

1           One of the bills in the House, Heather  
2 Wilson has a provision that would require us to do  
3 something we would have done anyways which is,  
4 provided we have adequate funds, and even if we don't  
5 we'll reprogram some, to do some vulnerability  
6 assessments using the National Laboratories. Sandia,  
7 Los Alamos and Livermore, are probably the three labs  
8 we'll primarily use for those analyses. They have  
9 done work in the past for us, but they have also work  
10 for other sectors.

11           Sandia did some interesting work for the  
12 Gore Commission with regard to transportation, looking  
13 at the transportation system as a whole and how  
14 security could be -- airline transportation system,  
15 and how security could be enhanced.

16           So we are -- I think that is an area where  
17 -- I'm sure I'm not telling you anything, but that  
18 takes up most days. We get about ye-thick set of  
19 documents to read, some of which are classified, some  
20 of which aren't, all of which are sensitive. We plow  
21 through that. The Chairman is in charge if it's fast  
22 moving, but if it's slow moving, the Commission as a  
23 whole deals with the issue. As I say, we are looking  
24 at everything. Everything is on the table.

25           Although I do want to say, and I'll say

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1 publicly, I mean I have had debates with Paul  
2 Levanthal sort of privately. I believe that I am  
3 proud of the security system that we had in place on  
4 September 11th. I think it provides the highest  
5 standard of security of any private sector enterprise  
6 in America and appropriately so because there are  
7 significant risks. There is no chemical regulatory  
8 commission that looks at the petrochemical plants and  
9 has requirements for security that are inspected by  
10 chemical regulatory agency staff, and there are no on-  
11 force exercises, and none of the apparatus that we  
12 have in place is in place for much of the rest of the  
13 infrastructure. It is quite clear that you can get  
14 catastrophic consequences in industries other than the  
15 nuclear industry.

16 That said, that we had a very, very high  
17 level of security on September 11th, and we have  
18 maintained it and obviously enhanced it, we are going  
19 to have to take into account the events of September  
20 11th and looking at security in the future.

21 One thing that we have stressed since  
22 September 11th is that we have to think in terms of  
23 what's appropriate for private security forces to do,  
24 and what is appropriate for the Federal Government to  
25 do. If it makes sense to defend against air threats,

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1 diving commercial airliners, and I'll get back to  
2 that, then that clearly is not something that we are  
3 going to ask licensees to do.

4 I do think we have to worry about  
5 commercial airliners, but I think given that we have  
6 been attacked by four of them, but the way to handle  
7 that is with enhanced security on the airplanes  
8 themselves, the cockpit door reinforcement that has  
9 been talked about, enhanced security at the airports  
10 to prevent people getting materials onto the planes  
11 that could be used to attack the pilots and take over  
12 the plane, additional air marshalls, all of those  
13 sorts of security.

14 The notion of having -- I mean Paul  
15 Levanthal for a month, until I talked to him on  
16 October 18th, has been calling for the deployment of  
17 surface -- not surface-to-air missiles, of guns, of  
18 anti-aircraft guns. I informed him on October 18th at  
19 our public meeting that the U.S. military doesn't have  
20 guns. I mean the last guns I was aware of was in 42  
21 dusters that were in the New Mexico National Guard  
22 while I was working for Senator Bingaman. Div-ad was  
23 cancelled. In 1985, I was working for Bingaman then  
24 too. It would have been a hell of a gun. But all of  
25 our air defense forces are designed for the clash of

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1 tank armies on the battlefield in Germany as the  
2 Russians try to pile through the Folda Gap and we try  
3 to stop them. They were not designed for defending  
4 the sort of 63 nuclear power sites.

5 So he has now amended it. He has figured  
6 out that we only have surface-to-air missiles, so he  
7 is now correctly saying that he wants -- really  
8 correctly in the sense of what's available in the  
9 American inventory. He wants surface-to-air missiles  
10 at the 63 sites.

11 I try to explain to Paul the command and  
12 control issues involved in having 63 surface-to-air  
13 missiles. I also try to explain to Paul the mal-  
14 deployment of scarce defense resources that would be  
15 involved in trying to have -- having 63, you know,  
16 taking essentially all the Hawks and Patriots we've  
17 got and sticking them around a bunch of nuclear power  
18 plants that aren't particularly vulnerable.

19 Now you get into this issue of -- you  
20 know, we have not except at Seabrook we looked at FP-  
21 111 going into Seabrook because at Pease Air Force  
22 base nearby there were large numbers of FP-111s  
23 stationed until they were taken out of the inventory.  
24 We looked at Harrisburg, at TMI we looked at 707s. So  
25 we have not done an analysis. We are clearly working

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1 on it, an analysis of what happens when a large  
2 commercial aircraft crashes into a containment dome or  
3 elsewhere in a nuclear power plant.

4 But you know, there's at least a pretty  
5 decent chance as I agree with Intergy, I think was in  
6 today's New York Times, is a pretty decent chance that  
7 these plants would survive famously. Number one, it  
8 would take a hell of a pilot to hit some of these  
9 plants. They are not the World Trade Center. Number  
10 two, the main thing, the Germans and the Swiss do have  
11 regulations. They looked at things like FB-111s.  
12 What was it, the old, I think it was F-104s. Yes, the  
13 F-104s Starfighters just routinely dropped out of the  
14 sky all through the 1970s. People decided they better  
15 look at what happens when Starfighters hit them at  
16 high speed. They look at speeds like 700-odd  
17 kilometers an hour. It's the engine, whether it's a  
18 jumbo jet or it's a fighter plane that's the key thing  
19 that might penetrate.

20 Even if it penetrates containment, it  
21 isn't clear that you have an accident yet that you  
22 can't recover from. So what has happened, thanks to  
23 Paul Levanthal and others, is this notion that if you  
24 hit anywhere, you have certainly got a catastrophe.  
25 You know, they don't take into account the defense and

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1 depth of the plants. You know, we can't rule out,  
2 just we can not provide perfect assurance, perfect  
3 safety to the American public. But we have provided  
4 a very high level of safety. We will continue to  
5 provide a very high level of safety. A lot of the  
6 issues that some of these members of the public are  
7 trying to trot out are in my mind the sort of worst  
8 national security analysis one could possibly come up  
9 with. You know, they are suddenly becoming national  
10 security experts. If you follow their prescription,  
11 you will do a disservice to American defense, in my  
12 view.

13 But that is just a passing comment. I do  
14 not really expect you guys to comment on that. I just  
15 had to get, in case there's somebody from the press  
16 here, I get it out and let them report it if they  
17 want.

18 What else? Risk informed regulation, one  
19 of you guys' favorite topics. We are making slow  
20 progress, in all honesty. I don't think any of us  
21 have dusted off the 50-46 paper we have in front of  
22 us. I keep promising I am going to vote on the 50-44  
23 paper because it's relatively straight-forward, but I  
24 am under no pressure to do so because just about no  
25 one else has. We are diverted at the moment.

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1           So I think the staff continues to make  
2 progress. The staff that's involved in the security  
3 issues isn't the same staff that works generally on  
4 risk informed regulation. The staff has made good  
5 progress, as I understand it, at least they have a  
6 couple options out there with regard to how the option  
7 two would work, and I think are having this month  
8 discussions with the public about these various  
9 options for how they would deal with the special  
10 treatment requirements at the nuclear power plants on  
11 a generic basis.

12           The Commission has encouraged the staff,  
13 as you know, to put drafts out even before they come  
14 to us in order to expedite these rulemakings. We will  
15 continue to do that. I think that is one of the big  
16 changes that has occurred in recent years. We learned  
17 from some of our rulemakings, the Part 70 rulemaking  
18 on the materials side, that sort of going closed for  
19 long periods of time and saying everything is pre-  
20 decisional and doesn't really help the process. When  
21 the information finally comes out, you tend to have a  
22 big controversy.

23           So we are hoping -- we learned through the  
24 50-59 revision process was very open and transparent.  
25 The maintenance rule revision, the A4 revision, as we

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1 called it, was open and transparent. Now we are going  
2 to try to do that with these new risk informed rules.

3 But anything that requires a Commission  
4 decision in the near term, we are a fairly diverted  
5 and distracted Commission at the moment. So things  
6 may get coagulated a little bit.

7 With that, and having taken about 15 of  
8 the 60 minutes, why don't I open myself up to your  
9 questions and see what you want to ask me about.

10 MEMBER POWERS: Can we come back to the  
11 security issue? I think one of the areas that the  
12 Committee could probably contribute on. I don't think  
13 we can contribute to some of your more policy things,  
14 but I think one of the areas that the Committee  
15 probably could contribute in is looking at what the  
16 staff is doing and the depth to what it's doing then,  
17 especially if we had a better understanding of the  
18 kind of information that you would like to have on the  
19 threat posed by terrorists to the nuclear power  
20 plants.

21 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: I don't want to get -- I  
22 think you'd need to talk -- I mean I almost would  
23 volunteer except I'll be in a briefing about other  
24 things at 3:00, whenever you are going to get briefed  
25 by the staff. But I could stick around some day in a

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1 closed session with you and go through some of the  
2 things that are in our minds as to where we might have  
3 to adjust our security posture.

4 One thing I will say to you in open  
5 session. The spent fuel pool study last year, you  
6 know, the possibility that cannot be eliminated that  
7 however infinitesimal it may be, that years after the  
8 spent fuel is put in an ISFSI or left in the spent  
9 fuel pool, I guess you were talking about a spent fuel  
10 pool here, years after the stuff has been put in  
11 there, there is still an infinitesimal chance -- I'm  
12 using my words, not the study's -- that you possibly  
13 would get a zircaloy fire is now of course being used  
14 to say that there's a real vulnerability in spent fuel  
15 pools.

16 You know, as you know, Commissioner Diaz  
17 and I and others at the time had problems with that  
18 because the assumptions where the staff went from  
19 there being a zero probability of an accident to there  
20 being some infinitesimal probability that therefore we  
21 had to relook the exemptions we already have. You all  
22 said that wasn't a -- I think they said that that  
23 wasn't something that desperately needed to be done  
24 quickly. We still haven't had any relook information  
25 from the staff about the exemptions previously

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1 granted. But it's sort of -- I wish we could have  
2 brought that study further along to the point where we  
3 really had some sense as to whether there's a  
4 vulnerability there that really needs to be addressed.

5 My understanding was with the proper  
6 earthquake and the proper misalignment of the fuel and  
7 assuming that heat somehow doesn't get out, you could  
8 somehow get a zircoloy fire, but it was even if the  
9 stuff has been cooled for five years, I think it's  
10 related to the point I made earlier. This sort of  
11 search for perfect security and perfect safety, you  
12 know. Is the remote, remote, remote possibility of  
13 something, with significant consequences if you  
14 believe it, something that we should expend in this  
15 case regulatory resources on to try to prevent? I  
16 don't know.

17 MEMBER KRESS: I think you have the right  
18 take on that. I think when we relook at it, we might  
19 ought to relook at it from the standpoint of how  
20 quickly can we get that stuff out. Because it would  
21 be much -- you would be a better risk status if you  
22 could get the stuff out and put it in the dry cask  
23 because I think they are much less vulnerable to a  
24 sabotage event.

25 MEMBER ROSEN: Better yet, put it in the

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1 mountain.

2 MEMBER KRESS: Dry cask first.

3 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: But you can't possibly  
4 put anything in the mountain because moving any spent  
5 fuel from here to anywhere is a mobile Chernobyl.  
6 Right?

7 I am not going to get into putting it in  
8 the mountain. Clearly, you would be better off -- I  
9 think our view historically has been the spent fuel  
10 pools and the ISFSIs are protected of public health  
11 and safety. I don't know how -- one of the things we  
12 will have to look at is the vulnerability of spent  
13 fuel pools to various sabotage and whether -- there's  
14 an additional argument now compared to before  
15 September 11th to get things into ISFSIs.

16 But the pools themselves are pretty darn  
17 safe. A plane diving into one, it strikes me, you  
18 know, you have got a lot of time to add water if the  
19 worst thing happens. I just don't -- you know, I  
20 don't -- compared to what one could do at various very  
21 soft targets around this country that aren't regulated  
22 by us, I am not sure that it is something that we are  
23 going to have to expend a lot of extra resources  
24 trying to regulate. The Nevadans actually have tried  
25 to use the September 11th event to say see, you can't

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1 possibly move this stuff. It has to stay where it is.  
2 I think your comment is closer to the truth, that we  
3 clearly never envisioned having spent fuel in large  
4 quantities forever at the sites. We would have been  
5 better off moving it off some time ago. Not to  
6 reprocess, because processing is not economic at this  
7 time. It may not be economic for a long time, given  
8 the price of uranium.

9 But the ideal world, we would have moved  
10 this material off of these sites as quickly as it had  
11 adequately cooled to make the transportation and the  
12 casks easy to carry out, the campaign easy to carry  
13 out. But I don't know.

14 MEMBER KRESS: I really like your view on  
15 this issue that the best thing you can do is control  
16 the initiating event frequency, but not dealing with  
17 the security of the airplanes.

18 I wonder what your view might be on, as  
19 part of that, having a no-fly zone over all the  
20 plants?

21 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: I am skeptical about no-  
22 fly zones, to be honest with you. A plane traveling  
23 400 miles an hour travels six-and-two-thirds miles in  
24 a minute.

25 MEMBER KRESS: That's not much warning

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1 time.

2 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: At 12 miles, you have  
3 less than two minutes warning time. You obviously  
4 aren't going to recognize it instantaneously either,  
5 so there's a delay time in the recognition.

6 We only in certain places have combat air  
7 patrol aircraft. They will not be there forever.  
8 Obviously they are there at the current time over the  
9 east coast and other places, and we have Strip Alert  
10 aircraft, but the Strip Alert aircraft aren't going to  
11 get there in 30 seconds or a minute, whatever time.

12 MEMBER KRESS: I was thinking about  
13 warning time to the reactor operators so they might be  
14 able to do something to shut down the reactor scrams.

15 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: To scram the plant,  
16 right. Well, that requires again, a tremendous degree  
17 of capability that we some day could have there, but  
18 I don't think we have today. In some places in the  
19 east coast, you are well inside FAA radar areas. If  
20 somebody dips inside the zone, a controller would  
21 recognize it. But you are talking about sort of real  
22 time communication from that controller to the  
23 reactor. We don't have that capability today.

24 We have the event on October 17th at Three  
25 Mile Island. We did shut -- the FAA did shut

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1 Harrisburg Airport. This turned out to be a non-  
2 credible threat the next morning, but one we had to  
3 treat as credible that evening on the advice of the  
4 intelligence community. But the airport was shut  
5 down. That was announced actually, as I understand  
6 it, at O'Hare Airport, you know, Harrisburg has been  
7 shut down due to threat to Three Mile Island.

8 The combat air patrol aircraft were in the  
9 vicinity. We had a specific time. Once it expired,  
10 the airport reopened and the combat air patrol  
11 aircraft went away.

12 MEMBER POWERS: Does the reactor being  
13 operated or shutting down if it's hit by an aircraft  
14 make any difference? I think it makes no difference  
15 at all.

16 MEMBER KRESS: I don't think it would  
17 either.

18 MEMBER POWERS: They certainly would shut  
19 down by itself. They shut down by themselves pretty  
20 easily.

21 MEMBER KRESS: It's assuming the control  
22 rods can go in.

23 MEMBER POWERS: Even if the control rods  
24 don't go in, it will shut itself down.

25 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: The other problems with

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1 no-fly zones, as I say, it isn't clear -- you get some  
2 seconds of warning time, which it isn't clear we could  
3 utilize today. Some day we might be able to utilize.  
4 But around many of the sites there are airports not  
5 far away, you know, where people like to fly their --

6 MEMBER KRESS: You'll have to shut those  
7 down.

8 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Well, you tell the  
9 airline owners and pilots association you would like  
10 to shut down all the airports that are within X miles  
11 of nuclear power plants. We were getting a lot of  
12 calls, and the FAA was getting far more last week,  
13 from Congressmen whose constituents were grounded.  
14 They honestly don't feel that they are much of a  
15 threat. These little pilots, you know, Lynchburg  
16 Airport down near the Cat1 Fuel facility in the  
17 western part of Virginia in the Shenandoah Valley.  
18 That airport was shut down the week that FAA had the  
19 controls in effect.

20 That's another piece of analysis we are  
21 going to have to do. I suspect it's going to be a  
22 straight-forward analysis, but people have suggested  
23 publicly that we need to look at small aircraft diving  
24 into the plant with explosives on board, sort of the  
25 air truck bomb. If the analysis previously done about

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1 the engine being the most important part of the  
2 ability to penetrate containment, these plants aren't  
3 going to be moving that fast. They don't have very  
4 massive engines. The additional explosive may not  
5 make much difference on the outside of the  
6 containment. Most of the explosive force is going to  
7 go out.

8 MEMBER POWERS: That's not where you want  
9 to hit the plant.

10 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: You can think of better  
11 targets, and that is what Paul Levanthal has been  
12 saying publicly. He can think of better targets, and  
13 I guess we all can.

14 No-fly zones just are something that it's  
15 sort of an example -- it's like the surface-to-air  
16 missiles. You know, it's an example of an easy  
17 solution that people gravitate to. In this case, the  
18 analogy early on was the first week we were protecting  
19 football stadiums during football games, you know, to  
20 the extent that no-fly zones protect them. So if it's  
21 good enough for Oklahoma versus Nebraska, why isn't it  
22 good enough for the nuclear sites was the basic  
23 question being asked by the public.

24 The same sort of thing happened with the  
25 Coast Guard coming around some of the plants. The

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1 Coast Guard, just as it's on high alert and wanted to  
2 know where the nuclear plants were, they put assets  
3 around several of the -- or at least they were  
4 patrolling near several of the sites. As one of the  
5 staff -- one of the staff aphorisms around here is  
6 that no good deed goes unpunished. When they actually  
7 wanted to take those assets out because they figured  
8 out that maybe they would be better utilized somewhere  
9 else in some of these busy ports where you have these  
10 large liquified natural gas tankers wandering through  
11 and whatever, there was uproar and human cry as to how  
12 dare you pull these Coast Guard assets from the  
13 nuclear sites.

14 A lot of the security people, and I'm glad  
15 Governor Hodges visited Catawba yesterday or the day  
16 before. He came out of the plant very impressed with  
17 the security. He visited with his director of state  
18 security.

19 Most of the people who go to our plants,  
20 you know, and see the capability that we have at the  
21 plants, especially in the state they are in at the  
22 moment, come away saying this is not the highest and  
23 best place to assign my marginal resources or that  
24 they are not particularly needy of National Guard  
25 assets compared to other places in that state. That

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1 we have a very mixed bag.

2 I saw in today's press clips that the  
3 Governor of Illinois felt peer pressured into putting  
4 the National Guard at his sites. I don't know whether  
5 he shut it down today or not. Texas took their  
6 National Guard out of Comanche Peak, feeling that the  
7 capability was adequate. I believe that's probably  
8 going to happen at Palaverde in Arizona. Governor  
9 Hull had put National Guard assets in there, and I  
10 think is probably going to pull them out. But these  
11 are decisions governors have to make, given the  
12 information that they have.

