

Exelon Generation Company, LLC
LaSalle County Station
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October 26, 2001

10 CFR 50.73

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555


LaSalle County Station, Unit 2
Facility Operating License No. NPF-18
NRC Docket No. 50-374

Subject: Licensee Event Report

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), Exelon Generation Company, (EGC), LLC, is submitting Licensee Event Report Number 01-004-00, Docket No. 050-374.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. William Riffer, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 415-2800.

Respectfully,



Mark A. Schiavoni
Plant Manager
LaSalle County Station

Attachments: Licensee Event Report

cc: Regional Administrator - NRC Region III
NRC Senior Resident Inspector - LaSalle County Station

IE22

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)
LaSalle County Station, Unit 2DOCKET NUMBER (2)
05000374PAGE (3)
1 OF 3TITLE (4)
Manual Reactor Scram Due to Heater Drain Isolation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
09	07	2001	2001	004	00	10	26	2001		05000
			-	-					FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)			
	1	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)
POWER LEVEL (10)	75	20.2201(d)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
		20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73.71(a)(4)
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.46(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	73.71(a)(5)
		20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	OTHER
		20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME: Danny Bost
TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code): 815-415-3800

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	NO			MO	DAY	YEAR
	X					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On September 7, 2001, at 0024 hours, during power ascension from a forced outage, at 75 percent power, LaSalle Unit 2 was manually scrambled due to 2 low pressure heater string isolations. All systems operated as designed. There were no ECCS actuations or primary containment isolations. The lowest reactor water level reached was minus 20 inches. All control rods fully inserted.

The cause of the event was that the 21A and 21C low pressure heaters were lined up to use the emergency heater drains instead of the normal heater drains. At high power levels the emergency heater drains can not pass the full condensate flow required which caused the feedwater heaters to isolate when the high level trip set points were reached.

The manual scram was initiated per procedure to prevent a loss of feedwater flow at less than 100% power due to low pressure heater string isolation. This transient is bounded by loss of feedwater event even if the event occurred at 100% power.

NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

(MM-YYYY)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2) NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
LaSalle County Station, Unit 2	05000374	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		2001	- 004	- 00	

PLANT AND SYSTEM Identification

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor, 3489 Megawatts Thermal Rated Core Power

A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit(s): 2

Event Date: 09/07/01

Event Time: 0024

Reactor Mode(s): 1

Power Level(s): 075

Mode(s) Name: Run

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On September 7, 2001, at 0024 hours, during power ascension from a forced outage, at 75 percent power, LaSalle Unit 2 was manually scrammed due to 2 low pressure heater string isolations. LOA-HD-201 "Heater Preparation for Operation" requires a scram with 2 heater strings isolated. All systems operated as designed. There were no ECCS actuations or primary containment isolations. The lowest reactor water level reached was minus 20 inches. All control rods fully inserted.

The 21A and 21C low pressure heater drains were lined up to use the emergency heater drains instead of the normal heater drains. At high power levels the emergency heater drains can not pass the full condensate flow required. This caused the feedwater heaters to isolate when the high level trip set points were reached. The operating shift was continuing power ascension without these two heater level indication lines filled and vented.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT

The first root cause is that the current valves installed for the emergency heater drains on the 11/21 heaters could not pass 100 percent of the condensate generated when the heater strings were in cascade at 100% power.

The second root cause is the operating shift continued power ascension without heater drain level indication.

The third root cause is that the Control Room operators felt that the emergency drains could handle full flow.

The fourth root cause is that the procedures used for the start up of the HD system allowed the 21A and 21C heater drains to be lined up in a manner that would cause high level alarms and HD string isolation when power increased above about 70% power.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS

This scram was due to loss of feedwater flow at less than 100% power. This transient is bounded by loss of feedwater event even if the event occurred at 100% power.

(MM-YYYY)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**TEXT CONTINUATION**

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LaSalle County Station, Unit 2		05000374		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3	OF	3
				2001	- 004	- 00			

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Revisions were made to all associated procedures to insure that the heater drain valves are aligned properly for all reactor power conditions. (ATM# 75007)
2. A design modification will be made to install new valves for the 11/21 emergency drain valves to allow for 100% draining capability through these valves when the drains are in cascade. (ATM# 75007)
3. Training will be provided to all operating shifts to understand the limitations of the heater drain capacities and the potential for errors when increasing power without level indication. (ATM# 75007)

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A review of Licensee Event Reports over the previous five years found no previous or similar occurrences.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

Since no component failure occurred, this section is not applicable.