



② 7/15/99

Timing - determined from IUEC-96-033;

[<sup>missing</sup> Copy of slide]

→ met of oxidation - 800°C vs 1600°C <sup>2</sup> fine ignition  
REAL, PROBABLE Events

break

① hotbeam - ONO are known if there will be more chances to discuss afterwards.

② ignored plant worker health ③. Human performance. Had not led to problems at operating plants; why should public believe there will be additional not overnight.

hide the issues -

④ Gray # - Do we need to put in a spectrum of heat loads + not volumes in our analysis?

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M. Maisner — (0.1 per shift prob of error)

G. Holahan — What kinds of things need to be done to "reset" operator eyes.

(Conservative view)  
Common sense —

Ray Shadhas — People out in industry selling selves as "lowest cost", "hire me"

GPU Nuclear —

Maine Yankee — heatup = 60% of AWS heat load.

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"Maintaining Safety"  
Goals

Afternoon

Industry Panel

→ "When decommission, not decrease effectiveness of <sup>fire</sup> plan"

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"Operators won't follow one strategy" Is it proceduralized? Part of Certified Fuel Handling

Ans: = ?

If in FSAK  $\Rightarrow$  assignment needs to be functional.

How do we credit security rounds?

Required to take local rounds 1-2 per shift  
" " " logs + have # approved  
What does "required" mean?

Training - design, actions of system, exams.

Choice to do  $\neq$  required

Reg Sube 1.33 - requires you to have procedures.

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## Staff Concerns

### 1. Organizational Attentiveness/Effectiveness -

R. Barnett - Good that SROs become CFHs + organizational people continue @ plant who were part of effectively operated ~~sys~~ organizations.

Paul Gunther - enforce attentiveness by enforcement.

\* "Risk addressed to a level we feel is appropriate."

R. Barnett \* We will try & requantify it (PRA)

M. Mäurer - "What is acceptable risk level?"

## [ Priority of Concerns ]

→ Merimeeche Fault in New England - New Info.

→ [ BWR Decomm. T.S. ]

Who is looking at that