There are no plans for resuming operation at this time. Tower Shielding Reactor No. II has no containment and was used at ground level, suspended from towers. The research included testing shielding designs and obtaining neutron flux data (ANS 1988; DOE 1993b).

The Tower Shielding Reactor No. II was placed in standby in September 1992 pending DOE direction to prepare the facility for shutdown. At that time, the only existing fuel assembly in the Tower Shielding Reactor No. II fuel assembly was being stored in the reactor core. For handling and storage purposes, an element is an integral core assembly composed of 4 upper central

4 lower central plates, 12 annular plates, a central plug, and 4 fuel plates. One MTHM, is being stored in the reactor core. The corrective actions associated with vulnerabilities identified in the Spent Fuel Working Group Report for the Tower Shielding Reactor No. II and Tower Shielding Facility Building 7708 are: 1) implement access control Shielding Reactor No. II area; 2) implement emergency operating procedures for the Shielding Reactor, i.e., those applicable to a seismic event requiring the experime checked for hazards by knowledgeable staff before personnel enter the area; 3) imp radiation protection controls requiring that a survey be completed by Radiation Pro personnel to verify acceptable radiation levels prior to granting access to a radio 4) remove the fork-lift from Building 7708 to eliminate a potential fire hazard and fuel pins to the Y-12 area for long-term storage to eliminate the potential of an a the same building (completed January 1994). All of these corrective actions plans completed and are being implemented (Holt 1993; ORNL 1994; DOE 1994b; Wichmann 1995 b).

Present options being discussed for storage of this fuel include shipment to th River Site or onsite dry storage at ORNL. Because this reactor is shut down, no ad elements are expected to accumulate through the year 2035 (Holt 1993; ORNL 1994).

2.3.5.3 Bulk Shielding Reactor. The 2 megawatt Bulk Shielding Reactor is an open pool,

light water moderated and reflected, training and research reactor. This reactor w and shut down in 1991; there are no plans for resumption of operations at this time DOE/OSTI 1993; DOE 1993b).

The Bulk Shielding Reactor is shut down and currently has no elements in the re on-site dry storage. Seventy-three of 90 storage locations are occupied in the ons There are 41 elements from the Bulk Shielding Reactor and 32 elements from the Oak Research Reactor for a total of 0.010 MTHM in the storage area. As the reactor is no additional fuel is expected to be added to the inventory through the year 2035; expansion of storage facilities onsite is expected (DOE 1993b; Wichmann 1995a, b).

2.3.5.4 Oak Ridge Research Reactor. The Oak Ridge Research Reactor was shut down

permanently in 1987 and has been defueled. Most of the fuel was transported to the River Site, but some of the fuel was transferred to the Bulk Shielding Reactor pool discussion of the spent fuel inventory in subsection 2.3.5.3 (Holt 1993; ANS 1988;

2.3.5.5 Molten Salt Reactor Experiment. The Molten Salt Reactor Experiment

operated from June 1965 to December 1969 at a nominal power level of 8 megawatts. purpose of the reactor was to test the practicality of a molten-salt reactor concep power station applications. The circulating fuel solution was a mixture of fluorid uranium fluoride as the fuel. The initial charge was uranium-235, but this was lat a charge of uranium-233. Processing capabilities were included as part of the faci fuel additions, removal of impurities, and uranium recovery. Following reactor shu fuel and flush salts were drained to critically safe storage tanks and isolated (Ha

The inventory at the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment consists of approximately 4,650 kilograms (9,514 pounds) of fuels salt mixture. The uranium salt is predomin 233 (31 kilograms [68 pounds]) with lesser amounts of uranium-234, uranium-235, and 238. The balance of the fuel salt is composed of lithium fluoride (LiF, 64.5 perce fluoride (BeF₂, 30.3 percent), and zirconium fluoride (ZrF₄, 5.0 percent). The Mol Experiment contains 0.037 MTHM as the reactor is shutdown, no additional SNF is exp be generated through the year 2035 (DOE 1993b; Hargrove 1993; Wichmann 1995a, b).

Radioactive material migration has been detected from the storage tanks. This could result in unnecessary personnel exposure. If left unabated, radiation levels to a point where access would be difficult. ORNL is determining appropriate correc and expects to implement its corrective action plan during fiscal year 1995 (DOE 19

2.3.5.6 KEMA Suspension Test Reactor. The KEMA Suspension Test Reactor was an

experimental fluidized bed test reactor. The fuel, consisting of one core, was pla Waste Storage Area 6 and totals 0.037 MTHM. The area of Solid Waste Storage Area 6

the fuel was placed is being managed by DOE as part of waste area grouping 6, an environmental restoration program activity, under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. As the reactor is shutdown, no additional SNF is generated through the year 2035 (Wichmann 1995a, b).

2.3.5.7 Advanced Neutron Source Reactor. The Advanced Neutron Source Reactor is

currently in the conceptual design stage and has been proposed to be operational in 2002 or 2003. Its principal purpose will be for neutron beam experiments, but it will be used for some isotope production (Holt 1993; DOE/OSTI 1993).

Since the current schedule projects initial operation of the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor in the year 2002 or 2003, spent fuel is not expected to be generated until 2002. Estimates are that 18 elements per year will be discharged. (For handling and storage an element is an integral core assembly composed of two concentric fuel plates.) A total of 576 SNF elements are predicted to be produced if the reactor is in operation from 2002 through 2035 (Holt 1993). As this reactor is in the conceptual design stage, the SNF expected to be generated is not included in the SNF Inventory Data.

3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL ALTERNATIVES

This chapter describes the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management alternatives evaluated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for this Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that are applicable to the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). The ORR generates SNF as a result of reactor research activities. Unlike the Hanford Site, the Idaho Engineering Laboratory (INEL), and the Savannah River Site (SRS), SNF management is a minor part of the ORR mission. Therefore, the No Action, Decentralization, and Regionalization alternatives could have minimal to no impact on ORR operations. However, Centralization Alternatives would produce major impacts on ORR operations.

3.1 Description of Management Alternatives

3.1.1 Alternative 1 - No Action

The No-Action Alternative is restricted to the minimum actions necessary for the safe and secure management of SNF. As defined, this alternative stipulates no SNF generation or from DOE facilities. While the ORR generates and stores SNF as a result of research activities, it does not receive SNF from offsite generators except occasionally in support of specific research assignments. No offsite SNF would be shipped to the ORR under this alternative, nor would SNF be shipped offsite, which could affect the planned shipment of High Flux Isotope Reactor assemblies to the SRS. SNF storage capacity at the ORR for the High Flux Isotope Reactor would be adequate only through the year 2002. This could be the shutdown of this reactor after this date. The proposed Advanced Neutron Source would need to consider this situation in the design and operation activities.

The environmental effects of the No-Action Alternative are essentially the same as current onsite SNF storage and are included in the affected environment discussions for current site operations.

Implementation of the No-Action Alternative at ORR could lead to the shutdown of the High Flux Isotope Reactor as a result of filling the SNF storage capacity. If the High Flux Isotope Reactor were shutdown, it would eliminate the national capacity to provide isotopes, eliminate the only western-world source of some medical isotopes, and eliminate nationally and internationally important capability for research and development in the use of materials and irradiation effects on materials (Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).

This alternative for the ORR is not analyzed or discussed further in this or subsequent chapters except in the Facility Accidents section, 5.15.

3.1.2 Alternative 2 - Decentralization

Decentralization involves storage of SNF at or close to generation sites. Under alternative no offsite SNF would be shipped to the ORR nor would SNF be shipped off site. The environmental effects of this alternative are the same as those of the No-Action Alternative. The environmental effects of current onsite SNF storage are included in the affected environment discussions covering current site operations. Consequently, this alternative is not discussed further in this or subsequent chapters for the ORR. Construction of new facilities could be initiated under this option.

The Decentralization Alternative would allow DOE to upgrade and/or replace facilities for the management of the SNF currently located on site. This alternative would allow continued operation of the High Flux Isotope Reactor by allowing new dry-storage facilities to be generated and existing SNF in the High Flux Isotope Reactor pool. To allow the High Flux Isotope Reactor to continue operations until a dry storage facility is available, a facility may be acquired. DOE could propose an interim, retrievable, aboveground, dry-storage facility for consolidating the SNF at ORR. DOE could also prepare facilities as necessary for the characterization and packaging of SNF for interim storage. The fuel in the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment reactor would need conditioning and stabilization before being relocated to a storage facility, or the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment fuel would need special storage facilities (Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).

3.1.3 Alternative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis

The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative is DOE's documented 1992/1993 plan for management of DOE and Naval SNF. This plan would include the shipment of SNF from ORR to other DOE sites as necessary to permit continued operation of ORR research reactors. The environmental effects of current onsite SNF storage are included in the affected environment discussions covering current site operations. Under this alternative, SNF storage at ORR would not increase. Therefore, this alternative would not have a measurable impact on the environment since there would be no changes to current ORR operations. Consequently, this alternative is not analyzed or discussed further in subsequent chapters for the ORR.

At ORR, this alternative would be very similar to the Decentralization alternative. Some SNF would be shipped to SRS. The SNF currently stored at the High Flux Isotope Reactor and Bulk Shielding Reactor pools, and at the Tower Shielding Reactor would be shipped to SRS. Only 20 elements from the High Flux Isotope Reactor can be shipped to SRS; other arrangements can be made. If the quantity of High Flux Isotope Reactor fuel shipped to SRS is limited to 20 elements, then the High Flux Isotope Reactor will require storage facilities to continue operation. DOE could prepare an interim, retrievable, aboveground, dry-storage facility for consolidating the SNF remaining at ORR. This would be similar to the one built under Alternative 2 except it would probably be smaller (Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).

3.1.4 Alternative 4 - Regionalization

3.1.4.1 Overview. The Regionalization Alternative consists of two subalternatives.

Subalternative A would distribute existing and new SNF between the Hanford Site, INEL, and SRS by SNF type. Under Subalternative B, SNF would be distributed to either an eastern or western regional site based on geographical location. SNF east of the Mississippi River would be shipped to the eastern regional site (i.e., SRS or ORR). SNF west of the Mississippi River would be shipped to the western regional site (i.e., Hanford Site, INEL, or Nevada Test Site). Additionally all Naval SNF would be shipped to only one of the regional sites, but the regional site will only receive all the Naval fuel if also selected as the Naval site. The ORR would be the alternative to the SRS as the eastern regional site, and the NTS would be the alternative to both the Hanford Site and INEL as the western regional site.

3.1.4.2 Regionalization Subalternative B. The following fuels would be transported to

the ORR for storage under the Regionalization Subalternative B:

- Naval-type SNF (if selected)
- All, including from the INEL, shipyards, and prototypes

- Hanford Production SNF
 - From eastern sites
- Graphite SNF
 - From eastern sites
- DOE-owned commercial SNF
 - From eastern sites, including the West Valley Demonstration Project and Lynchburg
- Experimental - Stainless Steel SNF
 - From eastern sites, including the Foreign Research Reactors, and non-DOE domestic research reactors
- Experimental - Zirconium SNF
 - From eastern sites, including the SRS
- Experimental - Other
 - From eastern sites
- SRS Production and Aluminum SNF
 - From eastern sites, including SRS, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Foreign Research Reactors, and non-DOE domestic research reactors.

All SNF presently in storage at DOE facilities would arrive at the ORR stabilized to the extent necessary for safe transportation. However, this SNF may need uncanned, stabilized, prepared, and recanned at the ORR to ensure safe interim storage. Non-DOE domestic and Foreign Research Reactor SNF would arrive in a state necessary for transportation but uncanned. This fuel would be stabilized, prepared, and canned to ensure safe interim storage. All fuel would be cooled for a minimum of 120 days prior to shipping and 5 years before being placed in dry storage.

The ORR currently has only limited-capacity facilities suitable for receiving, storing, or supporting the research activities necessary for the safe management of SNF. As a result, a new SNF management complex would be built at the ORR under the Regionalization Subalternative B. The SNF management complex would include the following:

- SNF receiving and canning facility
- Technology development facility
- Interim dry storage area
- Expanded Core Facility similar to the one currently at the INEL (if selected for receipt).

The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from the ORR and prepare the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility to cool SNF before it is placed into dry storage, as necessary. The technology development facility would investigate the applicability of dry storage technologies and pilot-development for disposal of the various types of SNF. The interim dry storage area would consist of passive storage modules designed to safely store the SNF for 40 years. SNF selected for Naval fuel receipt, Naval SNF would be examined at the Expanded Core Facility prior to being turned over for interim storage management.

The SNF management complex which would be built at the ORR under the Regionalization Alternative would have the same components as that built under the Centralization Alternative. The dry storage component would be smaller, however, due to the smaller SNF inventory that would be transported to the ORR under the Regionalization Alternative. The other components of the SNF management complex would be the same general size as those built under the Centralization Alternative. This is because the inventories of new uncanned fuel would be sent to the ORR under the Regionalization and Centralization Alternatives would be similar. Additionally, since the major portion of the potential radiological and chemical release rates are associated with these components, the Regionalization Alternative was not analyzed separately but is compared to the Centralization Alternative in a semi-quantitative manner.

If the ORR was not chosen as the eastern regional site, all SNF at the ORR would be shipped to the SRS. An exception would be those fuels for which there is no available technology for stabilization to permit safe transport. There is a small quantity of Molten Salt Reactor Experiment SNF that is stored in tanks at the ORR. Currently, the technology to stabilize this SNF for transport does not exist. Under this alternative, if the ORR were chosen as the eastern regional site, this Molten Salt Reactor Experiment SNF would continue to be stored at the ORR until it could be stabilized for safe shipment.

Based on the projected schedule for operation of additional regional SNF storage facilities, the option for acquiring dry storage facilities at the ORR would be maintained to ensure continued High Flux Isotope Reactor operation (Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).

3.1.5 Alternative 5 - Centralization

3.1.5.1 Overview. Under the Centralization Alternative, all existing and new SNF would

be shipped to one DOE site. There are five Centralization options considered in the Hanford Site, the INEL, the SRS, the NTS, and the ORR. If the ORR was chosen as the centralization site, all SNF stored at the Hanford Site, INEL, SRS, and other sites storing DOE fuel would be transferred to the ORR.

3.1.5.2 Centralization Alternative Option D. The following fuels would be transported

to the ORR for storage under Centralization Alternative Option D:

- Naval-type SNF
 - From the INEL, shipyards, and prototypes
- Hanford Production SNF
 - From the Hanford Site
- Graphite SNF
 - From the INEL and the Public Service of Colorado
- DOE-owned commercial SNF
 - From the Hanford Site, INEL, West Valley Demonstration Project, and B&W Lynchburg
- Experimental - Stainless Steel SNF
 - From the Hanford Site, INEL, SRS, Foreign Research Reactors, and non-DOE domestic research reactors
- Experimental - Zirconium Clad SNF
 - From the INEL and SRS
- Experimental - Other
 - From the ORNL
- SRS Production and Aluminum Clad SNF
 - From the INEL, SRS, ORNL, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Foreign Research Reactors, and non-DOE domestic research reactors.

All SNF presently in storage at DOE facilities would arrive at the ORR stabilized to the extent necessary for safe transportation. However, this SNF may need uncanned, stabilized, prepared, and recanned at the ORR to ensure safe interim storage. Non-DOE domestic, Foreign Research Reactor, and Naval SNF would arrive in a state not fit for safe transportation but uncanned. This fuel would be stabilized, prepared, and examined at the ORR to ensure safe interim storage. All fuel would be cooled a minimum of 120 days shipping and 5 years before being placed into dry storage. Additionally, Naval SNF would be examined at the ORR before it was turned over for interim storage management.

Although the ORR has a number of experimental and pilot facilities, probably no facility is suitable for receiving, canning, storing, or supporting research activities necessary for management of SNF, unless they are extensively upgraded and expanded. As a result, a SNF management complex would be built at the ORR under the Centralization Alternative Option D. The SNF management complex would include the following:

- SNF receiving and canning facility
- Technology development facility
- Interim dry storage area
- Expanded Core Facility for Naval-type fuel similar to the one currently at

The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from the Hanford Site and prepare the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility to cool SNF before it is placed into dry storage, as necessary. The technology development facility would investigate the applicability of dry storage technologies and pilot-test development for disposal of the various types of SNF. The interim dry storage area would consist of passive storage modules designed to safely store the SNF for 40 years. The facility would be examined at a new Expanded Core Facility constructed at the ORR prior to being turned over for interim storage management.

The SNF management complex which would be built at the ORR under the Centralization Alternative would have the same components as that built under the Regionalization Alternative. However, the dry storage component would be about 10 times larger, due to the large inventory that would be transported to the ORR under the Centralization Alternative. The components of the SNF management complex would be the same general size as those built under the Regionalization Alternative. This is because the inventories of new uncanned SNF which would be sent to the ORR under the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives

would be very similar. Additionally, the major portion of the potential radiologic releases and waste generation rates are associated with these components and would significantly different for the Regionalization Alternative. Therefore, this alter the basis for a semiquantitative comparison with the Regionalization Alternative.

If the ORR is not chosen as the centralization site, all SNF at the ORR would b to the selected centralization site. An exception would be those fuels for which t available technology for stabilization to permit safe transport. There is a small from the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment that is stored in tanks at the ORR. Current technology to stabilize this SNF for transport does not exist. Under this alternat to ship SNF to the SRS, this Molten Salt Reactor Experiment SNF would continue to b at the ORR until it could be stabilized for safe shipment.

Based on the projected schedule for operation of additional centralized SNF sto facilities, the option for acquiring dry storage facilities at the ORR would be mai ensure storage facilities at the ORR would be maintained to ensure continued High F Reactor operation (Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).

3.2 Comparison of Alternatives

Table 3.2-1 shows a comparison of the alternatives. The Regionalization Altern column does not include the requirements of the Naval Expended Core Facility, altho facility may be constructed at the site under this alternative. The Centralization column does include the requirements of the Naval Expended Core Facility, which are in Volume 1, Appendix D, since this facility will be built at the site under this a **Table 3.2-1. Comparison of alternatives at the Oak Ridge Reservation.**

Parameter	Regional Subalter
Land for new facilities (acres)	90
Site area (acres)	34,667
Percent of site area	0.26
SNF-related employmentb	556
Baseline site employment	17,082
Percent of baseline site employment	3.3
Estimated maximum latent cancer fatalities in 80-km population per year, SNF management operationsc	2.5×10
Estimated cancer fatalities in 80-km population per year, other site operations	2.7×10
Estimated probability of cancer fatalities in MEI per year, SNF management operationsc	3.1×10
Estimated probability of cancer fatalities in MEI per year, other site operations	9.2×10
Estimated probability of cancer fatality in average worker per year, SNF management operationsc	1.6×10
Estimated probability of cancer fatality in average worker per year, other site operations	1.1×10
Water use (million gallons) per year, SNF management	3.6
Baseline water use (million gallons) per year, site operations	6,680
Percent of baseline site water use	0.05
Electricity use (megawatt-hours) per year, SNF management	23,000

Table 3.2-1. (continued).

Parameter	Regionalization Subalternative B at ORR
Baseline electricity use (megawatt-hours) per year, site operations	1,000,000
Percent of baseline site electricity use	2.30
Sewage discharge (million gallons) per year, SNF management	3.6
Baseline sewage discharge (million gallons) per year, site operations	200
Percent of baseline site sewage discharge	1.8
High-level waste (cubic meters) per year, SNF management	0
Transuranic waste (cubic meters), SNF management	16
Mixed waste (cubic meters), SNF management	0
Low-level waste (cubic meters), SNF management	203
Estimated maximum cancer fatalities in 80-km population	2.1×10^{-2}

from maximum risk accidentd

Frequency of occurrence (number per year)d	1.6 x 10 ⁻¹
Estimated maximum risk of cancer fatalities in 80-km population maximum risk accident (cancer fatalities per year)d	3.4 x 10 ⁻³
Estimated maximum worker cancer fatalities from maximum risk accidentd	1.9 x 10 ⁻³
Frequency of occurrence (number per year)d	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴
Estimated maximum risk of worker cancer fatalities from maximum accident (latent cancer fatalities per year)d	1.9 x 10 ⁻⁷

- a. Centralization Option includes the Naval Expended Core Facility (ECF) results f without ECF would be the same as for Regionalization.
- b. Annual average SNF direct construction and operation jobs over the 10-year peri
- c. Excludes baseline site operations.
- d. Centralization Option is the same as the Regionalization Option for the SNF Man Naval Expended Core Facility accident analyses results from Volume 1, Appendix D.

4.0 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

4.1 Overview

This chapter describes the existing environmental conditions in areas potential programmatic decision to site spent nuclear fuel (SNF) facilities at the Oak Ridge under the Centralization and Regionalization alternatives. Topics were selected fo their potential to be affected by these alternatives. Each topic is addressed in t serve as a baseline for assessment of potential environmental consequences in Chapt

4.2 Land Use

The ORR occupies an area of approximately 34,667 acres (140 square kilometers) Tennessee, in a predominantly rural area about 25 miles (40 kilometers) west of Kno which is bordered on the southeast and southwest by the Clinch River, is within the boundaries of the City of Oak Ridge, and also lies within Roane and Anderson Counti

The ORR consists of three plants located on three separate sites: the Y-12 Plan or 3.4 square kilometers); the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) (1.8 square mil kilometers); and the K-25 Site (1.1 square miles or 2.8 square kilometers) (MMES 19

Land use activities at the ORR have historically occurred within the boundaries plant sites. However, more recently, other ORR lands have also begun to be used. utilized for waste storage in the mid-1940s and for environmental research in the 1 management program was initiated in 1964, and the first comprehensive forest manage was released in 1965. The ORR has been used by research institutions, universities agencies as a site for the study of terrestrial ecology, aquatic ecology, forestry, Department of Energy (DOE) designated approximately 21 square miles (54 square kilo undeveloped ORR land as a National Environmental Research Park, which today provide areas for research and education in the environmental sciences (MMES 1989).

Land use outside the three main plant sites falls into seven general categories research and development; support services; waste management; environmental restora areas; public recreational park; and national environmental research park (Figure 4 58 percent of the land on the ORR (20,051 acres or 31 square miles) can be classifi due to its current land use designation (MMES 1994a).

Land uses bordering the ORR are primarily forest and agricultural. Residential the only other significant uses of land in the vicinity, and occur along the northe boundary of the ORR in the City of Oak Ridge. The land areas bordering the ORR com (mostly hardwood forests), small farms, and rural residences. Commercial forestry account for approximately 76 percent of the total land use in this region (MMES 199

The entire ORR has been placed under the forestry, agriculture, industry, and r classification by the City of Oak Ridge, although this designation does not bind DO on the site. DOE land use plans applicable to the ORR include the Oak Ridge Reserv Development and Facilities Utilization Plan, issued in 1989 and updated in 1990; th Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance, issued in 1985 and updated in 1988; and th

Management Plan for the U.S. DOE Oak Ridge Reservation, first issued in 1984.

The region surrounding the ORR has numerous local, state, and national public recreation facilities (Figure 4.2-2). Federal outdoor recreation facilities include the Great Smoky Mountains National Forest; the Cumberland Gap National Historic Park; the Big South River and Recreation Area; and the Obed Wild and Scenic River (MMES 1994a). State ORR site include the Frozen Head State Natural Area; the Big Ridge State Park; the Park; the Fall Creek Falls State Park; the Pickett State Rustic Park; the Panther Creek Hiwassee State Scenic River (MMES 1994a).

Figure 4.2-1. Generalized land use at the Oak Ridge Reservation. Figure 4.2-2. such as fishing and boating. Wildlife management areas that allow in-season hunting on the South Fork National River and Recreation Area, Catoosa Wildlife Management Area, Chatahoochee Wildlife Management Area, and the ORR (MMES 1994a).

Numerous locally funded recreational areas exist near the ORR, the closest being the Ridge. The City of Oak Ridge has 2 golf courses, 11 athletic fields, 36 tennis courts, and a public outdoor swimming pool (MMES 1994a).

Clark Center Recreational Park, located on the ORR, is a 90-acre (0.36-square-kilometer) recreational area that is open to the public. The park consists of three shelters, fields, a swimming area, and a paved access road. It is located approximately 2 miles south of the Y-12 Plant (MMES 1994a).

The ORR is a controlled area with public access limited to through traffic on Tennessee Routes 95, 58, 62, 162, and 170 (MMES 1991b).

The site proposed for SNF activities is located within the West Bear Creek Valley on the western portion of the ORR site near the site boundary. This area of the ORR is in the Natural Areas land use category and is designated for future Waste Management and Land Use (MMES 1994a). The area is designated as a Potential Site for a Future Programmatic Initial ORR Master Plan (MMES 1994a). With the exception of an industrial park, land uses in the ORR in the area of West Bear Creek Valley are primarily agricultural farmland and cropland with sparsely located residences (MMES 1994a).

The industrial park located just to the south of the proposed SNF management facility on Bear Creek Road houses two organizations. The Scientific Ecology Group, Inc., employs a few people and is a low-level radioactive waste incinerator whose commercial operation is International Technology, Inc., operates a hazardous and radioactive waste geotechnical pilot lab, also on Bear Creek Road. This International Technology, Inc., operates a hazardous and radioactive waste geotechnical laboratory also on Bear Creek Road. This International Technology, Inc., facility is an extension office and employs about 10 people at the facility (IT undated a, undated b; SEG undated).

There are no onsite areas that are subject to Native American Treaty rights or other unique farmland.

4.3 Socioeconomics

4.3.1 Region of Influence

The socioeconomic information presented in this Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement covers the baseline conditions in the Region of Influence. The Region of Influence is the region in which the principal direct and indirect socioeconomic effects of actions are expected to occur and are expected to be of consequence for local jurisdictions. The Region of Influence is the current residential distribution of the DOE and contractor personnel employed by the ORR, the probable location of offsite contractor operations, and the probable location of land supporting indirect economic activity linked to the ORR. The Region of Influence includes the counties of Anderson, where 34 percent of ORR personnel reside, Knox (16 percent), and Loudon (6 percent) (Truex 1991 [Table J]).

4.3.2 Regional Economic Activity and Population

Regional economic linkage supporting production activity at the ORR occurs primarily in Anderson, Knox, and Roane counties, where most of the supporting contractors' offsite capital supporting indirect economic activity linked to the ORR are located.

4.3.2.1 Anderson County. Most of the industrial and commercial development, dominated by

energy-related companies specializing in manufacturing and research and development ORR, has occurred in the City of Oak Ridge in Anderson County and Roane County.

The major employment sectors in Anderson County in 1990 were services, manufacturing, government, and retail trade. As a percentage of Anderson County wage and salary employment, the service and manufacturing sector each accounted for 30 percent, the government sector 11 percent, and retail trade 11 percent. The number of employed persons in Anderson County in 1990 have increased 3 percent annually between 1980 and 1990, and are projected to continue to increase at an average rate of less than 1 percent annually for the next several years (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). Since 1988, the unemployment level for Anderson County remained below the national unemployment rate. The unemployment rate reached a low of 5.6 percent in 1992 (Anderson County 1993; Department of Economic and Community Development Industrial Development Division 1993).

Approximately 40 percent of the Anderson County population resides in the City of Oak Ridge with an additional 42 percent in rural areas, and the remaining 18 percent in other parts of Anderson County (Anderson County 1993). Between 1980 and 1990, the population in Anderson County increased by over 1 percent from 67,500 to 68,250 persons (0.10 percent annually). The population in Anderson County is projected to continue to grow at an average rate of 0.10 percent annually over the next several years, reaching 76,100 persons by 2004 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993).

4.3.2.2 Knox County. In Knox County, the major employment sectors in 1990 were service,

manufacturing, retail trade, and government. As a percentage of Knox County wage and salary employment, the service sector accounted for approximately 27 percent, retail trade 12 percent, and government 17 percent. The total number of persons employed in Knox County in 1990 was 215,948. Jobs have increased 2 percent annually between 1980 and 1990 and are projected to continue to grow at an average rate of less than 1 percent annually for the next several years (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). The unemployment rate for Knox County was 4.6 percent in 1992 (Department of Economic and Community Development Industrial Development Division 1993).

Between 1980 and 1990, the population in Knox County increased 5 percent from 335,750. The population in Knox County is projected to continue to increase at an average rate of less than 1 percent annually for the next several years, reaching 377,130 persons by 2004 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993).

4.3.2.3 Roane County. Development that has occurred in Roane County has been

predominantly residential. In Roane County, the major employment sectors in 1990 were manufacturing, services, and government. As a percentage of wage and salary employment, retail trade accounted for approximately 26 percent, manufacturing 24 percent, and government 15 percent. The total number of persons employed in Roane County was 24,640. Jobs have increased less than 1 percent annually between 1980 and 1990 and are projected to continue to increase at an average rate of less than 1 percent annually for the next several years (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). The unemployment rate for Roane County was 6.8 percent in 1992 (East Tennessee Development District 1993).

Between 1980 and 1990, the population in Roane County decreased 2.5 percent, from 47,230. The population in Roane County is projected to increase at an average rate of 0.10 percent annually for the next several years, reaching 52,670 persons by 2004.

4.3.2.4 Loudon County. Total employment in Loudon County in 1990 was 12,560 persons. In

1990, the farming sector accounted for a considerably larger percentage, while the government sector accounted for a smaller percentage of total jobs than in Anderson County (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). The unemployment rate for Loudon County was 7.2 percent in 1992, dropping from 7.2 percent in 1991 due to increase in construction (East Tennessee Development District 1993).

The population of Loudon County increased by 1 percent annually, from 28,700 in 1990. The population of Loudon County is projected to increase at an average rate of 0.10 percent annually for the next several years, reaching 32,900 persons by 2004 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993).

4.3.2.5 Oak Ridge Reservation. The employment level at the ORR in 1994 was 18,200

persons (Truex 1995). In 1993, there were approximately three full-time-equivalent positions involved in SNF operations on the ORR (Brown 1994b). Employment levels a decrease to 16,980 by the year 1999 and are projected to remain constant through th 1994).

4.3.2.6 Aggregate Regional Economic and Demographic Baseline. For the purposes of

establishing a regional baseline to compare potential impacts for the programmatic 5.3, regional economic and demographic data for the four-county Region of Influence form one region (Table 4.3-1).

The total population of the Region of Influence, shown in Table 4.3-1, is pr persons in 1995, and is projected to grow at an annual average rate of less than 1 538,820 persons in 2004. The labor force of the Region of Influence is also projec annual average rate of less than 1 percent, growing to 360,000 persons in 2004. Th the Region of Influence is projected to grow at an annual average rate of approxima growing from 292,700 jobs in 1995 to 338,070 jobs in 2004.

4.3.3 Public Service, Education and Training, and Housing Infrastructure

4.3.3.1 Police and Fire. ORR fire protection services are provided by the fire departments on

the reservation. The ORR fire departments have mutual aid agreements among themsel City of Oak Ridge (MMES 1989).

Twelve city, county, and state law enforcement agencies provide police protec Influence. In 1990, the largest law enforcement agency in the four-county Region o Knoxville, with 296 sworn officers (FBI 1991). Law enforcement on the ORR is provi Oak Ridge Police Department. Security enforcement, established to meet the Atomic mission requirements, is provided by the prime management and operations contractor

Table 4.3-1. Aggregate regional economic and demographic indicators for ORR. a

Years	Regional employment	Regional labor force	Regional population
1995	311,700	332,000	506,600
1996	315,100	335,700	510,300
1997	318,600	339,400	51,400
1998	322,100	343,100	517,900
1999	325,700	346,900	521,700
2000	329,300	350,700	525,500
2001	331,500	353,000	528,800
2002	333,700	355,400	532,100
2003	335,900	357,700	535,500
2004	338,000	360,000	538,800
2005	340,300	362,400	542,200
Average Annual Growth Rate	0.9%	0.9%	0.7%

a. Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce 1993; East Tennessee Development District

Note: Aggregate region includes the Roane, Anderson, Loudon and Knox Counties. La force projection developed for this study.

4.3.3.2 Education and Training. Four school districts, Anderson, Knox, Loudon, and Roane,

provide public education services in the Region of Influence. In 1990, the four s average daily membership of 66,510 students. Knox County had the highest average d of 50,324 students (Tennessee Department of Education 1992).

4.3.3.3 Housing. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of housing units in the Region of

Influence increased 14 percent from 181,299 to 206,234. In 1980 and 1990, the home rates in the Region of Influence averaged 1.4 and 1.5 percent, respectively (Census

Housing additions in the Region of Influence peaked at 3,882 units in 1990, but in 1991. In 1992, however, housing additions increased to a total of 3,880 units (Development District 1993).

4.4 Cultural and Paleontological Resources

4.4.1 Archeological Sites and Historic Structures

For approximately 10,000 years, people have inhabited the ORR site. A culture conducted in 1975 did not identify any cultural resources on the proposed site for facilities. Therefore, no prehistoric or historic resources are expected to be located for the SNF management facilities (Fielder 1975).

4.4.2 Native American Resources

In the early 1700s, the Overhill Cherokee lived in the area that is now the ORR. It remained in the area until 1838, when it was moved forcibly to Oklahoma under Federal Order 1984a). While the Cherokee may retain cultural affiliation with their ancestral known Native American resources on the proposed site for the SNF facilities.

4.4.3 Paleontological Resources

The ORR is underlain by nine geologic formations or groups ranging in age from Early Mississippian. On the ORR, the only formations known to contain fossils are the Chickamauga Limestone (which does not usually contain fossils but does contain small coiled gastropods in the formation, but does contain large brachiopods, cephalopods, crinoid stems, corals, and trilobites); the Sequatchie Formation (which abundant supply of fossils in the formation, but does contain large brachiopods, cephalopods, and bryozoans within several thin beds of gray limestone); the Rockwood Formation (which contains stem fossils in the upper half of the formation); and the Fort Payne Chert, which contains crinoid stems (McMaster 1988). No unusual paleontological remains from the ORR were

4.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources

Visual or scenic resources comprise the natural and man-made features that give an environment its aesthetic qualities. These features form the overall impression of an area or its landscape character. Visual sensitivity is assessed by considering the unique, or in other ways special to viewers. High visual sensitivity exists when others in the area or is of secondary importance relative to other significant aspects. Medium visual sensitivity exists when a view has little value to viewers and an intrusion would have no impact on viewers.

