

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

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The primary containment isolation instrumentation automatically initiates closure of appropriate primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs). The function of the PCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). Primary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a DBA.

The isolation instrumentation includes the sensors, relays, and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of primary containment and reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) isolation. Most channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a primary containment isolation signal to the isolation logic. Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of independent parameters. The input parameters to the isolation logics are (a) reactor vessel water level, (b) area ambient temperatures, (c) main steam line (MSL) flow measurement, (d) Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System initiation, (e) main steam line pressure, (f) high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and isolation condenser steam line flow, (g) drywell radiation and pressure, (h) HPCI steam line pressure, (i) isolation condenser return flow, (j) recirculation line water temperature, and (k) reactor vessel pressure. Redundant sensor input signals from each parameter are provided for initiation of isolation. The only exception is SLC System initiation.

Primary containment isolation instrumentation has inputs to the trip logic of the isolation functions listed below.

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1. Main Steam Line Isolation

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Main Steam Line Pressure—Low, and Main Steam Line Pressure—Timer Functions receive inputs from four channels. One channel associated with each Function inputs to one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of all main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), MSL drain valves, and recirculation loop sample isolation valves. Any channel will trip the associated trip string. Only one trip string must trip to trip the associated trip system. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation.

The Main Steam Line Flow—High Function uses 16 flow channels, four for each steam line. One channel from each steam line inputs to one of the four trip strings. Two trip strings make up each trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of all MSIVs, MSL drain valves, and recirculation sample isolation valves. Each trip string has four inputs (one per MSL), any one of which will trip the trip string. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. This is effectively a one-out-of-eight taken twice logic arrangement to initiate isolation.

The Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature—High Function receives input from 16 channels, four for each of the four tunnel areas. The logic is arranged similar to the Main Steam Line Flow—High Function. One channel from each steam tunnel area inputs to one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation.

MSL Isolation Functions isolate the Group 1 valves.

2. Primary Containment Isolation

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low and Drywell Pressure—High Functions receive inputs from four channels. One channel associated with each Function inputs to one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of the PCIIVs identified in Reference 1. Any channel will trip the

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2. Primary Containment Isolation (continued)

associated trip string. Only one trip string must trip to trip the associated trip system. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation.

The Drywell Radiation-High Function receives input from two radiation detector assemblies each connected to a switch. Each switch actuates two contacts. Each contact inputs to one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of the PCIIVs identified in Reference 1. The two contacts associated with the same switch provide input to both trip strings in the same trip system. Any contact will trip the associated trip string. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. For the purpose of this Specification, a channel is considered to include a radiation detector assembly, a switch, and one of two contacts.

Primary Containment Isolation Functions isolate the Group 2 valves.

3. 4. High Pressure Coolant Injection System Isolation and Isolation Condenser System Isolation

The HPCI Steam Flow-High and HPCI Steam Flow Timer Functions each receive input from two channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. Each of the two trip systems is connected to both valves on the HPCI steam supply penetration. The Isolation Condenser Steam Flow-High and Return Flow-High Functions each receive input from one channel with its associated flow switch. The steam flow switch and the condensate flow switch are connected in a one-out-of-two logic in each of two trip strings. Each of the two trip strings provides input into two trip systems in a one-out-of-two logic and each trip system isolates either the inboard or outboard Isolation Condenser steam and condensate isolation valves. For the purpose of this Specification, an Isolation Condenser Steam Flow-High Function channel and the associated Return Flow-High channel must be OPERABLE (one separate channel for each trip system).

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3. 4. High Pressure Coolant Injection System Isolation and Isolation Condenser System Isolation (continued)

The HPCI Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low Function receives input from four steam supply pressure channels. The outputs from the HPCI steam supply pressure channels are connected in a one-out-of-two-twice arrangement which provides input to two trip systems. Either trip system isolates both valves in the HPCI steam supply penetration.

The HPCI Turbine Area Temperature-High Function receives input from 16 temperature switches. Four channels, each with an associated temperature switch, provide inputs to a one-out-of-two-twice logic arrangement in each of two AC and two DC trip strings. Each of the trip strings provides input into both an AC and DC trip system and only one trip string must trip to trip the associated trip system. However for OPERABILITY, only one DC trip string is required to provide input into the DC trip system and only one AC trip string is required to provide input into the AC trip system. Either trip system isolates both valves in the HPCI steam supply penetration.

HPCI and Isolation Condenser Functions isolate the Group 4 and 5 valves, as appropriate.

5. Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Isolation Function receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels. Each channel inputs into one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) valves. Any channel will trip the associated trip string. Only one trip string must trip to trip the associated trip system. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation. The SLC System Initiation Function receives input from the SLC initiation switch. The switch provides trip signal inputs to both trip systems in any position other than "OFF". The other switch positions are SYS 1, SYS 2, SYS 1+2 and SYS 2+1. For the purpose of this Specification, the SLC

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5. Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation (continued)

initiation switch is considered to provide 1 channel input into each trip system. Each of the two trip systems is connected to one of the two RWCU valves.

RWCU Functions isolate the Group 3 valves.

6. Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System Isolation

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Function receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels. Each channel inputs into one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of the SDC suction isolation valves. Any channel will trip the associated trip string. Only one trip string must trip to trip the associated trip system. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation. The Recirculation Line Water Temperature-High Function receives input from two channels, both of which provide input to both trip systems. Any channel will trip both trip systems. This is a one-out-of-two logic for each trip system. Each of the two trip systems is connected to one of the two valves on the SDC suction penetration. Only one of the trip systems isolates the SDC return penetration.

Shutdown Cooling System Isolation Functions isolate some Group 3 valves (SDC isolation valves).

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The isolation signals generated by the primary containment isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 2 and 3 to initiate closure of valves to limit offsite doses. Refer to LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)," Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for more detail of the safety analyses.

Primary containment isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.35(c)(2)(ii). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

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The OPERABILITY of the primary containment instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time, where appropriate.

Allowable Values are specified for each Primary Containment Isolation Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The trip setpoints are determined from the analytic limits, corrected for defined process, calibration, and instrument errors. The Allowable Values are then determined, based on the trip setpoint values, by accounting for the calibration based errors. These calibration based errors are limited to reference accuracy, instrument drift, errors associated with measurement and test equipment, and calibration tolerance of loop components. The trip setpoints and Allowable Values determined in this manner provide adequate protection because instrument uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for and appropriately applied for the instrumentation.

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Certain Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) valves (e.g., containment spray isolation valves) also serve the dual function of automatic PCIVs. The signals that isolate these valves are also associated with the automatic initiation of the ECCS. Some instrumentation requirements and ACTIONS associated with these signals are addressed in LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) Instrumentation," and are not included in this LCO.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 consistent with the Applicability for LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment." Functions that have different Applicabilities are discussed below in the individual Functions discussion.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

Main Steam Line Isolation

1.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of the MSIVs and other interfaces with the reactor vessel occurs to prevent offsite dose limits from being exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Function is one of the many Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation signals. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Function associated with isolation is assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 4). The isolation of the MSLs supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded for a DBA.

Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water

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1.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low (continued)

(reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1) to ensure that the MSIs isolate on a potential loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to prevent offsite doses from exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits.

This Function isolates the Group 1 valves.

1.b. Main Steam Line Pressure—Low

Low MSL pressure indicates that there may be a problem with the turbine pressure regulation, which could result in a low reactor vessel water level condition and the RPV cooling down more than 100°F/hr if the pressure loss is allowed to continue. The Main Steam Line Pressure—Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the pressure regulator failure (Ref. 5). For this event, the closure of the MSIVs ensures that the RPV temperature change limit (100°F/hr) is not reached. In addition, this Function supports actions to ensure that Safety Limit 2.1.1.1 is not exceeded. (This Function closes the MSIVs prior to pressure decreasing below 785 psig, which results in a scram due to MSIV closure, thus reducing reactor power to < 25% RTP.)

The MSL low pressure signals are initiated from four pressure switches that are connected to the MSL header directly downstream of the main steam equalizing header. The switches are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, each switch is able to detect low MSL pressure. Four channels of Main Steam Line Pressure—Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

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1.b. Main Steam Line Pressure—Low (continued)

The Allowable Value was selected to be high enough to prevent excessive RPV depressurization.

The Main Steam Line Pressure—Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 since this is when the assumed transient can occur (Ref. 5).

This Function isolates the Group 1 valves.

1.c. Main Steam Line Pressure—Timer

The Main Steam Line Pressure—Timer is provided to prevent false isolations on low MSL pressure as a result of pressure transients, however, the timer must function in a limited time period to support the OPERABILITY of the Main Stem Line Pressure—Low Function by enabling the associated channels after a certain time delay. The Main Steam Line Pressure—Timer is directly assumed in the analysis of the pressure regulator failure (Ref. 5). For this event, the closure of the MSIVs ensures that the RPV temperature change limit (100°F/hr) is not reached. In addition, this Function supports actions to ensure that Safety Limit 2.1.1.1 is not exceeded.

The MSL low pressure timer signals are initiated when the associated MSL low pressure switch actuates. Four channels of Main Steam Line Pressure—Timer Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is chosen to be long enough to prevent false isolations due to pressure transient but short enough to prevent excessive RPV depressurizations.

This Function isolates the Group 1 valves.

1.d. Main Steam Line Flow—High

Main Steam Line Flow—High is provided to detect a break of the MSL and to initiate closure of the MSIVs. If the steam were allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor would depressurize and the core could uncover. If

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1.d. Main Steam Line Flow-High (continued)

the RPV water level decreases too far, fuel damage could occur. Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The Main Steam Line Flow-High Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the main steam line break (MSLB) (Ref. 6). The isolation action, along with the scram function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46 and offsite doses do not exceed the 10 CFR 100 limits.

The MSL flow signals are initiated from 16 differential pressure switches that are connected to the four MSLs (the differential pressure switches sense differential pressure across a flow restrictor). The differential pressure switches are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, all four connected to one MSL would be able to detect the high flow. Four channels of Main Steam Line Flow-High Function for each MSL (two channels per trip system) are available and are required to be OPERABLE so that no single instrument failure will preclude detecting a break in any individual MSL.

The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded due to the break.

This Function isolates the Group 1 valves.

1.e. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature-High

Main steam line tunnel temperature is provided to detect a leak in the RCPB in the steam tunnel and provides diversity to the high flow instrumentation. Temperature is sensed in four different areas of the steam tunnel above each main steam line. The isolation occurs when a very small leak has occurred in any one of the four areas. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. However, credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as MSLBs.

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1.e. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature-High (continued)

Main steam line tunnel temperature signals are initiated from temperature switches located in the four areas being monitored. Even though physically separated from each other, any temperature switch in any of the four areas is able to detect a leak. Therefore, sixteen channels of Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature-High Function are available, but only eight channels (two channels in each of the four trip strings) are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature-High Allowable Value is chosen to detect a leak of less than 1% rated steam flow.

These Functions isolate the Group 1 valves.

Primary Containment Isolation

2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on low RPV water level supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low signals are initiated from differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

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2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (continued)

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown.

This Function isolates the Group 2 and 3 valves.

2.b. Drywell Pressure-High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment. The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Drywell Pressure-High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure switches that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of Drywell Pressure-High per Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure-High (LCO 3.3.5.1) and RPS Drywell Pressure-High (LCO 3.3.1.1) Allowable Values, since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

This Function isolates the Group 2 valves.

2.c. Drywell Radiation-High

High drywell radiation indicates possible gross failure of the fuel cladding. Therefore, when Drywell Radiation-High is detected, an isolation is initiated to limit the release of fission products. However, this Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the UFSAR because other leakage paths (e.g., MSIVs) are more limiting.

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2.c. Drywell Radiation-High (continued)

The drywell radiation signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located in capped drywell penetrations. Two channels of Drywell Radiation-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is low enough to promptly detect gross failures in the fuel cladding.

This Function isolates the Group 2 valves.

High Pressure Coolant Injection System Isolation

3.a. HPCI Steam Line Flow-High

The HPCI Steam Line Flow-High Function is provided to detect a break of the HPCI steam lines and initiate closure of the HPCI steam line isolation valves. If the steam is allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor will depressurize and the core can uncover. Therefore, the isolations are initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for these Functions is not assumed in any UFSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks. However, these instruments prevent the HPCI steam line breaks from becoming bounding.

The HPCI Steam Line Flow-High signals are initiated from two differential pressure transmitters that are connected to the system steam lines. Two channels of the HPCI Steam Line Flow-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to be low enough to ensure that the trip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLE event as the bounding event.

This Function isolates the Group 4 valves.

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3.b. HPCI Steam Line Flow - Timer

The HPCI Steam Line Flow - Timer is provided to prevent false isolations on HPCI Steam Line Flow - High during system startup transients and therefore improves system reliability. This Function is not assumed in any UFSAR transient or accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks. However, these instruments support prevention of HPCI steam line breaks from becoming bounding.

The HPCI Steam Line Flow-Timer Function delays the HPCI Steam Line Flow-High signal by use of time delay relays. When a HPCI Steam Line Flow-High signal is generated, the time delay relays delay the tripping of the associated HPCI isolation trip system for a short time. Two channels of HPCI Steam Line Flow-Timer Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is chosen to be long enough to prevent false isolations due to system starts but not so long as to impact offsite dose calculation.

This Function, in conjunction with the HPCI Steam Line Flow-High Function, isolates the Group 4 valves.

3.c. HPCI Steam Supply Line Pressure - Low

Low HPCI steam supply line pressure indicates that the pressure of the steam in the HPCI turbine may be too low to continue operation of the turbine. These isolations are for equipment protection and are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR. However, they also provide a diverse signal to indicate a possible system break. These instruments are included in Technical Specifications (TS) because of the potential for risk due to possible failure of the instruments preventing HPCI initiations. Therefore, they meet Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

The HPCI Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that are connected to the system steam line. Four channels of HPCI Steam

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3.c. HPCI Steam Supply Line Pressure - Low (continued)

Supply Line Pressure - Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are selected to be high enough to prevent damage to the system turbine.

These Functions isolate the Group 4 valves.

