

Maine Yankee
5/5/99

Solicitation for Additional Information

- ◆ **Identification of initiating events and accident sequences:** What are the correct accidents to be evaluating? Why and/or when can an accident be eliminated as a concern?

As discussed in the Maine Yankee Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR), the consequences of all of the assumed possible accident analyses are quite low. Specifically, due to the greater than two year spent fuel decay time, accidents associated with fuel criticality and handling are insignificant compared to the 10 CFR 100 limits and the EPA Protective Action Guidelines.

Accidents for Decommissioning Plants (DBA's and BDBA's)

- Low Level Waste Release Incident (Liquid, Gas, Resin)
- Fuel Handling Accidents (fuel drop, insufficient shielding)
- Fuel Criticality Accidents (fuel misplacement, boron dilution)
- Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Inventory
- Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
- Spent Fuel Cask Drop

Low Level Waste Release Incidents

Radioactive Waste Gas System Leaks and Failures

The inventory of the waste gas decay tanks can be eliminated shortly after permanent plant shutdown. Therefore this accident may be eliminated from scope.

Radioactive Liquid Waste System Leaks and Failures

Potential releases to the Atmosphere – The inventory of liquid waste may be eliminated shortly after the conclusion of chemical decontamination activities. Even with the limiting event of a rupture of the primary drain tank the consequences are below the EPA - PAG's

Resin Spills or Fires

This is the bounding offsite release dose consequence for design basis accidents at Maine Yankee (using a hypothetical resin cask with an inventory of 20,000 curies). Even with conservative assumptions, the consequences are below the EPA - PAG's. Depending on the type of spent fuel pool purification method, some small amount of contaminated resin will be produced periodically.

Fuel Handling Accidents

Spent Fuel Assembly Drop

The largest contributor to offsite release dose is from the short-lived iodines. Following a modest level of decay (3-4 months), offsite release dose is negligible. Site boundary exposures are reduced to at least two orders of magnitude below EAP PAGs.

Insufficient Shielding

This scenario is coupled with either a lost of inventory in the fuel pool or inadvertent raising of a fuel bundle to near the surface. The dose at the top of the pool as a function of water depth and decay time is presented in Fig. 5.5-3 in the Maine Yankee DSAR. A loss of 16 feet of water inventory, to a level of six feet above the active fuel, would result in a dose at top of pool of about 1 rad/hr. This dose is low enough to allow for operator action to restore pool level. As presented in Figure 5.5-4 of the Maine Yankee DSAR, the projected skyshine Radiation Dose at 610 meters (Exclusion Area Boundary) from the pool would be about $4.7E-7$ rad/hr for the same scenario. Raising of a fuel bundle to cause a high radiation dose at the surface of the fuel pool, assuming normal or near normal water level, is precluded by the physical limitations of the fuel crane.

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Fuel Criticality Accidents

At Maine Yankee, the Boral fuel racks are designed to preclude criticality assuming no boration of the Fuel Pool water. Misplaced/dropped assemblies are precluded from criticality, assuming the worst case conditions, by the borated Fuel Pool water. Fuel Pool water is maintained borated to about 30% more than required by analysis. This analysis assumes new fuel assemblies. Maine Yankee no longer has any new fuel assemblies. Unless a fuel bundle is misplaced or otherwise not in its assigned location, boron dilution to pure water cannot cause criticality due to the rack design.

Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Inventory

The active portion of the fuel is stored at or below outside grade level (el.21'0"). Drain down of the fuel pool below this grade elevation by leakage or breach of the pool is highly unlikely. The suction and discharge piping of the fuel pool cooling system is protected by passive syphon breakers which would prohibit drain down by syphon. At Maine Yankee the only penetration into the pool below the level of the fuel is the fuel transfer tube into the Containment building. This tube is sealed on the pool side by a valve and on the containment side by a blank flange. Any human error related to a leak path through the fuel transfer tube would be impossible. This would require the deliberate act of two individuals. Only incredible events (eg. meteor, massive earthquakes) would be precursor events to a loss of inventory rapid enough to preclude operator action.

Loss of SFP Inventory due to loss of cooling

The Maine Yankee DSAR documents the parametric studies prepared to demonstrate the time available for operation action to recover from a loss of SFP cooling or loss of SFP inventory event. With the spent fuel cooled for over two years and the syphon breaks installed in the SFP cooling supply and return lines, it was calculated that it would take approximately 64.6 hours to reach bulk boiling (assuming an initial bulk temperature of 100°F and an initial pool level of 40 Ft.). Given these parameters, the calculated boil-off rate would be 9.22 gpm or a loss of SFP level of 1.16 feet/day. These estimates are quite conservative since they assume considerably more latent heat than as actually exists (i.e. The SFP heat-up test conducted in 1997 determined that the ANS decay heat values used in the analyses were high by approximately 60%.) And since all convective and evaporative heat losses are conservatively neglected. Given these inputs the consequence of loss of SFP cooling results in dose levels in the fuel building of less than 2 mR per hour.