Scenic resources at the ORR and the surrounding area are set in a landscape of predominantly parallel ridges with steep slopes interspersed with relatively flat valleys physiographically as the Ridge and Valley Province. Due to the rolling topography approximately 62 percent of the reservation is located on slopes of less than 14 percent. The reservation is framed by the Clinch River at the west, south, and eastern boundary and Bear Creek to the north. The vegetation present at the reservation is primarily a mixed coniferous forest covering approximately 80 percent of the site (MMES 1989). Roads access to the interior of the site include State Routes 95 and 58, along with Bethel (4.2-1).

The location of the proposed SNF management facilities, under the Centralization set along the north side of Bear Creek Road west of State Route 95, between the extension and State Route 95, at the western end of the reservation. The public has access to

of State Route 95. As a result, the entrance to the site will be visible to traffic (MMES 1994a). The proposed facilities would consist of 90 acres (0.36 square kilometers) would be located within security fencing. The facility would have the appearance of a building ranging in height from one to three stories. The site would receive and unload up to 5,000 trucks per day, or a total of 5,500 truck shipments over the 40-year operation period. The site is on the south side of Pine Ridge midway between the top of the ridge, with elevations ranging from 1,100 feet (274 and 335 meters), and Bear Creek Valley, with an elevation of approximately 213 meters (TVA 1987). Chestnut Ridge, located south of Pine Ridge on the reservation boundary, is the only adjacent urban area.

Under the Regionalization Alternative, the location of the proposed SNF facilities would be the same but would be reduced in area and extent. Operation of the facilities would also result in the receipt of fewer truck shipments over the 40-year operation period.

The viewshed surrounding the ORR consists mainly of sparsely populated rural land. Oak Ridge, along the northeast portion of the site, is the only adjacent urban area. Facilities from areas surrounding the reservation include those from public roadways 40 and 75, U.S. Route 70, and State Routes 62, 162, and 95. The reservation can also be seen from the south bluffs along the Clinch River. The Great Smoky Mountains National Park and the Clinch Mountains are approximately 70 miles southeast of the ORR and are generally not visible from the reservation (MMES 1989). In general, views are limited by the rolling terrain, heavy vegetation, and hazy atmospheric conditions.

The developed areas of the ORR could generally be classified as having low visual sensitivity. The remainder of the site ranges from low to moderate visual sensitivity. Of the jurisdictions affected by the construction and operation of the proposed SNF facilities, only the ORR's Comprehensive Plan has provided policies that promote elements of scenic resource preservation through streetscape design, landscaping, lighting, and signage to improve the urban area and the city center. One entrance to the urban area that promotes scenic enhancement and preservation is Illinois Avenue, crossing the northeast portion of Oak Ridge (1989).

4.6 Geologic Resources

This section provides a general description of the geology, soils, geologic resources, volcanic, and other geologic hazards at the ORR and surrounding area. This section also describes existing impacts to the geology and geologic resources resulting from past and present activities at the ORR.

4.6.1 General Geology

As shown in Figure 4.6-1, the ORR lies entirely within the western portion of the Valley and Ridge Province, near the boundary with the Cumberland Plateau. The Valley and Ridge Province, a zone of rocks in the Appalachian mountain belt, is characterized by numerous linear ridges trending approximately southwest-northeast as shown on Figure 4.6-2. The rocks of the Valley and Ridge Province are Early Cambrian to Early Mississippian in age. A stratigraphic column for the East Fork Ridge (south of Interstate 95) is shown on Figure 4.6-3. A generalized geologic map of the ORR is shown on Figure 4.6-2. Most of the ORR is underlain by the Rome Formation and Conasauga Groups, sedimentary rocks of Cambrian and Ordovician age (Hatcher et al. 1992). A detailed geologic map of the ORR is shown on Figure 4.6-4.

The Rome Formation consists of interbedded sandstone, siltstone, and shale. This formation is not exposed in the Oak Ridge area, but consideration of regional structural trends indicates the Rome Formation is in fault contact with younger rocks. On the Copper Creek and White Creek thrust sheets the Rome is 120-180 meters (390-590 feet) thick, and on the Clinch Mountains it is 100-150 meters (330-490 feet) thick.

Figure 4.6-1. Generalized map of the southern Appalachian geologic provinces showing the location of the ORR. Figure 4.6-2. Geologic map of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Figure 4.6-3. Stratigraphic column of the East Fork Ridge. Figure 4.6-4. Detailed geologic map of the ORR. The faults shown on the map carry the name of the fault at their front, or northwest edge. Faults are shown on the map as lines with teeth pointing in the direction of movement. The transition between the sandstones of the Rome Formation and the overlying Pumpkin Vine Group occurs rather abruptly, as the more resistant sandstones grade into shales.

The formations of the Middle to Upper Cambrian Conasauga Group are primarily limestone interlayered with shales, limestones, and siltstones. At the ORR, the Conasauga Group consists of six units (see Figure 4.6-3). Approximately 450 meters (1,500 feet) of the Conasauga Group is exposed at the ORR. The transition from the Conasauga Group to the overlying Knox Group is the dominant rock type shifting from shale and dolomitic limestones in the Conasauga Group to dolomites with occasional limestones in the Knox Group.

At the ORR, as in the rest of eastern Tennessee, the Upper Cambrian to Lower Ordovician Group is divided into five formations, which are shown on Figure 4.6-3. The Knox Group is approximately 914 meters (3,000 feet) thick on the ORR and consists primarily of dolomite (Hatcher et al. 1992). Above the Knox Group is the Middle to Upper Ordovician Group. See Figure 4.6-3 for the units that comprise the Chickamauga on the Whiteoak sheet.

Surface relief at the ORR typically ranges from a ridge crest to valley floor (100 to 225 feet) (Lee and Ketelle 1987). Surface elevations on the ORR range from 1,356 feet (National Geodetic Vertical Datum) at the crest of Melton Hill to a minimum of 226 feet (National Geodetic Vertical Datum) near Mile 10 on the ORR (Boyle et al. 1982). A series of crests and ridges that trend northeast and southwest (Figure 4.6-2). In general, the crests or ridges are composed of resistant sandstone. Limestone and shale generally form the ridge flanks and valley bottoms.

Sinkholes, large springs, caves, and other karst features are common in the Knox Group parts of the ORR underlain by limestones and dolomites (certain units in the Conasauga Group) are for the most part classified as karst terranes. In a karst area, little surface drainage because of the diversion of surface waters to subterranean routes. These subterranean routes are caves and other enlarged openings that have resulted from dissolution of the carbonate rock. Four major karst zones exist at the ORR that are distinct stratigraphic horizons (Ketelle 1982). These four karst zones all occur specifically in the Copper Ridge Dolomite, near the base of the Chepultepec Dolomite, the Chepultepec Dolomite, and in the Kingsport Formation (Ketelle 1982). Karst development is present to varying degrees in the carbonate rocks of the Conasauga Group, most notably Maynardville Limestone. In Bear Creek Valley, karst development in the Maynardville Limestone causes variations in discharge along Bear Creek as the surface water and groundwater in dominance (Lee et al. 1988). Bear Creek Valley is underlain by calcareous shale of the Conasauga Group (Bailey and Lee 1991). Although no site-specific geologic characterization was conducted at the West Bear Creek Valley site, it appears the proposed SNF management facility located over the lower Conasauga Group strata not normally characterized by karst development.

The soils occurring in the ORR are predominantly clay, although chert and quartz are also present. Soils developed in the Conasauga are clay. Hatcher et al. (1992) provides detailed information on the soils. Many of the soils belong to the broad group of Ultisols, which are reddish or yellowish acidic soils. Entisols, which are thin surface soils over bedrock that show little horizon development, are found locally in steeply sloping areas. In addition, small areas of alluvial areas adjacent to streams (Boyle et al. 1982). These are young soils, also in development. Soils on the ORR tend to retain moisture and are typically 90 percent clay to a depth of 3 meters (10 feet) (Ketelle and Huff 1984). Depths of soil profiles on the ORR range from 6 centimeters (6 inches) on slopes to 18 meters (60 feet) over dolomites in the Knox Group (Hatcher et al. 1992).

4.6.2 Geologic Resources

The known resources of the geologic units exposed on the ORR are limited to include sandstone, limestone, and clay. These industrial minerals are of low unit value and are not found elsewhere. Quarry rock has been mined at several major locations throughout the ORR, but currently in operation (Oakes et al. 1984b).

There has been extensive seismic testing by private companies along roads that traverse the ORR for deep accumulations of oil and gas. Land has been leased by major oil companies northwest of K-25 off the ORR; no exploratory wells have been drilled and the status of the resources underlying the ORR is unknown at this time (Oakes et al. 1984b).

4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards

There is no evidence that there has been volcanic activity in the vicinity of the ORR in the last 1 million years.

4.6.3.1 Historical Seismic Activities. From 1811 to 1975, only five major earthquakes or

earthquake series have affected the ORR area. These are the New Madrid, Missouri, and the Charleston, South Carolina; Knoxville, Tennessee; Strawberry Plains, Tennessee earthquakes. The New Madrid earthquake series of December 1811 to February 1812 produced maximum Modified Mercalli Intensity disturbances of V to VI in the ORR area.

Mercalli Intensity V earthquake is felt by everyone. Typical damage includes some etc. being broken, a few instances of cracked plaster, and unstable objects being o
 Mercalli Intensity VI earthquake is also felt by all, and many become frightened an
 Typical damage includes some heavy furniture moved and a few instances of fallen pl
 chimneys. A Modified Mercalli Intensity of VI is approximately equal to a Richter
 (Griggs and Gilchrist 1977).

The 1844 Knoxville earthquake, which occurred approximately 40 kilometers (25 m
 ORR, had an epicenter shaking of Modified Mercalli Intensity VI. The Charleston ea
 had a Modified Mercalli Intensity of V to VI at the ORR, as did the 1913 Strawberry
 The 1930 Kingston earthquake, 8 kilometers (5 miles) northwest of the ORR, had an e
 Modified Mercalli Intensity V (Boyle et al. 1982). When intensities are reported a
 would have been less at the ORR, as intensities diminish with distance.

A Modified Mercalli Intensity VII earthquake does not typically cause severe da
 causes breaking of weak chimneys at the roof line, cracks in masonry, and the falli
 bricks, and stones. No Modified Mercalli Intensity VII earthquakes have been recor
 during the 165-year period from 1811 to 1975. Earthquakes with a Modified Mercalli
 generally occur one order of magnitude less frequently than earthquakes with a Modi
 Intensity of V to VI. Seismic records indicate that the ORR is located in a region
 activity having an average of one to two earthquakes per year, with seismic activit
 followed by long periods of no activity. No deformation of recent surface deposits
 and seismic shocks from the surrounding, more seismically active areas are dissipat
 the epicenters (Boyle et al. 1982).

The underlying structure of the ORR is complex due to the extensive faulting an
 characteristic of the region. There are three regional thrust faults in the ORR ar
 Whiteoak Mountain, and Copper Creek Faults (see Figure 4.6-4). All three strike to
 dip to the southeast. Latest movement on the faults was Late Pennsylvanian/Early P
 million years ago); consequently, they are not considered to be capable faults at p
 1984b). According to 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, capable faults include those fau
 exhibited movement at or near the ground surface at least once during the past 35,0
 of a recurring nature within the past 500,000 years.

4.6.3.2 Seismicity Studies. Four seismic studies have been specifically conducted for the

ORR for which the results have been published. Three of these studies have been su
 Beavers et al. (1982), and were performed by Blume in 1973, Dames and Moore in 1973
 1981. The first two studies were directed toward the seismic hazards at the K-25 S
 Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant), and the latter focused on ORNL (Beavers et al. 1982

These three early studies presented preliminary analysis and conclusions. The
 (McGuire et. al. 1992), is a more recent seismic analysis for the entire ORR. DOE
 1994a) and 1024 (DOE 1992b) summarize the results of recent seismic analyses at DOE
 that the peak ground accelerations for the ORR for 500-year, 1,000-year, 2,000-year
 seismic events are 0.08g, 0.13g, 0.19g and 0.29g, respectively.

Figure 4.6-5 presents the site specific uniform hazard response spectra for hori
 which were approved by DOE Headquarter's Office of Nuclear Energy on August 25, 199
 1993). The response spectra noted on Figure 4.6-5 are for top of rock sites.

4.6.3.3 DOE Seismic Design Criteria. DOE Order 5480.28 requires that the Design and

Evaluation Guidelines for Department of Energy Facilities Subjected to Natural Phen
 UCRL-15910 (Kennedy et al. 1990), be used for natural phenomena hazards design and
 criteria until a DOE standard is issued. In April 1994, DOE-STD-1020 was issued to
 15910.

At the SNF management facility site the categorization of each structure, syste
 would be determined in accordance with DOE Standard DOE-STD-1021, Performance Categ
 Criteria for Structures, Systems and Components at DOE facilities Subjected to Natu
 Hazards.

A maximum horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0.19g at ORR is estimated t
 earthquake that could occur once every 2,000 years (DOE, 1994a). The seismic hazar
 presented in this EIS is for general seismic hazard comparisons across DOE sites.
 and site specific procedures require that potential seismic hazards for existing an
 evaluated on a facility specific basis.

Figure 4.6-5. Oak Ridge- Site Specific Uniform Hazard Response Spectra for Horizontal Rock Motion 4.7 Air Resources

4.7.1 Climatology

Except where indicated, the information presented in this section is derived from NOAA 1991.

The ORR site is located within the Great Valley of Tennessee in which the Cumberland borders to the northwest and the Great Smoky Mountains lie to the southeast. Climate is influenced by these terrain features.

The climate and meteorology in the lowlands are generally unlike those that occur in mountainous regions of the southeastern United States. Daytime winds are usually from the south, and night-time winds are northeasterly, at least during periods of light wind. The elevation of the Cumberland Plateau and Great Smoky Mountains encompassing the valley impede wind to a moderate degree. The Cumberland Plateau retards the drainage of cold air from the valley during winter, thus reducing the probability of extremely cold temperatures. The average daily temperature at the Oak Ridge National Weather Service Station, considered representative of the ORR, was 14.2°C (57.5°F) for the period of record 1961-1990. Temperatures varied from a low of 2.6°C (36.7°F) in January to a high of 24.8°C (76.6°F) in July.

Humidity data are maintained at the Knoxville National Weather Service with a record from 1961-1990. Records are reported for humidity readings during the hours 0100, 0700, and 1900 (local time). The 0700 and 1900 values will be reported here. The mean 0700 humidity was 86 percent with the mean monthly maximum of 92 percent occurring in July and August, and the mean monthly minimum of 80 percent occurring during February and March. The mean 1900 humidity is 63 percent with the mean monthly maximum of 68 percent occurring in September and October, and the mean monthly minimum of 52 percent occurring in April.

The mean wind speed measured at the Oak Ridge National Weather Service over the period 1961-1990 was 2.0 meters per second (4.4 miles per hour) at an average height above ground of 10 meters (41 feet). At a meteorological tower at the ORR the mean wind speed was 2.1 meters per second (4.7 miles per hour) at about 10 meters (33 feet) above ground level. Wind speeds are influenced by local topographic conditions and are generally higher on top of the ridges and in the valleys.

The wind direction above the ridgetops and within the valleys tends to follow the topography. The prevailing wind direction is from the southwest, with a secondary maximum from the northeast during the winter, spring, and summer months. The situation is reversed in the valleys.

Figure 4.7-1 shows 1992 wind roses for the 10- and 60-meter levels of the Y-12 meteorological tower. The annual 10-meter level on the Y-12 west meteorological tower shows peak wind direction frequencies from the west-southwest, with the secondary peak from the northeast. The annual 60-meter level shows wind direction frequencies from the northeast, with the secondary peak from the southwest. Since the valley floor is inclined, cold air will sink during stable periods. Both wind rose levels show the influence of the topography.

Damaging winds are uncommon in the region. Peak gusts recorded in the Great Valley are generally in the 27- to 31-meter-per-second (60- to 70-mile-per-hour) range for the months of June through July; in the 22- to 27-meter-per-second (50- to 60-mile-per-hour) range for the months of August and September; and in the 16- to 20-meter-per-second (35- to 45-mile-per-hour) range for the months of October and November. The maximum gust reported in the region was about 37 meters per second (83 miles per hour); it occurred during the month of March at Chattanooga. Knoxville has reported about 33 meters per second (73 miles per hour) and Oak Ridge a gust of about 26 meters per second (58 miles per hour).

Winter is the wettest of the seasons in the ORR area; March and December are the wettest, and October the driest. The annual average precipitation measured at the ORR in Bearden from 1944 through 1964 was 130.9 centimeters (51.5 inches), while the annual average precipitation at the Oak Ridge National Weather Service is 124.1 centimeters (48.9 inches).

Figure 4.7-1. Wind Roses for Y-12 west tower (@ 10 and 60m) for 1992 at ORR. National Weather Service. The maximum monthly precipitation was 48.9 centimeters (19.3 inches) in July 1967, and the maximum rainfall in a 24-hour period observed at the Oak Ridge National Weather Service was 19.0 centimeters (7.5 inches) in August 1960.

On average there are about 51 thunderstorm days per year at the Oak Ridge National Weather Service station. The summer thunderstorms, which may be accompanied by strong wind, heavy precipitation, or, less frequently, hail, occur primarily during the late afternoon and evening hours. Summer thunderstorms are attributable primarily to convective activity resulting from the ground and generally moist atmospheric conditions. Thunderstorm activity in the

attributable mainly to frontal activity.

The Great Valley of Tennessee is infrequently subject to tornadoes. The western half has experienced three times as many tornadoes as the eastern half, where the ORR is did experience a tornado from a severe thunderstorm on February 21, 1993 (MMES 1993b). The tornado path passed the Y-12 Plant in an east-northeast direction 21 kilometers (13 miles), ending just north of Knoxville. The wind speeds associated ranged from 18 meters per second (40 miles per hour) to nearly 58 meters per second hour), depending on the location along the path (MMES 1993b).

Hurricanes are rarely sustained once they reach as far inland as the Great Valley loss of energy when they are cut off from their source of moisture. The remnants were classified as devastating after crossing the coastline of the United States have of Tennessee in the last 70 years.

Atmospheric dispersion improves as wind speed increases, conditions become more the depth of the mixing height increases. The transport and dispersion of airborne functions of air movement. Transport directions and speeds are governed by the general flow (and by the nature of the terrain), whereas the diffusion of airborne material scale, random eddying of the atmosphere (i.e., turbulence). Turbulence is indicated stability classification. Data collected at Y-12 for calendar year 1992 were class temperature difference (i.e., between 60- and 10-meter levels) in accordance with N Commission Regulatory Guide 1.23 (NRC 1986). The atmospheric conditions are unstable Stability Classes A through C) approximately 5 percent of the time, neutral (Class percent of the time, and stable (Classes E through G) approximately 52 percent of the meter level.

4.7.2 Air Monitoring Networks

This section discusses the air monitoring networks of the ORR. Atmospheric emissions ORR facilities are monitored by stack monitors and by a network of ambient air monitoring the perimeter of each major ORR operations area (ORNL, the Y-12 Plant, and K-25 Site the ORR perimeter and throughout the surrounding communities.

4.7.2.1 Radiological Monitoring Network. Twelve of the ambient air monitoring stations on

the perimeter of the Y-12 Plant routinely monitor total suspended uranium particulate perimeter monitoring network consists of four stations that monitor radiation parameters alpha, gross beta, iodine, and gamma-emitting radionuclides). Samples of atmosphere collected monthly at selected perimeter stations.

4.7.2.2 Nonradiological Monitoring Network. The perimeter ambient air monitoring

network for K-25, which was upgraded in 1986, consists of five stations that monitor contaminants such as nickel, lead, and chromium. In 1988, two additional ambient stations were installed at the K-25 Site. These stations measure polychlorinated biphenyls, dioxins, and hexachlorobenzene that may accidentally be released due to the Toxic Substances Act incinerator (located in the K-25 area).

4.7.3 Air Releases

4.7.3.1 Radiological Emissions. Table 4.7-1 presents the radioactive emissions to the atmosphere

from each of the three ORR areas (ORNL, K-25, and Y-12) during 1992.

Table 4.7-1. Radioactive atmospheric emissions (curies/yr) from the ORR during 1992.

Isotope	ORNL	K-25	Y-12
Hydrogen-3 (Tritium)	2.14 x 10 ³	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Beryllium-7	8.91 x 10 ⁻⁶	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Potassium-40	0.0 x 100	1.01 x 10 ⁻³	0.0 x 100
Cobalt-57	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Cobalt-60	2.97 x 10 ⁻⁵	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Bromine-82	1.02 x 10 ⁻⁵	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100

Krypton-83m	7.32 x 10 ¹	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Krypton-85	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Krypton-85m	1.73 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Krypton-87	3.50 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Krypton-88	4.94 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Krypton-89	6.27 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Strontium-90	1.19 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Niobium-95	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Technetium-97	0.0 x 100	6.10 x 10 ⁻²	0.0 x 100
Ruthenium-106	0.0 x 100	4.36 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100
Iodine-129	2.70 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Iodine-131	1.25 x 10 ⁻¹	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Iodine-132	1.36 x 100	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Iodine-133	6.48 x 10 ⁻¹	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Iodine-134	2.05 x 10 ⁻²	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Iodine-135	1.22 x 100	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Xenon-133	8.81 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Xenon-133m	2.74 x 10	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Xenon-135	2.82 x 10	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Xenon-135m	1.55 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Xenon-138	8.50 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Cesium-134	6.03 x 10 ⁻⁷	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Cesium-137	6.13 x 10 ⁻⁴	8.16 x 10 ⁻⁵	0.0 x 100
Cesium-138	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Barium-137	3.84 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Barium-137m	6.13 x 10 ⁻⁴	8.16 x 10 ⁻⁵	0.0 x 100
Barium-140	1.00 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Lanthanum-140	1.39 x 10 ⁻⁶	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Isotope	ORNL	K-25	Y-12
Cerium-144	0.0 x 100	1.23 x 10 ⁻⁶	0.0 x 100
Europium-152	1.86 x 10 ⁻¹²	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Europium-154	5.87 x 10 ⁻⁶	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Europium-155	3.02 x 10 ⁻⁶	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Osmium-191	2.27 x 10 ⁻²	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Gold-194	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Lead-212	1.56 x 100	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Thorium-228	9.52 x 10 ⁻⁶	1.54 x 10 ⁻³	0.0 x 100
Thorium-230	6.49 x 10 ⁻⁷	7.41 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100
Thorium-232	1.86 x 10 ⁻⁷	2.96 x 10 ⁻⁵	0.0 x 100
Thorium-234	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Protactinium-234m	0.0 x 100	4.07 x 10 ⁻¹	0.0 x 100
Uranium-234	2.24 x 10 ⁻⁵	2.55 x 10 ⁻²	4.70 x 10 ⁻²
Uranium-235	4.79 x 10 ⁻⁷	1.12 x 10 ⁻³	1.49 x 10 ⁻³
Uranium-236	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100	1.86 x 10 ⁻⁴
Uranium-238	7.57 x 10 ⁻⁷	3.74 x 10 ⁻²	4.11 x 10 ⁻³
Neptunium-237	0.0 x 100	1.10 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100
Plutonium-238	7.40 x 10 ⁻⁶	6.02 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100
Plutonium-239	2.06 x 10 ⁻⁵	1.12 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100
Americium-241	1.37 x 10 ⁻⁵	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Curium-244	2.05 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100

4.7.3.2 Nonradiological Emissions. Table 4.7-2 presents the nonradiological emissions to the

atmosphere from each of the three ORR areas during 1992.

4.7.4 Air Quality

4.7.4.1 Radiological. A summary of ORR airborne radionuclide emissions for 1992 is

presented in Table 4.7-1. The GENII environmental transport and dose assessment model calculate the effective dose equivalent resulting from these radionuclide emissions summarized in Table 4.7-3. The maximum effective dose equivalent at the ORR boundary

This is 33 percent of the corresponding National Emissions Standard for Hazardous A collective effective dose equivalents to the estimated population of 910,000 person (50 miles) of the proposed SNF facility is 52 person-rem. This dose is 0.019 per cent background radiation affecting this population. Background radiation doses are pre

4.7.4.2 Nonradiological. The ORR is located in Anderson and Roane Counties, in the Eastern

Tennessee-Southwestern Virginia Interstate Air Quality Control Region 207. As of 1 within this Air Quality Control Region were designated as attainment with respect to Ambient Air Quality Standards (CFR 1993a).

One Prevention of Significant Deterioration ambient air quality Class I area is in the vicinity of ORR. That is the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, located approximately 30 miles southeast of ORR. Since the promulgation of the Prevention of Deterioration regulations, no such permits have been required for any emissions source.

Ambient air quality within and near the ORR is monitored for total suspended particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter (PM₁₀), fluorides, lead, and sulfur dioxide until August 1990 (MMES 1993a). Ambient air quality monitoring data are summarized in Table 4.7-4.

Table 4.7-2. Nonradiological emissions at ORR (kg/yr).

Pollutant	Y-12	ORNL	K-25
Carbon monoxide	36,807	45,872	12,119
Nitrogen dioxide	648,746	201,090	20,065
Particulates	1,576	5,599	1,137
Sulfur dioxide	268,894	703,419	302
Volatile organic compounds	1,582	1,068	1,011
Chlorine	91	b	1,567
Hydrochloric acid	6,959	b	42
Methanol	26,407	b	b
Nitric acid	9,491	30	b
Perchloroethylene	12,245	b	b
Sulfuric acid	2,424	0	130
Hydrogen fluoride	73	b	b
Mercury	0.01	b	b
Trichloroethane	745	b	b

a. Source: MMES (1993a).

b. No source indicated.

Table 4.7-3. Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from ORR operation during 1992.

	Maximum exposed individual dose	Collective dose to the population within 80 km of ORR source
Dose	3.3 mrem	52 person-rem
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants	10 mrem per year	--
Percentage of National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants	33	--
Natural background dose	295 mrem per year	279,000 person-rem per year
Percentage of natural background dose	1.1	0.019

a. Sources: MMES (1993a); PNL (1988).

b. The maximum boundary dose is to the hypothetical individual who remains in the area continuously during the year at the ORR boundary.

c. Based on estimated population of 910,000 persons within 80 kilometers of the pr

SNF facility site location in 1995.

Figure 4.7-2. Sources of radiation exposure, unrelated to Oak Ridge Reservation o

Table 4.7-4. Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable Criteria pollutant Averaging time Most stringent regulation or guideline (-g/m3) Maximum(a) background concentration (-g/m3) Maxi site (-g/

Carbon monoxide	8-hour	10,000	b	6.9
	1-hour	40,000	b	24.1
Nitrogen dioxide	Annual	100	b	2.1
Lead	Calendar quarter	1.5	b	c
Particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter	Annual	50	8	4.0d
	24-hour	150	54	43.9
Sulfur dioxide	Annual	80	27	2.3
	24-hour	365	146	31.8
	3-hour	1,300	321	80.5
Total suspended particulatesf	Annual	50	32	4.0
	24-hour	150	73	43.9
Hydrogen	30-day	1.2	0.06	c
Fluoride	7-day	1.6	0.03	c
Hydrogen fluorides (as fluorides)	24-hour	2.9	b	c
	8-hour	3.7	b	c
Hazardouse air pollutants				
Chlorine	8-hour	150	b	0
Selenium	8-hour	20	b	c
Mercury	8-hour	0.5	b	c
Chromium	8-hour	5	b	c
Chrome	8-hour	5	b	c

a. Ambient air quality data (MMES 1992a, 1991a).

b. Not monitored.

c. Not estimated because the potential release is negligible.

d. It is conservatively assumed that data for particulate matter less than 10 micr particulates data.

e. State standard.

f. State guideline.

Table 4.7-4 presents the effects of site emissions on local ambient air qualit pollutants obtained from ambient air quality monitoring data are added to pollutant determined from air dispersion modeling using site-specific emission rates. The re compare total concentrations to applicable Federal and state criteria pollutant and pollutant guidelines and regulations. All pollutant concentrations of existing emi below applicable regulations.

4.8 Water Resources

4.8.1 Surface Water

The hydrologic system on the ORR is controlled by the Clinch River (MMES 1994a) River flows about 350 miles (560 kilometers) from its headwaters in southwest Virgi to its confluence with the Tennessee River at Kingston, Tennessee. Its drainage ar square miles (11,340 square kilometers) (Boyle et al. 1982). All water that drains

the Clinch River and subsequently the Tennessee River.

Flow in the Clinch-Tennessee River system is regulated by multipurpose dams of the Valley Authority (TVA). Three dams operated by the TVA control the flow of the Clinch River. Clinch Dam, approximately 31 miles (50 kilometers) upstream of the ORR, was constructed to control and low-flow regulation. Melton Hill Dam, south of the ORNL site, controls Clinch River near the ORR. Its primary function is power generation. Flood control function. Watts Bar Dam, also used for power generation, is located on the Tennessee River. The lower reaches of the Clinch River by creating backwaters that can extend as far as Melton Hill Dam (Oakes et al. 1987).

Heavy precipitation in the area causes localized flooding, primarily in the Clinch River (MMES 1994a) and along the Clinch River. A flood analysis was prepared by the TVA (TVA 1991). This analysis provides flood elevations for flooding events in the Clinch River tributaries on the ORR. Flooding events analyzed ranged from the 25-year flood (a chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year) to probable maximum flooding. Approximate 500-year floodplains (1 in 500 chance in any given year) are shown on Figure 4.8-1. Specific surveys should be performed to more accurately determine locations of flooding.

The average discharge from Melton Hill Dam between 1963 and 1979 was 5,300 cubic feet per second (Boyle et al. 1982). The average summer (June-September) same period was 4,730 cubic feet (134 cubic meters) per second. However, power is generated at Melton Hill Dam to help meet peak loads and, as a result, flow in the Clinch River is pulsed at the dam can be followed by periods of flow of up to 20,000 cubic feet (560 cubic meters). Variations in the flow of the Clinch River affect the flow of the tributaries on the ORR during peak periods of power generation at Melton Hill Dam, flow from White Oak Creek is blocked or even reversed. The 1992 minimum monthly release at the Melton Hill Dam was 3.5 billion cubic feet (100 million cubic meters) (MMES 1994a).

The ORR is drained by a network of tributaries of the Clinch River (Figure 4.8-1). Stream classification system based on water quality, water use, and resident aquatic life. Streams on the ORR for fish and aquatic life, irrigation, and livestock watering (M designated classification, specific water quality criteria are applied, forming the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits. No rivers designated as wild and scenic on the ORR.

Stream flow on the ORR varies primarily with seasonal precipitation (MMES 1994a). Flow varies throughout the year, with the winter months and July experiencing the highest flows. Cycles of wet and dry seasons are also evident. Precipitation is lost through evaporation, runoff to streams, and to groundwater recharge through the soil.

The drainage pattern on the ORR is a weakly developed "trellis" pattern (Lee and Golder Associates 1988). The majority of the small streams are located in the northeast-southwest-trending valleys across the ridges through water gaps that may have formed due to the presence of karst topography also affects the appearance of surface water.

Figure 4.8-1. Locations of the Clinch River and tributaries on the Oak Ridge Reservation

A number of wetlands occur on the ORR (MMES 1994a). Wetlands are surface features periodically saturated with or covered by water, and have hydric soils and hydrophytic vegetation. Wetlands absorb flood waters and improve groundwater quality. Characteristic wetlands of the ORR region include forested wetlands along creeks, wetlands associated with streams and seeps, and emergent communities in shallow embayments.

The abundance of limestone and dolomite is reflected by the presence of calcium in surface waters at the ORR. Water hardness is typically moderate, and the concentration of dissolved solids normally range between 100 and 250 milligrams per liter (Rogers et al. 1988).

Measurements of surface water quality and flow are made at a number of sampling points around the ORR. Reference surface waters, ORR surface waters receiving effluents, surface waters, and effluents are all sampled and analyzed as part of the surface water quality program. Water samples are collected and analyzed for radiological and nonradiological constituents. Results are reported yearly in publicly available environmental reports (e.g., MMES 1991a).

Although bedrock characteristics differ somewhat among the watersheds of these streams, the observed differences in water quality are attributed to different contaminant sources (Rogers et al. 1988). Both wastewater discharges and the groundwater transport of contaminants from sites affect water quality in ORR streams. Consequently, a number of surface streams are contaminated by activities at the ORR (DOE 1992c). In the past, contaminants have been released to surface waters on the ORR. Indirect releases via shallow groundwater discharge to surface streams have occurred in the past and continue to date. For example, activities at the White Oak Creek system and Melton Branch with radionuclides and other hazardous chemicals. The stream channel of Upper East Fork Poplar Creek in the

has been contaminated from past activities at the Y-12 Plant. Activities at the Y-contaminated surface water and groundwater in the Bear Creek Valley with nitrates, radionuclides, and metals beyond the ORR boundary. Operations at the Y-12 Plant have contaminated Lower East Fork Poplar Creek beyond the ORR boundary with mercury, other organics, and radionuclides. Ultimately, contaminants from all these streams have the Clinch River, where sediment contamination is a primary concern.

All effluent discharges to streams are required to meet specified National Pollution Elimination System permit limits (MMES 1994a). For example, the quality of water in Creek partially reflects the influence of the Y-12 Plant and the City of Oak Ridge treatment facility. Each of the ORR installations has a National Pollution Discharge permit. In 1992, more than 400 National Pollution Discharge Elimination System stations requiring more than 65,000 water analyses. Significant reductions in the number of the ORR between 1991 to 1992 were engineered especially with respect to the Y-12 Plant Site was in 99.9 percent compliance with discharge limits. The Y-12 Plant was in 99 percent compliance with discharge limits. The ORNL was in 99 percent compliance with discharge limits. Table 4.8-1 lists the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System noncompliance and discharge point. At the Y-12 Plant, ORNL, and the K-25 Site, radiological effluent well within limits at all effluent monitoring locations (MMES 1993a).

Water quality in the Clinch River is affected by ORR activities, by contaminant upstream from the ORR, and by flow regulation at the Tennessee Valley Authority dam impoundment has resulted in a rise in water temperatures, sediment retention, and adsorption. Several institutions routinely monitor water quality in the Clinch River Valley Authority and the U.S. Geological Survey monitor just below Melton Hill Dam. Department of Environment and Conservation maintains a monitoring station on the Clinch River 2 miles (3.2 kilometers) below the mouth of Poplar Creek and the K-25 Site (Rogers 1994a).

