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May 7, 2001

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287
Security Special Report 269/2001-S01, Revision 0
Problem Investigation Process No.: O-01-1229

Gentlemen:


Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71 Sections (b) (1) and Appendix G (I) (b), attached is a Security Special Report 269/2001-S01, concerning the falsification of pre-employment screening records by a vendor employee.

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 and Appendix G (I) (b). This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

There are no commitments contained in this submittal.

Questions regarding this Licensee Event Report should be directed to R. P. Todd at 864-859-3414.

Very truly yours,



W. R. McCollum, Jr.

Attachment

IE74

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Date: May 7, 2001

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cc: Mr. Luis A. Reyes
Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
61 Forsyth Street, S. W., Suite 23T85
Atlanta, GA 30303

Mr. D. E. LaBarge
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. M. C. Shannon
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

INPO (via E-mail)

NRC FORM 366 (1-2001)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2001			
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)				Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to: bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and			
FACILITY NAME (1) Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1			DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050- 269		PAGE (3) 1 OF 6		
TITLE (4) Security Access Revoked For Falsification of Criminal Record							
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)		
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO DAY YEAR	
04	11	2001	2001	- S01 -	0	05 07 2001	
OPERATING MODE (9) 1			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)				
			20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	
			20.2201(d)		20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	
			20.2203(a)(1)		50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.46(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
			20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
POWER LEVEL (10) 100			50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(a)(4) 73.71(a)(5) OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A				
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)							
NAME L.E. Nicholson, Regulatory Compliance Manager					TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (864) 885-3292		
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)							
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)					EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).					x	NO	
					MONTH	DAY	
					YEAR		
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) <p>On 4-11-2001 at 1035 hours with Unit 1 at 100%, Unit 2 at 99% and Unit 3 at 0% power, the Oconee site security was notified by Duke Power Company (DPC) Access Services Group that the criminal history inquiry for a vendor employee revealed information that was not disclosed by the individual on his questionnaire. Subsequent adjudication of the information determined that the individual was unreliable. The individual had been granted unescorted access to Oconee protected area from 05-03-99 through 06-07-99. Clearance authorization and subsequent access to Oconee was granted based upon information that was obtained from the individual's Plant Access Data System (PADS) record. DPC Access Services personnel properly flagged the individual's PADS record upon discovery. An ENS event notification was made at 1115 hours on 4-11-01. This written report is required by 10CFR 73.71(b)(2).</p> <p>This event is considered to have no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.</p>							

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NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EVALUATION:

BACKGROUND

This event is reportable per 10CFR 73.71(b)(2) due to entry into a protected area by a person who should have been denied access. Specifically, a vendor employee was authorized access due to omission from pre-employment screening records of disqualifying information.

Oconee Nuclear Station, along with all other nuclear sites in Region II and most others in the country, utilizes the Plant Access Data System (PADS). PADS is a database which allows the sharing of background screening data among nuclear sites. This system facilitates the movement of nuclear workers from one site to another without requiring additional screening to be done at each site of access. The system saves each licensee time and money in terms of in-processing outage workers and other personnel.

Prior to discovery of this event Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1 at 100% power with no safety systems or components out of service that would have contributed to this event. However, during the dates the vendor employee was actually on-site, Unit 1 was operating in Modes 4, 5, and 6 during a refueling outage.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On 2-10-99, another licensee facility fingerprinted a vendor employee for access to the site. The vendor employee was subsequently badged and worked at the other licensee facility from 2-19-99 until 3-24-99 under a temporary clearance. On 3-29-99, the fingerprint history on the individual was returned to that licensee and it contained criminal history (additional drug charge) that the individual had not previously disclosed on his background questionnaire. Personnel at that licensee facility failed to update PADS with this information.

On 3-31-99, the vendor employee was badged for access into Catawba Nuclear Site. Duke Power Company (DPC) Access Services Group had granted a clearance authorization based upon the information that was in PADS. The vendor employee was badged at Catawba from 3-31-99 through 5-20-99. Upon his job completion at Catawba, the vendor

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employee reported to Oconee. On 5-3-99, the vendor employee was granted access to Oconee pursuant to the individual's arrival at Oconee. His badge was restricted until his arrival date. Due to delays at Catawba, the employee did not complete his work assignment at Catawba until 5-20-99. On 5-24-99, the vendor employee reported to Oconee and his badge was removed from Administrative Hold. The vendor employee's job assignment was complete and site access was terminated at Oconee on 6-7-99.

