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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Ladies and Gentlemen:

**VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES**

The Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications, section 5.5.14, Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program, provide for changes to the Bases without prior NRC approval. In addition, TS section 5.5.14 requires that Bases changes made without prior NRC approval be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71 (e). Pursuant to TS section 5.5.14, Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby submits Bases changes made to the VEGP TS Bases under the provisions of TS section 5.5.14. This submittal reflects changes since November 6, 1999 through May 4, 2001.

Sincerely,

J. B. Beasley, Jr.

JBB/NJS

Enclosure: Bases Changes

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A001

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The AFD is a measure of the axial power distribution skewing to either the top or bottom half of the core. The AFD is sensitive to many core related parameters such as control bank positions, core power level, axial burnup, axial xenon distribution, and, to a lesser extent, reactor coolant temperature and boron concentration.

The allowed range of the AFD is used in the nuclear design process to confirm that operation within these limits produces core peaking factors and axial power distributions that meet safety analysis requirements.

The RAOC methodology (Ref. 2) establishes a xenon distribution library with tentatively wide AFD limits. One dimensional axial power distribution calculations are then performed to demonstrate that normal operation power shapes are acceptable for the LOCA and loss of flow accident, and for initial conditions of anticipated transients. The tentative limits are adjusted as necessary to meet the safety analysis requirements.

The limits on the AFD ensure that the Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor ($F_Q(Z)$) is not exceeded during either normal operation or in the event of xenon redistribution following power changes. The limits on the AFD also restrict the range of power distributions that are used as initial conditions in the analyses of Condition 2, 3, or 4 events. This ensures that the fuel cladding integrity is maintained for these postulated accidents. The most important Condition 4 event is the LOCA. The most important Condition 3 event is the loss of flow accident. The most important Condition 2 events are uncontrolled bank withdrawal and boration or dilution accidents. Condition 2 accidents simulated to begin from within the AFD limits are used to confirm the adequacy of the Overpower ΔT and Overtemperature ΔT trip setpoints.

The limits on the AFD satisfy Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

The shape of the power profile in the axial (i.e., the vertical) direction is under the control of the operator through the manual operation of the control banks.

(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued)

Signals are available to the operator from the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) excore neutron detectors (NI-0041B, NI-0042B, NI-0043B, NI-0044B). Separate signals are taken from the top and bottom detectors. The AFD is defined as the difference in normalized flux signals between the top and bottom excore detectors in each detector well multiplied by nuclear gain such that AFD equals core average axial offset at Rated Thermal Power.

The AFD limits are provided in the COLR. Figure B 3.2.3-1 shows typical RAOC AFD limits. The AFD limits for RAOC do not depend on the target flux difference. However, the target flux difference may be used to minimize changes in the axial power distribution.

Violating this LCO on the AFD could produce unacceptable consequences if a Condition 2, 3, or 4 event occurs while the AFD is outside its specified limits.

APPLICABILITY

The AFD requirements are applicable in MODE 1 above 50% RTP when the combination of THERMAL POWER and core peaking factors are of primary importance in safety analysis.

For AFD limits developed using RAOC methodology, the value of the AFD does not affect the limiting accident consequences with THERMAL POWER < 50% RTP and for lower operating power MODES.

ACTIONS

A.1

As an alternative to restoring the AFD to within its specified limits, Required Action A.1 requires a THERMAL POWER reduction to < 50% RTP. This places the core in a condition for which the value of the AFD is not important in

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

- Manual Reactor Trip;
- RTBs;
- RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms; and
- Automatic Trip Logic.

This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS for these Functions. With one channel or train inoperable, the inoperable channel or train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours. If the affected Function(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the RTBs must be opened within the next hour. The additional hour provides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderly manner. With the RTBs open, these Functions are no longer required. This Condition is modified by a Note that prohibits closing the RTBs in MODE 5 if any of the above Functions (Function 1, 17, 18, or 19 of Table 3.3.1-1) are not met. Closing the RTBs in MODES 3 or 4 with any of these Functions not met is prohibited by LCO 3.0.4.

The Completion Time is reasonable considering that in this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE channel or train is adequate to perform the safety function, and given the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

D.1.1, D.1.2, D.2.1, D.2.2, and D.3

Condition D applies to the Power Range Neutron Flux — High Function. This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1.1, D.1.2, D.2.1, D.2.2, and D.3 (continued)

The NIS power range detectors provide input to the CRD System and the SG Water Level Control System and, therefore, have a two-out-of-four trip logic. A known inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition. This results in a partial trip condition requiring only one-out-of-three logic for actuation. The 72 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition is justified in WCAP-14333-P-A (Ref. 12).

In addition to placing the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to $\leq 75\%$ RTP within 78 hours. Reducing the power level prevents operation of the core with radial power distributions beyond the design limits. With one of the NIS power range detectors inoperable, 1/4 of the radial power distribution monitoring capability is lost.

As an alternative to the above actions, the inoperable channel can be placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours and the QPTR monitored once every 12 hours as per SR 3.2.4.2, QPTR verification. Calculating QPTR every 12 hours compensates for the lost monitoring capability due to the inoperable NIS power range channel and allows continued unit operation at power levels $\leq 75\%$ RTP. The 12 hour Frequency is consistent with LCO 3.2.4, "QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)."

If the Required Actions described above cannot be met within the specified Completion Times, the unit must be placed in a MODE where this Function is no longer required OPERABLE. An additional 6 hours beyond the Completion Time for Required Action D.1.1 and Required Action D.2.1 are allowed to place the unit in MODE 3. Six hours is a reasonable time, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. If Required Actions D.2.2 cannot be completed within their allowed Completion Times, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered.

The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing a channel in the bypass condition for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing. With one channel inoperable, the Note also allows routine surveillance testing of another channel with a channel in bypass. The Note also allows placing a channel in the bypass condition to allow setpoint adjustments when required to reduce the Power Range Neutron

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1.1, D.1.2, D.2.1, D.2.2, and D.3 (continued)

Flux — High setpoint in accordance with other Technical Specifications. The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 12.

Required Action D.2.2 has been modified by a Note which only requires SR 3.2.4.1 to be performed if the Power Range Neutron Flux input to QPTR becomes inoperable. Failure of a component in the Power Range Neutron Flux channel which renders the High Flux Trip function inoperable may not affect the capability to monitor QPTR. As such, determining QPTR using the movable incore detectors once per 12 hours may not be necessary.

E.1 and E.2

Condition E applies to the following reactor trip Functions:

- Power Range Neutron Flux — Low;
- Overtemperature ΔT ;
- Overpower ΔT ;
- Power Range Neutron Flux — High Positive Rate;
- Pressurizer Pressure — High; and
- SG Water Level — Low Low.

This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1 and E.2 (continued)

A known inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours. Placing the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition requiring only one-out-of-two logic for actuation of the two-out-of-three trips and one-out-of-three logic for actuation of the two-out-of-four trips. The 72 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition is justified in Reference 12.

If the operable channel cannot be placed in the trip condition within the specified Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE where these Functions are not required OPERABLE. An additional 6 hours is allowed to place the unit in MODE 3. Six hours is a reasonable time, based on operating experience, to place the unit in MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing a channel in the bypassed condition for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing. With one channel inoperable, the Note also allows routine surveillance testing of another channel with a channel in bypass. The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 12.

F.1 and F.2

Condition F applies to the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip when THERMAL POWER is above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint and one channel is inoperable. Above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint, the NIS intermediate range detector performs the monitoring Functions. If THERMAL POWER is greater than the P-6 setpoint but less than the P-10 setpoint, 24 hours are allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER below the P-6 setpoint or increase to THERMAL POWER above the P-10 setpoint. The NIS Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channels must be OPERABLE when the power level is above the capability of the source range, P-6, and below the capability of the power range, P-10. If THERMAL POWER is greater than the P-10 setpoint, the NIS power range detectors perform the monitoring and protection functions and the intermediate range is not required. The Completion Times allow for a slow and controlled power adjustment above P-10 or below P-6 and take

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

F.1 and F.2 (continued)

into account the redundant capability afforded by the redundant OPERABLE channel, and the low probability of its failure during this period. This action does not require the inoperable channel to be tripped because the Function uses one-out-of-two logic. Tripping one channel would trip the reactor. Thus, the Required Actions specified in this Condition are only applicable when channel failure does not result in reactor trip.

G.1 and G.2

Condition G applies to two inoperable Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip channels when THERMAL POWER is above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint. Required Actions specified in this Condition are only applicable when channel failures do not result in reactor trip. Above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint, the NIS intermediate range detector performs the monitoring Functions. With no intermediate range channels OPERABLE, the Required Actions are to suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions immediately. However, this does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory or place the unit in a safe conservative condition provided the required SDM is maintained. The suspension of positive reactivity additions will preclude any power level increase since there are no OPERABLE Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channels. The operator must also reduce THERMAL POWER below the P-6 setpoint within two hours. Below P-6, the Source Range Neutron Flux channels will be able to monitor the core power level. The Completion Time of 2 hours will allow a slow and controlled power reduction to less than the P-6 setpoint and takes into account the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by the NIS Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip.

H.1

Condition H applies to the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip when THERMAL POWER is below the P-6 setpoint and one or two channels are inoperable. Below the P-6 setpoint, the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. The inoperable NIS intermediate range channel(s) must be returned to OPERABLE status prior to increasing power above the P-6 setpoint. The NIS intermediate range channels must be OPERABLE when the power level is above the capability of the source range, P-6, and below the capability of the power range, P-10.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

I.1

Condition I applies to one inoperable Source Range Neutron Flux trip channel when in MODE 2, below the P-6 setpoint, and performing a reactor startup. With the unit in this Condition, below P-6, the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With one of the two channels inoperable, operations involving positive reactivity additions shall be suspended immediately.

This will preclude any power escalation. With only one source range channel OPERABLE, core protection is severely reduced and any actions that add positive reactivity to the core must be suspended immediately. However, this does not preclude actions to maintain or place the unit in a safe conservative condition provided the required SDM is maintained.

J.1

Condition J applies to two inoperable Source Range Neutron Flux trip channels when in MODE 2, below the P-6 setpoint, and performing a reactor startup, or in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs closed and the CRD System capable of rod withdrawal. With the unit in this Condition, below P-6, the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With both source range channels inoperable, the RTBs must be opened immediately. With the RTBs open, the core is in a more stable condition and the unit enters Condition L.

K.1 and K.2

Condition K applies to one inoperable source range channel in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs closed and the CRD System capable of rod withdrawal. With the unit in this Condition, below P-6, the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With one of the source range channels inoperable, 48 hours is allowed to restore it to an OPERABLE status. If the channel cannot be returned to an OPERABLE status, 1 additional hour is allowed to open the RTBs. Once the RTBs are open, the core is in a more stable condition and the unit enters Condition L. The allowance of 48 hours to restore the channel to OPERABLE status, and the additional hour to open the RTBs, are justified in Reference 7.