The Clinch River supplies most of the water to the ORR, the City of Oak Ridge, along the river (MMES 1994a). Major surface water uses in the Oak Ridge area include agriculture, industry, and domestic use. Table 4.8-1. 1992 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System noncompliance at Installation Discharge point Parameter Percent compliance Number of samples

Installation	Discharge point	Parameter	Percent compliance	Number of samples
Y-12	302 (Rogers Quarry)	pH	99	
	501 (Central Pollution Control Facility [CPCF-1])	Total toxic organics	91	
	502 (West End Treatment Facility)	Total suspended solids	98	
	503 (Steam Plant Wastewater Treatment Facility)	Iron, total	99	
	Category IV outfalls (untreated process wastewaters)	Oil and grease	99	
		pH	95	
	506 (9204-3 sump pump oil)	Oil and grease	98	
	512 (Groundwater Treatment Facility) Creek Outfalls	pH	98	
		Polychlorinated biphenyls	97	
		Visual	not applicable	
ORNL	X01 (Sewage Treatment Plant)	Oil and grease	99	
	X02 (Coal Yard Runoff Treatment Facility)	Total suspended solids	96	
		Oil and grease	94	
	Category I outfalls	Oil and grease	33	
	Category II outfalls	Oil and grease	87	
	Cooling systems	Total suspended solids	91	
		Chlorine, total residual	98	
		Copper, total	98	
K-25	001 (K-1700 discharge)	Zinc, total	98	
		Aluminum	96	
	005 (K-1203 sanitary treatment facility)	Oil and grease	99	
		Chlorine, residual	99	
		Fecal coliform, No./100 milliliter	99	
		Settleable solids, milliliter/liter	99	
	006 (K-1007-B holding pond)	Chemical Oxygen Demand	99	

007 (K-901-A holding pond)	Chromium, total	98
	Suspended solids	98
	Dissolved oxygen	98
Storm drain	Unpermitted discharge	not applicable

a. Source: MMES (1993a).

b. Number of noncompliances.

industrial and public water supplies, commercial and recreational navigation, and other activities such as fishing, boating, and swimming. Five public water supplies are the ORR (MMES 1994a). The two nearest are the K-25 Site water treatment plant and water treatment plant. These are located 2.5 miles (4 kilometers) above and 21 miles below the mouth of Poplar Creek, respectively.

4.8.2 Groundwater

Groundwater beneath the ORR is heavily influenced by the site geologic structure (Solomon et al. 1992). Geologic units of the ORR are assigned to two broad hydrologic groups: (1) formed by the Knox Group and the Maynardville Limestone (carbonate rocks), in which dominated by solution conduits and which stores and transmits relatively large volumes of water; and (2) the ORR aquitards, made up of all other geologic units of the ORR (sandstones, siltstones, and shales) which flow is controlled by fractures. These aquitards may store fairly large volumes of water but transmit only limited amounts.

The hydrologic groups are divided into the near-surface stormflow zone, the vadose zone, and the aquiclude (Solomon et al. 1992). Flow in the 3- to 7-foot deep stormflow zone accounts for approximately 90 percent of the water moving laterally subsurface. The stormflow zone can transmit some water laterally to surface streams at rates of 39 feet (12 meters) per hour through large pores; however, less than 1 percent of the zone is large pores. Most water mass resides and migrates through smaller pore spaces at rates 10 to 100 times slower. Advective-diffusive exchange between pores and fractures controls contaminant migration rates. A vadose zone between the stormflow and groundwater zone exists at the ORR except where the water table is at the land surface, such as along perennial streams. The vadose zone is thickest beneath ridges and thinnest or non-existent in valleys. Most water movement through the vadose zone occurs vertically during precipitation events and discrete features such as fractures in the bedrock. Measurements of permeability, hydraulic conductivity vary considerably by locality in the vadose zone. Generally, conductivity is on the order of millimeters to centimeters per day. The groundwater zone is a saturated area in which the remaining 10 percent of lateral sub-surface water movement occurs in the deep aquiclude layer.

The Knox aquifer is the only true aquifer of the ORR and is the primary source of flow in perennial streams such as Upper White Oak Creek, East Fork Poplar Creek, and the Y-12 Plant effluent (Solomon et al. 1992). In some places the Knox aquifer can supply large quantities of water. Flow volumes are significantly larger than in the aquitards, and flow paths are deeper. Groundwater flow path length in the Knox aquifer is also substantially greater than in the aquitards, on the order of a few miles or kilometers. The one strongly suspected instance of groundwater flow along the ORR boundary occurs along the northeastern portion of Chestnut Ridge, where water travels along a geological strike northeastward from the Y-12 Plant across the ridge. In March 1994, DOE announced that elevated levels of four industrial solvents (carbon tetrachloride, tetrachloroethylene, and trichloroethylene) had been found in groundwater at the Y-12 Plant. DOE is currently monitoring the size and direction of the solvent plume. No proposed SNF management facilities would overlie the Knox aquifer.

Virtually all mobile water in the aquitards is discharged to local streams with the ORR effluent; about 98 percent occurs at depths of less than 100 feet (Solomon et al. 1992). Water in the aquitards travels through the uppermost part of the zone along flow paths of up to 1,000 feet (300 meters) in length before being discharged to streams. Groundwater flow volume decreases and solute residence times increase sharply with depth. Mean solute transport rate in the stormflow zone is on the order of meters per hour. In the intermediate and deep intervals of the groundwater zone, representative transport rates are on the order of centimeters per day.

few centimeters per year. Additionally, the mobility of most contaminants on the O reduced by sorption onto subsurface solids. Residence times of solutes near the wa aquitards range from a few days to a few years. In the intermediate and deep inter residence times range from hundreds to tens of thousands of years. Most groundwater aquitards occurs through a few widely spaced (23-164 feet [7-50 meters]) permeable

Water in the aquitards is at best a marginal resource (Solomon et al. 1992). A under 0.25 gallon per minute (0.02 liter per second). In many places, wells are in enough water to support a typical household.

Background groundwater quality at the ORR is generally good in the surficial aq poor (because of high total dissolved solids) in the bedrock aquifer at depths grea meters) (DOE 1993a). Water in the surficial aquifer is typically a nearly neutral calcium bicarbonate type. Transport processes in the subsurface (including diffusi the rock matrix, sorption, and exchange) have resulted in an accumulation of contam of the sources (Solomon et al. 1992).

Contaminated sites in need of environmental restoration include past-practice w waste storage tanks, spill sites, and contaminated inactive facilities (DOE 1993a). contaminants that exceed applicable standards at the Y-12 Plant include volatile or metals, and radioactivity (MMES 1993a). Exact rates and extent of the contaminatio quantified. However, data indicate that most contamination remains relatively clos example of the maximum extent of groundwater contamination, nitrate has been detect feet (920 meters) southwest of the source. Nitrate is relatively mobile in groundw define the maximum horizontal migration of contamination. At the ORNL, 20 waste ar have been identified and are being monitored for groundwater contamination. Monito each waste area group will direct further groundwater studies. At the K-25 Site, o commonly detected groundwater contaminants. Elevated levels of gross alpha and gro been detected in a number of wells. Uranium and technetium-99, respectively, appea responsible for the elevated gross alpha and gross beta levels. The metals chromiu barium have been detected in a number of wells at concentrations exceeding drinking Elevated levels of fluoride and polychlorinated biphenyls have also been detected i

In 1989, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory implemented an off-site residential quality monitoring program (MMES 1993a). The program objective is to document grou near the ORR and to monitor the potential impact of ORR operations on groundwater q Parameters monitored under the program include volatile organics, metals, anions, a radioactive parameters. Radionuclides and organics have been detected in some of t monitoring wells, however, concentrations have been below drinking water standards. detected at concentrations exceeding drinking water standards in one of the off-sit fluoride concentrations and accompanying high pH are most likely attributed to natu reactions in the substrate. No sources or flow paths have been identified for the detected.

Although surface water sources provide the main portion of potable water suppli groundwater does provide for some domestic, municipal, farm, irrigation, and indust 1993a). Single-family wells are common in areas not served by public water supplie However, because of the abundance of surface water and its proximity to the points groundwater is used at the ORR (DOE 1993a). Only one supply well exists on the res provides a supplemental supply to an aquatics laboratory.

All aquifers at the ORR are classified as Class II (DOE 1993a). Class II groun and potential sources of drinking water and those waters having other beneficial us source aquifers beneath the ORR (DOE 1993a). Water rights are not an issue in the

4.9 Ecological Resources

Land for the ORR was primarily in agricultural use at the time of acquisition b predecessor agencies. Clearings for orchards and pastures were on some of the uppe areas, and ridgetops; tillage crops were raised on the lower slopes and bottomland. also occurred in some areas. Except on very steep slopes, most of the forests had though not necessarily cleared for agricultural uses. Natural plant communities ha themselves on most of the ORR, although many areas are maintained as pine plantatio areas (ORNL 1988). Plant communities at the ORR are characteristic of the intermou central and southern Appalachia. Approximately 10 percent of the ORR has been deve withdrawn from public access; the remainder of the site has reverted to or been pla vegetation (MMES 1989).

Biotic media, such as fish and deer, that may be affected by the releases or th pathways of exposure to people are included in the environmental surveillance progr

Bluegill (*Lepomis macrochirus*) and whitetail deer (*Odocoileus virginianus*) are rout radionuclide contamination. In 1992, the maximum doses to man projected from actua were within the applicable regulatory requirements (see Section 4.12.4 and 4.12.5)

The following describes biotic resources at the ORR, including terrestrial reso aquatic resources, and threatened and endangered species. Within each biotic resou discussion focuses first on the ORR as a whole and then on the proposed site.

4.9.1 Terrestrial Resources

The vegetation of the ORR has been categorized into seven plant communities (Fi (Parr and Pounds 1987). The pine and pine-hardwood forest is one of the most exten plant communities on the ORR. Important species of this community type include lob shortleaf pine (*Pinus echinata*), and Virginia pine (*Pinus virginiana*) (Parr and Pou abundant plant community is the oak-hickory forest, which is commonly found on ridg ORR. Northern hardwood forest and hemlock-white pine-hardwood forest are the rares community types on the ORR. Currently, timber on the ORR is managed by thinning yo harvesting mature stands. Timber is also sold when an area is to be cleared for de 1994). A total of 899 species, subspecies, and varieties of plants have been ident et al. 1985; Cunningham and Pounds 1991).

Thirty areas on the ORR that are representative of the vegetational communities Appalachian region or that possess unique biotic features have been designated by D Environmental Research Park Reference Areas (Pounds et al. 1993). Several of these

Figure 4.9-1. Oak Ridge Reservation plant communities. The ORR provides habitat fo amphibians, 33 species of reptiles, 169 species of birds, and 39 species of mammals (Parr and Evans 1992). Habitats dominated by hardwood trees support the greatest n species, followed in order by wetlands, old fields, and pine plantations (ORNL 1988

Game animals present on the ORR include the whitetail deer, which has been hunt reservation since 1985 (MMES 1992b). Animals commonly found on the ORR include the toad (*Bufo americanus*), eastern garter snake (*Thamnophis sirtalis*), Carolina chicka carolinensis), northern cardinal (*Cardinalis cardinalis*), white-footed mouse (*Perom raccoon* (*Procyon lotor*). Raptors, such as the red-shouldered hawk (*Buteo lineatus*) owl (*Bubo virginianus*), and carnivores, such as the gray fox (*Urocyon cinereoargent (Mustela vison)*, are ecologically important groups on the ORR (Loar et al. 1981).

The surrounding countryside has much greater proportions of cultivated fields, residential areas than the ORR, and much more fragmented forest cover. Because of continuity of forests and a lack of human disturbance over much of the ORR, wildlif affected by forest fragmentation offsite may find an abundance of suitable habitat ORR may serve as a refuge for wildlife and as a source of wildlife migration (ORNL

Vegetative communities of the West Bear Creek site are typical of the ORR as a of second-growth oak-hickory forest and mixed pine-hardwood forest. There are some plantations adjacent to the northern edge of the powerline right-of-way and between Bear Creek Road (Rosensteel 1994). There are no National Environmental Research Pa Areas on the SNF site. Fauna of the site would also be similar to those expected t

4.9.2 Wetlands

Wetlands on ORR have recently been evaluated based on National Wetland Inventor field surveys of vegetation (Cunningham and Pounds 1991). Soils and hydrology were considered in this survey. Wetlands on the ORR include emergent, scrub/shrub, and located in embayments of the Melton Hill and Watts Bar Reservoirs that border ORR; streams, including East Fork Poplar Creek, Poplar Creek, Bear Creek, and their trib ponds; and around groundwater seeps.

Several well-developed emergent communities greater than 1 acre (0.004 square-k in shallow embayments of the reservoirs. The emergent communities typically grade adjoining forested wetlands. Most forested wetland sites are typically less than 1 wetlands greater than 1 acre are found along the East Fork Poplar Creek and the Cli Gallahar Bridge. Ponds on the ORR vary in size and support diverse flora and fauna areas exist along utility rights-of-way, especially in Bear Creek and Melton Valley Pounds 1991).

Originating on the lower slopes of Pine Ridge are several headwater tributary s Creek that flow from north to south across the West Bear Creek site. The stream va wetlands. A powerline right-of-way crosses the stream bottoms, where the vegetatio

wetland scrubs and herbaceous species, of which a portion adjacent to the west bound designated a National Environmental Research Park Natural Area for the protection of plant species.

4.9.3 Aquatic Ecology

Aquatic habitats on or adjacent to the ORR range from small, free-flowing stream watersheds to larger streams with altered flow patterns because of dam construction. Habitats include tailwaters, impoundments, reservoir embayments, and large and small

Sixty-four fish species have been collected on or adjacent to the ORR. The minimum number of species and is numerically dominant in most streams (ORNL 1988). The most common fish species of the Clinch River in the vicinity of the ORR are shad (*Dorosoma sp.*), common carp (*Cyprinus carpio*), catfish (*Ictalurus sp.*), bluegill, crappie (*Pomoxis annularis*), (Aplodinotus sp.) (Loar et al. 1981). Important fish species taken commercially in the Clinch River are common carp and catfish. Recreational species include crappie, bass (*Micropterus salmoides*), (Stizostedion canadense), sunfish (*Lepomis sp.*), and catfish (Rector 1994).

Results from the ORNL monitoring program indicate varying degrees of impact on communities of the small perennial streams resulting from past waste disposal practices. These streams are dominated by pollutant-tolerant insect species (Loar 1992).

Portions of certain streams on the ORR have been designated by DOE as National Research Park Aquatic Natural or Reference Areas. These areas generally represent streams or reaches of streams and are used primarily for reference areas as part of monitoring and abatement programs or environmental remediation efforts at ORR facilities. Presently eight Aquatic Natural Areas and nine Aquatic Reference Areas (Pounds et al. 1992) are designated. The Aquatic Natural Areas contain the Tennessee dace, a species listed as endangered by the State of Tennessee.

The aquatic resources occurring in the area of the West Bear Creek site are lim headwater tributary systems of Grassy Creek originating on the lower slopes of Pine from north to south across or adjacent to the site. Fifteen fish species have been Creek.

A National Environmental Research Park Aquatic Reference Area is located along and its tributaries, one of which runs through the eastern portion of the proposed diverse assemblage of invertebrates and fish species for a stream its size. The OR a reference area for studies of other streams affected by site development (Pounds

4.9.4 Threatened and Endangered Species

Federally and state-listed threatened, endangered, or other special-status species under the Federal Endangered Species Act and/or the state's Nongame and Endangered Species and the Raptor Protection and Conservation Laws that have a reasonable potential for occurrence on the ORR are listed in Table 4.9-1. The table indicates that 25 of these species have recent records on the ORR. The potential occurrence of the other 22 species listed is due to historical record ranges, and migratory nature of species. No critical habitat for threatened and endangered species as defined in the Endangered Species Act (U.S. DOI 1992), exists on the ORR.

Although not all of the ORR has been surveyed for rare species, 33 different ar plant species (federally or state-listed) have been designated as National Environm Natural Areas by DOE (Pounds et al. 1993). The plant species listed in Table 4.9-1 these Natural Areas but are not excluded from other areas on ORR. These Natural Ar to provide protection for rare plant and animal species. The designated areas incl bluffs, calcareous barrens, mesic forests, flood plains, and wetland cover classes.

No animal species listed by the Federal Government as threatened or endangered reside on the ORR (Kroodsmma 1987). The bald eagle (Federal, endangered) is a winter resident at Bar Lake and Melton Hill Lake. None of the species listed in Table 4.9-1 have been proposed for the West Bear Creek Valley site. The purple fringeless orchid occurs in a natural area on the western border of the site (Pounds et al. 1993). Pink lady's-slippers are expected in the Pine Ridge area (MMES 1992a). Preferred habitat within the site indicates a good occurrence of the barn owl, black vulture, Cooper's hawk, red-shouldered hawk, and sharp-shinned hawk. Surveys of the proposed site will be required to verify the presence of these and other species.

Table 4.9-1. Federally and state-listed threatened, endangered, and other special-potentially occur on or in the vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation.

Statusb

Common name	Scientific name	Federal	State
Plants			
Appalachian bugbanec	Cimicifuga rubifolia	C2	T
Butternut	Juglans cinerea	C2	T
Canada (wild yellow) lilyc	Lilium canadense	NL	T
Carey's saxifragec	Saxifraga careyana	NL	S
Fen orchidc	Liparis loeselii	NL	E
Ginsengc	Panax quinquefolius	NL	T
Golden sealc	Hydrastis canadensis	NL	T
Gravid sedgec	Carex gravida	NL	S
Lesser lady's tressesc	Spiranthes ovalis	NL	S
Michigan lily	Lilium michiganense	NL	T
Mountain witch alderc	Fothergilla major	NL	T
Northern bush honeysucklec	Diervilla lonicera	NL	T
Nuttall waterweedc	Elodea nuttallii	NL	S
Pink lady's-slipperc	Cypripedium acaule	NL	E
Purple fringeless orchidc	Platanthera peramoena	NL	T
Spreading false foxglovec	Aureolaria patula	C1	T
Tall larkspurc	Delphinium exaltatum	C2	E
Tuberclcd rein-orchidc	Platanthera flava var. herbiola	NL	T
Virginia spiraea	Spiraea virginiana	T	E
Fish			
Flame chub	Hemitremia flammea	NL	D
Tennessee dacec	Phoxinus tennesseensis	NL	D
Amphibians			
Green salamander	Aneides aeneus	NL	D
Hellbenderc	Cryptobranchus alleganiensis	C2	D
Tennessee cave salamanderd	Gyrinophilus palleucus	C2	T
Reptiles			
Cumberland turtle	Chrysemys scripta troosti	NL	D
Eastern slender glass lizard	Ophisaurus attenuatus longicaudus	NL	D
Northern pine snake	Pituophis melanoleucus	C2	T
Six-lined racerunnerd	Cnemidophorus sexlineatus	NL	D
Birds			
Bachman's sparrow	Aimophila aestivalis	C2	E
Bald eaglee	Haliaeetus leucocephalus	E	E
Table 4.9-1. (continued).			
Common name	Scientific name	Statusb Federal	Stat
Birds (continued)			
Barn owlc	Tyto alba	NL	D
Bewick's wren	Thyromanes bewickii altus	C2	T
Black-crowned night heronc	Nycticorax nycticorax	NL	D
Black vulturec	Coragyps atratus	NL	D
Cooper's hawkc	Accipiter cooperii	NL	T
Grasshopper sparrow	Ammodramus savannarum	NL	T
Northern harrier	Circus cyaneus	NL	T
Ospreyc	Pandion haliaetus	NL	E
Peregrine falcon	Falco peregrinus	E	E
Red-shouldered hawkc	Buteo lineatus	NL	D
Redheaded woodpecker	Malanerpes erythrocephalus	NL	D
Sharp-shinned hawkc	Accipiter striatus	NL	T
Mammals			
Eastern woodrat	Neotoma floridana magister	C2	D
Gray bat	Myotis grisescens	E	E
Indiana bat	Myotis sodalis	E	E

Smoky shrew	Sorex fumeus	NL	D
Southeastern shrew	Sorex longirostris	NL	D

a. Sources: Barclay (1990, 1992); Bay (1991); Cunningham et al. (1993); Hardy (199 Kitchings and Story (1984); Kroodsma (1987); ORNL (1981); ORNL (1988); 1992c, 1992d); TWRC (1991a, 1991b); U.S. DOI (1990, 1991, 1992).

b. Status codes:

C1 = Federal Candidate - Category 1 (probably appropriate to list)
 C2 = Federal Candidate - Category 2 (possibly appropriate to list, more study requ
 D = species deemed in need of management
 E = endangered
 NL = not listed
 S = species of special concern
 T = threatened, more study required

c. Recent record of species occurrence on the ORR.

d. Species collected on the ORR in 1964 (ORNL 1988).

e. Observed near ORR on Melton Hill and Watts Bar Lakes.

4.10 Noise

The major noise sources within the ORR occur primarily in developed operational include various facilities, equipment, and machines (e.g., cooling towers, transfor boilers, steam vents, paging systems, construction and materials-handling equipment Major noise sources outside the operational areas consist primarily of vehicles and At the site boundary, away from most of these activities, noise from these sources distinguishable from background noise levels. Some disturbance of wildlife activit ORR as a result of operational activities and construction activities.

Sound-level measurements have been made around the ORR in the process of testin preparing support documentation for the Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation site The acoustic environment along the ORR site boundary in rural areas and at nearby r from traffic noise is typical of a rural location, with the average day-night sound to 50 decibels, A-weighted. Areas near the site within Oak Ridge are typical of a average day-night sound level in the range of 53 to 62 decibels, A-weighted (EPA 19 source of ORR noise at the site boundary and at residences near the site boundary i trucks, private vehicles, and freight trains. During peak hours, plant vehicular t contributor to traffic noise levels in the area. In addition, some noise due to ai via commercial air transport through the airport at Knoxville can be attributed to Section 4.11 (Traffic and Transportation) discusses vehicular, air, and rail transp

The State of Tennessee has not established specific numerical environmental noi applicable to the ORR. The City of Oak Ridge has specified allowable noise levels shown in Table 4.10-1.

During a normal week, about 17,000 employees travel to the ORR each day in pri from surrounding communities. In addition, both government-owned and private truck deliver materials at the site. Based on the number of employees, it was estimated vehicle trips are generated to and from the site each day; mostly on Tennessee Stat Table 4.10-1. City of Oak Ridge maximum allowable noise limits applicable to the O Adjacent uses

Adjacent uses	Where measured	Maximum sound level (dBA) ^b
All residential districts	Common lot line	50
Neighborhood business district	Common lot line	55
General business district	Common lot line	60
Industrial district	Common lot line	65
Major streets	Street lot line	75
Secondary residential streets	Street lot line	60

a. Source: City of Oak Ridge (1984).

b. Decibels, A-weighted.

and 162, which pass through the ORR and are open to the general public. Both govern private trucks pick up and deliver materials at the site. The contribution of ORR volumes along these routes, especially during peak traffic periods, affects noise in the vicinity of the ORR and through the City of Oak Ridge.

Use of the railroad branches from the CSX and the Norfolk Southern Corporation and pick up shipments at the ORR may cause some noise impacts along these routes. Service is scheduled to Y-12 from the CSX line. However, only 60 cars were delivered to K-25 as needed. Only three or four trains serviced K-25 in 1993. Hundreds of trains per week may be required beginning in 1994 (Pearman 1994). Noise sources include diesel engines, wheel-track contact, and whistle warnings at rail crossings.

4.11 Traffic and Transportation

Traffic congestion is measured by level of service. Level of service A represents free flow traffic. Level of service B is in the range of stable flow, but the presence of other vehicles begins to be noticeable. Level of service C is in the range of stable flow, but the range of flow in which the operation of individual users becomes significant. Level of service D represents high density traffic with significant interactions with others in the traffic stream. Level of service E represents operating conditions at or near the capacity level. Level of service F represents forced or breakdown flow. The calculated level of service is for each segment. Level of service will most likely be worse in urban areas and better in rural areas.

The Region of Influence for the ORR includes site roads and regional roads in Anderson, Knox, Loudon, and Roane counties. Regional and local transportation routes are presented in Figure 4.11-1 and Figure 2.1-2.

Primary roads on the ORR include Tennessee State Routes 95, 62, 162, and 170 (Bear Creek Road), and Bear Creek Road. Except for Bear Creek Road, all are public roads. The roads on the ORR are private. Interstate 75 and Tennessee State Routes 162, 62, and 61 form the regional transportation network. Figure 4.11-1. Oak Ridge Reservation regional transportation map. Bear Creek Road and peak hour volume. Other areas on the site that have traffic problems include S entrance, and intersections.

Current baseline traffic (i.e., 1995) along segments providing access to the ORR contribute to differing service level conditions (TDOT 1993). Tennessee State Route 162 at level of service D between Interstate 75 at Norris and U.S. Route 25W at Clinton to level of service C between U.S. Route 25W at Clinton to Tennessee State Route 62 east of Oliver Springs. Tennessee State Routes 58 and 170 (providing access from the east), as well as Bear Creek Road would operate between level of service D and B. Tennessee State Routes 62 and 95 would operate between level of service D and B. Tennessee State Routes 62 and 95 would operate between level of service D and B. Tennessee State Route 62 would operate between level of service E between Tennessee State Route 95 at Oak Ridge and Tennessee State Route 162 at Oak Ridge. Tennessee State Route 62 at Oak Ridge.

Road reconstruction, widening, modification of interchanges, and new interchange projects are planned for segments of Bear Creek Valley Road, Scarboro Road, and Tennessee State Routes 58, 62, and 95 (Johnson, C. 1994; MMES 1991b).

Current baseline traffic along segments providing regional access to the ORR is contribute to differing service level conditions. Interstate 40 passes within 5 miles south of the ORR. It has a level of service of A to B between U.S. Route 27 at Harrogate which passes northeast about 11 miles (18 kilometers) and south about 3 miles (5 kilometers) to the ORR. U.S. Route 25W passes the ORR about 10 miles (16 kilometers) to the east and level of service of D to E between Interstate 75 at Lake City to Tennessee State Route 162 at Oak Ridge.

In 2001, when site-related impacts are at their highest along segments providing background traffic is projected to contribute to differing service level conditions. Tennessee State Route 61 would operate at level of service D between Interstate 75 at Lake City to U.S. Route 25W at Clinton and level of service C between U.S. Route 25W at Clinton to Tennessee State Route 62 east of Oliver Springs. Tennessee State Routes 58 and 170 as well as Bear Creek Road would operate between level of service D and B. Tennessee State Routes 62 and 95 would operate between level of service D and B. Tennessee State Routes 62 and 95 would operate between level of service D and B. Tennessee State Route 62 would operate between level of service E between Tennessee State Route 95 at Oak Ridge and Tennessee State Route 162. U.S. Routes 11/70 would operate at level of service F between Tennessee State Route 131 and U.S. Routes 11E/11W Split. All roads would operate at level of service E or better (University of Tennessee 1993). Interstate 40 would operate at level of service B to D between U.S. Route 27 at Harrogate to Tennessee State Route 162.

The level of service was calculated using average daily traffic counts (TDOT 19 parameters (ITE 1991; TRB 1985; Rand McNally 1993)).

No public transportation service exists in the City of Oak Ridge. Other modes within the Region of Influence include railways and waterways. Railroad service in Influence is provided by CSX Transportation and the Norfolk Southern Corporation. serve the ORR. A CSX Transportation spur line serves the ORR site as well as the C Waterborne transport in the Region of Influence is via the Clinch River, which prov mode of transportation to the Oak Ridge area. The Clinch River waterway has rarely business, and no designated port facilities exist for such purposes (Corps 1991).

McGhee Tyson Airport in Knoxville, 40 miles (64 kilometers) from the ORR, recei passenger and cargo services from both national and international carriers. The cl facility to ORR is Atomic Airport in Oliver Springs. Numerous other private airpor throughout the Region of Influence (DOT 1991).

4.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety

The Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Reservation released chemicals and small q radionuclides to the environment from operations at all facilities during 1992. Th quantified and characterized in detail in the Oak Ridge Environmental Report for 19 information, along with estimates of the potential consequences resulting from thes summarized in greater detail within sections 4.7, 5.7, 4.8, and 5.8 for the purpose existing radiation and chemical environment. The ORR baseline data presented withi expected to remain essentially constant between 1992 and 1995 (the year in which SN expected to commence).

Health effects from radiation are presented here as the risk of fatal cancer. of the health risk estimator (risk of fatal cancer per rem of exposure). The value exposures to the public is 5×10^{-4} for fatal cancers. The corresponding estimator workers is 4×10^{-4} .

4.12.1 Atmospheric Emissions and Doses

Table 4.7-1 in Section 4.7 illustrates the breakdown of radioactive emissions t from each of the three ORR operations areas (ORNL, K-25, and Y-12), during 1992. T dose of 3.3 millirem/year due to 1992 operations, to the maximally exposed individu boundary, is well within the 10 millirem/year limit given in 40 CFR Part 61 (the U. Protection Agency's National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants) (MMES

The concentrations at the ORR boundary of all radionuclides released to the atm three operations areas in 1992 were less than 1 percent of the DOE Derived Concentr is based upon an exposure of 100 millirem; this equates to a dose of less than 1 mi

The associated isotopic gaseous release cancer risks are presented within Secti

Table 4.7-2 in Section 4.7 presents the chemical releases for 1992 in a fashion 4.7-1. All of these releases are within permitted levels. The associated chemical presented within Section 4.12.6.

4.12.2 Groundwater/Surface Water Contamination and Doses

Referring to the various water contamination data presented in Section 4.8, it plausible 0.62 mrem/year of site operation could be incurred by a potential maximal individual at the site boundary due to water ingestion, fish ingestion, and other a **Table 4.12-1) (MMES 1993a).**

Additionally, a dose of 17 mrem/year of site operation could be incurred by thi maximally exposed individual, due to external exposure from contaminated liquid eff **Table 4.12-1.** Summary of estimated radiation dose to public from 1992 operations a ORR.

Pathway	Location of maximally exposed individual	Committed effective dose equivalent to maximally exposed individual (mrem)	Collective committed effective do equivalent (person-rem)
---------	--	--	---

Gaseous effluents	Nearest resident to
-------------------	---------------------

Inhalation plus direct	Y-12 Plant	2.7	29
radiation from air,	ORNL	0.06	2
ground, and food	K-25 Site	0.53	21
chains	ORR	3.3	52
Liquid effluents			
Drinking water	Gallaher	0.2	0.85
Eating fish	Poplar Creek	0.4	1.0b
Other activities	Poplar Creek	0.02	
Direct radiationb			
	Clinch River shoreline	2	
	Poplar Creek (K-25 Site)	15	

a. Within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the ORR.

b. Includes doses from all liquid pathways (MMES 1993a).

4.12-1). Fifteen mrem/year of this dose would result from a hypothetical individual hours/year along Poplar Creek near the K-25 storage areas (MMES 1993a).

The associated cancer risks related to these doses are presented in Section 4.1

4.12.3 External Gamma Radiation

External gamma radiation measurements were made with thermoluminescent dosimeter locations coinciding with the ambient air locations. The average external gamma rate at the ORR perimeter for 1992 was 7.6 microroentgens per hour. All of the measurements were in the range of typical values for cities in the United States (MMES 1993a).

4.12.4 Radiation Dose and Health Effects Summary (Public and ORR Workers)

A summary of the effective dose equivalents to the hypothetical maximally exposed individual from the important pathways of exposure during 1992 is presented in Table 4.12-1. The individual receives the highest effective dose equivalent (3.3 millirem) from gaseous effluent from the Gallaher area (0.2 millirem), and went fishing at Poplar Creek (for 250 hours/year at the K-25 site (15 millirem), that individual would receive a total effective dose equivalent of 18.5 millirem, which is roughly 6.3 percent of the annual dose (295 millirem) from radiation (see Figure 4.7-2). All of these doses are within the applicable regulatory limits (10 millirem/year from the drinking water pathway, 10 millirem/year from the airborne radionuclides, and 100 millirem/year total for all pathways) (MMES 1993a).

The risk of fatal cancer to the maximally exposed individual at the site boundary (from atmospheric emissions only) is 1.7×10^{-6} per year of operation, and the corresponding risk to the maximally exposed individual from drinking water is 1.0×10^{-7} per year of operation. The risk of fatal cancer from direct radiation due to an individual's spending 250 hours/year at the K-25 Site is 7.5×10^{-6} per year of exposure. A more realistic maximally exposed individual from direct radiation, an individual spending 250 hours/year along the Clinch River on which cesium-137 experiments were performed, yields an associated risk of 1×10^{-6} per year of operation; over the management facility lifetime this risk would be 3.7×10^{-4} . Table 4.12-1 also includes doses to the general population within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of the ORR. It was estimated that approximately 54 person-rem (which translates to an expected 0.027 fatal cancer) were received by the general population from 1992 ORR operations. Thus, over the lifetime of the ORR there would be approximately 1.1 fatal cancers expected.

Doses to onsite workers at the ORR have been reported by DOE for 1991 operation as approximately 17,000 workers monitored, the maximally exposed individual was reported to have received 2 rem (assumed as 2 mrem), which is well below the DOE guidelines of 5 rem (DOE 1992). The average dose to workers at the site was 2.8 mrem/yr. The risk of fatal cancer to the average worker per year of operation; the risk to a worker who spent 40 years at ORR is approximately 0.0001. Additionally, the total collective (population) dose received by these workers was approximately 280,000 person-rem, which corresponds to 0.019 fatal cancers per year of exposure. Over a 40-year period, the expected 0.76 fatal cancer to this worker population.

4.12.5 Health Effects Studies

Two epidemiologic studies were conducted to determine whether the ORNL facility any excess cancers in the communities surrounding the facility. One study found no mortality in the population living in counties surrounding ORNL when compared to the populations located in other nearby counties and elsewhere in the United States (Ja other found slight excess cancer incidences of several types in the counties near O excess risks were statistically significant (Sharpe 1992).

An Oak Ridge health assessment study is ongoing. This study will include a rec doses received by the public from historical releases of radioactivity from the res Phase I report has been issued (Tennessee Department of Health and the Oak Ridge He Steering Panel 1993).

