



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-2000

April 12, 2001

TVA-SQN-TS-00-02

10 CFR 50.90

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of	)	Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority	)	50-328

**SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - TECHNICAL  
SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE NO. 00-02, "ICE CONDENSER ICE  
SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS"**

In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.4 and 50.90, TVA is submitting a request for an amendment to SQN's Licenses DPR-77 and 79 to change the TSs for Units 1 and 2.

The proposed change would revise TSs and associated bases for Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.5.1 to: (1) change the method and frequency for sampling the ice condenser ice bed (stored ice), and (2) add a new SR and associated bases to address sampling requirements for all ice additions to the ice bed. SR 3.6.5.1 is changed to: (1) increase the sample population from 9 representative samples to 1 randomly selected sample per ice condenser bay for a total of 24 samples, (2) add a note to clarify that acceptable performance of the SR is met provided the average results of the individual samples is within the existing (unchanged) acceptance criteria for boron concentration and pH value, and

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(3) increases the performance frequency from 18 months to 54 months. The new SR requires that all ice additions to the ice condenser be sampled to verify they meet the boron and pH requirements of SR 3.6.5.1. A clarifying note allows samples to be obtained from either the liquid solution or the resulting ice.

The proposed change will make the SQN section of the TS consistent with the NRC approved change that was submitted by Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN). The WBN submittal was the ice condenser utility group lead plant for the ice condenser sampling and analysis TS change under WBN TS Change No. 99-06 and Standard Technical Specification Change No. TSTF 356. WBN TS Change No. 99-06 was approved by the NRC on March 21, 2000.


TVA has determined that there are no significant hazards considerations associated with the proposed change and that the change is exempt from environmental review pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). The SQN Plant Operations Review Committee and the SQN Nuclear Safety Review Board have reviewed this proposed change and determined that operation of SQN Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the proposed change, will not endanger the health and safety of the public. Additionally, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), TVA is sending a copy of this letter to the Tennessee State Department of Public Health.

Enclosure 1 to this letter provides the description and evaluation of the proposed change. This includes TVA's determination that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, and is exempt from environmental review. Enclosure 2 contains copies of the appropriate TS pages from Units 1 and 2 marked up to show the proposed change. Enclosure 3 contains the revised TS pages for Units 1 and 2 which incorporate the proposed change.

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
TVA requests that the revised TS be made effective during each units Cycle 11 refueling outage. Unit 1 Cycle 11 is scheduled for the Fall of 2001 and Unit 2 Cycle 11 is scheduled for the Spring of 2002. If you have any questions about this change, please telephone me at (423) 843-7170 or J. D. Smith at (423) 843-6672.

Sincerely,



Pedro Salas  
Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager

Subscribed and sworn to before me  
on this 12<sup>th</sup> day of April



Peggy M. Billingsley  
Notary Public

My Commission Expires October 9, 2002

Enclosures  
cc: See page 4

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## **ENCLOSURE 1**

### **TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 327 AND 328**

#### **PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE No. 00-02 DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE**

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##### **I. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE**

TVA proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2 TSs by revising Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.6.5.1 to change the methodology and frequency for sampling the ice condenser ice bed (stored ice), and to add a new TS SR to address sampling requirements for each ice addition to the ice bed.

Specifically, SR 4.6.5.1 currently requires that every 18 months ice in the ice bed be verified to have a boron concentration of at least 1800 parts per million (ppm) and a pH value of 9.0 to 9.5, as determined by chemical analysis of 9 representative ice samples. The proposed amendment increases the number of samples from 9 to 24. The 24 samples are obtained by randomly selecting 1 ice basket to be sampled from each of the 24 ice bays. The acceptance criteria for boron concentration is changed to include an upper limit of 2500 ppm. A note is added to clarify that the SRs are satisfied if the boron concentration and pH values obtained from averaging the individual sample results are within the limits specified. The performance frequency for the SR is increased from 18 months to 54 months.

A new SR is added to require that ice additions to the ice condenser be verified by chemical analysis to meet the boron concentration and pH requirements of SR 4.6.5.1. A note is provided to clarify that this verification can be performed by chemical analysis of either the liquid solution or the resulting ice.

##### **II. REASON FOR THE PROPOSED CHANGE**

Recent industry events related to the ice condenser prompted a review of related TSs. Through these reviews, differences were identified between each ice condenser plant's interpretation and implementation of the related TSs. Review of the differences regarding the ice sampling SR led to the proposed changes, as agreed to by the ice

condenser utilities group. The proposed changes will provide additional assurance that TSs and accident analysis assumptions are maintained, and will facilitate the regulatory oversight process at each ice condenser plant.

