

Issues, Objectives and Requirements for HRA

The issue of concern is how much credit can be given to the operating staff in responding to an incident at a spent fuel that would lead to a loss of cooling and eventually to a zirconium fire.

The objective of this exercise is to develop a framework that provides a traceable and defensible approach to the estimation of human error probabilities for accident scenarios as a function of the plant physical and software (management procedures, operating procedures, training, etc.) characteristics. *instrumentation*

The framework should be built upon current understanding of the factors that influence human performance. To accomplish this the team should have members that have the following areas of expertise:

HRA, defining and incorporating HFEs (human failure events) into logic models, quantification with a variety of models (understand what typical HEPs are and what they represent)

Behavioral Science/Cognitive Science to characterize those factors that can influence human performance. While procedures and instrumentation (indicators/alarms etc.) are important, what is likely to be just as important is routine surveillance practices.

Organizational structure. Also important are the characteristics of the organizational structure within which the operators function.

Operational Experience to shed light on current (good) practices.

Candidates:

* Harold Blackman, INEEL, (work on spent fuel pools for AEOD, ASP HRA methodology, psychology) *industrial psychologist*

Alan Swain (big name, probably retired)

Dennis Bley (PRA type, not universally known as an HRA expert, but works on ATHEANA, and more versatile than Wreathall, more practical than A. Ramey-Smith)

source: Resident Inspector?
Industry *Joel Kramer*

Ed Burns (good systems guy, some may think he's an HRA expert, but limited in quantification methods)

Bill Hannaman

Joe Fragola

B/86

Ed Dougherty (Thankfully out of the business)

Tony Spurgin

Vojin Joksimovich

Don Wakefield