Studies of workers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Jablon et al 1991; Wing et an excess of leukemia deaths among maintenance workers and engineers who had worked 10 years, suggesting a possible excess attributed to exposures other than radiation percent in deaths from all causes and 4.94 percent for all cancers with every rem o exposure with a 20-year exposure lag was also reported. Excess cancer deaths were working in radioisotope production and chemical operations but not with work in phy or unknown job categories. Cancer mortality was also associated with exposure to b mercury.

In March 1990, the Secretary of Energy announced that DOE would turn over respo analytical epidemiologic research on long-term health effects on workers at DOE fac surrounding communities to the Department of Health and Human Services, and directe health and exposure data be released. A Memorandum of Agreement with the Departmen Human Services was signed in January 1991. The Department of Health and Human Serv conducting the ongoing health effects research program. To develop a database on w initiated an Epidemiologic Surveillance Program and Health-Related Records Inventor

4.12.6 Chemical Dose and Health Effects Summary

Table 4.7-2 in Section 4.7 presents the ORR chemical releases for 1992. Exposu released from the ORR was compared with acceptable levels of exposure (no adverse e noncarcinogens) for the ingestion exposure pathway via drinking water and consumpti Aluminum, nitrate, and polychlorinated biphenyls were measured above acceptable lev Creek; the ratios of their doses to acceptable doses were 3.4, 2.2, and 11.1, respe chemical exposure attributable to ORR operations that was found to exceed acceptabl mercury. This noncarcinogen was found in fish caught from the Clinch River. The r dose to acceptable dose levels was found to be 1.1 (MMES 1993a).

Because of concerns for possible contamination of the population by mercury, th Department of Health and Environment conducted a pilot study in 1984. The study sh difference in urine or hair mercury levels between individuals with potentially hig (residence or activity in contaminated areas based on soil measurements or consumpt the contaminated areas) and those with little potential exposure. Mercury levels i as high as 2,000 parts per million. Analysis of a few soil samples showed that mos soil was inorganic, however, thereby lowering the probability of bioaccumulation an Planned occupational studies at the ORR include a 24-month clinical follow-up of 11 mercury workers (Wing et al. 1991).

4.13 Utilities and Energy

4.13.1 Water Consumption

Both the Clinch River and the Melton Hill Reservoir supply water to the ORR. B part of the TVA flood control system, they are capable of maintaining a constant vo excess of the demands of the ORR (MMES 1993a).

In 1995, water supply facilities at the ORR will have a capacity of approximate second (27,916 gallons per minute). In 1993, the average demand for water on the O facilities was approximately 801 liters per second (12,708 gallons per minute) (Fri

A pumping station near Y-12 on the Melton Hill Reservoir supplies untreated water treatment plant. After treatment, the water is stored in two reservoirs with 26 million liters (7 million gallons). From the reservoirs, water is supplied by g operations site, ORNL, the Scarboro Facility (which houses the Oak Ridge Institute Education's Energy/Environmental Systems Division), and the City of Oak Ridge (MMES

A pumping station on the Clinch River provides water to the K-25 water system. the water is stored in two water storage tanks on Pine Ridge. This system provides Site, the Transportation Safeguards Facility, and the city's Clinch River Industria

The SNF facilities will be supplied with water from the K-25 water system. In water system will have a capacity of approximately 184 liters per second (2,917 gal the years 1988 to 1994, K-25 water usage varied from a high of 97 liters per second minute) in 1990 to a low of 78 liters per second (1,235 gallons per minute) in 1988 demand was 84 liters per second (1,324 gallons per minute). Significant growth in demand is not expected (Fritts 1994).

4.13.2 Electrical Consumption

The ORR electrical system is supplied power from four major power sources in th Kingston Steam Plant, Bull Run Steam Plant, Wolf Creek Hydroelectric Plant, and For Hydroelectric Plant. The K-25 Power Operations Department manages and operates the transmission and substation system of the ORR (MMES 1994a).

Three substations located at the K-25, Y-12, and ORNL sites comprise the ORR po The substations are tied together onsite by five DOE 161-kilovolt transmission line to ORR substations by six TVA electrical lines at 161 kilovolts, which is reduced t distribution (MMES 1994a).

In 1995, the connected capacity of ORR facilities would be approximately 920 me From 1989 through 1993, the peak demand of electricity varied from a high of 116 me 1989 to a low of 98 megavolt-amperes in 1993 (Fritts 1994).

4.13.3 Fuel Consumption

The East Tennessee Natural Gas Company supplies natural gas to the ORR, transpo from the supply areas through upstream pipelines and then through its own pipeline delivery to the ORR (MMES 1994a). By contract, ORR natural gas capacity is 7,600 d amount can be increased if necessary. In 1994, the average daily usage of natural decatherms (Fritts 1994).

Coal is used to produce steam at ORNL and as a backup fuel at the Y-12 steam pl to use more coal in the future as a replacement for natural gas (Fritts 1994).

4.13.4 Wastewater Disposal

The ORR does not have a centralized sewage system for all facilities. The K-25 have their own sewage systems, while Y-12 shares sewage lines with the City of Oak 1994a).

The sanitary sewage effluent from the Y-12 operations area flows to the Oak Rid Treatment Plant. DOE maintains the sewage lines extending from Y-12 to the east en road (Bear Creek Road). The City of Oak Ridge maintains the sewage lines from the road to the treatment plant on West Oak Ridge Turnpike (MMES 1994a).

The sewage treatment plant for ORNL discharges treated effluent into White Oak compliance with all permit requirements (MMES 1994a). There are no anticipated cap with the K-25 sanitary sewage system, which is permitted by the National Pollution Elimination system (MMES 1994a).

The SNF management facility could use the K-25 sanitary sewer treatment system, north of the proposed SNF site. The K-25 system has a capacity of 26 liters per se minute). From 1988 to 1994, wastewater production peaked at 24 liters per second (minute) during wet conditions in 1994 (Fritts 1994). As an alternative, a new onsi system and wastewater treatment plant might be required for the proposed SNF manage

4.14 Materials and Waste Management

This section describes the hazardous materials management (chemical raw materia categories, and the ongoing waste management activities, including onsite treatment onsite waste disposal, and preparation for appropriate offsite disposal, for the th within the ORR: the Y-12 Plant, the K-25 Site, and the ORNL (see Figure 2.1-2). O related activities at the ORR have resulted in the generation of low-level, mixed l transuranic, spent nuclear fuel (see Chapter 2 for discussion), and industrial soli are discussed in this section. Section 4.8 discusses nonhazardous liquid waste tre of the Y-12 Plant, the K-25 Site, and ORNL waste categories and the waste managemen to each of these complexes follows.

Facilities at the Y-12 Plant are being used to manage low-level radioactive, ha Conservation and Recovery Act hazardous/mixed polychlorinated biphenyl and polychlo biphenyl/uranium), and nonhazardous solid wastes. Figure 4.14-1 shows the waste ma at the Y-12 Plant.

Figure 4.14-1. Flow diagram of Y-12 Plant storage and disposal units at ORR (Page wastes. Nonhazardous solid wastes are disposed at the Y-12 Plant Sanitary Landfill shows the waste management process at the K-25 Site.

Facilities at the ORNL are being used to manage transuranic, low-level radioact mixed waste. Nonhazardous solid wastes are disposed at the Y-12 Plant Sanitary Lan shows the waste management process at the ORNL.

The overall ORR waste management activities, as well as details on the faciliti wastes, are presented by waste category (transuranic, mixed low-level, low-level, h industrial solid) in Sections 4.14.1 through 4.14.5 respectively. Note that the 19 presented in tables associated with these sections are a representation of the annu operations until the year 2035. Section 4.14.6 describes the management of the che used for ORR activities.

4.14.1 Transuranic Waste

The ORNL is the only complex at the ORR that generates and manages transuranic 4.14-1 presents a summary of transuranic waste management activities projected for on the facilities used to manage transuranic wastes are presented in Table 4.14-2.

4.14.2 Mixed Low-Level Waste

All three complexes at the ORR generate and manage mixed low-level wastes. The 25 Site, and the ORNL manage non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act wastes (pol biphenyls, beryllium, and asbestos) contaminated by low-level radioactive materials substances and include them with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-regulat contaminated materials as mixed wastes. Table 4.14-3 presents a summary of mixed l management activities projected for 1995, and details on the facilities used to man low-level waste are presented in Table 4.14-4.

Figure 4.14-2. Flow diagram of K-25 waste storage units at ORR (Page 1 of 2). F

Figure 4.14-3. Flow diagrams of ORNL waste treatment units and storage and dispos
Table 4.14-1. Projected 1995 transuranic waste management activities at the ORR (O
 Waste category Generation rate^b Treatment Treatment Storage method St
 method capacity

Transuranic (Solid)					
Contact	10.7 m3	None	Not available	Staged	61
handled					
Remote	5.4 m3	None	Not available	Shielded storage	22
handled					

a. Sources: Snider (1993); Turner (1994).

b. 1991 data.

c. WIPP = Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Table 4.14-2. Baseline transuranic waste management activities as of 1995 at the O

Waste description	Facility number	Facility description	Facility storage capacity
Transuranic	7802N	TRUc trenches	199 concrete casks

7855	RH-TRUd waste storage facility	108 concrete casks
7878	Interim storage facility	Not applicable (inspection facility)
7824	Waste examination and assay facility (dual use facility)	Not available
7879	CH-TRUe/LLWf solids storage (dual storage facility)	372 m2

- a. Sources: PAI Corporation (1993a); Turner (1994).
b. 1993 data.
c. TRU = Transuranic waste.
d. RH-TRU = Remote-handled transuranic waste.
e. CH-TRU = Contact-handled transuranic waste.
f. LLW = Low-level (radioactive) waste.

Table 4.14-3. Projected 1995 mixed low-level waste management activities at the OR

Complex	Waste category	Generation rate	Treatment method	Treatment capacity
Y-12 Plant	Mixed solidb	242,869 kgc (573 m3/yr)	None	N/A
	Mixed liquidb	1,537,234 kge (426,120 gal/yr)	Settlement and filtration	8,716 m3 yr (2.3 million gal/yr)
K-25 Site	Mixed liquidg	47,022.9 m3 h	Settlement and filtration/ incineration	58,400,000 gal
ORNL	Mixed solidg	535.2 m3j	Planned	Planned
	Mixed liquidg	Not reported	Ion exchange	259,199.4 m3
	Mixed solidg	48.9 m3 k	Planned	Planned

- a. Sources: Snider (1993); Brown (1994c).
b. 1992 data.
c. Includes 37,434 kg of contaminated (radionuclides) asbestos beryllium oxide was
d. RCRA/PCB Warehouse (Building 9720-9), RCRA and PCB Container Storage Area (Buil 9720-12) and PCB Drum Storage Facility (Building 9407-7).
e. Includes 13,152 kg of polychlorinated biphenyl/uranium waste.
f. OD-9 and OD-10.
g. 1991 data.
h. TSCA (Toxic Substances Control Act) incinerator waste water.
i. Includes permitted container (solid/sludges/liquid wastes) and tank (liquids) s
j. May include some polychlorinated biphenyl-tainted waste.
k. Includes polychlorinated biphenyl and asbestos waste.

- l. Mixed Waste Drum Storage Pads - Bldg 7507 W, Part A permit, 22,000 gal.

Table 4.14-4. Baseline mixed low-level waste management activities as of 1995 at t

Complex	Waste identification	Facility number	Facility description
Y-12 Plant	Mixedb	9201-4 9404-7	Mixed waste storage area PCB storage facility (dual storage/use)

		9720-9	Mixed and PCBC storage area (dual storage/use)
		9720-31	RCRAD staging and storage facility (dual storage/use)
		9720-58	RCRAD and PCBC container storage area (dual storage/use)
		9811-1	Waste oil tank storage area, OD-7 (dual storage/use)
		9811-8	Waste oil solvent drum storage facility OD-8 (dual storage/use)
		9811-8	Organic liquid storage area, OD-9 (dual storage/use)
		None	Containerized waste storage area (dual storage/use)
K-25 Sitef	Mixede	K-1065A, B, C, D, E	Container storage
		K-1419	Liquid waste storage facility
		K-31	Waste piles (dual storage/use facility)
		K-33	Waste piles (dual storage/use facility)
		K-27	Withdrawal alleys and vaults
		K-27	Vault 31X
ORNL	Mixed	7075	Used oil storage tank
Complex	Waste identification	7507W	Mixed waste storage facility
		Facility number	Facility description
		7654	Long term hazardous waste storage facility
		7823	Mixed waste storage facility
		7830A	Waste storage tank

- a. Sources: PAI Corporation (1993b); PAI Corporation (1994); Turner (1994).
- b. 1993 data.
- c. PCB = Polychlorinated biphenyl.
- d. RCRA = Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
- e. 1994 data.
- f. For additional mixed waste facilities see hazardous waste facilities at the K-2

4.14.3 Low-Level Waste

The Y-12 Plant, K-25 Site, and the ORNL generate and manage low-level wastes. presents a summary of low-level waste management activities projected for 1995, and details on the facilities used to manage low-level waste are presented in Table

4.14.4 Hazardous Waste

All three complexes at the ORR generate and manage hazardous wastes. The Y-12 Site, and the ORNL manage non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act wastes (asbest polychlorinated biphenyls) as dangerous substances and include them with the Resour and Recovery Act-regulated wastes as hazardous wastes. Table 4.14-7 presents a sum hazardous waste management activities projected for 1995, and details on the facili to manage hazardous waste are presented in Table 4.14-8.

4.14.5 Industrial Solid Waste

The K-25 Site and the ORNL industrial solid wastes are disposed of at the Y-12 Landfill (PAI Corporation 1994; PAI Corporation 1993a). Table 4.14-9 presents a summary of industrial solid waste management activities projected for 1995 at the Y-12 Plant, and details on the facilities used to manage industrial solid waste are presented in Table 4.14-5.

4.14.6 Hazardous Materials

The ORR uses a variety of chemical raw materials for activities associated with finishing/plating, uranium recovery, laboratory services, cooling tower operation, cleaning/maintenance operations. Examples of chemicals used at the ORR include acids (nitric), organics (methanol, perchloroethylene), and inorganics (hydrogen fluoride, 309 specific chemicals and 20 chemical categories are being reviewed for possible Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act Section 313 requirements. For 1992, there are 7 extremely hazardous substances and 39 hazardous chemicals for the Y-12 Plant; 5 extremely hazardous substances and 16 hazardous chemicals for the K-25 Site; and 20 extremely hazardous chemicals for ORNL (MMES 1993a).

In addition, diesel fuel and gasoline, used to fuel site service and construction, are stored in bulk containers (55-gallon drums, aboveground storage tanks, and underground storage tanks).

The Y-12 Plant underground storage tank program includes seven in-service petroleum storage tanks. In addition, there are seven active petroleum underground storage tanks at the K-25 Site. There is one active underground storage tank containing heating oil and 22 active underground storage tanks that will be taken out of service or upgraded by 1998. The contents of these tanks are listed in Table 4.14-5.

Table 4.14-5. Projected 1995 low-level waste management activities at the ORR.

Complex	Waste category	Generation rate ^b	Treatment method	Treatment capacity	Storage
Y-12 Plant	Low-level solid ^b	1,438,680 kgc (5,793 m3/yr)	Compaction/ incineration	Offsite	Storage
	Low-level liquid ^b	565,929 kg (148,186 gal/yr)	Settlement and filtration	20,644m3/yr (5,400,000 gal/yr)	Storage
	K-25 Site Low-level liquid ^f	Included in mixed liquid ^f	Settlement and filtration	See mixed liquid	Non-hazardous
	Low-level solid ^f	978.7 m3 g	Compaction/ smelting	Offsite	Onsite
ORNL	Low-level liquid ^f	2,064.4 m3	Neutralization & precipitation	1.5292M m3 i	Storage and treatment
	Low-level solid ^f	130 m3 j	Compaction	Offsite	Onsite

a. Sources: Snider (1993); Brown (1994c).

b. 1992 data.

c. Includes 649,429 kg of contaminated scrap metal.

d. N/A = not applicable.

e. West End Treatment Facility and Central Pollution Control Facility.

f. 1991 data.

g. Includes contaminated scrap metal.

h. Does not include 6.9 acre scrap metal storage site.

Table 4.14-5. (continued)

i. NPDES discharge limit for the ORNL Non-rad Wastewater Treatment Facility.

j. Includes scrap metal only. Does not include low-level radioactive waste solid Wastewater Treatment Plant.

k. Solid Waste Storage Area.

Table 4.14-6. Baseline low-level waste management activities as of 1995 at the ORR

Complex	Waste identification	Facility number	Facility description	Facility capacity
Y-12 Plant	Low-levelb	9720-12	Low-level waste storage	
			Indoor area	465 m2
			Outside area	557 m2
		9720-44	Low-level waste storage pad	Not re
		9825-1, 2	Uranium oxide storage	906 m3
			vaults I and II	(each
		None	Contaminated scrap metal storage area	Not re
		None	Outside low-level waste storage	359 m3
		None	Above grade low-level waste storage facility	3,948
		9720-25	Classified waste storage facility	340 m3
			Containerized waste storage area (dual use/storage)	2,323
		K-25 Site	Contaminated scrap metal storage yard	31,857
			Temporary drum storage	2.5 m3
			LLWd storage	3,830
			Sludge-drum storage yard	8,846
			LLWd storage	138 m3
			Process vaults (dual storage/use facility)	2,469
ORNL	Low-levelb	K-33	Waste piles (dual storage/use facility)	961 m3
		K-1232	Container storage area (dual storage/use facility)	42.5 m
		7831	Waste compaction facility	Not (tre
		7841	Contaminated equipment storage yard	Not
		7856	Cask storage site	Not
		7823A, B, C, D, E	RUBB buildings	Not
			Waste examinations and assay facility, dual use facility	Not
		7879	CH-TRUF/LLWd solids storage facility (dual storage facility)	372
		7842	SWSA-6g staging and equipment building	297
		None	Tumulus I and II	Not

a. Sources: PAI Corporation (1993b); PAI Corporation (1994); PAI Corporation (199

b. 1993 data.

c. 1994 data.

d. LLW = Low-level (radioactive) waste.

e. RCRA = Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.

f. CH-TRU = Contact-handled transuranic waste.

g. SWSA-6 = Solid Waste Storage Area - 6.

Table 4.14-7. Projected 1995 hazardous waste management activities at the ORR.

Complex	Waste category	Generation rate	Treatment method	Treatment capacity
Y-12 Plant	Hazardous solid ^b	511,421 kgc (846 m3/yr)	None	Not applicable
	Hazardous liquid ^b	767,874 kge (215,492 gal/yr)	Settlement and filtration	See low-level liqui
K-25 Site	Hazardous liquid ^d	8,410.6 m3 h	Neutralization/precipitation	See mixed
	Hazardous solid ^d	680.5 m3	Compaction for non-RCRA/TSCA ⁱ incineration	Offsite
ORNL	Hazardous liquid ^d	0.8 m3	Neutralization/detonation	Not applicable
	Hazardous solid ^d	84.1 m3 j	None	Not applicable

a. Sources: Snider (1993); Brown (1994c).

b. 1992 data.

c. Includes 420,192 kg of uncontaminated (radionuclides) asbestos/beryllium oxide waste.

d. Remaining West End Tank Farm sludge storage capacity.

e. Includes 55,624 kg of uncontaminated (radionuclides) polychlorinated biphenyl w

f. Liquid Organic Waste Storage Facility OD3, Building 9418-9, and OD9.

Table 4.14-7. (continued)

g. 1991 data.

h. Hydrogen softener blowdown from the steam plant.

i. RCRA = Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; TSCA = Toxic Substances Control

j. Includes polychlorinated biphenyls and asbestos.

k. Hazardous Waste Storage Facility.

Table 4.14-8. Baseline hazardous waste management activities as of 1995 at the ORR

Complex	Waste identification	Facility number	Facility description
Y-12 Plant	Hazardous ^b	None	Interim reactive waste treatment area (open burning)
		9720-45	Organic liquid storage facility
		9720-9	Mixed and PCB ^c storage area (dual storage/use)
		9720-31	RCRA ^d staging and storage facility (dual storage/use)
		9720-58	RCRA ^d and PCB ^c container storage area (dual storage/use)
		9811-1	Waste oil tank storage Area

			OD-7 (dual storage/use)
		9811-8	Waste oil solvent drum storage facility, OD-8 (dual storage/use)
		9811-8	Organic liquid storage area, OD-9 (dual storage/use)
		9404-7	PCBc storage facility
		None	East Chestnut Ridge Waste Pile (dual use/storage facility)
K-25 Site	Hazardous/ mixed	K-25	Process vaults (dual storage/use facility)
		K-711	Container storage building (dual storage/use facility)
		K-1025C	Container storage (dual storage/use facility)
		K-1036A	Container storage facility (dual storage/use facility)
Complex	Waste identification	Facility number	Facility description
		K-1202	Storage tanks (dual storage/use facility)
		K-1302	Compressed gas cylinder storage (dual storage/use facility)
		K-1420A	Hazardous waste storage tank (dual storage/use facility)
		K-1425	Container storage/tank management units (dual storage/use facility)
		K-726	Container storage building (dual storage/use facility)
		K-33	TSCAf (dual storage/use facility)
	Hazardousb	7659-A	Gas cylinder venting facility
ORNL		7667	Chemical waste detonation facility
		7507	PCBsg, liquids and solids storage facility
		7651	Used oil storage facility
		7652	Hazardous waste storage facility
		7653	Chemical waste storage facility

- a. Sources: PAI Corporation (1993b); PAI Corporation (1994); PAI Corporation (199
- b. 1993 data.
- c. PCB = Polychlorinated biphenyl.
- d. RCRA = Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
- e. 1994 data.
- f. TSCA = Toxic Substances Control Act.
- g. PCB = Polychlorinated biphenyl.

Table 4.14-9. Projected 1995 industrial solid waste management activities at the O

Waste category	Generation rateb	Treatment method	Treatment capacity	Stora
Complex				
Y-12 Plant Industrial solidb	5,554,873 kg	None	N/A	None

K-25 Site	Industrial solide	(48,518 m3/yr) 3,899.5 m3	None	Not applicable	None
	Other solide	5,046.4 m3g	Compaction	Not applicable	None
ORNL	Industrial solide	13 m3	None	Not applicable	None
	Other solide	30.6 m3h	None	Not applicable	None

- a. Sources: Snider (1993); Brown (1994c); PAI Corporation (1994); PAI Corporation
- b. 1992 data.
- c. M = million
- d. New sanitary landfill to open in 1994.
- e. 1991 data.
- f. Wastes are disposed of at the Y-12 Plant Sanitary Landfill.
- g. Includes construction/demolition spoil and scrap metal.
- h. Includes construction/demolition spoil; scrap metal estimates not available.

Table 4.14-10. Baseline industrial solid waste management activities as of 1995 at

Complex	Waste identification	Facility number	Facility description	Facilit capacit
Y-12 Plant	Industrial solid	None	New salvage yard	4,046.9
		None	Industrial landfill IV (classified waste landfill)	Not rep
		9983-44	Industrial landfill II	Storage
		None	Spoil Area 3 (construction debris)	Facilit
		9720-25	Classified waste storage (dual use facility)	Not app (nonhaz staging)
K-25 Site	Industrial solidc			
ORNL	Industrial solidc			

- a. Source: PAI Corporation (1993b).
- b. 1993 data.

- c. Wastes are disposed of at the Y-12 Plant Sanitary Landfill.

In addition, diesel fuel and gasoline, used to fuel site service and construction stored in bulk containers (55-gallon drums, aboveground storage tanks, and underground tanks).

The Y-12 underground storage tanks program includes seven in-service petroleum tanks. In addition, there are seven active petroleum underground storage tanks at the K-25 Site. At the ORNL there is one active underground storage tank containing heat 22 active underground storage tanks that will be taken out of service or upgraded by The contents of these tanks was not reported (MMES 1993a).

5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

5.1 Overview

This chapter describes the potential environmental consequences from the construction and operation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) facilities at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives. Potential environmental consequences are assessed to the extent necessary to support a programmatic decision concerning the proposed SNF facilities. More detailed considerations of potential environmental consequences would be performed as necessary prior to initiating construction or operation of the facilities.

Impacts on the operation of the current facilities at ORR that create or store new SNF are discussed in Chapter 3.

5.2 Land Use

The proposed site for SNF activities is in the eastern portion of the West Bear area, located in the western portion of the ORR. The SNF program's land requirements are assumed to be 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer), including all facilities and buffer areas. The majority of the land in the West Bear Creek Valley Area can be characterized as vacant and developable.

5.2.1 Centralization Alternative

Use of the West Bear Creek Valley area of the ORR for program activities would be consistent with the current land use and land use policies and plans for that area. The land use designation for this area is Natural Areas, a generic category that includes areas within the ORR not under any other specific land use designation (DOE 1993a). Use of the area for program activities would also be consistent with proposed future land uses in the ORR Site Development Plan (MMES 1989).

Future land uses proposed for the area of Roane County adjacent to the ORR near the proposed SNF site are low-density residential and public/semi-public uses (Roane County Regional Planning Commission 1992). These low intensity uses would be compatible with development in the western portion of the ORR.

Use of the West Bear Creek Valley site for the placement of SNF facilities may have irreversible and irretrievable impacts to land use in that area by precluding all other management-type uses in the future. However, the placement of SNF facilities at the site would be consistent with U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 1994 future land use plan, which designates the West Bear Creek Valley site for these uses (MMES 1989). Therefore, mitigation measures are proposed.

5.2.2 Regionalization Alternative

As under the Centralization Alternative, land use impacts resulting from the Regionalization Alternative would not be expected to be significant. Impacts would be similar in character to those described for the Centralization Alternative.

5.3 Socioeconomics

Socioeconomics as addressed in this programmatic environmental impact statement encompasses the interaction of economic, demographic, and social conditions. Economic consequences (e.g., technology requirements for operation of an SNF management facility, business activities, market structures, procurement methods, and dissemination of technology) within and between regions. Demographic consequences (e.g., in-migration of specialized resources to support the SNF management program) affect size, distribution, and composition of the population, labor force, and the housing market in the regions. Social consequences (e.g., capacity modifications of public infrastructure to support SNF activity) affect the quality of life enjoyed by the residents of a community (Murdock and Leistritz 1979). These impacts are potentially affected either directly or indirectly by actions proposed under the Management Program.

The significance of actions and their intensity are relative to the affected region. The region can be described as a dynamic socioeconomic system, where physical and human resources, technology, social and economic institutions, and natural resources interrelate to produce goods, products, processes, and services to meet consumer demands. The measure of a region's

to support these demands depends on its ability to respond to changing economic, de and social conditions.

Potential socioeconomic effects are addressed only to the extent that they are with the natural or physical environment (CFR 1993c). Direct effects include those caused by the action and occurring at the same time and place. Indirect effects in impacts caused by the action that are later in time or farther removed in distance, reasonably foreseeable (i.e., offsite) (CFR 1993b).

Socioeconomic effects are quantified for regional economic activity and populat Potential impacts to individual communities such as public infrastructure and housi discussed qualitatively to address programmatic issues.

Economic projections include direct and indirect jobs. Direct jobs are those j construct or support operation of the SNF management complex at ORR. Indirect jobs created throughout the regional economy within the Region of Influence as a result procurement for materials, services, and other commodities; and induced effects fro spending. These direct and indirect impacts reflect both construction and operatio demands that may occur concurrently or independently throughout the project plannin Indirect jobs were projected using parameters from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Anal Regional Input-Output Modeling System.

Two scenarios were analyzed to account for two potential distributions of the S construction efforts. The construction effort consists of fabricating various stru its own construction labor need and a duration of either three or five years. The accelerates the construction labor requirements into the first two years of constru Average Scenario averages the labor requirements of a structure for the duration of The total construction effort for all structures, in labor years is the same for ea Therefore, for structures with a three year construction duration, the Peak Scenari labor needs for the first two years and then a substantial reduction for the third Average Scenario has a constant labor requirement for the three years. Likewise, f with a five year construction duration, the Peak Scenario has a high labor need for years, then a lower need for the remaining three years, while the Average Scenario constant requirement for all five years. Because the total construction labor year structure is the same for both scenarios, the Average Scenario will have a lower re than the Peak Scenario in the first two years, then will have a higher requirement Scenario in the remaining construction years.

Regional population projections reflect the potential change in population resu increase in regional economic activity. Detailed assumptions regarding in-migratio with SNF Management Program were not developed given the programmatic scope of the analysis. Potential in-migration effects resulting from direct job creation are p qualitatively where appropriate.

5.3.1 Centralization Alternative

The upper and lower bounds of construction and operations related jobs generate implementation of the Centralization Alternative from 1995 to 2005 are illustrated and tabulated in Table 5.3-1. In the initial phases, the Centralization Alternativ 90 jobs (25 direct, 65 indirect) beginning in 1995 and continuing through the year project planning, engineering design, and environmental permitting and compliance. Construction is expected to begin in the year 2000, requiring a total of 4,352 dire indirect jobs). In that year and 2001, the Peak Scenario requires 1,587 constructi while the Average Scenario needs 1,346. There is no operational labor required for period. In 2002 after two years of construction, the Peak Scenario decreases its c labor requirements to 928 workers, while the Average Scenario maintains its 1,346 l Additionally, 300 operational personnel are needed, raising the total of SNF worker the Peak Scenario and 1,646 for the Average Scenario. By 2003, the buildings with construction durations have been completed; therefore, both the Peak and Average Sc construction labor requirements decline to 125 and 157, respectively. Operation la

Figure 5.3-1. Total employment effects- ORR Centralization Alternative. Table 5.3

Years	Time period					
	1995-1999	2000, 2001	2002	2003	2004	2005 +
Operations						
Direct jobs	25	0	300	300	487	800
Indirect jobs	65	0	780	780	1,265	2,079
Total jobs	90	0	1,080	1,080	1,752	2,879
Construction						

Direct jobs						
Peak	0	1,587	928	125	125	0
Average	0	1,346	1,346	157	157	0
Indirect jobs						
Peak	0	2,597	1,519	205	205	0
Average	0	2,203	2,203	257	257	0
Total jobs						
Peak	0	4,184	2,447	330	330	0
Average	0	3,549	3,549	414	414	0
Total						
Direct jobs						
Peak	25	1,587	1,228	425	612	800
Average	25	1,346	1,646	457	644	800
Indirect jobs						
Peak	65	2,597	2,299	984	1,470	2,079
Average	65	2,203	2,983	1,036	1,522	2,079
Total jobs						
Peak	90	4,184	3,527	1,408	2,082	2,879
Average	90	3,548	4,629	1,493	2,166	2,879
Population Change						
Peak	82	4,366	(1,001)	(3,214)	1,022	2,011
Average	82	3,688	1,640	(4,759)	1,022	1,797

requirements remain at 300 workers. Total SNF labor requirements are 425 workers for Peak Scenario and 457 for the Average Scenario. In 2004, construction labor needs scenarios remains at their previous level, but operational personnel increase. Total requirements are 612 workers in the Peak Scenario and 644 workers in the Average Scenario. By 2005, all construction has been completed and operational personnel have increased full staff labor requirement of 800 workers.

The peak scenario reaches its maximum construction labor with 1,587 direct jobs (jobs created) over a 2-year period from years 2000 through 2001. The average scenario has its maximum construction labor with 1,346 direct jobs (3,549 total jobs created) through 2002.

Ancillary operation (Table 5.3-1) activity associated with the Centralization Alternative begins in the year 2002; the initial operations might create approximately 1,080 phase-related jobs (300 direct, 780 indirect). Additional operation activity would also begin, creating 187 phase-related jobs (485 indirect jobs). The remaining operation activities are scheduled to start in 2005, after construction is finished, creating a total of 2,879 phase-related jobs (200 direct, 2,079 indirect), and the jobs will continue through 2035.

Regional businesses and the workforce will benefit from increased competition for procurements and jobs associated with SNF Centralization Alternative. Most of this is anticipated to be captured by Anderson, Knox, and Roane counties, with a small share in Loudon County. The impact to the regional economy, however, only represents a portion of the total economic activity generated by the Centralization Alternative. For instance, materials purchases and technology acquisition may occur outside Tennessee. The economic activity occurring outside the region might result in economic benefits for that region. The indirect effect is not captured by this analysis since it occurs outside of the Region of Influence defined in Section 4.3.

Most of the population change in the Region of Influence above the baseline for the project will be driven by the in-migration of labor and households to support SNF management activities at ORR. It is likely that most of the operation jobs will be filled by SNF personnel from other DOE sites where SNF inventories were stored prior to shipments to ORR. These personnel would be familiar with the processes, technologies, and research involved in SNF management operations elsewhere. Other operational jobs not associated with SNF management will be filled by the regional labor force. The regional labor force would be likely to be used for construction jobs, except for specialized tasks.

To assess potential population and housing impacts, an in-migration rate per job created was estimated using a ratio between forecasted employment and population figures (Table 5.3-1). This ratio was applied to the number of total (direct and indirect) jobs created by management activities at ORR, giving the total estimated number of persons migrating into the Region of Influence per job created (Table 5.3-1).

With initial operation in 1995 under both scenarios, a total of 82 persons will migrate into the Region of Influence. The number of persons migrating into the Region of Influence will be at its largest when construction starts, for the years 2000 through 2001; (a total of 2,011 in-migrants for the peak scenario and 1,797 for the average scenario). For the year

2003, after most of the construction has finished, people might migrate out of the Influence. The number of in-migrants might increase as more of the SNF management operations start in the years 2004 and 2005. After the year 2005, in-migration due management activities would cease due to the fact that SNF management activities would create any more jobs.

Assuming one housing unit per household, and an average family size of 2.6 persons family (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991), the number of houses demanded in 1995, when preliminary operations start, might be 32. Between the year 2000 and 2002, a total housing units might be demanded. Even though this demand is only a temporary demand Region of Influence may have difficulty providing new housing during this time period year 2003 and 2004, however, there might be a surplus of 1,236 housing units due to out of construction. In 2005, once SNF operational activities are under way, there demand for 1,167 housing units associated with SNF management activities.

