



June 8, 2001

C0601-12
10 CFR 50.54(f)

Docket Nos.: 50-315
50-316

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Mail Stop O-P1-17
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2
COMPLETION OF GENERIC LETTER 87-02,
SUPPLEMENT 1, PLANNED ACTIONS
(TAC Nos. M69437 and M69438)

- References:
1. Letter from E. E. Fitzpatrick (I&M) to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, "Response to Supplement 1 to Generic Letter 87-02 on SQUG Resolution of USI A-46," submittal AEP:NRC:1040A, dated September 21, 1992.
 2. Letter from E. E. Fitzpatrick (I&M) to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, "GL 87-02 supplement No. 1; Request for Additional Information," submittal AEP:NRC:1040B, dated April 1, 1993.
 3. Letter from James G. Partlow (NRC) to All Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 Plant Licensees Who are Members of the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG), "Supplement No. 1 to Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, that Transmits Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 (SSER No. 2) On SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure, Revision 2, As Corrected on February 14, 1992 (GIP-2)," dated May 22, 1992.
 4. Letter from E. E. Fitzpatrick (I&M) to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, "Response to NRC Generic Letter 87-02, 'Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactor, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46'," submittal AEP:NRC:1040C, dated January 30, 1996.

A025

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), this letter updates Indiana Michigan Power Company's (I&M) response to Generic Letter 87-02, "Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors." In References 1 and 2, I&M committed to use the methodology of "Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment," Revision 2 (GIP-2) for the resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46, "Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants." This procedure was developed by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG), and was approved for use by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in Reference 3.

As part of the resolution of USI A-46, I&M submitted a seismic evaluation report, Reference 4, Attachment 2. Tables 4-5 and 4-6 of that report contained a list of components that did not comply with the GIP screening guidelines and the proposed actions for their resolution. I&M has completed the actions for these components, and, as requested by Reference 3, is informing the NRC of their completion. Several of the items have been resolved differently than described in Reference 4. These items, their final resolution, and the resolution of two additional items are described in the attachment to this letter.

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Ronald W. Gaston, Manager of Regulatory Affairs, at (616) 697-5020.

Sincerely,



M. W. Rencheck
Vice President Nuclear Engineering

/dmb

Attachment

c: J. E. Dyer
MDEQ – DW & RPD, w/o attachment
NRC Resident Inspector
R. Whale, w/o attachment

AFFIRMATION

I, Michael W. Rencheck, being duly sworn, state that I am Vice President of Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M), that I am authorized to sign and file this request with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on behalf of I&M, and that the statements made and the matters set forth herein pertaining to I&M are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.


Indiana Michigan Power Company



M. W. Rencheck
Vice President Nuclear Engineering

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME

THIS 8 DAY OF June, 2001


Notary Public

My Commission Expires 5/26/2005

JENNIFER L KERNOSKY
Notary Public, Berrien County, Michigan
My Commission Expires May 26, 2005

Generic Letter 87-02
Revised Issue Resolutions

Original Number	Equipment ID	Equipment Description	Issue	Proposed Resolution	Final Resolution
Item 3 Table 4-5	1-MMO-220	Main Steam Stop Valve	Adjacent railing can rotate and swing into the valve operator.	Move the railing at least 4 inches from the operator.	On a subsequent walkdown performed per GIP-2 guidelines, the seismic capability engineers noted that previously missing screws in the handrail had been installed and the removable handrail is prevented from swinging. Hence, the issue is resolved, and this valve is considered to be seismically adequate. This is documented in the Screening Evaluation Worksheet (SEWS) in accordance with the GIP-2 guidelines.
Item 4 Table 4-5	1-MMO-230	Main Steam Stop Valve	Adjacent railing can rotate and swing into the valve operator.	Move the railing at least 4 inches from the operator.	On a subsequent walkdown performed per GIP-2 guidelines, the seismic capability engineers noted that previously missing screws in the handrail had been installed and the removable handrail is prevented from swinging. Hence, the issue is resolved, and this valve is considered to be seismically adequate. This is documented in the SEWS in accordance with the GIP-2 guidelines.
Item 21 Table 4-5	12-QC-3	Spent Fuel Pit Filter	Block wall enclosure does not appear to be seismically qualified.	Determine if these walls were included in the IE Bulletin 80-11 program.	This wall was included in the IE Bulletin 80-11 program. Subsequent calculations indicate that there may be a possibility of local failure of the anchors at the joint of the block wall to the concrete wall. However, it is concluded that the block wall is not subjected to overturning failure, and it is not a credible interaction hazard for the filter. This is documented in the SEWS in accordance with the GIP-2 guidelines.