3.d. HPCI Turbine Area Temperature - High

HPCI turbine area temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the HPCI system steam piping. The isolation occurs when a very small leak has occurred and is diverse to the high flow instrumentation. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. These Functions are not assumed in any UFSAR transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or MSL breaks.

HPCI Turbine Area Temperature - High signals are initiated from temperature switches that are appropriately located to detect a leak from the system piping that is being monitored. Four instruments monitor each area. Sixteen instruments monitor the HPCI Turbine Area. Sixteen channels for HPCI Turbine Area Temperature - High are available, however only eight channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. As noted (footnote (a) to Table 3.3.6.1-1) each trip system associated with this Function requires all four channels to be associated with a single trip string (four channels within the same AC trip string for the AC trip system and four channels within the same DC trip string for the DC trip system).

The Allowable Value is set well above the expected ambient condition but low enough to detect steam line leakage.

These Functions isolate the Group 4 valves.

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Isolation Condenser System Isolation

4.a. 4.b. Isolation Condenser Steam Flow-High and Return
Flow-High

The Isolation Condenser Flow-High Functions are provided to detect a break of the isolation condenser lines and initiate closure of the inboard and outboard steam line and condensate return line isolation valves and vent line isolation valves. If steam or condensate is allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor may depressurize and the core can uncover. Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for these Functions is not assumed in any UFSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks. However, these instruments prevent the Isolation Condenser steam flow or return flow breaks from becoming bounding.

The Isolation Condenser Flow-High signals are initiated from four differential pressure switches (two in the steam line and two in the condensate return line). Two channels of both Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to be low enough to ensure that the trip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLB event as the bounding event.

These Functions isolate the Group 5 valves.

Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation

5.a. SLC System Initiation

The isolation of the RWCU System is required when the SLC System has been initiated to prevent dilution and removal of the boron solution by the RWCU System (Ref. 7). SLC System initiation signals are initiated from the SLC initiation switch.

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5.a. SLC System Initiation (continued)

Two channels of the SLC System Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE only in MODES 1 and 2, since these are the only MODES where the reactor can be critical, and these MODES are consistent with the Applicability for the SLC System (LCO 3.1.7).

There is no Allowable Value associated with this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the SLC System initiation switch.

This Function isolates the reactor water cleanup inboard and outboard valves.

5.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some interfaces with the reactor vessel occurs to isolate the potential sources of a break. The isolation of the RWCU System on low RPV water level supports actions to ensure that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Function associated with RWCU isolation is not directly assumed in the UFSAR safety analyses because the RWCU System line break is bounded by breaks of larger systems (recirculation and MSL breaks are more limiting).

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

This Function isolates the Group 3 valves.

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Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System Isolation

6.a. Recirculation Line Water Temperature-High

The Recirculation Line Water Temperature-High Function is provided to isolate the Shutdown Cooling System. This interlock is provided for equipment protection to prevent exceeding the system design temperature, and credit for the interlock is not assumed in the accident or transient analysis in the UFSAR.

The Recirculation Line Water Temperature-High signals are initiated from the high recirculation loop temperature alarm circuit. Two channels (both providing input into two trip systems) of Recirculation Line Water Temperature-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the only MODES in which the reactor coolant temperature exceeds the system design temperature and equipment protection is needed. The Allowable Value was chosen to be low enough to protect the system equipment from exceeding its design temperature.

This Function isolates the Group 3 shutdown cooling valves.

6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some reactor vessel interfaces occurs to begin isolating the potential sources of a break. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Function associated with Shutdown Cooling System isolation is not directly assumed in safety analyses because a break of the Shutdown Cooling System is bounded by breaks of the recirculation and MSL. The Shutdown Cooling System isolation on low RPV water level supports actions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak (e.g., pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the Shutdown Cooling System.

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6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low (continued)

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. As noted (footnote (b) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), only one channel per trip system (with an isolation signal available to one shutdown cooling pump suction isolation valve) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5, provided the Shutdown Cooling System integrity is maintained. System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that has the potential for draining the reactor vessel through the system.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. In MODES 1 and 2, another isolation (i.e., Recirculation Line Water Temperature - High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path.

This Function isolates the Group 3 shutdown cooling valves.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to primary containment isolation instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

A.1

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours or 24 hours, depending on the Function (12 hours for those Functions that have channel components common to RPS instrumentation and 24 hours for those Functions that do not have channel components common to RPS instrumentation), has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 8 and 9) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation), Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic isolation capability being lost for the associated penetration flow path(s). The MSL and Primary Containment Isolation Functions and portions of other system Isolation Functions are considered to be maintaining isolation

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. For Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 5.b, 6.a, and 6.b, this would require both trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. For Function 1.d, this would require both trip systems to have one channel, associated with each MSL, OPERABLE or in trip. Function 1.e, consists of channels that monitor several locations within a given area (e.g., different locations within the main steam tunnel area). However, any channel in any of the four areas is able to detect a leak. Therefore, this would require both trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. The HPCI and portions of other system Isolation Functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that one of the two PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path can receive an isolation signal from the given Function. For Functions 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 4.a, 4.b, and 5.a, this would require one trip system to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. For Function 3.d, this would require one trip system to have two or more channels OPERABLE or in trip (e.g., contacts 2370 or 2371 and 2372 or 2373).

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

C.1

Required Action C.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1 is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

of Condition A or B and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time the associated MSLs may be isolated (Required Action D.1), and, if allowed (i.e., plant safety analysis allows operation with an MSL isolated), operation with that MSL isolated may continue. Isolating the affected MSL accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channel. This Required Action will generally only be used if a Function 1.d channel is inoperable and untripped. The associated MSL(s) to be isolated are those whose Main Steam Line Flow-High Function channel(s) are inoperable. Alternately, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours (Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2). The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 8 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

F.1

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the affected penetration flow path(s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channel. Alternately, if it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the penetration flow path(s) could result in a reactor scram), Condition H must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for plant operations personnel to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s).

G.1 and G.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, or any Required Action of Condition F is not met and the associated Completion Time has expired, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

H.1 and H.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated SLC subsystem(s) is declared inoperable or the RWCU System is isolated. Since this Function is required to ensure that the SLC System performs its intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated SLC subsystems inoperable or isolating the RWCU System.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

H.1 and H.2 (continued)

The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCU System.

I.1 and I.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path should be closed. However, if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to isolate the Shutdown Cooling System (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the penetration flow path can be isolated). Actions must continue until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status or the Shutdown Cooling System is isolated.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 8 and 9) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) when necessary.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.3.6.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.6.1.2 and SR 3.3.6.1.5

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.6.1.2 and SR 3.3.6.1.5 (continued)

The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.2 is based on the reliability analyses described in References 8 and 9. The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.5 is based on engineering judgement and the reliability of the components.

SR 3.3.6.1.3

Calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than that accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analyses of References 9 and 10.