The new SR alone provides adequate assurance that the boron concentration and pH requirements of the ice are maintained. However, the industry has elected to retain a modified version of SR 4.6.5.1 as added assurance that the stored ice maintains the required boron concentration and pH value, and to ensure no unexpected phenomena results in a chemical change in the ice.

### **III. SAFETY ANALYSIS**

The ice condenser consists of at least 2,082,024 pounds, at a 95% confidence, of ice stored in baskets within the ice condenser. Its primary purpose is to provide a large heat sink in the event of a release of energy from a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or a high energy line break (HELB) in containment. The ice would absorb energy and limit containment peak pressure and temperature during the accident transient. Limiting the pressure and temperature reduces the release of fission product radioactivity from containment to the environment in the event of one of the above design basis accidents.

Other functions of the ice bed and melted ice are to remove fission product iodine if released by the core, contribute inventory in the form of melted ice to the containment sump for recirculation mode core cooling, and minimize the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion of systems/components exposed to emergency core cooling system and containment spray fluids.

The proposed changes to SR 4.6.5.1 and the addition of SR 4.6.5.1.f do not alter the above functions in any way, or the existing TS acceptance criteria for boron concentration or pH of the ice. Allowing acceptance of the criteria to be based on the averaged analysis results of the individual samples is consistent with the accident analysis assumption that the bulk containment sump pH and boron concentration will not be altered from their accident analysis assumed values following complete ice melt. Thus, application of the acceptance criteria to the analysis results of each sample is not required. Additionally, industry experience has shown that analysis results have rarely been outside the acceptance criteria. This is because pH remains in the specified range once boron concentration is above 1100-1200 ppm, and there are no normal operating mechanisms for the boron concentration

to decrease. The few anomalies that have occurred were found to be very localized, not only in regards to adjacent baskets, but within the sampled basket itself. Often the problem was due to samples that contained clear ice as a result of ice scraping from doors. This, and the addition of SR 4.6.5.1.f support changing the performance frequency from 18 to 54 months, which is expected to be the equivalence of 3 fuel cycles. For newly added ice, there is no significant difference in sampling the liquid solution from which it is made, or the resultant ice.

#### **IV. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION**

TVA has concluded that operation of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the proposed change to the Technical Specifications (TSs), does not involve a significant hazards consideration. TVA's conclusion is based on its evaluation, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1), of the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c).

**A. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.**

The only analyzed accidents of possible consideration in regards to changes potentially affecting the ice condenser are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a main steam line break (MSLB) inside containment. However, the ice condenser is not postulated as being the initiator of any LOCA or MSLB. This is because it is designed to remain functional following a design basis earthquake, and the ice condenser does not interconnect or interact with any systems that interconnect or interact with the reactor coolant or main steam systems. Since the proposed changes to the TS and TS bases are solely to revise and provide clarification of the ice sampling and chemical analysis requirements, and are not the result of or require any physical change to the ice condenser, there can be no change in the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report.

In order for the consequences of any previously evaluated event to be changed, there would have to be a change in the ice condenser's physical operation during a LOCA or MSLB, or in the chemical composition of the stored ice. The proposed changes do not alter either from existing requirements, except to add an upper limit on boron concentration, which is the bounding value for the hot leg switchover timing

calculation. Though the frequency of the existing surveillance requirement (SR) for sampling the stored ice is changed from once every 18 months to once every 54 months, the sampling requirements are strengthened overall with: (1) the requirement to obtain one randomly selected sample from each ice condenser bay (24 total samples) rather than 9 "representative" samples, and (2) the addition of a new SR to verify each addition of ice meets the existing requirements for boron concentration and pH value. The only other change is to clarify that each sample of stored ice is individually analyzed for boron concentration and pH, but that the acceptance criteria for each parameter is based on the average values obtained for the 24 samples. This is consistent with the bases for the boron concentration of the ice, which is to ensure the accident analysis assumptions for containment sump pH and boron concentration are not altered following complete melting of the ice condenser. Historically, chemical analysis of the stored ice has had a very limited number of instances where an individual sample did not meet the boron or pH requirements, with all subsequent evaluations (follow-up sampling) showing the ice condenser as a whole was well within these requirements. Requiring chemical analysis of each sample is provided to preclude the practice of melting all samples together before performing the analysis, and to ensure the licensee is alerted to any localized anomalies for investigation and resolution without the burden of entering a 24-hour action, provided the averaged results are acceptable. Thus, based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

**B. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.**

Because the TS and TS bases changes do not involve any physical changes to the ice condenser, any physical or chemical changes to the ice contained therein, or make any changes in the operational or maintenance aspects of the ice condenser as required by the TS, there can be no new accidents created from those already identified and evaluated.



C. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The ice condenser TSs ensure that during a LOCA or MSLB the ice condenser will initially pass sufficient air and steam mass to preclude over pressurizing lower containment, that it will absorb sufficient heat energy initially and over a prescribed time period to assist in precluding containment vessel failure, and that it will not alter the bulk containment sump pH and boron concentration assumed in the accident analysis. Since the proposed changes do not physically alter the ice condenser, but rather only serve to strengthen and clarify ice sampling and analysis requirements, the only area of potential concern is the effect these changes could have on bulk containment sump pH and boron concentration following ice melt. However, this is not affected because there is no change in the existing requirements for pH and boron concentration, except to add an upper limit on boron concentration. This upper limit is the bounding value for the hot leg switchover timing calculation. Averaging the pH and boron values obtained from analysis of the individual samples taken is not a new practice, just one that was not consistently used by all ice condenser plants. Using the averaged values provides an equivalent bulk value for the ice condenser, which is consistent with the accident analysis for the bulk pH and boron concentration of the containment sump following ice melt. Changing the performance frequency for sampling the stored ice does not reduce any margin of safety because: (1) the newly proposed surveillance (SR 4.6.5.1.f) ensures ice additions meet the existing boron concentration and pH requirements, (2) there are no normal operating mechanisms, including sublimation, that reduce the ice condenser bulk pH and boron concentration, and (3) the number of required samples has been increased from 9 to 24 (1 randomly selected ice basket per bay), which is approximately the same number of samples that would have been taken in the same time period under the existing requirements. Thus, it can be concluded that the proposed TS and TS bases changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

## **V. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONSIDERATION**

The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, a significant change in the types of or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Therefore, the proposed change meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an environmental assessment of the proposed change is not required.

ENCLOSURE 2

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY  
SEQUOYAH PLANT (SQN)  
UNITS 1 AND 2

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE  
MARKED PAGES

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I. AFFECTED PAGE LIST

Unit 1

3/4 6-26  
3/4 6-27  
B3/4 6-5a

UNIT 2

3/4 6-27  
3/4 6-28  
B3/4 6-5a

II. MARKED PAGES

See attached.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER

#### ICE BED

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.6.5.1. The ice bed shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The stored ice having a boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm boron as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5,  $\geq$  and  $\leq$  2500 ppm
- b. Flow channels through the ice condenser,
- c. A maximum ice bed temperature of less than or equal 27°F,
- d. A total ice weight of at least 2,082,024 pounds at a 95% level of confidence, and
- e. 1944 ice baskets.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

#### ACTION:

With the ice bed inoperable, restore the ice bed to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.6.5.1 The ice condenser shall be determined OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 12 hours by using the ice bed temperature monitoring system to verify that the maximum ice bed temperature is less than or equal to 27°F.
- b. At least once per 18 months by verifying, by visual inspection, accumulation of ice on structural members comprising flow channels through the ice bed is  $\leq$  15 percent blockage of the total flow area for each safety analysis section.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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- c. At least once per 40 months by lifting and visually inspecting the accessible portions of at least two ice baskets from each 1/3 of the ice condenser and verifying that the ice baskets are free of detrimental structural wear, cracks, corrosion or other damage. The ice baskets shall be raised at least 10 feet for this inspection.
- d. At least once per 18 months by:

- 1. ~~Deleted~~ Chemical analyses which verify that at least 9 representative samples of stored ice have a boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5.
- 2. Weighing a representative sample of at least 144 ice baskets and verifying that each basket contains at least 1071 lbs of ice. The representative sample shall include 6 baskets from each of the 24 ice condenser bays and shall be constituted of one basket each from Radial Rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 (or from the same row of an adjacent bay if a basket from a designated row cannot be obtained for weighing) within each bay. If any basket is found to contain less than 1071 pounds of ice, a representative sample of 20 additional baskets from the same bay shall be weighed. The minimum average weight of ice from the 20 additional baskets and the discrepant basket shall not be less than 1071 pounds/basket at a 95% level of confidence.

The ice condenser shall also be subdivided into 3 groups of baskets, as follows: Group 1 - bays 1 through 8, Group 2 - bays 9 through 16, and Group 3 - bays 17 through 24. The minimum average ice weight of the sample baskets from Radial Rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 in each group shall not be less than 1071 pounds/basket at a 95% level of confidence.

The minimum total ice condenser ice weight at a 95% level of confidence shall be calculated using all ice basket weights determined during this weighing program and shall not be less than 2,082,024 pounds.