Although the ruggedness of the new Maine Yankee SFP cooling system is not credited in the loss of SFP cooling evaluation, it should be pointed out that the new Decay Heat Removal (DHR) system was designed and installed to resist the 0.18g NUREG/CR-0098 response spectrum which resulted from the 1987 Maine Yankee Seismic Margin Review (NUREG/CR-4826). Additionally, the system contains a built-in 100% capacity spare pump and it can be powered by the site's dedicated Security diesel generator. As discussed below, numerous sources of make-up water are available to credit operator actions to adequately assure make-up capability to the SFP.

Gross Seismic Failure of the SFP:

The Maine Yankee SFP is a reinforced concrete structure comprised of 6-foot thick walls and base slab. The pool is supported directly on bedrock and is

embedded up to approximately Elevation 21' (or to approximately the top of the spent fuel assemblies). During the NRC-sponsored Maine Yankee Seismic Margin Review (NUREG-CR-4826), the structure was screened out as a seismic initiator having a High-Confidence-of-a-Low-Probability-of-Failure (HCLPF) capacity of $> 0.30g$ (which was the Margins program's screening threshold). NUREG/CR-4334 estimates that similar reinforced concrete structures can be screened out up to HCLPF values of $0.5g$ ZPA. Similarly, NUREG/CR-5176 calculated a median seismic capacity for a "representative" PWR as $2.0g$ and the resulting HCLPF as $0.65g$. The probability of such a large magnitude earthquake along the coast of Maine can be gleaned from either the EPRI or LLNL seismic hazard curves.

Other Initiators:

A review of "Other" potential initiators, such as tornadoes, fires or operator errors has yielded no credible initiators. The massive, passive SFP is robust enough to resist the most damaging tornado missiles, relies on no operating systems or immediate operator actions, thereby greatly reducing the chance of an operator error or the failure of necessary equipment and is not susceptible to a fire-induced failure.

Loss of inventory through sabotage related initiators are discussed and evaluated in NRC correspondence.¹ The consequences of these inventory related scenarios are minimized due to the fact that the active portion of the fuel is stored at or below outside grade level (el. 21'0").

In conclusion, other than a seismically-induced gross failure of the SFP, any other accidents result in minor off-site dose effects and/or days of response time for operators to take remedial actions to restore cooling or to provide make-up water to compensate for loss of cooling or minor leakage losses.

Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling

The Maine Yankee Spent Fuel Pool has been analyzed to $212^{\circ}F$. The present boil off rate (700 days after shutdown) is less than 10 GPM which results in a boil off loss of less than 1.3 feet per day. This scenario is not a credible accident condition because of the very long time available for operator action.

Spent Fuel Pool Cask Drop

At present Maine Yankee is precluded by license condition from lifting a cask over the fuel pool. Although not part of the present license basis, analyses have been performed which demonstrate a cask drop will result in leakage from the pool but not catastrophic failure. Since the active storage portion of the pool is below grade, leakage from the pool is also limited by the geology of the rock below the pool structure.

Maine Yankee currently prohibits bringing a spent fuel shipping cask into the spent fuel pool (SFP), however, this prohibition will have to be eliminated in order to proceed with plans to create an onsite, dry cask ISFSI. The ISFSI project scope includes plans to replace/modify the existing yard crane (CR-3)

¹ Maine Yankee Letter to NRC dated March 5, 1998 (MN98-14) and July 1, 1998 (MN98-52) Safeguards Information

with a single-failure-proof crane which meets all of the requirements of NUREG/CR-0612.

Besides upgrading the existing crane, Maine Yankee has completed a number of consequence analyses to demonstrate the "worst-case" scenarios associated with a postulated spent fuel shipping cask drop accident. The potential damage to spent fuel, resulting from the postulated drop of an assumed 125 ton shipping cask, was shown to be not a return to criticality concern and that off-site dose level would be well less than the PAGs. An upper bound SFP leak rate of 5 gpm was calculated for the assumed cask drop. This make-up value is less than the calculated evaporation/boil-off value calculated for the loss-of-SFP cooling accident analyses and can easily be compensated for by the various available make-up sources. Available make-up sources include: SFP make-up via pump P-SFP2 and the 160,000 gallon primary water storage tank, the 3,000,000 gallon on-site fire pond and either the electric (P-4) or diesel powered (P-5) fire pumps, the Town of Wiscasset site water line or other actions which could be initiated within the days available (Refer to the loss of SFP cooling discussion for more details on available time for operator actions).

