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GENERAL ELECTRIC

NUCLEAR ENERGY BUSINESS OPERATIONS
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MC 682, (408) 925-1913
March 29, 1985

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. C. E. Rossi

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: TELECON - RELIANCE MOTORS

Please find the attached memo of my telecon, to you of March 25, 1985. The telecon provided information on GE's investigation on a test failure of Reliance Motors.

Very truly yours,

G. B. Stramback, Manager
Safety Evaluation Programs

cc: L. S. Gifford, GE-Bethesda

Attachment

IE19

MEMO OF TELECON

DATE: March 25, 1985

TIME: 11:45 A. M.

PERSON CALLING: G. B. Stramback/R. L. Gridley

PERSON CALLED: C. E. Rossi - 8* 301-492-4193

SUBJECT: RELIANCE MOTORS

E. Rossi was called in order to inform the NRC that GE was investigating a test failure which had generic implication.

The concern is the failure of two Reliance Class RH AC motors during a NUREG-0588 Category 1 test. The CE application of the Reliance Electric Company Class RH motor (AC) is as part of the Limitorque SB-3-150 actuator.

The failure condition was an inability to torque the valve, with the valve position remaining as is. CE was conducting Equipment Qualification tests of Motor Operated Valves for Riverbend and Nine Mile Point 2 to an envelope of harsh environments when the failures occurred. The first motor was aged and had completed 7 days of LOCA and post LOCA testing before failure. A second unaged motor was installed and testing continued for another 15 days when this second motor failed, like the first. River Bend has submitted a 10CFR50.55(e) report on 2/1/85.

Bill Jones 27613

The test specimens have been analyzed by the vendor (Reliance and Limitorque) and failure was attributed to 1) over-testing, 2) test facility characteristics eg., voltage imbalance, and 3) absence of "T drain connectors" in the motors. CE has met with Anchor-Darling and Limitorque to gather additional information and discuss particulars of the test. Discussions with the vendors and customers are almost complete on the next actions. Insufficient information on the root cause of the failure may require additional testing.

Note { GE has completed a preliminary evaluation of the safety consequence with the assumed valve failures. The evaluation shows that the plant can be safely shutdown well before any impact due to assumed valve failure.

Since there is not complete vendor information on the characteristics of motors in the NSSS and utility BOP applications, GE cannot identify where all suspect motors may be used.

The Equipment Qualification Program participants are informed of the test information. The BWR Owners Group will be informed this week also.

GBS/dc