



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 29, 2001

MEMORANDUM TO: John A. Zwolinski, Director
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: Suzanne C. Black, Deputy Director *Suzanne C. Black*
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF MEETING HELD ON FEBRUARY 7, 2001, BETWEEN
NRC STAFF AND INDUSTRY LICENSING ACTION TASK FORCE

Members of the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) hosted a meeting with representatives of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and licensees comprising the Licensing Action Task Force (LATF) on February 7, 2001, at NRC Headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. This meeting was open to the public. A list of attendees is provided as Attachment 1. An agenda of the meeting provided by the LATF is included as Attachment 2.

A summary of the discussions for each agenda item are provided below.

1. Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP)

The staff provided an update on the use of the CLIIP for the elimination of post accident sampling requirements for Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering Plants (TSTF-366 — Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) assigned number to a proposed change to the standard technical specifications). The NRC has received seven amendment requests using the model application posted on the NRC web site for use of the CLIIP for TSTF-366. The process is working well in terms of expediting NRC review and approval of these amendments.

A prioritized list of pending or recently completed TSTF changes was provided by the LATF. The staff repeated its request that the industry, either the LATF or TSTF, consider a review of TSTF changes approved for incorporation into Revision 2 of the standard technical specifications to determine if it would be worthwhile to use CLIIP to make it easier for licensees to adopt some of those changes.

The staff and LATF discussed the possible use of a CLIIP-like process for other licensing areas. The possible development of a similar process for American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Cases was mentioned and was a subject of discussion at a meeting between the staff and ASME (February 22, 2001, at NRC headquarters). LATF members mentioned the incorporation of topical reports into the licensing bases for specific plants as another possible use of a process similar to CLIIP.

2. Reporting Requirements

The staff and LATF discussed possible rule changes to reduce reporting requirements (based on lists provided by Commonwealth Edison [now Exelon] and the LATF). Melinda Malloy, Chief of the Rulemaking Section in NRR/DRIP/RGEB, provided background information on the rulemaking process. A flowchart of the rulemaking process that was used during the discussion is provided as Attachment 3. The staff stated that the list provided at the last LATF meeting (see meeting summary dated November 16, 2000, (Accession No. ML003762439)) is being reviewed and that the staff will develop a plan for this initiative. It was mentioned that one item on the list, Monthly Operating Reports, is a requirement in the technical specifications and that a proposed change has been submitted to the staff (TSTF-369).

3. NEI White Papers

(A) Standard Format for License Amendment Reviews

The staff provided a proposed NRC safety evaluation with a revised format and content as well as some proposed guidance (in tabular and a list format) for licensee applications. The material is provided as Attachment 4. The effort has been discussed at previous LATF meetings and the merits of improving the regulatory bases for licensees' proposals and NRC staff decisions has been generally recognized by both the LATF and the staff. The LATF agreed to review the latest staff material and will arrange for further discussions between the staff and the LATF subcommittee for technical specifications.

(B) Standardized Change Process for Technical Specifications Bases and "Technical Requirements" Documents

The staff summarized the NRC view that the Bases section of technical specifications would best be treated as a licensee-controlled document. This approach has been incorporated into the latest versions of the standard technical specifications. Although some administrative agreements will need to be worked out for plants that have not converted to the standard technical specifications, the staff and LATF agreed that mutually agreeable approaches could be developed. The LATF is nearing completion of a white paper on the control of technical specification Bases sections and technical requirements manual. The staff stated that following receipt of the white paper, the staff would likely issue a Regulatory Issue Summary to explain the preferred handling of Bases changes by all licensees.

(C) Unintended Technical Specification Action (UTSA)

The staff and LATF briefly discussed the proposed unintended technical specification action provision for technical specifications. The LATF is continuing discussions with the NRC Office of the General Counsel in hopes of finding an acceptable proposal. However, based on the staff's assessment that the technical specification approach is untenable, the LATF requested that the staff revisit an earlier proposal to revise the policy for Notifications of Enforcement Discretion (NOEDs). The staff stated that it would review the NOED policy for a possible way to simplify the process for conditions that would have been addressed by the UTSA provision in technical specifications.

4. NRR Office Letters

The staff offered a brief update on the schedules for revising Office Letter 803, "License Amendment Review Procedures," and Office Letter 1201, "Control of Task Interface Agreements." The current expectation is that revisions of both office letters will be issued in the spring of 2001. The LATF representatives requested, and the staff agreed to provide, a flow chart for the processes.

5. LATF Accomplishments

The LATF summarized the accomplishments of the group to date (see Attachment 2) and expressed some concern about negative remarks from an NRR manager about the LATF. The staff reiterated previous statements that NRR believes the interactions between the LATF and staff have been beneficial.