Original Number	Equipment ID	Equipment Description	Issue	Proposed Resolution	Final Resolution
Item 35 Table 4-5	1-SG	Steam Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Control Panel	Recorders 1-MR-17, 18, 19, and 20 can slide out. They latch once they slide out almost their entire length. At that point, the seismic review team judges they are vulnerable to vertical forces.	Secure the recorders so that they cannot slide out more than about half their length without being unlatched in some manner.	In a subsequent walkdown performed per GIP-2 guidelines, the seismic capability engineers have determined that this recorder cannot easily slide out, and that if it were to do so, when fully extended, existing latching mechanisms for this recorder were adequate to prevent the recorder from falling from the panel. Also, based on observations with the recorder fully extended, the mounting frame and latching mechanism were judged to be adequate to withstand the vertical load effects. Hence, the issue is resolved, and this panel is considered to be seismically adequate. This is documented in the SEWS in accordance with the GIP-2 guidelines.
Item 42 Table 4-5	1-RPS-A	Reactor Protection and Control Panels and Cabinets	Potential seismic interaction with the concrete wall.	Anchor 1-RPS-A to the adjacent concrete wall.	The gap between the wall and the cabinet is about 1 inch. The calculated displacement of the cabinet during a seismic event is much less than 1 inch. Hence, there is no concern for seismic interaction with the adjacent wall. This is documented in the SEWS in accordance with the GIP-2 guidelines.
Item 14 Table 4-6	2-TFP	Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Sub-panel	Potential seismic interaction with the concrete wall.	Attach the panel to the concrete wall.	The gap between the wall and the cabinet is about 1/2 inch. The calculated displacement of the cabinet during a seismic event is much less than 1/2 inch. Hence, there is no concern for seismic interaction with the adjacent wall. This is documented in the SEWS in accordance with the GIP-2 guidelines.
Item 17 Table 4-6	2-RPC-III	Reactor Protection Channel III Cabinet	Potential seismic interaction with the concrete wall.	Bolt the cabinet to the adjacent wall.	The gap between the wall and the cabinet is about 3/4 inch. The calculated displacement of the cabinet during a seismic event is much less than 3/4 inch. Hence, there is no concern for seismic interaction with the adjacent wall. This is documented in the SEWS in accordance with the GIP-2 guidelines.

Original Number	Equipment ID	Equipment Description	Issue	Proposed Resolution	Final Resolution
Item 28 Table 4-6	2-BA	Boric Acid Charging and Letdown Control Panel	Recorder 2-MR-42 can slide out as it is not secured.	Secure the recorder so that it cannot slide out without being unlatched.	In a subsequent walkdown performed per GIP-2 guidelines, the seismic capability engineers have determined that the existing latching mechanisms for this recorder were adequate to prevent the recorder from sliding. Hence, the outlier is resolved, and this panel is considered to be seismically adequate. This is documented in the SEWS in accordance with GIP-2 guidelines.
Item 32 Table 4-6	2-SG	Steam Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Control Panel	Recorders 2-MR-17, 18, 19, and 20 can slide out. They latch once they slide out almost their entire length. At that point, the seismic review team judges that they are vulnerable to vertical forces.	Secure the recorders so that they cannot slide out more than about half their length without being unlatched in some manner.	In a subsequent walkdown performed per GIP-2 guidelines, the seismic capability engineers have determined that this recorder cannot easily slide out. If it were to do so, the existing latching mechanisms for this recorder were adequate to prevent the recorder from falling from the panel. Also, based on observations with the recorder fully extended, the mounting frame and latching mechanism were judged to be adequate to withstand vertical load effects. Hence, the issue is resolved, and this panel is considered to be seismically adequate. This is documented in the SEWS in accordance with GIP-2 guidelines.

Original Number	Equipment ID	Equipment Description	Issue	Proposed Resolution	Final Resolution
New Item	1-PPP-303	Lower Containment Channel 1 Pressure Protection Transmitter	The support frame for this transmitter is attached to both the containment wall and the auxiliary building. This situation was not previously identified and evaluated.	Not Applicable	A calculation has been performed in accordance with Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) procedures. This calculation has determined that the support frame meets the intent of the GIP-2 criteria.
New Item	2-PPP-303	Lower Containment Channel 1 Pressure Protection Transmitter	The support frame for this transmitter is attached to both the containment wall and the auxiliary building. This situation was not previously identified and evaluated.	Not Applicable	A calculation has been performed in accordance with CNP procedures. This calculation has determined that the support frame meets the intent of the GIP-2 criteria.