13 There are times when augmenting with  
14 National Guard, clearly augmenting -- we have  
15 encouraged since September 11th that there be these  
16 protocols in effect between the licensees and state  
17 and local. They are sort of there always. We have  
18 encouraged dialogue with the governors. Some of our  
19 licensees have asked for National Guard augmentation.  
20 That is fine.

21 But in many cases, Governors have gone in  
22 with their security folks and said, gosh. I don't  
23 think it's needed. I've got some state police there.  
24 That is enough. I don't need to put the National  
25 Guard in.

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1           In Florida, we had two different utilities  
2           making two different choices.   Florida Power at  
3           Crystal River decided they didn't need the National  
4           Guard help.   Florida Power and Light accepted it at  
5           St. Lucy and Turkey Point.

6           We probably at some point need to, you  
7           know, as a Nation, think these things through.   They  
8           are clearly not decisions just for the NRC.   We are  
9           not the deployers of national security assets of the  
10          country.   But there is a real concern that we have  
11          that by focusing too much on the nuclear facilities,  
12          you are going to actually hurt overall security by  
13          raising vulnerabilities at these software chemical,  
14          petrochemical, et cetera, sites that would offer very  
15          attractive targets.

16          MEMBER SIEBER: I was wondering, you spoke  
17          earlier about doing vulnerability studies.   It would  
18          be my impression that to really do good ones to try to  
19          redefine the design basis threat, it might take a year  
20          or two to do that.

21          MR.    MCGAFFIGAN:       Well    see,    the  
22          vulnerability studies, I'm not sure will inform the  
23          design-basis threat.   If I am postulating that I  
24          personally do not think that we are going to add ever  
25          air strikes to the design-basis threat.   By

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1 definition, the design-basis threat is the threat  
2 against which licensees should have high assurance of  
3 being able to defeat. Licensees have assets that are  
4 constrained by law as to what they can have. I don't  
5 think even Charleton Heston, who we'll have to pry  
6 that gun out of his cold dead hands, wants surface-to-  
7 air missiles in licensee hands at these sites. It  
8 wouldn't be Patriots, it would be Stingers.

9           You solve one problem that we may solve by  
10 other means and we create another. Proliferation of  
11 Stingers around the country at a variety of sites, and  
12 god help us if somebody gets their hand on a Stinger.  
13 That's the real way to bring down a commercial  
14 airliner.

15           So some of these vulnerability analyses  
16 are going to be more of interest to the Pentagon and  
17 the Office of Homeland Security in terms of trying to  
18 decide how important it is that they assign assets  
19 that are under their control to the defense of these  
20 plants. Vulnerability analyses, the sort of analyses  
21 that we're going to have to -- the design-basis  
22 threat, we are going to have to decide about the  
23 numbers of attackers, and we are going to have to  
24 decide about the weaponry that the attackers are going  
25 to be hypothesized to have available to them.

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1                   We are going to have to decide how large  
2 the truck bomb. We have a certain sized truck bomb in  
3 our design-basis threat at the moment. We'll have to,  
4 as Mr. Levantahl requests, and I think we would do it  
5 in any case, look at whether a larger truck bomb will  
6 need to be protected against.

7                   We will need to look at -- I mean there's  
8 legislation that you all should look at pending. It  
9 is attached to the Price Anderson Act, reauthorization  
10 in the House, that would require the President to do  
11 a study in which he would parse. It is the so-called  
12 Tauzin, Dingle, Markey amendment, in which he would  
13 parse threats into two bins, the design-basis threat  
14 bin and the enemy of the state bin. Then the  
15 provision would require us to do regulations within a  
16 certain time period, I believe 275 days after  
17 receiving the President's report, to adjust our  
18 design-basis threat. Then presumably the enemy of the  
19 state threat, that information would be used by the  
20 Pentagon and Office of Homeland Security and others to  
21 decide what they were going to do.

22                   It also mandates that we will have  
23 essentially an OSRE type program, but an expanded OSRE  
24 type program, in that it defines sensitive nuclear  
25 facilities for which an OSRE will be required to

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1 include reactors, category 1 fuel facilities, the  
2 gaseous diffusion plants, spent fuel pools,  
3 decommissioned reactors, et cetera. So you would have  
4 -- we have done OSREs in the past at the 63 or 64  
5 sites, depending how you count them, that we have,  
6 reactor sites.

7 We have not done OSREs -- we have force-  
8 on-force exercises at the 2 Cat 1 fuel facilities as  
9 well. We have not done them at decommissioned  
10 reactors or spent fuel pool facilities that are  
11 independent of reactors. So it envisions an expansion  
12 of the OSRE program, and in a sense, the design-basis  
13 threat analysis that they want us to do I think given  
14 the definition of sensitive facility, would also  
15 require that the Presidential study look at binning  
16 design basis threat and enemy of the state threats for  
17 this larger category of facilities.

18 MEMBER POWERS: What was their force-on-  
19 force exercises? The problem you always have with  
20 large-scale tests, you get to do one.

21 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: We got to do four. Each  
22 OSRE has four drills that are gone through.

23 MEMBER POWERS: That's right. It gives  
24 you a very limited view of what your actual defensive  
25 capabilities are, and does not allow much in -- if you

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1 find deficiencies in those defensive capabilities,  
2 your choice is to amend them, and then to go retest.  
3 You don't have the facility for looking at lots of  
4 different options.

5 That is a problem that the Air Force  
6 encountered in defending lots of its bases. There has  
7 been a fairly well developed technology of developing  
8 computerized scenarios, where you calibrate against a  
9 test for the facility and what not, and then you use  
10 these computerized capabilities to evaluate options  
11 and designs and what not, and make your testing along  
12 some sort of a progression where you improve actually.

13 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Right.

14 MEMBER POWERS: I wondered if we shouldn't  
15 be thinking about bringing those technologies to bear  
16 here, rather than just going out and running lots of  
17 OSREs at every facility around the country at God  
18 knows what cost.

19 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: I think we understand  
20 some of the limitations of force-on-force testing. I  
21 would welcome any thoughts as to how to bring that  
22 technology. Unfortunately, the dynamic that has been  
23 set up is, you know, the factoid out there is that 47  
24 percent of the time licensees over the last X number  
25 of years, ten years or so, have failed OSREs.

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1                   MEMBER POWERS: I'd like Dick's response  
2                   on that one too.

3                   MR. MCGAFFIGAN: I'm not sure what his  
4                   response his. The actual number is more like, you  
5                   know, in terms of the four drills per site, licensees  
6                   have actually succeeded 85 or 90 percent of the time  
7                   in these drills. When they have had problems, we fix  
8                   them, like you say.

9                   Does that mean that the whole strategy has  
10                  been fixed? It isn't clear. It means that that one  
11                  hole in the strategy that was tested that day in one  
12                  of four tests has been fixed. I don't know whether  
13                  that -- I think we're better off having done OSREs  
14                  than the chemical industry that doesn't have anything  
15                  like this capability. I think we do give hard tests.

16                  These tests that the staff uses in an  
17                  OSRE, they do a bunch of tabletops. Then they detect  
18                  what they think is a vulnerability. Then they test  
19                  against that vulnerability. So these are fairly smart  
20                  -- the four drills that are carried out, they can't  
21                  all test the same vulnerability, but if they see a  
22                  vulnerability in the tabletops in the licensee's  
23                  defense posture, we go try to probe that vulnerability  
24                  in the OSRE. As I say, if we find it, as we did at  
25                  Vermont Yankee or other places, we get it fixed

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1 promptly with compensatory actions.

2 But I think trying to find a way -- you  
3 know, I have come at OSREs a little bit from at Fort  
4 Irwin in the desert in California, we do force-on-  
5 force exercises at very large units. The red team is  
6 pretty damn good, and they win. It is better for our  
7 other units to learn in the desert in California than  
8 to learn in the battlefield in Iran or Iraq. So there  
9 is a value to force-on-force because you are getting  
10 to make mistakes that don't matter, so that when it  
11 does matter, you are better able.

12 MEMBER POWERS: I think when you get to do  
13 repetitive tests that that's true. I think you are  
14 running into the problem of diminishing returns  
15 because in many respects you are playing got-you with  
16 the licensee here, because they don't happen that  
17 often at each one of them. I think there is room for  
18 bringing an improved technology into this.

19 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Well, I would love to  
20 hear about it.

21 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Can we move onto  
22 other subjects?

23 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Sure. You guys are  
24 falling into the September 11th trap that we all are  
25 in.

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1 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Let me come back to  
2 something you mentioned in passing earlier and others  
3 also mentioned it in the public forum. Risk informing  
4 the regulations is proceeding at a very slow pace or  
5 slower pace than anticipated.

6 I guess I am a little puzzled by that.  
7 Can you elaborate? I mean what should we have done by  
8 now to be able to say we are on schedule?

9 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: I don't know. In 50/46,  
10 there's some fairly complex issues, that paper for us.  
11 You guys have it. I forget if you sent us a letter on  
12 that paper, I forget whether you have. You probably  
13 have. It shows you how much I've read.

14 The problem is others are suggesting from  
15 the industry that the strategy in the 50/46 paper is  
16 not aggressive enough, and that we would do better to  
17 carve out a few things and to get some early success.  
18 I have not -- you could use the next few minutes if  
19 you want to educate me as to why I should go back to  
20 my office and just check yes next to the approved  
21 column and move that paper along.

22 I thought that probably given all the  
23 letters that we have gotten from members of the  
24 public, mostly from industry to be honest with you,  
25 that it was worth my looking at them, thinking about

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1       them, and seeing whether the industry folks were right  
2       that there's some parts of this -- they also are  
3       disappointed, is my recollection, that we are not  
4       willing to -- they have been arguing, as I understand  
5       it, for an amendment to 50/46 that essentially would  
6       say you can change the large break loca. We will  
7       entertain changes to the current double guillotine  
8       break large break loca design-basis accident. You  
9       know, they fully expect that any change would have to  
10      be done with NRC approval.

11               They would like to get that regulation  
12      moving so that there's a regulation in place whereby  
13      owners groups could submit arguments for another  
14      design-basis accident, and we all could grapple with  
15      it. As they see the staff proposal, it is going to be  
16      many years before they can even have the argument with  
17      us. I don't know what the right answer is there. So  
18      I am trying to figure out what the right strategy is  
19      on the 50/46, the various 50/46 options that are  
20      before us.

21               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: So it seems then  
22      that --

23               MR. MCGAFFIGAN: On 50/44 it is going to  
24      be straight-forward. When we all get around to voting  
25      on it, we are going to basically, I think, endorse

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1 what the staff, the revised approach the staff is  
2 taking. I think that one will go reasonably rapidly.  
3 50/69, or whatever the option two stuff, I think  
4 depends how these meetings go and whether the staff  
5 itself can come to consensus. But if you, the staff,  
6 and the public were all to come to consensus that this  
7 is the right 50/69 option, that could go fairly  
8 quickly. It's the 50/46 is the place where I see a  
9 problem.

10 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: So as long as the  
11 first 50/46, not the overall.

12 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Not the whole thing. As  
13 I say, I think a lot of people are working, the people  
14 who do risk-informed regulation on a day-to-day basis  
15 are out there trying to figure out how to do it. They  
16 are having their meetings. But I think it is the  
17 option three stuff that I see as going a little  
18 slower.

19 MEMBER POWERS: I think we have run into  
20 some technical challenges on 50/46 that made  
21 consideration of going for some of the gimmies in 50/46  
22 attractive. I mean things like, for heaven sakes, why  
23 can't we update the decay heat curve. That is kind of  
24 a gimmie.

25 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Well, see what Oshuk

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1 tells me in my office is well, not so fast,  
2 Commissioner, because that is clearly an area of over  
3 conservatism, but there may be a few places in 50/46  
4 where we're not being overly conservative. By giving  
5 up the over-conservative here, are we somehow  
6 upsetting something. So my understanding is, and the  
7 50/46 paper I think reflects this, that everything is  
8 connected to everything else. So therefore, you can't  
9 do the gimmees because everything is connected.

10 I am skeptical about that, to be honest  
11 with you. If you all were to come in and say take the  
12 gimmees, I think it would have a strong effect on how  
13 the Commission would think about this stuff if there  
14 was a consensus in this group.

15 But the staff's approach is that  
16 everything is connected and everything will only come  
17 together when everything comes together. That could  
18 be some significant period of time.

19 MEMBER ROSEN: That sounds to me like a  
20 prescription for not doing anything for a very long  
21 time.

22 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: I worry about that, yes.

23 MEMBER POWERS: I think there was merit to  
24 what the staff's approach was when it looked like you  
25 could move forward. They have run into a real

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1 technical barrier in one aspect of it. I think you  
2 need to rethink your strategy here and look for the  
3 gimmees in this thing.

4 Before, you know, they are right. There  
5 are tentacles from 50/46 that go out and touch lots of  
6 places, but now that you have run in and found a hard  
7 spot, it is going to take some substantial work. Why  
8 can't we go back and look for the ones where the  
9 tentacles are few in number and limited in extent.

10 MEMBER ROSEN: The decay heat curve that  
11 you mentioned is one of those places. It is merely  
12 being used as a -- we need to trade off something with  
13 it. I don't think that's the right kind of thought  
14 process.

15 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: I tend to agree with you.  
16 You know, the staff is in this sort of let's make a  
17 deal mode. I'll give you that if you will give me  
18 this. I am not sure that that's -- there is clearly  
19 an awful lot of conservatism in 50/46. There may be  
20 a place or two where there isn't, but there's an awful  
21 lot of conservatism in it. It drives a lot of stuff.  
22 It may not be the best place to expend resources. So  
23 we need to think about it.

24 As I say, there is an opportunity for you  
25 there. I will tell you, the number of commissioners

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1 who have voted on the 50/46 paper is a null set. So  
2 you would be still timely if you have any additional  
3 thoughts you want to make on the 50/46 paper. You  
4 have heard some of the comments, I suspect, from NEI  
5 and others in your deliberations in recent months. If  
6 you have now come to the conclusion that we should  
7 think about gimmees, I think it could have an effect.

8 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: The difficulty you  
9 just raised I think is an important difficulty. In  
10 the old traditional way of doing business, we put  
11 conservatisms in various places. You should get them  
12 as a package as a whole. You can't really start  
13 removing here without thinking about what happens  
14 somewhere else.

15 But the concern now, and I understand how  
16 that evolved because risk-informed regulations came a  
17 few decades after the original system was put in  
18 place. What I am concerned about is that we are about  
19 to create a situation that will be very similar to  
20 this for the future reactors. Again, there are good  
21 reasons for that, but maybe we should try to be a  
22 little more vigilant to avoid it.

23 The reason why people want to use as much  
24 of the existing system as they can, like Exelon, for  
25 example, is that of course it is much faster. I mean

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1 if you use something that is already in the books and  
2 you modify it a little bit to accommodate your new  
3 design, then you have a hope that sometime you will  
4 see your license.

5 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Within a glacial time  
6 period.

7 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Well, on the other  
8 hand, you are creating again a situation where we're  
9 perpetuating philosophies and approaches to regulation  
10 of the past. Then we're going to say again, 10 years,  
11 15 years from now, my goodness now how do we remove  
12 burden, how do we -- I mean we are stuck again with  
13 safety-related and non-safety related components.  
14 What do we do about it? The year will be 2020.

15 So I don't know what to do about it,  
16 frankly, because I appreciate the difficulty or the  
17 concerns that the applicants have. You know, we can't  
18 wait until you guys come up with a new system. Right?  
19 But it's really something I think that should be of  
20 concern to everyone.

21 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Isn't NEI talking about  
22 giving us a new part 50 for --

23 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: We have not seen it  
24 yet.

25 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Part 53, whatever they

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1 call it, for new reactors?

2 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: The last time the  
3 representative was here, he didn't present anything.

4 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: This is a new. I mean it  
5 doesn't exist, but I thought they wanted to come up  
6 with some sort of risk-informed operating regime for -  
7 -

8 VICE CHAIRMAN BONACA: We have heard the  
9 rumors.

10 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: I haven't seen -- I've  
11 seen it in Inside NRC or Nuclear Next Week, reliable  
12 publications. I assume they have sent it to somebody  
13 in public.

14 I understand what you are saying, George.  
15 I don't know that -- there is at least, my  
16 understanding is that they are going to take an extra  
17 year to make their pebble bed decision or at least  
18 nine months. So there is some extra time for us to  
19 try to put different regimes in place. But there  
20 isn't a lot of -- that probably isn't the focus to be  
21 either Exelon's or the staff's work at the current  
22 time.

23 I see Graham Wallis. I should mention I  
24 do like the work that you guys have been doing with  
25 regard to reviewing some of the staff's work on

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1 approving codes and whatever. I see some of these  
2 hard-hitting letters. I commend you for those  
3 letters. I think somebody has to keep the system  
4 honest. You guys are clearly doing that, so at least  
5 as one commissioner, I appreciate that.

6 MEMBER FORD: Can I ask you a question?  
7 Going on from the risk-informed aspect. Come back to  
8 the very first topic, CRDM housing. Specifically,  
9 what do you want our advice on?

10 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Should we issue an order  
11 shutting down Davis-Besse 100 days earlier than their  
12 normal outage because there is the risk of allowing  
13 them to operate that extra 100 days does not provide  
14 reasonable assurance of public health and safety. Or  
15 should we not issue an order and allow the 100 days to  
16 run and let them shut down at the normal time and do  
17 the inspections at their normal outage date. That is  
18 the issue before us. It is before the staff.

19 As I say, the staff is -- Davis-Besse is  
20 talking to you. Davis-Besse is talking to the staff.  
21 Davis-Besse is trying to argue -- I mean the undertow  
22 of what you guys were watching this morning was this  
23 dance between the staff and Davis-Besse.

24 If the staff isn't satisfied that they  
25 believe there is reasonable assurance of public health

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1 and safety during this 100 day period, they will  
2 sometime in December come to us with an order. They  
3 won't come to us. They will send us -- Ken Rogers is  
4 in the audience. They will send us an email to one of  
5 our staff saying we would like to issue -- not hearing  
6 from the Commission otherwise, we will issue five days  
7 hence, an order to Davis-Besse and perhaps to this  
8 other facility telling them to shut down on December  
9 31st and get their inspection done.

10 I am capable of a lot of stuff, but I am  
11 not an expert in this. So this is exactly where this  
12 group of people could tell us is the staff on the  
13 right track or should we give Davis-Besse the extra  
14 100 days. You don't see a lack of reasonable  
15 assurance during that period.

16 If you were to send us that letter or just  
17 even threaten to send us that letter, the staff --

18 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Actually, there may  
19 be some procedural problem here.

20 MEMBER FORD: We really haven't had enough  
21 data. I don't think we have really heard, we haven't  
22 heard formally from the staff on their position on  
23 this. We have had in fact remarkably little  
24 information. We have heard a lot of plans of what's  
25 going to happen. So any advice we give you would be

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1 very, very --

2 MEMBER ROSEN: I would offer one  
3 perspective, which is that when you're talking about  
4 100 days in the timeframe of this whole thing and  
5 saying it somehow goes against our analysis, it  
6 ascribes through our analysis a degree of precision  
7 that I'm not sure is really there.

8 MEMBER POWERS: That's right.

9 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: As I say, I'm open to  
10 whatever you guys want to advise. But the issue comes  
11 down to how conservative do we want to be and when do  
12 we lose reasonable assurance.