The greatest impact to the Region of Influence housing market may occur between years 2000 and 2002, when construction starts. The demand for housing during the construction period would be for transitional housing. While the population in the Influence under baseline conditions has historically been growing and is projected than 1 percent annually, recent vacancy rates for housing in the Region of Influence low (Census 1982, 1991). Therefore the in-migration associated with SNF construction cause shortages in the housing market, and might cause shortages in construction supply. However, due to decreasing employment levels on ORR between 1990 and 1999 (Section 4.3.1.5), additional housing units above the baseline may be available, thus reducing strain on the housing market. Since construction will only be temporary, there may capacity in the regional infrastructure when all SNF management operations begin in

5.3.1.1 Potential Public Service and Education Impacts. Given the population growth

associated with the SNF Management Program, increases in capital expenditure may be to meet the increased demand of housing utilities, including electricity generation treatment, and water (see Section 5.13), transportation infrastructure (see Section education or service levels, assuming current conditions are constant through the a

Assuming that the Centralization Alternative would be an addition to the ORR's operations, security and fire protection on the site would need to be investigated to determine whether or not current capacity could accommodate the requirements of Management Program.

5.3.2 Regionalization Alternative

Socioeconomic impacts resulting from the Regionalization Alternative are expected similar to the Centralization Alternative. The construction and operation cycles for alternative would be the same; therefore, the same issues identified for the Central Alternative would apply. Labor requirements may be slightly reduced for the Regional Alternative. Although the volume of SNF stored would be less for the Regionalization Alternative, an economy of scale occurs for both alternatives, so that differences capital between the two alternatives would be minimized.

5.3.3 Mitigation Measures

5.3.3.1 Coordination with Local Jurisdictions. To reduce construction- and operation-

related impacts, possible coordination with local communities could address potential from increased labor and capital requirements. The knowledge of the extent and effect growth due to SNF management activities could greatly enhance the ability of affected jurisdictions to plan effectively. Effective planning would address changes in level housing, infrastructure, utilities, transportation, and public services and finance

5.3.3.2 Enhance Labor Force Availability. To alleviate potential impacts associated with

the in-migration of labor, local labor force availability could be increased through employment training and referral systems. The goal of these systems would be to re

potential for in-migration of labor to support SNF management activities.

5.4 Cultural and Paleontological Resources

5.4.1 Centralization Alternative

Under the Centralization Alternative, the proposed construction area for the SNF is not expected to exceed 100 acres. There are no known historical, archeological, paleontological or Native American traditional sites in the proposed area (Fielder impacts to cultural or paleontological resources are expected due to ground disturb air emissions during construction or operation of the SNF facilities. Consultation Tennessee State Historic Preservation Officer prior to project implementation is re section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.

5.4.2 Regionalization Alternative

Under the Regionalization Alternative, the location of the SNF facilities would same, but would be reduced in area. As with the Centralization Alternative, impact anticipated.

5.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources

5.5.1 Centralization Alternative

When fully constructed and under operation, the proposed SNF facilities associa Centralization Alternative would consist of a series of buildings set within a 90-a maximum height of the buildings contained at the site would not exceed 42 feet above level, or two to three stories. The entrance to the site and security fencing will traffic on Bear Creek Road.

Since the buildings would be set into the south face of Pine Ridge, between Pin Chestnut Ridge, the site would not be visible from areas outside the reservation, w exception of a limited section of Gallaher Road on the west side of the Clinch Riv east along Bear Creek Valley (TVA 1987). However, since the approximate distance f boundary of the reservation to the proposed location is in excess of 2 miles, and i terrain and heavy vegetation, public views looking on to the site from off-site are be affected. Impacts to aesthetics and scenic resources on and off ORR are not ant

5.5.2 Regionalization Alternative

Under the Regionalization Alternative, proposed SNF facilities are reduced in a intensity of operations, and environmental effects to aesthetics and scenic resourc than those under the Centralization Alternative. Therefore, adverse environmental the Regionalization Alternative are also not anticipated.

5.6 Geologic Resources

This section describes any incremental or additional impacts on geology and geo resources that might result from the construction and operation of the new faciliti with the storage of SNF at the ORR.

For the most part, geologic impacts from construction activities would be limit disturbance, although in some areas, ripping or blasting of limestone, dolomite, or might be required. Since no extensive or unique geologic or mineral resources are occur on the West Bear Creek Valley site, impacts to geologic resources would not b

Because previously undisturbed areas would be used for new construction, some s from siting SNF facilities at the West Bear Creek Valley site would occur as a resu Potential impacts from sediment runoff generated during construction activities wou minimized by implementation of soil erosion and sediment control measures. During impacts to soil resources would be controlled by the planting or landscaping of lan

covered by pavement and buildings.

Major seismic activity and associated mass movement and subsidence are unlikely during the construction or operation phases, because although ground-shaking has occurred in the ORR due to earthquakes in other parts of the country, faults in the area have not been active since the late Paleozoic.

5.7 Air Resources

The proposed SNF management facility would be composed of a wet and dry storage facility and a technology development facility, with construction to take place in years 2000-2004. Air quality is assessed for construction and operation with regard to radiological and nonradiological air emissions. This section characterizes the impacts expected from an SNF facility. This section also discusses the quantitative impacts under the Regionalization Alternative. The Centralization Alternative qualitative impacts are compared with the regionalization impacts in order to determine exceedances, if any, of existing local and Federal standards for both alternatives.

5.7.1 Releases

Emissions of radiological and nonradiological air pollutants might result from construction and operation of a SNF management facility. These emissions might include airborne radionuclides, criteria pollutants, and hazardous air pollutants.

The impact of air emissions from construction activities might include criteria pollutants of particulate matter (fugitive dust) primarily from the moving of soil, and exhaust from equipment with an aerodynamic diameter equal to or less than 10 microns (PM₁₀); sulfur dioxide; volatile organic compounds; and nitrogen dioxide from earthmoving and equipment-handling machinery and equipment. During construction, a small increase in traffic volume above existing levels might result in a small increase in air pollutants (Section 5.11 discusses the level of traffic activity projected for the construction phases of the SNF facility.)

During operations, the transport of SNF within the ORR from points of generation to storage sites to the disposal site would result in emissions of criteria air pollutants from worker vehicles as well. Some emissions of air pollutants from worker vehicles would also occur within and beyond the ORR.

5.7.1.1 Radiological Emissions. There are no expected contributions to radiological air

emissions during the construction phases of the proposed SNF management facility. During operations, the facility would be expected to generate negligible radiological emissions. Potential radiological emissions associated with the proposed SNF management facility are presented in Table 5.7-1 by isotope.

5.7.1.2 Nonradiological Emissions. The construction phase of the SNF facility for the

Receipt/Storage Facility and Canning Factory is estimated to be complete in about 8 years. Short-term emissions, such as fugitive dust and heavy equipment exhaust emissions, generated temporarily, and would only affect receptors close to construction areas. Emissions would be minimized by watering. Under the operational phase of the SNF management facility, criteria and hazardous air pollutants might be emitted. Table 5.7-1 presents the total expected annual emissions associated with the SNF storage facility. These emissions are primarily from the technology development facility and were estimated for a similar facility proposed at INEL.

Table 5.7-1. Isotopic release additions due to SNF management facility presence (Ci/yr) at ORR.

	(Baseline) ORR	(SNF) ISF	ORR+ ISF
Hydrogen-3	2.1 x 10 ³	7.9 x 10 ⁻¹	2.1 x 10 ³
Beryllium-7	8.9 x 10 ⁻⁶	0.0 x 10 ⁰	8.9 x 10 ⁻⁶
Carbon-14	0.0 x 10 ⁰	1.2 x 10 ⁰	1.2 x 10 ⁰
Potassium-40	1.0 x 10 ⁻³	0.0 x 10 ⁰	1.0 x 10 ⁻³
Manganese-54	0.0 x 10 ⁰	2.2 x 10 ⁻⁸	2.2 x 10 ⁻⁸

Cobalt-60	3.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	4.2 x 10 ⁻⁸	3.0 x 10 ⁻⁵
Bromine-82	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	0.0 x 100	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁵
Krypton-83M	7.3 x 10 ¹	0.0 x 100	7.3 x 10 ¹
Krypton-85	0.0 x 100	1.0 x 10 ⁴	1.0 x 10 ⁴
Krypton-85M	1.7 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	1.7 x 10 ²
Krypton-87	3.5 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	3.5 x 10 ²
Krypton-88	4.9 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	4.9 x 10 ²
Krypton-89	6.3 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	6.3 x 10 ²
Strontium-90	1.2 x 10 ⁻⁴	3.3 x 10 ⁻⁶	1.2 x 10 ⁻⁴
Yttrium-90	1.2 x 10 ⁻⁴	3.3 x 10 ⁻⁶	1.2 x 10 ⁻⁴
Technetium-99	6.1 x 10 ⁻²	0.0 x 100	6.1 x 10 ⁻²
Ruthenium-106	4.4 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.1 x 10 ⁻⁵	4.5 x 10 ⁻⁴
Antimony-125	0.0 x 100	3.4 x 10 ⁻⁴	3.4 x 10 ⁻⁴
Iodine-129	3.1 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.0 x 10 ⁻¹	1.0 x 10 ⁻¹
Iodine-131	1.2 x 10 ⁻¹	0.0 x 100	1.2 x 10 ⁻¹
Iodine-132	1.4 x 100	0.0 x 100	1.4 x 100
Iodine-133	6.5 x 10 ⁻¹	0.0 x 100	6.5 x 10 ⁻¹
Iodine-134	2.1 x 10 ⁻²	0.0 x 100	2.1 x 10 ⁻²
Iodine-135	1.2 x 100	0.0 x 100	1.2 x 100
Xenon-133	8.8 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	8.8 x 10 ²
Xenon-133M	2.7 x 10 ¹	0.0 x 100	2.7 x 10 ¹
Xenon-135	2.8 x 10 ¹	0.0 x 100	2.8 x 10 ¹
Xenon-135M	1.6 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	1.6 x 10 ²
Xenon-138	8.5 x 10 ²	0.0 x 100	8.5 x 10 ²
Cesium-134	6.3 x 10 ⁻⁷	6.2 x 10 ⁻⁸	6.9 x 10 ⁻⁷
Cesium-137	7.0 x 10 ⁻⁴	4.8 x 10 ⁻⁵	7.5 x 10 ⁻⁴
Cesium-144	1.2 x 10 ⁻⁶	0.0 x 100	1.2 x 10 ⁻⁶
	(Baseline) ORR	(SNF) ISF	ORR+ ISF
Barium-140	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴
Lanthanum-140	1.4 x 10 ⁻⁶	0.0 x 100	1.4 x 10 ⁻⁶
Europium-152	4.4 x 10 ⁻¹¹	0.0 x 100	4.4 x 10 ⁻¹¹
Europium-154	5.9 x 10 ⁻⁶	0.0 x 100	5.9 x 10 ⁻⁶
Europium-155	3.0 x 10 ⁻⁶	0.0 x 100	3.0 x 10 ⁻⁶
Osmium-191	2.3 x 10 ⁻²	0.0 x 100	2.3 x 10 ⁻²
Lead-212	1.6 x 100	0.0 x 100	1.6 x 100
Thorium-228	1.5 x 10 ⁻³	0.0 x 100	1.5 x 10 ⁻³
Thorium-230	7.4 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100	7.4 x 10 ⁻⁴
Thorium-232	3.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	0.0 x 100	3.0 x 10 ⁻⁵
Protactinium-234	1.2 x 10 ⁻³	0.0 x 100	1.2 x 10 ⁻³
Uranium-234	7.2 x 10 ⁻²	0.0 x 100	7.2 x 10 ⁻²
Uranium-235	2.6 x 10 ⁻³	0.0 x 100	2.6 x 10 ⁻³
Uranium-236	1.9 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100	1.9 x 10 ⁻⁴
Uranium-238	4.1 x 10 ⁻²	0.0 x 100	4.1 x 10 ⁻²
Neptunium-237	1.1 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100	1.1 x 10 ⁻⁴
Plutonium-238	6.1 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100	6.1 x 10 ⁻⁴
Plutonium-239	1.3 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100	1.3 x 10 ⁻⁴
Plutonium-240	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100	0.0 x 100
Americium-241	1.4 x 10 ⁻⁵	0.0 x 100	1.4 x 10 ⁻⁵
Curium-244	2.0 x 10 ⁻⁴	0.0 x 100	2.0 x 10 ⁻⁴

a. Source: Johnson, V. (1994).

Cm241 with 35 day half-life included with AM241 with 458 yr half-life.
Os194 with 8.0 yr half-life decays to Ir194 with 17.4 hr half-life, then to P1194 w
ISF: Interim Storage Facility.

Table 5.7-2. Total annual nonradioactive emissions for the SNF management facility

Criteria pollutants	Release rate (kg/yr)
Carbon monoxide	1.7 x 10 ³
Particulate matter, PM10b	1.0 x 10 ⁻³
Nitrogen oxides	5.5 x 10 ³
Sulfur dioxide	1.3 x 10 ²
Lead	5.0 x 10 ⁻⁹

Hazardous air pollutants

Selenium compounds	1.6×10^{-4}
Mercury compounds	5.1×10^{-1}
Chlorine	3.5×10^3
Hydrogen fluoride	1.6×10^1
Cadmium compounds	2.9×10^{-7}
Cobalt, chromium, antimony, and nickel compounds	2.0×10^{-10}

a. Source: Johnson, V. (1994).

b. It is assumed that PM₁₀ (particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter) d suspended particulate data.

5.7.2 Air Quality

5.7.2.1 Radiological. The GENII Environmental Transport and Dose Assessment Model,

along with 1992 Y-12 west meteorological data and 1992 source terms (Table 5.7-1), calculate the effective dose equivalent for the year 2005. A population of 988,754 80 kilometers (50 miles) is estimated. A radiation background level of 306 millirem used.

Based on model results, 1 year of operation at the SNF management facility might a calculated dose of 9.5 millirem per year to the maximally exposed member of the population. This dose is below the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants limit of per year and is 3.1 percent of the natural background radiation received by the average person near the ORR.

The annual population dose from operation in the year 2005 was calculated to be 2.1 x 10⁻² percent of the dose received by the surrounding population from natural radiation.

Table 5.7-3 summarizes the effective dose equivalents for the maximum boundary to the population with 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the proposed SNF facility. Compared to background radiation, these increased doses are very small. The total doses are well below regulatory limits.

5.7.2.2 Nonradiological. The Industrial Source Complex Short-Term Air Dispersion

A model was used with 1992 meteorological data from the Y-12 west meteorological monitoring station at ORR to determine pollutant concentrations resulting from the centralized nonradiological emissions listed in Table 5.7-2. An emissions baseline was established. **Table 5.7-3.** Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from ORR operation at the proposed SNF management facility.

	Maximally exposed individual dose ^a	Collective dose to population within 80 km of ORR sources
Dose	9.5 mrem per year ^b	5.7×10^1 c
Location	Site boundary 1.2 km SW of ORR storage facility	9.1×10^5 people within 80 km of SNF storage facility
NESHAP ^b standard	10 mrem per year	-
Percentage of NESHAP	95	-
Natural background dose	306 mrem	2.79×10^5 person-rem
Percentage of	3.1	2.1×10^{-2}

natural
background dose

a. The maximum boundary dose is the hypothetical individual exposed continuously d year at ORR boundary located 1.2 km SW from the SNF site.

b. The SNF management facility contributes 6.2 mrem to this dose.

c. The SNF management facility contributes 5.2 person-rem to this dose.

NESHAP: National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants.

km: kilometer

mrem: millirem

Note: Effective dose equivalents computed using GENII (PNL 1988). characterize conditions at ORR using actual emission rates (MMES 1993a). It is also that 1995 operations at the ORR will result in the same baseline nonradiological emissions as 1992 operations at the ORR. The results of modeling are presented in Table 5.7-4, existing ORR site contribution concentration is compared to the existing DOE site contribution plus the proposed SNF contribution. Table 5.7-5 presents the annual concentration for hazardous air pollutants for offsite receptors. These concentrations are used in Section 5.12 for calculation of health effects. The increases in pollutant concentrations from proposed action are negligible in magnitude. The concentrations of nonradiological emissions from operation of the SNF facilities, under that alternative, and from existing sources remain within all applicable regulatory guidelines.

If a Regionalization Alternative SNF facility is operated at the ORR, the increase in contribution to maximum concentrations of pollutants would be less than for the Centralization Alternative. The concentrations of nonradiological air pollutants from operation of the facilities, under this alternative, and from existing sources would remain within all applicable guidelines.

5.8 Water Resources

Construction and operation of SNF management facilities could potentially affect water resources. Potential environmental impacts to surface water and groundwater resources from construction include depletion of water supplies, floodplain encroachment, and surface sedimentation from erosion runoff occurring after land clearing. Potential normal operation impacts would include depletion of water supplies, and diminished water quality resources from wastewater discharges from normal operations.

Impacts are analyzed for the Centralization Alternative, which would cause the impacts to water resources at the ORR, if chosen. However, for the Centralization Alternative, no significant impacts are identified with respect to water resources issues. The most significant impacts are expected from the Regionalization Alternative as the Centralization Alternative is the bounding case.

Table 5.7-4. Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable standards and guidelines at ORR and proposed SNF management facility plus current operations.

Criteria pollutant	Averaging time	Most stringent regulation or guidelinea (-g per m3)	Total existing maximum concentrationb (-g per m3)	Total projected maximum concentration including SNF (-g per m3)
Carbon monoxide	8-hour	10,000	6.9	6.9
	1-hour	40,000	24.1	33.5
Nitrogen dioxide	Annual	100	2.1	2.7
Lead	Calendar quarter	1.5	d	3.7 x 10 ⁻¹²
PM10e	Annual	50	12.0	12.0
	24-hour	150	97.9	97.9
Sulfur dioxide	Annual	80	29.29	29.34
	24-hour	365	177.8	178.0

Total suspended particulates	3-hour	1,300	401.5	401.5
	Annual	50a	36.0	36.0
Hydrogen fluoride (as fluorides)	24-hour	150a	116.9	116.9
	30-day	1.2a	0.06	0.06
	7-day	1.6a	0.03	0.03
	24-hour	2.9a	d	f
	8-hour	3.7a	d	f
Hazardous air pollutants				
Selenium	8-hour	20	d	2.18×10^{-7}
Mercury compounds	8-hour	0.5	d	2.18×10^{-3}
Chlorine compounds	8-hour	150	d	1.52
Cadmium compounds	8-hour	5	d	1.81×10^{-9}
Cobalt, chromium, antimony, and nickel compounds	8-hour	5	d	5.5×10^{-10}

a. State standard.

b. Includes background concentration plus existing DOE facilities impact concentration.

c. Existing maximum and projected maximum did not occur in the same location.

d. Zero release (no sources indicated).

e. It is assumed that PM₁₀ (particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter) d particulate data.

f. Not estimated because the potential release is negligible.

Table 5.7-5. Calculated annual maximum concentrations for hazardous air pollutants at ORR for offsite receptors.

Hazardous air pollutant	Maximum average concentration(-g/m3)
Selenium compounds	8.85×10^{-8}
Mercury compounds	8.85×10^{-4}
Chlorine compounds	0.62
Hydrogen fluoride	1.53×10^{-3}
Cadmium compounds	7.35×10^{-10}
Cobalt, chromium, antimony and nickel compounds	2.21×10^{-10}

a. Offsite includes public access roads within the ORR. All impacts from proposed source only. No hazardous air pollutant emissions information available for existing sources.

5.8.1 Surface Water Quantity

The ORR currently receives its water supply from the Clinch River basin. Const operation of SNF management facilities would have very minimal impact on the quanti in the river and in local surface streams.

Construction of SNF management facilities would require some water consumption. However, the amount of water required would not significantly affect the Clinch Riv level.

Stormwater runoff associated with both the construction and operation of SNF fa expected to have a negligible impact on surface water quantity. During constructio stormwater management techniques would be employed to attenuate runoff. A site dra stormwater management system consisting of perimeter drainage ditches and a retenti

would be included as part of SNF operations (Johnson, V. 1994). This system would runoff and erosion control, which could otherwise affect receiving water courses or operations.

As discussed in Section 4.8.1, analysis of available data indicates that the management facilities would be sited outside the 500-year floodplain. The SNF management facilities would be located and constructed to minimize any floodplain impact, as required by Executive Order 11988 (Floodplain Management) and DOE Orders. Site-specific surveys would be performed to more accurately determine precise locations of flooding elevations.

Operation of SNF management facilities would require approximately 9,863 gallons (37,335 liters) of water per day. This would mean that an additional 3.6 million gallons (13,637,000 liters) of water would be used at the ORR per year. This figure is significantly less than the minimum monthly release for 1992 which was 3.5 billion cubic feet (100 million cubic meters) of that year (MMES 1993a). Therefore no impacts to water supply from SNF operations are expected.

Operation of SNF management facilities would involve the discharge of almost all water withdrawn, as very little would be consumed. A new onsite sanitary wastewater treatment facility would be required at the SNF facility. If all water withdrawn were to be treated at a constant rate over the course of a year, the increased flow from SNF operations would be approximately 0.13 gallon (0.5 liter) per second. Flow in Grassy Creek at its confluence with the Clinch River has been estimated at 20 gallons (80 liters) per second. Water discharge from other appropriate mitigation measures would be selected in accordance with state and federal requirements so as not to impact surface water quantity and flow in streams receiving

5.8.2 Surface Water Quality

During construction of SNF management facilities, 90 acres (36 hectares) would be disturbed, all in previously undisturbed areas. This would create the potential for sediment runoff into wetlands, adjacent to the site and along the downstream reaches of Grassy Creek as well as into Grassy Creek and its tributaries, which drain to the Clinch River. Sediment runoff from construction activities would be controlled and minimized by implementing soil erosion control measures.

Under the Centralization Alternative, SNF management facilities would require a sewer system comprising a sewage treatment facility equipped with a sewage treatment ejection pump system with a programmable controller and software. A pressurized sanitary sewer line would be provided that would run to a permitted stream discharge point (Johnson, V. 1994). This would accommodate the estimated 9,863 gallons (37,335 liters) of sanitary wastewater generated by SNF facilities and personnel, and would result in no appreciable impact to surface water quality. This system would be operated in accordance with State of Tennessee permitting requirements.

The proposed SNF management facilities are designed to have no liquid release of wastewater with hazardous chemical or radiological characteristics related to SNF management operations. These facilities would be constructed using state-of-the-art technology, secondary containment, and leak detection and water balance monitoring equipment. No environmental consequences related to surface water resources are anticipated from normal operation of SNF management facilities.

A very low probability release scenario was evaluated to identify the potential environmental consequences of a liquid release to the environment under normal operating conditions. The release scenario was evaluated for information purposes only, as no operating releases are planned for the proposed facilities. The scenario evaluated maximum potential liquid release to the environment under normal operating conditions, an undetected secondary containment failure or piping leak. The scenario was developed using conservative estimates of the sensitivity of actual leak detection systems and operational data from similarly functioning facilities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). The estimates for the hypothetical release included a point release of 5 gallons (19 liters) per day to the environment over the course of 1 month. The release volume and duration are considerably greater than existing leak detection system sensitivities, and radiological surveys. Source terms were derived at the 95 percent confidence level from 8 years of operational data at the INEL Fluorine and Storage Facility at the Chemical Processing Plant.

This release was assumed to occur at 40 feet (12 meters) below the land surface and would be at either the depth of the vadose zone or the groundwater zone in most cases. SNF management facilities would be sited on the ORR. Any release to the vadose zone would migrate downward to the groundwater zone as described in Section 4.8.2. The upper

the groundwater zone in the ORR aquitards (where SNF management facilities would be flow laterally to discharge points in nearby streams).

Most radiological constituents would be below drinking water standards at the p release. Those radiological constituents above drinking water standards would be d movements through the vadose zone, groundwater zone, and immediately upon entry int receiving surface water body. Migration of contaminants through the vadose and gro zones would also be greatly reduced by sorption.

The short-term scenario evaluated would result in a long-term release of dilute contaminants to local streams and the Clinch River. Any release from the SNF manag facilities would discharge to Grassy Creek through the subsurface. Although there continuous records of stream discharge for Grassy Creek, the average discharge of G to the Clinch River has been estimated at 20 gallons (80 liters) per second (Bailey Lee 1991). The worst-case undetected release from the SNF facilities (5 gallons [1 day) would constitute less than 0.0003 percent of the estimated daily creek dischar Clinch River. Therefore, any hazardous constituents would be well below establishe at the confluence of Grassy Creek and the river. Even if a release were to occur d of low flow in Grassy Creek, the percentage would still be very small. Additionall minimum monthly release (in May) of 3.5 billion cubic feet (100 million cubic meter Melton Hill Dam on the Clinch River averages to approximately 10,000 gallons (40,00 second (MMES 1994a). Therefore, no significant contaminant concentrations would be at the confluence of Grassy Creek and the Clinch River, or in the river itself.

5.8.3 Groundwater Quantity

No groundwater would be used for SNF management activities given the plentiful water supplies at the ORR. Therefore no impacts to groundwater quantity are expect

5.8.4 Groundwater Quality

As previously mentioned in Section 5.8.2, the proposed SNF management facilitie designed to have no liquid release to the environment of wastewater with hazardous radiological characteristics. However, for the purpose of this analysis, a conserv scenario was analyzed.

As discussed in Section 4.8, virtually all mobile groundwater in the ORR aquita discharged to local streams through the upper layers of the groundwater zone. The intervals of groundwater have extremely high residence times. Therefore, even the scenario of a release to groundwater would have negligible impacts to these resourc significant impacts to offsite groundwater.

5.9 Ecological Resources

The Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives could affect ecological res primarily through the alteration or loss of habitat. Potential impacts to terrestr resources and threatened and endangered species are described below for both altern

Radiation doses received by terrestrial biota from SNF activities would be expe similar to those received by man. Although guidelines have not been established fo limits for radiation exposure to species other than man, it is generally agreed tha established for humans are also conservative for other species (NRC 1979). Evidenc that no other living organisms have been identified that are likely to be significa radiosensitive than man (Casarett 1968; National Academy of Sciences 1972). Thus, exposure limits protective of man are not exceeded, no significant radiological imp populations of biota would be expected as a result of SNF activities at the West Be

5.9.1 Centralization Alternative

Under this alternative, construction of the proposed SNF management facility wo in the disturbance of approximately 90 acres (0.36 square kilometers), or less than the ORR. It is assumed that the area to be disturbed includes construction laydown grading, and new buildings, and that the access road or other rights-of-ways have n included in total area to be disturbed. Vegetation within the area proposed for th

management facility would be destroyed during land clearing activities but may be revegetated with native species where possible. Vegetation cover in this area is oak-hickory forest or pine and pine-hardwood forest. Both forest types are common and within the region.

Construction of the proposed SNF management facility would have some adverse effects on animal populations. Less mobile animals, such as amphibians, reptiles, and small mammals within the project area would be destroyed during land-clearing activities. Larger birds in construction and adjacent areas would be disturbed by construction activities and move to nearby suitable habitat. The long-term survival of these animals would depend on whether the area to which they moved was at or below its carrying capacity. Areas revegetated upon completion of construction would be of minimal value to most wildlife and would be repopulated by more tolerant species.

The Migratory Bird Treaty Act is primarily concerned with the destruction of migratory birds, as well as their eggs and nests. It may be necessary to survey construction areas for nests of migratory birds prior to construction and/or avoid clearing operations during the breeding season.

Activities associated with operation, such as noise, increased human presence and night lighting could affect wildlife living immediately adjacent to the site. Disturbances may cause some sensitive species to move from the area, but most animals should be able to adjust.

Construction of the proposed SNF management facility would likely displace the wetlands adjacent to tributaries of Grassy Creek flowing through the proposed site. Unavoidable displacement of wetlands would be accomplished in accordance with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Tennessee Water Quality Control Administration requirements. A potential also exists to disturb wetlands further downstream through erosion and sedimentation. Such impacts would be controlled through implementation of a soil erosion and sediment control plan. Construction-related discharges to Grassy Creek would be relatively low and negligible impacts to wetlands associated with the creek. No impacts to wetlands are expected during facility operations.

Construction of the proposed SNF management facility would require the rechanneling of tributaries to Grassy Creek that cross the proposed site and, thus, the loss of this habitat. In addition, soil erosion due to construction could cause water quality changes (primarily sediment loading) to Grassy Creek and its tributaries. These impacts could be minimized through implementation of soil erosion and sediment control measures. No operational impacts to aquatic resources are anticipated. It is assumed that the proposed project will have a retention pond and a sewage lagoon area within the security fence that may provide habitat for amphibians in the area.

No federally listed species are expected to be affected by construction and operation of the SNF management facility. Site surveys will be required to verify the presence of any other special status species. Land clearing activities may destroy protected plant species including the purple fringeless orchid and pink lady's-slippers, that may occur within the site. Other species including the Cooper's, sharp-shinned, and red-shouldered hawks, the barn owl, black vulture, which potentially occur in the area, could be impacted by project activities. Approximately 90 acres (36 hectares) of potential nesting and foraging habitat would be lost as a result of construction activities. Because this type of habitat is abundant in the area, it is not expected to affect the viability of populations of these species. However, appropriate measures would be taken to prevent nest disturbance. The DOE would consult with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation as appropriate to avoid or mitigate immediate impacts to state-listed species.

5.9.2 Regionalization Alternative

Impacts under this alternative are expected to be generally the same as under the Centralization Alternative. The major difference between the two is the total area disturbed. The Regionalization Alternative is expected to have fewer buildings required, therefore, fewer acres to be disturbed.

5.10 Noise

As discussed in Section 4.10, noises generated on the ORR do not propagate off-site at levels that impact the general population. Thus, ORR noise impacts for both the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives are those resulting from the transportation of personnel and materials.

materials to and from the site that affect the nearby communities, and those result sources that may affect some wildlife near these sources. The effect of noise on SNF management facilities under the Centralization or Regionalization Alternatives addressed in a project-specific environmental assessments.

The transportation noises are a function of the size of the work force (e.g., a the size of the work force would result in increased employee traffic and correspond in deliveries by truck and rail, and a decreased work force would result in decreases traffic and corresponding decreases in deliveries). This analysis of traffic noise noise from the major roadways that provide access to the ORR. Vehicles used to transport employees and personnel on roadways would be the principal sources of community noise impacts near the ORR from the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives.

This analysis used the day-night average sound level to assess community noise by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 1974, 1982) and the Federal Interagency Committee on Noise (FICON 1992). The change in day-night average sound level from baseline noise level for each alternative was estimated based on the projected change in employment and traffic levels from the baseline levels. The baseline levels are the combination of construction and operation employment was considered. A change level below 3 decibels would not be expected to result in a change in community reaction (FICON 1992).

Under the Centralization Alternative the projected ORR work force might increase about 9 percent in the years 2000 to 2002, during the peak construction period, and decrease thereafter (Section 5.3). There would be a corresponding increase in private and truck trips to the site. The day-night average sound level at 15 meters (50 feet) roads that provide access to the ORR would be expected to increase by less than 1 decibel. A change is expected in the community reaction to noise along these routes. No mitigation is necessary.

Under the Regionalization Alternative the traffic noise impacts would be the same as the Centralization Alternative.

5.11 Traffic and Transportation

5.11.1 Centralization Alternative

The proposed SNF management activities would involve a small increase in the number of employees commuting to the ORR and the transportation of SNF and hazardous chemical waste onsite. This section summarizes the potential transportation impacts due to the proposed facilities on the ORR.

5.11.1.1 Level of Service. Levels of service were calculated for construction and

operation of the SNF facility at the ORR. The maximum reasonably foreseeable scenario for operations occurs when the projected combined employees and population are at the highest level. This occurs in 2001, when there are 4,184 employees and a projected population of 528,800. The Region of Influence includes Anderson, Blount, Loudon, and Roane counties. This is the region from which employees can be expected to commute. The employees and population associated with the proposed action generate trips in the Region of Influence. These trips to the site are distributed to the Region of Influence road network according to percentages based on a traffic flow to the site that employees historically have lived. Increase in baseline population and indirect site employees will generate indirect traffic trips in the Region of Influence. These trips are distributed based on the current average daily traffic per present population in the Region of Influence for a given segment. Direct and indirect average daily traffic is added to the baseline to determine the level of service. Construction and operation employees contribute little to the traffic because they represent such a small percentage of the Region of Influence population growth.

The following segment has a poorer level of service due to site-related impacts on the future baseline. Tennessee State Route 61 between Interstate 75 at Norris and 25W will worsen to a level of service of E while Tennessee State Route 62 between Interstate 75 and US 441/TN 33 at Knoxville will worsen to a level of service of F. The other site-related impacts on any other segment.

Road reconstruction, widening, modification of interchanges, and new interchange construction projects are planned for segments of Bear Creek Valley Road, Scarboro

Tennessee State Routes 58, 62, and 95 (Johnson, C. 1994; MMES 1991b).

Possible mitigation of impacts on local and regional roads having level of service include adding lanes or employing traffic demand management.

The generic facility design would require rail access for Naval fuel delivery. create impacts that would be evaluated in detail if the site were selected for the

5.11.1.2 Transportation of Hazardous Chemicals. The hazardous chemicals required

and hazardous waste generated by the proposed SNF facility operation are assumed to be transported by truck. The onsite transportation impacts for these hazardous chemical wastes shipments are calculated based on the assumptions that (a) they do not have free impacts, (b) the material would not leak during transport, (c) only risk is due to fatalities, and (d) the material spill of entire contents is bound by the risk evaluation. Expanded Core Facility considered under facility accidents.

The total distance for onsite shipment of these hazardous chemicals is assumed to be the maximum site boundary distance from the proposed SNF facility to the nearest highway on the unit risk factor (Cashwell et al. 1986) and occupational and nonoccupational considering a rural setting, the onsite transportation risks are calculated, assuming shipments.

The maximum one-way distance from the site to the ORR gate by which trucks would deliver hazardous waste is 16 kilometers (10 miles). Based on 1.5×10^{-8} accident fatalities per kilometer per shipment, 1.92×10^{-4} accident occupational fatalities over a 40-year period. Based on 5.3×10^{-8} accident non-occupational fatalities per shipment, 6.8×10^{-4} accident non-occupational fatalities are estimated for a 40-year period.

