

11/5/99

ACRS

(1)

## "Spent Fuel Fire Risk"

Dr. Kress -

Would be cautious about going past top of fuel - Wouldn't understand chemical/fuel kinetics. Zirc hydride <sup>modules</sup> could ignite earlier. knowledge of chemical kinetic locking.

→ postulated  
Canadian accident - fuel bundle ejection  
fuel exposed to air

Release models not applicable to this situation.

George A - "We don't all mean the same thing by defense-in-depth"

Lynette Hendricks  
Mike Meisner

Unloading casks / fuel - ~~should~~ should be made risk-informed.

George A. <sup>Austrian</sup> - Some of problem is use of point analysis versus distributions.

Peter Atherton -

- Risk assessment techniques - don't go to cost/benefits.
- Once plant decides to shutdown, people in area want to know what is happening.

B1215

11/5/99

ACRS

2

- seismic issues - no look at degradation of liner or concrete.
- criticality - how do old criteria apply to today's fuel.
- Added enrichment toward mixed oxide fuel. ACRS-specific towards a plant + DOE

\* terrorism -

→ \* equip qualification - not safety grade - how tell reliability

\* Steve Hammer -

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Paul Blanch - seismic - only realistic issue - Looked at it at Conn. Yankee -

Add issues need to be addressed in SECY 99-168

- DBAs - what needs to be considered?
- Application of part 50 - except for App A doesn't discuss HLW
- rules for long term storage of HLW (Part 72)
- Consistent application of rules - clarity HP