13 If one of these circumferential cracks  
14 grew and the whole thing was severed, is that an  
15 accident that we would want somebody to have to endure  
16 and recover from? My understanding is that that  
17 accident is well within the design-basis of these  
18 plants, and they should easily be able to handle it if  
19 it occurred.

20 MEMBER POWERS: Provided it's just one.

21 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Provided it's just one,  
22 right.

23 MEMBER ROSEN: And the consequence of the  
24 accident, it's a medium loca, are within the  
25 containment. So the public's health and safety is not

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1 at issue.

2 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Right.

3 MEMBER POWERS: It's a medium loca with a  
4 failure to scram is what it is.

5 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: That is the issue that is  
6 going to be before us. There is a procedural problem  
7 in probably the Commission as a whole. This one  
8 commissioner hasn't asked you guys your opinion. But  
9 if you would want to be asked, I could work on getting  
10 you asked.

11 (Laughter.)

12 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Soft vote.

13 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: But that is an issue that  
14 of all the issues that are currently sort of kicking  
15 around that is so up your guy's ally and so not up my  
16 ally, that I would ask for any help I could get on it.

17 MEMBER LEITCH: We haven't really had a  
18 chance to talk about this yet, but after hearing the  
19 Davis-Besse presentation this morning, this cracking  
20 phenomena, and I haven't bounced this off my  
21 metallurgical counterparts here, but the cracking  
22 phenomena is extremely proportional to temperature.  
23 A relatively small reduction in temperature gives  
24 considerable relief from this phenomena.

25 I was just wondering -- chance to ask the

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1 Davis-Besse people this morning, but I don't know. It  
2 seems to me that plant may be able to be operated --

3 VICE CHAIRMAN BONACA: At lower power.

4 MEMBER LEITCH: At lower temperatures, at  
5 lower power levels. So perhaps --

6 VICE CHAIRMAN BONACA: There's a  
7 compromise there.

8 MEMBER LEITCH: A compromise position  
9 might be a -- I don't know what the temperature of a  
10 say, an 80 percent power might cause a reduction of  
11 seven degrees or something like that. I mean I don't  
12 -- it might be of that order.

13 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: And I don't know what the  
14 TMI data. You know, the TMI data where they did not  
15 see circumferential cracks when they inspected. We  
16 had the Oconee data. These are all, what, BNW plants.  
17 So we know we have the TMI data. Does that mean that  
18 we should have more assurance now that we have the TMI  
19 data and there weren't circumferential cracks? I  
20 don't know how you handle all that.

21 But as I say, it is clearly an issue that  
22 you are more capable than I of thinking it through,  
23 although I am willing to hear from anyone on the  
24 subject.

25 Other questions? I have almost used up my

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1 hour.

2 MEMBER ROSEN: Well, I was interested in  
3 your take on the whole question of advanced reactors  
4 and licensing of them. Where do you think where the  
5 Commission is headed on it?

6 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: I don't know. We clearly  
7 are putting resources into it Congress has been happy  
8 to give us. We did get 10 million dollars extra in  
9 our budget to help us deal with advanced reactor  
10 issues this coming year. What's most important to the  
11 industry as a whole is what we need to work on, the  
12 early site permits.

13 My understanding, Intergy now has just as  
14 Exelon has lined up with the pebble bed, Intergy has  
15 lined up with the modular high temperature gas reactor  
16 General Atomics. Others are still looking at the  
17 Westinghouse AP1000.

18 We just need to put adequate resources  
19 into doing the things we need to do. We need to look  
20 at the PAR52 rulemaking, to update it on certain  
21 things that I think would expedite the process if it  
22 starts. We're all a little skeptical, to be honest  
23 with you.

24 I mean a year ago when the price was up  
25 here, and it was easy to see these plants being quite

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1 economical. We're about to go through a winter where  
2 the price of gas is going to be a lot lower, and I  
3 don't know what to predict for the long-term price of  
4 natural gas, which is one of the key things that  
5 utility executives look at when they try to make a  
6 decision to invest in a nuclear power plant.

7 So we're trying to put adequate resources  
8 into it. If we get early site permits, we will try to  
9 run that process expeditiously as we have done the  
10 license renewal process.

11 I think the September 11th events -- we  
12 have 2 206 petitions before us. We have various folks  
13 who are going to be trying to raise for anybody who  
14 does come in for an early site permit, some of these  
15 security issues.

16 Mr. Waxman -- there is a provision in the  
17 House version that was adopted unanimously by the  
18 House Energy and Commerce Committee that would require  
19 us to consult with the Office of Homeland Security  
20 before providing any Price Anderson indemnification to  
21 any new applicant.

22 That will require, if it becomes law,  
23 require us to put in place some procedures that we  
24 don't have today to get -- I'm sure our licensee will  
25 want to get that check off from the Office of Homeland

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1 Security very early in the process. They are not  
2 going to want to build the plant and say, okay, give  
3 us our Price Anderson indemnity, and we say sorry,  
4 Homeland Security vetos your plant.

5 So it's an extra little bit of  
6 uncertainty. I think it's handleable. But if that  
7 becomes law, and as I say it was adopted by voice vote  
8 in the committee, and I don't believe the  
9 Administration is objecting to that provision in the  
10 statement of administration policy in the House bill,  
11 we will just have to build that into our process in a  
12 way that isn't there at the moment.

13 So I think if that is the only thing that  
14 results from September 11th, that isn't much of a  
15 burden and we'll handle it. But I can't fully predict  
16 what's in the minds of utility executives at the  
17 current time in light of the price of gas going down  
18 and the climate being complicated by the security  
19 events, and the undue focus on vulnerability of  
20 nuclear assets.

21 General Atomics, and I'm not sure it's  
22 good for the industry as a whole, you know, General  
23 Atomics and Exelon have helpfully said that they could  
24 bury their plants.

25 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: And still produce

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1 power.

2 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: And still produce power,  
3 right. They can make these almost impossible targets  
4 if indeed we have to worry about it. If they want to  
5 bury their plants, great. I am not sure that as a  
6 regulator I am going to require them to bury their  
7 plants in order to take on diving commercial  
8 airliners.

9 Is that enough of an answer?

10 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Any other questions  
11 for the Commissioner?

12 MR. MCGAFFIGAN: Okay. Well, thank you  
13 very much.

14 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Thank you for  
15 coming down here.

16 We'll take a five minute break.

17 (Whereupon, from 3:00 p.m. until 3:15  
18 p.m., the proceedings went off the record.)

19 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. We are back  
20 in session. We have an ad hoc presentation by the  
21 staff on the issue of power uprate.

22 MR. BAILEY: Yes. This is Stewart Bailey.  
23 I am the Project Manager for Quad Cities. We are here  
24 to try to answer some of the Committee's questions  
25 related to how Exelon is achieving the power uprate

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1 out of their BWR course. So with that, I'll turn it  
2 over to Tony Ulises.

3 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: What's the name  
4 again?

5 MR. ULSES: Tony Ulises. How to do a power  
6 uprate in ten words or less.

7 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Good.

8 MR. ULSES: What I would like to start off  
9 with is -- well actually I'd like to not put that on  
10 right now, Stu.

11 I was kind of reviewing this material that  
12 you all got yesterday from GE. I kind of see where  
13 the confusion is coming from here. I would like to  
14 make a brief comment on it, and then try and avoid  
15 getting into it because I don't really understand all  
16 the details of how the information was generated. I  
17 understand I will probably have limited success at  
18 that, but that is kind of where I would like to go.

19 Essentially what you are seeing here when  
20 you compare this information from cycle 17 to cycle  
21 18, what really is causing the confusion is that they  
22 are introducing a new type of fuel into cycle 18. In  
23 other words, they are going from a nine-by-nine fuel  
24 in cycle 17 to a ten-by-ten fuel in cycle 18.

25 MEMBER SIEBER: Partially.

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1 MR. ULSES: Right, partially. That is  
2 going to be the new batch that they are inserting, is  
3 going to be ten-by-ten. That fuel in fact can run at  
4 higher total bundle powers than the nine-by-nine fuel.  
5 That is how you can increase the average and not cause  
6 the peak average to go down because you are in fact  
7 increasing the peak maximum of bundle power, but you  
8 are not increasing the peak rod power, kilowatts per  
9 foot. Because basically you have more rods to work  
10 with, you can make more power. That is basically what  
11 they are doing.

12 Also, another feature of the ten-by-ten  
13 assembly is that they have additional margin to  
14 minimum critical power ratio, which allows them to get  
15 this additional power out of the assembly due to  
16 changes in the assembly design, mainly in the spacers  
17 and the optimization of their axial location.

18 That is all I really wanted to say on  
19 that, unless there are any questions.

20 MEMBER WALLIS: Well, ten times ten is 100  
21 and nine times nine is 81. The difference is  
22 something like 19 percent or something, which is what  
23 they are asking for almost.

24 MR. ULSES: Well, I think that might just  
25 be a coincidence.

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1                   MEMBER SIEBER:   It's the surface that  
2 counts there.   The surface doesn't go up by 20  
3 percent.

4                   MEMBER WALLIS:   I think they said this  
5 morning that the fuel is also more enriched.

6                   MR. ULSES:   Yes.   They are running at a  
7 higher enrichment because they want to get more energy  
8 into the core.

9                   MEMBER WALLIS:   And they play more tricks  
10 with Gadolinium.   They also put in pressure fuel more  
11 often.   So the more fuel, the more --

12                  MEMBER SIEBER:   More assemblies, yes.

13                  MR. ULSES:   Let me jump into the  
14 presentation here.   I have this stuff on the slides.  
15 Let me go ahead and change this around, Stu.

16                  All right.   How to do a power uprate.   So  
17 essentially they have to do three things.   They have  
18 to get more fissile content into the core.   They want  
19 to burn more U-235.   So they load more bundles.   Also,  
20 in this case the bundles happen to have a higher  
21 bundle average enrichment, although I don't know that  
22 that's necessarily generally true.   That means they  
23 withdraw more as well because they have a fixed number  
24 of locations.

25                  MEMBER WALLIS:   The total level stays the

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1 same, but in each load they exchange more.

2 MR. ULSES: Exactly. They have a fixed  
3 number of locations. Essentially they extract more  
4 and they add more fresh, which gives them a higher  
5 fissile content and they can burn it.

6 Now with this new fuel, they have to keep  
7 it within limits obviously. So what they do is they  
8 use more changes in the Gadolinia loading, both  
9 axially and radially, and they also do a lot of radial  
10 enrichment and axial enrichment changes in the fuel as  
11 well. These modern beauty bar fuel assemblies are  
12 extremely complicated.

13 MEMBER KRESS: Tell me what the different  
14 Gadolinium loading means. You add less of it in?

15 MR. ULSES: Well, what it means is that  
16 within one bundle you could see different locations  
17 that actually have different Gadolinia concentrations  
18 radially and axially in order to shape the power.  
19 Then within each type of bundle that they insert at  
20 the beginning of core, you could actually see actual  
21 different total Gadolinia loading as well.

22 MEMBER KRESS: It might put more in the  
23 central channels and less in the --

24 MR. ULSES: No. What they are doing is  
25 putting in what they need where in order to maintain

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1 the power distribution. You know, the concepts of  
2 doing like an outer middle, inner ring loading, that  
3 is not done any more.

4 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: But by fuel rod,  
5 fuel rod by fuel rod.

6 MR. ULSES: Exactly.

7 MEMBER KRESS: Pellet by pellet almost.

8 MR. ULSES: Sure. Right. Well that's  
9 actually the truth, pellet by pellet. You are going  
10 to see radial and axial enrichment changes, and also  
11 Gladolinia loading changes. They also will increase  
12 the total load of gad in order to keep the reactivity  
13 down as they burn the core, because obviously they are  
14 going out to longer burnouts. Well they are going out  
15 to higher -- the batch average burnouts are not  
16 increasing the fuel burnup over the limits. I mean  
17 let me just get that out there.

18 MR. BAILEY: Higher reactivity.

19 MR. ULSES: And essentially they have been  
20 doing this for about 10, 15 years roughly. It  
21 actually started with their later eight-by-eight  
22 products. It is in the nine-by-nine products, and  
23 it's in the ten-by-ten products that are out there  
24 right now. This is also not just done by GE, it's  
25 done by all BWR fuel vendors to a certain extent.

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1           Now for EPU, which is basically the power  
2           uprates that get up in the 15 to 20 percent range,  
3           they are going to have to go to these newer fuel  
4           designs because they have to get more maximum bundle  
5           power. You just simply can't get it out of the nine-  
6           by-nine assembly because mainly limits on the critical  
7           power ratio. In other words, they are going to go  
8           into dry out in these assemblies if they run them up  
9           in power.

10           MEMBER KRESS: Where do they get this  
11           extra space? Do they actually cut down on the spacing  
12           of the fuel?

13           MR. ULSES: What they do is they make the  
14           pin smaller.

15           MEMBER KRESS: That's what I meant.

16           MR. ULSES: Right. They are actually  
17           physically smaller themselves. Then they will  
18           increase the enrichment, they will offset any changes  
19           in the actual physical geometry of the assembly. That  
20           allows them to run these bundles out to higher  
21           burnups.

22           Now like I said before, they are going to  
23           have to get more CPR performance out of these bundles  
24           or they won't be able to increase the maximum power,  
25           but that has been achieved over the years by changes

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1 in spacer design and by the physical changes of the  
2 geometry themselves. But the key point here is that  
3 it is confirmed with prototypical tests. They  
4 actually design a prototypical bundle with  
5 electrically heated rods. They put it into their  
6 atlas test facility, and they do CPR testing in order  
7 to confirm the continued applicability of the  
8 correlation they use to predict critical power. That  
9 is done for each fuel type that they manufacture.

10 Essentially just the last bullet there is  
11 just kind of the point that they made incremental  
12 design changes over the years, but if you look at the  
13 modern fuel, basically what they have done is they  
14 have grabbed everything that they have learned, and  
15 they have put it all into one place, which is really  
16 what is allowing them to get this extra power out of  
17 these assemblies and maintain the actual local limits  
18 on the assembly, which is how they are really  
19 licensed.

20 MEMBER WALLIS: It's obviously a very  
21 complicated fuel management program.

22 MR. ULSES: Extremely complicated.

23 MEMBER WALLIS: If you look at these, you  
24 find 1.39 is beside .99, and then there's another  
25 1.15. There's no pattern at all that makes any sense.

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1 MR. ULSES: It is extremely complicated,  
2 which is why if you look at the way they do the actual  
3 reactor design these days, they are going to take the  
4 core and they are going to do detailed calculations of  
5 the reactor as it burns out on its lifetime because  
6 they need to ensure that they are going to maintain  
7 thermal limits.

8 Actually, I have got a lot of --

9 MEMBER WALLIS: The flux may not flatten.  
10 The flux flattening is probably a red herring.

11 MR. ULSES: But that is more consequence  
12 of what they are doing. They are going to load more  
13 reactor fuel at the beginning of the life, and the  
14 flux has to flatten simply because they are loading  
15 more fuel and it's going to take up more locations,  
16 and the flux is going to have to flatten. So I would  
17 say it's more of a consequence than a means to an end,  
18 myself.

19 That is even more true when you are  
20 talking about inserting new types of fuel which can  
21 run at higher maximum bundle power.

22 MEMBER WALLIS: Also the axial  
23 distribution varies tremendously from beginning to  
24 end.

25 MR. ULSES: What I was going to say is

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1       that I have a lot of -- actually, I have a lot of  
2       background information up here which is actually GE  
3       proprietary. I would obviously rather not get into it  
4       here, but if anyone wants to look at it, I can stay by  
5       after we're done here and I could show it to any of  
6       the members who would be interested in seeing  
7       information about the design.

8               MEMBER ROSEN: The ACRS handles a lot of  
9       GE proprietary information during the reviews. It was  
10      an innocent that was asked to try to follow just a  
11      little deeper in the proposal which said something  
12      like we're going to flatten the profile and that's how  
13      we are going to get a lot more power out of it.

14             So I asked for the profile. Let me see a  
15      core map. Let me see a beginning a live core map.  
16      Let me see an end-to-live core map, the pre-EPU and  
17      post-EPU so I can get a sense of just taking it  
18      another level down so we understand. That may have  
19      turned out to be the wrong question.

20             What I would like to know is, because I  
21      think we need to go another level beyond oh, we're  
22      just going to flatten the power. That is all that was  
23      really said about how we're going to get all this  
24      power in this stack of documents this high. I would  
25      like to go another level down below that, get a little

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1 more sense of sensible information. I don't know the  
2 right question. What is the right question?

3 MR. ULSES: The right question to ask is  
4 will they maintain the bundles within their rating,  
5 within the thermal limits.

6 MEMBER ROSEN: What are those? Show me  
7 what your projections are and all that.

8 MR. ULSES: If we look at how we license  
9 BWR fuel, it is very dependent on the local parameters  
10 because of the fuel channels. The reactor fuel itself  
11 doesn't really care what's around it because of the  
12 channel. All it cares about is what it sees at the  
13 inlet and the outlet.

14 So it is very local. It is very specific  
15 on the assembly. That is one of the reasons why they  
16 are able to do this, because they are able to using  
17 basically the tool of the Gladolinia, if you will, in  
18 this case it uses the tool, that they able to shape  
19 the power in the assembly such that they can keep the  
20 peaking within the assembly down as they burn the  
21 fuel. They can stay within the applicable limits.

22 Let me go and jump to my next slide here,  
23 which is how we license fuel. But as for your  
24 question about what you need to ask --

25 MEMBER ROSEN: I am going to ask a

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1 question on the next EPU that comes through, and I  
2 understand there is going to be a lot of them.

3 MR. ULSES: There will be.

4 MEMBER ROSEN: I don't know exactly what  
5 the question is but I will certainly want to zero in  
6 on this. I would ask the staff to help me with that.

7 MR. ULSES: Well I would say without  
8 thinking about it a great deal, the question that I  
9 would ask is, just like I said, I mean essentially are  
10 you maintaining the bundles within the design limits.  
11 That information ought to be able to be provided to  
12 the Committee. Essentially those limits are you have  
13 to maintain the LHGR limits. You have to maintain the  
14 MCPR limits, and you have to maintain the maximum  
15 average planar linear generation rate.

16 What is in parenthesis here is what those  
17 limits are trying to protect. Essentially you don't  
18 want to melt fuel. You want to maintain good heat  
19 transfer, and you want to meet the 10 CFR 50:46  
20 exception criteria, which is what you have the maximum  
21 average planar linear generation rate for. That is  
22 going to be set by your loca analysis.

23 MEMBER WALLIS: Average planar is local?

24 MR. ULSES: It's an average planar, right.  
25 That's the mapple hover.

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1 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Just one comment I  
2 have is that I think at least I was mislead in the  
3 statement of flatten out the power distribution. You  
4 are assuming that that meant that the peaking factors  
5 go down. That is not the case. You are pushing it  
6 up. Let me finish.

7 You are pushing it up axially at the top  
8 and bottom because the same strategy is being used by  
9 the PWR vendors.

10 MR. ULSES: But actually the axial power  
11 profiles, but those have been used for many years.  
12 That is not atypical. That is in use right now.