5.11.1.3 Transportation of Radioactive SNF. The definition of offsite transportation

includes transportation of radioactive material from the shipping facility to the site and the receiving site; therefore this local transportation does not separately address transportation impacts due to radioactive materials shipment except for handling at the facility. Based on current inventories and expected future generation, DOE estimates approximately 480 spent nuclear shipments over 40 years (1995-2035) from the High Flux Isotope Reactor. The distance between the High Flux Isotope Reactor and the proposed SNF management facility at ORR is about 6 miles (9.75 km). Incident-free onsite radiological transportation impacts from the estimated 480 shipments were calculated for transport members (occupational) and general population. Occupational dose of 0.34 person-rem over 40 years was calculated based on a unit risk factor of 7.16×10^{-5} person-rem per kilometer (Appendix I). This dose results in 1.36×10^{-4} fatal cancers. The general population dose of 1.83×10^{-3} person-rem over 40 years was calculated based on a unit risk factor of 1.83 rem per kilometer (Appendix I). This dose results in 4.28×10^{-6} fatal cancers.

5.11.2 Regionalization Alternative

The impacts due to the Regionalization Alternative would be less than those described for the Centralization Alternative.

5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety

5.12.1 Centralization Alternative

This section evaluates the impacts to human health resulting from both contaminant emissions and direct exposures associated with the proposed SNF management facility Centralization Alternative. Based on current inventories and expected future generation, DOE estimates approximately 480 spent nuclear shipments over 40 years (1995 - 2035) from the High Flux Isotope Reactor. The distance between the High Flux Isotope Reactor and the proposed SNF management facility at ORR is about 6 miles (9.75 km). Incident-free onsite radiological transportation impacts from the estimated 480 shipments were calculated for transport members (occupational) and general population. Occupational dose of 0.34 person-rem over 40 years was calculated based on a unit risk factor of 7.16×10^{-5} person-rem per kilometer (Appendix I). This dose results in 1.36×10^{-4} fatal cancers. The general population dose of 1.83×10^{-3} person-rem over 40 years was calculated based on a unit risk factor of 1.83 rem per kilometer (Appendix I). This dose results in 4.28×10^{-6} fatal cancers.

$\times 10^{-3}$ person-rem over 40 years was calculated based on a unit risk factor of 1.83 rem per kilometer (Appendix I). This dose results in 4.28×10^{-6} fatal cancers.

5.12.1.1 Radiological Dose and Cancer Impacts. Computation and modeling (see

Table 5.7-1) have shown that the dose rate (due to atmospheric effluents only) to the exposed individual, conservatively taken to be at the site boundary of the ORR (with presence of the interim storage facility), is 3.3 millirem per year of site operation. **associated risk of fatal cancer of 1.7×10^{-6} to this maximally exposed individual.** established (see Section 4.12.4) that liquid effluents may present an additional potential of 15.2 millirem per year of site operation (MMES 1993a) to a potential maximally exposed individual at the site boundary (due to both water consumption [0.2 millirem] and a liquid material [15 millirem]), yielding a corresponding risk of 7.6×10^{-6} per year. Subsequently, an additional 6.2 millirem per year to the postulated maximally exposed at the site boundary has been tabulated due to the presence of interim storage facility effluents (no radioactive liquid effluents are expected from the interim storage facility if the spent fuel were brought to the ORR, it could result in a total cumulative dose to the maximally exposed individual at the site boundary of 1.2×10^{-5} for fatal cancer; the resulting increase in risk to this individual with SNF management included is 34 percent. The total dose (24.7 millirem) to the exposed individual is well within all applicable DOE limits (i.e., 4 millirem per year drinking water pathway, 10 millirem per year from the airborne release pathways, an millirem per year total for all pathways). Table 5.12-1 shows the relationship among sources of radiation doses to the maximally exposed individual. The risks are presented both 1 and 40 years of exposure. The latter values are approximate and correspond to the operating lifetime of the SNF facility.

The annual population dose (80-kilometer [50-mile] radius) from total site operation (without the interim storage facility) is 54 person-rem, resulting in an increase of 0.027. The increase in annual population dose from SNF operations is 5 person-rem, an increase of 2.5×10^{-3} for fatal cancer.

Over 40 years the increase in fatal cancers from SNF operations is 0.10. The increase is 9 percent in fatal cancers to the population from site operations with SNF results from 0.019 to 0.021 percent in the comparison of the dose received from ORR to that from background. Table 5.12-1 also includes a summary of these population health impacts. **Table 5.12-1. Critical Interim Storage Facility impacts on radiation dose and cancer**

	Dose rate to the maximally exposed individual (mrem per yr)	Associated fatal cancer risk (yr of operation) ^a	Associated facility lifetime fatal cancer risk (40 years) ^a
Natural background	295	1.5×10^{-4}	5.9×10^{-3}
Public			
Baseline site operations	18.5	9.2×10^{-6}	3.7×10^{-4}
SNF operations	6.2	3.1×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-4}
Baseline & SNF	24.7	1.2×10^{-5}	4.9×10^{-4}
Percent increase	34	34	34
SNF over baseline			
Workers			
Baseline site operations	2.8 ^b	1.1×10^{-6}	4.5×10^{-5}
SNF operations	40 ^b	1.6×10^{-5}	6.4×10^{-4}

- a. Facility lifetime fatal cancer risk accounts for time-varying number of workers.
b. Dose rate to an average worker.

It has been assumed that the additional doses to SNF workers (due to interim storage facility operations) will be similar in nature to those for major DOE facility Waste Processing/Management personnel. Hence, by examining the dose data from 1989, 1990, 1991 for Richland, INEL, and Savannah River Site and assuming that the nuclear activity of SNF would remain fairly constant until it is dealt with at the interim storage facility.

asserted that a maximally exposed interim storage facility worker could plausibly receive an additional (above background) annual dose of 3 rem from normal operations; this is a risk of 1.2×10^{-3} for fatal cancer per year of operation. However, the average (incurred in 1989, 1990, and 1991) to SNF workers was approximately 40 millirem per year, which is equivalent to a risk of 1.6×10^{-5} for fatal cancer per year of operation, and a risk of 6.4×10^{-4} to a worker who is present during the entire 40-year facility life span.

An excess of 0.013 fatal cancer among all SNF facility workers is projected from annual operations; exposures to radiation over the lifetime of SNF operations could result in an excess of 0.40 fatal cancer. The maximum health effects due to radiological doses to a noninvolved worker, i.e., an ORR worker at a facility other than SNF, would be on the order of 1 percent of the occupational exposure to an SNF worker based on analyses for the SNF sites. Table 5.12-1 includes a summary of the doses and fatal cancer risks to

5.12.1.2 Chemical Exposure Health Impacts. The calculated atmospheric maximum

concentrations of hazardous chemicals (at the site boundary) for the proposed action are presented in Table 5.7-5 in Section 5.7. The maximum concentrations at the site boundary reflect an exposure to a maximally exposed individual, whereas the maximum onsite concentrations reflect an exposure to a worker. Of the potential hazardous chemicals for the proposed action, cadmium, nickel and chromium VI (chrome) are carcinogens for which a total cancer risk is calculated. The remaining seven chemicals are noncarcinogens for which a hazard index is calculated. A hazard index value of greater than 1 serves as an indicator of potential adverse health effects.

The offsite concentrations in Table 5.7-5 represent values at public access road intersections. However, a maximally exposed individual is assumed to be unable to take residence on these roads, but instead takes up residence along the reservation fence line. Concentrations at the fence line are 62 percent of those listed as offsite. On the roads, being the highest listed within the fence line, are used to represent maximum concentrations for ORR workers.

Based on the maximum hazardous chemical concentrations at the site boundary, the fatal cancer risk and hazard index to the maximally exposed member of the public are 1.2×10^{-2} and 1.2, respectively. Based on the maximum concentrations onsite, the fatal cancer risk and hazard index to a worker are 4.0×10^{-12} and 1.9, respectively, indicating that there will be virtually no health impacts from nonradiological releases.

5.12.1.3 Labor and Construction Health Risks. There are expected to be 25,212 total

occupational/total labor worker-years for the 40-year duration of the interim storage facility. Hence, over the 40-year interim storage facility life span, it is estimated that 80 injuries/illnesses and 0.81 fatality to DOE and contractor personnel would result. 4,352 total construction worker-years for the 40-year duration of the interim storage facility results in 270 total injuries/illnesses and 0.48 fatality to DOE and contractor personnel.

5.12.2 Regionalization Alternative

Although the Regionalization Alternative is not explicitly analyzed, its impacts are expected to be less than those from the Centralization Alternative.

5.13 Utilities and Energy

Direct changes in utility demand as a result of the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives were compared against the current capacity and peak demand for each utility resource. Impacts to provision of a utility are considered to occur if the current annual demand, or peak demand for a utility is equal to or exceeds the current availability within the designated Region of Influence. For the purpose of analysis, the Region of Influence for each resource area is defined as the area served by the utility provider responsible for meeting the service demands of the ORR.

5.13.1 Centralization Alternative

5.13.1.1 Water Consumption. For the Centralization Alternative, approximately 0.43

liter per second (6.85 gallons per minute) of water is required to operate all the the facility (Harr 1994). The K-25 plant, which would provide water to the site, h 184 liters per second (2,917 gallons per minute) (Fritts 1994).

The proposed SNF management facilities would require approximately 0.2 percent K-25 plant's water capacity. The K-25 plant would operate at 53 percent of its cap SNF facilities' water requirements are combined with the 1990 peak water usage of 9 second (1,533 gallons per minute).

5.13.1.2 Electrical Consumption. The proposed SNF management facilities under the

Centralization Alternative would require approximately 23,000 megawatt hours of ele year or approximately 2.63 megavolt-amperes average demand (Harr 1994). This repre 0.3 percent of ORR's 920 megavolt-ampere connected capacity. Thirty-one percent of connected capacity of ORR would be utilized when the peak electric requirement of 2 megavolt-amperes was combined with the electrical requirements of the Centralizatio Alternative.

5.13.1.3 Fuel Consumption. Energy requirements for the proposed SNF management

facilities under the Centralization Alternative were calculated assuming that elect purchased from a utility provider was the primary source of energy; however, fossil used to power backup generators and during construction. The amount of fuel requir operations would be small and should not substantially increase ORR fuel requiremen

5.13.1.4 Wastewater Disposal. Under the Centralization Alternative, approximately

0.43 liter per second (6.85 gallons per minute) of wastewater would be generated (H new onsite sanitary sewage system and wastewater treatment plant might be required facility. If a new system is not built, and sanitary sewage and wastewater are tre addition would represent approximately 2 percent of the K-25 sanitary sewer treatme capacity of 26 liters per second (417 gallons per minute). Ninety-four percent of capacity of the K-25 sanitary sewer treatment system would be utilized when the pea production of 24 liters per second (378 gallons per minute) was combined with the w production of the SNF management facilities.

5.13.2 Regionalization Alternative**5.13.2.1 Water Consumption. The proposed SNF management facilities under the**

Regionalization Alternative would require less water than the facilities under the Alternative; therefore, the impacts would be less.

5.13.2.2 Electrical Consumption. The proposed SNF management facilities under the

Regionalization Alternative would require less electricity than the facilities unde Centralization Alternative; therefore, the impacts would be less.

5.13.2.3 Fuel Consumption. Energy requirements for the proposed SNF management

facilities under the Regionalization Alternative were calculated assuming that elec purchased from a utility provider was the primary source of energy; however, fossil used to power backup generators and during construction activities. The amount of for these operations would be small and should not substantially increase ORR fuel requirements.

5.13.2.4 Wastewater Disposal. The proposed SNF management facilities under the

Regionalization Alternative would produce less wastewater than the Centralization A therefore, the impacts would be less.

5.14 Materials and Waste Management

This section discusses the potential environmental consequences of the Centrali Regionalization Alternatives for the management of chemical raw materials and trans level radioactive, and hazardous waste at the ORR. Nonhazardous (sanitary) wastes discussed in Section 5.8. Section 4.14 describes the waste categories and outlines waste management activities for the ORR. These waste management activities include and offsite waste treatment, onsite and offsite waste disposal, and onsite waste st Section 4.14 also describes the chemical raw material management activities for the

5.14.1 Methodology

This analysis considers the impact of the Centralization and Regionalization Al current waste management activities at the ORR (baseline conditions). In addition land area for SNF management, both alternatives would generate transuranic, low-level radioactive, hazardous, and nonhazardous wastes. Neither alternative is projected mixed wastes or high-level wastes. This analysis is based on a comparison of the p amounts of waste generated by the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives v current waste generation rates and storage capacity at the ORR.

5.14.2 Materials and Waste Management

SNF management activities would require the use of chemicals, and it is conserv assumed that all chemical raw materials used within the proposed SNF management fac would become hazardous wastes. The proposed SNF management facility would contribu transuranic, solid low-level, and sanitary (sewage) wastes. Table 5.14-1 presents waste generations by waste classification for each of the two alternatives (Central Regionalization) and by each of two storage options (wet storage, dry storage).

5.14.2.1 Centralization Alternative. Under the Centralization Alternative, all DOE SNF

(including Naval and domestic and foreign research reactors) will be transferred to at the ORR.

5.14.2.2 Wet Storage Option. The wet storage option would generate transuranic, low-

level, hazardous, and sanitary wastes. The effect that the projected amounts of ea wastes would have on the ORR waste management is discussed below.

5.14.2.2.1 Transuranic Waste-Over a period of 40 years of operation the

projected amount of transuranic waste generated due to the recovery and purificatio transuranic products would be 644 cubic meters (22,750 cubic feet).

The current storage capacity

at the ORR (ORNL) is 833.4 cubic meters (295,000 cubic feet). ORNL will continue t transuranic waste, and disposal is eventually planned for the Waste Isolation Pilot the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant unit does not come on line, the ORR transuranic was **Table 5.14-1.** Ten-year cumulative estimated waste generation for SNF alternatives at the ORR (m3).

Alternative/ storage option	Time period
--------------------------------	-------------

	1995-2004	2005-2014	2015-2024	2025-2034
Centralization Alternative				
Wet storage option				
Transuranic waste	161	161	161	161
Low-level waste	1,950	1,950	1,950	1,950
Hazardous waste	74	74	74	74
Sanitary waste (sewage)	1.2 x 10 ⁵	1.2 x 10 ⁵	1.2 x 10 ⁵	1.2 x 10 ⁵
Dry storage option				
Low-level waste	76	76	76	76
Sanitary waste (sewage)	1.9 x 10 ⁴	1.9 x 10 ⁴	1.9 x 10 ⁴	1.9 x 10 ⁴
Regionalization Alternative				
Wet storage option				
Transuranic waste	<161	<161	<161	<161
Low-level waste	<1,950	<1,950	<1,950	<1,950
Hazardous waste	<74	<74	<74	<74
Sanitary waste (sewage)	<1.2 x 10 ⁵	<1.2 x 10 ⁵	<1.2 x 10 ⁵	<1.2 x 10 ⁵
Dry storage option				
Low-level waste	<76	<76	<76	<76
Sanitary waste (sewage)	<1.9 x 10 ⁴	<1.9 x 10 ⁴	<1.9 x 10 ⁴	<1.9 x 10 ⁴

a. Source: Harr (1994).

capacity may have to be expanded to accommodate transuranic waste generated at the facility.

5.14.2.2.2 Low-Level Waste-The wet storage option would generate liquid low-

level waste as a result of its interim storage in water.

Over a period of 40 years of operation, an estimated 7,800 cubic meters (over 2 million gallons) of low-level liquid waste might be generated. The total ORR (Y-12, K-25, ORNL) storage capacity for liquid low-level waste is about 98,300 cubic meters (about 26 million gallons) (see Tables 4.14-1, 4.14-3, and 4.14-4). The impact of SNF generated hazardous waste on the management of hazardous waste at ORR would be small.

5.14.2.2.3 Hazardous Wastes-Installation of the proposed SNF management

facility would require additional management of hazardous wastes, including the installation of satellite storage areas within the SNF complex and more frequent offsite shipments of hazardous wastes.

It is estimated that the wet storage option will generate approximately 7.4 cubic meters (261 cubic feet) of waste annually. Currently ORR manages about 10,000 cubic meters (353,000 cubic feet) of hazardous waste annually (see Tables 4.14-1, 4.14-3, and 4.14-4). The impact of SNF generated hazardous waste on the management of hazardous waste at ORR would be minimal.

5.14.2.2.4 Sanitary Waste-Sanitary wastes are covered in Section 5.

8.

5.14.2.3 Dry Storage Option. The dry storage option would generate low-level waste

and sanitary waste. The effects that the projected amounts of each of these wastes have on the ORR waste management is discussed below.

5.14.2.3.1 Low-Level Waste-The low-level radioactive contaminated waste stream

would result from wastes generated during decontamination operations. Over a period of

40 years of operation, an estimated 304 cubic meters (10,700 cubic feet) of low-level waste would be generated. As reported in Section 5.14.2.2.2 the total ORR storage capacity for low-level waste is about 98,300 cubic meters (about 26 million gallons). Impacts from operations on low-level waste management would be minimal.

5.14.2.3.2 Sanitary Waste-Sanitary wastes are covered in Section 5.

8.

5.14.2.2 Regionalization Alternative. Under the Regionalization Alternative, the ORR

would be the alternate site for the SRS. This alternative would generate less waste than the Centralization Alternative since it is the alternative that is presented for either the wet storage or dry storage option, the waste generated would be less presented for the Centralization Alternative. Therefore, Table 5.14-1 presents the waste generation for the SNF for the Regionalization Alternative as less than those presented for the Centralization Alternative. The impacts presented for each of the waste categories (wet storage, dry storage) for the Centralization Alternative apply to the Regionalization Alternative as well.

5.15 Facility Accidents

A potential exists for accidents at facilities associated with the handling, in storage of spent nuclear fuel at the ORR. Accidents can be categorized into events abnormal (for example, minor spills), events a facility was designed to withstand, facility is not designed to withstand. These categories are termed abnormal, design beyond design basis accidents, respectively. Summarized here are consequences of potential accidents for a member of the public at the nearest site boundary and at the nearest the collective population within 80 kilometers (50 miles), for workers, and for the public. See Section 5.11 for a summary of the assessment of transportation accidents.

A review of the historical record of accidents at the ORR is summarized in the section. Methods used to assess potential future events are summarized in Section 5.15.3. Evaluations of accident impacts by alternative are summarized in Sections 5.15.3 through 5.15.4. A summary comparison of accident impacts by alternative is given in Section 3.2. A supporting documentation for the accident impacts is given in a separate report (HN-15.15.1).

This section examines the various activities that have been performed to assess potential accidents and their consequences for workers and the public for each alternative. Potential reasonably foreseeable accidents over the 40-year period are described with all accidents. Secondary impacts of accidents pertaining to cultural resources, economic use, endangered species, water resources, and ecology are also addressed. This section addresses emergency preparedness plans that have been established to mitigate the potential secondary effects of accidents.

5.15.1 Historical SNF Accidents at ORR

The records of unusual events, including accidents, at the ORR have been reviewed to determine whether there have been any accidents with offsite impacts. The results of the review show there have been no accidents at the ORR associated with SNF that have had significant consequences for the general public.

5.15.2 Methodology

5.15.2.1 Existing Facilities.

5.15.2.1.1 Assumptions and Approach-The potential accidents associated with

the existing SNF management facilities and operations were screened to determine which ones to include in the accident analysis for the No Action Alternative.

Source terms were developed for each accident analysis. The GENII code (PNL 1988) was used to estimate accident consequences for the general public and for individuals onsite or at the site boundary both 50 percent and 95 percent meteorology. Accident consequences and risk are described in terms of dose, cancer fatalities, and total health detriments for workers, an individual at the site boundary, and the public residing as far as 80 kilometers (50 miles) from the proposed management facility.

5.15.2.1.2 Accident Screening-The potential accidents associated with the existing

SNF management facilities and operations were screened to determine which ones to include in the accident analysis for the No Action Alternative.

Initiating events were reviewed including natural phenomena (earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.), human initiated events (human error equipment failures, fires, explosions, airplane crashes, and terrorism. One reference fuel handling accident was selected for detailed analysis.

The dam in the High Flux Isotope Reactor fuel pool is removed and stored within the pool during refueling operations. The reference design basis fuel handling accident occurs during refueling operations, the dam falls and damages all the 62 spent fuel cores, most recently discharged core, located in the pool. The fission products from all the cores are released to the water in the pool (ORNL 1992b).

A beyond design basis tornado accident was considered that resulted in collapse of the High Flux Isotope Reactor bay roof and the roof's major structural member falls into the pool, damaging all the 62 spent fuel cores located in the pool. The fission products from the fuel cores are released to the water in the pool (Flanagan 1994).

Additional beyond design basis accidents initiated by an airplane crash were possible at the High Flux Isotope Reactor and Bulk Shielding Reactor but were screened out because the probability of an airplane crash into the fuel pool was estimated to be less than 1 in 10,000 years.

The consequences of postulated operational and reference design basis accidents at existing facilities are enveloped by the accident consequences presented in the Centralization Alternative.

5.15.2.2 New Facilities. In the absence of suitable design details for new SNF

management facilities during this stage of the SNF Management Program upon which to base the accident analysis, the approach makes use of accident scenarios and associated data that have been analyzed and documented for similar facilities. They include spent nuclear fuel at INEL, Hanford, Savannah River Site, and Naval sites.

5.15.2.2.1 Assumptions and Approach-A number of postulated accidents for the

similar facilities have been selected to serve as a common basis for estimating accident consequences for workers and the public at the ORR site.

Although the accident scenarios, source terms, and related assumptions are common for both sites, the estimated consequences are unique to the ORR site because of site differences in modeling parameters pertaining to site boundaries and population centers, population distributions, and meteorology. The GENII code was used to estimate accident consequences for the general public and for individuals onsite or at the site boundary based on both 50 percent and 95 percent meteorology. Accident consequences and risk are described in terms of dose, cancer fatalities, and total health detriments for workers, an individual at the site boundary, a transient individual at the site boundary, and the public residing as far as 80 kilometers (50 miles) from the facility. The estimated frequency of each selected accident is based on the reference documentation.

The probability of an airplane crash into the new SNF management facility is considered small because there are no nearby airports with large aircraft activity. The probability is expected to be in the 1×10^{-6} to 1×10^{-8} per year range. For calculational purposes, the probability of this accident is conservatively estimated at 1×10^{-6} per year. Potential

initiated by an airplane crash into the SNF management facilities and the estimated consequences have been analyzed.

The secondary impacts of accidental releases of radioactive and hazardous mater also addressed in a qualitative manner. Secondary impacts pertain to effects of ac use, endangered species, water resources, cultural resources, and ecology.

5.15.2.2.2 Accident Screening-The potential accidents associated with existing

SNF management facilities and operations were screened to determine which ones to i the accident analysis for the ORR.

The source documentation for this purpose was primarily Appendices A, B, C, and D of Volume 1 of this EIS. The source documentation descri potential accidents for existing and planned SNF management facilities that were se screening process. Initiating events were reviewed including natural phenomena (ea tornados, etc.), human initiated events (human error), equipment failures, fires, airplane crashes, and terrorism. Accidents associated with the Expanded Core Facil at the ORR, were analyzed separately and the results are documented in Appendix D o EIS. For the ORR the maximum reasonably foreseeable criticality and nonradiologica are associated with the Expanded Core Facility. The potential for a criticality ex fuel is in dry storage, during handling, and in the wet storage pool. Although the any criticality is very low, a hypothetical criticality of 1×10^{19} fissions was po Expanded Core Facility wet pool as a basis for estimating the maximum reasonably fo consequences of a criticality.

The selected accidents include beyond reference design basis events to reflect magnitude of accident consequences that envelop all other accidents that have a rea probability of occurrence. They also include other accidents with lower consequen typically higher probabilities of occurrence to show a range of accident types and The accidents included in this set are reasonably foreseeable, meaning that there a more sequences of events that will lead to their occurrence and the sequence with t probability of occurrence is greater than 1×10^{-7} per year. Accidents falling out envelope, such as a meteorite impact, have been judged unreasonable because the pro occurrence in less than 1×10^{-7} per year.

5.15.2.2.3 Accident Prevention and Mitigation - Under the Centralization and

Regionalization alternatives, the SNF management facilities at the ORR will be of n and construction and incorporate the latest technology for safety.

The accidents postulated for the SNF management facilities are based on operations and safety analyses that have performed at similar facilities. One of the major design goals for the SNF managem is to achieve a reduced risk to facility personnel and to public health and safety associated with similar functions at the existing SNF management facilities. Signi exist between design criteria and safety standards for the new SNF management facil those for the current facilities, thus reducing total risk. These changes include DOE structural and safety criteria and to planned throughput and storage capacity.

The new SNF management facilities would be designed to comply with current Fede state, and local laws, DOE Orders, and industrial codes and standards. This would facilities that are highly resistant to the effects of severe natural phenomena, in earthquake, flood, tornado, high wind, as well as credible events as appropriate to as fire and explosions, and man-made threats to its continuing structural integrity materials.

Emergency preparedness plans have also been prepared for existing facilities an revised for new facilities to lower the potential consequences of an accident to wo public. All workers receive evacuation training to ensure timely and orderly perso away from high-risk areas. Plans and arrangements with local authorities are also evacuate the general public that may be at risk of exposure to hazardous materials accidentally released.

5.15.3 No Action Alternative

There is a potential for the accidental release of radioactive substances durin stages of SNF handling operations and storage. The operations begin with discharge

from the reactor during refueling operations. The discharged SNF is placed in the cooling and short term storage. After an adequate cooldown period, SNF is removed pool and transported offsite for long term storage. Accidents that may occur during handling operations and storage may involve the release of radioactive material to pathways. The cause of accidents may be due to internal initiators, such as operator equipment failure, and terrorism, or external initiators, such as an earthquake.

In the event that SNF can not be transported offsite for long term storage, reoperations will cease when the fuel pool is full. Presently the SNF stored in the is sound and has not deteriorated. If the existing SNF were to remain in the ORR for an extended period of time and deterioration of the aluminum fuel cladding occurred no existing facilities at the ORR to characterize the SNF.

5.15.3.1 Radiological Impacts. The potential accidents associated with the existing SNF

management facilities and operations were screened to determine which ones to include accident analysis for the No Action Alternative. One reference design basis accident beyond design basis accident were selected for detailed analysis. Although other accidents occur, their estimated consequences are bounded by this beyond design basis accident probability of occurrence is less than 1.0×10^{-7} per year. If these accidents were dose and risk to the onsite worker and the general population are shown in Tables 5.15-2 for 95 percent and 50 percent meteorology respectively. Similarly, cancer risk is shown in Tables 5.15-3 and 5.15-4, and the health effects are shown in Tables 5.15-5.

5.15.3.1.1 Reference Design Basis Accident-The dam that separates the High

Flux Isotope Reactor pool from the clean center pool during normal reactor operation to a position between the east and center clean pools prior to defueling the reactor. The dam is

lifted approximately 3 feet above the water over its slot between the reactor and center pool, then moved with the crane across the center clean pool, and then lowered into its slot between the east and center pools. During this movement, and when the dam is being moved between the east and center pools, fuel in the center pool is subjected to the possibility of dropping the dam and mechanical damage to the fuel.

Table 5.15-1. Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for 95 percent meteorology.

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	95 percent meteorology Dose			
		MEIa (rem)	NPAIb	Workerd (rem)	Population (person-rem)
Dropped dam	1.0×10^{-4} e	3.7×10^{-1}	6.2×10^{-1}	2.3×10^{-2}	3.5×10^3 c
Beyond design basis tornado	1.9×10^{-7}	4.9×10^0	7.5×10^1	2.6×10^1	4.5×10^4 d

- a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI).
 - b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI) - Radiation exposure received from inhalation.
 - c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
 - d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
 - e. The value is expected to be in the 1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6} range. For calculation of risk, the value is expected to be in the 1.0×10^{-4} to 1.0×10^{-6} range.
- Table 5.15-2.** Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for 50 percent meteorology.

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	50 percent meteorology Dose			
		MEIa (rem)	NPAIb	Workerd (rem)	Population (person-rem)
Dropped dam	1.0×10^{-4} e	8.6×10^{-2}	1.9×10^{-1}	5.7×10^{-3}	1.2×10^3 c

Beyond design 1.9 x 10⁻⁷ 9.5 x 10⁻¹ 1.9 x 10¹ 4.0 x 10⁰ 7.2 x 10³ d
basis tornado

- a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI).
- b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from i
- c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathway
- d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
- e. The value is expected to be in the 1.0 x 10⁻⁴ to 1.0 x 10⁻⁶ range. For calc
Table 5.15-3. Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis cancer fatality a
percent meteorology.

95 percent meteorology

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Cancer fatalities				C (c)
		MEIa	NPAIb	Workerd	Population	
Dropped dam	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ e	1.8 x 10 ⁻⁴	3.1 x 10 ⁻⁴	9.2 x 10 ⁻⁶	1.7 x 10 ⁰ c	
Beyond design basis tornado	1.9 x 10 ⁻⁷	2.5 x 10 ⁻³	7.5 x 10 ⁻²	2.0 x 10 ⁻²	2.3 x 10 ¹ d	

- a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI).
- b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from i
- c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathway
- d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
- e. The value is expected to be in the 1.0 x 10⁻⁴ to 1.0 x 10⁻⁶ range. For calc
Table 5.15-4. Summary of No Action Alternative accident cancer fatality and risk e
meteorology.

50 percent meteorology

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Cancer fatalities			
		MEIa	NPAIb	Workerd	Population
Dropped dam	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ e	4.3 x 10 ⁻⁵	9.5 x 10 ⁻⁵	2.3 x 10 ⁻⁶	6.2 x 10 ⁻¹ c
Beyond design basis tornado	1.9 x 10 ⁻⁷	4.8 x 10 ⁻⁴	9.5 x 10 ⁻³	1.6 x 10 ⁻³	3.6 x 10 ⁰ d

- a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI).
- b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from i
- c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathway
- d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
- e. The value is expected to be in the 1.0 x 10⁻⁴ to 1.0 x 10⁻⁶ range. For calc
Table 5.15-5. Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis health effects an
percent meteorology.

95 percent meteorology

Accident Frequency Total health detriment^a

scenario	(per year)	MEI ^b	NPAI ^c	Workere	Population
Dropped dam	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ f	2.7 x 10 ⁻⁴	4.6 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.3 x 10 ⁻⁵	2.5 x 100 d
Beyond design basis tornado	1.9 x 10 ⁻⁷	3.6 x 10 ⁻³	1.1 x 10 ⁻¹	2.9 x 10 ⁻²	3.3 x 101 e

- a. The estimated number of cancer fatalities, cancer nonfatalities, and genetic
- b. Maximum exposed individual (MEI).
- c. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from i
- d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathway
- e. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
- f. The value is expected to be in the 1.0 x 10⁻⁴ to 1.0 x 10⁻⁶ range. For calc
Table 5.15-6. Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis health effects an
percent meteorology.

50 percent meteorology

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Total health detriments ^a			
		MEI ^b	NPAI ^c	Workere	Population
Dropped dam	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ f	6.3 x 10 ⁻⁵ d	1.4 x 10 ⁻⁴	3.2 x 10 ⁻⁶	9.0 x 10 ⁻¹ d
Beyond design basis tornado	1.9 x 10 ⁻⁷	6.9 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.4 x 10 ⁻²	2.2 x 10 ⁻³	5.3 x 100 e

- a. The estimated number of cancer fatalities, cancer nonfatalities, and genetic
- b. Maximum exposed individual (MEI).
- c. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from i
- d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathway
- e. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
- f. The value is expected to be in the 1.0 x 10⁻⁴ to 1.0 x 10⁻⁶ range. For calc
damaging the fuel. There is also a possibility that the dam could somehow be dropp
being lowered into (or raised from) its place between the clean pools and then fall
would damage the fuel in either pool. The reference design basis fuel handling acc
postulated that during refueling operations, the dam falls and damages all the 62 s
including the most recently discharged core, located in the pool. The fission prod
spent fuel cores are assumed to be instantaneously released into the water in the p
analysis assumed that the pool area exhaust system was operational, it carried off
fission products, it filtered the stream, and it released the remaining fission pro
The source term released up the stack is shown in Table 5.15-7. The frequency of o
this accident is in the range of 1.0 x 10⁻⁴ to 1.0 x 10⁻⁶ per year (ORNL 1992b).

5.15.3.1.2 Beyond Design Basis Accident-The beyond design basis accident

postulated that a beyond design basis tornado with wind speeds of approximately 300
the High Flux Isotope Reactor reactor bay.

The reactor bay roof collapses and the major
structural member in the roof falls into the fuel pool and damages all the 62 spent
including the most recently discharged core, located in the pool. The fission prod
62 spent fuel cores are assumed to be instantaneously released into the water in th
analysis assumed that all evaporated fission products are released directly to the

ground level. The source term is similar to the reference design basis accident so present in Table 5.15-7 except that no credit was taken for filtration of the iodine from the pool. The iodine released in the beyond design basis source term is 100 t than the iodine released in the reference design basis accident source term (Flanagan

The annual return frequency of a tornado with wind speeds of approximately 300 ORR is 1.4×10^{-5} . The conditional probability for collapse of the reactor bay roof 300 mph tornado is 0.46. The ratio of the spent fuel area to the reactor bay floor probability that the falling structural member will fall into the spent fuel area is 0.03. The frequency of occurrence for this beyond design basis accident is 1.9×10^{-1} (Flanagan 1994).

Due to the dose consequences associated with the postulated accident, protective measures were assumed for the offsite population. The analysis took no credit for evacuation from the affected area. However, credit was taken for removing contaminated food from the general public.

Table 5.15-7. Estimated radionuclide releases for the High Flux Isotope Reactor fuel pool dam drop accident at ORR.

