



**Pacific Gas and
Electric Company**

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PG&E Letter DCL-01-037

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2
Licensee Event Report 1-2001-S01-00
Security Rifle Left Unattended Due to Personnel Error

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71, PG&E is submitting the enclosed licensee event report regarding a security rifle that was left unattended due to a personnel error.

This event was not considered risk significant and did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

Sincerely,



for DHO

David H. Oatley

cc: Ellis W. Merschoff
David L. Proulx
Girija S. Shukla
Diablo Distribution
INPO

Enclosure

LMP/2246/SIR01-0093-5Y

IE74

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Diablo Canyon Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000 275

PAGE (3)

1 OF 4

TITLE (4)

SECURITY RIFLE LEFT UNATTENDED

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03	18	2001	2001	S01	00	04	17	2001	Diablo Canyon Unit 2	05000 323
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)							
Power Operation			20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)	
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.2201(d)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
100%			20.2203(a)(1)		50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		X 73.71(a)(4)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)		73.71(a)(5)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)		OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.46(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
			20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Roger Russell

TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)

(805) 545-4327

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE

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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED
SUBMISSION DATE
(15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

X NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On March 18, 2001, at 0100 PST, with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power, a PG&E Nuclear Security Officer left his rifle unattended in an office in the Turbine Building, located in the Protected Area. At 0120 PST, the Nuclear Security Officer (NSO) discovered the rifle was missing. He immediately called another NSO to retrieve the rifle and return it to him at a guard shack at the north end of the Protected Area. At 0122 PST, the rifle was found in the office where the NSO had left it. All ammunition was accounted for. At 0207 PST, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.62, Section C.2.2.24, "Loss of Security Weapon at the Site," and 10 CFR 73.71(b), the Security Watch Commander made a 1-hour notification to the NRC.

The cause of the event was personnel error.

Corrective actions included disciplinary action and providing rifle racks at locations within security holding areas.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)								LER NUMBER (6)						PAGE (3)		
									YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER				REVISION NUMBER			
Diablo Canyon Unit 1	0	5	0	0	0	2	7	5	2001	-	S	0	1	-	0	0	2 OF 4

TEXT

I. Plant Conditions

Units 1 and 2 were in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power.

II. Description of Problem

A. Background

Nuclear Security Officers (NSOs) rotate to various positions throughout the plant protected area, and routinely carry both a side arm and rifle. For additional details, refer to the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Physical Security Plan (PSP). Additional background information is not provided here because it would involve safeguards information.

B. Event Description

On March 18, 2001, at 0040 PST, a NSO was on break in the outer office of a two-office security holding area in the Turbine Building. He set his rifle down in a corner of the outer office.

At 0100 PST, the NSO left the outer office and forgot to pick up his rifle. He proceeded to his next post, located at the north end of the Unit 1 protected area.

At 0120 PST, the NSO realized that his rifle was missing. He called another NSO at the holding area and asked that he locate the rifle in the adjacent outer office.

At 0122 PST, the second NSO located the rifle in the adjacent outer office where it had been left.

At 0124 PST, the NSO who retrieved the rifle returned it to the NSO who had left it unattended. The NSO who left it unattended verified it was his rifle, accounted for all ammunition, and determined there was no evidence of a discharge, or tampering.

At 0130 PST, the NSO who left the rifle unattended notified the Diablo Canyon Watch Commander (DCWC) of the unattended rifle.

At 0207 PST, the DCWC notified the NRC of the unattended rifle in accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.62, Section C.2.2.24, "Loss of Security Weapon at the Site," and 10CFR73.71(b). Reference NRC Event Number 37847.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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									YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER				REVISION NUMBER			
Diablo Canyon Unit 1	0	5	0	0	0	2	7	5	2001	-	S	0	1	-	0	0	3 OF 4

TEXT

C. Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event

None

D. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected

None

E. Method of Discovery

The NSO who left the rifle unattended realized he had done so when he rotated to the next security post inside the Protected Area.

F. Operator Actions

None

G. Safety System Responses

None

III. Cause of the Problem

A. Root Cause

The root cause of the unattended rifle was personnel error, inattention to detail.

B. Contributory Cause

A contributory cause of the event was a lack of storage location for the weapon. While on break, the NSO placed his weapon in a corner. There was no designated storage location in the room. Had there been a standard storage location for his weapon, he may have checked it as part of a routine, prior to leaving for his assigned post.

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Diablo Canyon Unit 1	0	5	0	0	0	2	7	5	2001	-	S	0	1	-	0	0	4 OF 4

TEXT

IV. Analysis of the Event

The event was determined not to be risk significant because there was no additional degraded condition in the security program at the time. Sufficient margin exists within security response scenarios to successfully neutralize a design basis threat, even though the NSO did not have possession of his rifle. Also, an NSO was in the adjacent room during the event and believes no other individuals came into the room where the unattended rifle was located. Therefore, the event screened out as a "minor issue," was not risk significant, and did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

V. Corrective Actions

A. Immediate Corrective Actions

On March 18, 2001, the Nuclear Security Sergeant and the NSO met to discuss job and performance expectations. Disciplinary action was administered to the NSO.

B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence

Rifle racks are being provided at security holding areas to allow a storage location for rifles while NSOs are on breaks.

The manager of Security Services has emphasized to NSOs the expectation to immediately notify the DCWC of potentially reportable events.

VI. Additional Information

A. Failed Components

None

B. Previous Similar Events

None