13 Essentially what they are doing is they  
14 run the core early in cycle with a highly bottom  
15 peaked power distribution. That allows them to  
16 spectral shift the reactor. Then they start moving it  
17 up at the top because they want to burn the fuel out  
18 evenly. In other words, they want to use all the  
19 uranium that's in the core.

20 If they went back to like what they used  
21 to do was like a hailing concept, but that is not used  
22 any more because it does not allow them to burn out  
23 all the fuel. Essentially the utilities are spending  
24 money on enrichment that they are not using.

25 So what they do now is they go to these --

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1 is that they go to these management strategies that  
2 allow them to move the axial power distribution around  
3 a great deal during the cycle. That is how every  
4 reactor that I am aware of currently operates right  
5 now.

6 MEMBER WALLIS: What's LHGR? Like the  
7 number here, .77. What's that? I am looking at these  
8 printouts we got, to relate them to your criteria. It  
9 says LHGR .77. That's not a temperature?

10 MR. ULSES: What we need to do is look at  
11 the thing at the section called the thermal limits  
12 summary. You look at maximum kilowatts per foot,  
13 which is for the one I'm looking at, is 10.14.  
14 Another one is --

15 MEMBER WALLIS: I think that's the second  
16 one on the list.

17 MR. ULSES: It's actually the second to  
18 last.

19 MEMBER WALLIS: What's rapid LHGR?

20 MR. ULSES: I actually don't know. That's  
21 a value that they probably use --

22 MEMBER WALLIS: Same symbols as you have  
23 up there.

24 MR. ULSES: Well, what they call a maximum  
25 kilowatts per foot is what I am referring to here as

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1 LHGR. Other than the limits of what they are going to  
2 use is what are more than likely going to be used by  
3 the operator in the control room. They try to come up  
4 with parameters in the control room that are really  
5 easy to understand. They try to ratio the parameters.

6 MEMBER WALLIS: This is less than 13 or  
7 something like that?

8 MR. ULSES: The values vary from field  
9 type to field type, but that is a pretty good average  
10 number.

11 MEMBER WALLIS: Where do I find MCPR?

12 MR. ULSES: That is --

13 MEMBER WALLIS: That's the 1.79.

14 MR. ULSES: The one you are looking at,  
15 1.79. Yes, that's going to be limited in the  
16 technical specifications. The value is on average  
17 typically I want to say 1.09, 1.1.

18 Ed, is that about right? In this  
19 particular case, yes.

20 MEMBER WALLIS: Then the other one, MCPR,  
21 is --

22 MR. ULSES: The next one is the mapple  
23 hugger.

24 MEMBER WALLIS: That must be the APLHGR,  
25 .77.

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1 MR. ULSES: No. That is actually going to  
2 be the one that is above the actual thermal limit  
3 summary which is on the order of 9.14 in this case,  
4 and on the other ones --

5 MEMBER WALLIS: Somewhere else?

6 MR. ULSES: Yes. You have to go right up  
7 above the section that says thermal limits summary, to  
8 something called maximum APLHGR.

9 MEMBER WALLIS: It says 9.11?

10 MR. ULSES: Right. In this case it's  
11 9.14. I'm not exactly sure what those units are. I  
12 assume they are probably kilowatts per foot. That  
13 would make sense.

14 MEMBER WALLIS: So what you guys do is you  
15 assure yourselves that all these numbers that are  
16 going to be varying throughout the cycle and with  
17 different fuel loads and all kinds of strategies,  
18 never go over some regulatory level?

19 MR. ULSES: Exactly. Those are specified  
20 in the fuel type and bundle-specific basis. They are  
21 monitored continuously throughout the cycle. The  
22 reactors, they are actually running online monitoring  
23 which actually runs a three-dimensional solution of  
24 the reactor all the time, comparing it to the in core  
25 instrumentation. They are using that to ensure that

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1 they are meeting all applicable thermal limits on the  
2 fuel.

3 MEMBER ROSEN: Maybe you could help me  
4 with the second question. The first question is are  
5 you maintaining LHGR for fuel temp and for loca and  
6 MCPR below the limits? The answer they give me is  
7 yes.

8 MR. ULSES: Yes. That is the answer they  
9 have given us. We have confirmed that through our  
10 audits.

11 MEMBER ROSEN: My next question is what  
12 should my next question be? Show me, right?

13 MR. ULSES: That would be my next  
14 question. Show me.

15 MEMBER ROSEN: What do I ask for? What  
16 should they provide that shows me that they are doing  
17 that?

18 MR. ULSES: They can give you a map, I  
19 suspect, just like you got with the normalized power  
20 distribution which has the kilowatts per foot on it  
21 for a bundle. But the maximum value per pin in a  
22 bundle. That would be useful information.

23 You can get the information about the  
24 minimum critical power ratio that's in the reactor.  
25 You can also get the mapple hugger limits.

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1           However, most PWRs are not going to be  
2           limited by mapple hugger. They are typically limited  
3           by MCPR values simply because they have so much ECCS  
4           injection. Normally loca is not a limiting factor for  
5           PWRs.

6           But those would be the questions that I  
7           would ask if I wanted to convince myself, and those  
8           are the questions that we do ask when we want to  
9           convince ourselves that the power uprates are not  
10          going to exceed any applicable licensing limits on the  
11          fuel. That information ought to be readily available  
12          to the Committee.

13           MEMBER SIEBER: Actually, the way all this  
14          is licensed is a little bit misleading. When you go  
15          for a change in license for a power uprate, you are  
16          basically using a demonstration bounding core to show  
17          that you can actually manipulate the fuel in order to  
18          get the power output. Each time you refuel the  
19          reactor though there is a design process that goes on  
20          that specifies how each fuel assembly will be built,  
21          how it is to be oriented in the core, and where it is  
22          supposed to go, plus where all the other ones are  
23          supposed to go because you've shuffled them around.

24           Each time they do that, they send in an  
25          RSE, a reload safety evaluation, the licensee does,

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1 that says I have followed all the procedures that the  
2 staff approves and I have done all these calculations  
3 and this is a good core. It's a 10-page document,  
4 which is what they get. So the process is approved by  
5 the staff, and then each reload is approved by saying  
6 I followed the process.

7 MR. ULSES: Right.

8 MEMBER SIEBER: So that is the kind of  
9 paper flow.

10 MR. ULSES: That is for a plant that's at  
11 a given power level and they are just reloading it.

12 MEMBER SIEBER: Well, what will happen  
13 here too.

14 MR. ULSES: Sure.

15 MEMBER SIEBER: How they have licensed a  
16 plant to go to a higher power and they have changed  
17 their machinery around to achieve that, that the next  
18 reload that goes in is going to have an RSE that's  
19 going to be reviewed by the staff using the same old  
20 process as General Electric always used or  
21 Westinghouse or Siemens or whomever. That is the  
22 process. There is no change to the process and  
23 there's no change to the analysis that they will do.  
24 They will use the same tools.

25 MR. ULSES: The reason why they don't do

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1 an actual calculation on what they expect the real  
2 power uprated reactor to be is that when we're in the  
3 review process, they are not going to know what target  
4 they are shooting at because they don't know exactly  
5 where the actual real core will be at the end of a  
6 cycle.

7 So they try and do a generic analysis to  
8 give us an understanding of what it is going to look  
9 like, but then you are certainly right, that they will  
10 use the standard reload process. We will get what  
11 actually nowadays is called a core operating limits  
12 report, but it's the same thing. It basically  
13 describes the fuel that's in the reactor, the method  
14 used, and a summary of a few key results which are the  
15 thermal limits.

16 MEMBER SIEBER: Then during core  
17 operation, you take flux maps or in core instrument  
18 readings to determine how well core is reproducing  
19 what the calculation showed in advance of refueling  
20 the core?

21 MR. ULSES: Right. Exactly. Nowadays  
22 that is done online continuously.

23 MEMBER SIEBER: So you get a map out of  
24 the computer that looks like the map they gave us,  
25 which is an analytical map as opposed to a flux map.

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1 MEMBER WALLIS: Do we have enough to go on  
2 those in Committee?

3 MEMBER SIEBER: The change I would suggest  
4 is the same one I said yesterday. All they have to do  
5 is change one word.

6 MEMBER WALLIS: I have concluded that this  
7 power uprate is achieved by having a new fuel.

8 MR. ULSES: That's true.

9 MEMBER WALLIS: Ten-by-ten instead of  
10 nine-by-nine.

11 MR. ULSES: That's correct.

12 MEMBER WALLIS: And by using new fuel  
13 management techniques.

14 MR. ULSES: That's correct.

15 MEMBER WALLIS: Which are so complicated  
16 in detail that there's no way that this Committee  
17 should try to explain them in a letter.

18 MR. ULSES: I definitely wouldn't try to  
19 explain them in a letter myself. It is an extremely  
20 complex process that has evolved over several years.

21 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Have we achieved  
22 what the purpose of this meeting was?

23 We certainly appreciate your coming down.

24 MR. ULSES: No problem.

25 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: On such a short

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1 notice.

2 MR. ULSES: I hope that we have  
3 straightened this out. Information on the first slide  
4 is basically a summary of what they are doing to  
5 achieve these power uprates. You can have this  
6 information if anyone is interested.

7 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Thank you very  
8 much. You answered a lot of good questions.

9 Why don't we recess for 15 minutes. Then  
10 we'll come back and do planning and procedures.

11 (Whereupon, at 3:36 p.m. the proceedings  
12 went off the record.)

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This is to certify that the attached proceedings  
before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: ACRS 487<sup>TH</sup> MEETING

Docket Number: (NOT APPLICABLE)

Location: ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND

were held as herein appears, and that this is the  
original transcript thereof for the file of the United  
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and,  
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direction of the court reporting company, and that the  
transcript is a true and accurate record of the  
foregoing proceedings.



Pippa Antonio  
Official Reporter  
Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.



# **Licensing Approach for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor**

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Staff Presentation to ACRS  
November 9, 2001

Eric J. Benner, NRR, 301-415-1171  
N. Prasad Kadambi, RES, 301-415-5896

# Outline

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Presentation Based on Staff Assessment to be  
Contained in Commission Paper

- Staff's Considerations
  - ▶ Licensing of Fort St. Vrain
  - ▶ Pre-Application Review of MHTGR
  - ▶ NRC Strategic Plan
- Exelon Proposal Summary
- Preliminary Staff Assessment
- Potential Policy Issues

# **Staff Considerations/Activities**

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## **Licensing of Fort St. Vrain**

- **AEC review focused on how the design met the intent of proposed GDC**
- **1972 safety evaluation report reached conclusion that intent of GDC was met and that sufficient barriers and defense-in-depth were provided**

# **Staff Considerations/Activities (cont)**

---

## **Pre-Application Review of MHTGR**

- **NRC review focused on conformance with:**
  - **Advanced reactor policy statement**
  - **NRC regulations, regulatory guides, and standard review plan**
- **Staff assessment (NUREG-1338 in 1989 and 1995) identified issues to the Commission, applicant, and public**

# **Staff Considerations/Activities (cont)**

---

Strategic Plan's Performance Goal: Maintain Safety

- Staff's approach is to use:
  - ▶ Advanced Reactor Policy Statement as the basis for requiring (as a minimum) that PBMR provide at least same degree of protection as current LWRs
  - ▶ Expectation to realize enhanced safety margins
  - ▶ Applicable current regulations
  - ▶ PBMR-specific requirements (license conditions)
  - ▶ Defense-in-depth principles

# **Staff Considerations/Activities (contd)**

---

Strategic Plan Performance Goal: Maintain Safety

- Staff must develop defensible basis to make adequate protection finding
- Subsequently apply performance monitoring program
- Defense-in-Depth considerations from White Paper on Risk-Informed, Performance-based Regulation
- Defense-in-Depth considerations from Risk-Informing Part 50 Option 3

# **Staff Considerations/Activities (cont)**

---

## **Strategic Plan: Increase Public Confidence**

- Staff approach is to:
  - ▶ Apply Commission Advanced Reactor Policy Statement to provide stakeholders with timely and independent assessment
  - ▶ Provide opportunities for public comment and discussion
  - ▶ Adhere to Commission guidance on public confidence building initiatives

# **Staff Considerations/Activities (cont)**

---

Strategic Plan Performance Goal: Increase Efficiency,  
Effectiveness, and Realism

- Integrated Risk-Informed, Performance-Based decision-making:
  - ▶ From Regulatory Guide 1.174
  - ▶ From White Paper on Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Regulation
  - ▶ From Option 3 Framework



# **Staff Considerations/Activities (cont)**

---

## **Strategic Plan: Reduce Unnecessary Burden**

- Staff approach is to use the Safety Goal Policy Statement which provides guidance on when regulatory burden can be considered unnecessary
- Licensee flexibility when performance-based approach is appropriate.

## Exelon's Graphical Depiction of Screening of Regulations



# Staff Perspectives


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## Screening of Regulations

- Similar to MHTGR Pre-application draft Safety Evaluation and Ft. Saint Vrain Licensing
- Preliminary screening of regulations not assessed in detail because of need for design and design-analysis information to make a meaningful assessment
- Final decisions on applicability of regulations made by the regulator

# Staff's Perspectives

## Exelon's Proposed Plot of Top-Level Regulatory Criteria



# Staff Perspectives

---

## Top-Level Regulatory Criteria

- Plotting of TLRC is useful to illustrate bounding criteria
- Early fatality safety goal stated to be be most limiting; latent fatality safety goal also needs to be addressed
- Staff assessing lower cutoff for DBE region for conformance to Option 3 of Risk-Informing 10 CFR Part 50

# Staff Perspectives

---

## Licensing Basis Events

- Assurance needed that set of LBEs is reasonably complete, including bounding events
- Process for selection of LBEs: necessity for appropriate combination of deterministic and risk information
- Development of “source term” is necessary for assessing LBEs
- Validation of process requires design and design analysis information not currently available.

# Staff Perspectives

---

## Determination of Safety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components

- Licensing basis consists of set of requirements applied to safety-related SSCs.
- “Inherently reliable” components may need appropriate requirements because of uncertainties.
- Defense-in-depth also provided by non-safety-related SSCs
- From STP experience, component-level special treatment may not be feasible

# Potential Policy Issues

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- The use of probabilistic criteria to select events
- The use of probabilistic criteria to make design decisions, specifically regarding the role of a containment in the design and emergency preparedness.



**OVERVIEW OF BULLETIN 2001-01:**

**"CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACKING OF REACTOR  
PRESSURE VESSEL HEAD PENETRATION NOZZLES"**

Allen Hiser

Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
Division of Engineering

Briefing for Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

November 9, 2001

## **OVERVIEW OF BULLETIN 2001-01**

Bulletin was issued on August 3, 2001

Bulletin requested information on:

- All plants:
  - Plant-specific susceptibility ranking
  - VHP nozzles (number, type, ID and OD, materials of construction)
  - RPV head insulation type and configuration
  - Recent VHP nozzle and RPV head inspections
  - Above the head structures, missile shield, cabling, etc.
- Plants that have found cracking or leakage:
  - Extent of cracking and leakage
  - Inspections, repairs and other corrective actions
  - Plans and schedule for future inspections
  - How plans will meet regulatory requirements
- Other plants:
  - Plans and schedule for future inspections
  - How plans will meet regulatory requirements

## **QUALIFICATION OF EXAMINATION METHODS**

- Verify compliance with regulatory requirements through QUALIFIED examinations
  - Graded approach depending on PWSCC likelihood
  - Examinations of 100% of all VHP nozzles
    - Based on statistics and no identified preferential cracking tendencies
    - All VHPs - similar materials, etc., only failure consequences vary
- Effective Visual Examination
  - Capable of detecting small amounts of boric acid deposits and discriminating deposits from VHP nozzle and other sources
- Plant-Specific Visual Examination Qualification
  - Plant-specific demonstration that VHP nozzle cracks will lead to deposits on the RPV head (interference fit measurements, etc.)
  - Must be capable of reliable detection and source identification of leakage (insulation, pre-existing deposits, other impediments)
- Volumetric Examination Qualification
  - Demonstrated capability to reliably detect cracking on the OD of VHP nozzles
  - Appropriate if Visual Examination cannot be Qualified

## **REVIEW OF BULLETIN 2001-01 RESPONSES**

Bulletin places PWR plants into 4 groups based on relative susceptibility ranking:

- Plants that have found Cracking or Leakage - 5 plants
  - Suggests qualified volumetric examination by end of 2001
  - Staff accepted qualified visual examination at last outage
- Plants with High Susceptibility (within 5 EFPY of Oconee 3) - 7 plants
  - Suggests qualified visual examination by end of 2001
  - Staff accepted qualified visual examination at last outage
- Plants with Moderate Susceptibility (between 5 and 30 EFPY of Oconee 3) - 32 plants
  - Suggests effective visual examination at next RFO
  - Staff accepted effective visual examination at next RFO
- Plants with Low Susceptibility (more than 30 EFPY of Oconee 3) - 25 plants
  - Suggests no additional actions required
  - No requirement to provide plans or schedule

Staff has addressed clarifications to Bulletin responses, and numerous licensees have provided revised or supplemented Bulletin responses

## PLANTS THAT HAVE PERFORMED "BARE METAL" VISUAL INSPECTIONS

Plants	Most Recent Inspection				
	Date	Method & Scope	Summary of Cracked or Leaking CRDM Nozzles		
			Total Number	Circumferential Nozzle Cracks	Number Repaired
Oconee 1	11/2000	Qualified Visual - 100%	1★	0	1
Oconee 3	02/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%	9	3★★	3
ANO-1	03/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%	1	0	1
Oconee 2	04/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%	5	1	5
Robinson	04/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%★★★	0	0	0
North Anna 1	09/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%★★★	8	0	0
Crystal River 3	10/2001	Effective Visual - 100%★★★★	1	1	1
TMI-1	10/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%	8★	0	6
Surry 1 (in progress)	10/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%★★★	10	TBD	5
North Anna 2 (in progress)	10/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%★★★	(3)	TBD	TBD

★ Thermocouple nozzles also cracked/leaking: Oconee 1 (5 out of 8), TMI 1 (8 out of 8)


★★ The size of 2 out of 3 circumferential flaws were identified from destructive examination.

★★★ Pending acceptability of licensee's supplemental response

★★★★ The highest ranked MODERATE susceptibility plant.

Moderate susceptibility plants that have completed effective visual examinations in Fall 2001 with no evidence of boric acid deposits: Beaver Valley 1, Farley 1, Kewaunee, and Turkey Point 3

## Time-Temperature Histogram






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




FEN 62 LOC K-14 QUAD C-B



FEN 63 LOC P-10



# **OVERVIEW OF STAFF PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT**

Summarizes available data and evaluations related to:

- Environment in CRDM annulus region
- Crack initiation
- Crack growth rate
- Stress analyses and crack-driving force
- Critical crack size

Deterministic assessment

Probabilistic assessment

Inspection timing

## STAFF CONCLUSIONS

### Annulus Environment

- Not expected to be highly aggressive - normal PWR reactor coolant
- Annulus deposits from leaking nozzles should be obtained and analyzed by industry to provide confirmation of the assumed annulus environment

### Crack Initiation

- The operating experience of leaking nozzles appears to be well modeled by the Weibull analysis with  $b = 1.5$
- New findings data will continue to be assessed

### Crack Growth Rate

- Crack growth rate data for PWSCC is a reasonable approximation for OD VHP nozzle cracking
- Analysis of data provided in Table 3 is appropriate for use at 325°C (617°F)
- The Arrhenius relation can be used for crack growth at other temperatures




Figure 3 Dependence of initiation time on inverse temperature for field cracking.