Isotope	Release Duration	
	0-2 hr Curies	0-30 day Curies
Hydrogen-3 (Tritium)	3.5×10^2	3.5×10^2
Krypton-83m	1.9×10^2	1.9×10^2
Krypton-85	1.0×10^4	1.0×10^4
Krypton-85m	3.6×10^3	3.6×10^3
Krypton-87	4.2×10^{-1}	4.2×10^{-1}
Krypton-88	1.1×10^3	1.1×10^3
Iodine-151	3.8×10^0	1.5×10^1
Iodine-132	5.0×10^0	5.1×10^0
Iodine-133	4.7×10^0	6.2×10^0
Iodine-134	2.2×10^{-7}	2.2×10^{-7}
Iodine-135	7.4×10^{-1}	8.1×10^{-1}
Xenon-131m	2.3×10^3	2.3×10^3
Xenon-133	8.7×10^5	8.7×10^5
Xenon-133m	2.5×10^4	2.5×10^4
Xenon-135	1.7×10^5	1.7×10^5
Xenon-135m	1.2×10^3	1.2×10^3

Source: ORNL 1992b

5.15.3.2 Nonradiological Hazards. The two bounding accidents involving nonradiological

hazards postulated for the Centralization Alternative in subsection 5.15.4.2 are as bounding for the No Action Alternative. SNF operations under the No Action Alternative should not introduce any nonradiological hazards unique to the ORR SNF facilities.

5.15.4 Centralization Alternative

There is a potential for the accidental release of radioactive substances during stages of SNF handling operations and storage. The operations at the new SNF management facilities begin with the receipt of an SNF shipment by truck or rail carrier, followed by unloading of the shipping cask from the transport vehicle. If the SNF requires cooling, it is placed into an unloading pool where the SNF is withdrawn from the cask, moved to a temporary wet storage basin, and placed into a fuel rack. Some SNF that does not require cooling will be handled in a special cell where it will undergo canning and/or characterization. SNF that does not have to be cooled and does not require canning and/or characterization will be loaded into a dry storage canister within a transfer cask and transported to moderate grade dry storage. Accidents that may occur during these handling operations and storage at existing or new SNF management facilities may involve the release of radioactive materials through air or water pathways. The cause of accidents may be due to internal initiators, such as equipment failure, error, terrorism, and equipment failure, or external initiators, such as an airplane crash at the facility.

5.15.4.1 Radiological Impacts. The accidents described below have been chosen to

envelop the consequences of potential accidents for the proposed new SNF management at the ORR. Although other accidents may occur, their estimated consequences are based on the accidents in the envelope or their probability of occurrence is less than 1 x 10⁻⁶ these accidents were to occur, the dose and risk would be as shown in Tables 5.15-8 for 95 percent and 50 percent meteorology respectively. These doses are in addition to the average natural background radiation exposure of 360 millirem per year. Similarly, fatalities are shown in Tables 5.15-10 and 5.15-11, and the health effects are shown in Tables 5.15-12 and 5.15-13.

5.15.4.1.1 Fuel Assembly Breach-Physical damage and breach of a fuel assembly

could accidentally occur from dropping, objects falling on the assembly, or cutting the assembly. Table 5.

15-8. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Site at 95 percent meteorology.

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Dose			
		MEI ^a (rem)	NPAI ^b (rem)	Worker ^c (rem)	Population ^d (person-rem)
Fuel assembly breach	1.6 x 10 ⁻¹ e	1.2 x 10 ⁻²	3.8 x 10 ⁻³	1.5 x 10 ⁻³	2.1 x 10 ¹
Dropped fuel cask	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ f	7.8 x 10 ⁰	1.2 x 10 ¹	4.7 x 10 ⁰	1.9 x 10 ⁴
Severe impact and fire	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	5.6 x 10 ¹	8.8 x 10 ⁰	3.4 x 10 ⁰	1.0 x 10 ⁵
Wind-driven missile impact into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	2.2 x 10 ⁻²	2.9 x 10 ⁻²	1.2 x 10 ⁻²	5.2 x 10 ¹
Airplane crash into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	9.0 x 10 ⁰	3.4 x 10 ¹	1.2 x 10 ¹	1.7 x 10 ⁴
Airplane crash into dry cell facility	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	7.6 x 10 ¹	5.8 x 10 ¹	2.3 x 10 ¹	1.2 x 10 ⁵
Airplane crash into water pool	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	1.4 x 10 ⁻¹	5.9 x 10 ⁻²	2.3 x 10 ⁻²	5.6 x 10 ³

a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Dose received from inhalation, external, and

b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Dose received from inhalation and external

c. Dose received from inhalation and external pathways.

d. Dose received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.

e. The value is <1.6 x 10⁻¹. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10⁻¹.

f. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁴. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10⁻⁴.

g. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁶. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10⁻⁶.

Table 5.15-9. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Site at 95 percent meteorology.

50 percent meteorology.

50 percent m

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Dose				Populationd (person-rem)
		MEIa (rem)	NPAIb (rem)	Workerc (rem)		
Fuel assembly breach	1.6 x 10 ⁻¹ e	1.2 x 10 ⁻³	6.7 x 10 ⁻⁴	3.2 x 10 ⁻⁴		2.5 x 100
Dropped fuel cask	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ f	7.5 x 10 ⁻¹	2.2 x 100	1.0 x 100		2.7 x 103
Severe impact and fire	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	5.5 x 100	1.6 x 100	7.5 x 10 ⁻¹		1.2 x 104
Wind-driven missile impact into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	2.1 x 10 ⁻³	5.5 x 10 ⁻³	2.5 x 10 ⁻³		7.7 x 100
Airplane crash into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	8.9 x 10 ⁻¹	6.2 x 100	2.7 x 100		2.5 x 103
Airplane crash into dry cell facility	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	7.2 x 100	1.1 x 101	5.1 x 100		1.5 x 104
Airplane crash into water pool	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	1.3 x 10 ⁻²	1.1 x 10 ⁻²	5.0 x 10 ⁻³		5.2 x 102

a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Dose received from inhalation, external, and

b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Dose received from inhalation and exte

c. Dose received from inhalation and external pathways.

d. Dose received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.

e. The value is <1.6 x 10⁻¹. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to bf. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁴. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to bg. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁶. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to b**Table 5.15-10.** Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer Ridge Site at 95 percent meteorology.

95 percent m

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Cancer fatalities				Popula
		MEIa	NPAIb	Workerc		
Fuel assembly breach	1.6 x 10 ⁻¹ e	6.0 x 10 ⁻⁶	1.9 x 10 ⁻⁶	6.0 x 10 ⁻⁷		2.1 x
Dropped fuel cask	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ f	3.9 x 10 ⁻³	6.0 x 10 ⁻³	1.9 x 10 ⁻³		1.9 x
Severe impact and fire	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	5.6 x 10 ⁻²	4.4 x 10 ⁻³	1.4 x 10 ⁻³		1.0 x
Wind-driven missile impact into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	1.1 x 10 ⁻⁵	1.5 x 10 ⁻⁵	4.9 x 10 ⁻⁶		5.2 x
Airplane crash	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	4.5 x 10 ⁻³	3.4 x 10 ⁻²	4.8 x 10 ⁻³		1.7 x

into dry storage

Airplane crash into dry cell facility	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	7.6 x 10 ⁻²	5.8 x 10 ⁻²	1.8 x 10 ⁻²	1.2 x
--	--------------------------	------------------------	------------------------	------------------------	-------

Airplane crash into water pool	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	6.9 x 10 ⁻⁵	3.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	9.2 x 10 ⁻⁶	5.6 x
-----------------------------------	--------------------------	------------------------	------------------------	------------------------	-------

- a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation
 - b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from in
 - c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
 - d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways
 - e. The value is <1.6 x 10⁻¹. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed t
 - f. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁴. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed t
 - g. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁶. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed t
- Table 5.15-11.** Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer
Ridge Site at 50 percent meteorology.

50 percent meteor

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Cancer fatalities			
		MEI ^a	NPAI ^b	Worker ^c	Popula ^d
Fuel assembly breach	1.6 x 10 ⁻¹ e	6.0 x 10 ⁻⁷	3.4 x 10 ⁻⁷	1.3 x 10 ⁻⁷	1.3 x
Dropped fuel cask	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ f	3.7 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.1 x 10 ⁻³	4.0 x 10 ⁻⁴	2.7 x
Severe impact and fire	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	2.8 x 10 ⁻³	8.1 x 10 ⁻⁴	3.0 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.2 x
Wind-driven missile impact into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶	2.7 x 10 ⁻⁶	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶	3.8 x
Airplane crash into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	4.4 x 10 ⁻⁴	3.1 x 10 ⁻³	1.1 x 10 ⁻³	2.5 x
Airplane crash into dry cell facility	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	3.6 x 10 ⁻³	5.5 x 10 ⁻³	2.0 x 10 ⁻³	1.5 x
Airplane crash into water pool	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ g	6.4 x 10 ⁻⁶	5.5 x 10 ⁻⁶	2.0 x 10 ⁻⁶	5.5 x

- a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation
- b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inh
- c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
- d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
- e. The value is <1.6 x 10⁻¹. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to
- f. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁴. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to
- g. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁶. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to

Table 5.15-12. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis health Site at 95 percent meteorology.

Accident Scenario	Frequency (per year)	Total health detriment ^{sa}			95 percent m
		MEI ^b	NPAI ^c	Worker ^d	
Fuel assembly breach	1.6 x 10 ⁻¹ f	8.8 x 10 ⁻⁶	2.8 x 10 ⁻⁶	8.4 x 10 ⁻⁷	
Dropped fuel cask	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ g	5.7 x 10 ⁻³	8.8 x 10 ⁻³	2.6 x 10 ⁻³	
Severe impact and fire	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ h	8.2 x 10 ⁻²	6.4 x 10 ⁻³	1.9 x 10 ⁻³	
Wind-driven missile impact into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	1.6 x 10 ⁻⁵	2.1 x 10 ⁻⁵	6.8 x 10 ⁻⁶	
Airplane crash into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ h	6.6 x 10 ⁻³	5.0 x 10 ⁻²	6.7 x 10 ⁻³	
Airplane crash into dry cell facility	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ h	1.1 x 10 ⁻¹	8.5 x 10 ⁻²	2.6 x 10 ⁻²	
Airplane crash into water pool	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ h	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴	4.3 x 10 ⁻⁵	1.3 x 10 ⁻⁵	

- a. The estimated number of cancer fatalities, cancer nonfatalities, and genetic
- b. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Radiation exposure received from inhalati
- c. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from i
- d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
- e. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathway
- f. The value is <1.6 x 10⁻¹. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed
- g. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁴. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed
- h. The value is <1.0 x 10⁻⁶. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed

Table 5.15-13. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis health 50 percent meteorology.

Accident scenario	Frequency (per year)	Total health detriment ^{sa}			50 perc
		MEI ^b	NPAI ^c	Worker ^d	
Fuel assembly breach	1.6 x 10 ⁻¹ f	8.8 x 10 ⁻⁷	4.9 x 10 ⁻⁷	1.8 x 10 ⁻⁷	
Dropped fuel cask	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁴ g	5.5 x 10 ⁻⁴	1.6 x 10 ⁻³	5.6 x 10 ⁻⁴	
Severe impact and fire	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ h	4.0 x 10 ⁻³	1.2 x 10 ⁻³	4.2 x 10 ⁻⁴	
Wind-driven missile impact into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁵	1.5 x 10 ⁻⁶	4.0 x 10 ⁻⁶	1.4 x 10 ⁻⁶	

Airplane crash into dry storage	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ h	6.5 x 10 ⁻⁴	4.5 x 10 ⁻³	1.5 x 10 ⁻³
Airplane crash into dry cell facility	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ h	5.2 x 10 ⁻³	8.0 x 10 ⁻³	2.9 x 10 ⁻³
Airplane crash into water pool	1.0 x 10 ⁻⁶ h	9.3 x 10 ⁻⁶	8.0 x 10 ⁻⁶	2.8 x 10 ⁻⁶

- a. The estimated number of cancer fatalities, cancer nonfatalities, and genetic def
- b. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation,
- c. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhal
- d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
- e. Radiation exposure recieved from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
- f. The value is $<1.6 \times 10^{-1}$. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to b
- g. The value is $<1.0 \times 10^{-4}$. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to b
- h. The value is $<1.0 \times 10^{-6}$. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to b
part of an assembly. The fuel cutting accident that has been postulated to occur a
River Site facilities is chosen as representative of the fuel assembly breach accid
(E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 1983). During normal operations at the Savannah Ri
the inert, non-uranium-containing extremities of some spent nuclear fuel elements a
the repackaging basin before the bundling of the elements. The accident occurs whe
uranium fuel is inadvertently cut, causing a radioactive release. The source term
is shown in Table 5.15-14. The estimated frequency of occurrence for this accident
per year based on the Savannah River Site's operating experience with SNF. However
of anticipated differences in operations and facilities at the ORR, the actual freq
expected to be much less than 1.6×10^{-1} per year.

5.15.4.1.2 Dropped Fuel Cask-The dropped fuel cask accident that has been

postulated to occur at the Hanford Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix A) is chosen representative of the dropped fuel cask/fuel handling accident for the new Centrali Alternative facility at the ORR. This accident is initiated when a fuel cask is dropped and overturned in the fuel transfer area and broken fuel elements spill out of the cask pool building but away from the pool. It is assumed that the shipping cask rupture of the broken fuel elements in three canisters--42 fuel elements, each containing 2 (50 pounds) of fuel. The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-15. probability of this accident is estimated to be less than 1×10^{-4} per year.

5.15.4.1.3 Severe Impact and Fire-The severe impact and fire accident that has

been postulated to occur at the Hanford Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix A) is ch representative of the severe impact and fire/onsite transportation accident for the Centralization Alternative facility at the ORR. This accident assumes an unspecified initiating event that subjects the fuel assemblies to a severe impact, breach of the transport fire. During the accident, the fuel pins rupture on impact or upon heating in the burns for an hour before being extinguished. Volatiles, particulates, and noble ga to the atmosphere. The source term for a release of 540 curies is shown in Table 5 estimated probability of occurrence for this accident, reflecting the fact that the site would be new, is less than 1×10^{-6} per year.

5.15.4.1.4 Wind-driven Missile Impact into Storage Casks-The wind-driven

missile impact into storage casks accident that has been postulated to occur at the Table 5.

15-14. Estimated radionuclide releases for a fuel assembly breach accident at ORR.

Radionuclide	Release (Ci)
Iodine-131	7.1×10^{-2}
Iodine-133	1.4×10^{-30}
Krypton-85	1.8×10^2
Xenon-133m	1.1×10^{-8}
Xenon-133	1.1×10^0

a. Source: E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1983).

Table 5.15-15. Estimated radionuclide releases for a dropped fuel cask accident at

Radionuclide	Release (Ci)	
	Onsite (2 hours)	Offsite (8 hours)
Plutonium-236	1.3×10^{-8}	5.4×10^{-8}
Plutonium-238	2.9×10^{-3}	1.2×10^{-2}
Plutonium-239	6.7×10^{-3}	2.7×10^{-2}
Plutonium-240	3.5×10^{-3}	1.4×10^{-2}
Plutonium-241	2.7×10^{-1}	1.1×10^0
Plutonium-242	1.3×10^{-6}	5.1×10^{-6}
Americium-241	5.7×10^{-3}	2.3×10^{-2}
Curium-244	2.8×10^{-4}	1.1×10^{-3}
Europium-154	5.4×10^{-3}	2.1×10^{-2}
Cesium-134	7.9×10^{-3}	3.2×10^{-2}
Cesium-137	4.5×10^{-1}	1.8×10^0
Cerium-144	1.7×10^{-3}	6.8×10^{-3}
Praseodymium-144	1.7×10^{-3}	6.8×10^{-3}
Praseodymium-144M	2.0×10^{-5}	8.1×10^{-5}
Promethium-147	1.2×10^{-1}	4.9×10^{-1}
Antimony-125	7.3×10^{-3}	2.9×10^{-2}
Tellurium-125M	1.8×10^{-3}	7.3×10^{-3}
Ruthenium-106	3.2×10^{-3}	1.3×10^{-2}
Strontium-90	3.5×10^{-1}	1.4×10^0
Yttrium-90	3.5×10^{-1}	1.4×10^0

a. Source: Appendix A, Table A-1.

Table 5.15-16. Estimated radionuclide releases for a severe impact and fire accident at ORR.

Radionuclide	Release (Ci)
Hydrogen-3 (Tritium)	4.6×10^1
Krypton-85	4.0×10^2
Strontium-90	2.7×10^{-2}
Ruthenium-106	1.3×10^0
Cesium-134	1.7×10^1
Cesium-137	8.0×10^1
Plutonium-238	8.9×10^{-4}
Plutonium-239	1.6×10^{-3}
Plutonium-240	1.8×10^{-3}
Plutonium-241	7.3×10^{-2}
Americium-241	1.0×10^{-3}

a. Source: Appendix A, Table A-14.

(reference Volume 1, Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the wind-driven mis-accident for the new Centralization Alternative facility at the ORR. This accident natural phenomena: a major wind storm or tornado in excess of the facility design scenario, a large object is propelled by the wind into a storage container, causing seal to be breached. No fuel damage would result from the impact because of the st the containers used. The source term is based on the spent nuclear fuel corrosion

percent of the original corrosion film on the fuel would be released from the cask atmosphere. The source term is shown in Table 5.15-17. The probability of this event is estimated to be less than 1×10^{-5} per year based on a design basis tornado probability per year and a missile impact with damage probability of less than 1×10^{-2} .

5.15.4.1.5 Airplane Crash Into Dry Storage-The airplane crash into dry storage

accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval Site (reference Volume 1, A is chosen as representative of the airplane crash into the dry storage area accident Centralization Alternative facility at the ORR.

This accident is externally initiated by an airplane crash into the SNF dry storage facility. The accident is postulated to cause damage storage cask. Due to the severity of the impact, the cask seal is assumed to be broken resulting in damage to the fuel and the release of corrosion products, located on the exterior, to the environment. The impact also causes a fire and a release of fission is assumed that 1 percent of all of the fuel units stored inside the cask are damaged impact or by the fire and that those fission products are available for release. 0 fission products, 100 percent of the noble gases, 3 percent of the halogens, 1.1 percent cesium, and 0.1 percent of the remaining solids are released to the environment. A 10 percent of the original corrosion products from the fuel units are released from the atmosphere. The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-18. The this accident, based on analyses of other facilities at the site (Flanagan 1994), is assumed to be less than 1×10^{-6} per year.

5.15.4.1.6 Airplane Crash into Dry Cell Facility-The airplane crash into the dry

cell facility accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval Site (reference Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the airplane crash into the canning and characterization cell accident for the new Centralization Alternative facility at the ORR. This

accident is initiated by an airplane crash into the dry cell facility. The accident cause significant damage to the building, resulting in the loss of containment and

Table 5.15-17. Estimated radionuclide releases for a wind-driven

missile impact into a storage cask at ORR.

Radionuclide	Release (Ci)
Cobalt-60	9.6×10^{-2}
Iron-55	1.8×10^{-1}
Cobalt-58	3.5×10^{-2}
Manganese-54	6.0×10^{-3}
Iron-59	5.1×10^{-4}

a. Source: See Section F.1.4.2.2.1, Appendix D to Volume 1.

Table 5.15-18. Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry storage facility at ORR.

Radionuclide	Release (Ci)
Cesium-134	2.6×10^1
Cesium-137	3.6×10^1
Plutonium-238	5.9×10^{-2}
Barium-137m	3.1×10^0
Strontium-90	3.1×10^0
Cerium-144	7.2×10^0
Niobium-95	4.4×10^0
Yttrium-90	3.1×10^0
Ruthenium-106	6.1×10^{-1}

a. Source: See Section F.1.4.2.2.2, Appendix D to Volume 1.

systems. The fuel units inside the dry cell could also be damaged due to mechanical potential fire. The mechanical impact also could result in the release of corrosion products to the environment. For this accident scenario, 1 percent of the fuel units stored in the cell are assumed to be damaged by either the impact or resultant fire and those fission products are available for release. Of the fission products available for release, 100

noble gases, 3 percent of the halogens, 1.1 percent of the cesium, and 0.1 percent remaining solids could be released to the environment. Ten percent of the available products could be released to the environment. The source term for this accident is **Table 5.15-19**. The probability of this accident is estimated to be less than 1×10^{-6} per year.

5.15.4.1.7 Airplane Crash into Water Pool-The airplane crash into the SNF water

pool accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval Site (reference Volume Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the airplane crash into the SNF water pool for the new Centralization Alternative facility at the ORR.

This externally initiated accident

occurs when an airplane crashes into an SNF water pool and damages the fuel units. Fission products and corrosion products are released from the fuel units into the water. The pool water is not released to the environment. The presence of the pool water release only of gaseous fission products into the atmosphere. In this accident scenario of all the fuel units stored inside the pool were postulated to be damaged and those products are available for release. Of the available fission products, 100 percent gases and 25 percent of the halogens are released to the pool water. Due to the presence of pool water, there is a reduction of the halogen release by a factor of 10 prior to release to the atmosphere. The source term for this accident is shown in **Table 5.15-20**. The probability of this accident is estimated to be less than 1×10^{-6} per year.

5.15.4.1.8 Integration of Existing Facilities- Existing SNF management facilities

will be integrated into the Centralization, Regionalization, and Planning Basis Alternative storage functions until the existing ORR operating reactors are shutdown.

The accident

consequences postulated for the No Action Alternative in subsection 5.15.3 can occur while the High Flux Isotope Reactor is operational. After the High Flux Isotope Reactor is operational, the accident consequence will decrease as the spent reactor cores, storage age. The reference design basis accident frequency of occurrence and risk will be reduced because refueling operations have ceased and requirements for movement of the damaged fuel are reduced. Since the beyond design basis accident is initiated by natural phenomenon (i.e., earthquake), the accident frequency is estimated to be less than 1×10^{-6} per year. **Table 5.15-19**. Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry cell at ORR.

Radionuclide	Release (Ci)
Cesium-134	4.5×10^1
Cesium-137	6.2×10^1
Plutonium-238	1.0×10^{-1}
Barium-137m	5.4×10^0
Strontium-90	5.5×10^0
Cerium-144	1.3×10^1
Niobium-95	7.7×10^0
Yttrium-90	5.5×10^0
Ruthenium-106	1.1×10^0

a. Source: See Section F.1.4.2.3.3, Appendix D to Volume 1.

Table 5.15-20. Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into an SNF water pool at ORR.

Radionuclide	Release (Ci)
Iodine-129	7.6×10^{-4}
Iodine-131	1.6×10^{-2}
Hydrogen-3 (Tritium)	4.3×10^2

a. Source: See Section F.1.4.2.1.4, Appendix D to Volume 1. The beyond design basis accident frequency of occurrence will remain the same as long as the High Flux Isotope Reactor cores remain in the spent fuel pool area.

5.15.4.2 Nonradiological Hazards. The two bounding accidents involving nonradiological

hazards are a chemical spill and fire and a diesel fuel fire. Both of these accidents with the Expanded Core Facility operations and the accident frequencies and impacts addressed in Volume 1, Appendix D. The analyses of these accidents considered the workers on the site as well as to the offsite population. The impacts were measured potential health effects due to exposure to toxic chemicals released during these accidents. The Expanded Core Facility at this site will be a new design and construction, it will all applicable standards and regulations and therefore limit the potential exposure of workers and the public in the event of an accident.

5.15.4.3 Secondary Impacts. In the event of an accidental release of radioactive

substances, there is a potential for secondary impacts to cultural resources, end uses, water resources, public and agricultural land use, the ecology in the vicinity of the site, national defense, and local economics. Figure 5.15-1 illustrates the radiological environment in the event of a severe accident at a new SNF management facility and release of radioactive material with 50 percent meteorology. The accident chosen for this analysis is an airplane crash into the Centralization Alternative canning and characterization (see Figure 5.15-1 shows several isodose lines ranging from 870 millirem per year down to 100 millirem per year. The solid line represents the site boundary, and it can be seen from the map that some doses exceeding background would exist outside the site boundary.

Table 5.15-21 presents a summary of the postulated severe accident secondary impacts on the environment, economy, and national defense. The evaluation was performed using 50 percent meteorology.

5.15.5 Decentralization Alternative

The Decentralization Alternative is not applicable for the ORR.

Figure 5.15-1. Isodose lines for an airplane crash into dry cell accident with 50 percent meteorology.

Table 5.15-21. Secondary impacts of Centralization Alternative accidents at the ORR.

Environmental or social factor	Impact
Land use	Yes. Major portions of the ORR, including the ORNL and K-25 areas, will be contaminated. Offsite contamination will occur. Industrial, residential, forest, and agricultural areas will be contaminated.
Cultural resources	Yes. Archaeological sites, cemeteries, and historic sites will be contaminated.
Aesthetic and scenic resources	Possible impact. Scenic public viewing areas are within 2 miles of the ORR border.
Water resources	Yes. The Clinch River will be contaminated. It is used for industrial and public water supplies, navigation, fishing, boating, and swimming.
Ecological resources	Possible impact. Many endangered or threatened plants and animals are potentially on or near the ORR.
Treaty rights	No impact. There are no ORR areas subject to Native American Treaty rights.
National defense	Possible impact. With the 50 percent meteorology, the area of contamination does not envelop U.S. military facilities or the Y-12 area. However, with the 95 percent meteorology, the Y-12 area will be contaminated.
Economic impacts	Yes. Offsite contamination will occur. Industrial, residential, forest, and agricultural areas will be contaminated. Major portions of the ORR will be contaminated. The accident consequences may require the evacuation and cleanup of onsite facilities, including but not limited to the ORNL and K-25 areas, and adjacent residential, industrial, forest, and agricultural area. The Clinch River will be contaminated. The associated industrial and residential water supplies will be contaminated. The commercial and recreational fishing industries may be

impacted.

5.15.6 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

The facility accident consequences and risks for the ORR No Action Alternative the facility accident consequences and risks for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alter

5.15.7 Regionalization Alternative

Under the Regionalization Alternative, new facilities will be constructed and o SNF. Details for the new facilities needed have not been defined, but it is reason that they will be similar to but with less storage requirements than those needed f Centralization Alternative. Due to smaller throughput and storage requirements, th for accidents (i.e., probability of occurrence) will be similar to but less than th the Centralization Alternative. The accident consequences will be similar for both Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the accident consequences and risks d the Centralization Alternative envelop the Regionalization Alternative.

5.15.8 Emergency Preparedness and Plans

The DOE has issued a series of Orders specifying the requirements for emergency preparedness (DOE 5500.1A, DOE 5500.2A, DOE 5500.3, draft DOE 5500.3A, DOE 5500.4, DOE 5500.9), and each DOE site has established an emergency management program. Th programs are developed and maintained to ensure adequate response for most accident conditions and to provide the framework to readily extend response efforts for acci specifically considered. The emergency management program incorporates activities with planning, preparedness, and response.

Officials at each DOE site have specified the emergency preparedness requiremen DOE facilities under their jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the relevant DO existing facilities have emergency plans and procedures that either implement the D requirements or are integrated with the site planning.

DOE-Oak Ridge Operations has overall responsibility at the plant and laboratory emergency response. However, primary authority for event response has been delegat Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., DOE's operating contractor. Although their p responsibility is onsite, they have agreed to provide offsite assistance if request of existing mutual aid agreements or Martin Marietta policies. If a hazardous mate occurs at a DOE-Oak Ridge Operations facility, the Governor of Tennessee is respons State's response efforts. The Governor's Executive Order No. 4 establishes the Ten Emergency Management Agency as the agency given responsibility for coordinating sta emergency services. If a hazardous materials accident at DOE-Oak Ridge Operations beyond the capability of the local government, and assistance is requested, the Ten Emergency Management Agency Director may direct that assistance from state agencies provided to local governments. To accomplish this task and ensure prompt initiatio emergency response actions, the Director may cause the State Emergency Operations C Field Coordination Center as well as any local Emergency Operations Center to be ac

5.16 Cumulative Impacts and Impacts From Connected

or Similar Actions

The ORR already contains several major DOE and non-DOE facilities, unrelated to that would continue to operate throughout the operating life of the proposed SNF ma facilities. A number of offsite industrial and research facilities in surrounding continue to operate throughout this period. The activities associated with these e produce environmental consequences that have been included in the baseline environm conditions (Chapter 4) against which Sections 5.1 through 5.15 have assessed the en consequences of the Centralization and Regionalization alternatives. This section environmental baseline conditions presented in Chapter 4 to assess potential cumula from the proposed SNF management facilities, if constructed at the ORR, plus other foreseeable activities planned by government agencies or private concerns for areas the ORR.

In addition to the proposed SNF management facilities, reasonably foreseeable a considered in this cumulative impact assessment include the proposed Expanded Core proposed hazardous waste remediation activities on the ORR, and activities proposed present Five-Year Plan for the ORR. Major programmatic initiatives planned for the the Five-Year Plan (MMES 1994a) consist of constructing the following: the propose Neutron Source Facility; the proposed Uranium-Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation facilities proposed for construction as a part of Complex-21; proposed low-level wa facilities; the proposed Mixed Waste Treatment Facility; the proposed Environmental Social Sciences Complex; the proposed Materials, Science, and Engineering Complex; proposed Solid Waste Storage Area-7. Several minor construction projects such as t refurbishment or expansion of existing facilities, widening of roadways, and instal are also included in the Five-Year Plan.

The ORR is part of the City of Oak Ridge, which also includes an urban area to of the ORR and several industrial areas in various locations around the perimeter o Additional construction and expanded operational activities is anticipated in these areas. For example, the Scientific Ecology Group, a private business in the Bear C Park on Bear Creek Road west of the ORR, is considering expanding its operations an presently constructing a second radioactive waste incinerator. The City of Oak Rid Comprehensive Plan encourages further development of several presently undeveloped several industrial parks (City of Oak Ridge 1989). The Comprehensive Plan also ant additional residential and commercial development in the City. The City of Oak Rid presently proposing construction of a golf course and residential development on ap 700 acres (2.8 square kilometers) east of the ORR.

The following cumulative impacts analysis considers in detail the potential inc effects from the proposed SNF management facilities; the proposed Expanded Core Fac the proposed Advanced Neutron Source facility. Adequate information is not availab consider in detail the other proposed Five-Year Plan activities or the proposed act in the City of Oak Ridge outside of the ORR. The potential incremental impacts fro activities are therefore assessed in a more qualitative manner.

5.16.1 Centralization Alternative

Separate analyses of potential cumulative impacts from the Centralization Alter each of the environmental resources addressed in Chapter 5 are provided below.

5.16.1.1 Land Use. Construction of the proposed SNF management facilities would

require the dedication of 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of undeveloped land on B Road in the western part of the ORR. Construction of the proposed Expanded Core Fa would require the dedication of an additional 30 acres (0.12 square kilometer) of u land on the ORR. Construction of the proposed Advanced Neutron Source facilities w require the dedication of an additional 75 to 115 acres (0.30 to 0.46 square kilome the ORR (MMES 1992c). The cumulative land area dedicated to these three projects w total as much as 235 acres (0.95 square kilometer), which represents only about 1 p roughly 20,600 acres (83 square kilometers) of undeveloped land remaining on the 34 (140 square kilometer) ORR. Additional unspecified areas of undeveloped land, gene parcels of under 100 acres (0.40 square kilometer), would have to be dedicated to s activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan. Many of these proposed activities do no dedication of undeveloped land. Additional undeveloped land on the ORR might have dedicated to the other planned activities, but their land requirements have not yet quantified.

Although large areas of undeveloped land remain both on the ORR and in the City Ridge, much of this land is steep or otherwise has constraints that limit its futur potential. The City of Oak Ridge indicates in its Comprehensive Plan that it seeks additional ORR land declared excess by the DOE and made available for urban expansi City (City of Oak Ridge 1989). Demand for buildable land on the ORR by the City of Ridge represents another cumulative demand for ORR land. The site of the proposed residential development and golf course east of the ORR is land recently sold by th City of Oak Ridge since adoption of the Comprehensive Plan.

5.16.1.2 Occupational and Public Health. The annual collective effective dose

equivalent from the existing ORR facilities to the population within 50 miles (80 k the ORR is 52 person-rem (MMES 1994a). Added to this baseline, operation of the pr SNF management facilities might contribute an additional 5 person-rem, and operation of proposed Advanced Neutron Source facilities might contribute an additional 4.3 person-rem (MMES 1992c), resulting in a cumulative effective dose of 61 person-rem to the population within 50 miles of the ORR.

The annual collective effective dose equivalent from the existing ORR facilities to the potential maximally exposed individual at the site boundary is 3.3 millirem per year. Operation of the proposed SNF management facilities might contribute an additional 6.2 millirem per year, resulting in a cumulative annual dose of 9.5 millirem per year to this maximally exposed individual.

The total annual baseline worker dose seen from normal ORR operations is about 80 person-rem. The total annual SNF management facility worker dose is expected to be about 80 person-rem. Hence, the cumulative annual dose might be 160 person-rem.

Over the planned 40-year operational lifetime of the SNF management facility, a population dose of roughly 2,500 person-rem will be observed from continuous operation of existing ORR facilities and the SNF management facility. This equates to a total health detriment (the summated risk of fatal cancer, nonfatal cancer, and genetic effects) of 2.5×10^{-4} over the 40-year span. For the maximally exposed individual, a total dose of 380 millirem will be observed over the 40-year period, which equates to a total detriment of 2.8×10^{-4} . For the management worker, a total dose of 3,200 person-rem will be observed over the 40-year period, which corresponds to a total health detriment of 1.8×10^{-4} .

Additional radiological impacts are not expected from operation of the proposed Core Facility. Analysis has shown that the dose to all individuals considered (workers and residents) from Oak Ridge Expanded Core Facility operations might be much less than 1 millirem per year.

5.16.1.3 Noise. Cumulative increases in noise levels from the proposed SNF

management facilities, the proposed Expanded Core Facility, and the proposed Advanced Neutron Source facilities would be limited to temporary, minor construction noise and increases in traffic noise occurring along various access routes to the ORR due to employment. This increase is not expected to result in any increased annoyance to the population. Noise levels from other planned activities have not yet been determined. Each would involve temporary periods of construction noise, but information on operation is not available.

5.16.1.4 Groundwater and Surface Water Resources. Operation of the proposed SNF

management facilities would require the withdrawal of an estimated 4 million gallons (15 million liters per year) of groundwater. Operation of the proposed Expanded Core Facility would require the withdrawal of an estimated additional 2 million gallons per year (7.6 million liters per year). Although the specific water demands of the proposed Advanced Neutron Source facility and other proposed activities are not known, the combined water demands would represent a small percentage of the total average discharge of the Clinch River, as measured at Melton Hill Dam, of 5,300 cubic feet per second (150 cubic meters per second).