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BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

L.1

Condition L applies when the required number of OPERABLE Source Range Neutron Flux channels is not met in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs open. With the unit in this Condition, the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With less than the required number of source range channels OPERABLE, operations involving positive reactivity additions shall be suspended immediately. This will preclude any power escalation. However, this does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory or place the unit in a safe conservative condition provided the required SDM is maintained. Note that the source range also continues to provide input to the high flux at shutdown alarm (HFASA - LCO 3.3.8). LCO 3.3.8 requires that the HFASA receive input from two source range channels for the HFASA to be OPERABLE.

M.1 and M.2

Condition M applies to the following reactor trip Functions:

- Pressurizer Pressure — Low;
- Pressurizer Water Level — High;
- Reactor Coolant Flow — Low (Two Loops);
- Undervoltage RCPs; and
- Underfrequency RCPs.

This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition.

With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours. Placing the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip above the P-7 setpoint (and below the P-8 setpoint for the Reactor Coolant Flow — Low — Two Loops

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

M.1 and M.2 (continued)

function). These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE below the P-7 setpoint because for the Pressurizer Water Level — High transients are slow enough for manual action, and for the other functions DNB is not as serious a concern due to the Low Power Level. The 72 hours allowed to place the channel in the tripped condition is justified in Reference 12. An additional 6 hours is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER to below P-7 if the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the specified Completion Time.

Allowance of this time interval takes into consideration the redundant capability provided by the remaining redundant OPERABLE channel, and the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by the Functions associated with Condition M.

The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies only to the RCP undervoltage and underfrequency instrument functions. These functions do not have installed bypass capability. Therefore, the allowance to place these instrument channels in bypass is more limited. Note 1 allows the inoperable undervoltage or underfrequency instrument channel to be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing of other channels.

Note 2 allows placing a channel in the bypassed condition for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing. Note 2 applies to all Condition M instrument functions except RCP undervoltage and underfrequency. With one channel inoperable, Note 2 also allows routine surveillance testing of another channel with a channel in bypass. The 12 hour time limit of both Notes is justified in Reference 12.

N.1 and N.2

Condition N applies to the Reactor Coolant Flow — Low (Single Loop) reactor trip Function. This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

N.1 and N.2 (continued)

applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in trip within 72 hours. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or the channel placed in trip within the 72 hours, then THERMAL POWER must be reduced below the P-8 setpoint within the next 4 hours. This places the unit in a MODE where the LCO is no longer applicable. This trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE below the P-8 setpoint because other RTS trip Functions provide core protection below the P-8 setpoint. The 72 hours allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or place in trip and the 4 additional hours allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER to below the P-8 setpoint are justified in Reference 12.

The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing a channel in the bypassed condition for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing. With one channel inoperable, the Note allows routine surveillance testing of another channel with a channel in bypass. The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 12.

O.1 and O.2

Condition O applies to Turbine Trip on Low Fluid Oil Pressure. This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in the trip

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

O.1 and O.2 (continued)

condition within 72 hours. If placed in the tripped condition, this results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in the trip condition, then power must be reduced below the P-9 setpoint within the next 4 hours. The 72 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition and the 4 hours allowed for reducing power are justified in Reference 12.

The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing a channel in the bypassed condition for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing. With one channel inoperable, the Note also allows routine surveillance testing of another channel with a channel in bypass. The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 12.

P.1 and P.2

Condition P applies to the Turbine Trip on Stop Valve Closure. This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition. With one or more channels inoperable, the inoperable channels must be placed in the trip condition within 72 hours. Since all the valves must be tripped (not fully open) in order for the reactor trip signal to be generated, it is acceptable to place more than one Turbine Stop Valve Closure channel in the tripped condition. If a channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in the trip condition, then power must be reduced below the P-9 setpoint within the next 4 hours. The 72 hours allowed to place an inoperable channel in the tripped condition and the 4 hours allowed for reducing power are justified in Reference 12.

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BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

Q.1 and Q.2

Condition Q applies to the SI Input from ESFAS reactor trip and the RTS Automatic Trip Logic in MODES 1 and 2. These actions address the train orientation of the RTS for these Functions. This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition. With one train inoperable, 24 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours. The Completion Time of 24 hours is reasonable considering that in this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the safety function and given the low probability of an event during this interval. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows bypassing one train up to 4 hours for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE. The 4 hour time limit for testing the RTS Automatic Trip Logic train may include testing the RTB also, if both the Logic test and RTB test are conducted within the 4 hour time limit. The 4 hour time limit is justified in Reference 12.

The 4 hour time limit for the RTS Automatic Trip Logic train testing is greater than the 2 hour time limit for the RTBs, which the Logic train supports. The longer time limit for the Logic train (4 hours) is acceptable based on Reference 13.

R.1 and R.2

Condition R applies to the P-6 interlock. With one or more channels inoperable for one-out-of-two coincidence logic, the associated interlock must be verified to be in its required state for the existing unit condition within 1 hour or the unit must be placed

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BASES

ACTIONS

R.1 and R.2 (continued)

in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours. Verifying the interlock status manually accomplishes the interlock's Function. The Completion Time of 1 hour is based on operating experience and the minimum amount of time allowed for manual operator actions. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The 1 hour and 6 hour Completion Times are equal to the time allowed by LCO 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of RTS Function.

S.1 and S.2

Condition S applies to the P-7, P-8, P-9, P-10, and P-13 interlocks. With one or more channels inoperable for one-out-of-two or two-out-of-four coincidence logic, the associated interlock must be verified to be in its required state for the existing unit condition within 1 hour or THERMAL POWER must be reduced to less than the affected interlock setpoint within the next 6 hours. These actions are conservative for the case where power level is being raised. Verifying the interlock status manually accomplishes the interlock's Function. The Completion Time of 1 hour is based on operating experience and the minimum amount of time allowed for manual operator actions. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

T.1 and T.2

Condition T applies to the RTBs in MODES 1 and 2. These actions address the train orientation of the RTS for the RTBs. With one train inoperable, 1 hour is allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The 1 hour and 6 hour Completion Times are equal to the time allowed by LCO 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of RTS Function. Placing the unit in MODE 3 removes the requirement for this particular Function.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

T.1 and T.2 (continued)

The Required Actions have been modified by three Notes. Note 1 allows one train to be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE. Note 1 applies to RTB testing that is performed independently from the corresponding Logic train testing. For simultaneous testing of the Logic and RTBs, the 4 hour test time limit of Condition Q applies. Note 2 allows one RTB to be bypassed for up to 2 hours for maintenance on undervoltage or shunt trip mechanisms if the other RTB train is OPERABLE. The 2 hour time limit is justified in Reference 7. Note 3 applies to RTB testing that is performed concurrently with the corresponding Logic train testing. For concurrent testing of the Logic and RTB, the 4 hour test time limit of Condition Q applies. The 4 hour time limit is justified in Reference 12.

U.1 and U.2

Condition U applies to the RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms, or diverse trip features, in MODES 1 and 2. With one of the diverse trip features inoperable, it must be restored to an OPERABLE status within 48 hours or the unit must be placed in a MODE where Condition U is no longer applicable. This is accomplished by placing the unit in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours (54 hours total time). The Completion Time of 6 hours is a reasonable time, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. With the unit in MODE 3, Condition C applies to this trip function. The affected RTB shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse features is inoperable except for the time required to perform maintenance to one of the diverse features. The allowable time for performing maintenance of the diverse features is 2 hours for the reasons stated under Condition T.

If two diverse trip features become inoperable in the same RTB, that RTB becomes inoperable upon discovery of the second inoperable trip feature.

The Completion Time of 48 hours for Required Action U.1 is reasonable considering that in this Condition there is one remaining diverse feature for the affected RTB, and one OPERABLE RTB capable of performing the safety function and given the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

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BASES

ACTIONS

(continued)

V.1

Condition V corresponds to a level of degradation in the RTS that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one Condition of this LCO is entered, and this results in the loss of automatic reactor trip capability, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analysis.

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BASES

REFERENCES (continued)

2. FSAR, Chapter 6.
3. FSAR, Chapter 15.
4. IEEE-279-1971.
5. 10 CFR 50.49.
6. WCAP-11269, Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems; as supplemented by:
 - Amendments 34 (Unit 1) and 14 (Unit 2), RTS Steam Generator Water Level – Low Low, ESFAS Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation SG Water Level – High High, and ESFAS AFW SG Water Level – Low Low.
 - Amendments 48 and 49 (Unit 1) and Amendments 27 and 28 (Unit 2), deletion of RTS Power Range Neutron Flux High Negative Rate Trip.
 - Amendments 60 (Unit 1) and 39 (Unit 2), RTS Overtemperature ΔT setpoint revision.
 - Amendments 57 (Unit 1) and 36 (Unit 2), RTS Overtemperature and Overpower ΔT time constants and Overtemperature ΔT setpoint.
 - Amendments 43 and 44 (Unit 1) and 23 and 24 (Unit 2), revised Overtemperature and Overpower ΔT trip setpoints and allowable values.
 - Amendments 104 (Unit 1) and 82 (Unit 2), revised RTS Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, Source Range Neutron Flux, and P-6 trip setpoints and allowable values.
7. WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 1, May 1986.
8. FSAR, Chapter 16.
9. Westinghouse Letter GP-16696, November 5, 1997.
10. WCAP-13632-P-A Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1996.
11. WCAP-14036-P-A Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests," October 1998.
12. WCAP-14333-P-A, Rev. 1, October 1998.
13. WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 2, Rev. 1, June 1990.

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY

7. Semi-Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump
(continued)

heat exchanger, inject the water back into the RCS, and supply the cooled water to the other ECCS pumps. Switchover from the RWST to the containment sump must occur before the RWST empties to prevent damage to the RHR pumps and a loss of core cooling capability. For similar reasons, switchover must not occur before there is sufficient water in the containment sump to support ESF pump suction. Furthermore, early switchover must not occur to ensure that sufficient borated water is injected from the RWST. This ensures the reactor remains shut down in the recirculation mode.

a. Semi-Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump —
Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays

Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b. Under specific conditions, a single inoperable actuation relay does not require that the affected automatic actuation logic function be declared inoperable. Specific guidance is provided in this section under the heading "Actuation Relays."

b. Semi-Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump —
Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level — Low Low
Coincident With Safety Injection

(LI-0990A&B, LI-0991A&B, LI-0992A, LI-0993A)

NOTE: RWST Level channels are also required OPERABLE by the Post Accident Monitoring Technical Specification. In addition channels LI-0990 and 0991 provide actuation signals to the RWST sludge mixing pump isolation valves required OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.4.

During the injection phase of a LOCA, the RWST is the source of water for all ECCS pumps. A low low level in the RWST coincident with an SI signal provides protection against a loss of water for the ECCS pumps and indicates the end of the injection phase of the LOCA. The containment sump to RHR pump suction valves open

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1, B.2.1, and B.2.2

Condition B applies to manual initiation of:

- SI;
- Containment Spray; and
- Phase A Isolation.