Figure 6 Crack growth rates in PWR environments for a variety of product forms. The curves correspond to a correlation based on the work of Scott (Ref. 17).

## STAFF CONCLUSIONS (cont.)

### Stress Analysis and Crack-Driving Force

- A single estimate for K as a function of circumferential crack length was provided (with a value of  $66 \text{ MPa}\sqrt{\text{m}}$  ( $60 \text{ ksi}\sqrt{\text{in.}}$ ) due to residual stresses for a crack angle of  $90^\circ$ )

### Critical Crack Size

- A safety margin of three on pressure --  $270^\circ$
- Nozzle failure and possible ejection -  $324^\circ$



# DETERMINISTIC ASSESSMENT

## Base Case - Assumptions

- Critical Flaw Size
  - 270° with a safety margin of three on pressure
  - 324° for nozzle failure and possible ejection
- Crack Growth Rate
  - 95/50 statistical bound
  - 318°C (605°F)
  - A for Scott model is  $1.303 \times 10^{-11}$
- Initial Flaw Size
  - Unknown - basis for issuance of the Bulletin
  - Used as a parameter

## Uncertainties and Sensitivity Studies

- Different statistical bounds to crack growth rate
- Effects of temperature on crack growth rate
- Initial flaw size as a parameter




Figure 15 Estimated stress intensity factor  $K$  for a CRDM nozzle based on SIA and ORNL results.

**Table 4      Summary of OD Circumferential Flaws Identified in  
Spring and Fall 2001 Outages**

Plant	Nozzle ID	Circumferential Crack Length	Through-Wall Extent
Oconee Unit 3	50	165°	100%
Oconee Unit 3	56	165°	100%
Oconee Unit 3	23	66° *	35% *
Oconee Unit 2	18	45° *	10% *
Crystal River Unit 3	32	90° *	50% *

\* Crack dimensions estimated from UT data.




Figure 18 Variation of crack growth rate with circumferential crack length for the base case of 318°C (605°F) 95/50 curve.

## FAILURE TIME EVALUATION

(318°C, 95/50)




Figure 19 Variation of time to failure as a function of initial crack length, for the base case of 318°C (605°F), 95/50, crack growth rate.




Figure 20 Evaluation of operating time to reach critical flaw sizes at three times design pressure and at nozzle failure/ejection after development of a 165° long circumferential through-wall flaw.

## EFFECT OF OPERATING TEMPERATURE ON 'A'




Figure 21 Lower operating temperature results in lower crack growth rates for VHP nozzle materials, within the operating temperature range of the nozzles.




Figure 22 Variation of crack growth rates at several pertinent temperatures and using 95/50 ('B' on the curves) and mean values ('M' on the curves).



## CRACK GROWTH EVALUATION




Figure 23 Crack growth analysis using various crack growth rate assumptions, from an initial flaw size of 165°. Although decreasing the temperature has some effect, the most dramatic increases in failure times occur with the mean crack growth curve instead of the 95/50 curve.

## TIME TO 3 X DESIGN PRESSURE




Figure 24 Comparison of time to reach the flaw size representing three times the design pressure, for a variety of crack growth rates and as a function of initial flaw size.

## TIME TO NOZZLE FAILURE/EJECTION




Figure 25 Comparison of time to reach the flaw size representing three times the design pressure, for a variety of crack growth rates and as a function of initial flaw size.

## **CONCLUSIONS FROM DETERMINISTIC CALCULATIONS**

Results are very sensitive to:

- Initial flaw size
- Statistical bound on crack growth rate
- Temperature

Traditional safety margins may not be sufficient to account for large variability in crack growth rates for Alloy 600 in PWSCC conditions

## **PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT**

- A Complete Phenomenological Model
  - Requires a better understanding of the complete cracking process
  - Requires data to characterize critical parameters (means & bounds)
- Empirical Model
  - Based on reliable data on number and size of cracks found in service
  - Qualification of NDE sizing an issue
  - Cost of destructive confirmation large
- Need to determine Frequency of Failure to estimate Core Damage Frequency

# INSPECTION TIMING

## Based on Likelihood of Circumferential Cracking

- ▶ High susceptibility plants - 8 out of 9 have identified axial or circ. cracking
- ▶ Moderate susceptibility - effective visual examinations will provide additional data

## High Susceptibility Plants That Have Performed Effective Inspections

- ▶ Can use Figures 24 to 25
- ▶ New circumferential cracking can initiate

## High Susceptibility Plants That Have NOT Performed Effective Inspections

- ▶ Need baseline inspection to provide basis for evaluation

## Inspection Method

- ▶ Qualified visual examination is appropriate
- ▶ Surface or volumetric examinations

## Inspection Scope

- ▶ 100 percent of nozzles
- ▶ Entire surface or metal volume of interest
- ▶ "Wetted surface" - J-groove weld, nozzle OD (below the weld), and nozzle ID to a location above the weld
- ▶ Volumetric - OD of nozzle above the J-groove weld
- ▶ Visual qualification analysis can occur ex-post facto after the inspection

## **FUTURE STAFF PLANS**

- Continue development of probabilistic modeling
- Complete review of Bulletin supplemental responses
- Assemble findings from inservice inspections
- Issue NUREG report
- Long-term inspection plans
  - ASME Code revisions
  - Rulemaking
  - Other regulatory actions (Generic Letter, etc.)

## **INDUSTRY INTERACTIONS**

- Interactions on deterministic and probabilistic analyses
- Inspection methods and findings
- Destructive confirmations
  - ▶ Flaw sizes
  - ▶ Annular conditions



# Materials Reliability Program Update on Reactor Head Penetration Activities

Larry Mathews  
Chairman, Alloy 600 ITG  
ACRS Meeting  
11/9/01


## Agenda

- Crack Growth Rate
  - Annulus Environment
- Risk Assessment
- Inspection Impacts on Susceptibility
- Recommendations for Spring
- ASME Code Activity

## Risk Assessment

- Preliminary Work Performed for Various Plant Types
- Meeting 11/6/01 to Finalize Approach
  - Industry Statistics for Probability of Thru-Wall Flaw vs. Time
  - PFM for Probability of Crack Propagation vs. Time, from Leak to thru wall or rupture
  - CCDP for Resultant LOCA/Ejection, including Assessment of Collateral Damage
  - CDF vs. Time for Each Unit


## Ranking with Inspection Results



## Long Range

- ASME Section XI
  - Established Working Group to Look at Alloy 600 Inspection Requirements
  - Met at Last Sec. XI Meeting
  - Will Meet Again at December Meeting

***Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station  
Briefing Regarding  
Reactor Pressure Vessel Head  
Penetration Nozzle Cracking***



November 9, 2001

## **Objective:**

- ★ Have ACRS consider additional industry information as it deliberates on the Control Rod Drive Nozzle cracking issue
- ★ Include this additional information in formal correspondence to the Commission.



## **Reason for Request:**

- ★ Davis-Besse is considered a high-susceptibility plant as discussed in Bulletin 2001-01
- ★ Davis-Besse is the only high-susceptibility plant that will not perform a visual inspection by December 31, 2001.
- ★ Impact of continued safe operation of the plant until March 2002 refueling outage is negligible.



## **Plant-Specific Deterministic Aspects:**

- ★ Qualified visual inspection performed in 1996, additional inspections in 1998 & 2000
- ★ Finite element analysis show that 65 of 69 nozzles will allow leakage
- ★ Larger allowable flaw size
- ★ Conservative initial flaw size
- ★ Over 3 adjusted effective full-power years less operation than Oconee Unit 3



# **Plant-Specific Risk Evaluation Results:**

☆ CDF - Davis-Besse plant specific risk assessment conservatively estimates incremental core damage frequency as  $6.7 \text{ E-6}$ , which is categorized as “small” per RG 1.174.

☆ LERF - The plant specific risk assessment conservatively estimates incremental large early release frequency as  $1.0 \text{ E-8}$ , which is categorized as “very small” per RG 1.174.

☆ Public Health Risk - The plant specific risk assessment estimates person-Rem per year to be  $6.5 \text{ E-1}$  which is negligible.





## **Bounding or Conservative Inputs:**

- ★ Nozzle Leak Frequency
- ★ Probability of OD Crack Initiation
- ★ Time to OD Crack Initiation
- ★ Initial Flaw Distribution
- ★ Crack Growth Model Stresses
- ★ Failure Definition
- ★ Leakage Detection
- ★ Probability of Core Damage



# **Consideration of Sensitivities:**

- ★ Visual Inspection Reliability
- ★ Initial Crack Size
- ★ Temperature
- ★ Crack Growth Rate Coefficient

## **Summary:**

Based on deterministic and probabilistic assessments independent of the NRC's preliminary staff assessment, there is reasonable assurance that Davis-Besse is safe to operate until the next refueling outage (March 2002).



**OFFICE OF RESEARCH INITIATIVES ON REACTOR  
VESSEL HEAD PENETRATION CRACKING**

**Briefing for  
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards**

**Ed Hackett  
Assistant Chief, Materials Engineering Branch  
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research**

**November 9, 2001**

Office of Research Initiatives on  
Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations (VHPs)

- At the request of NRR (June 2001), RES formed an independent group of experts to review technical aspects of the recent VHP cracking occurrences at Oconee and ANO. The expert group assessment was completed and documented in an inter-office memo on September 7, 2001.
- RES staff and contractors have continued to provide support to NRR in development of the technical assessment of the VHP cracking through on-going programs:
  - Environmentally Assisted Cracking
  - Non-destructive Evaluation
  - Structural Integrity/Fracture Mechanics
  - Probabilistic Risk Assessment
  - Thermal Hydraulics
- RES has provided support to NRR for VHP inspections at plant sites.
- RES staff and contractors are developing a probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) assessment of the VHP cracking and have interacted with the industry in this regard
  - Conference call (9/27/01)
  - Public meeting (11/8/01)

RES Initiatives on  
Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations

*Key Considerations in PFM Analysis*

- Crack Initiation
- Crack Growth Rates
- Analysis of Stress State
- Maintenance of Structural Margins
- Inspection Methods and Timing

RES Initiatives on  
Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations

*Key Considerations in PFM Analysis*  
*Crack Initiation*

- Location/Process
  - Axial crack initiates in the J-groove weld interface / progresses above the weld/ through-wall penetration causes leakage to the annulus /stress state causes “turning” to circumferential crack following the weld
  - Axial crack in VHP or J-groove weld progresses through-wall / through-wall penetration causes leakage to the annulus / multiple circumferential cracks initiate on the OD following the weld profile
  - Consideration of time to initiation from inspection data
- Annulus Environment
  - potential site for concentration of aggressive chemical species
  - concentrated primary water if boiling occurs at exit of crack
  - normal primary water when boiling occurs well above the J-weld
  - unlikely to be oxygenated
  - analyze deposits to confirm environment

RES Initiatives on  
Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations

*Key Considerations in PFM Analysis*  
*Crack Growth*

- Data for the environment of interest do not exist
- Significant variability in alloy 600 PWSCC data
- Appropriate to consider variability on a heat basis
- Complicated due to consideration of multiple initiation sites
- Crack growth rates in excess of 1 inch/year are possible



RES Initiatives on  
Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations

*Key Considerations in PFM Analysis*  
*Analysis of Stress State*

- Stresses due to primary pressure and crack face pressure
- Residual stresses
  - welding
  - fabrication processes & sequences, installation procedures
  - modeling details
  - influence of VHP through-wall strength gradients
- Differential expansion stresses at the root of the J-groove weld
- Potential for contribution from cyclic thermal stresses

RES Initiatives on  
Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations

*Key Considerations in PFM Analysis*  
*Maintenance of Structural Margins*

- Intent would be to perform PFM analysis on a “best estimate” basis for all input variables
- Assessment of uncertainties in previous elements indicates the need for application of margins
- Where to apply margins and appropriate magnitude(s)?

RES Initiatives on  
Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations

*Key Considerations in PFM Analysis*  
*Inspection Methods and Timing*

- Certain inspection methods have been “qualified” for determination of leakage and for VHP ID cracking
  - External Visual of RPV head for evidence of leakage
  - Eddy Current examinations for axial ID cracking on VHPs
- Other Inspection methods remain to be qualified for the OD circumferential cracking “process”
  - surface and volumetric exams for the J-groove weld
  - volumetric exams for the VHPs
- Determination for appropriate inspection intervals from PFM analysis will also depend on reliability and effectiveness of inspection methods

RES Initiatives on  
Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations

*Summary*

- RES and NRR are developing an integrated technical perspective on VHP cracking using deterministic and probabilistic (PFM) methods
- Development thus far indicates that key inputs are lacking appropriate data and/or are highly uncertain
- At the current state of development, these uncertainties limit the ability of a PFM assessment alone to provide an accurate evaluation of structural integrity and guidance on appropriate inspection intervals
- Continued efforts in this area should result in reductions in uncertainties in key input variables

**ITEMS OF INTEREST**

**487th ACRS MEETING**

**NOVEMBER 8 - 10, 2001**

engineers & Scientists. Give one copy to  
John Larkins. Return originals to me.

Thanks

Shir  
10/23



ENHANCING THE NRC'S CAPACITY TO MEET NEW  
REGULATORY CHALLENGES

Richard A. Meserve, Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Nuclear Safety Research Conference  
Washington, DC  
October 22, 2001

**ITEMS OF INTEREST  
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS  
487<sup>h</sup> MEETING  
NOVEMBER 8-10, 2001**

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## Introduction

Good morning. I am pleased to be able to address you today.

Although this is the 29<sup>th</sup> year that the NRC has held a conference on reactor safety research, I want to take special note of the change in the name of this conference. When I spoke at this meeting last year, I had no idea that I was addressing the final "Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting." Those of you who attended that meeting may recall that it was devoted in large part to a retrospective on the WASH-1400 report, which may, in hindsight, have been the perfect way to bring the era of the water reactor safety meeting to a close. I now have the pleasure of addressing the first "Nuclear Safety Research Conference."

The new name reflects the reality that the research carried out by the NRC, our contractors, our international partners, and the industry now extends beyond water-cooled reactors. The new name reflects an effort by the NRC to reach out to the broader nuclear community to explore new concepts and approaches in reactor design, fuels and materials, waste disposition, and related topics -- in addition to addressing issues associated with the current generation of water-cooled reactors.

## Nuclear Security

I would like to take a few minutes at the outset to reflect upon the events of September 11, and the impacts that those events have had on the NRC. Tomorrow marks six weeks since the United States was viciously attacked by terrorists. Although nuclear facilities were not targets, these brutal actions have brought home, in no uncertain terms, the potential threat that we face. When I say "we," I do not mean only the United States, but rather all those in the nuclear community, both in this country and internationally.

Let me say just a few words about the NRC response to the terrorist events. Shortly after the second attack on the World Trade Center, we fully staffed our Emergency Operations Center at headquarters and the counterpart offices in the Regions and put our major licensees on the highest level of alert -- a status we have maintained since September 11. We have no specific or general credible threat directed at an NRC licensee at this time, but the general threat environment is obviously very high. As a result, we have issued a variety of different threat advisories to our licensees, as well as guidance as to actions that our licensees should undertake to enhance security. We have engaged with the FAA, resulting in the issuance of a notice to airmen to avoid flyovers of nuclear power plants. We have also interacted with the military to assure that there is full awareness of the nature, and limits, of licensee capability to respond to attacks. We are working with the FBI and others in a variety of ways to assist in investigations and to assure the NRC's actions are coordinated with other agencies. And the NRC has communicated with the Governors of 40 states so as to assure that state assets -- state police or National Guard -- are available as needed.

The September 11<sup>th</sup> events have served as a wake-up call throughout the Government about the need to focus greater attention on the terrorist threat. With the full support of the Commission, I have directed the Executive Director for Operations to commence a top-to-bottom review of the NRC's safeguards and security system. This will encompass not only regulatory requirements, but also communications, the security of NRC facilities, and coordination with other agencies. Many of the important issues -- including in particular the definition of the boundary between those responsibilities that must be assumed by the private



sector and those that must be undertaken by Government -- will require a broader societal discussion. These will not be issues of the NRC and its licensees to resolve alone.

I recognize as well that the effort does not stop at our borders. We must also depend on our friends and partners internationally to provide information on potential threats and to help find methods to deal with them. We must remember that a serious event or accident at a nuclear plant or facility anywhere in the world affects us all, and we must redouble our efforts bilaterally, multilaterally, and through organizations such as the IAEA and the NEA, to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities everywhere. I am hopeful that, with a dedicated focus by all, we can limit the threat that terrorism presents.

Let me now turn to the main topic of my speech -- enhancing the NRC's capacity to meet regulatory challenges.

### NRC's Regulatory Challenges

Last year at this event I discussed the efforts of our Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research in the context of ongoing agency programs, especially those related to the economic deregulation of electricity. I focused on license renewal, power uprates, and the transition to a risk-informed approach to regulation. I then discussed anticipatory programs to prepare the NRC for new challenges, including innovative designs for new nuclear power plants.

In many respects, the situation today mirrors that which existed last year. I am pleased to say, however, that we are moving forward in meeting the technical and regulatory challenges. Our license renewal program is proceeding aggressively: three applications have been granted; seven plants, totaling 14 units, currently are under active review; and almost half the plants in the U.S. have indicated that they intend to pursue renewal. In fact, we expect that almost all of the plants in the U.S. will ultimately apply to have their licenses renewed.

We also expect to receive a large number of applications for power uprates of 10 percent or more, as licensees seek to maximize the economic contribution of their nuclear plants, while maintaining adequate margins to plant safety limits. Our responsibility, of course, is to ensure that such margins are maintained in order to protect public health and safety. New instrumentation and more realistic analytical techniques provide the means to justify power uprates without a compromise of safety margins.

We continue to make progress in risk-informing our regulations, although this has proven to be a slow and sometimes challenging process. And with regard to future reactors, we are proceeding with the "pre-application" reviews of new reactor designs, such as the AP1000 and the pebble-bed modular gas-cooled reactor, in anticipation of formal applications for design certification or a combined construction permit and operating license at some point in the future.

In these and many other areas, our research activities have made and continue to make significant contributions by providing the technical bases that comprise the foundation for our regulatory activities. The NRC's ability to continue over time to make such progress depends, however, on a fundamental underpinning -- what I shall call the "research infrastructure." There are three different components to this infrastructure -- technical personnel, experimental facilities, and analytical tools. Each of these components helps to provide the technical

foundation for regulation. All are important because significant degradation of any of the components can seriously undermine that foundation. It is the maintenance of this infrastructure that is the focus of my remarks this morning.

