



September 26, 2001

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Operating Licenses DPR-58 and DPR-74
Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316

Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Report System, the following report is being submitted:

LER 315/2001-SO1-00: "Unauthorized Individual in Plant Protected Area"

The following commitment was identified in this submittal:

- A supplement to this LER will be issued to provide the cause and analysis of the event and any associated corrective actions.

Should you have any questions regarding this correspondence, please contact Mr. Ronald W. Gaston, Manager, Regulatory Affairs, at 616/697-5020.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Joseph E. Pollock'.

Joseph E. Pollock
Plant Manager

/pae

Attachment

c: J. E. Dyer, Region III
A. C. Bakken
L. Brandon
T. P. Noonan
R. P. Powers
M. W. Rencheck
R. Whale
NRC Resident Inspector
Records Center, INPO

IE22

NRC Form 366 (6-1998)						U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION						APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 <small>ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503</small>					
<h2 style="margin: 0;">LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)</h2> <p style="margin: 5px 0 0 40px;">(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)</p>																	
FACILITY NAME (1) Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1						DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000-315			PAGE (3) 1 of 2								
TITLE (4) Unauthorized Individual in Plant Protected Area.																	
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)							
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME D.C. Cook, Unit 2		DOCKET NUMBER 316						
08	27	2001	2001	-- S01 --	00	09	26	2001	FACILITY NAME		DOCKET NUMBER						
OPERATING MODE (9)		1		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)													
POWER LEVEL (10)		100		20.2201 (b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)							
				20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)							
				20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		X 73.71							
				20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER							
				20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A							
				20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)									
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																	
NAME D. R. Bronicki, Regulatory Affairs						TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (616) 465-5901, x1668											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																	
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX							
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)						EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR							
X	YES (If Yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).				NO			10	19	2001							
Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) On August 27, 2001, a security officer whose employment was voluntarily terminated August 22, 2001, entered the protected area using his previously assigned, yet still active, security badge. The individual was properly searched prior to entry and remained within the protected area for 22 minutes. He did not enter any vital areas, nor had he attempted to access the protected area at any other time since terminating employment. The individual entered the protected area to return his Thermoluminescent Dosimeter to Radiation Protection. After entering, the individual spoke with the Shift Security Supervisor for approximately 10 minutes, went immediately to radiation protection, and subsequently left the protected area depositing his badge in the security access control station upon exit. The immediate cause of this event involved individuals unfamiliar with a site specific procedure. The interim Security Project Manager and Security Human Resource managers were not familiar with, and received no training on, the plant procedure for contractor control. The procedure contains an out processing checklist requiring a notification to security to terminate the badge, and a reminder to ensure the badge is turned in. However, due to the site inexperience of the interim managers, the out-processing checklist was not used. As an immediate corrective action, the interim Security Project Manager, Human Resources Manager, and Shift Supervisors were required to review the current plant procedure for contractor control. In addition, specific instructions were issued to site security supervisory personnel regarding security badge controls as they relate to implementing the existing plant procedural guidance, conduct of exit interviews, and announcement of terminations in pre-shift briefings. A cause investigation is presently in progress. A supplement to this LER will be issued to provide the cause and analysis of the event and any associated corrective actions.																	

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER(2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	
		2001	--	S01	--	00

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1

05000-315

2 of 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form (366A) (17))

Conditions Prior to Event

Unit 1 was in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 82 percent Rated Thermal Power.

Unit 2 was in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 100 percent Rated Thermal Power.

Description of Event

On August 27, 2001, at 1031 hours, a former site employee (security officer) entered the plant protected area unescorted using his active security badge. This was later determined to be an unauthorized entry into the protected area because the individual had voluntarily terminated employment with site security on August 22, 2001. The individual's security badge had not been deactivated following his last working shift.

At approximately 1330 hours on August 27, 2001, the Shift Security Supervisor and the Security Project Manager identified that an individual who had terminated his employment on August 22, 2001, had entered the protected area to return his assigned Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) to the Radiation Protection department. After accessing the protected area, the individual remained within the north security access building for approximately ten minutes while meeting with the on-duty Shift Security Supervisor. The individual then proceeded directly to the Radiation Protection Access Control facility, approximately 400 yards south of the security access building. The individual turned in his TLD, then promptly left the protected area at 1053 hours depositing his badge with security upon exit. The duration of the plant entry was approximately 22 minutes. The individual's badge was subsequently deactivated by security supervision.

This event was reported to the NRC on August 27, 2001, at 1453 hours in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1) and as described in Appendix G, section I. Due to internal delays in communicating the violation, the required 1 hour notification was not made in a timely manner.

This report does not contain Safeguards Information.

Cause of Event

The immediate cause of this event involved individuals unfamiliar with a site specific procedure. The interim Security Project Manager and Security Human Resource managers were not familiar with, and received no training on, the plant procedure for contractor control. The procedure contains an out processing checklist requiring a notification to security to terminate the badge, and a reminder to ensure the badge is turned in. However, due to the site inexperience of the interim managers, the out-processing checklist was not used.

A cause investigation is presently in progress. A supplement to this LER will be issued to provide the cause and analysis of the event and any associated corrective actions.

Analysis of Event

The analysis of the event will be addressed in the supplemental LER.

Corrective Actions

As an immediate corrective action, the interim Security Project Manager, Human Resources Manager, and Shift Supervisors were required to review the current plant procedure for contractor control. In addition, specific instructions were issued to site security supervisory personnel regarding security badge controls as they relate to implementing the existing plant procedural guidance, conduct of exit interviews, and announcement of terminations in pre-shift briefings. Additional corrective actions to prevent recurrence are being developed and will be described in the supplemental LER.

Previous Similar Events

None