

## Indian Point 2 Steam Generator Tube Failure Lessons-Learned Report

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Event Description
- Team Charter
- Report
  - Task Group focused on issues directly related to the February 15, 2000 tube failure event and operation of the current SGs at IP2.
  - Public input was not sought as part of the Task Group effort
  - Two additional reports were important to the Task Group effort:
    - 1) RES review dated March 16, 2000.
    - 2) OIG Event Inquiry on the "NRC's Response to the February 15, 2000, Steam Generator Tube Rupture at Indian Point Unit 2 Power Plant."
- Safety Significance
  - No actual radiological consequences of the event. The event did not impact the public health and safety. [NRC Special Inspection Report]
  - Preliminary staff assessment appropriate for the SDP process.
  - The risk from the IP2 SG event and risk from the tube condition prior to the event were well within NRC measures for maintaining public health and safety.
- Lessons Learned
- Recommendations
  - Industry
  - Regulatory Process
    - Licensing
    - Inspection

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### Lessons-Learned/Recommendation

- Con Ed

Special Inspection Team findings are reasonable, corrective actions at IP2 should proceed in accordance with the ongoing inspection and enforcement process.

1997 Examinations: PWSCC; Tube denting and hour-glassing; Noise

- Industry / NEI / EPRI

- Improvements to the Generic industry guidelines (NEI, EPRI):

Plant-specific qualification of eddy current probes

Probability of detection;

In-situ pressure testing.

2) NEI noise study

3) Vendor oversight by licensees

4) Plant-specific implementation of lessons-learned

- NRC Regulatory Processes

Licensing

Amendment Review and Safety Evaluation: Missed opportunity to pursue questions.

Tech. Spec. required Reports

Inspection

- 1) Additional SG inspection guidance for the baseline inspection program.
- 2) Inspector training to support the objectives of the SG inspection program.
- 3) NRR support of the SG inspection program - Outage phone calls are effective and should be formerly incorporated into the inspection program.
- 4) Risk-informed thresholds to identify when increased NRC interaction is warranted in response to SG tube degradation.

- 5) Risk-informed thresholds to identify when increased NRC interaction is warranted in response to an adverse primary-to-secondary trend.

**Schedule**

- Report to Brian Sheron - September 29 (today)
  - Brain's Recommendation to Sam Collins - October 4
- Who Reviews/Comments on the Report
- Task Group Briefing of S. Collins and Others (as decided) - Week of 10/8