### **Personnel and Technical Skills**

Since becoming Chairman of the NRC, almost two years ago, I have come to regard the NRC staff as one of the most technically competent and highly skilled groups in the Federal government. Nonetheless, I must also acknowledge that the NRC is facing a potentially serious situation with respect to maintaining technical capabilities in the next few years. We have many times more people over the age of 60 than under the age of 30, and a significant fraction of the most experienced staff members are currently eligible to retire. Unless we can bring skilled new people on board and somehow transmit the accumulated knowledge of the veteran staffers to them, a great deal of the NRC's corporate memory may simply walk out the door. This problem of an aging workforce is not limited to the NRC; in fact, it extends across the nuclear industry, including utilities, vendors, and national laboratories.

We recognize the need to recruit young engineers and scientists and to ensure that they have the necessary technical skills and training. But, in doing so, we run into a second problem that is just as acute as that of our aging staff. Nuclear power has not been perceived as a thriving field by technically inclined students looking for professional challenges. As a consequence, the number of nuclear engineering programs in the U.S. has declined sharply over the last decade, and the enrollment in the ones that remain has fallen over the same period. This trend has been reported in several surveys, including the report of the blue-ribbon panel from the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee.<sup>1</sup> This report, published in May of last year, indicates that while the decline in the number of programs and students began in the 1970s, the rate of shrinkage increased sharply in the early 1990s and has just recently begun to level off. Another report with a similar focus, published last year by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD, indicates that these trends are international in scope, as well.<sup>2</sup>

We are now seeing, at long last, a small but perceptible increase in student interest and enrollment. But it will take several years to get enough people into the pipeline to fill the need for nuclear engineers, especially if recent industry interest in the possibility of building new plants ultimately results in actual new orders. Needless to say, nuclear engineering is not the only technical discipline from which the NRC draws its staff, but the general reduction of interest in nuclear power as a career choice also has affected our ability to recruit mechanical, electrical, and chemical engineers, as well as those with training in other key scientific and engineering fields.

The shortfall in new nuclear engineering graduates creates a "double whammy" when it comes to recruiting for the NRC staff. The number of available candidates is very limited. But the fact that there are too few people to fill the entry-level slots across the industry tends to put

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<sup>1</sup> M. L. Corradini, et al., "The Future of University Nuclear Engineering Programs and University Research and Training Reactors," commissioned by DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology (May 2000).

<sup>2</sup> "Nuclear Education and Training: Cause for Concern?" OECD/NEA (June 2000).

upward pressure on starting salaries, and it is difficult for the NRC to compete with utilities, vendors, and other engineering firms. The NRC has recently undertaken an initiative to identify key technical needs in our staffing profile and to recruit aggressively to attract new staff members to fill those needs. We have revitalized our intern program, entry into which is based on academic achievement. Recent graduates are selected for an extensive training program that includes formal instruction and rotational assignments. When they have completed their training, the interns are then assigned permanently to key positions throughout the agency. We expect these people to be prominently represented among the next generation of leaders at the NRC.

Several management training programs are offered for more experienced staff, as well. For example, the NRC also sponsors a graduate fellowship program, through which staff members can obtain advanced degrees at the agency's expense. We are hopeful that the availability of these types of programs will make NRC more attractive as an employer. It is through these efforts that we strive to ensure ourselves of an adequate supply of highly competent staff to meet future challenges.

As is true with virtually all issues that affect the NRC, concerns about the availability and technical competence of scientists and engineers in nuclear-related disciplines extend to the international community, as well. The international reach of the issue is illustrated by an October 1999 workshop, sponsored by the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities of the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency.<sup>3</sup> CNRA's report, released in February 2000, takes note of many of trends that are now shaping the nuclear technology community on a global scale, and includes a list of short-and long-term challenges, many of which are similar to the ones I have already outlined.

The themes of personnel demand and technical competence are closely linked, both in terms of attracting the brightest science and engineering students to study nuclear technology and in being able to transfer the experience and accumulated knowledge of veterans in the field to the new generation. It should come as no surprise, particularly to this audience, that strong, state-of-the-art research programs are seen as a key element in confronting this need. Let me then move on to address another of the aspects of "infrastructure" that I mentioned earlier: experimental facilities.

### Experimental Facilities

The development of nuclear technology in general and nuclear power in particular is highly dependent on the use of experimental facilities in almost every discipline that contributes to the field. Whether we consider reactor physics, thermal-hydraulics, the effects of radiation on materials, or fundamental knowledge in numerous other areas, the great wealth of information that is available to us today is built on the foundation of experimentation. In addition to their role in developing the technological base, research programs in general, and experimental programs in particular, also serve to attract bright young engineers and scientists into the field.

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<sup>3</sup>"Workshop on Assuring Nuclear Competence into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,"  
NEA/CNRA/R(2000)1, OECD/NEA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (February 2000)

Some consider the period from about the early 1970s to the mid-1980s as a "golden age" of experimentation in the U.S., particularly with respect to reactor safety research. In the area of water reactor technology alone, for example, we had the benefit of facilities like SEMISCALE, LOFT, MIST, THTF, and FLECHT -- most of which were sponsored in full or in part by the NRC (or its predecessor, the AEC). These facilities provided the data to support accident assessments and the development of analytical models, some of which are still in use today. It is no coincidence that this was also the time when the number of nuclear engineering students was at its highest -- even accounting for a slight drop right after the accident at Three Mile Island. When they graduated, many of those students were employed in the national laboratories that ran or used these facilities. Many of you in the audience probably were drawn to nuclear engineering and related disciplines in just this way.

Advances in nuclear safety research based on experimentation are, of course, not limited to the United States alone. Major facilities were built in France, Japan, and in many other countries. Much valuable water-reactor-related data have come from programs such as BETHSY at the CEA's Grenoble laboratory and ROSA at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute. In fact, confirmatory testing in the ROSA Large Scale Test Facility played an important role in the NRC's certification of the AP600 design.

Although experimental facilities have played a pivotal role in advancing nuclear technology, it is also true that they can be extremely expensive to build, maintain, and operate. As government and private support for nuclear research has fallen, particularly over the last decade in the U.S., we have seen many of our test facilities shut down and dismantled. Once such facilities are closed, it is virtually impossible to resurrect them and a valuable resource is gone.<sup>4</sup> Even more dismaying is the fact that the state of the art in data collection and retention has advanced so rapidly that the tapes and other media used to acquire and store the information gathered from previous test programs can, in some cases, no longer be read or are deteriorating to the point that the data are at risk of being irretrievably lost.

Another related resource that has suffered a similar fate in the U.S. has been non-power and testing reactors, particularly those at universities. This issue is also discussed in the report of NERAC's blue ribbon panel, to which I referred earlier. Just as the number of nuclear engineering programs and students has declined sharply over the past 10 years, we have seen a drastic decrease in the number of operating research reactors as well. This decline is a matter for concern for several reasons. University research reactors are often seen as an integral part of a successful nuclear engineering program and closure of the facility may be interpreted by students as a sign that the program is in trouble, which could serve to diminish enrollment further. Moreover, these reactors serve two important purposes. First, they help in the training of nuclear engineering students in aspects of reactor technology. And second, they provide important facilities for both basic and applied research, contributing to a wide range of projects from materials behavior to forensic investigation to the treatment of cancer. Many of

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<sup>4</sup>This issue is also a matter of international concern, and is the subject of another NEA report, developed by the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and released earlier this year, "Nuclear Safety Research in OECD Countries: Major Facilities and Programmes at Risk," OECD/NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (2001). The report addresses research facilities and programs that are in danger of being lost and ways in which these key resources can be maintained.

our research reactors, both at universities and elsewhere, are quite old and are increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain. Their declining number is a source of real concern, particularly since no new facilities of this type have been built in the U.S. for many years.

Although much of the news from this sector of the nuclear technology community has been discouraging, I was recently pleased to learn that the University of Missouri-Columbia, home of the largest university research reactor in the U.S., has decided not to close its reactor, rather, the university will create a Nuclear Science and Engineering Institute, of which the reactor will be the centerpiece. We can only hope that this positive sign will encourage other universities struggling with similar issues to keep their reactors operating as long as it is safe and practical to do so.

The loss of both in-reactor and out-of-reactor experimental facilities is a serious threat to the maintenance of our regulatory infrastructure. I have already alluded to the impact on attracting new, technically competent technical staff members to the field. Moreover, when important new research must be undertaken to address emerging technical issues, the facilities may not be available to respond quickly to the need. Thus, we may not have the necessary capability to develop and validate the third aspect of infrastructure: state-of-the-art analytical codes.

Let me turn to that subject now.

### Analytical Tools

In the early developmental stages of nuclear reactor technology, much of the basic knowledge about how reactors work was gained by building small reactors, testing them, and observing what happened. As reactors got larger and more complex, it became clear that direct observation would have to be replaced by analysis, using mathematical models derived from experiments. For more than 30 years, researchers in government, industry, and academia have designed and operated experimental facilities that simulate reactors and their associated systems, structures, and components. Researchers have used these facilities to acquire data, to understand more fully the physical phenomena that are important to nuclear reactor safety, and to develop the analytical models that enable the accurate prediction of the behavior of the actual reactors and power plants.

The sophistication of these models has increased as computer technology, instrumentation, and data acquisition techniques have improved, and today we have literally dozens of codes and models to calculate thermal-hydraulics, neutronics and kinetics, fuel performance, severe accident phenomena, the behavior of materials and structures, and the dispersal of radioactive material in the environment, just to name a few. The art and science of designing experiments has grown more sophisticated as well, with formalized scaling methodologies such as the hierarchical, two-tiered scaling process, and techniques like the CSAU methodology for assessing the uncertainties associated with complex thermal-hydraulics codes.

Even analytical methodologies that are not directly associated with testing depend to a substantial degree on data from either testing or plant operations. For example, probabilistic safety assessment techniques rely on information on causes and rates of component and

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system failures as input to event and fault trees, and the establishment of success criteria for event sequences depends on accident analysis codes derived and validated using experimental results. Indeed, the NRC's evolution to a more risk-informed regulatory paradigm demands that our analytical tools be as realistic as possible, so that we can make sound, technically defensible judgments as to what is safety-significant and what is not.

The interrelationship between the different elements of the research infrastructure should be clear from this discussion. We need creative, well-trained people to design, operate, and analyze sophisticated, cutting-edge experiments that will help us develop the state-of-the-art analytical tools to support critical regulatory initiatives, such as risk-informed regulation, safety reviews of advanced reactor designs, license renewal, and power uprates. Those creative, bright, and energetic engineers and scientists will be available to us only if we are able to establish experimental and analytical research programs that will attract them to nuclear engineering and associated fields as professionals.

Unfortunately, as I noted earlier, it is an undeniable fact that experimental facilities can be extremely expensive to design, build, operate, and maintain. With the NRC's research budget falling from more than \$200 million in the mid-1980s to \$40-to-50 million today – not accounting for inflation – it is clear that the NRC does not have the wherewithal to maintain the infrastructure by itself. We must look for other ways to tackle these critical issues.

#### **Possible Approaches to Enhancing Infrastructure**

In my view, the answer to the problem of maintaining and enhancing infrastructure is broad cooperation among all of the various sectors of the nuclear technology community. I realize that there are challenges to be faced in this regard, particularly with respect to cooperative work with the regulated industry, in view of conflict-of-interest concerns. Nonetheless, we have to find ways in which such obstacles can be successfully negotiated. The NRC's research program has been assessed many times by various groups: the National Academy of Science, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, the former Nuclear Safety Research Review Committee, and most recently, a panel of experts drawn from across the community and chaired by former Commissioner Ken Rogers. In virtually every instance, the NRC has been advised to find ways to work cooperatively with the Department of Energy and the nuclear industry to provide adequate support for major research programs.

Cooperation does not necessarily refer solely to jointly funded research. For example, universities struggle to find adequate funds to operate their reactors and to upgrade them when necessary. DOE provides some funding for university reactor operations, and is looking at ways to do more. But the nuclear power industry – utilities, vendors, their contractors, and organizations like EPRI – should realize that they have a stake in keeping these facilities operating too. Research funding and outright grants should be available so as to ensure the continued viability of university reactors and nuclear engineering programs.

Cooperation extends beyond national borders, as well. International cooperation is a key element of enhancing the regulatory infrastructure, not only in the United States, but also everywhere that nuclear power is used. The international nuclear community already does much in the way of cooperative programs, through bilateral and multilateral programs and through organizations like the NEA and the IAEA. But we must do more. Various NEA reports

contain many valuable suggestions in this respect, such as establishing international centers of excellence, exchanges of staff, and collaborating on defining core competencies and means for assuring that they are maintained. This does not mean that all countries will end up regulating nuclear power in the same way – I recognize that there may be many different paths to a successful outcome. But we should all strive to ensure that, whatever path we choose, our decision-making is informed by the best information that can be brought to bear from wherever in the world the information can be found.

### **Conclusion**

My objective this morning has been to provide a vision of the direction in which I would like to see the NRC and the nuclear technology community move in order to ensure that our regulatory infrastructure is up to the task of establishing the technical bases for current and future challenges. I hope that you share this vision. I look forward to working together with you to reach our common goals.

Thank you.

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## **NRC NEWS**

### **UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

#### **OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

Office of Public Affairs  
Washington, DC 20555-001

Telephone: 301/415-8200

E-mail: [opa@nrc.gov](mailto:opa@nrc.gov)

Web Site: <http://www.nrc.gov/OPA>

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No. S-01-025

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[ [PDF Version \(42 KB\)](#) ]

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### **"New Direction in Research"**

**The Honorable Greta Joy Dicus  
Commissioner  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission**

### **Nuclear Safety Research Conference**

**October 22, 2001  
Washington, D. C.**

#### **Welcoming remarks**

**Good morning everyone!**

I would like to **welcome** you to the Nuclear Safety Research Conference, or what was formerly known as the Water Reactor Safety Meeting. I see some familiar faces in the audience. To them, and to all of you who have been to previous Water Reactor Meetings before, welcome back. To those who are at this meeting for the first time, I hope you would find this meeting insightful, and informative. We expect to benefit from the new ideas and new information, which you bring along with you.

Finally, I want to extend a warm welcome to our foreign guests who have come from far. Most issues critical to the industry today, whether it is a need to improve the security of our facilities, extend the life of our plants, or develop advanced reactors which are safe as well as cost-competitive, are multinational rather than national issues. Therefore, your presence and participation in this meeting are a benefit to all of



us.

In addition to the meeting, I hope you would enjoy the fine October weather in Washington, D.C. I also hope you had, or will have time to enjoy the many national monuments and museums in the city, before you return. All of them are only a short train ride from this hotel.

We all recognize from history that issues which confront the nuclear industry are not static. The issues that were critical have been changed, and will continue to change. The directions of research, must change to accommodate the changing needs. History also shows that the Office of Research and the NRC have successfully changed direction to address the issues which were contemporary to the time. Many of us may not have been part of the nuclear community when issues were confronted relating to emergency core cooling, in the 1970s. The Office of Research's focus on code development and experiments helped NRC address these issues and enhance the regulatory process. In the 1980s, continuation of research activities on probabilistic risk assessment lead to publication of NUREG-1150, issuance of Generic Letter 88-20, and the development of many tools and methods to enhance the regulatory process through the use of probabilistic risk assessment. During the 1990s, NRC did a fair amount of research on ageing of equipment in our plants, thermal hydraulic analysis in advanced reactors, and even more research in the area of probabilistic risk assessment. This research is helping us address key questions relating to plant license renewals, an improved reactor oversight process, and risk-informing our regulations.

Before your minds wonder off to the exciting topics which will be discussed this afternoon, I want to describe what I will be speaking about today. First, I will address some of the initiatives we have undertaken to improve the effectiveness of NRC. Second, I will discuss present challenges to industry. Finally, I will discuss some of the new directions which NRC may be heading toward, specifically in the area of international standards on radiation protection. In that respect, I will share with you recent advancements in this area and my vision of how these advancements should, or should not, affect U.S. regulations.

### **Initiatives; to improve Effectiveness of NRC**

Over the last several years, the agency, in part using significant contributions from the Office of Research, has made major strides to be more effective. We have done this by changing the regulatory framework to allow the NRC to shift resources to address issues which have the highest impact on public health and safety. The new reactor oversight process is an excellent example of this changing framework. Even though we are still experiencing some growing pains, NRC has created a process that assesses the risk significance of events or issues, and NRC uses this risk significance to guide us in our interactions with licensees.

In the area of changes to regulations, the Commission has been looking at staff's proposals to risk-inform 10 CFR 50.44 which reduces requirements on hydrogen recombiners. The Commission is also looking at Staff's proposals to risk-inform 10 CFR 50.46 which will reduce unnecessary burdens on the licensees in their loss-of-coolant analysis (LOCA). The progress we have made to improve effectiveness may not be as fast as NRC like it to be. However, NRC has made these fundamental changes with public safety as our number one priority, and sometimes that involves taking extra time. We look for ways to improve effectiveness, and I commend the staff on their accomplishments, and thank the industry for continuing active, constructive dialogues.

### **Present challenges**

Even though a good safety level for nuclear facilities and applications has been achieved in most countries,

there are areas where improved knowledge will be necessary to efficiently and effectively regulate and operate the current fleet of reactors as they age, and to provide the scientific and technical basis for the development of innovative nuclear reactors and novel means for high-level waste management and disposal. History indicates that new issues will continue to emerge from operational experience, and an enterprising and dynamic industry together with an efficient and effective regulator will continue to propose innovative initiatives to improve or maintain safety in a cost-effective manner. Further, new designs are being proposed which have many characteristics that differ from those of the current fleet of plants. Availability of knowledgeable and well-trained human resources is necessary to sustain and improve the safety of nuclear power and provide effective regulation of it through all its phases from research and conceptual design, through operation, to and finally to waste management and decommissioning.

Some examples of areas where novel emerging issues have been identified follow. For each example, emphasis must be placed on understanding the uncertainties involved and highlighting those needing attention; as well as the role of risk information in identifying safety and regulatory needs.

Economic conditions are leading to extension of the operating cycle, higher fuel burnup and increased power levels. As in this country, initiatives have been identified in several other IAEA member countries to explore use of mixed oxide fuel either because of non proliferation considerations or to recycle fuel to use it more efficiently. These are being evaluated by the regulatory authorities in member states. The combined effect of these considerations must be evaluated to determine the overall safety impact.

Economic deregulation has had many influences on plant performance. It could create the potential to lead to degradation of existing safety principles, if the impacts of deregulation on plant performance, are not fully understood and monitored by the plant operator and an independent regulator to provide early warning of changes in culture and operations. Similarly, extending the effective operating life of nuclear power plants will bring great benefits, but requires effective programs for mitigating or managing the deleterious effects of plant ageing.

Life extension, decommissioning, introduction of new technology, and aging workforce pose unique challenges in the area of human performance. We must be prepared to understand these challenges and develop means to measure, monitor and trend organizational and management performances with regard to safety as well as individual human performance.

New reactor concepts (e.g., Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, and advanced LWRs) are under development that appear to have advantages in both economics and safety over existing plants. Where there is a reasonable prospect that such new designs may be proposed to a country's regulatory authority, it is essential that the regulatory authority prepare in advance for such a proposal, ensuring it has the proper mix of technical skills and experimental facilities to thoroughly evaluate the safety of such new designs.

Similarly, in the fuel cycle, new concepts are under consideration for both the enrichment of new fuel and the disposal of radioactive waste. Because of these initiatives, research expertise is needed. The application of risk analysis techniques to nuclear materials manufacturing or processing facilities is well underway, but these facilities differ from reactors and it may be necessary to adopt a different technique for risk assessments.