On 4-10-01, DPC Access Services personnel were notified by personnel at the other licensee facility regarding the individual's failure to list the additional criminal history information at that facility and their subsequent failure to update the individual's PADS data. A telephone conference call between security management at Oconee and Catawba Nuclear Sites and personnel in the DPC Access Services Group was held at 1035 hours on 4-11-01 to discuss event reportability. As a result of this discussion and based on guidance in the DPC Reporting and Trending of Safeguards and Security Events Directive, the event was reported by Oconee via ENS notification at 1115 hours on 4-11-01.

The following is a chronology of the security event reported by Oconee Nuclear Site to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) at 1115 hours 4-11-01. Note that DPC's Catawba Nuclear Site made a similar ENS report, and is also providing a written Special Report, which is designated 413/2001-S01.

- 2-10-99 Vendor employee fingerprinted for access into another licensee facility. Temporary clearance granted.
- 2-19-99 Vendor badged for work at the other licensee facility.
- 3-24-99 Vendor left that facility. Work completed.
- 3-29-99 Fingerprint record returned to that facility reflecting additional criminal information not disclosed by vendor employee. PADS data not updated by that facility's personnel.
- 3-31-99 Vendor employee badged at Catawba subsequent to granting of clearance authorization based on existing PADS data.

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- 5/3/99 Vendor employee granted access to Oconee pursuant to the employee's arrival. Badge restricted until employee's arrival.
- 5-20-99 Vendor left Catawba site. Work completed.
- 5/24/99 Vendor employee granted access to Oconee Protected Area to work as a scaffold builder during 1EOC18 Refueling Outage.
- 6-07-99 Vendor left Oconee site. Work completed.
- 9/20/00 The other licensee reported "Unescorted access granted inappropriately" via ENS. Event Number 37355 assigned. The other licensee discovered that additional criminal information had not been entered into PADS database. The additional information was entered into PADS. DPC was not notified regarding the PADS update.
- 10-12-00 The other licensee submitted written report 1-00-01s.
- 4-10-01 The other licensee notified DPC Access Services Group about the vendor employee and the omission/falsification of criminal history data.
- 4-11-01 Conference call at 1035 hours between Catawba Nuclear Site, Oconee Nuclear Site, and the DPC Access Services Group regarding reportability determination.
- 4-11-01 ENS Event notification to NRC made by Oconee at 1115 hours.

CAUSAL FACTORS

The cause for this vendor employee gaining access into Catawba and Oconee is that the additional criminal data was not entered in the individual's PADS record by the other licensee facility's personnel in a timely manner after receipt of background information on March 29, 2000. There can be no determination made by DPC as to whether this failure to update PADS was due to a system failure or a human error.

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As a result of this event, it can be determined that there was no program failure or human performance error on the part of any personnel in the DPC Access Services group, the Catawba Nuclear Site In-processing/Security areas or at the Oconee Nuclear site In-processing/Security areas.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate:

None

Subsequent:

The vendor employee's PADS record was flagged by DPC Access Services Personnel.

Planned:

There are no planned corrective actions in response to this event as there were no program failures or human performance errors by DPC Access Services, Catawba site personnel or Oconee site personnel. Therefore there are no NRC commitment items contained in this LER.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

Although the individual was allowed access into the Oconee site, there was no malevolence associated with the entry. The individual entered the protected area of the site, but did not enter any vital area. He was utilized as a scaffold builder during Unit 1 EOC 18 Refueling Outage, without incident. The vendor employee did not operate or manipulate any equipment that would impact plant operability.

This event did not result in any uncontrolled releases of radioactive material, personnel injuries, or radiation over exposure. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A review of events over the previous three years found one similar event, reported as Special Report 269/99-S02, which also involved an applicant for temporary employment who failed to report prior offenses and was subsequently granted access to the protected area. Therefore, this is a recurring event. Since the current event involved a similar act by a different applicant, and included untimely updating of PADS by another utility, corrective actions from the previous event could not be expected to have prevented this event.

This event is not considered reportable under the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) program.