**ADD**

- e. At least once per 54 months by chemical analysis of the stored ice in at least one randomly selected ice basket from each ice condenser bay verify:

- 1. Ice bed boron concentration is  $\geq 1800$  ppm and  $\leq 2500$  ppm as sodium tetraborate and;
- 2. pH is  $\geq 9.0$  and  $\leq 9.5$

NOTE: The requirements of this SR are satisfied if the boron concentration and pH values obtained from averaging the individual sample results are within the limits specified above.

- f. Each ice addition verify, by chemical analysis, that ice added to the ice condenser meets the boron concentration and pH requirements of SR 4.6.5.1.e.

NOTE: The chemical analysis may be performed on either the liquid solution or the resulting ice.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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Frost buildup or loose ice is not to be considered as flow channel blockage, whereas attached ice is considered blockage of a flow channel. Frost is the solid form of water that is loosely adherent, and can be brushed off with the open hand.

The frequency of 18 months was based on ice storage tests and the allowance built into the required ice mass over and above the mass assumed in the safety analyses. Operating experience has verified that, with the 18-month interval, the weight requirements are maintained with no significant degradation between surveillances.



#### 3/4.6.5.2 ICE BED TEMPERATURE MONITORING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the ice bed temperature monitoring system ensures that the capability is available for monitoring the ice temperature. In the event the monitoring system is inoperable, the ACTION requirements provide assurance that the ice bed heat removal capacity will be retained within the specified time limits.

#### 3/4.6.5.3 ICE CONDENSER DOORS

The OPERABILITY of the ice condenser doors ensures that these doors will open because of the differential pressure between upper and lower containment resulting from the blowdown of reactor coolant during a LOCA and that the blow-down will be diverted through the ice condenser bays for heat removal and thus containment pressure control. The requirement that the doors be maintained closed during normal operation ensures that excessive sublimation of the ice will not occur because of warm air intrusion from the lower containment.

If an ice condenser inlet door is physically restrained from opening, the system function is degraded, and immediate action must be taken to restore the opening capability of the inlet door. Being physically restrained from opening is defined as those conditions in which an inlet door is physically blocked from opening by installation of a blocking device or by an obstruction from temporary or permanently installed equipment or is otherwise inhibited from opening such as may result from ice, frost, debris, or increased inlet door opening torque beyond the valves specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.3.1.

Note: entry into Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.6.5.3.b is not required due to personnel standing on or opening an intermediate deck or upper deck door for short durations to perform required surveillances, minor maintenance such as ice removal, or routine tasks such as system walkdowns.

#### 3/4.6.5.4 INLET DOOR POSITION MONITORING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the inlet door position monitoring system ensures that the capability is available for monitoring the individual inlet door position. In the event the monitoring system is inoperable, the ACTION requirements provide assurance that the ice bed heat removal capacity will be retained within the specified time limits.

#### 3/4.6.5.5 DIVIDER BARRIER PERSONNEL ACCESS DOORS AND EQUIPMENT HATCHES

The requirements for the divider barrier personnel access doors and equipment hatches being closed and OPERABLE ensure that a minimum bypass steam flow will occur from the lower to the upper containment compartments during a LOCA. This condition ensures a diversion of the steam through the ice condenser bays that is consistent with the LOCA analyses.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS



### 3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER

#### ICE BED

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.6.5.1 The ice bed shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The stored ice having a boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm boron as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5,  
- b. Flow channels through the ice condenser,
- c. A maximum ice bed temperature of less than or equal to 27°F,
- d. A total ice weight of at least 2,082,024 pounds at a 95% level of confidence, and
- e. 1944 ice baskets.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

#### ACTION:

With the ice bed inoperable, restore the ice bed to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.6.5.1 The ice condenser shall be determined OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 12 hours by using the ice bed temperature monitoring system to verify that the maximum ice bed temperature is less than or equal to 27°F.
- b. At least once per 18 months by verifying, by visual inspection, accumulation of ice on structural members comprising flow channels through the ice bed is  $\leq 15$  percent blockage of the total flow area for each safety analysis section.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- c. At least once per 40 months by lifting and visually inspecting the accessible portions of at least two ice baskets from each 1/3 of the ice condenser and verifying that the ice baskets are free of detrimental structural wear, cracks, corrosion or other damage. The ice baskets shall be raised at least 10 feet for this inspection.
- d. At least once per 18 months by:

- 1. ~~Deleted~~ Chemical analyses which verify that at least 9 representative samples of stored ice have a boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5.
- 2. Weighing a representative sample of at least 144 ice baskets and verifying that each basket contains at least 1071 lbs of ice. The representative sample shall include 6 baskets from each of the 24 ice condenser bays and shall be constituted of one basket each from Radial Rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 (or from the same row of an adjacent bay if a basket from a designated row cannot be obtained for weighing) within each bay. If any basket is found to contain less than 1071 pounds of ice, a representative sample of 20 additional baskets from the same bay shall be weighed. The minimum average weight of ice from the 20 additional baskets and the discrepant basket shall not be less than 1071 pounds/basket at a 95% level of confidence.