The analysis of the risk associated with both interim aboveground storage of spent fuel and the transportation of high level waste to final repositories requires detailed analyses of cask designs and evaluation of material behavior. Similarly, the long-term storage of radioactive waste will require monitoring as operational information begins to be assembled. Experience from reactors and other industries using advanced technology indicates operational observations may require mid-course

corrections by the regulatory body as well as by the operator of the facility to maintain safety.

New enrichment and recycle approaches as well as consideration of transmutation of high level waste will require careful evaluation of the need for safety research in parallel with developmental analyses.

The complexity of these techniques, and the safety, non proliferation, and operational concerns will require a cadre of nuclear safety experts to evaluate future research needs. We must be prepared to understand these challenges and develop means to measure, monitor and trend organizational and management performances with regard to safety as well as individual human performance. Adequate research must be conducted to understand these new technologies, their associated risks to public health and safety, the uncertainty in the risk estimates, and to evaluate where controls are needed for public protection or where further research is needed to reduce uncertainties.

Let me turn now to the core topic. The essence of what NRC does pertains, of course, to protecting public health and safety and the environment. In accomplishing this mission we rely on many processes, procedures, and regulations. During the remaining part of my speech, I would like to contribute to this meeting by talking about (a) the evolution of new recommendations which may be developed by International Committee on Radiation Protection, and (b) my perspectives on how these recommendations should or should not affect the near-term and long-term policies of the NRC.

As you all know, technology evolves with the advancement of science and science advances through research and study. These advancements occur at academic institutions, laboratories, and other research and development facilities through the efforts of many dedicated members, like you, in the scientific community. Regulatory agencies are faced with the challenge of how to translate our current knowledge of radiation health effects into a regulatory framework, via regulations and with regulatory guides, that are protective of not only the workers, the public, and the environment, but, at the same time, strike a balance between the uncertainties in that knowledge and the beneficial applications of radiation. For example, we certainly are all aware of uncertainties which have led to controversy over whether the present uses of the linear non threshold model to describe radiation health effects at low doses and dose rates are appropriate for establishing regulatory standards in radiological protection.

Many factors influence decisions in the business of setting regulatory standards for radiation protection. Historically, NRC's regulatory approach for radiation protection has considered new scientific information on radiation health effects as one important input into this complex business. The NRC has also depended upon a process in which first, independent bodies of experts evaluate information on radiation health effects and then other bodies of experts, drawing upon this collective knowledge, develop recommendations for systems of radiation protection. Examples of the first set of bodies are the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), the Radiation Effect Research Foundation (RERF) and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Committee on Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR). The second set includes The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), in this country, and the International Council on Radiation Protection (ICRP). After considering recommendations from these scientific bodies, if the Commission agrees that revisions to NRC's radiation protection regulatory framework are needed, then the changes are proposed through an open and inclusive process that provides for public input. Finally, NRC is subject to statutory requirements to follow the generally applicable radiation protection standards issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

This then moves us from science into policy decisions. In the final analysis, the flexibility and direction that agencies have in making these policy decisions are dictated by a number of considerations including the underlying legislation for regulatory agencies and, in some cases, by court decisions on the implementation

of the legislation.

For those who are not familiar with the activities of the ICRP, and how ICRP influences NRC Regulations, let me say a few words about some key activities of ICRP and how they relate to NRC's regulations.

ICRP updates models to reflect new biokinetic information and to achieve greater predictive accuracy through the application of physiologically realistic model structures like the respiratory tract model described in ICRP Publication 66 (1994). Furthermore, using these models, ICRP provides recommendations to the international radiation protection community. The ICRP models and recommendations provide significant input in formulating the regulations which NRC adopts, after incorporating stakeholder concerns. For example, the current 10 CFR Part 20 which establishes standards for protection against radiation adopted models and recommendations from ICRP Publication 26 published in 1977 and Publication 30 published in 1978.

Since the 1970s ICRP has made major changes to ICRP recommendations and models-- and --- they are continuing to evaluate many more changes.

Let me first discuss proposed changes to the ICRP models and how we might begin using them. During the last few years the ICRP has updated many of the models in ICRP Publication 30 which were published in 1978, to reflect new biokinetic information and to achieve greater predictive accuracy. Because the models of Publication 30 often reflected overly cautious parameter values chosen in the absence of physiological constraints, it is common for the newer models to yield lower dose coefficients. For example, the updated effective dose coefficient for the inhalation of  $^{232}\text{Th}$  by a worker is about a factor of 15 lower than the earlier value. However, for a few radioisotopes, the new models have led to substantial increases in dose estimates. Some licensees have made requests to use these new models, and on a case-by-case basis, since these models clearly reflect advances in knowledge, we have granted a few exemptions to the rules.

Unlike models which are purely scientific correlations based on experimental or other information, ICRP recommendations must be evaluated in light of other factors such as cost-benefits, perceptions, and political ramifications. Since 1978, the ICRP has made major revisions to its basic radiation protection recommendations. These were published in ICRP Publication 60 in 1990. This publication has recommendations which supercede those of the ICRP Publication 26. Because of timing and other considerations, NRC adopted only some of the ICRP recommendations into Part 20. As an example, NRC adopted the ICRP-60 recommendation to lower the dose limit for the general public from 5 mSv (500 mrem) per year to 1 mSv (100 mrem) per year. However, with respect to the occupational exposures, even though ICRP-60 recommended a new occupational dose limit of 100 mSv (10 rems) in 5 years with a 50 mSv (5 rem) maximum, NRC believed that a reduction in the annual dose limit was not required since the annual average radiation dose to most occupational workers in 1987 was already well below 20 mSv (2 rem). Furthermore, as a part of the revised regulations, NRC included the concept of maintaining radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

It is my view that some facts and figures based on recent information must be fully evaluated before considering a rulemaking change to reduce occupational exposure as recommended by ICRP-60. For example, in 1999, out of approximately 150,000 monitored individuals at commercial power reactors, only twenty-four individuals received doses exceeding 20 mSv (2 rems), and only 2 individuals received more than 30 mSv (3 rems). No individual exceeded 50 mSv (5 rems). When you consider the fact that even ICRP-60 allows a maximum of 50 mSv (5 rem) per year, as long as the average over five years is below 20 mSv (2 rems), even if NRC adopts ICRP-60, there would not be any savings of dose. Furthermore, there would be substantial cost for implementing the new regulation, with uncertain or any added benefit.

For example, the cost of record keeping and managing radiation protection programs, may increase considerably due to loss of operating margin. Most plants operate with administrative controls which are lower than 10 CFR Part 20. If we lower the Part 20 annual dose limits, the administrative margin may have to be lowered further to ensure compliance. That may mean more situations of individual doses come close to administrative limits, more bookkeeping may be necessary, and more management involvement may be required with questionable additional benefits.

ICRP met in early September of this year to discuss additional changes. One area which has been discussed by ICRP is the value selected for limitation of a dose to a member of the public. Current NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 specify 1 mSv (100 mrem) for this annual dose limit. This was derived from ICRP-60. Internationally there may be an interest to drop the public limit per se, and rely solely on a source related constraint of approximately 0.3 mSv (30 mrem) as the point of specifying whether a source (licensee) is appropriately controlling their material. This could potentially be a factor of three reduction in the dose limit from an individual facility, if ICRP were to adopt this recommendation.

The 1 mSv (100 mrem) to 0.3 mSv (30 mrem) reduction could have significant ramifications with respect to public perception, even though actual doses encountered by public would unlikely be affected. The pressure on modeling and in verifying compliance would increase because the industry would have to demonstrate compliance with lower margins. As far as ramifications on public perceptions, comparison of a 0.3 mSv (30 mrem) rather than a 1 mSv (100 mrem) limit against thresholds in other regulations, such as thresholds allowed for routine emissions, could lead to the belief that NRC is allowing too much radiation exposure to public via routine emissions.

ICRP is considering even more changes to get rid of some complexities. The system of radiological protection set out in ICRP Publication 60 evolved over 60 years. ICRP acknowledges that the current system is complex and difficult to explain and consequently, is attempting to develop a new system that is more coherent and less confusing. The new controllable dose concept will be debated by the ICRP over the coming years.

Another major shift considered by ICRP is going from utilitarian to egalitarian ethics. The historic optimization process in radiation protection has been based on utilitarian ethics applying classical cost benefit analysis to address the question - "How much does it cost and how many lives are to be saved?" The use of collective dose emphasized the protection of society because of the difficulty in taking into account individual risk in any quantitative manner for the general public. A utilitarian ethic is the doctrine that the greatest good of the greatest number should be the guiding principle. In developing the recommendations for the 21st century, the shift continues from utilitarian values, so as to include the recognition of individual rights by using egalitarian ethics. Egalitarian is the principle of equal treatment for all individuals.

In summary, considering (a) the ICRP recommendations are still being debated and (b) the benefit to the general public and licensees is relatively low, there is, in my view, no pressing safety issue, to revise Part 20 to adopt ICRP-60 standards. We must, however, remain diligent to new concepts and be prepared to make whatever modifications to our regulations deemed worthwhile to meet our statutory responsibilities.

When and if the NRC decides on revising regulations, we will pay significant attention to the recommendations provided by the ICRP. But we must also consider insights from other scientific communities as well. There are other ongoing studies, such as BEIR VII, which will also be taken under consideration, before any rule changes are made. In September 1998, the National Research Council was awarded a 3-year grant to conduct a comprehensive reassessment of the health risk resulting from exposure to low levels of ionizing radiation. This reassessment (BEIR VII) will include a review of data

that might affect the shape of the dose-response curve at low-doses, in particular, evidence for threshold in dose-response relationships and the influence of adaptive response and radiation hormesis on radiation exposure. In September 2000, the EPA requested a 2-year extension of the BEIR report and re analysis of the Japanese health effects data. Assuming both reports are completed on schedule, the final BEIR VII report should be published in late 2003.

## Conclusions

In closing, I would like to make two remarks, the first on my vision on the role of the Office of Research and the second, on my vision of ICRP and other ideas which it is currently considering on the near- and long-term impacts to NRC regulations.

My vision has not changed from last year. My vision of the NRC Office of Research would be a center of excellence and source of expertise. This center would maintain a cadre of reactor and materials safety specialists in various key areas, with independent and unbiased expertise across a broad spectrum of advanced nuclear technology, to provide the technical basis for robust and transparent regulatory decisions. Experimental facilities and resources would be maintained to ensure our ability to respond in a timely manner to new or emerging issues. The office would complement the front-line regulatory activities of the agency and independently examine evolving technology and anticipated issues. I would expect that we do more and focus on making what we produce more timely and more useful.

On ICRP recommendations and many other changes which are currently being considered by the Commission, I believe the following. In the near-term, although considerations of the ICRP-60 recommendations are still being debated, I believe that this is not a pressing safety issue in the US. It is premature to consider changes to 10 CFR Part 20, which would require use of recommendations of ICRP-60. However, in the long-term, because ensuring public health and safety is as it should be our primary focus, --- and--- because through ICRP we receive the global benefits of the advancements in science and technology in the area of radiation protection, we should monitor and prepare to consider any new ICRP recommendations, -- after-- a careful evaluation of their merits to the society.

Thank you for your attention, I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have at this time.

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## **NRC NEWS**

### **UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

#### **OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

Office of Public Affairs  
Washington, DC 20555-001

Telephone: 301/415-8200

E-mail: [opa@nrc.gov](mailto:opa@nrc.gov)

Web Site: <http://www.nrc.gov/OPA>

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## **Radiological Protection, Nuclear Energy and the Environment in the 21st Century**

**Resurgence of Nuclear Power by The Honorable Greta Joy Dicus  
Commissioner  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission**

**National Congress of Professional Societies  
Mexican Nuclear Society  
Mexican Health Physics Society**

**Zacatecas, Mexico  
October 8, 2001**

Buenos Dias. Let me try some more Spanish. **Es un gran placer estar aqui.** This is a lovely setting to participate in the Annual Conference of the Nuclear Mexican Society and the Annual Reunion of the Mexican Society of Radiological Protection.

Before I begin my presentation, let me say a few words about the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. Latin America and the rest of the world have expressed their sympathy. We greatly appreciate our friend's words of support and sympathy. These are difficult times for us but we will recover. Concerning our nuclear plants, since September 11, the United States Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been working with our licensees (around the clock) to ensure adequate

protection of nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel facilities. The NRC is prepared to make any adjustments as may be deemed necessary to continue to protect the public health and safety.

When Mr. Raul Ortiz invited me to speak, I welcomed the opportunity to come and tell you how nuclear power is doing in the United States. As you may be aware, the number one responsibility of the United States NRC is to ensure public safety in the operations of our licensees. The NRC does not promote the nuclear industry. It is from the regulatory view point that we are involved with the nuclear power industry. This is a very important point that needs to be underscored. I mention this because the structure in other countries may differ from the United States and because this responsibility will continue as new nuclear power plants are built.

There has been a tremendous amount of nuclear power developments in the past twelve months. Never since the inception of nuclear power have such monumental movements occurred in the United States. These are movements that may eventually lead to building new nuclear power plants. Specifically, I would like to discuss three very important current topics in the resurgence of nuclear power that cut across international borders. The first topic is the new **Regulatory and Industry Activities** - if the resurgence is to take place, the various industry efforts need to be consistent and supported by a new regulatory framework and infrastructure. The first topic leads to the second topic, the realization that we have a **Human Capital Crisis** - we are finding that there are not enough nuclear professionals to meet the demand. The third topic is the **High-Level Waste Repository** - spent fuel was never meant to be stored permanently at the plant site. I will talk more about topic one than the other two topics but believe that for completeness the other two topics need some discussion.

### **Regulatory and Industry Activities**

There are many factors that have led to the potential nuclear power resurgence in the United States. In many ways, the NRC planned for the future over a decade ago by establishing the regulatory framework (i.e., Part 52 and Part 54) needed to accommodate the nuclear power resurgence. But that is not to say that we had a crystal ball that predicted precisely what has happened or is happening. In fact, the rules that were promulgated for the new framework may need to be reviewed now that some of those rules are being exercised. In addition to the regulatory framework, the regulatory infrastructure needs to be established. Some of the other factors deal with timing and external factors, such as, the California power crisis and the deregulation of the electrical industry. Let me discuss some of these factors, some may be very obvious and some may not be so obvious.

#### Part 52 and New Reactor Designs

The current fleet of 103 operating nuclear power plants was licensed many years ago under 10 CFR Part 50. Part 50 served its purpose well for that time but the processes were eventually criticized for being slow. The NRC started to lay the foundation for a new way of licensing reactors in the late 1980s. While new nuclear plant applications were not foreseen in the 1980s, the move to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the processes in Part 50 prompted the development of 10 CFR Part 52. Part 52 was promulgated to provide an alternate process for licensing that differs from Part 50. Part 52 allows for the certification of standardized designs and the early approval of sites for reactor construction, either or both of which may be referenced in an application for a combined construction permit and operating license.

By the late 1990s Part 52 had been exercised when the NRC certified three new reactor designs - Combustion Engineering's System 80+, General Electric's Advanced Boiling Water Reactor, and Westinghouse's AP600. The industry is currently working with the Nuclear Energy Institute to develop plans for the applications of early site permits, advanced reactor design certifications, and combined



operator licenses.

The potential nuclear power resurgence has also brought new ideas in design. Due to the economics, some of the new designs are modular facilities where multi-units can be combined to supply the amount of power needed. Each modular unit by itself produces only a fraction of today's operating nuclear plants. Two of the modular designs of interest are the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor and the Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor. Two other designs receiving attention are the AP1000, a modified version of the certified AP600, and the International Reactor Inherently Safe Design, normally called IRIS.

The consolidation of the nuclear industry has resulted in licensees like Exelon that owns several nuclear power plants being in the forefront of building new power plants with new reactor designs. Exelon along with other parties in South Africa is in the process of designing and building a pebble bed modular reactor. Depending upon on-going feasibility assessment, Exelon will decide by the end of the year to either proceed or drop its plan to build a new reactor in the United States. If they decide to proceed, Exelon could potentially apply for a combined license for the pebble bed modular reactor as early as 2003.

### California Power Crisis

The California electrical power crisis influenced the plans to build new power plants including nuclear ones. The deregulation of the electrical industry began its final stage of implementation in California this year. This fact, the business factors associated with deregulation, and California's resistance to build new power plants due to plant air emissions, combined to create a power crisis in late winter 2000 and spring of this year. Among the many issues identified, the California crisis pointed out the shortage of generation capacity in California and, in general, the western United States. In many cases, it was not the cost of electricity that escalated to extreme level that was the problem but that excess power was just not available in the western United States to sell to California. The nuclear industry noted that new nuclear plants could meet the electrical demand and satisfy the strict requirements of air emissions. As it turned out, the crisis of the lack of power did not materialize this summer when it was believed that California would experience many blackouts. Fortunately, conservation and a mild summer averted the power crisis.

### National Energy Policy

In the Spring of this year when the shortage of electrical power in California was being experienced, a special group commissioned by President Bush was in the process of assessing the federal energy supply for its report - the National Energy Policy. The report was submitted to President Bush in mid-May. The National Energy Policy was designed to help bring together business, government, local communities and citizens to promote dependable, affordable and environmentally sound energy for the future. The report envisions a comprehensive long-term strategy that uses leading edge technology to produce an integrated energy, environmental and economic policy. The report states that to achieve a 21<sup>st</sup> century quality of life, the United States must modernize conservation, modernize infrastructure, and increase energy supplies. In addition to hydro, coal, and oil, the report specifically recommends that the President support the expansion of nuclear energy as a major component of our national energy policy.

While the report was a well-thought out assessment of the energy situation and carries a lot of influence, there are still very powerful opponents to nuclear power in the United States. This points out that the nuclear industry still has to overcome resistance if the nuclear power resurgence is to occur. Nevertheless, we have seen increased interest in Congress to pass laws that would facilitate the nuclear energy resurgence.

### License Renewal (Part 54)

It is not necessary to build new nuclear plants to generate more electricity. The United States nuclear industry generated more electricity by being more effective and efficient in their operations. In addition, in recent years the NRC has approved power uprates. These approved power uprates have increased the power output by a few percentage points, and there is interest in the industry to increase the power up to 20%. Nevertheless, the biggest factor for the industry to produce more electricity has been to extend the years of the existing operating licenses. The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) limits the initial license term for operation to 40 years. This term limitation was not established by technical considerations, but rather was driven by antitrust and financial factors. However, AEA did allow for license renewal, and the Commission has established regulations to implement this option.

In the 1990s, the NRC promulgated 10 CFR Part 54, Renewal of Operating License. Part 54 has provided the option for licensees to renew their license for an additional twenty years. A few years ago, it was believed that this option would not be used by many of the licensees. The first application for license renewal was received in 1998, long before the potential nuclear power resurgence. Since that time, the NRC has approved operating license extensions for three plants and there are five more pending applications. The NRC expects to receive twenty more applications for license renewal in the next four years. Furthermore today, it is believed that most current licensees, if not all, will ultimately seek to extend their licenses.