This action addresses the channel orientation of the SSPS for the functions listed above. If a channel is inoperable, 48 hours is allowed to return it to an OPERABLE status. Note that for containment spray, failure of one or both handswitches in one channel renders the channel inoperable. Condition B, therefore, encompasses both situations. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering that there are two automatic actuation trains and another manual initiation channel OPERABLE for each Function, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours (54 hours total time) and in MODE 5 within an additional 30 hours (84 hours total time). The allowable Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.1, C.2.1, and C.2.2

Condition C applies to the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for the following functions:

- SI;
- Containment Spray;
- Phase A Isolation; and
- Semi-Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump.

This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1, C.2.1, and C.2.2 (continued)

the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition.

This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS and the master and slave relays. If one train is inoperable, 24 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The 24 hours allowed for restoring the inoperable train to OPERABLE status is justified in Reference 15. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours (30 hours total time) and in MODE 5 within an additional 30 hours (60 hours total time). The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one train to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing or maintenance, provided the other train is OPERABLE. This allowance is based on the reliability analysis assumption of WCAP-10271-P-A (Ref. 7) that 4 hours is the average time required to perform train surveillance.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2

Condition D applies to:

- Containment Pressure — High 1;
- Pressurizer Pressure — Low;
- Steam Line Pressure — Low;
- Containment Pressure — High 2;

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 (continued)

- Steam Line Pressure — Negative Rate — High; and
- SG Water level — Low Low.

This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition.

If one channel is inoperable, 72 hours are allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition. Generally this Condition applies to functions that operate on two-out-of-three logic. Therefore, failure of one channel places the Function in a two-out-of-two configuration. One channel must be tripped to place the Function in a one-out-of-three configuration that satisfies redundancy requirements. The 72 hours allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition is justified in Reference 15.

Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status or place it in the tripped condition within 72 hours requires the unit be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 4 within the next 6 hours.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4, these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows placing one channel in bypass for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing. The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 15.

E.1, E.2.1, and E.2.2

Condition E applies to:

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1, E.2.1, and E.2.2 (continued)

- Containment Spray Containment Pressure — High 3.

This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition.

This signal does not input to a control function. Thus, two-out-of-three logic is necessary to meet acceptable protective requirements. However, a two-out-of-three design would require tripping a failed channel. This is undesirable because a single failure would then cause spurious containment spray initiation. Spurious spray actuation is undesirable because of the cleanup problems presented. Therefore, these channels are designed with two-out-of-four logic so that a failed channel may be bypassed rather than tripped. Note that one channel may be bypassed and still satisfy the single failure criterion. Furthermore, with one channel bypassed, a single instrumentation channel failure will not spuriously initiate containment spray.

To avoid the inadvertent actuation of containment spray, the inoperable channel should not be placed in the tripped condition. Instead it is bypassed. Restoring the channel to OPERABLE status, or placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition within 72 hours, is sufficient to assure that the Function remains OPERABLE and minimizes the time that the Function may be in a partial trip condition (assuming the inoperable channel has failed high). The Completion Time is further justified based on the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status, or place it in the bypassed condition within 72 hours, requires the unit be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 4 within the next 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4, this Function is no longer required OPERABLE.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1, E.2.1, and E.2.2 (continued)

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that, with one channel inoperable, allows routine surveillance testing of another channel with a channel in bypass for up to 12 hours. Placing a second channel in the bypass condition for up to 12 hours for testing purposes is acceptable based on the results of Reference 15.

F.1, F.2.1, and F.2.2

Condition F applies to:

- Manual Initiation of Steam Line Isolation; and
- P-4 Interlock.

For the Manual Initiation and the P-4 Interlock Functions, this action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS. If a channel is inoperable, 48 hours is allowed to return it to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering the nature of this Function, the available redundancy, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the channel cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4, the unit does not have any analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection function noted above.

G.1, G.2.1, and G.2.2

Condition G applies to the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for the Steam Line Isolation and AFW actuation Functions.

This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

G.1, G.2.1, and G.2.2 (continued)

service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition.

The action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS and the master and slave relays for these functions. If one train is inoperable, 24 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The 24 hours allowed for restoring the inoperable train to OPERABLE status is justified in Reference 15. The Completion Time for restoring a train to OPERABLE status is reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

If the train cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. Placing the unit in MODE 4 removes all requirements for OPERABILITY of the protection channels and actuation functions. In this MODE, the unit does not have analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above.

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one train to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other channel is OPERABLE. This allowance is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 7) assumption that 4 hours is the average time required to perform channel surveillance.

H.1 and H.2

Condition H applies to the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for the Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation Function.

This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

H.1 and H.2 (continued)

the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition.

This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS and the master and slave relays for this Function. If one train is inoperable, 24 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours. The 24 hours allowed for restoring the inoperable train to OPERABLE status is justified in Reference 15. The Completion Time for restoring a train to OPERABLE status is reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. These Functions are no longer required in MODE 3. Placing the unit in MODE 3 removes all requirements for OPERABILITY of the protection channels and actuation functions. In this MODE, the unit does not have analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above.

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one train to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing or maintenance provided the other train is OPERABLE. This allowance is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 7) assumption that 4 hours is the average time required to perform channel surveillances.

I.1 and I.2

Condition I applies to:

- SG Water Level — High High (P-14).

This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

I.1 and I.2 (continued)

the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition.

If one channel is inoperable, 72 hours are allowed to restore one channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition. If placed in the tripped condition, the Function is then in a partial trip condition where one-out-of-three logic will result in actuation. The 72 hours allowed to restore one channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition is justified in Reference 15. Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status or place it in the tripped condition within 72 hours requires the unit to be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 3, this Function is no longer required OPERABLE.

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows placing one channel in bypass for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing. The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 15.

J.1 and J.2

Condition J applies to the AFW pump start on trip of all MFW pumps.

This action addresses the train orientation for the auto start function of the AFW System on loss of all MFW pumps. The OPERABILITY of the AFW System must be assured by allowing automatic start of the AFW System pumps. If a channel is inoperable, 48 hours are allowed to return it to an OPERABLE status. If the function cannot be returned to an OPERABLE status, 6 hours are allowed to place the unit in MODE 3. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 3, the unit does not have any analyzed

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

J.1 and J.2 (continued)

transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection function noted above. The allowance of 48 hours to return the train to an OPERABLE status is justified in Reference 7.

K.1, K.2.1, and K.2.2

Condition K applies to:

- RWST Level — Low Low Coincident with Safety Injection.

This Condition contains bypass times and Completion Times that are risk-informed. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) is used to assess changes in core damage frequency resulting from applicable plant configurations. The CRMP uses the equipment out of service risk monitor, a computer based tool that may be used to aid in the risk assessment of on-line maintenance and to evaluate the change in risk from a component failure. The equipment out of service risk monitor uses the plant probabilistic risk assessment model to evaluate the risk of removing equipment from service based on current plant configuration and equipment condition.

RWST Level — Low Low Coincident With SI provides actuation of switchover to the containment sump. Note that this Function requires the bistables to energize to perform their required action. The failure of up to two channels will not prevent the operation of this Function. However, placing a failed channel in the tripped condition could result in a premature switchover to the sump, prior to the injection of the minimum volume from the RWST. Placing the inoperable channel in bypass results in a two-out-of-three logic configuration, which satisfies the requirement to allow another failure without disabling actuation of the switchover when required. Restoring the channel to OPERABLE status or placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition within 72 hours is sufficient to ensure that the Function remains OPERABLE, and minimizes the time that the Function may be in a partial trip condition (assuming the inoperable channel has failed high). The 72 hour Completion Time is justified in Reference 15. If the channel cannot be returned to OPERABLE status or placed in the bypass condition within 72 hours, the unit must be brought to MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 5 within the next 30 hours.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

K.1, K.2.1, and K.2.2 (continued)

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 5, the unit does not have any analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above.

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows placing one channel in bypass for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing. The channel to be tested can be tested in bypass with the inoperable channel also in bypass. The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 15.

L.1, L.2.1, and L.2.2

Condition L applies to the P-11 interlock.

With one or more channels inoperable, the operator must verify that the interlock is in the required state for the existing unit condition. This action manually accomplishes the function of the interlock. Determination must be made within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is equal to the time allowed by LCO 3.0.3 to initiate shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of ESFAS function. If the interlock is not in the required state (or placed in the required state) for the existing unit condition, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. Placing the unit in MODE 4 removes all requirements for OPERABILITY of this interlock.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

The SRs for each ESFAS Function are identified by the SRs column of Table 3.3.2-1.

A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that Table 3.3.2-1 determines which SRs apply to which ESFAS Functions.

Note that each channel of process protection supplies both trains of the ESFAS. When testing channel I, train A and train B must be examined. Similarly, train A and train B must be examined when

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

testing channel II, channel III, and channel IV (if applicable). The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COTs are performed in a manner that is consistent with the assumptions used in analytically calculating the required channel accuracies.

SR 3.3.2.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.2.5 (continued)

where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment. Actuation equipment that may not be operated in the design mitigation MODE is prevented from operation by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay.

For slave relays and associated auxiliary relays in the ESFAS actuation system circuit that are Potter and Brumfield (P&B) type MOTOR-DRIVEN RELAYS (MDRs), the SLAVE RELAY TEST is performed on an 18-month frequency. This test frequency is based on relay reliability assessments presented in WCAP-13878, "Reliability Assessment of Potter and Brumfield MDR Series Relays." The reliability assessments are relay specific and apply only to Potter and Brumfield MDR series relays. Quarterly testing of the slave relays associated with non-P&B MDR auxiliary relays will be administratively controlled until an alternate method of testing the auxiliary relays is developed or until they are replaced by P&B MDR series relays.

SR 3.3.2.6

SR 3.3.2.6 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and AFW pump start on trip of all MFW pumps. It is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.). The Frequency is based on industry operating experience and is consistent with the typical refueling cycle. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints for manual initiation Functions. The manual initiation Functions have no assumed setpoints.

SR 3.3.2.7

SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.3.2.7 (continued)

CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the unit specific setpoint methodology. The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.