6. Other Matters (items not on agenda)

The staff and LATF had a brief discussion about a recent Federal Register Notice (FRN) in which NRC solicited comments on ways for the NRC to assess its performance in areas such as reducing unnecessary regulatory burden. The LATF members were generally against the idea of providing financial information as part of licensing applications. Some of the LATF representatives expressed the concern that the current system is generally meeting the needs of all licensees and that a prioritization system as mentioned in the FRN would add complexity and burden to licensees and may even put some licensees at a competitive disadvantage. The staff briefly discussed the possible need to reallocate NRC resources to address increasing numbers of license renewal applications or the potential of requests for NRC certification of new reactor designs. The discussion ended with the staff emphasizing the need for licensees to respond to our requests, such as the one in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2000-04, "Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates," for information related to planned licensing submittals.

The LATF provided a short briefing on the industry effort to coordinate various initiatives associated with technical specifications. The relationship of various task forces is shown in Attachment 5.

The staff and LATF representatives briefly discussed issues related to power uprate amendments (especially the applications for increases of around 1 percent that are following the recent rule change that reduced required allowances for measurement uncertainties in emergency core cooling evaluations). The LATF representatives stated that the staff should consider issuing a RIS to explain the staff's expectations and possible ways to improve applications.

The LATF representatives expressed a concern about the staff's handling of generic issues during the review of site-specific licensing applications. The LATF noted that the staff has sometimes kept the generic issues separate from site-specific licensing actions pending resolution of the issue (e.g., suction strainers). The staff has on other occasions insisted that

an action be taken to address the generic issue before approving an amendment (e.g., tightness of control room envelope). The licensees noted that asking them (individually) to be reactive to the generic issue was inefficient and counter to the goal of resolving generic issues in a planned and deliberative manner. The LATF asked the staff to review its practices and guidance in this area.

Attachments: As stated (5)

cc w/attach: See next page

cc: Mr. Ralph Beedle
Senior Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
Nuclear Energy Institute
Suite 400
1776 I Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006-3708

Ms. Lynnette Hendricks, Director
Plant Support
Nuclear Energy Institute
Suite 400
1776 I Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006-3708

Mr. Alex Marion, Director
Programs
Nuclear Energy Institute
Suite 400
1776 I Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006-3708

Mr. Charles B. Brinkman, Director
Washington Operations
ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Mr. David Modeen, Director
Engineering
Nuclear Energy Institute
Suite 400
1776 I Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006-3708

Mr. Anthony Pietrangelo, Director
Licensing
Nuclear Energy Institute
Suite 400
1776 I Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006-3708

Mr. H. A. Sepp, Manager
Regulatory and Licensing Engineering
Westinghouse Electric Company
P.O. Box 355
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230-0355

Mr. Jim Davis, Director
Operations
Nuclear Energy Institute
Suite 400
1776 I Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006-3708

LICENSING ACTION TASK FORCE MEETING

FEBRUARY 7, 2001

LIST OF ATTENDEES

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
Suzanne Black	NRC/NRR/DLPM
Janice Moore	NRC/OGC
William Beckner	NRC/NRR/DRIP
Bob Dennig	NRC/NRR/DRIP
Melinda Malloy	NRC/NRR/DRIP
Bill Reckley	NRC/NRR/DLPM
L. Raghavan	NRC/NRR/DLPM
Jack Cushing	NRC/NRR/DLPM
Catherine Marco	NRC/OGC
Bill Raughley	NRC/RES
George Lanik	NRC/RES
Alex Marion	NEI
Mike Schoppman	NEI
James Fisicaro	Duke Energy
Steve Wideman	WCNOC/TSTF
Don Woodlan	TXU Electric
Jim Hutton	Exelon
Jim Kenny	PPL/BWROG
Brian McIntyre	AEP
Al Passwater	AmerenUE
Pete Kokolakis	Entergy - NE
Nancy Chapman	SERCH/Bechtel

**NRC/NEI Meeting
Licensing Action Task Force
February 7, 2001**

1. Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP)
 - PASS elimination pilot
 - Prioritization
 - Use of CLIIP for other purposes (code cases, relief requests, and topical reports)
2. Reporting Requirements
 - ComEd list (June 2000)
 - NEI LATF list (09/20/00 meeting with NRC)
3. NEI White Papers
 - Standard Format for License Amendment Requests
 - Standardized Change Process for Tech Spec Bases and "Technical Requirements" Documents
 - Unintended Technical Specification Action
4. NRR Office Letters
 - OL-803 (License Amendment Review Procedures)
 - OL-1201 (Control of Task Interface Agreements)
5. LATF Accomplishments