Other Heavy Loads

Current plans call for a prohibition of heavy loads in the vicinity of the containment side of the fuel transfer tube. Greater-than-Class-C (GTCC) wastes resulting from segmentation of the reactor internals will be packaged in the containment with no plans to re-open the fuel transfer tube, thereby eliminating the possibility of introducing any operator errors that could accidentally draining the SFP. With the fuel transfer tube isolation flange installed on the containment side of the transfer tube and the tube isolation valve (FP-21) closed and administratively controlled on the fuel pool side of the tube, there is no credible way of accidentally draining the SFP.

- ◆ **Probability of initiating events and accident sequences:** Existing information based on operating reactors and had large uncertainties associated with the estimate? How can these be improved? What else, such as human error, needs to be examined?

Seismic Events

Recent work by EPRI and LLNL regarding the probability of seismic events of a given magnitude should be the basis for determining precursor events. Cask drop events, for those designs susceptible to severe damage from such events should be considered.

- ◆ **Methods or criteria to assess scenarios and consequences:** This is a very large, fundamental question – What type or types of analysis should be used? What criteria should be used? Can generic parameters be defined?
- ◆ **Mitigative actions or features:** Is there equipment or personnel actions that can be given credit for a given accidents(s)?

The capability of the fuel pool to retain some water due to its relationship to grade elevation should be considered. The active portion of the fuel is stored at or below outside grade level (el.21'0"). Drain down of the fuel pool below this grade elevation by leakage or breach of the pool is highly unlikely.

The availability of make-up water and the ease of initiating make-up should be considered. Available make-up sources include: SFP make-up via pump P-SFP2 and the 160,000 gallon primary water storage tank, the 3,000,000 gallon on-site fire pond and either the electric (P-4) or diesel powered (P-5) fire pumps, the Town of Wiscasset site water line or other actions which could be initiated within the days available

The long time available for operator detection and mitigating action in loss of fuel pool inventory and loss of cooling scenarios should be considered. With the spent fuel cooled for over two years and the syphon breaks installed in the SFP cooling supply and return lines, it was calculated that it would take approximately 64.6 hours to reach bulk boiling (assuming an initial bulk temperature of 100°F and an initial pool level of 40 Ft. - minimum siphon elevation) Given these parameters, the calculated boil-off rate would be 9.22 gpm or a loss of SFP level of 1.16 feet/day. At this rate it would take over 12 days for the spent fuel pool level to reach 4 feet above the fuel racks assuming no operator action. At this level, the radiation dose rate at the exclusion area boundary is less than 2.6×10^{-6} Rad/hr.

The location of the plant in relation to the probability and severity of seismic events should be considered as well as the seismic ruggedness of the pool design.

- ◆ **Characteristics of Zircaloy fire:** How does it behave? How energetic is the release? How much is released? When is propagation a concern?
- ◆ **Dose from fire after 30 days post-shutdown and beyond:** Previous studies evaluated dose from fire at 30 days; limited fire at 90 days but it appears that they did not evaluate the consequences of a fire when the fuel is older than 90 days – is there a point in time that event does not have offsite consequences?

According to NUREG 0654 and NUREG 0396 the bounds of the parameters for which planning was recommended were identified based upon a knowledge of the potential consequences, timing, and release characteristics of a spectrum of accidents. As described in NUREG-1353 "Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools, "the source term for the spent fuel pool accident is not the same as the source term associated with core damage accidents. The consequences of a spent fuel pool accident which results in the complete loss of water are dominated by the long lived isotopes, such as cesium and strontium. " "A direct comparison of the consequences of a severe accident in a spent fuel storage pool to the consequences of a severe core accident can be misleading. For the spent fuel pool accident there are no 'early' fatalities and the risk of early injury is negligible. For a severe core damage accident, early fatalities and early injury are part of the risk due to the presence of the shorter lived isotopes." From this discussion, it is clear that the Zirc fire scenario would not have been one of those accident sequences which contributed to the basis for the emergency plan requirements since the accident consequences and release characteristics fall outside the bounding parameters that necessitate offsite response capability.

DSAR Table 5.3.1 (attached) provides the bounding fuel rod gap radiological inventories assumed in the fuel handling accident analysis assuming one year of decay.

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Table 5.3.1

BOUNDING SPENT FUEL INVENTORIES FOR RADIOLOGICAL ANALYSES⁽²⁾

NUCLIDE	ASSEMBLY INVENTORY (Ci) ⁽¹⁾
I-129	1.85 E-02
I-131	6.60 E-09
Kr-81	3.85 E-07
Kr-85	4.04 E+03
Xe-129m	5.97 E-14
Xe-131m	5.86 E-06
Xe-133	8.06 E-16

(1) Inventories include a 5% uncertainty factor.

(2) On a per assembly basis.