The ice condenser shall also be subdivided into 3 groups of baskets, as follows: Group 1 - bays 1 through 8, Group 2 - bays 9 through 16, and Group 3 - bays 17 through 24. The minimum average ice weight of the sample baskets from Radial Rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 in each group shall not be less than 1071 pounds/basket at a 95% level of confidence.

The minimum total ice condenser ice weight at a 95% level of confidence shall be calculated using all ice basket weights determined during this weighing program and shall not be less than 2,082,024 pounds.

**ADD**

- e. At least once per 54 months by chemical analysis of the stored ice in at least one randomly selected ice basket from each ice condenser bay verify:
  - 1. Ice bed boron concentration is  $\geq 1800$  ppm and  $\leq 2500$  ppm as sodium tetraborate and;
  - 2. pH is  $\geq 9.0$  and  $\leq 9.5$

NOTE: The requirements of this SR are satisfied if the boron concentration and pH values obtained from averaging the individual sample results are within the limits specified above.

- f. Each ice addition verify, by chemical analysis, that ice added to the ice condenser meets the boron concentration and pH requirements of SR 4.6.5.1.e.

NOTE: The chemical analysis may be performed on either the liquid solution or the resulting ice



## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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Frost buildup or loose ice is not to be considered as flow channel blockage, whereas attached ice is considered blockage of a flow channel. Frost is the solid form of water that is loosely adherent, and can be brushed off with the open hand.

The frequency of 18 months was based on ice storage tests and the allowance built into the required ice mass over and above the mass assumed in the safety analyses. Operating experience has verified that, with the 18-month interval, the weight requirements are maintained with no significant degradation between surveillances.

← **Insert A**

#### 3/4.6.5.2 ICE BED TEMPERATURE MONITORING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the ice bed temperature monitoring system ensures that the capability is available for monitoring the ice temperature. In the event the monitoring system is inoperable, the ACTION requirements provide assurance that the ice bed heat removal capacity will be retained within the specified time limits.

#### 3/4.6.5.3 ICE CONDENSER DOORS

The OPERABILITY of the ice condenser doors ensures that these doors will open because of the differential pressure between upper and lower containment resulting from the blowdown of reactor coolant during a LOCA and that the blow-down will be diverted through the ice condenser bays for heat removal and thus containment pressure control. The requirement that the doors be maintained closed during normal operation ensures that excessive sublimation of the ice will not occur because of warm air intrusion from the lower containment.

If an ice condenser inlet door is physically restrained from opening, the system function is degraded, and immediate action must be taken to restore the opening capability of the inlet door. Being physically restrained from opening is defined as those conditions in which an inlet door is physically blocked from opening by installation of a blocking device or by an obstruction from temporary or permanently installed equipment or is otherwise inhibited from opening such as may result from ice, frost, debris, or increased inlet door opening torque beyond the valves specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.3.1.

Note: entry into Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.6.5.3.b is not required due to personnel standing on or opening an intermediate deck or upper deck door for short durations to perform required surveillances, minor maintenance such as ice removal, or routine tasks such as system walkdowns.

#### 3/4.6.5.4 INLET DOOR POSITION MONITORING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the inlet door position monitoring system ensures that the capability is available for monitoring the individual inlet door position. In the event the monitoring system is inoperable, the ACTION requirements provide assurance that the ice bed heat removal capacity will be retained within the specified time limits.

#### 3/4.6.5.5 DIVIDER BARRIER PERSONNEL ACCESS DOORS AND EQUIPMENT HATCHES

The requirements for the divider barrier personnel access doors and equipment hatches being closed and OPERABLE ensure that a minimum bypass steam flow will occur from the lower to the upper containment compartments during a LOCA. This condition ensures a diversion of the steam through the ice condenser bays that is consistent with the LOCA analyses.