(continued)

BASES

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BASES

REFERENCES
(continued)

- Amendments 43 and 44 (Unit 1) and 23 and 24 (Unit 2), revised ESFAS Interlocks Pressurizer P-11 trip setpoint and allowable value.
 - 7. WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 2, Rev. 1, June 1990.
 - 8. FSAR, Chapter 16.
 - 9. Westinghouse Letter GP-16696, November 5, 1997.
 - 10. WCAP-13632-P-A Revision 2, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1996.
 - 11. WCAP-14036-P-A Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests," October 1998.
 - 12. WCAP-13878-P-A Revision 2, "Reliability Assessment of Potter & Brumfield MDR Series Relays," April 1996.
 - 13. WCAP-13900 Revision 0, "Extension of Slave Relay Surveillance Test Intervals," April 1994.
 - 14. WCAP-14129 Revision 1, "Reliability Assessment of Westinghouse Type AR Relays Used as SSPS Slave Relays," January 1999.
 - 15. WCAP-14333-P-A, Rev. 1, October 1998.
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BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values

The Trip Setpoints used in the bistables are based on the analytical limits presented in FSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2). These analytical limits have been incorporated into SR 3.3.5.2 as the Allowable Values. The selection of the Trip Setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The LOP DG start instrumentation is required for the ESF Systems to function in any accident with a loss of offsite power. Its design basis is that of the ESFAS.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1 (continued)

required to be entered immediately. The actions of this LCO provide for adequate compensatory actions to support unit safety.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.5.1

SR 3.3.5.1 is the performance of a COT. This test is performed every 92 days. A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function. Setpoints must be found within the specified Allowable Values. The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and controls and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.3.5.2

SR 3.3.5.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Nominal Trip Setpoint considers factors that may affect channel performance such as rack drift, etc. Therefore, the Nominal Trip Setpoint (within the calibration tolerance) is the expected value for the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. However, the Allowable Value is the value that was used for the loss of voltage and degraded grid studies. Therefore, a channel with an actual Trip Setpoint value that is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value is considered OPERABLE; but the channel should be reset to the Nominal Trip Setpoint value (within the calibration tolerance) to allow for factors which may affect channel performance (such as rack drift) prior to the next surveillance.

The setpoints, as well as the response to a loss of voltage and a degraded voltage test, shall include a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delay.

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

The Frequency of 18 months is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle and is justified by the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

safety valves and also may be used for cold overpressure protection. See LCO 3.4.12, "Cold Overpressure Protection System (COPS)."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Plant operators may employ the PORVs to depressurize the RCS in response to certain plant transients if normal pressurizer spray is not available. For the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) event, the safety analysis assumes that manual operator actions are required to mitigate the event. A loss of offsite power is assumed to accompany the event, and thus, normal pressurizer spray is unavailable to reduce RCS pressure. The PORVs or auxiliary pressurizer spray may be used for RCS depressurization, which is one of the steps performed to equalize the primary and secondary pressures in order to terminate the primary to secondary break flow and the radioactive releases from the affected steam generator.

In addition, in the event of an inadvertent safety injection actuation at power, the potential for pressurizer filling and subsequent water relief via the pressurizer safeties (PSVs) is evaluated (FSAR section 15.5.1). Operator action to make one PORV available is credited in the analysis to mitigate this event. If the PORV is available for automatic actuation, the event consequences would be mitigated directly by preventing water relief through the PSVs. However, automatic actuation is not required to mitigate this event. The analysis includes an acceptable delay for the operator to open a block valve and to manually control the PORV if necessary.

The PORVs also provide the safety-related means for reactor coolant system depressurization to achieve safety-grade cold shutdown and to mitigate the effects of a loss of heat sink or an SGTR. They are modeled in safety analyses for events that result in increasing RCS pressure for which departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) criteria, pressurizer filling, or reactor coolant saturation are critical (Ref. 2). By assuming PORV actuation, the primary pressure remains below the high pressurizer pressure trip setpoint, thus the DNBR calculation is more conservative. As such, automatic actuation is not required to mitigate these events, and PORV automatic operation is, therefore, not an assumed safety function. Events that assume this condition include a turbine trip, loss of normal feedwater, and feedwater line break (Ref. 2).

Pressurizer PORVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

BASES

LCO

The LCO requires the PORVs and their associated block valves to be OPERABLE for manual operation to mitigate the effects associated with an SGTR, or loss of heat sink, and to achieve safety grade cold shutdown. The PORVs are considered OPERABLE in either the manual or automatic mode. The PORVs (PV-455A and PV-456A) are powered from 125 V MCCs 1/2AD1M and 1/2BD1M, respectively. If either or both of these MCCs become inoperable, the affected PORV(s) are to be considered inoperable.

By maintaining two PORVs and their associated block valves OPERABLE, the single failure criterion is satisfied.

An OPERABLE PORV is required to be capable of manually opening and closing, and not experiencing excessive seat leakage. Excessive seat leakage, although not associated with a specific criteria, exists when conditions dictate closure of the block valve to limit leakage.

An OPERABLE block valve may be either open and energized, or closed and energized with the capability to be opened, since the required safety function is accomplished by manual operation. Although typically open to allow PORV operation, the block valves may be OPERABLE when closed to isolate the flow path of an inoperable PORV that is capable of being manually cycled (e.g., as in the case of excessive PORV leakage). Similarly, isolation of an OPERABLE PORV does not render that PORV or block valve inoperable provided the relief function remains available with manual action. Satisfying the LCO helps minimize challenges to fission product barriers.

APPLICABILITY

The PORVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 for manual actuation to mitigate a steam generator tube rupture event, an inadvertent safety injection, and to achieve safety grade cold shutdown. In addition, the block valves are required to be OPERABLE to limit the potential for a small break LOCA through the flow path. The most likely cause for a PORV small break LOCA is a result of a pressure increase transient that causes the PORV to open. Imbalances in the energy output of the core and heat removal by the secondary system can cause the RCS pressure to increase to the PORV opening setpoint. The most rapid increases will occur at the higher operating power and pressure conditions of MODES 1 and 2. Pressure increases are less prominent in MODE 3 because the core input energy is reduced, but the RCS pressure is high. Therefore, the LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The LCO is not applicable in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in place when both pressure and core energy are decreased and the pressure surges become much less significant. LCO 3.4.12 addresses the PORV

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY requirements in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in place.
(continued)

ACTIONS Note 1 has been added to clarify that all pressurizer PORVs are treated as separate entities, each with separate Completion Times (i.e., the Completion Time is on a component basis). The exception for LCO 3.0.4, Note 2, permits entry into MODES 1, 2, and 3 with inoperable PORVs that are not capable of being manually cycled or inoperable block valves.

A.1

PORVs may be inoperable and capable of being manually cycled (e.g., excessive seat leakage, instrumentation problems, or other causes that do not create a possibility for a small break LOCA). In this condition, either the PORVs must be restored or the flow path isolated within 1 hour. The associated block valve is required to be closed, but power must be maintained to the associated block valve, since removal of power would render the block valve inoperable. The PORVs may be considered OPERABLE in either the manual or automatic mode. This permits operation of the plant until the next refueling outage (MODE 6) so that maintenance can be performed on the PORVs to eliminate the problem condition.

Quick access to the PORV for pressure control can be made when power remains on the closed block valve. The Completion Time of 1 hour is based on plant operating experience that has shown that minor problems can be corrected or closure accomplished in this time period.

B.1, B.2, and B.3

If one PORV is inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, it must be either restored or isolated by closing the associated block valve and removing the power to the associated block valve. The Completion Times of 1 hour are reasonable, based on challenges to the PORVs during this time period, and provide the operator adequate time to correct the situation. If the inoperable valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, it must be isolated within the specified time. Because there is at least one PORV that remains OPERABLE, an additional 72 hours is provided to restore the inoperable PORV to

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

OPERABLE status. If the PORV cannot be restored within this additional time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply, as required by Condition D.

C.1 and C.2

If one block valve is inoperable, then it is necessary to either restore the block valve to OPERABLE status within the Completion Time of 1 hour or place the associated PORV in manual control. The prime importance for the capability to close the block valve is to isolate a stuck open PORV. Therefore, if the block valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour, the Required Action is to place the PORV in manual control to preclude its automatic opening for an overpressure event and to avoid the potential for a stuck open PORV at a time that the block valve is inoperable. The Completion Time of 1 hour is reasonable, based on the small potential for challenges to the system during this time period, and provides the operator time to correct the situation. The time allowed to restore the block valve is based upon the Completion Time for restoring an inoperable PORV in Condition B since the PORV may not be capable of mitigating an event if the inoperable block valve is not fully open. If the block valve is restored within the Completion Time of 72 hours, the PORV may be restored to automatic operation. If it cannot be restored within this additional time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply, as required by Condition D.

D.1 and D.2

If the Required Action of Condition A, B, or C is not met, then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, maintaining PORV OPERABILITY may be required. See LCO 3.4.12.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSESPORV Performance (continued)

the mass injection transient of two centrifugal charging pumps and the positive displacement pump injecting into the RCS, and the heat injection transient of starting an RCP with the RCS 50°F colder than the secondary coolant. These analyses consider pressure overshoot and undershoot beyond the PORV opening and closing, resulting from signal processing and valve stroke times. The PORV setpoints at or below the derived limit ensures the Reference 1 P/T limits will be met.

-----NOTE-----

Although the positive displacement pump (PDP) was replaced with the normal charging pump (NCP), the current mass injection transient analysis assumes two centrifugal charging pumps and the positive displacement pump. Westinghouse performed an evaluation of the effect of replacing the PDP with the NCP and obtained acceptable results without reanalysis of the mass injection transient. Reference Westinghouse letter, GP-168.38 from J. L. Tain to J. B. Beasley, Jr., dated August 13, 1998, COPS PORV Setpoint for New Charging Pump.

The PORV setpoints in the PTLR will be updated when the revised P/T limits conflict with the COPS analysis limits. The P/T limits are periodically modified as the reactor vessel material toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement caused by neutron irradiation. Revised limits are determined using neutron fluence projections and the results of examinations of the reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens. The Bases for LCO 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits," discuss these examinations.

The PORVs are considered active components. Thus, the failure of one PORV is assumed to represent the worst case, single active failure.

RHR Suction Relief Valve Performance

The RHR suction relief valves do not have variable pressure and temperature lift setpoints like the PORVs. Analyses show that one RHR suction relief valve with a setpoint at or between 440 psig and 460 psig (Ref. 9) will pass flow greater than that required for the limiting COPS transient while maintaining RCS pressure less than the P/T limit curve.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

RHR Suction Relief Valve Performance (continued)

As the RCS P/T limits are decreased to reflect the loss of toughness in the reactor vessel materials due to neutron embrittlement, the RHR suction relief valves must be analyzed to still accommodate the design basis transients for COPS.

The RHR suction relief valves are considered active components. Thus, the failure of one valve is assumed to represent the worst case single active failure.

RCS Vent Performance

With the RCS depressurized, analyses show a vent size of 2.14 square inches (based on an equivalent length of 10 feet of pipe, i.e., a vent capable of relieving 670 gpm waterflow at 470 psig) is capable of mitigating the allowed COPS overpressure transient. The capacity of a vent this size is greater than the flow of the limiting transient for the COPS configuration, with both safety injection pumps incapable of injecting into the RCS, maintaining RCS pressure less than the maximum pressure on the P/T limit curve.

The RCS vent size will be re-evaluated for compliance each time the P/T limit curves are revised based on the results of the vessel material surveillance.

The RCS vent is passive and is not subject to active failure.