Discharges of wastewater from the SNF management facilities would increase the flow in Grassy Creek by an estimated average of less than 1 percent. Discharge points would be selected in accordance with permit requirements to minimize impacts to surface water. The sanitary wastewater and cooling water from the Advanced Neutron Source facility would be discharged to separate streams and therefore would not contribute to cumulative impacts in Grassy Creek. Discharges from other planned facilities have not yet been designed. No expected cumulative impacts to groundwater quality and quantity.

5.16.1.5 Biotic Resources. Construction of the proposed SNF management facilities

would require the disturbance of approximately 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of forested terrestrial habitat, construction of the proposed Expanded Core Facility would require the disturbance of an additional 30 acres (0.12 square kilometer), and construction of proposed Advanced Neutron Source facilities would require the disturbance of an additional 30 acres (0.12 square kilometer).

75 to 115 acres (0.30 to 0.46 square kilometer). This would result in a combined c much as 235 acres (0.94 square kilometer) of forested habitat to developed uses. A areas of forested habitat on the ORR would be lost during construction of activitie the Five-Year Plan. Additionally, losses of similar forested habitat off of the OR anticipated due to future construction in the City of Oak Ridge. For example, cons the proposed golf course and residential development east of the ORR by the City of would result in the conversion of several hundred acres of forested habitat to stru lawns.

The total losses would represent only a small percentage of the total forested ORR and in the surrounding vicinity. However, the several scattered areas of habit planned for the ORR, including that associated with the SNF management facilities, increase fragmentation of the relatively contiguous forest cover over much of the O fragmentation could affect the suitability of the forested habitat on the ORR for s

5.16.1.6 Air Resources. The potential cumulative air emissions from the proposed SNF

management facility, Expended Core Facility, and Advanced Neutron Source facilities result in an exceedance of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards or Tennessee criteria. Also, there would be no exceedance of Federal National Emissions Standar Hazardous Air Pollutants or DOE radiological standards. Air emission data for the planned activities (Five-Year Plan or offsite) are not available.

5.16.1.7 Socioeconomics. Operation of the proposed SNF management facilities might

generate up to 800 new jobs during the year 2005. Operation of the proposed Expend Facility might generate up to 562 additional jobs during that year, resulting in a increase of up to 1,362 new jobs. The 16,980 jobs presently forecasted for the ORR 2005 would be increased by 8 percent, to as much as 18,342 jobs. The 360,000 jobs forecasted for the surrounding area in the year 2005 might be increased by less tha as much as 361,352 jobs. Additional employment increases could also result from th Advanced Neutron Source facility project, activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan offsite activities, but specific estimates are not available.

The proposed SNF management facilities could cause cumulative growth-inducing e when coupled with the proposed Advanced Neutron Source facilities or with other pla activities on the ORR. Previous actions at the ORR have had a modest effect on lon growth and productivity in Knox County and Loudon County, but they did not have a g effect on long-term growth and productivity in Anderson County and Roane County.

5.16.1.8 Transportation. For transportation, minor levels of service changes might occur

due to employment increases associated with the proposed SNF management facilities, proposed Expended Core Facility, the proposed Advanced Neutron Source facility, som proposed onsite activities in the Five-Year Plan, and some of the proposed offsite Maps included in the Five-Year Plan show several road improvements on the ORR to accommodate presently projected regional traffic increases.

5.16.1.9 Waste Management. Operation of the proposed SNF management facilities

would generate an estimated 203 cubic meters per year of low-level waste and an est cubic meters per year of transuranic waste. Operation of the proposed Expended Cor would generate an additional 425 cubic meters of low-level waste (for a combined to facilities of 628 cubic meters) but would not generate any additional transuranic w radioactive waste, including high-level waste or mixed waste, would be generated by facility. Although it is known that the proposed Advanced Neutron Source facility generate low-level waste, comparable quantitative data are not available for it or activities, or for activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan. All wastes generated SNF management facilities and other planned activities on the ORR would be treated disposed of in accordance with all applicable Federal and state regulations.

5.16.1.10 Other Resources. The absence of impacts, or the potential for very minimal

impacts, from the proposed SNF management facilities to cultural resources, aesthetic resources, utilities, and geologic resources ensures that their potential contributory impacts affecting these resources would be negligible. No further analysis is necessary.

5.16.2 Regionalization Alternative

The Regionalization Alternative would have similar or fewer cumulative impacts than Centralization Alternative. Generally, the alternative requires less construction operations, and the potential for cumulative impacts is therefore less.

5.17. Adverse Environmental Effects That Cannot Be Avoided

5.17.1 Overview

This section discusses potentially unavoidable adverse impacts to the environment from construction and operation of the proposed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) under the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives. Unavoidable adverse impacts are impacts that cannot be mitigated by changes in project operation, construction, or by other measures.

5.17.2 Centralization Alternative

Operation of the proposed SNF facilities at the ORR under the Centralization Alternative would increase the radiation dose rate to the maximally exposed individual by 6.2 mrem per year, resulting in a 34 percent increase in cancer risk to this individual from ORR. These cancer risks still would be minimal. The number of fatal cancers resulting from operations on the ORR from all sources (including baseline and the SNF facilities) would be 3.0×10^{-2} , the number of nonfatal cancers per year would be 5.9×10^{-3} , and the number of genetic effects per year would be 7.7×10^{-3} .

Construction of the proposed SNF management facilities would require the disturbance of approximately 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of mostly forested undeveloped land and long-term dedication of approximately 85 acres (0.34 square kilometer) of land. Although this represents less than 1 percent of the undeveloped land on ORR, it would eliminate potential foraging and nesting habitat and would destroy plant species in the area. It would require the dedication of a reasonably level land parcel that could have otherwise accommodated construction projects.

The potential impacts from the Centralization Alternative to the other environmental resources discussed in Chapter 5 are not unavoidable adverse impacts.

5.17.3 Regionalization Alternative

Potential unavoidable adverse impacts associated with the Regionalization Alternative resemble those discussed above for the Centralization Alternative. The extent of the impacts could be less due to the reduced land requirements, reduced extent of construction and reduced scale of operations.

5.18 Relationship Between Short-Term Use of the Environment and

the Maintenance of Long-Term Productivity

Implementation of any of the SNF management alternatives would cause some adverse impacts to the environment and permanently commit certain resources. These resources include the use of the environment and those associated with construction and operation of the management facilities.

The proposed alternatives for SNF management would require the short-term use of resources including energy, construction materials, and labor in order to achieve the safe management of SNF to minimize the risk to workers, the public, and the environment.

The premature shutdown of research reactors due to a lack of sufficient SNF inventory

storage space under the No Action Alternative could have an impact upon the ORR reg communities. The ORR High Flux Isotope Reactor is an important source of radiopharmaceuticals. The reactors are unique research and training facilities for and students in many fields of research and development: materials science, enviro science, physics, biology, and electronics.

Development of new SNF interim management facilities would commit lands to thos from the time of construction through the cessation of operations, at which time th could be converted to other uses or decontaminated, decommissioned, and the site re original land use. Existing SNF management facilities could also be converted to o the lands could be restored following decommissioning.

5.19. Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources

5.19.1 Overview

This section discusses the irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resour from the use of materials that cannot be recovered or recycled, or that must be con reduced to irrecoverable forms.

5.19.2 Centralization Alternative

Construction and operation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management facilities un Centralization Alternative would require commitments of electrical energy, fuel, co sand, gravel, and miscellaneous chemicals. Most of the water that would be withdra Clinch River to operate the SNF management facilities would be returned to surface Clinch River watershed, although some evaporative losses would be unavoidable. The dedicated to the SNF management facilities could become available for other urban u following closure and decommissioning. However, the soils on the site would have t amended to support land uses such as agriculture, forestry, or wildlife management.

5.19.3 Regionalization Alternative

Irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources associated with the Reg Alternative would resemble those discussed above for the Centralization Alternative the extent of these resource commitments could be less due to the reduced land requ and reduced scale of operations.

5.20 Potential and Mitigation Measures

5.20.1 Pollution Prevention

The DOE Oak Ridge Field Office established a Waste Minimization and Pollution Prevention Awareness Plan to reduce the quantity and toxicity of hazardous, mixed, radioactive wastes generated at Oak Ridge. The plan is designed to reduce the poss releases to the environment and thus increase the protection of employees and the p contractors and users that exceed the EPA criteria for small-quantity generators ar their own waste minimization and pollution prevention awareness programs. Contract programs ensure that waste minimization activities are in accordance with Federal, local environmental laws and regulations, and DOE Orders.

Additional goals include the promotion and use of nonhazardous materials, estab a baseline of waste generation data, calculations of annual reductions of waste gen implementation of recycling programs. Goals also include incorporation of waste mi concepts and technologies in planning and design of new processes and facilities, a of existing facilities. A waste minimization task force composed of representative contractor has been established to coordinate waste minimization and pollution awar activities.

5.20.2 Potential Mitigation Measures

Potential impact avoidance and mitigation measures are addressed in Chapter 5, through 15 as appropriate.

6.0 REFERENCES

- ANS (American Nuclear Society), 1988, Research, Training, Test and Production Directories of America, third edition, Reed Robert Burn (ed.), published by the American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois.
- Anderson County Tennessee (Anderson County), 1993, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1992.
- Bailey, Z. A., and R. W. Lee, 1991, Hydrogeology and Geochemistry in Bear Creek and Near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, U.S. Geological Survey, Water - Resources Investigations 90-4008, Nashville, Tennessee.
- Barclay, L. A., 1992, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, letter to R. L. Kroodsma of ORNL, regarding "Updated Threatened and Endangered Species Information for the Oak Ridge Reservation," July 20.
- Barclay, L. A., 1990, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, letter to R. L. Kroodsma of ORNL, regarding Construction - related loss of wildlife habitat on ORNL lands, June 13.
- Bay, R. T., 1991, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, letter to R. L. Kroodsma of ORNL, regarding Updated Threatened and Endangered Species Information for the Oak Ridge Reservation, March 7.
- Beavers, J. E., W. E. Manrod, and W. C. Stoddart, 1982, Recommended Seismic Hazard for Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; Fernald, Ohio; and Portsmouth, Ohio, DOE Energy Reservations, K/BD-1025/R1, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- Benedict, G.W., 1993, U.S. Department of Energy Field Office, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Cannon, K-25 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, regarding "Implementation of New Seismic Levels for the Oak Ridge Reservation", September 1.
- Bowdle, K., 1994, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, personal communication with K. Landkrohn, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Water Resources Information," May 20.
- Boyle, J. W., R. Blumberg, S. J. Cotter, G. S. Hill, C. R. Kerley, R. H. Ketelle, R. Lee, R. C. Martin, R. D. Roop, D. N. Secora, W. P. Staub, and R. E. Thoma, 1982, Analysis of the Operation of Oak Ridge Laboratory (X-10 Site), ORNL-5870, Oak Ridge Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- Bradburn, D., 1994, Martin Marietta Energy System, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, personal communication with J. R. Schinner, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Forest Management on the Oak Ridge Reservation," May 4.
- Brown, D., 1994a, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, memorandum to Office of Spent Fuel Management, Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., regarding the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Department of Energy Spent Fuel," December 12.
- Brown, D., 1994b, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, personal communication with C. Schwartz, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Requirements at ORR," April 7.
- Brown, D., 1994c, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, personal communication with D. Olson, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Calendar Year 1992 Y-12 Plant Waste Generation Information," May 24.

- Casarett, A. P., 1968, Radiation Biology, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jers
- Cashwell, J. W., K. S. Neuhauser, P. C. Reardon and G. W. McNair, 1986, Transportat
Commercial Radioactive Waste Management Program, SAND 85-2715, TTC-0633, Sand
National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April.
- Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census), 1991, General Housing Characteristics, Tennesse
Housing, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic and Statistics Administration, 1
- Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census), 1982, General Housing Characteristics, Tennesse
of Housing, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic and Statistics Administration
- CFR (Code of Federal Regulations), 1993a, 40 CFR Part 81.329, "Designation of Areas
Planning Purposes, Subpart C, Section 107 Attainment Status Designations, Nevad
Federal Register, Washington, D.C., July.
- CFR (Code of Federal Regulations), 1993b, 40 CFR Part 1508.8, Effects, Council on E
Quality, July 1.
- CFR (Code of Federal Regulations), 1993c, 40 CFR Part 1508.14, Human Environment, C
Environmental Quality, July 1.
- City of Oak Ridge, 1989, Comprehensive Plan Including 1988 Update, Oak Ridge, Tenne
- Clark, W. D., 1994, U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, me
Rosine, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, regarding "Ship
Nuclear Fuel to the Savannah River Site," received March 24.
- Cleaves, J. E., 1991, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 1
T. Polecastro, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois, regarding "Noise
Ridge K-25 Site," October 14.
- Corps (U.S. Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers), 1991, Waterborne Commerce
States Calendar Year 1986, Part 2: Waterways and Harbors Gulf Coast, Mississip
and Antilles, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, June 28.
- Cunningham, M. and L. Pounds, 1991, Resource Management Plan for the Oak Ridge Rese
Volume 28: Wetlands on the Oak Ridge Reservation, ORNL/NERP-5, Oak Ridge Nation
Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, December.
- Cunningham, M., L. Pounds, S. Oberholster, P. Parr, L. Edwards, B. Rosensteel, and
Resource Management Plan for the Oak Ridge Reservation, Volume 29: Rare Plants
Ridge Reservation, ORNL/NERP-7, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenne
August.
- Department of Economic and Community Development Industrial Development Division, 1
Tennessee Community Data, Department of Economic and Community Development Indu
Development Division, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, August.
- Department of Economic and Community Development Industrial Development Division, 1
Tennessee Community Data, Department of Economic and Community Development Indu
Development Division, Knoxville, Tennessee, September.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1994a, Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evalua
for Department of Energy Facilities, DOE-STD-1020-94, U.S. Department of Energy
D.C., April.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1994b, Plan of Action to Resolve Spent Fuel Vulner
III, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., October.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993a, Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Asse
Volume 1, DOE/EA-0792, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington D.C., June.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993b, Spent Fuel Working Group Report on Inventor

of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel and Other Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Material Environmental, Safety and Health Vulnerabilities, DOE ZZ 700, Volume 1, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., November.

- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1992a, Distribution of Annual Whole-Body Radiation Facility Type, Oak Ridge Operations-1991, October.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1992b, Guidelines for Use of Probabilistic Seismic Department of Energy Sites, DOE-STD-1024-92, U.S. Department of Energy Seismic Group, December.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1992c, Oak Ridge Reservation Site Management Plan Environmental Restoration Program, DOE/OR-1001/R2, U.S. Department of Energy, Environmental Restoration Division, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, June.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1988, Environmental Survey, Preliminary Report, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (X-10), Oak Ridge, Tennessee, DOE/EH/OEV-31-P, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., July.
- DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1987, Environmental Survey, Preliminary Report, Y-12 Plant, Tennessee, DOE/EH/OEV-07-P, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.
- DOE/OSTI (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information) Reactors Built, Being Built, or Planned: 1992, DOE/OSTI-8200-R56 (DE93015065) U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Washington, D.C., August.
- DOT (U.S. Department of Transportation), 1991, Airport Activity Statistics of Certified Carriers, 12 Months Ending December 31, 1990, Federal Aviation Administration, Special Programs Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office Document No. 1060/40772, Washington, D.C.
- East Tennessee Development District, 1993, Economic Statistics, Knoxville Tennessee
- E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1983, Safety Analysis - 200-Area, Savannah River Plant Operations, DPSTSY-200-1H, Volume 2, Savannah River Laboratory, Aiken, South Carolina
- EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 1982, Guidelines for Noise Impact Analysis, EPA-82-105 (PB82-219205), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., April.
- EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) 1981, Population Exposure to External Noise Background in the United States, ORP/SEPD-80-12, PB81-233082, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Radiation Programs, Washington, D.C., April.
- EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 1974, Information on Levels of Environmental Risk Requisite to Protect Public Health and Welfare with an Adequate Margin of Safety, EPA-004 (PB-239429), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., March.
- FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice), 1991, 1990 Uniform Crime in the United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, August 11.
- FICON (Federal Interagency Committee on Noise), 1992, Federal Agency Review of Selected Noise Analysis Issues, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C., August.
- Fielder, G., 1975, Cultural Resource Survey of the Exxon Nuclear Facility, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee, May.
- Fitzpatrick, F. C., 1982, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Site Data for Safety Analysis, ORNL/ENG/TM-19, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, December.
- Flanagan, G. F., 1994, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, memorandum to the Board of Directors, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Definition of the Design-Basis Event for the High Flux Isotope Reactor for Use in the Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (SNF-Environmental Impact Statement

- Action Alternative," May 27.
- FR (Federal Register), 1992, Volume 57, Number 193, Notice of Intent, Monday, October 19, 1992.
- FR (Federal Register), 1990, Volume 55, Number 204, Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, Monday, October 22, 1990.
- Fritts, S., 1994, Barge, Waggoner, Sumner and Cannon, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, memorandum to Halliburton NUS Spent Nuclear Fuels EIS Team regarding "Requests for Data," March 1, 1994.
- Golder Associates, 1988, Well Logging and Geohydrologic Testing, Site Characterization, Groundwater Flow Computer Model Application, Volume I of VI, 873-3512.26, Golder Associates, Atlanta, Georgia, May.
- Griggs, G. B. and J. A. Gilchrist, 1977, The Earth and Land Use Planning, Duxbury Publishing Company, Inc., Belmont, California.
- HNUS (Halliburton NUS Corporation), 1995, Accident Analysis of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage at the Oak Ridge Reservation and Nevada Test Site, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, March.
- Hardy, C., L. Pounds, and R. Cook, 1992, Results of the Y-12 Area Rare Plant and Weevil Survey, Environmental Sciences Division, National Environmental Research Park, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, January.
- Hardy, C. L., 1991, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge National Laboratory, memorandum to R. Kroodsma, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, regarding "Observations of Nesting Black Vultures on the ORR," April 18.
- Hargrove, J. T., 1993, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge National Laboratory, memorandum to D. G. Abbott, EG&G Idaho Inc., regarding "Oak Ridge National Laboratory Spent Nuclear Fuel Data for the Department of Energy's Background Report and the Spent Nuclear Fuel Database System," August 11.
- Harr, E. C., 1994, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, memorandum to U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, Idaho Falls, Idaho, regarding "Final Report Generic Facility Information," March 22.
- Hatcher, R. D. Jr., Lemiszki, P. J., Dreier, R. B., Ketelle, R. H., Lee, R. R., Lieberman, M., Foreman, J. L., and Lee, S. Y., 1992, Status Report on the Geology of the Oak Ridge Reservation, ORNL/TM-12074, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- Hoel, D. F., 1994, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Spent Fuel Management, letter to U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, regarding "Changes to the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Department of Energy's Spent Nuclear Fuel," December 19.
- Holt, D. C., 1993, Brown & Root Environmental, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, ORNL Research Responses to Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposition Questionnaire, November 9.
- IT (International Technology Corporation), undated a, Environmental Technology Development, International Technology Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- IT (International Technology Corporation), undated b, Geotechnical Laboratory, International Technology Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- ITE (Institute of Transportation Engineers), 1991, "Trip Generation, 5th Edition," Institute of Transportation Engineers, Washington D.C.
- Jablon, S., Z. Hrubec, J. Boice Jr., 1991, "Cancer in Populations Living Near Nuclear Power Plants" (Journal of the American Medical Association) Vol. 265, No. 11, pp. 1403, March 1991.
- Johnson, C., 1994, State of Tennessee, Department of Transportation, Nashville, Tennessee, memorandum to Varner, Brown & Root Environmental, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Highway Construction Reports," April 5.

- Johnson, V., 1994, U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, memorandum t regarding "F-Team Final Report," Predecisional Draft, March 4.
- Kennedy, R. P., S. A. Short, J. R. McDonald, M. W. McCann, Jr., R. C. Murray, and J Design and Evaluation Guidelines for Department of Energy Facilities Subjected Phenomena Hazards, UCRL-15910, U.S. Department of Energy, June.
- Ketelle, R. H., and D. D. Huff, 1984, Site Characterization of the West Chestnut Ri 9229, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- Ketelle, R. H., 1982, Report on Preliminary Site Characterization of the West Chest ORNL/NFW-82/21, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, October 26
- Kitchings, J. T. and J. D. Story, 1984, Resource Management Plan for U.S. Departmen Ridge Reservation, Volume 16, Appendix Q: Wildlife Management, ORNL 6026/V16, National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- Kroodsma, R. L., 1987, Resource Management Plan for the Oak Ridge Reservation, Volu Threatened and Endangered Animal Species, ORNL/ESH-1/V24, Oak Ridge National La Oak Ridge, Tennessee, January.
- LaGrone, J., Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, 1994, memora Wilczynski, U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, Idaho Falls, Ida "Request for Support in Preparing the Spent Nuclear Fuel and Idaho National Eng Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Environmental Impact (OPE. EIS 94.111)," March 31.
- Lee, S. Y., D. A. Lietzke, R. H. Ketelle, and J. T. Ammons, 1988, Soil and Surficia to the Oak Ridge Reservation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, ORNL/TM-10803, Oak Ridge Na Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- Lee, R. R., and R. H. Ketelle, 1987, Stratigraphic Influence on Deep Groundwater Fl Group Copper Ridge Dolomite on the West Chestnut Ridge Site, ORNL/TM-10479, Oak National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, October.
- Loar, J. M., J. A. Solomon, and G. F. Cada, 1981, Technical Background Information Environmental and Safety Report, Volume 2: A Description of the Aquatic Ecolog Creek Watershed and the Clinch River Below Melton Hill Dam, ORNL/TM-7509/V2, Oa National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, October.
- Loar, J. M., editor, 1992, First Annual Report on the Biological Monitoring and Aba Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/TM-10399, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oa Tennessee.
- Mann, L. K., T. S. Patrick, and H. R. DeSelm, 1985, "A Checklist of the Vascular Pl Department of Energy Oak Ridge Reservation," Journal of the Tennessee Academy o Volume 60, Number 1, pp. 8-13, January.
- McGuire, R.K., G.F. Toro, R.J. Hunt, 1992, Seismic Hazard Evaluation for Department Ridge Reservations, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Y/EN-4683, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, Oak Tennessee, September 30.
- McMaster, W. M., 1988, Geologic Map of the Oak Ridge Reservation, Tennessee, ORNL-T Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, November.
- MMES (Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.), 1994a, Oak Ridge Reservation Technical Information, ES/EN/SFP-23, Site and Facilities Planning Department, Martin Mar Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, August.
- MMES (Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.), 1994b, Spent Nuclear Fuels Management Siting Study, white paper summary report, revision 1, Site Facilities and Plann Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, March 28.

- MMES (Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.), 1993a, Oak Ridge Reservation Environme 1992, Volume 1 and 2, ES/ESH-31, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridg June.
- MMES (Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.), 1993b, Tornado Special Study Report, E Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, June 14.
- MMES (Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.), 1992a, Oak Ridge Reservation Environme 1991, ES/ESH-22/VI, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ride, Tennessee,
- MMES (Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.), 1992b, 1992 Oak Ridge Wildlife Managem Hunting Map, DOE/TWRA Wildlife Management Area.
- MMES (Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.), 1992c, Phase I Environmental Report fo Neutron Source at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/TM-12069, Oak Ridge Natio Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, February.
- MMES (Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.), 1991a, Oak Ridge Reservation Environme 1990, ES/ESH-18/V1, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee,
- MMES (Martin Marietta Energy Systems Inc.), 1991b, Oak Ridge Reservation Site Devel Facilities Utilization Plan, 1990 Update, DOE/OR-885/R1, U.S. Department of Ene Reservation, Tennessee, June.
- MMES (Martin Marietta Energy Systems Inc.), 1990, Oak Ridge Reservation Site Evalua the Advanced Neutron Source, ORNL/TM-11419, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Tennessee.
- MMES (Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.), 1989, Oak Ridge Reservation Site Devel Facilities Utilization Plan, DOE/OR-885, (89), U.S. Department of Energy, Oak R June.
- Murdock, S. H., and F. L. Leistritz, 1979, Energy Development in the Western United Rural Areas, Praeger Publishers, New York.
- National Academy of Sciences, 1972, The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low L Radiation, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., November.
- NCRP (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement), 1987, Ionizing Rad of the Population of the United States, National Council on Radiation Protectio Bethesda, Maryland, September.
- NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), 1991, Local Climatological Summaries for 1990, Part II - Southern Region, National Oceanic and Atmospheric March.
- NRC (U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1986, Second Proposed Revision 1 to Regu 1.23, Meteorological Measurement Program for Nuclear Power Plants, U. S. Nuclea Commission, April.
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1979, Environmental Standard Review Plans Environmental Review of Construction Permit Applications for Nuclear Power Plan 0555, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May.
- Oakes, T. W., C. W. Kimbrough, P. M. Pritz, S. T. Goodpasture, S. F. Haung, C. S. G E. D. Aebisher, and F. M. O'Hara, 1987, Environmental Surveillance of the U.S. Energy Oak Ridge Reservation and Surrounding Environs During 1986: Volume 1, Su Conclusion, ES/ESH-1/V1, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenne
- Oakes, T. W., J. T. Kitchings, H. M. Braunstein, W. W. Chance, D. B. Slaughter, and Resource Management Plan for the U.S. DOE Oak Ridge Reservation, Volume 3, Appe Archeological Considerations, ORNL-6026/V3, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Tennessee, July.

- Oakes, T. W., J. T. Kitchings, H. M. Braunstein, W. W. Chance, D. B. Slaughter, and Resource Management Plan for DOE Oak Ridge Reservation, Volume 8, Appendix H: ORNL-6026/V8, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, July.
- ORNL (Oak Ridge National Laboratory), 1994, Tower Shielding Facility Shutdown Report ORNL/RRD/INT-98/R1, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, January.
- ORNL (Oak Ridge National Laboratory), 1992a, HFIR Spent Fuel Management Alternative 2377, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, October.
- ORNL (Oak Ridge National Laboratory), 1992b, Oak Ridge Research Reactor Shutdown Report ORNL/M-2255, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, September 30.
- ORNL (Oak Ridge National Laboratory), 1988, Data Package for the Low-Level Waste Development and Demonstration Program, Environmental Impact Statement, ORNL/TM-10939/V1, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, September.
- ORNL (Oak Ridge National Laboratory), 1981, Environmental and Safety Report for Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL-SUB-41B-38403C, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, September 30.
- PAI Corporation, 1994, Description of the K-25 Site Waste Management System, PAI Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- PAI Corporation, 1993a, Description of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Waste Management System, PAI Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- PAI Corporation, 1993b, Description of Y-12 Plant Waste Management System, PAI Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- Parr, P. D. and J. W. Evans, 1992, Draft Resource Management Plan for the Oak Ridge Wildlife Management Plan, ORNL/NERP-6, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- Parr, P. D. and L. R. Pounds, 1987, Resource Management Plan for the Oak Ridge Reservation, ORNL/ESH-1/V23, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
- Pearman, B., 1994, Barge, Waggoner, Summer and Cannon, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, memorandum to the Honorable Earl W. Varner, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Rail Service to the Oak Ridge Reservation," April 5.
- PNL (Pacific Northwest Laboratory), 1988, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiation Monitoring Software System, PNL-6584/UC-600, Software version 1.485 (December 3, 1990), Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington, December.
- Pounds, L. R., P. D. Parr, and M. G. Ryon, 1993, Resource Management Plan for the Oak Ridge Reservation, Volume 30: Oak Ridge National Environmental Research Park Natural Reference Areas - Oak Ridge Reservation Environmentally Sensitive Sites Contain Plants, Animals and Communities, ORNL/NERP-8, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, August.
- Rand McNally, 1993, "Road Atlas", Chicago, Illinois.
- Rector, D., 1994, Tennessee Environment and Conservation Department, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, personal communication with J. Schinner, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Commercial and Sport Fishing in the Vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation."
- Roane County Regional Planning Commission, 1992, Population and Economy Report for Roane County, Tennessee, Department of Economic and Community Development, March.
- Rogers, J. H., K. L. Daniels, S. T. Goodpasture, C. W. Kimbrough, and E. W. Whitfield, 1987, Environmental Surveillance of the U.S. Department of Energy Oak Ridge Reservation Surrounding Environs During 1987: Volume 1, Narrative, Summary, and Conclusions, ES/ESH-4/V1, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, April.

- Rosensteel, B., 1994, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, M
Mason, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, regarding "W
Rare Plant Information, West Bear Creek Road Site," March 21.
- SEG (Scientific Ecology Group, Inc.) undated, Incineration, Scientific Ecology Grou
Tennessee, received May 1994.
- Sharp, R., 1994, Meteorological Engineer, Oak Ridge Operations, personal communicat
Septoff, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Genera
for the Proposed Location of the SNF Facility at Oak Ridge," May 4.
- Sharpe, M., 1992, Tennessee Medical Management, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, letter
Hospital Administrator, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, regarding, "Incidence Rates of Ne
various dates.
- Snider, J. D., 1993, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, le
of Tetra Tech, Inc., Alexandria, Virginia, regarding "Updated Waste Generation
Ridge Reservation," August 10.
- Solomon, D. K., G. K. Moore, L. E. Toran, R. B. Dreier, and W. M. McMaster, 1992, S
Hydrologic Framework for the Oak Ridge Reservation, ORNL/TM-12026, Oak Ridge Na
Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, May.
- TDEC (Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation), 1992a, Federal and Sta
Tennessee Rare Vertebrates, Division of Ecological Services, Nashville, Tennesse
- TDEC (Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation), 1992b, Federal and Sta
Tennessee Rare Invertebrates, Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservat
Tennessee, March 6.
- TDEC (Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation), 1992c, Rare Plant List
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Nashville, Tennessee, Feb
- TDEC (Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation), 1992d, Tennessee Count
Distribution Records for Endangered, Threatened, and Status Review Species, Ten
Department of Environment and Conservation, Nashville, Tennessee, July 20.
- TDOT (Tennessee Department of Transportation), 1993, Tennessee city and county maps
average daily traffic, Bureau of Planning and Development, Tennessee Department
Transportation, March 25.
- Tennessee Department of Education, 1992, Annual Statistical Report of the Departmen
the Scholastic Year Ending June 30, 1992, Tennessee Department of Education, Na
Tennessee, February.
- Tennessee Department of Health and the Oak Ridge Health Agreement Steering Panel, 1
Health Studies, Phase 1 Report, Volume 1, Tennessee Department of Health and th
Health Agreement Steering Panel, Nashville, Tennessee, September.
- TRB (Transportation Research Board), 1985, "Highway Capacity Manual, Special Report
Transportation Research Board, Washington D.C.
- Truex, W. ., 1991, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, letter
Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., regarding "Data ;for Nuclear Weapons Comp
Reconfiguration," November 13.
- Truex, W. A., 1995, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, memoran
Stump, U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, regarding "Oak Ridge
Office Contractor Employment," March 22.
- Turner, D., 1994, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, personal com
D. Olson, Halliburton NUS Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, regarding "Verif
EIS Comments," May 18.
- TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority), 1991, Flood Analyses for Department of Energy Y-1
K-25 Plants, Flood Protection Section, Water Resources Operations Department, W

Division, Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, Tennessee, December.

TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority), 1987, Map of Oak Ridge Area, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 16A, Tennessee Valley Authority.

TWRC (Tennessee Wildlife Resources Commission), 1991a, Proclamation - Wildlife in N Management, amended by Proclamation 91-4, Tennessee Wildlife Resources Commission March 2.

TWRC (Tennessee Wildlife Resources Commission), 1991b, Proclamation - Endangered or Species, Amended by Proclamation 91-5, Tennessee Wildlife Resources Commission,

U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993, Tennessee County Projections to 2040, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic and Statistics Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1991, 1990 Tennessee Housing Unit and Population Per Household by County, City and Census Designated Places, U.S. Department of Commerce, March 18.

U.S. DOI (U.S. Department of Interior), 1992, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants 17.11 and 17.12, U.S. Department of Interior, August 29.

U.S. DOI (U.S. Department of Interior), 1991, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants Candidate Review for Listing as Endangered or Threatened Species, Proposed Rule Register, Volume 56, No. 225, Part VIII, 50 CFR Part 17, U.S. Department of Interior November 21.

U.S. DOI (U.S. Department of Interior), 1990, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants of Plant Taxa for Listing as Endangered or Threatened Species; Notice of Review Register, Volume 55, No. 35, Part IV, 50 CFR Part 17, U.S. Department of Interior

USGS (United States Geological Survey), 1985, Digital Line Graph Data, 1:2 million, Survey, Earth Science Information Center, Reston, Virginia.

University of Tennessee, 1993, Population Projections for the State of Tennessee, University of Tennessee, Nashville, Tennessee.

Wichmann, T. L., 1995a, U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, Letter regarding "Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory Data," OPE-EIS-95.028, February 1.

Wichmann, T. L., 1995b, U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, letter regarding "Transmittal of SNF and INEL EIS Project Independent Verification of Nuclear Fuel Inventory," OPE-EIS-95.102, March 6.

Wing, S., C. M. Shy, J. Wood, S. Wolf, D. Cragle, W. Tankersly, and E. L. Frome, 1991, Radiation and Cancer Mortality at Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Follow-Up Through AJIM (American Journal of Industrial Medicine), Vol. 23, pp. 265-279.

Wing, S., C. M. Shy, J. Wood, S. Wolf, D. Cragle, and E. L. Frome, 1991, "Mortality at Oak Ridge National Laboratory," JAMA (Journal of the American Medical Association) No. 11, pp. 1397-1401.

7.0 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

yC	degrees Celsius
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
Ci	curie(s)
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EIS	environmental impact statement
ECF	Expended Core Facility
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
yF	degrees Fahrenheit

FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
g	gram
gal	gallon(s)
hr	hour
INEL	Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
kg	kilogram
km	kilometer
kv	kilovolt
y	liter
m	meter
m3	cubic meter
mi	mile
mi2	square mile
min	minute
mph	miles per hour
mR	milliroentgen
mrem	millirem
MTHM	metric tons of heavy metal
MW	Megawatt
nCi	nanocurie
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NTS	Nevada Test Site
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
ORR	Oak Ridge Reservation
PCB	polychlorinated biphenyl
pCi	picocurie(s)
PEIS	Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
PM10	particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter
ppm	parts per million
RCRA	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
SNF	spent nuclear fuel
SRS	Savannah River Site
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
ug	micrograms
USGS	U.S. Geological Survey
yr	year