SR 3.3.6.1.4 and SR 3.3.6.1.6

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.4 is based on the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. The Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.6 is based on the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.3.6.1.7

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed on PCIVs in LCO 3.6.1.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. Technical Requirements Manual.
 2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
 3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 4. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5.
 5. UFSAR, Section 15.1.3.
 6. UFSAR, Section 15.6.4.
 7. UFSAR, Section 9.3.5.
 8. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," July 1990.
 9. NEDC-30851P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.
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B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND The secondary containment isolation instrumentation automatically initiates closure of appropriate secondary containment isolation valves (SCIVs) and starts the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System. The function of these systems, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1). Secondary containment isolation and establishment of vacuum with the SGT System ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment following a DBA, or are released outside primary containment, or are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE are maintained within applicable limits.

The isolation instrumentation includes the sensors, relays, and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of secondary containment isolation. Most channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a secondary containment isolation signal to the isolation logic. Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of independent parameters. The input parameters to the isolation logic are (1) reactor vessel water level, (2) drywell pressure, (3) reactor building exhaust high radiation, and (4) refueling floor high radiation. Redundant sensor input signals from each parameter are provided for initiation of isolation.

For both the Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low and Drywell Pressure—High Function, the secondary containment isolation logic receives input from four channels. One channel associated with each Function inputs to one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to initiate the secondary containment isolation function. Any channel will trip the associated trip string. Any trip string will trip the associated trip system. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate the secondary containment

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)	isolation function. For both Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation-High and Refueling Floor Radiation-High Functions, the secondary containment isolation trip system logic receives input from four channels. Two channels of Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation-High are located in each of the unit reactor building exhaust ducts and two channels of Refueling Floor Radiation-High are located where they can monitor the environment of each of the unit spent fuel pools. The output of the channels associated with Unit 2 are provided to one trip system while the output of the channels associated with Unit 3 are provided to the other trip system. The output from these channels are arranged in two one-out-of-two trip system logics for each Function to initiate the secondary containment isolation function. Any Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation-High or Refueling Floor Radiation-High channel will initiate the secondary containment isolation function. Initiating the secondary containment isolation function provides an input to both secondary containment Train A and Train B logic. Either train initiates isolation of all secondary containment isolation valves and provides a start signal to the associated SGT subsystem.
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY	<p>The isolation signals generated by the secondary containment isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 2 and 3 to initiate closure of the SCIVs and start the SGT System to limit offsite doses.</p> <p>Refer to LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for more detail of the safety analyses.</p> <p>The secondary containment isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.</p> <p>The OPERABILITY of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions. Each Function</p>
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(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)

must have the required number of OPERABLE channels with their setpoints set within the specified Allowable Values, as shown in Table 3.3.6.2-1. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.

Allowable Values are specified for each Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.

Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The trip setpoints are determined from the analytic limits, corrected for defined process, calibration, and instrument errors. The Allowable Values are then determined, based on the trip setpoint values, by accounting for the calibration based errors. These calibration based errors are limited to reference accuracy, instrument drift, errors associated with measurement and test equipment, and calibration tolerance of loop components. The trip setpoints and Allowable Values determined in this manner provide adequate protection because instrument uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for and appropriately applied for the instrumentation.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions when SCIVs and the SGT System are required.

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Function is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation and initiation signals. The isolation and initiation of systems on Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low support actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis (Ref. 2).

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low signals are initiated from differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), since this could indicate that the capability to cool the fuel is being threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS); thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, this Function is not required. In addition, the

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low (continued)

Function is also required to be OPERABLE during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded if core damage occurs.

2. Drywell Pressure - High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The isolation and initiating of the systems on Drywell Pressure-High supports actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis (Ref. 2).

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure switches that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of Drywell Pressure-High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude performance of the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Drywell Pressure-High Function Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1) since this is indicative of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

The Drywell Pressure-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the RCS; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. This Function is not required in MODES 4 and 5 because the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES.

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)

3, 4. Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation-High and
Refueling Floor Radiation-High

High reactor building exhaust radiation or refuel floor radiation is an indication of possible gross failure of the fuel cladding. The release may have originated from the primary containment due to a break in the RCPB or the refueling floor due to a fuel handling accident. When Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation-High or Refueling Floor Radiation-High is detected, secondary containment isolation and actuation of the SGT System are initiated to support actions to limit the release of fission products as assumed in the UFSAR safety analyses (Refs. 2 and 3).

The Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation-High signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located on the ventilation exhaust duct coming from the associated reactor building. Therefore, the channels must be declared inoperable if the associated reactor building ventilation exhaust duct is isolated. Refueling Floor Radiation-High signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located on the refueling floor around the spent fuel storage pool. The signal from each detector is input to an individual monitor whose trip outputs are assigned to an isolation channel. Four channels of Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation-High Function and four channels of Refueling Floor Radiation-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding.

The Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation-High and Refueling Floor Radiation-High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the RCS; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not required. In addition, the Functions are also required to

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY

3, 4. Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation-High and
Refueling Floor Radiation-High (continued)

be OPERABLE during CORE ALTERATIONS, OPDRVs, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncover or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

A.1

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours or 24 hours depending on the Function (12 hours for those Functions that have channel components common to RPS instrumentation and 24 hours for those Functions that do not have channel components common to RPS instrumentation), has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 4 and 5) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation), Condition C must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of isolation capability for the associated penetration flow path(s) or a complete loss of initiation capability for the SGT System. A Function is considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that a trip signal will be generated from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that the two SCIVs in the associated penetration flow path and the SGT System can be initiated on an isolation signal from the given Function. For the Functions with two one-out-of-two logic trip systems (Functions 1 and 2), this would require one trip system to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 3 and 4, this would require each trip system to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

C.1.1, C.1.2, C.2.1, and C.2.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the ability to isolate the secondary containment and start the SGT System cannot be ensured. Therefore, further actions must be performed to ensure the ability to

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS	<p><u>C.1.1, C.1.2, C.2.1, and C.2.2</u> (continued)</p> <p>maintain the secondary containment function. Isolating the associated penetration flow path(s) and starting the associated SGT subsystem (Required Actions C.1.1 and C.2.1) performs the intended function of the instrumentation and allows operation to continue. The method used to place the SGT subsystem in operation must provide for automatically reinitiating the subsystem upon restoration of power following a loss of power to the SGT subsystem.</p> <p>Alternately, declaring the associated SCIVs or SGT subsystem(s) inoperable (Required Actions C.1.2 and C.2.2) is also acceptable since the Required Actions of the respective LCOs (LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3) provide appropriate actions for the inoperable components.</p> <p>One hour is sufficient for plant operations personnel to establish required plant conditions or to declare the associated components inoperable without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.</p>
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<p>As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Secondary Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.2-1.</p> <p>The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 4 and 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the SCIVs will isolate the associated penetration flow paths and that the SGT System will initiate when necessary.</p>

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.3.6.2.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel status during normal operational use of the displays associated with channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.6.2.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.6.2.2 (continued)

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of References 4 and 5.

SR 3.3.6.2.3

Calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.6.2-1. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of References 4 and 5.