The COPS satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

This LCO requires that the COPS is OPERABLE. The COPS is OPERABLE when the minimum coolant input and pressure relief capabilities are OPERABLE. Violation of this LCO could lead to the loss of low temperature overpressure mitigation and violation of the Reference 1 limits as a result of an operational transient.

To limit the coolant input capability, the LCO requires both safety injection pumps to be incapable of injecting into the RCS and all accumulator discharge isolation valves closed and immobilized when accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR.

(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued)

The elements of the LCO that provide low temperature overpressure mitigation through pressure relief are:

a. Two RCS relief valves, as follows:

1. Two OPERABLE PORVs; or

A PORV is OPERABLE for the COPS when its block valve is open, its lift setpoint is set to the limit required by the PTLR and testing proves its ability to open at this setpoint, and motive power is available to the two valves and their control circuits. The PORVs (PV-455A and PV-456A) are powered from 125 V MCCs 1/2AD1M and 1/2BD1M, respectively. The PORVs are to be considered OPERABLE whenever these MCCs are available to supply power.

2. Two OPERABLE RHR suction relief valves; or

An RHR suction relief valve is OPERABLE for the COPS when its RHR suction isolation valve and its RHR suction valve are open, its setpoint is at or between 440 psig and 460 psig, and testing has proven its ability to open at this setpoint.

3. One OPERABLE PORV and one OPERABLE RHR suction relief valve; or

b. A depressurized RCS and an RCS vent.

An RCS vent is OPERABLE when open with an area of ≥ 2.14 square inches (based on an equivalent length of 10 feet of pipe, i.e., capable of relieving 670 gpm at 470 psig).

Each of these methods of overpressure prevention is capable of mitigating the limiting COPS transient.

APPLICABILITY

This LCO is applicable in MODE 4, in MODE 5, and in MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on. The pressurizer safety valves provide overpressure protection that meets the Reference 1 P/T limits. When the reactor vessel head is off, overpressurization cannot occur.

LCO 3.4.3 provides the operational P/T limits for all MODES. LCO 3.4.10, "Pressurizer Safety Valves," requires the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

C.1

If a Required Action and the associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met or if the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 is in the unacceptable region of Figure 3.4.16-1, the reactor must be brought to MODE 3 with RCS average temperature < 500°F within 6 hours. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 below 500°F from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.16.1

SR 3.4.16.1 requires performing gross specific activity of the reactor coolant at least once every 7 days. Gross specific activity is basically a quantitative measure of radionuclides with half lives longer than 14 minutes, excluding all radioiodines. It is the sum of concentrations of individually identified nuclides, liquid and gaseous, counted within 2 hours after the sample is taken and extrapolated back to when the sample was taken. Determination of the contributors to the gross specific activity shall be based upon those gamma energy peaks identifiable with a 95% confidence level. The latest available data may be used for pure beta-emitting radionuclides. This Surveillance provides an indication of any increase in gross specific activity.

Trending the results of this Surveillance allows proper remedial action to be taken before reaching the LCO limit under normal operating conditions. The Surveillance is applicable in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with T_{avg} at least 500°F. The 7 day Frequency considers the unlikelihood of a gross fuel failure during the time.

SR 3.4.16.2

This Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 only to ensure iodine remains within limit during normal operation and following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. The 14 day Frequency is adequate to trend changes in the iodine activity level, considering gross activity is

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.5.4.3

The boron concentration of the RWST should be verified every 7 days to be within the required limits. This SR ensures that the reactor will remain subcritical following a LOCA, and that boron precipitation in the core will not occur. Further, it assures that the resulting sump pH will be maintained in an acceptable range so that the effect of chloride and stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components will be minimized. Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a 7 day sampling Frequency to verify boron concentration is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.5.4.4

(LI-0990, LI-0991)

This Surveillance demonstrates that each automatic sludge mixing pump isolation valve actuates to the closed position on an actual or simulated RWST low-level signal. Automatic isolation of this system is required to ensure adequate RWST level during a Design Bases Event. The 18 month Frequency is acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15.
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BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.5.1 (continued)

based on engineering judgment and is consistent with other ECCS valve Surveillance Frequencies. The Frequency has proven to be acceptable through operating experience.

The requirements for charging flow vary widely according to plant status and configuration. When charging flow is adjusted, the positions of the air-operated valves which control charging flow are adjusted to balance the flows through the charging header and through the seal injection header to ensure that the seal injection flow to the reactor coolant pumps is maintained between 8 and 13 gpm per pump. The reference minimum differential pressure across the seal injection needle valves ensures that regardless of the varied settings of the charging flow control valves that are required to support optimum charging flow, a reference test condition can be established to ensure that flows across the needle valves are within the safety analysis. The values in the safety analysis for this reference set of conditions are calculated based on conditions during power operation and they are correlated to the minimum ECCS flow to be maintained under the most limiting accident conditions.

As noted, the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 8 hours after the RCS pressure has stabilized within a ± 20 psig range of normal operating pressure. The RCS pressure requirement is specified since this configuration will produce the required pressure conditions necessary to assure that the manual valves are set correctly. The exception is limited to 8 hours to ensure that the Surveillance is timely.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15.
 2. 10 CFR 50.46.
 3. Westinghouse Calculation FRSS/SS-GAE-952.
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BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

The 6 day portion of the Completion Time for Required Action B.1 is based upon engineering judgment. It takes into account the low probability of coincident entry into two Conditions in this Specification coupled with the low probability of an accident occurring during this time. Refer to Section 1.3 for a more detailed discussion of the purpose of the "from discovery of failure to meet the LCO" portion of the Completion Time.

C.1 and C.2

If the inoperable containment spray or cooling train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 84 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The extended interval to reach MODE 5 allows additional time for attempting restoration of the containment spray or cooling train and is reasonable when considering the driving force for a release of radioactive material from the Reactor Coolant System is reduced in MODE 3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.6.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the containment spray flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for Containment Spray System operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves outside containment (only check valves are inside containment) and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

In addition, the minimum available AFW flow and system characteristics are serious considerations in the analysis of a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

The AFW System design is such that it can perform its function following an FWLB between the MFW isolation valves and containment, combined with a loss of offsite power following turbine trip, and a single active failure of the steam turbine driven AFW pump. In such a case, the ESFAS logic may not detect the affected steam generator if the backflow check valve to the affected MFW header worked properly. One motor driven AFW pump would deliver to the broken MFW header (limited by flow restrictor installed in the AFW line) until the problem was detected, and flow terminated by the operator. Sufficient flow would be delivered to the intact steam generators by the other AFW line and the redundant AFW pump.

The ESFAS automatically actuates the AFW turbine driven pump and associated power operated valves and controls when required to ensure an adequate feedwater supply to the steam generators during loss of power. DC power operated valves are provided for each AFW line to control the AFW flow to each steam generator.

The AFW System satisfies the requirements of Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

This LCO provides assurance that the AFW System will perform its design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in overpressurization of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Three independent AFW pumps in three diverse trains are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of RHR capability for all events accompanied by a loss of offsite power and a single failure. This is accomplished by powering two of the pumps from independent emergency buses. The third AFW pump is powered by a different means, a steam driven turbine supplied with steam from a source that is not isolated by closure of the MSIVs. The steam supply valves (1/2HV-3019 and 1/2HV-3009) for the turbine driven AFW pump are powered from 125 V MCCs 1/2AD1M and 1/2BD1M, respectively. Suction header valve 1/2HV-5113, pump block valve 1/2HV-5106, and discharge header valves 1/2HV-5120, 5122, 5125, and 5127 are powered from 125 V MCC 1/2CD1M. If 125 V MCC 1/2AD1M or 1/2BD1M becomes inoperable, the affected steam supply valve is to be considered inoperable. If both 1/2AD1M and 1/2BD1M become

(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued)

inoperable, the turbine driven AFW train is to be considered inoperable. If 125 V MCC 1/2CD1M becomes inoperable, the turbine driven AFW train is to be considered inoperable.

The AFW System is configured into three trains. The AFW System is considered OPERABLE when the components and flow paths required to provide redundant AFW flow to the steam generators are OPERABLE. This requires that the two motor driven AFW pumps be OPERABLE in two diverse paths, each supplying AFW to separate steam generators. The turbine driven AFW pump is required to be OPERABLE with redundant steam supplies from each of two main steam lines upstream of the MSIVs, and shall be capable of supplying AFW to any of the steam generators. The piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls in the required flow paths also are required to be OPERABLE. The AFW pumphouse ESF supply fans and associated dampers must be OPERABLE to support operation of the motor driven pumps, and the ESF outside air intake and exhaust dampers must be OPERABLE to support operation of the turbine driven pump.

Although the AFW System can be used in MODE 4 to add to SG inventory when the SG is being used to support RCS operability requirements in accordance with LCO 3.4.6, the LCO does not require the AFW System to be OPERABLE in MODE 4.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the AFW System is required to be OPERABLE in the event that it is called upon to function when the MFW is lost.

In MODE 4 the AFW System may be used for heat removal via the steam generators, but is not required since the RHR System is available in this MODE.

In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators are not normally used for heat removal, and the AFW System is not required.

ACTIONS

A.1

If one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven AFW train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on the following reasons:

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

- a. The redundant OPERABLE steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump;
- b. The availability of redundant OPERABLE motor driven AFW pumps; and
- c. The low probability of an event occurring that requires the inoperable steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.

The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The AND connector between 7 days and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

B.1

With one of the required AFW trains (pump or flow path) inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours. This Condition includes the loss of two steam supply lines to the turbine driven AFW pump. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on redundant capabilities afforded by the AFW System, time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.

The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.5.2 (continued)

testing each pump once every 3 months, as required by Ref. 2.

In addition to the acceptance criteria of the Inservice Testing Program, performance of this SR also verifies that pump performance is greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the safety analysis.

This SR is modified by a Note allowing the SR to be deferred until suitable test conditions are established. This deferral may be required because there may be insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.

SR 3.7.5.3

This SR verifies that AFW can be delivered to the appropriate steam generator in the event of any accident or transient that generates an ESFAS, by demonstrating that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. This surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. However, for the turbine driven AFW train this SR may be performed in conjunction with ASME Section XI full flow check valve testing which must be performed when steam is available to run the turbine driven AFW pump. The 18 month Frequency is acceptable based on operating experience and the design reliability of the equipment.

SR 3.7.5.4

This SR verifies that the AFW pumps will start in the event of any accident or transient that generates an ESFAS by demonstrating that each AFW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. However, for the turbine driven AFW train this SR must be performed when steam is available to run the pump.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.5.4 (continued)

This SR is modified by a Note allowing the SR to be deferred until suitable test conditions are established. This deferral may be required because there may be insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.