#### NRR and RES New Design Organizations

In March of this year, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) established the Future Licensing Organization which was staffed by temporary assignments. In August of this year, the temporary organization was replaced with a permanent office called the New Reactor Licensing Project Office (NRLPO). The permanent staffing for this new office is currently on-going. NRLPO has responsibility for coordination of all NRR activities with new reactor licensing, including design certification, early site permits, and combined license applications. NRLPO will also be responsible for reactor regulatory infrastructure development, and will coordinate all its activities with other NRC headquarters and regional offices.

In July of this year, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) also established the Advanced Reactor Group (ARG). ARG will serve as a focal point for RES advanced reactor activities. Responsibilities for ARG include managing, in coordination with NRR and the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, non LWR advanced reactor pre-application activities, and supporting NRR in activities related to advanced LWR's. Current activities include a pre-application review of Exelon's Pebble Bed Modular Reactor and interface with the United States Department of Energy on the Generation IV reactor program. ARG will use a matrix approach to capitalize on the technical expertise across RES, such as thermal hydraulic analysis, severe accident analysis, and high temperature performance of materials, components, and systems.

These two NRR and RES organizations are needed to support the industry activities. As I have previously mentioned, industry representatives are developing plans to submit applications for early site permits, advanced reactor design certifications, and combined licenses. In addition, the industry is assessing the potential to restart suspended construction projects over the next one to two years. Stakeholders have also expressed an interest in working with the NRC to resolve regulatory issues affecting possible new reactor licenses, and to make improvements to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of regulatory processes. The NRC has also begun efforts to reactivate the construction inspection program in anticipation of these potential projects. While there is still considerable uncertainty regarding what activities the NRC will be called upon to support, and when this support would be required, it is essential that the NRC continue the

efforts already underway to prepare for future applications so that the NRC can fulfill its safety mission.

## **Human Capital Crisis**

For the past decade, the number of college graduates in nuclear engineering, health physics, and in general, engineering and sciences has been declining in the United States. When the number of operating nuclear power plants was decreasing, this fact was not as troublesome as it is today with the potential nuclear power resurgence. That is not to say that we did not worry a few years ago, we did. The private industry and the government were competitors then and now in attracting new graduates. This competition for engineers will continue but with more urgency. The human capital crisis is exacerbated when we consider that many of the nuclear professionals are near retirement age.

To say the least, the NRC has been affected by the diminishing supply of new engineering graduates. As we found out, this has been a problem not only for us but all of the federal technical agencies. There have been recent reports that this decline in science and engineering graduates has stabilized. But even if the downward trend is stopped, it will take years to reverse the declining trend. I say this not because it involves only students but institutions who continue to shut down their research reactors. Not only are these reactors important in training the graduates but additionally providing the opportunity for further reactor research. Today, we believe that the supply of nuclear engineering graduates at most only meets 50% of the demand.

If this deficient supply of graduates was not enough of a problem, the industry and the NRC are now facing an aging work force. The large number of near retirements will aggravate the problem. I have recent data that demonstrates some of our concerns specifically for the NRC. As of May 2001, the average age of the NRC professional staff was 48.5. In September 2000, the NRC had six times as many staff over the age of 60 as it had staff under the age of 30. Today, because of our effort to aggressively recruit, the ratio has been reduced to five times as many staff over the age of 60 as for the staff under the age of 30. I do not have the exact comparable data for our licensees but the numbers would closely resemble the NRC figures.

The supply outlook for health physics professionals is no better than for engineering professionals. In August of this year, the Health Physics Society (HPS) published a position statement on this topic. In this position, the HPS recommends significant financial support by the US Congress and federal agencies for health physics programs in academic institutions. This support would assist faculty, students, and research associated with these programs and thus ensure an adequate supply of qualified radiation safety professionals.

The HPS position paper goes on to point out a critical shortage exists in the supply of qualified radiation safety professionals throughout a broad spectrum of activities including medical practice and research, regulatory oversight, academic research, environmental protection, occupational safety, and the research and application of nuclear technologies. A recent survey conducted by HPS indicates that present supply of radiation safety professionals is approximately 77% of the demand. Supply during the next five years will only be 63% of the demand. One again, the retirement of the radiation safety professionals is the big factor in meeting less of the demand in the next five years.

As I have stated, this human capital crisis is across the industry and the government. In testimony before Congress, the NRC has also asked for help from the federal government and we have pointed out specific remedies - for instance, allowing the NRC to fund fellowships and scholarships, and supporting specific colleges that provide the training in skills needed by the NRC. The whole federal issue of the human capital problem is being addressed by the United States Office of Personnel Management.

## High-Level Waste Repository

With respect to the progressions that are before us in a path toward new reactor designs, license renewals, and potential new reactor applications, we should pursue these progressions methodically and with the end-in-mind. Along this critical path there is one essential element that remains to be resolved. That element being a national policy decision on where spent fuel and other high-level waste will be emplaced for final disposal.

We are all well aware of the Department of Energy's efforts regarding siting and characterization activities at the proposed Yucca Mountain site, as mandated by law. Along these lines, both the Environmental Protection Agency and the NRC have recently finalized our environmental protection standards and implementing regulations. With the site characterization and sufficiency aspects drawing to closure, the United States government is rapidly approaching a policy decision, that I believe, will forever impact future decisions of the commercial nuclear industry. This decision will yield impacts well beyond the U.S. borders. After two decades of data compilation and spending more than \$6 billion dollars, I believe that a final decision whether to move forward with Yucca Mountain or not, is needed, so that energy generators and suppliers can fairly evaluate and determine their future. With more than 100 commercial nuclear reactors now in operation in the United States, and with projections of more to come, we are faced with two very fundamental issues.

The first being, do we conduct final waste disposal operations at one location or do we plan for continued storage at over 50 individual locations; and the second being, when does continued storage become in-place disposal. Whatever decisions are made, they will unquestionably have lasting global implications.

Although the technical and safety aspects of any major policy decision are inherently critical, spent fuel and other high-level waste disposal will always remain a political decision. It is time to make that decision.

### Conclusion

In summary, the nuclear industry has many on-going activities that could lead to a new nuclear power resurgence. The NRC has begun to establish the framework and infrastructure to accommodate the potential nuclear power resurgence. There are many challenges ahead including the shortage of nuclear professionals and the long term storage of the high-level waste.

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## UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Announcement No. 062

Date: October 19, 2001

**To: All NRC Employees**

**SUBJECT: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN THE NRR DIVISION OF INSPECTION  
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT**

The NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) has reorganized its Division of Inspection Program Management (DIPM) to address changes in the current and projected workload. The reorganization also provides for improved support for the continued implementation of the reactor oversight process and an increased role in regional interface activities. NRR completed the major organizational changes as of September 9, 2001, and will complete additional personnel shifts beyond the major organizational moves in October 2001.

To address changes in the current and projected workload in the reactor safeguards area, NRR added a second reactor safeguards section to the Reactor Safeguards, Radiation Safety, and Emergency Preparedness Branch (formerly the Operator Licensing, Human Performance, and Plant Support Branch). Over the next several years, major tasks in this area will include developing and responding to lessons learned from the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001; 10 CFR 73.55 rulemaking for reactor physical protection requirements; fitness for duty rulemaking; oversight of the Safeguards Performance Assessment Program and the current Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations program; emerging issues in cyberterrorism; and design-basis threat assessment activities. In addition, the reactor safeguards sections will provide continued support to the reactor oversight process; conduct licensing and decommissioning reviews; and interact with industry, Congressional, and public stakeholders.

To provide continued support for reactor oversight process implementation and address changes in workload, NRR combined the Reliability and Maintenance Section and the Quality Assurance and Safety Assessment Section into the Quality and Maintenance Section within the Equipment and Human Performance Branch (formerly the Equipment Quality and Performance Branch). NRR has also moved the Operator Licensing and Human Performance Section into this branch. In addition, an Allegation Team will report to the Chief of the Equipment and Human Performance Branch.

To support an increased role in regional interface activities, NRR has added a second technical assistant position under the Division Director. This position will assume the enforcement-related functions that were previously assigned to the Senior Enforcement Coordinator, who reported to the Associate Director for Inspection and Programs. In addition, the second technical assistant will support divisional and office activities to facilitate regional interface issues.

These changes have been designed with the goal of improving organizational effectiveness and efficiency in implementing NRR programs. The attached organization chart and functional descriptions provide additional details of the realigned NRR/DIPM organization for your information.


/RA/

Samuel J. Collins, Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Attachments:

1. Organization Chart
2. Functional Descriptions

Attachment



Attachment



## **Functional Descriptions**

### **Division of Inspection Program Management, NRR**

Develops policy and provides overall program management and planning for the reactor oversight process, including the inspection and performance assessment programs. Develops programs and conducts reviews to ensure the effective consideration of human factors engineering in nuclear power plant design and operation and the adequacy of facility training programs and emergency operating procedures. Develops policies and guidance and implements the national program for licensing nuclear reactor operators. Develops and oversees the reactor safeguards, emergency preparedness, and radiation protection inspection and licensing programs. Responsible for the development, maintenance, implementation and oversight of the NRR allegations management programs.

#### **Inspection Program Branch**

Provides overall management for the reactor oversight process, including the inspection and performance assessment programs. Develops policies, practices, procedures, and necessary infrastructure to support implementation and continuous enhancement of the reactor oversight process. Analyzes and evaluates program effectiveness and implementation. Participates in oversight activities as necessary to coordinate policy, procedures, guidance, and programs. Responds to external policy-related inquiries and requests. Participates in the establishment of regional operating plans for NRR's regulatory programs, and reports to the Executive Director for Operations on regional performance against the plans. Provides overall program support for the activities of senior reactor analysts and the use of risk information in the reactor oversight process.

#### **Equipment and Human Performance Branch**

Monitors and evaluates industry maintenance initiatives and performance. Coordinates agency activities associated with the implementation of the Maintenance Rule. Develops policy and guidance for future reactor reliability assurance programs, and reviews and evaluates licensees' quality assurance programs. Reviews and evaluates nuclear power plant administrative controls for safety committees, audits, independent engineering groups, procedures, and records. Provides programmatic support on issues related to Part 21 and commercial-grade item dedication. Reviews and evaluates initial, pre-operational, and restart test programs for nuclear power plants. Develops overall licensing and regulatory policy pertaining to licensing operators pursuant to 10 CFR Part 55, including the initial examination, licensing, and requalification programs for power reactor operator applicants and operators, and oversight of regional implementation. Develops overall regulatory policy and provides assessments for human performance, including manual operator actions, fatigue, and emergency procedures; monitors and evaluates industry initiatives regarding personnel training; reviews and evaluates human factors engineering design and design changes to the control room and control centers outside of the main control room; reviews staffing and organizational issues at operating reactors; and coordinates with and oversees the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations' accreditation programs. Processes, controls, reviews, manages and resolves allegations and takes or recommends appropriate actions to address safety concerns.



Coordinates with the NRC's Office of Investigations on issues involving discrimination and wrongdoing. Performs inspections in response to allegations and reports of defective or substandard components, equipment, and services. Coordinates with other Federal agencies on misrepresented and substandard products.

**Reactor Safeguards, Radiation Safety, and Emergency Preparedness Branch**

Develops policy, programs, and procedures for the safeguards area, including fitness for duty. Conducts technical and regulatory safeguards reviews related to power and non-power reactors, reviews physical security programs and approves licensee requests for changes in those programs, and develops and oversees the reactor safeguards inspection program carried out by the NRC's regional offices. Develops policy, programs, and guidelines for health physics and emergency preparedness areas; provides technical expertise for health physics and emergency preparedness issues and interpretations; and conducts technical and regulatory reviews of applications and amendments for these areas. Coordinates with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on emergency preparedness matters, and reviews and evaluates FEMA findings and determinations related to offsite preparedness of State and local governments.



# ***NRC NEWS***

## **UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

### **OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION II**

**61 Forsyth Street SW, Atlanta, GA 30303**

**Web Site: <http://www.nrc.gov/OPA>**

No. II-01-042

October 16, 2001

**CONTACT:** Ken Clark (404)562-4416/e-mail: [kmc2@nrc.gov](mailto:kmc2@nrc.gov)  
Roger D. Hannah (404)562-4417/e-mail: [rdh1@nrc.gov](mailto:rdh1@nrc.gov)

### **NRC STAFF PROPOSES \$88,000 CIVIL PENALTY AGAINST TVA BASED UPON DEPARTMENT OF LABOR FINDING OF DISCRIMINATION**

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has proposed an \$88,000 civil penalty against the Tennessee Valley Authority based upon U. S. Department of Labor findings that TVA wrongly discriminated against a nuclear power plant employee because the employee had raised safety concerns at the Watts Bar nuclear power plant near Spring City, Tennessee.

NRC officials informed TVA in a letter dated October 15 that DOL findings related to a discrimination complaint, filed by the employee, indicated TVA discriminated against the employee in 1995 and 1996, because the employee had engaged in protected activities, by arranging the employee's transfer to TVA Services and failing to re-employ the employee once the employee had been transferred, resulting in the employee's eventual lay-off from TVA.

Based on NRC review of the DOL findings and TVA's responses, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred.

NRC officials said that because TVA has filed an appeal of the DOL decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals, TVA may defer payment of the civil penalty until the appeal process has been completed.

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# **NRC NEWS**

**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

**Office of Public Affairs  
Washington, DC 20555-001**

**Telephone: 301/415-8200**

**E-mail: [opa@nrc.gov](mailto:opa@nrc.gov)**

**Web Site: <http://www.nrc.gov/OPA>**

No. 01-124

October 18, 2001

## **THREAT TO THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR PLANT DEEMED NON-CREDIBLE; NRC MONITORING CONTINUES AND WEBSITE RESTORED**

A potential terrorist threat directed at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, has been determined by the intelligence community to be non-credible.

However, when the threat came into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, it was taken seriously, resulting in a number of security measures taken by TMI's licensee, Exelon, as well as by other Federal and State authorities.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is continuing to closely monitor security at all nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel facilities around the country.

Contrary to some rumors, the agency has not ordered any plants to shut down for security reasons. Some plants are, as usual, shut down for normal refueling and maintenance.

All nuclear power plants have remained at the highest level of security since September 11. Subsequently, the agency has advised all of its licensees of additional actions considered prudent and appropriate to strengthen security further. The NRC is closely monitoring the actions being taken to enhance security.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and the continuing uncertainty about future terrorist intentions, the agency is conducting a comprehensive review of its safeguards and physical security program at the direction of Chairman Richard A. Meserve, with the support of the Commission.

On September 26, Chairman Meserve sent letters to the governors of 40 states that have nuclear power plants or other NRC-regulated nuclear facilities, advising them that it would be prudent to establish clear liaison between nuclear facilities and state authorities in the event that state security forces might be needed to augment security. Clear lines of communication among the State, the NRC and licensees have been established.

The NRC continues to maintain close contact with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, other intelligence agencies and other law enforcement, military and state authorities to assess the latest threat information and to discuss current conditions and plans.

NRC's website, which was closed down last week, was restored Wednesday with a limited amount of information. Taking down the agency website was a precaution to make sure it did not contain information

that could be helpful to terrorists. As the agency's review continues, other information and documents deemed non-sensitive will be added to the site.

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# NRC NEWS

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION I

475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pa. 19406

No. 1-01-063

October 29, 2001

CONTACT: Diane Screnci (610)337-5330/ e-mail: [dps@nrc.gov](mailto:dps@nrc.gov)  
Neil A. Sheehan (610)337-5331/e-mail: [nas@nrc.gov](mailto:nas@nrc.gov)

## NRC SENDS SPECIAL INSPECTION TEAM TO TMI

A Nuclear Regulatory Commission special inspection team has arrived at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant to review the circumstances surrounding the separation of a steam generator tube. The plant is located in Middletown, Pa., and is operated by Amergen Energy Company, LLC.

During an in-service inspection of the steam generator tubes at TMI last week as part of the refueling outage, Amergen found that a plugged tube had separated from the tube-sheet and caused wear on several adjoining tubes. During the prior period of operation, there was no indication of a problem. The cause of the separation is still being evaluated.

Steam generators are components that transfer heat from the reactor systems to the power-generating portion of a nuclear power plant. In accordance with NRC requirements, Amergen conducts inspections and tests of the tubes in the plant's two steam generators during plant outages to assess the structural integrity of the tubes. Tubes with flaws or degradation above specified limits are plugged (taken out of service by installing plugs in both ends of the tube) or repaired in another manner.

The four-member NRC team will independently develop an understanding of the separation, and review the company's root cause determinations and corrective actions. The team also will perform an independent risk assessment. NRC inspectors also will ensure appropriate corrective actions are taken before the plant restarts from its refueling outage.

An inspection report will be issued about 45 days from the end of the inspection.

As a separate matter, NRC inspectors are also reviewing Amergen's work to identify and repair small cracks associated with control rod drive mechanisms (CRDM) nozzle penetrations in TMI's reactor vessel head. CRDM leaks have occurred at other B&W plants. That work also will be completed before the unit restarts.

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## ***NRC NEWS***

**UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

**OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION III**

**801 Warrenville Road, Lisle IL 60532**

No. III-01-048

October 29, 2001

**CONTACT:**

Jan Strasma (630)829-9663/e-mail: [rjs2@nrc.gov](mailto:rjs2@nrc.gov)

Pam Alloway-Mueller (630)829-9662/e-mail: [pla@nrc.gov](mailto:pla@nrc.gov)

**NRC CITES NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY FOR SAFETY VIOLATION  
AT PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT**

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has determined that a violation of NRC regulations at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant should be characterized as "white," meaning that it is an issue with low to moderate safety significance, but one which may require additional NRC inspections. The plant, located near Covert, Michigan, is operated by the Nuclear Management Company.

The violation concerned the inadequate number and spacing of smoke detectors in the plant's cable spreading room.

Under the safety significance determination process, NRC officials classify certain conditions at nuclear power plants as being one of four colors which delineate increasing levels of safety significance, beginning with green and progressing to white, yellow or red.

The violation was identified during an NRC inspection that was completed on August 17, 2001. The Nuclear Management Company did not contest the "white" characterization of the safety significance of this finding and officials chose not to meet with the NRC staff.

The Nuclear Management Company has taken compensatory measures to address the problem until permanent corrective actions are completed. The NRC plans to conduct a follow-up inspection on this issue early next year.

The company has until November 9 to appeal the NRC's finding.

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# How to do a Power Uprate

- Insert and burn more fresh fuel (more fissile loading)
- New fuel management strategy
  - Different Gd loading and control rod patterns
  - These techniques in use for last 10-15 years
- For EPU, new fuel types
  - 9x9 to 10x10
  - Increase maximum bundle power and not increase local maximum values (more fuel pins)
  - Enhanced CPR performance confirmed by prototypical testing
  - culmination of incremental fuel design changes

# Fuel Licensing

- Governed by local conditions
- Maintain LHGR(fuel temperature), MCPR (clad heat transfer), and Average Planar LHGR (LOCA) below limits
  - this is achieved through new fuel management techniques (Gd loading) and improved CPR performance (reduce in-bundle peaking, allow higher bundle power)
- All fuel assembly behavior predicted for new cycles
- All assemblies monitored during operation to confirm compliance with thermal limits by using in-core instruments and on-line predictions