



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

May 6, 1996

[REDACTED] *7C*
SUBJECT: RII-95-A-0093 - CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE POSITION INDICATION NOT
ADDRESSED

Dear [REDACTED] *7C*

7C This refers to our letter dated January 23, 1996, in which you were informed
that we were continuing our review of the concerns you expressed on
[REDACTED] with [REDACTED] of our staff related to operations and
overtime practices at the Harris Nuclear Plant.

Our review regarding this matter has been completed, and our findings are
documented in the enclosures to this letter. Based on the information
provided, we were unable to substantiate the allegation.

This concludes the staff's activities regarding this matter. If you have any
questions, you may contact at 1-800-577-8510 or (404) 331-5535 or by mail at
P.O. Box 845, Atlanta, GA 30301.

Sincerely,

M B Shymlock
Milton B. Shymlock, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

- Enclosures: 1. Allegation Evaluation Report
2. Inspection Report No. 50-400/95-11
3. Inspection Report No. 50-400/95-15

Certified Mail No. Z 238 513 603
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

ALLEGATION EVALUATION REPORT

ALLEGATION NUMBER RII-95-A-0093

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1

DOCKET NUMBER 50-400

ALLEGATION:

7C On [REDACTED] the CIs contacted the resident inspector and told him that management did not properly address questionable containment isolation valve position indication in the control room.

EVALUATION:

The inspector reviewed Adverse Condition and Feedback Report (ACFR) [REDACTED] which was associated with the questionable containment isolation valve position indication. The valve was [REDACTED] a Post Accident Sampling System valve that has control room remote position indication only. The problem described was that on May 11, 1995 the operators opened the valve from the main control room and received mid-position indication instead of full open indication. The valve was not declared inoperable until June 1, 1995. The valve's safety function position was closed which was not in question. Management dispositioned the issue by declaring that the valve would meet its safety function since it was required to be closed for accident conditions. On June 12 the valve was successfully stroked from full open to full closed and declared operable. On June 7, 1995 the inspector observed an operator opening the valve and witnessed the mid-position indication. On June 11, 1995 the inspector witnessed an operator opening the valve and this time the full open position was indicated on the control panel. Inspector Followup Item 95-11-01 was opened for further review of this issue.

Further review was conducted as documented in IR 50-400/95-15. The inspector reviewed NUREG-1482, Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants. The valve was in the licensee's ASME Section XI Inservice Testing Program which is implemented through licensee procedure ISI-203, ASME Section XI Pump and Valve Program Plan. The program requires a specific time from full open to full closed for the valve to meet the ASME requirements. There was no indication that the valve would not close nor that it would not meet the ASME requirements. The June 12, 1995 valve timing confirmed that the valve met the ASME requirements and therefore had been operable on May 11, 1995. The inspector concluded that the CP&L management position was accurate.

CONCLUSIONS:

The concern that management did not properly address questionable containment isolation valve position indication in the control room was not substantiated.