SR 3.7.5.5 and SR 3.7.5.6

These surveillances demonstrate that each AFW pumphouse ESF supply fan 1/2-1593-B7-001 and 1/2-1593-B7-002 and associated shutoff dampers actuate to their correct position on a simulated or actual high room temperature signal, and that the ESF outside air intake and exhaust dampers for the turbine-driven AFW pump actuate to the correct position on a simulated or actual turbine-driven AFW pump automatic start signal. These HVAC systems provide ventilation to limit the air temperature in the AFW pump rooms and are required to support the OPERABILITY of the associated AFW pump. The frequency of 18 months has been shown to be adequate to verify the required equipment actuations based on operating experience and is consistent with similar component actuation testing requirements for other ESF systems.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Subsection 10.4.9.
 2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.
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BASES

LCO
(continued)

- d. Cooling coils and associated temperature control equipment are capable of performing their function.

In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors.

The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the control room boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls without requiring entry into the Condition for an inoperable pressure boundary. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening when a need for control room isolation is indicated.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, CREFS must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure and maintain control room temperature during and following a DBA.

ACTIONS

The following ACTIONS have been developed to take credit for the redundancy and inherent flexibility designed into the four 100% capacity CREFS trains. These ACTIONS were reviewed to ensure that the system function would be maintained under accident conditions coupled with a postulated single failure. The results of this review are documented in Reference 3.

A.1

With a single CREFS train inoperable for reasons other than Condition D, action must be taken to restore the CREFS train to OPERABLE status, or one train of CREFS in the unaffected unit must be placed in the emergency mode of operation within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREFS train is adequate to perform the control room protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CREFS train could result in a loss of the CREFS function for the affected unit. Placing one CREFS train in the unaffected unit in the emergency mode of operation ensures the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

control room remains protected for all postulated accident and single failure conditions. In addition, the capability of the CREFS to pressurize the control room, limit the radiation dose, and provide adequate cooling remains undiminished. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring during this time interval that would require CREFS operation and the capability of the remaining OPERABLE CREFS train to provide protection for the control room.

B.1

With one CREFS train inoperable in each unit for reasons other than Condition D, action must be taken to restore the CREFS trains to OPERABLE status or the two remaining OPERABLE CREFS trains must be placed in the emergency mode of operation within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREFS trains are adequate to perform the control room protection function for each unit. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in one of the OPERABLE CREFS trains could result in a loss of the CREFS function for the affected unit. Placing one CREFS train in the emergency mode of operation in each unit ensures the control room remains protected for all postulated accident and single failure conditions. In addition, the capability of the CREFS to pressurize the control room, limit the radiation dose, and provide adequate cooling remains undiminished. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring during this time interval that would require CREFS operation and the capability of the remaining OPERABLE CREFS trains to provide protection for the control room.

C.1

With two CREFS trains inoperable in one unit for reasons other than Condition D, action must be taken to protect the control room for the affected unit immediately. In this condition, there is no CREFS function for one unit. The two CREFS trains in the unaffected unit must be placed in the emergency mode of operation immediately. Placing two CREFS trains in the emergency mode of operation in the unaffected unit ensures the control room remains protected for all postulated accident and single failure conditions. In addition, the capability of the CREFS to pressurize the control room, limit the radiation dose, and provide adequate cooling remains undiminished. Due to the loss of the CREFS function for one unit, the completion time of immediately is specified.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

D.1

If the control room boundary is inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CREFS trains cannot perform their intended functions. Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE control room boundary within 24 hours. During the period that the control room boundary is inoperable, appropriate compensatory measures (consistent with the intent of GDC 19) will be utilized to provide physical security and to protect control room operators from potential hazards such as radioactive contamination, smoke, temperature, and relative humidity. Preplanned measures should be available to address these concerns for intentional and unintentional entry into the condition. These preplanned measures will include, but not necessarily be limited to, suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and/or loads over irradiated fuel assemblies within the fuel handling building. The 24-hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period and the use of compensatory measures. The 24-hour Completion Time is a typically reasonable time to test, diagnose, plan, and possibly execute a repair of most problems with the control room boundary.

E.1

With the control room air temperature outside its limit, action must be taken to restore the air temperature to within the limit within 7 days. If the control room air temperature exceeds its limit, the ability of a single train of CREFS to maintain control room temperature after a CRI may be affected. The completion time of 7 days is reasonable considering the number of CREFS trains available to perform the required temperature control function and the low probability of an event occurring that would require the CREFS operation during that time.

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that states LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. In consideration of the number of redundant CREFS trains available, the small variation in temperature expected between 12 hour surveillances, and the marginal impact small temperature variations may have on the ability of a CREFS train to maintain the control room temperature within limits, an exception to LCO 3.0.4 is applicable for this condition.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

F.1, F.2, and F.3

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Conditions A, B, C, D, or E are not met, action must be taken to place the unit in a condition where the inoperable CREFS train(s) are no longer required. Locking closed the outside air (OSA) dampers in the affected unit and locking open the OSA dampers in the unaffected unit within 1 hour, ensure that all control room air intake is monitored by redundant radiogas monitors that actuate OPERABLE CREFS trains. The affected unit(s) must also be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 5 within the following 36 hours, which removes the requirement for control room protection in the event of an SI in the affected unit(s). These actions ensure that if the control room cannot be protected from all postulated accident and single failure conditions, the unit or units are placed in a MODE where the protection is no longer required. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the Required Actions and to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner without challenging unit systems.

All the Required Actions are modified by a Note that clarifies the application of LCO 3.0.4. Since the shutdown actions may only apply to the affected unit and the unaffected unit may continue to operate, LCO 3.0.4 does not apply to the unaffected unit in this Condition.

Required Action F.1 is modified by a Note that excepts Conditions B, D, and E. Conditions B, D, and E affect both units, and Required Action F.1 is based on a single affected unit. Therefore, upon entry into Condition F from Condition B, D, or E, only Required Actions F.2 and F.3 apply.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.10.1

The CREFS is required to maintain the control room temperature $\leq 85^{\circ}\text{F}$ in the event of a CRI. The maintenance of the control room below this temperature ensures the operational requirements of equipment located in the control room will not be exceeded. To accomplish this function, the CREFS air flow is directed through cooling coils which are supplied by the Essential Chilled Water System. The design cooling capacity of the CREFS and the limitation of the normal control room ambient temperature (before CRI) ensure the capability of the CREFS to maintain the

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.10.1 (continued)

control room temperature within limit after a CRI. The control room temperature is verified every 12 hours, and operating experience has proven this Frequency to be adequate.

SR 3.7.10.2

Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not too severe, testing each train once every month provides an adequate check of this system. Monthly operations with the heater control circuit energized allows the heaters to operate as necessary to reduce the humidity in the ambient air and ensure excessive moisture (> 70% relative humidity) is removed from the adsorber and HEPA filters. Systems with heaters must be operated for ≥ 10 continuous hours with the heater control circuit energized and flow (FI-12191, FI-12192) through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. The 31 day Frequency is based on the reliability of the equipment and the two train per unit redundancy availability.

SR 3.7.10.3

This SR verifies that the required CREFS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CREFS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 4). The VFTP includes testing the performance of the HEPA filter, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.10.4

This SR verifies that each CREFS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The Frequency of 18 months is specified in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 3).

SR 3.7.10.5

This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure, and the assumed inleakage rates of the potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper functioning of the CREFS. During the emergency mode of operation, the CREFS is designed to pressurize the control room

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.10.5 (continued)

≥ 0.125 inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas in order to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The CREFS is designed to maintain this positive pressure with one train at a makeup flow rate of 1500 cfm. The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-0800 (Ref. 5).

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.4.
 2. FSAR, Chapter 15.
 3. VEGP Calculation No. X6CNA.09.01, Control Room HVAC Technical Specifications, October 21, 1988.
 4. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2.
 5. NUREG-0800, Section 6.4, Rev. 2, July 1981.
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B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS — One Unit Operating)

BASES

BACKGROUND	A description of the CREFS is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.10, "CREFS — Both Units Operating."
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	<p>The Applicable Safety Analyses section of the Bases for LCO 3.7.10 also applies to this Bases section.</p> <p>The CREFS provides airborne radiological protection for the control room operators in the event of the most limiting design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in the operating unit as well as for a design basis fuel handling accident in the shutdown unit.</p>
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LCO	<p>As this LCO requires all four CREFS trains OPERABLE, the LCO section of the Bases for LCO 3.7.10 also applies to this Bases section.</p> <p>The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the control room boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls without requiring entry into the Condition for an inoperable pressure boundary. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening when a need for control room isolation is indicated.</p>
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APPLICABILITY	<p>In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the CREFS must be OPERABLE to control the operators' exposure to radiation and maintain the control room temperature during and following a design basis LOCA in the operating unit.</p> <p>The LCO requirements and ACTIONS of this LCO bound the movement of irradiated fuel or CORE ALTERATIONS in the shutdown unit as well. During movement of irradiated fuel or</p>
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(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)

CORE ALTERATIONS, the CREFS must be OPERABLE to control the operators' exposure to radiation and maintain the control room temperature during and following a design basis radiological release.

ACTIONS

The following ACTIONS have been developed to take credit for the redundancy and inherent flexibility designed into the four 100% capacity CREFS trains.

These ACTIONS were reviewed to ensure that the system function would be maintained under accident conditions coupled with a postulated single failure. The results of this review are documented in Reference 1.

A.1

With a single CREFS train inoperable in the operating unit for reasons other than Condition F, action must be taken to restore the CREFS train to OPERABLE status or one CREFS train in the shutdown unit must be placed in the emergency mode of operation within 7 days. In this condition the remaining OPERABLE CREFS train is adequate to perform the control room protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CREFS train could result in a loss of the CREFS function for the operating unit. Placing one CREFS train in the shutdown unit in the emergency mode of operation ensures the control room remains protected for all postulated accident and single failure conditions. In addition, the capability of the CREFS to pressurize the control room, limit the radiation dose, and provide adequate cooling remains undiminished. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring during this time interval that would require CREFS operation and the capability of the remaining OPERABLE CREFS train to provide protection for the control room.

B.1 and B.2

With a single CREFS train inoperable in the shutdown unit for reasons other than Condition F, action must be taken to restore the CREFS train to OPERABLE status or lock closed the outside air (OSA) dampers in the shutdown unit and lock open the OSA dampers in the operating unit or one train of CREFS in the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

operating unit must be placed in the emergency mode of operation within 7 days.

In this condition the remaining OPERABLE CREFS train is adequate to perform the control room protection function.

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CREFS train could result in a loss of the CREFS function for the shutdown unit. Locking closed the OSA dampers in the shutdown unit and locking open the OSA dampers in the operating unit ensure that all control room air intake is monitored by redundant radiogas monitors that actuate OPERABLE CREFS trains. Placing one CREFS train in the operating unit in the emergency mode of operation ensures the control room remains protected for all postulated accident and single failure conditions. In addition, the capability of the CREFS to pressurize the control room, limit the radiation dose, and provide adequate cooling remains undiminished. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring during this time interval that would require CREFS operation and the capability of the remaining OPERABLE CREFS train to provide protection for the control room.