## Insert A

Verifying the chemical composition of the stored ice ensures that the ice and the resulting melted water will meet the requirement for borated water for accident analysis. This is accomplished by obtaining at least 24 ice samples. Each sample is taken approximately one foot from the top of the ice of each randomly selected ice basket in each ice condenser bay. The SR is modified by a NOTE that allows the boron concentration and pH value obtained from averaging the individual samples' analysis results to satisfy the requirements of the SR. If either the average boron concentration or the average pH value is outside their prescribed limit, then entry into the LCO ACTION is required. Sodium tetraborate has been proven effective in maintaining the boron content for long storage periods, and it also enhances the ability of the solution to remove and retain fission product iodine. The high pH is required to enhance the effectiveness of the ice and the melted ice in removing iodine from the containment atmosphere. This pH range also minimizes the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components exposed to ECCS and Containment Spray System fluids in the recirculation mode of operation. The frequency of 54 months is intended to be consistent with the expected length of three fuel cycles, and was developed considering these facts:

- a. Long-term ice storage tests have determined that the chemical composition of the stored ice is extremely stable;
- b. There are no normal operating mechanisms that decrease the boron concentration of the stored ice, and pH remains within a 9.0-9.5 range when boron concentrations are above approximately 1200 ppm.
- c. Operating experience has demonstrated that meeting the boron concentration and pH requirements has never been a problem; and
- d. Someone would have to enter the containment to take the sample, and, if the unit is at power, that person would receive a radiation dose.

The SR is modified by a NOTE that allows the chemical analysis to be performed on either the liquid or resulting ice of each sodium tetraborate solution prepared. If ice is obtained from off site sources, then chemical analysis data must be obtained for the ice supplied.

**ENCLOSURE 3**

**TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY  
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)  
UNITS 1 AND 2**

**PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE  
REVISED PAGES**

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**I. AFFECTED PAGE LIST**

Unit 1

3/4 6-26  
3/4 6-27  
B3/4 6-5a  
B3/4 6-5b (text rollover)

UNIT 2

3/4 6-27  
3/4 6-28  
B3/4 6-5a  
B3/4 6-5b (text rollover)

**II. REVISED PAGES**

See attached.

**CLEAN PAGES PROVIDED TO NRC AND EDMS ONLY)**

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER

#### ICE BED

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.6.5.1. The ice bed shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The stored ice having a boron concentration of  $\geq 1800$  ppm and  $\leq 2500$  ppm boron as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5,
- b. Flow channels through the ice condenser,
- c. A maximum ice bed temperature of less than or equal 27°F,
- d. A total ice weight of at least 2,082,024 pounds at a 95% level of confidence, and
- e. 1944 ice baskets.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

#### ACTION:

With the ice bed inoperable, restore the ice bed to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.6.5.1 The ice condenser shall be determined OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 12 hours by using the ice bed temperature monitoring system to verify that the maximum ice bed temperature is less than or equal to 27°F.
- b. At least once per 18 months by verifying, by visual inspection, accumulation of ice on structural members comprising flow channels through the ice bed is  $\leq 15$  percent blockage of the total flow area for each safety analysis section.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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- c. At least once per 40 months by lifting and visually inspecting the accessible portions of at least two ice baskets from each 1/3 of the ice condenser and verifying that the ice baskets are free of detrimental structural wear, cracks, corrosion or other damage. The ice baskets shall be raised at least 10 feet for this inspection.
- d. At least once per 18 months by:
  - 1. Deleted.
  - 2. Weighing a representative sample of at least 144 ice baskets and verifying that each basket contains at least 1071 lbs of ice. The representative sample shall include 6 baskets from each of the 24 ice condenser bays and shall be constituted of one basket each from Radial Rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 (or from the same row of an adjacent bay if a basket from a designated row cannot be obtained for weighing) within each bay. If any basket is found to contain less than 1071 pounds of ice, a representative sample of 20 additional baskets from the same bay shall be weighed. The minimum average weight of ice from the 20 additional baskets and the discrepant basket shall not be less than 1071 pounds/basket at a 95% level of confidence.

The ice condenser shall also be subdivided into 3 groups of baskets, as follows: Group 1 - bays 1 through 8, Group 2 - bays 9 through 16, and Group 3 - bays 17 through 24. The minimum average ice weight of the sample baskets from Radial Rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 in each group shall not be less than 1071 pounds/basket at a 95% level of confidence.

The minimum total ice condenser ice weight at a 95% level of confidence shall be calculated using all ice basket weights determined during this weighing program and shall not be less than 2,082,024 pounds.

- e. At least once per 54 months by chemical analysis of the stored ice in at least one randomly selected ice basket from each ice condenser bay verify:
  - 1. Ice bed boron concentration is  $\geq 1800$  ppm and  $\leq 2500$  ppm as sodium tetraborate and;
  - 2. pH is  $\geq 9.0$  and  $\leq 9.5$

NOTE: The requirements of this SR are satisfied if the boron concentration and pH values obtained from averaging the individual sample results are within the limits specified above.

- f. Each ice addition verify, by chemical analysis, that ice added to the ice condenser meets the boron concentration and pH requirements of SR 4.6.5.1.e.

NOTE: The chemical analysis may be performed on either the liquid solution or the resulting ice.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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Frost buildup or loose ice is not to be considered as flow channel blockage, whereas attached ice is considered blockage of a flow channel. Frost is the solid form of water that is loosely adherent, and can be brushed off with the open hand.