SR 3.3.6.2.4 and SR 3.3.6.2.5

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequencies of SR 3.3.6.2.4 and SR 3.3.6.2.5 are based on the assumption of a 92 day and a 24 month calibration interval, respectively, in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.3.6.2.6

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed on SCIvS and the SGT System in LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3, respectively, overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.3.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5.
 3. UFSAR, Section 15.7.3.
 4. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," July 1990.
 5. NEDC-30851P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.
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B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.6.3 Relief Valve Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The low set portion of relief valve instrumentation is designed to mitigate the effects of postulated thrust loads on the relief valve discharge lines by preventing subsequent actuations with an elevated water leg in the discharge line. It also mitigates the effects of postulated pressure loads on the torus shell or suppression pool by preventing multiple actuations in rapid succession of the relief valve subsequent to their initial actuation. The low set function of relief valve instrumentation is contained within the control logic of the two relief valves that are set to initiate first on an overpressure event. The relief valve instrumentation, as a whole, is designed to mitigate the effects of overpressurization transients via the relief mode of five relief valves.

The relief valve instrumentation logic consists of separate channels for each of the five relief valves with each channel controlling one associated relief valve. Each channel contains a high pressure (PS_H) switch and a low pressure (PS_L) switch. The pressure switches sense reactor pressure from the upstream side of the relief valve to open the associated relief valve on a sensed high reactor pressure and close the valve following a reduction in reactor pressure. Actuation of the associated relief valve is accomplished via closure of the PS_H on a sensed high reactor pressure, which energizes the relief valve solenoid to open the valve. The PS_L closes to seal in the actuation signal and opens when reactor pressure has decreased below the low pressure setpoint of the switch to de-energize the solenoid and allow the relief valve to close.

The relief valve high pressure setpoints are set such that two of the five relief valves (i.e., the Low Set Relief Valves) will actuate at a pressure that is approximately twenty pounds lower than the remaining three relief valves (i.e., the Relief Valves). The lower pressure settings are intended to reduce the frequency of multiple relief discharges.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

Two Low Set Relief Valve Reactuation Time Delay channels are included in the associated control logic for the two relief valves designated to open at the lower reactor pressure (i.e., the Low Set Relief Valves). Each channel consists of a time delay dropout relay and its associated contacts. The channels are arranged in a two-out-of-two logic arrangement for each low set relief valve. The Low Set Relief Valve Reactuation Time Delay Function ensures a time delay of approximately 10 seconds occurs between the closure of the associated relief valve and any subsequent opening of the valve by preventing the reopening of the valve. In this fashion, the low set portion of relief valve instrumentation increases the time between (or prevents) subsequent actuations to allow the high water leg created from the initial relief valve opening to return to (or fall below) its normal water level; thus, reducing thrust loads from subsequent actuations to within their design limits.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The relief valve instrumentation and low set function ensures that the containment loads remain within the primary containment design basis (Refs. 1 and 2). The opening setpoints of the relief valves also ensure that the transient analyses of Reference 3 can be met.

The relief valve instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The LCO requires OPERABILITY of sufficient relief valve instrumentation channels to ensure successfully accomplishing the relief valve function assuming any single instrumentation channel failure. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of the relief valve instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the instrumentation channel Function specified in Table 3.3.6.3-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Value. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.

Allowable Values are specified for each relief valve actuation Function in Table 3.3.6.3-1. Nominal trip

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel pressure), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The trip setpoints are determined from the analytic limits, corrected for defined process, calibration, and instrument errors. The Allowable Values are then determined, based on the trip setpoint values, by accounting for the calibration based errors. These calibration based errors are limited to reference accuracy, instrument drift, errors associated with measurement and test equipment, and calibration tolerance of loop components. The trip setpoints and Allowable Values determined in this manner provide adequate protection because instrument uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for and appropriately applied for the instrumentation.

The Low Set Relief Valve Reactuation Time Delay is based on preventing unacceptable thrust loads on relief valve discharge piping due to relief valve openings with elevated water leg conditions. The time delay setpoint was chosen to ensure the two low set relief valves will remain closed following their initial opening, until normal water level in the discharge line is restored and is based on the calculated worst case elevated water leg duration.

The relief valve setpoint Allowable Values are based on the safety analysis performed in References 1, 2, and 3.

APPLICABILITY

The relief valve instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since considerable energy is in the

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)	nuclear system and the relief valves may be needed to provide pressure relief. If the relief valves are needed, then the relief valve function is required to ensure that the primary containment design basis is maintained. In MODES 4 and 5, the reactor pressure is low enough that the overpressure limit cannot be approached by assumed operational transients or accidents. Thus, relief valve instrumentation and associated pressure relief is not required.
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ACTIONS

A.1

The failure of any relief valve instrument channel to provide the pressure setpoint or low set time delay for an individual relief valve does not affect the ability of the other relief valves to perform their relief or low set function. A relief valve is OPERABLE if the associated logic, has one Function 1.a or 2.a channel, as applicable, and, for low set relief valves, two Function 1.b channels OPERABLE. Therefore, 14 days is provided to restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status (Required Action A.1). If the inoperable channel(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition B must be entered and its Required Action taken. The 14 day Completion Time is considered appropriate because of the redundancy in the design (five relief valves are provided and any four relief valves can perform the relief function, two low set relief valves are provided and one low set relief valve can perform the low set function) and the very low probability of multiple relief instrumentation channel failures, which render the remaining relief valves inoperable, occurring together with an event requiring the relief or low set function during the 14 day Completion Time. The 14 day Completion Time to restore inoperable channels to OPERABLE status is based on the relief capability of the remaining relief valves, the low probability of an event requiring relief valve actuation and a reasonable time to complete the Required Action.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met, or two or more relief valves are inoperable due to inoperable channels, the relief valves may be incapable of performing their intended relief or low set function. Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 with 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LLS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.3-1.

SR 3.3.6.3.1 and SR 3.3.6.3.2

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of every 92 days for SR 3.3.6.3.1 is based on the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. The Frequency of once every 24 months for SR 3.3.6.3.2 is based on the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.3.6.3.3

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specified channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.4.3, "Safety and Relief Valves" and LCO 3.6.1.6, "Low Set Relief Valves," overlaps this test to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The Frequency of once every 24 months for SR 3.3.6.3.3 is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.2.2.
 2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.1.3.4.
 3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
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B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.7.1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The CREV System is designed to provide a radiologically controlled environment to ensure the habitability of the control room for the safety of control room operators under all plant conditions. The CREV System is capable of fulfilling the stated safety function. The CREV System instrumentation provides control room alarms so that manual action can be taken to start the CREV System and pressurize control room emergency zone to minimize the consequences of radioactive material in the control room environment.

In the event of a Reactor Building Ventilation System-High High Radiation alarm signal, operator action is required to switch the CREV System to the isolation/pressurization mode of operation and close required dampers to maintain the control room emergency zone slightly pressurized with respect to the adjacent zones. A description of the CREV System is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.4, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System."

The CREV System instrumentation has two trip systems, either of which provide sufficient information to ensure the CREV System is initiated and the dampers are closed when necessary. Each trip system receives input from one radiation monitor channel. Two detectors (one detector for each radiation monitor channel) are located in the reactor building ventilation exhaust duct. The output of each channel is provided to one trip system (i.e., one radiation monitor channel per trip system). The output from each channel is arranged in a one-out-of-one trip (alarm) system. A trip of any trip system will initiate a Reactor Building Ventilation System-High High Radiation Alarm in the control room. The channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a signal to the alarm logic.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The ability of the CREV System to maintain the habitability of the control room emergency zone is explicitly assumed for certain accidents as discussed in the UFSAR safety analyses (Refs. 1, and 2). CREV System operation ensures that the radiation exposure of control room personnel, through the duration of any one of the postulated accidents, does not exceed the limits set by GDC 19 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.