C.1 and C.2

With one CREFS train inoperable in each unit for reasons other than Condition F, action must be taken to restore the CREFS trains to OPERABLE status or lock close the OSA dampers in the shutdown unit and lock open the OSA dampers in the operating unit and place the OPERABLE CREFS train in the shutdown unit in the emergency mode within 7 days. Locking closed the OSA dampers in the shutdown unit and locking open the OSA dampers in the operating unit ensure that all control room air intake is monitored by redundant radiogas monitors that actuate an OPERABLE CREFS train. Placing the OPERABLE CREFS train of the shutdown unit in the emergency mode of operation ensures the control room remains protected for all postulated accident and single failure conditions.

In addition, the capability of the CREFS to pressurize the control room, limit the radiation dose, and provide adequate cooling remains undiminished. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring during this time interval that would require CREFS operation and the capability of the remaining OPERABLE CREFS train to provide protection for the control room.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

D.1

With two CREFS trains inoperable in the operating unit for reasons other than Condition F, action must be taken to place both CREFS trains in the shutdown unit in the emergency mode immediately. In this condition, there is no CREFS function for the operating unit. The two CREFS trains in the shutdown unit must be placed in the emergency mode of operation immediately. Placing two CREFS trains in the emergency mode of operation in the shutdown unit ensures the control room remains protected for all postulated accident and single failure conditions. In addition, the capability of the CREFS to pressurize the control room, limit the radiation dose, and provide adequate cooling remains undiminished. Due to the loss of the CREFS function for one unit, the completion time of immediately is specified.

E.1 and E.2

With two trains inoperable in the shutdown unit for reasons other than Condition F, action must be taken to lock close the OSA dampers in the shutdown unit and lock open the OSA dampers in the operating unit or place both the operating unit CREFS trains in the emergency mode immediately. In this condition, there is no CREFS function for the shutdown unit. Locking closed the OSA dampers in the shutdown unit and locking open the OSA dampers in the operating unit ensure that all control room air intake is monitored by redundant radiogas monitors that actuate OPERABLE CREFS trains. Placing two CREFS trains in the emergency mode of operation in the operating unit ensures the control room remains protected for all postulated accident and single failure conditions. In addition, the capability of the CREFS to pressurize the control room, limit the radiation dose, and provide adequate cooling remains undiminished. Due to the loss of the CREFS function for one unit, the completion time of immediately is specified.

F.1

If the control room boundary is inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CREFS trains cannot perform their intended functions. Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE control room boundary within 24 hours. During the period that the control room boundary is inoperable, appropriate compensatory measures (consistent with the intent of GDC 19) will be utilized to provide physical security and to protect control room operators from potential hazards such as radioactive contamination, smoke,

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

F.1 (continued)

temperature, and relative humidity. Preplanned measures should be available to address these concerns for intentional and unintentional entry into the condition. These preplanned measures will include, but not necessarily be limited to, suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and/or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and/or loads over irradiated fuel assemblies. The 24-hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period and the use of compensatory measures. The 24-hour Completion Time is a typically reasonable time to test, diagnose, plan, and possibly execute a repair of most problems with the control room boundary.

G.1

With the control room air temperature outside its limit, action must be taken to restore the air temperature to within the limit within 7 days. If the control room air temperature exceeds its limit, the ability of a single train of CREFS to maintain control room temperature after a CRI may be affected. The completion time of 7 days is reasonable considering the number of CREFS trains available to perform the required temperature control function and the low probability of an event occurring that would require the CREFS operation during that time.

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that states LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. In consideration of the number of redundant CREFS trains available, the small variation in temperature expected between 12 hour surveillances, and the marginal impact small temperature variations may have on the ability of a CREFS train to maintain the control room temperature within limits, an exception to LCO 3.0.4 is applicable for this condition.

H.1 and H.2

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times for the operating unit are not met, action must be taken to place the unit in a condition where the inoperable CREFS train(s) are no longer required. The operating unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours, which removes the requirement for control room protection in the event of an SI in the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

H.1 and H.2 (continued)

operating unit. These actions ensure that if the control room cannot be protected from all postulated accident and single failure conditions, the unit is placed in a MODE where the protection is no longer required. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.11.1

SR 3.7.11.1 requires that the SRs specified in LCO 3.7.10 be applicable for this LCO as well. The description and Frequencies of those required SRs are included in the Bases for LCO 3.7.10.

REFERENCES

1. VEGP Calculation No. X6CNA.09.01, Control Room HVAC Technical Specifications, October 21, 1988.
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BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

moisture removal. The primary purpose of the heaters is to maintain the relative humidity at an acceptable level; however, the VEGP dose analysis assumes no heater operation and an iodine removal efficiency consistent with the iodine removal efficiency in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 4) for systems designed to operate inside primary containment (i.e., no humidity control). Therefore, the heaters are not required for PPAFES OPERABILITY.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The PPAFES design basis is established by the large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The system evaluation assumes 2 gpm continuous leakage and a 50 gpm leak for 30 minutes due to a passive failure during a Design Basis Accident (DBA). The system restricts the radioactive release to within the 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 4) limits, or the NRC staff approved licensing basis (e.g., a specified fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits). The analysis of the effects and consequences of a large break LOCA are presented in Reference 3.

The PPAFES satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

Two independent and redundant trains of the PPAFES are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one train is available, assuming there is a single failure disabling the other train coincident with a loss of offsite power.

The PPAFES is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control radioactive releases are OPERABLE in both trains. A PPAFES train is considered OPERABLE when its associated:

- a. Fan is OPERABLE;
- b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and
- c. Demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE and air circulation can be maintained.

The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the PPAFES boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls without requiring entry into the Condition for an inoperable pressure boundary. For

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening when a need for PPAFES isolation is indicated.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the PPAFES is required to be OPERABLE, consistent with the OPERABILITY requirements of the ECCS.

In MODE 5 or 6, the PPAFES is not required to be OPERABLE since the ECCS is not required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one PPAFES train inoperable, the action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. During this period, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the PPAFES function. The 7 day Completion Time is appropriate because the risk contribution of the PPAFES is less than that of the ECCS (72 hour Completion Time), and this system is not a direct support system for the ECCS. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period, and the remaining train providing the required capability.

B.1

If the PPAFES boundary is inoperable, the PPAFES trains cannot perform their intended function. Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE PPAFES boundary within 24 hours. During the period that the PPAFES boundary is inoperable, appropriate compensatory measures (consistent with the intent, as applicable, of GDC 19, 60, 64 and 10 CFR 100) will be utilized to ensure the necessary physical security and to minimize the release of radioactive material to the atmosphere outside the building. Preplanned measures should be available to address these concerns for intentional and unintentional entry into the condition. The 24-hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

probability of a DBA occurring during this time period and the use of compensatory measures. The 24-hour Completion Time is a typically reasonable time to test, diagnose, and plan and possibly execute a repair of most problems with the PPAFES boundary.

C.1 and C.2

If the inoperable train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.13.1

Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once every month provides an adequate check on this system. Flow (FI-12629 and FI-12542) through the HEPA and charcoal filters is verified. Systems that do not take credit for humidity control (heaters) need only be operated for ≥ 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system. The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of equipment and the two train redundancy available.

SR 3.7.13.2

This SR verifies that the required PPAFES testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The PPAFES filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 5). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.7.13.3

This SR verifies that each PPAFES starts and operates on an actual or simulated containment ventilation isolation signal. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with that specified in Reference 5.

SR 3.7.13.4

This SR verifies the integrity of the penetration room enclosure. The ability of the penetration room to maintain a negative pressure, with respect to potentially uncontaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper function of PPAFES. During the post accident mode of operation, the PPAFES is designed to maintain a negative pressure ≥ 0.250 inches water gauge relative to atmospheric pressure (PDI-2550 and PDI-2551 in rooms R1-63 and R1-64) at a flow rate of $15,500 \pm 10\%$ cfm in the penetration room to prevent unfiltered LEAKAGE. The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-0800 (Ref. 6).

The minimum system flow rate maintains a slight negative pressure in the penetration room area, and provides sufficient air velocity to transport particulate contaminants, assuming only one filter train is operating. The number of filter elements is selected to limit the flow rate through any individual element to about $15,500 \pm 10\%$ cfm. The maximum limit ensures that the flow through, and pressure drop across, each filter element are not excessive.

The number and depth of the adsorber elements ensure that, at the maximum flow rate, the residence time of the air stream in the charcoal bed achieves the desired adsorption rate. At least a 0.250 second residence time per 2 inch of bed depth is necessary for an assumed 90% efficiency.

The filters have a certain pressure drop at the design flow rate when clean. The magnitude of the pressure drop indicates acceptable performance, and is based on manufacturers' recommendations for the filter and adsorber elements at the design flow rate. An increase in pressure drop or a decrease in flow indicates that the filter is being loaded or that there are other problems with the system.

This test is conducted along with the tests for filter penetration; thus, the 18 month Frequency is consistent with that specified in Reference 5.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Subsection 6.5.1.
 2. FSAR, Subsection 9.4.3.
 3. FSAR, Subsection 15.6.5.
 4. 10 CFR 100.
 5. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2.
 6. NUREG-0800, Section 6.5.1, Rev. 2, July 1981.
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BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Each DG building contains two ventilation supply fans and associated dampers. The ventilation supply fans are required to limit the DG building air temperature to $\leq 120^{\circ}\text{F}$ to support the operation of the associated DG. The fans in each DG building and associated dampers start and actuate on different signals. Fans 1/2-1566-B7-001 (train A) and 1/2-1566-B7-002 (train B) start automatically and the necessary intake and discharge dampers actuate to the correct position on a train associated DG running signal and fans 1/2-1566-B7-003 and 1/2-1566-B7-004 start automatically and the necessary intake and discharge dampers actuate to the correct position on high DG building temperature signal coincident with a DG running signal.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4), and in the FSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 5), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DGs are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that fuel, Reactor Coolant System and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

Since diesel fuel oil, lube oil, air start, and ventilation subsystems support the operation of the standby AC power sources, they satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

Stored diesel fuel oil is required to have sufficient supply for 7 days of full load operation. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a capacity equivalent to 85,362 gallons (Ref. 8) is required to provide for ≥ 7 days of operation supplying the maximum post loss of coolant accident load demand. However, in MODES 5 and 6, the highest DG loading identified for either train is significantly less than the maximum post loss of coolant accident loading for MODES 1 through 4, and the capacity of one storage tank is sufficient to provide for ≥ 7 days of DG operation. It is also required to meet specific standards for quality. Additionally, sufficient lubricating

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.5 (continued)

fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies are established by Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 2). This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this SR, provided the accumulated water is removed during performance of the Surveillance.