The frequency of 18 months was based on ice storage tests and the allowance built into the required ice mass over and above the mass assumed in the safety analyses. Operating experience has verified that, with the 18-month interval, the weight requirements are maintained with no significant degradation between surveillances.

Verifying the chemical composition of the stored ice ensures that the ice and the resulting melted water will meet the requirement for borated water for accident analysis. This is accomplished by obtaining at least 24 ice samples. Each sample is taken approximately one foot from the top of the ice of each randomly selected ice basket in each ice condenser bay. The SR is modified by a NOTE that allows the boron concentration and pH value obtained from averaging the individual samples' analysis results to satisfy the requirements of the SR. If either the average boron concentration or the average pH value is outside their prescribed limit, then entry into the LCO ACTION is required. Sodium tetraborate has been proven effective in maintaining the boron content for long storage periods, and it also enhances the ability of the solution to remove and retain fission product iodine. The high pH is required to enhance the effectiveness of the ice and the melted ice in removing iodine from the containment atmosphere. This pH range also minimizes the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components exposed to ECCS and Containment Spray System fluids in the recirculation mode of operation. The frequency of 54 months is intended to be consistent with the expected length of three fuel cycles, and was developed considering these facts:

- a. Long-term ice storage tests have determined that the chemical composition of the stored ice is extremely stable;
- b. There are no normal operating mechanisms that decrease the boron concentration of the stored ice, and pH remains within a 9.0-9.5 range when boron concentrations are above approximately 1200 ppm.
- c. Operating experience has demonstrated that meeting the boron concentration and pH requirements has never been a problem; and
- d. Someone would have to enter the containment to take the sample, and, if the unit is at power, that person would receive a radiation dose.

The SR is modified by a NOTE that allows the chemical analysis to be performed on either the liquid or resulting ice of each sodium tetraborate solution prepared. If ice is obtained from off site sources, then chemical analysis data must be obtained for the ice supplied.

### 3/4.6.5.2 ICE BED TEMPERATURE MONITORING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the ice bed temperature monitoring system ensures that the capability is available for monitoring the ice temperature. In the event the monitoring system is inoperable, the ACTION requirements provide assurance that the ice bed heat removal capacity will be retained within the specified time limits.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.5.3 ICE CONDENSER DOORS

The OPERABILITY of the ice condenser doors ensures that these doors will open because of the differential pressure between upper and lower containment resulting from the blowdown of reactor coolant during a LOCA and that the blow-down will be diverted through the ice condenser bays for heat removal and thus containment pressure control. The requirement that the doors be maintained closed during normal operation ensures that excessive sublimation of the ice will not occur because of warm air intrusion from the lower containment.

If an ice condenser inlet door is physically restrained from opening, the system function is degraded, and immediate action must be taken to restore the opening capability of the inlet door. Being physically restrained from opening is defined as those conditions in which an inlet door is physically blocked from opening by installation of a blocking device or by an obstruction from temporary or permanently installed equipment or is otherwise inhibited from opening such as may result from ice, frost, debris, or increased inlet door opening torque beyond the valves specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.3.1.

Note: entry into Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.6.5.3.b is not required due to personnel standing on or opening an intermediate deck or upper deck door for short durations to perform required surveillances, minor maintenance such as ice removal, or routine tasks such as system walkdowns.

#### 3/4.6.5.4 INLET DOOR POSITION MONITORING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the inlet door position monitoring system ensures that the capability is available for monitoring the individual inlet door position. In the event the monitoring system is inoperable, the ACTION requirements provide assurance that the ice bed heat removal capacity will be retained within the specified time limits.

#### 3/4.6.5.5 DIVIDER BARRIER PERSONNEL ACCESS DOORS AND EQUIPMENT HATCHES

The requirements for the divider barrier personnel access doors and equipment hatches being closed and OPERABLE ensure that a minimum bypass steam flow will occur from the lower to the upper containment compartments during a LOCA. This condition ensures a diversion of the steam through the ice condenser bays that is consistent with the LOCA analyses.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER

#### ICE BED

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.5.1 The ice bed shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The stored ice having a boron concentration of  $\geq 1800$  ppm and  $\leq 2500$  ppm boron as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5,
- b. Flow channels through the ice condenser,
- c. A maximum ice bed temperature of less than or equal to 27°F,
- d. A total ice weight of at least 2,082,024 pounds at a 95% level of confidence, and
- e. 1944 ice baskets.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

#### ACTION:

With the ice bed inoperable, restore the ice bed to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.6.5.1 The ice condenser shall be determined OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 12 hours by using the ice bed temperature monitoring system to verify that the maximum ice bed temperature is less than or equal to 27°F.
- b. At least once per 18 months by verifying, by visual inspection, accumulation of ice on structural members comprising flow channels through the ice bed is  $\leq 15$  percent blockage of the total flow area for each safety analysis section.



## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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- c. At least once per 40 months by lifting and visually inspecting the accessible portions of at least two ice baskets from each 1/3 of the ice condenser and verifying that the ice baskets are free of detrimental structural wear, cracks, corrosion or other damage. The ice baskets shall be raised at least 10 feet for this inspection.

- d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Deleted.

2. Weighing a representative sample of at least 144 ice baskets and verifying that each basket contains at least 1071 lbs of ice. The representative sample shall include 6 baskets from each of the 24 ice condenser bays and shall be constituted of one basket each from Radial Rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 (or from the same row of an adjacent bay if a basket from a designated row cannot be obtained for weighing) within each bay. If any basket is found to contain less than 1071 pounds of ice, a representative sample of 20 additional baskets from the same bay shall be weighed. The minimum average weight of ice from the 20 additional baskets and the discrepant basket shall not be less than 1071 pounds/basket at a 95% level of confidence.

The ice condenser shall also be subdivided into 3 groups of baskets, as follows: Group 1 - bays 1 through 8, Group 2 - bays 9 through 16, and Group 3 - bays 17 through 24. The minimum average ice weight of the sample baskets from Radial Rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 in each group shall not be less than 1071 pounds/basket at a 95% level of confidence.

The minimum total ice condenser ice weight at a 95% level of confidence shall be calculated using all ice basket weights determined during this weighing program and shall not be less than 2,082,024 pounds.

- e. At least once per 54 months by chemical analysis of the stored ice in at least one randomly selected ice basket from each ice condenser bay verify:

1. Ice bed boron concentration is  $\geq 1800$  ppm and  $\leq 2500$  ppm as sodium tetraborate and;
2. pH is  $\geq 9.0$  and  $\leq 9.5$

NOTE: The requirements of this SR are satisfied if the boron concentration and pH values obtained from averaging the individual sample results are within the limits specified above.

- f. Each ice addition verify, by chemical analysis, that ice added to the ice condenser meets the boron concentration and pH requirements of SR 4.6.5.1.e.

NOTE: The chemical analysis may be performed on either the liquid solution or the resulting ice

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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The frequency of 18 months was based on ice storage tests and the allowance built into the required ice mass over and above the mass assumed in the safety analyses. Operating experience has verified that, with the 18-month interval, the weight requirements are maintained with no significant degradation between surveillances.

Verifying the chemical composition of the stored ice ensures that the ice and the resulting melted water will meet the requirement for borated water for accident analysis. This is accomplished by obtaining at least 24 ice samples. Each sample is taken approximately one foot from the top of the ice of each randomly selected ice basket in each ice condenser bay. The SR is modified by a NOTE that allows the boron concentration and pH value obtained from averaging the individual samples' analysis results to satisfy the requirements of the SR. If either the average boron concentration or the average pH value is outside their prescribed limit, then entry into the LCO ACTION is required. Sodium tetraborate has been proven effective in maintaining the boron content for long storage periods, and it also enhances the ability of the solution to remove and retain fission product iodine. The high pH is required to enhance the effectiveness of the ice and the melted ice in removing iodine from the containment atmosphere. This pH range also minimizes the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components exposed to ECCS and Containment Spray System fluids in the recirculation mode of operation. The frequency of 54 months is intended to be consistent with the expected length of three fuel cycles, and was developed considering these facts:

- a. Long-term ice storage tests have determined that the chemical composition of the stored ice is extremely stable;
- b. There are no normal operating mechanisms that decrease the boron concentration of the stored ice, and pH remains within a 9.0-9.5 range when boron concentrations are above approximately 1200 ppm.
- c. Operating experience has demonstrated that meeting the boron concentration and pH requirements has never been a problem; and
- d. Someone would have to enter the containment to take the sample, and, if the unit is at power, that person would receive a radiation dose.

The SR is modified by a NOTE that allows the chemical analysis to be performed on either the liquid or resulting ice of each sodium tetraborate solution prepared. If ice is obtained from off site sources, then chemical analysis data must be obtained for the ice supplied.

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## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.5.3 ICE CONDENSER DOORS

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Note: entry into Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.6.5.3.b is not required due to personnel standing on or opening an intermediate deck or upper deck door for short durations to perform required surveillances, minor maintenance such as ice removal, or routine tasks such as system walkdowns.

#### 3/4.6.5.4 INLET DOOR POSITION MONITORING SYSTEM

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