CREV System instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

High reactor building ventilation exhaust radiation is an indication of possible gross failure of the fuel cladding. The release may have originated from the primary containment due to a break in the RCPB or the refueling floor due to a fuel handling accident. When high reactor building ventilation exhaust radiation is alarmed in the control room, the CREV System is manually initiated in the isolation/pressurization mode and required dampers are closed since this condition could result in radiation exposure to control room personnel.

The Reactor Building Ventilation System—High High Radiation Alarm Function signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located in the ventilation exhaust ducting coming from the reactor building and refueling zones. The signals from each detector are input to individual monitors whose trip outputs are assigned to a control room alarm. Two channels of Reactor Building Ventilation System—High High Radiation Alarm Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the alarm function. The Allowable Value was selected to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding and to ensure protection of control room personnel. Each channel must have its setpoint set within the specified Allowable Value in SR 3.3.7.1.3. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.

Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor building ventilation exhaust radiation), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The trip setpoints are determined from the analytic limits, corrected for defined process, calibration, and instrument errors. The Allowable Values are then determined, based on the trip setpoint values, by accounting for the calibration based errors. These calibration based errors are limited to reference accuracy, instrument drift, errors associated with measurement and test equipment, and calibration tolerance of loop components. The trip setpoints and Allowable Values determined in this manner provide adequate protection because instrument uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for and appropriately applied for the instrumentation.

APPLICABILITY

The Reactor Building Ventilation System—High High Radiation Alarm Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), to ensure that control room personnel can be protected during a LOCA, fuel handling event, or vessel draindown event. During MODES 4 and 5, when these specified conditions are not in progress (e.g., CORE ALTERATIONS), the probability of a LOCA or fuel damage is low; thus, the Functions is not required.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to CREV System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable CREV System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable CREV System instrumentation channel.

A.1 and A.2

Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide alarm signals, an allowable out of service time of 6 hours is provided to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. However, this out of service time is only acceptable provided the Function is still maintaining CREV System alarm capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining CREV System alarm capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE such that both trip systems will generate an alarm signal on a valid signal. This would require one trip system per unit each with one channel OPERABLE. For a loss of CREV System alarm capability, the 6 hour allowance of Required Action A.2 is not appropriate. If the Function is not maintaining CREV System Instrumentation alarm capability, the CREV System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour of discovery of the loss of CREV System Instrumentation alarm capability in both trip systems (Required Action A.1). This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action A.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the CREV System Instrumentation alarm capability is lost in both trip systems. The 1 hour Completion Time (A.1) is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoring channels. If the inoperable channel

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition B must be entered and its Required Action taken.

The 6 hour Completion Time is based on the consideration that this Function provides the primary signal to the control room so that manual action can be initiated to start the CREV System and close the required dampers; thus, ensuring that the design basis of the CREV System is met.

B.1 and B.2

With the Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the CREV System must be placed in the isolation/pressurization mode of operation per Required Action B.1 to ensure that control room personnel will be protected in the event of a Design Basis Accident. The method used to place the CREV System in operation must provide for automatically re-initiating the system upon restoration of power following a loss of power to the CREV System. Alternately, if it is not desired to start the CREV System, the CREV System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour.

The 1 hour Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to place the CREV System in the isolation/pressurization mode of operation. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels, for placing the associated CREV System in operation, or for entering the applicable Conditions and Required Actions for the inoperable CREV System.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours, provided the associated Function maintains CREV System Instrumentation alarm capability. Upon completion of

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 3, and 4) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the CREV System Instrumentation alarm will initiate when necessary.

SR 3.3.7.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel status during normal operational use of the displays associated with channels required by the LCO.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.3.7.1.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analyses of References 3 and 4.

SR 3.3.7.1.3

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5.
 3. GENE-770-06-1-A, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," December 1992.
 4. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," July 1990.
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B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

Successful operation of the required safety functions of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) is dependent upon the availability of adequate power sources for energizing the various components such as pump motors, motor operated valves, and the associated control components. The LOP instrumentation monitors the 4160 V Essential Service System (ESS) buses. Offsite power is the preferred source of power for the 4160 V ESS buses. If the monitors determine that insufficient voltage is available, the buses are disconnected from the offsite power sources and connected to the onsite diesel generator (DG) power sources.

Each 4160 V ESS bus has its own independent LOP instrumentation and associated trip logic. The voltage for each bus is monitored at two levels, which can be considered as two different undervoltage Functions: Loss of Voltage and Degraded Voltage.

Each Division 1 and 2 4160 V ESS Bus Loss of Voltage and Degraded Voltage Function is monitored by two undervoltage relays for each ESS bus, whose outputs are arranged in a two-out-of-two logic configuration (Ref. 1). When, on decreasing voltage, the 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) Function setpoint has been exceeded on both relay channels, the Loss of Voltage Function sends a LOP signal to the respective bus load shedding scheme and starts the associated DG. For the Degraded Voltage Function, one Bus Undervoltage/Time Delay Function (two channels) and one Time Delay Function (one channel) are included. The Time Delay Function associated with the Bus Undervoltage relay is inherent to the Bus Undervoltage - Degraded Voltage relay and is nominally adjusted to seven seconds to prevent circuit initiation caused by grid disturbances and motor starting transients. The Bus Undervoltage/Time Delay Function provides input to the Time Delay Function. The Time Delay Function relay is nominally adjusted to five minutes to allow time for the operator to attempt to restore normal bus voltage. When a Bus Undervoltage/Time Delay Function setpoint has been exceeded and persists for seven

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BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

seconds on both relay channels, a control room annunciator alerts the operator of the degraded voltage condition and the five minute Time Delay Function timer is initiated. If the degraded voltage condition does not clear within five minutes, the five minute Time Delay Function relay sends a LOP signal to the respective bus load shedding scheme and starts the associated DG. If a degraded voltage condition exists coincident with an ECCS actuation signal, the five minute Time Delay Function is bypassed such that load shedding and the associated DG start will be initiated following the seven second time delay (Bus Undervoltage/Time Delay Function).

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY

The LOP instrumentation is required for Engineered Safety Features to function in any accident with a loss of offsite power. The required channels of LOP instrumentation ensure that the ECCS and other assumed systems powered from the DGs, provide plant protection in the event of any of the Reference 2, 3, and 4 analyzed accidents in which a loss of offsite power is assumed. The initiation of the DGs on loss of offsite power, and subsequent initiation of the ECCS, ensure that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Accident analyses credit the loading of the DGs based on the loss of offsite power coincident with a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The diesel starting and loading times have been included in the delay time associated with each safety system component requiring DG supplied power following a loss of offsite power.

