June 19, 2001

Mr. Randall K. Edington
Vice President - Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
P. O. Box 220
St. Francisville, LA 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI) - LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LAR 2000-27) TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1.3, "PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVS)" (TAC NO. MB1116)

Dear Mr. Edington:

By letter dated January 24, 2001, Entergy Operations, Inc., requested an amendment to Facility Operating License NPF-47, for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The amendment proposes changes to Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 to permit operation of the Inclined Fuel Transfer System (IFTS) after removal of the primary containment IFTS blind flange while the containment is required to be operable.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the information provided in the January 24, 2001, letter. In order to complete its evaluation, the NRC staff requires a response to the enclosed RAI.

The contents of the RAI have been discussed with Mr. Ron Byrd of Entergy Operations, Inc., and a response time frame of 30 days was agreed to. If for any reason this date becomes unreasonable, please contact me at your earliest opportunity.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert E. Moody, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate IV
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-458

Enclosure: RAI

cc w/encl: See next page

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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
REGARDING LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LAR) 2000-27
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
RIVER BEND STATION (RBS), UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-458

The following questions relate to the LAR to change Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)," to permit the operation of the Inclined Fuel Transfer System (IFTS) after removal of the primary containment IFTS blind flange while the containment is required to be operable:

1. It is possible that the IFTS bottom gate valve would be open at the onset of a severe accident, with the fuel transfer carriage or cables part way through the open valve. In this regard please:

   a. identify systems required to move the fuel transfer carriage and close the IFTS bottom gate valve, and discuss the availability of these systems (or manual back-up systems) in frequency-dominant sequences;

   b. provide an estimate of the core damage frequency for those events that involve loss of systems needed to operate the carriage or close the valve, based on the latest probabilistic safety analysis; and

   c. confirm whether and how the carriage can be moved and the open valve can be closed in the frequency-dominant core damage events at RBS, including events that involve loss of power to the carriage or valve and loss of lighting. Identify any plant procedures that would govern such actions.

2. Please confirm that the structural analyses performed in support of the LAR adequately address the pool hydrodynamic loads associated with release of containment atmosphere through an open IFTS bottom valve in those sequences that can clear the IFTS water seal (e.g., small break loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) with suppression pool bypass and short-term station blackout events). This includes loads on the IFTS transfer tube, the spent fuel storage pool, and adjacent spent fuel racks.

3. Please justify why the current commitment to close the upper gate valve and both IFTS drain line isolation valves during periods when the system is not in use should not be extended to include the IFTS bottom gate valve as well, and why this commitment should not be incorporated in the RBS TSs.

4. With a full utilization of the IFTS during power operation, the IFTS tube and drain lines will become a part of the containment pressure boundary and radiation barrier. Provide a summary of the evaluation of the IFTS tube and drain lines, including online components and supports, to demonstrate their design adequacy in sustaining the plant operational transients, design basis accident loads and load combinations.

ENCLOSURE

5. Confirm whether the spent fuel pool analysis accounts for the slushing effect during an safe-shutdown earthquake to ensure that the depth of water above the fuel is maintained at 23 feet, as a minimum, to provide sufficient hydraulic pressure to overcome the containment peak pressure. Also, provide a summary of the analysis performed.

6. With the proposed full utilization of the IFTS, discuss the effects of the addition of new fuel bundles on the existing dynamic analytical model and the existing structural responses to LOCA and seismic events.

7. With the proposed full utilization of the IFTS during the plant power operation, substantial weight of new fuel bundles will be added to the upper pool during plant power operation. Provide an evaluation of the upper pool structure and the upper pool fuel rack to demonstrate that these components are adequate to sustain the combination of seismic and LOCA loads, and other operational transients (such as transients involving safety relief valves).

8. Discuss the consequences resulting from failure of the transport mechanism for the new fuel bundles in the IFTS tube during LOCA and earthquake events.

River Bend Station

cc:

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