



South Texas Project Electric Generating Station P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483

May 1, 2001

NOC-AE-01001094

File No.: G20.02.02

G21.02.02

10CFR50.59

STI: 31279221

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

South Texas Project
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499
Technical Specification Bases Change

The South Texas Project Technical Specification Bases Section 3/4.4.6.1 "Leakage Detection Systems" has been changed pursuant to 10CFR50.59. This change adds text for clarification to the bases section of the Technical Specifications concerning leakage detection methods.

If there are any questions, please contact S. M. Head at (361) 972-7136 or me at (361) 972-7902.

T. J. Jordan

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "T. J. Jordan".

Manager, Nuclear
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mkj

Attachment: Revised Technical Specification Bases Pages 3/4 4-3a, 3/4 4-4 (2 pages)

IE47

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

STEAM GENERATORS (Continued)

The mid-cycle equation in SR 4.4.5.4.a. 11.e should only be used during unplanned inspections of Model E steam generators in which eddy current data is acquired for indications at the tube support plates.

SR 4.4.5.5 implements several reporting requirements for Model E steam generators recommended by GL 95-05 for situations which the NRC wants to be notified prior to returning the SGs to service. For the purpose of this reporting requirement, leakage and conditional burst probability can be calculated based on the as-found voltage distribution rather than the projected end-of-cycle voltage distribution (refer to GL 95-05 for more information) when it is not practical to complete these calculations using the projected EOC voltage distributions prior to returning the SGs to service. Note that if leakage and conditional burst probability were calculated using the EOC voltage distribution for the purposes of addressing the GL section 6.a.1 and 6.a.3 reporting criteria, then the results of the projected EOC voltage distribution should be provided per the GL section 6.b.(c) criteria.

Whenever the results of any steam generator tubing inservice inspection fall into Category C-3, these results will be promptly reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days and prior to resumption of plant operation. Such cases will be considered by the Commission on a case-by-case basis and may result in a requirement for analysis, laboratory examinations, tests, additional eddy-current inspection, and revision of the Technical Specifications, if necessary.

3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

3/4.4.6.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS Leakage Detection Systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary. These Detection Systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973.

RCS Leakage Detection instrumentation consists of one Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity Monitor (gaseous or particulate), and the Containment Normal Sump Level and Flow Monitoring System.

The Containment Normal Sump Level and Flow Monitoring System leakage detection method is accomplished by monitoring the containment sump using two independent methods. One method is the Flow Monitoring System. This method measures the volume of water pumped out of the sump over a period of time and calculates an average leak rate. The other volumetric method involves measuring a change in the Containment Normal Sump Level over time, which also provides a means of manually or automatically calculating an average leak rate. Since both of these methods provide a means to detect average leak rate, they are redundant. OPERABILITY of the Containment Normal Sump Level and Flow Monitoring System is dependent on the operability of LI-7812 "Containment Normal Sump Level" or FQI-7823 "Containment Normal Sump Discharge."

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.6.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE of any magnitude is unacceptable since it may be indicative of an impending gross failure of the pressure boundary. Therefore, the presence of any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE requires the unit to be promptly placed in COLD SHUTDOWN.

Industry experience has shown that while a limited amount of leakage is expected from the RCS, the unidentified portion of this leakage can be reduced to a threshold value of less than 1 gpm. This threshold value is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of additional leakage.

The leakage limits incorporated into SR 4.4.6 are more restrictive than the standard operating leakage limits and were implemented in conjunction with the application of voltage-based repair criteria and laser-welded sleeving to Model E steam generators. They were intended to provide an additional margin to accommodate a crack which might grow at a greater than expected rate or unexpectedly extend outside the thickness of the tube support plate. Hence, the reduced leakage limit, when combined with an effective leak rate monitoring program, provides additional assurance that should a significant leak be experienced in service, it will be detected, and the plant shut down in a timely manner. The additional margin provided by the reduced leakage limit will be retained with the $\Delta 94$ steam generators.

The steam generator tube leakage limit of 150 gpd for each steam generator not isolated from the RCS ensures that the dosage contribution from the tube leakage will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values in the event of either a steam generator tube rupture or steam line break. The 150 gpd limit per steam generator is conservative compared to the assumptions used in the analysis of these accidents. The 150 gpd leakage limit per steam generator ensures that steam generator tube integrity is maintained in the event of a main steam line rupture or under LOCA conditions.

The 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE limitation provides allowance for a limited amount of leakage from known sources whose presence will not interfere with the detection of UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE by the Leakage Detection Systems.

The specified allowed leakage from any RCS pressure isolation valve is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of possible in-series check valve failure. It is apparent that when pressure isolation is provided by two in-series check valves and when failure of one valve in the pair can go undetected for a substantial length of time, verification of valve integrity is required. Since these valves are important in preventing overpressurization and rupture of the ECCS low pressure piping which could result in a LOCA that bypasses containment, these valves should be tested periodically to ensure low probability of gross failure.

The Surveillance Requirements for RCS pressure isolation valves provide added assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA. Leakage from the RCS pressure isolation valve is IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE and will be considered as a portion of the allowed limit.

3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY

The limitations on Reactor Coolant System chemistry ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimized and reduces the potential for Reactor Coolant System leakage or failure due to stress corrosion. Maintaining