The LOP instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

The OPERABILITY of the LOP instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.8.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels per 4160 V ESS bus, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)

The Allowable Values are specified for each Function in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within the Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., degraded voltage), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The trip setpoints are determined from the analytic limits, corrected for defined process, calibration, and instrument errors. The Allowable Values are then determined, based on the trip setpoint values, by accounting for the calibration based errors. These calibration based errors are limited to reference accuracy, instrument drift, errors associated with measurement and test equipment, and calibration tolerance of loop components. The trip setpoints and Allowable Values determined in this manner provide adequate protection because instrument uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for and appropriately applied for the instrumentation.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

1. 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)

Loss of voltage on a 4160 V ESS bus indicates that offsite power may be completely lost to the respective 4160 V ESS bus and is unable to supply sufficient power for proper operation of the applicable equipment. Therefore, the power supply to the bus is transferred from offsite power to DG power prior to the voltage on the bus dropping below the

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY

1. 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)
(continued)

minimum Loss of Voltage Function Allowable Value but after the voltage drops below the maximum Loss of Voltage Function Allowable Value. This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment.

The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that power is available to the required equipment.

Two channels of 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) Function per associated emergency bus are required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the bus undervoltage function. Refer to LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources—Operating," and 3.8.2, "AC Sources—Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

2. 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)

A reduced voltage condition on a 4160 V ESS bus indicates that, while offsite power may not be completely lost to the respective emergency bus, available power may be insufficient for starting large ECCS motors without risking damage to the motors that could disable the ECCS function. Therefore, power supply to the bus is transferred from offsite power to onsite DG power when the voltage on the bus drops below the Degraded Voltage Function Allowable Value, however the transfer does not occur until after the inherent and No LOCA time delays have elapsed, as applicable. If a LOCA condition exists coincident with a loss of power to the bus, the Time Delay (No LOCA) Function is bypassed. This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment.

The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that sufficient power is available to the required equipment. The Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough to provide time for the offsite power supply to recover or

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY	<u>2. 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)</u> (continued) allow restoration to normal voltages, but short enough to ensure that sufficient power is available to the required equipment. Two channels of 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage/Time Delay (Degraded Voltage) Function and one channel of Degraded Voltage-Time Delay Function per associated bus are required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the degraded voltage and time delay function. Refer to LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2 for Applicability Bases for the DGs.
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ACTIONS	A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to LOP instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable LOP instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable LOP instrumentation channel.
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A.1

With one or more channels of a Function inoperable, the Function is not capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, only 1 hour is allowed to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure (within the LOP instrumentation), and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the channel in trip would result in a DG initiation), Condition B must be entered and its Required Action taken.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

B.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the associated Function is not capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, the associated DG(s) is declared inoperable immediately. This requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2, which provide appropriate actions for the inoperable DG(s).

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LOP instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.8.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 2 hours provided the associated Function maintains LOP initiation capability. LOP initiation capability is maintained provided the bus load shedding scheme and the associated DG can be initiated by the Loss of Voltage or Degraded Voltage Functions for one of the two 4160 V ESS buses. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 2 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.3.8.1.1 and SR 3.3.8.1.3

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequencies of 18 months and 24 months are based on operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any 18 month or 24 month interval, as applicable, is a rare event.

SR 3.3.8.1.2 and SR 3.3.8.1.4

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of an 18 month or 24 month calibration interval, as applicable, in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.3.8.1.5

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety functions.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 8.3.1.7.
 2. UFSAR, Section 5.2.
 3. UFSAR, Section 6.3.
 4. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
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B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring

BASES

BACKGROUND

RPS Electric Power Monitoring System is provided to isolate the RPS bus from the motor generator (MG) set or an alternate power supply in the event of overvoltage, undervoltage, or underfrequency. This system protects the loads connected to the RPS bus against unacceptable voltage and frequency conditions (Ref. 1) and forms an important part of the primary success path of the essential safety circuits. Some of the essential equipment powered from the RPS buses includes the RPS logic and scram pilot valve solenoids.

The RPS electric power monitoring assembly will detect any abnormal high or low voltage or low frequency condition in the outputs of the two MG sets or the alternate power supply and will de-energize its respective RPS bus, thereby causing all safety functions normally powered by this bus to de-energize.

In the event of failure of an RPS Electric Power Monitoring System (e.g., both inseries electric power monitoring assemblies), the RPS loads may experience significant effects from the unregulated power supply. Deviation from the nominal conditions can potentially cause damage to the scram pilot valve solenoids and other Class 1E devices.

In the event of a low voltage condition for an extended period of time, the scram pilot valve solenoids can chatter and potentially lose their pneumatic control capability, resulting in a loss of primary scram action.

In the event of an overvoltage condition, the RPS logic relays and scram pilot valve solenoids may experience a voltage higher than their design voltage. If the overvoltage condition persists for an extended time period, it may cause equipment degradation and the loss of plant safety function.

Two redundant Class 1E circuit breakers are connected in series between each RPS bus and its MG set, and between each RPS bus and its alternate power supply. Each of these

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

circuit breakers has an associated independent set of Class 1E overvoltage, undervoltage, and underfrequency sensing logic. Together, a circuit breaker and its sensing logic constitute an electric power monitoring assembly. If the output of the inservice MG set or alternate power supply exceeds predetermined limits of overvoltage, undervoltage, or underfrequency, a trip coil (undervoltage release coil) within the circuit breaker driven by this logic circuitry opens the circuit breaker, which removes the associated power supply from service.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The RPS Electric Power Monitoring is necessary to meet the assumptions of the safety analyses by ensuring that the RPS equipment powered from the RPS buses can perform its intended function. RPS Electric Power Monitoring provides protection to the RPS components, by acting to disconnect the RPS bus from the power supply under specified conditions that could damage the RPS equipment.

RPS Electric Power Monitoring satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The OPERABILITY of each RPS electric power monitoring assembly is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the overvoltage, undervoltage, and underfrequency logic, as well as the OPERABILITY of the associated circuit breaker. Two electric power monitoring assemblies are required to be OPERABLE for each inservice power supply. This provides redundant protection against any abnormal voltage or frequency conditions to ensure that no single RPS electric power monitoring assembly failure can preclude the function of RPS bus powered components. Each of the inservice electric power monitoring assembly trip logic setpoints is required to be within the specified Allowable Value. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.

Allowable Values are specified for each RPS electric power monitoring assembly trip logic (refer to SR 3.3.8.2.2). Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., overvoltage), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip coil) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The trip setpoints are determined from the analytic limits, corrected for defined process, calibration, and instrument errors. The Allowable Values are then determined, based on the trip setpoint values, by accounting for the calibration based errors. These calibration based errors are limited to reference accuracy, instrument drift, errors associated with measurement and test equipment, and calibration tolerance of loop components. The trip setpoints and Allowable Values determined in this manner provide adequate protection because instrument uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for and appropriately applied for the instrumentation.

The Allowable Values for the instrument settings are based on RPS component testing with the RPS providing $56 \text{ Hz} \pm 1\%$, $126.5 \text{ V} \pm 2.5\%$, and $108.0 \text{ V} \pm 2.5\%$. The most limiting voltage requirement and associated line losses determine the settings of the electric power monitoring instrument channels. The settings are calculated based on the loads on the buses and RPS MG set or alternate power supply being 120 VAC and 60 Hz.