CLIIP Priorities

1. TSTF-366 (first CLIIP pilot) – PASS elimination for CEOG and WOG
2. PASS elimination for B&WOG and BWROG
3. TSTF-358 – missed surveillance requirements
4. TSTF-359 – increase flexibility in MODE restraints
5. TSTF-360 – DC power
6. TSTF-368 (CEOG) – eliminate pressure sensor response time testing (incorporate corresponding TSTF-111 for WOG and TSTF-332 for BWROG)
7. TSTF-369 – delete TS 5.6.4 (Monthly Operating Report)
8. TSTF-370 (WOG) – increase accumulator AOT from 1 to 24 hours

LATF ACCOMPLISHMENTS

NRR Office Letters

- ✓ OL-803, Rev. 3, "License Amendment Review Procedures," December 31, 1999
- ✓ OL-807, Rev. 0, "Control of Licensing Bases for Operating Reactors," April 5, 2000
- ✓ OL-808, Rev. 0, "Relief Request Reviews," July 31, 2000
- ✓ OL-900, Rev. 0, "Managing Commitments Made by Licensees to the NRC," March 24, 2000
- ✓ OL-1201, Rev. 2, "Control of Task Interface Agreements," July 26, 1999

Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP)

- ✓ Post-accident sampling system (PASS) elimination
- ✓ Prioritization of TSTF travelers for CLIIP implementation


NEI White Papers

- ✓ “Standard Format for Operating License Amendment Requests from Commercial Reactor Licensees,” January 19, 2001 (draft)
- ✓ “Standardized Change Process for Technical Specification BASES and ‘Technical Requirements’ Documents,” September 27, 2000 (draft)
- ✓ “Unintended Technical Specification Action (UTSA),” January 31, 2001 (draft)

Other Licensing Process Issues

- ✓ Use of precedent
- ✓ Availability of draft NRR material for industry “proof & review”
- ✓ “Oath & Affirmation” options
- ✓ Application of CLIIP-like process to other areas
- ✓ Implementation of licensing process guidance
- ✓ Reporting burden reduction
- ✓ Licensing action estimates

Rulemaking Flow Diagram





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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. _____ TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-42

WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-482

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated June 23, 2000, as supplemented by letters dated July 21 and 26, 2000, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS). The supplements dated July 21 and 26, 2000, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the *Federal Register* on July 12, 2000 (65 FR 43053).

The major change is allowing containment penetrations to be open under administrative controls during refueling operations with core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel inside containment. Specifically the proposed changes would revise:

1.1 TS 3.9.4(c)-NOTE

the NOTE in the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.4, Item (c), to allow unisolating containment penetration flow path(s) under administrative controls during operations involving core alterations or fuel movement inside containment.

1.2 SR 3.9.4.1

Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.9.4.1 to delete the exception for containment penetrations P-63 and P-98 based on the revision to the NOTE (item 1 above).

1.3 TS 3.8.3, ACTION E and TS 5.2.2b

TS 3.8.3, ACTION E, to provide the correct format consistent with TSs 1.2 and 1.3. Specifically, the "OR" logical connector is shifted to be flush with the left margin and a Completion Time is specified for Required Action E.2.

TS 5.2.2b. to correctly reference the regulation that specifies the requirements for shift crew composition. Specifically, "10 CFR 50.54(m) (2) (I)" is revised to "10 CFR 50.54(m) (2) (i).

The proposed change to allow containment penetration flow paths to be open during core alterations or fuel movement inside containment implements the NRC approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler 312 to NUREG 1431, "Standard Technical

Specifications for Westinghouse Plants.” Justification for TSTF 312 is that (1) the dose consequences for the design basis FHA indicate acceptable radiological consequences, and (2) the licensee will implement administrative procedures that ensure open containment penetrations can and will be promptly closed in the event of a fuel handling accident (FHA). The licensee will document the time to close the penetrations in the dose calculations.

2.0 EVALUATION

The staff has reviewed the licensee’s technical and regulatory analyses in support of its proposed license amendment which are described in Sections 4 and 5 of the licensee’s submittal.

The staff finds that the licensee in section 5 of its submittal has identified all applicable regulatory requirements. The regulatory requirements for which the staff based its acceptance are General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 and 10 CFR 100 dose limits. The staff finds the proposed TS changes acceptable on the basis of the following.

2.1 TS 3.9.4(c)-NOTE

The proposed change meets 10 CFR 100 and GDC 19 dose limits. The licensee evaluated and the staff performed independent calculations of a postulated FHA inside containment with open personnel airlock doors in amendments No. 95 and 120. The licensee’s dose calculations documented a two-hour time to close the containment penetrations. The calculations showed the dose consequences would be within the acceptance criteria given in Standard Review Plan (SRP) 15.7.4 of NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants” and 10 CFR 100 and GDC 19 limits. The calculations performed for the previously approved amendments bounds the open containment penetration condition. Basis for this conclusion, in amendment No. 95, no credit was taken for the containment building barrier and all radioactivity was assumed to be released to the environment within a two-hour period, therefore this bounds having containment penetrations open for two hours.

