79-104-000 (R)

Pt 21 79013
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GENERAL ELECTRIC

NUCLEAR ENERGY

PROJECTS DIVISION

RAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, 175 CURTNER AVE., SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95125
MC 682, (408) 925-5040

MFN 065-79

RECEIVED MAR 8 1979

March 6, 1979

Mr. Robert H. Engelken
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V
1990 North California Street
Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Dear Mr. Engelken:

SUBJECT: REPORTABLE CONDITION OF BWR/6 CONTROL ROOM PANEL H22-P028

This is to advise the NRC of a reportable defect per 10CFR, Part 21. As reported to Mr. L. E. Vorderbruggen, of your office, by Walter H. D'Ardenne, Manager, BWR Product Standards, on March 6, 1979, this defect is in a control room panel shipped to one project under construction. The defect was found to be reportable on March 5, 1979. Attached is the report of the defect as it applies to this specific project.

General Electric's Control and Instrumentation Department, designer and manufacturer of the subject panel, has implemented changes to its procedures and quality assurance program to preclude similar occurrences. The Department has also initiated corrective actions necessary to resolve the specific defect with the affected project. Those corrective actions are shown in the attachment.

Very truly yours,

Glenn G. Sherwood, Manager
Safety & Licensing Operation

GGS:mh/1537

Attachment

cc: L. S. Gifford

IE19

ATTACHMENT

DEFECT IN CONTROL ROOM PANEL H22-P028
SHIPPED TO TVA X-17 HARTSVILLE PROJECT

On March 5, it was determined that a defect existed in control room panel H22-P028 manufactured by the General Electric Company, Nuclear Energy Business Group, and shipped to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for application on its X-17 project.

The defect involves an HPCS differential relay, Type CFD, manufactured by the General Electric Company, which failed seismic qualification testing. The relay spuriously operated due to both OBE and SSE excitation. Spurious operation of this relay results in the tripping of the HPCS lock-out relay. In operation this would either remove the HPCS diesel generator from service or keep it from operating during an OBE or SSE. The following corrective actions are being taken:

1. TVA has been notified of the condition.

2. Seismically qualified replacement relays are being purchased.

3. The new relays will be installed by December 1, 1979.

WHD:mh/1535
3/6/79