SR 3.8.3.6

This surveillance demonstrates that each DG ventilation supply fan starts automatically and the necessary dampers actuate to the correct position on a simulated or actual actuation signal. The two fans in each DG building and associated dampers start and actuate on different signals. Fans 1/2-1566-B7-001 (train A) and 1/2-1566-B7-002 (train B) start automatically and the necessary intake and discharge dampers actuate to the correct position on a train associated DG running signal and fans 1/2-1566-B7-003 and 1/2-1566-B7-004 start automatically and the necessary intake and discharge dampers actuate to the correct position on high DG building temperature signal coincident with a DG running signal. The frequency of 18 months has been shown to be adequate to verify the required equipment actuations based on operating experience and is consistent with similar component actuation testing requirements for other ESF systems.

SR 3.8.3.7

Draining of the fuel oil stored in the supply tanks, removal of accumulated sediment, and tank cleaning are required at 10 year intervals by Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 2), paragraph 2.f. To preclude the introduction of surfactants in the fuel oil system, the cleaning should be accomplished using sodium hypochlorite solutions, or their equivalent, rather than soap or detergents. This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of sediment does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR, provided that accumulated sediment is removed during performance of the Surveillance.

While this SR is being performed, the requirement for sufficient fuel oil to support ≥ 7 days of operation may be met by alternate means as discussed in FSAR section 9.5.4.2.2.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.1 (continued)

Note that in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a capacity equivalent to 85,362 gallons (Ref. 8) is required to provide for ≥ 7 days operation at full load. In MODES 5 and 6 only one storage tank is required to provide for ≥ 7 days DG operation.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.3 (continued)

The particulate concentration limit is 10 mg/l. Each tank must be considered and tested separately.

The Frequency of this test takes into consideration fuel oil degradation trends that indicate that particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Frequency intervals.

SR 3.8.3.4

This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for each DG is available. The system design requirements provide for a minimum of five engine start cycles without recharging. The duration of each start cycle is about 3 seconds or two to three engine revolutions. The pressure specified in this SR is intended to reflect the lowest value at which the five starts can be accomplished. (PI-9060, PI-9061, PI-9064, PI-9065)

The 31 day Frequency takes into account the capacity, capability, redundancy, and diversity of the AC sources and other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure.

SR 3.8.3.5

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel storage tanks once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, and contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.8.3.7 (continued)

The SR is modified by a Note that excepts the performance of this SR when the associated DG is required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2. This exception is consistent with the SR performance exceptions in LCO 3.8.2 for SRs that might impact the OPERABILITY of the DGs.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Paragraph 9.5.4.2.
 2. Regulatory Guide 1.137.
 3. ANSI N195-1976, Appendix B.
 4. FSAR, Chapter 6.
 5. FSAR, Chapter 15.
 6. ASTM Standards: D4057-81; D975-81; D4176-82; D1552-79; D2622-82; D2276-78.
 7. ASTM Standards, D975, Table 1.
 8. Southern Company Services Calculation number X4C2403V08, Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Consumption and Storage Tank Capacity.
 9. Southern Company Services Calculation number X4C2403V10, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Technical Specification Values.
 10. Southern Company Services Calculation numbers X4C2403V11 and X4C2403V12, Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Inventory Technical Specification Values.
 11. Southern Company Services Calculation number X4C2403V09, Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air Pressure Technical Specification Value.
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Table B 3.8.9-1 (page 1 of 1)
AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems

TYPE	VOLTAGE	TRAIN A*	TRAIN B*
AC safety buses	4160 V	Switchgear ESF Bus 1/2AA02	Switchgear ESF Bus 1/2BA03
	480 V	Switchgear 1/2AB04 1/2AB05 1/2AB15	Switchgear 1/2BB06 1/2BB07 1/2BB16
	480 V	Motor Control Centers 1/2ABE, 1/2ABA, 1/2ABC, 1/2ABF, 1/2ABB, 1/2ABD	Motor Control Centers 1/2BBE, 1/2BBA, 1/2BBC, 1/2BBF, 1/2BBB, 1/2BBD
DC buses***	125 V	Switchgear 1/2AD1 1/2CD1	Switchgear 1/2BD1 1/2DD1
	125 V	Distribution Panels 1/2AD11, 1/2AD12, 1/2CD11	Distribution Panels 1/2BD11, 1/2BD12, 1/2DD11
AC vital buses	120 V	Distribution Panels Channel I 1/2AY1A, 1/2AY2A Channel III 1/2CY1A Associated Regulating Transformers**	Distribution Panels Channel II 1/2BY1B, 1/2BY2B Channel IV 1/2DY1B Associated Regulating Transformers**

* Each train of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is a subsystem.

** A regulating transformer is a component of the Electrical Power Distribution Systems only when it is in service providing power to a 120 VAC vital bus.

***Operability of 125 V Motor Control Centers 1/2AD1M and 1/2BD1M is addressed by LCOs 3.4.11, 3.4.12, and 3.7.5. Operability of Motor Control Center 1/2CD1M is addressed by LCO 3.7.5.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations

BASES

BACKGROUND

During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment when the LCO requirements are met. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment OPERABLE as described in LCO 3.6.1, "Containment." In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent. The LCO requirements are referred to as "containment closure" rather than "containment OPERABILITY." Containment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being closed. Since there is no potential for containment pressurization, the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J leakage criteria and tests are not required.

The containment serves to contain fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100. Additionally, the containment provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving large equipment and components into and out of containment. If closed, the equipment hatch must be held in place by at least four bolts. Good engineering practice dictates that the bolts required by this LCO be approximately equally spaced. Alternatively, the equipment hatch can be open provided it can be installed with a minimum of four bolts holding it in place.

The containment air locks, which are also part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 in accordance with LCO 3.6.2, "Containment Air Locks." Each air lock has a door at both ends. The doors are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY is

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

In MODE 6, the 24 inch main or shutdown purge and exhaust valves are used to exchange large volumes of containment air to support refueling operations or other maintenance activities. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment any open 24 inch valves are capable of being closed (LCO 3.3.6). The 14 inch mini-purge and exhaust valves, though typically not opened during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, if opened are also capable of being closed (LCO 3.3.6).

The other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated on at least one side. Isolation may be achieved by a closed automatic isolation valve, a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. Equivalent isolation methods allowed under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, atmospheric pressure, ventilation barrier for the other containment penetrations during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment (Ref. 1).

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES**

During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the most severe radiological consequences result from a fuel handling accident. The fuel handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). Fuel handling accidents, analyzed in Reference 3, include dropping a single irradiated fuel assembly onto another irradiated fuel assembly.

To support the plant configuration of both air lock doors open (personnel and/or emergency air locks), and to further minimize an unmonitored, untreated release, the designated individual for closure of the air lock will have the air lock closed within 15 minutes of the fuel handling accident. The 15 minute duration was chosen as the limit for the response capability for the person who is designated for closing the air lock door. The NRC

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

acceptance of this specification was based on doses for a 2 hour release as well as a licensee commitment for a person designated to close the door quickly.

The requirements of LCO 3.9.7, "Refueling Cavity Water Level," and the minimum decay time of 100 hours prior to CORE ALTERATIONS ensure that the release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a fuel handling accident, results in doses that are well within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. Standard Review Plan, Section 15.7.4, Rev. 1 (Ref. 3), defines "well within" 10 CFR 100 to be 25% or less of the 10 CFR 100 values. The acceptance limits for offsite radiation exposure will be 25% of 10 CFR 100 values or the NRC staff approved licensing basis (e.g., a specified fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits). The radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident in containment have been evaluated assuming that the containment is open to the outside atmosphere. All airborne activity reaching the containment atmosphere is assumed to be exhausted to the environment within 2 hours of the accident. The calculated offsite and control room operator doses are within the acceptance criteria of Standard Review Plan 15.7.4 and GDC 19. Therefore, although the containment penetrations do not satisfy any of the NRC Policy Statement criteria, LCO 3.9.4 provides containment closure capability to minimize potential offsite doses.

LCO

This LCO limits the consequences of a fuel handling accident in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity released within containment. The LCO requires the equipment hatch, the air locks, and any penetration providing direct access to the outside atmosphere to be closed or capable of being closed. Personnel air lock closure capability is provided by the availability of at least one door and a designated individual to close it. Emergency air lock closure capability is provided by the availability of at least one door and a designated individual to close it. Equipment hatch closure capability is provided by a designated trained hatch closure crew and the necessary equipment. For the OPERABLE containment ventilation penetrations, this LCO ensures that each penetration is isolable by the Containment Ventilation Isolation valves. The OPERABILITY requirements for LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation ensure that radiation monitor inputs to the control room alarm exist so that operators can take timely

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BASES

LCO
(continued)

action to close containment penetrations to minimize potential offsite doses. The LCO requirements for penetration closure may also be met by the automatic isolation capability of the CVI system.

Item b of this LCO includes requirements for both the emergency air lock and the personnel air lock. The personnel and emergency air locks are required by Item b of this LCO to be isolable by at least one air lock door in each air lock. Both containment personnel and emergency air lock doors may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS provided at least one air lock door is isolable in each air lock. An air lock is isolable when the following criteria are satisfied:

1. one air lock door is OPERABLE,
2. at least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of the reactor vessel flange in accordance with Specification 3.9.7,
3. a designated individual is available to close the door.

OPERABILITY of a containment air lock door requires that the door seal protectors are easily removed, that no cables or hoses are being run through the air lock, and that the air lock door is capable of being quickly closed.

The equipment hatch is considered isolable when the following criteria are satisfied:

1. the necessary equipment required to close the hatch is available.
2. at least 23 feet of water is maintained over the top of the reactor vessel flange in accordance with Specification 3.9.7,
3. a designated trained hatch closure crew is available.

Similar to the air locks, the equipment hatch opening must be capable of being cleared of any obstruction so that closure can be achieved as soon as possible.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.4.1 (continued)

product radioactivity within the containment will not result in a release of fission product radioactivity to the environment.

SR 3.9.4.2

This Surveillance demonstrates that each containment ventilation isolation valve in each open containment ventilation penetration actuates to its isolation position. The 18 month Frequency maintains consistency with other similar testing requirements. Also, SR 3.6.3.5 demonstrates that the isolation time of each valve is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program requirements. These Surveillances Performed during MODE 6 will ensure that the valves are capable of closing after a postulated fuel handling accident to limit a release of fission product radioactivity from the containment.

SR 3.9.4.3

The equipment hatch is provided with a set of hardware, tools, and equipment for moving the hatch from its storage location and installing it in the opening. The required set of hardware, tools, and equipment shall be inspected to ensure that they can perform the required functions.

The 7 day frequency is adequate considering that the hardware, tools, and equipment are dedicated to the equipment hatch and not used for any other functions.

The SR is modified by a Note which only requires that the surveillance be met for an open equipment hatch. If the equipment hatch is installed in its opening, the availability of the means to install the hatch is not required.

REFERENCES

1. GPU Nuclear Safety Evaluation SE-0002000-001, Rev. 0, May 20, 1988.
 2. FSAR, Subsection 15.7.4.
 3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4, Rev. 1, July 1981.
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