During a FHA with open containment penetrations, containment will not be pressurized. This lack of pressurization means that the radioactive release rate will not be accelerated by any pressure differential resulting from the accident. Therefore, this lack of pressurization provides sufficient time for the licensee to isolate the containment penetrations within the two hours assumed in the analysis.

The licensee has committed to administrative controls to ensure in the event of a FHA that all open containment penetrations will be promptly closed. The administrative controls include, designating individuals who maintain awareness of the open penetration flow paths, and will promptly close penetration flow paths. The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for implementing and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the above regulatory commitments are best provide by the licensees’s administrative processes, including its commitment management program. The above regulatory commitments do not warrant the creation of regulatory requirements.

The FHA analyses are consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.25, “Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors.” The staff has

determined that the licensee's analyses acceptably addressed all applicable regulatory and design requirements.

2.2 SR 3.9.4.1

The current note in SR 3.9.4.1 allowed containment penetrations P63 and P98 to be opened under administrative controls. This note is no longer required since all containment penetrations will be allowed to be open under administrative control.

2.3 TS 3.8.3, ACTION E and TS 5.2.2b

The changes are editorial in nature and have no safety significance.

Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the licensee has acceptably addressed all applicable regulatory and design requirements and therefore the licensee's application of June 23, 2000, is acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Kansas State Official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (65 FR 43053). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Jack Cushing

Date:

TS	Regulatory requirements	Design basis	Analysis	Conclusion and licensee action
3.9.4	<p>GDC 16, "Containment Design"</p> <p>GDC 61, Fuel Storage and Handling and Radioactivity Control"</p> <p>GDC 19 "Control Room"</p> <p>10 CFR Part 100</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. USAR Section 15.7.4 Equipment hatch is closed and held in place by four bolts. 2. One door in the personnel airlock is capable of being closed. 3. Presently, containment penetration flow path(s) are allowed to remain open under administrative controls during modes 1 thru 4 provided direct access is available for isolation. 4. FHA is defined as the dropping of a single irradiated fuel assembly in the fuel building or inside containment. Postulated FHA inside containment assumes that personnel airlock doors are open. 	<p>No change</p> <p>No Change</p> <p>No change.</p> <p>Postulated FHA inside containment with open personnel airlock doors bounds open containment penetration condition. Basis for this conclusion: The dose analysis did not take credit for the containment building barrier and all radioactivity was assumed to be released to the environment. In the event of a FHA containment will not be pressurized. This lack of pressurization means that the radioactive release will be at a slower rate, therefore this bounds having containment penetrations open for two hours. Consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident (FHA) inside containment during core alterations or fuel handling activities remain within 10 CFR Part 100 and GDC 19 limits.</p> <p>The lack of containment pressurization and administrative controls for prompt closure of the containment flow paths would minimize dose consequences.</p> <p>FHA analyses are consistent with RG 1.25 and SRP 15.7.4.</p>	<p>Appropriate personnel will maintain an awareness of the open status of the penetration flow path during core alterations and fuel movement inside containment.</p> <p>Designate individuals will promptly close penetration flow paths in case of an FHA.</p> <p>The above administrative controls for prompt closure of the containment flow paths would minimize dose consequences.</p>

INTRODUCTION

Brief Description of Proposed Change

State each proposed change (in a manner such that the staff can cut and paste in its SE.

BACKGROUND

Proposed change

Reason for the proposed change

CURRENT DESIGN

Description of the system

Current Design

REGULATORY ANALYSIS

Describe applicable regulations

Describe applicable regulatory acceptance criteria (e.g., Part 100 dose limits)

Describe or state any implementing requirements (Appendix K, R etc)

Summary of FSAR, TS Bases, Design requirements for meeting the regulations

Code requirements

Regulatory Guides, Generic Letters

Standard Review Plans

Regulatory Commitments

TSTF, Precedents etc

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

Describe how the proposed design meets the regulatory requirements above

EVALUATION OF EACH TS CHANGE

e.g, TS3.9.4(c) Note

How GDC 19 and Part 100 limits are satisfied

Describe and state Methodology consistent with SRP 15.7.4

Assumptions and analysis consistent with RG 1.25


REGULATORY AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS SUMMARY

See table - provide for each TS change

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

REFERENCES



an action be taken to address the generic issue before approving an amendment (e.g., tightness of control room envelope). The licensees noted that asking them (individually) to be reactive to the generic issue was inefficient and counter to the goal of resolving generic issues in a planned and deliberative manner. The LATF asked the staff to review its practices and guidance in this area.

Attachments: As stated (5)

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