APPLICABILITY

The operation of the RPS electric power monitoring assemblies is essential to disconnect the RPS bus powered components from the inservice MG set or alternate power supply during abnormal voltage or frequency conditions. Since the degradation of a nonclass 1E source supplying

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY
(continued)

power to the RPS bus can occur as a result of any random single failure, the OPERABILITY of the RPS electric power monitoring assemblies is required when the RPS bus powered components are required to be OPERABLE. This results in the RPS Electric Power Monitoring System OPERABILITY being required in MODES 1 and 2; and in MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS A.1

If one RPS electric power monitoring assembly for an inservice power supply (MG set or alternate) is inoperable, or one RPS electric power monitoring assembly on each inservice power supply is inoperable, the OPERABLE assembly will still provide protection to the RPS bus powered components under degraded voltage or frequency conditions. However, the reliability and redundancy of the RPS Electric Power Monitoring System is reduced, and only a limited time (72 hours) is allowed to restore the inoperable assembly to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable assembly cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the associated power supply(s) must be removed from service (Required Action A.1). This places the RPS bus in a safe condition. An alternate power supply with OPERABLE power monitoring assemblies may then be used to power the RPS bus.

The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the remaining OPERABLE electric power monitoring assembly and the low probability of an event requiring RPS electric power monitoring protection occurring during this period. It allows time for plant operations personnel to take corrective actions or to place the plant in the required condition in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Alternately, if it is not desired to remove the power supply from service (e.g., as in the case where removing the power supply(s) from service would result in a scram), Condition C or D, as applicable, must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

If both power monitoring assemblies for an inservice power supply (MG set or alternate) are inoperable or both power monitoring assemblies in each inservice power supply are inoperable, the system protective function is lost. In this condition, 1 hour is allowed to restore one assembly to OPERABLE status for each inservice power supply. If one inoperable assembly for each inservice power supply cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the associated power supply(s) must be removed from service within 1 hour (Required Action B.1). An alternate power supply with OPERABLE assemblies may then be used to power one RPS bus. The 1 hour Completion Time is sufficient for the plant operations personnel to take corrective actions and is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or removal from service of the electric power monitoring assemblies.

Alternately, if it is not desired to remove the power supply(s) from service (e.g., as in the case where removing the power supply(s) from service would result in a scram), Condition C or D, as applicable, must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

C.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met in MODE 1 or 2, a plant shutdown must be performed. This places the plant in a condition where minimal equipment, powered through the inoperable RPS electric power monitoring assembly(s), is required and ensures that the safety function of the RPS (e.g., scram of control rods) is not required. The plant shutdown is accomplished by placing the plant in MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

D.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met in MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, the operator must immediately initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Required Action D.1 results in the least reactive condition for the reactor core and ensures that the safety function of the RPS (e.g., scram of control rods) is not required.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.8.2.1

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each overvoltage, undervoltage, and underfrequency channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

As noted in the Surveillance, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is only required to be performed while the plant is in a condition in which the loss of the RPS bus will not jeopardize steady state power operation (the design of the system is such that the power source must be removed from service to conduct the Surveillance). The 24 hours is intended to indicate an outage of sufficient duration to allow for scheduling and proper performance of the Surveillance.

The 184 day Frequency and the Note in the Surveillance are based on guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-09 (Ref. 2).

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.3.8.2.2

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency is based on the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.8.2.3

Performance of a system functional test demonstrates that, with a required system actuation (simulated or actual) signal, the logic of the system will automatically trip open the associated power monitoring assembly. The system functional test shall include actuation of the protective relays, tripping logic, and output circuit breakers. Only one signal per power monitoring assembly is required to be tested. This Surveillance overlaps with the CHANNEL CALIBRATION to provide complete testing of the safety function. The system functional test of the Class 1E circuit breakers is included as part of this test to provide complete testing of the safety function. If the breakers are incapable of operating, the associated electric power monitoring assembly would be inoperable.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 7.2.3.
 2. NRC Generic Letter 91-09, "Modification of Surveillance Interval for the Electrical Protective Assemblies in Power Supplies for the Reactor Protection System."
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B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Reactor Recirculation System is designed to provide a forced coolant flow through the core to remove heat from the fuel. The forced coolant flow removes heat at a faster rate from the fuel than would be possible with just natural circulation. The forced flow, therefore, allows operation at significantly higher power than would otherwise be possible. The recirculation system also controls reactivity over a wide span of reactor power by varying the recirculation flow rate to control the void content of the moderator. The Reactor Recirculation System consists of two recirculation pump loops external to the reactor vessel. These loops provide the piping path for the driving flow of water to the reactor vessel jet pumps. Each external loop contains one variable speed motor driven recirculation pump, a motor generator (MG) set to control pump speed and associated piping, jet pumps, valves, and instrumentation. The recirculation loops are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and are located inside the drywell structure. The jet pumps are reactor vessel internals.

The recirculated coolant consists of saturated water from the steam separators and dryers that has been subcooled by incoming feedwater. This water passes down the annulus between the reactor vessel wall and the core shroud. A portion of the coolant flows from the vessel, through the two external recirculation loops, and becomes the driving flow for the jet pumps. Each of the two external recirculation loops discharges high pressure flow into an external manifold, from which individual recirculation inlet lines are routed to the jet pump risers within the reactor vessel. The remaining portion of the coolant mixture in the annulus becomes the suction flow for the jet pumps. This flow enters the jet pump at suction inlets and is accelerated by the driving flow. The drive flow and suction flow are mixed in the jet pump throat section and result in partial pressure recovery. The total flow then passes through the jet pump diffuser section into the area below the core (lower plenum), gaining sufficient head in the process to drive the required flow upward through the core. The subcooled water enters the bottom of the fuel channels and contacts the fuel cladding, where heat is transferred

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

to the coolant. As it rises, the coolant begins to boil, creating steam voids within the fuel channel that continue until the coolant exits the core. Because of reduced moderation, the steam voiding introduces negative reactivity that must be compensated for to maintain or to increase reactor power. The recirculation flow control allows operators to increase recirculation flow and sweep some of the voids from the fuel channel, overcoming the negative reactivity void effect. Thus, the reason for having variable recirculation flow is to compensate for reactivity effects of boiling over a wide range of power generation (i.e., 55 to 100% of RTP) without having to move control rods and disturb desirable flux patterns.

Each recirculation loop is manually started from the control room. The MG set provides regulation of individual recirculation loop drive flows. The flow in each loop is manually controlled.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The operation of the Reactor Recirculation System is an initial condition assumed in the design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) (Ref. 1). During a LOCA caused by a recirculation loop pipe break, the intact loop is assumed to provide coolant flow during the first few seconds of the accident. The initial core flow decrease is rapid because the recirculation pump in the broken loop ceases to pump reactor coolant to the vessel almost immediately. The pump in the intact loop coasts down relatively slowly. This pump coastdown governs the core flow response for the next several seconds until the jet pump suction is uncovered (Ref. 1). The analyses assume that both loops are operating at the same flow prior to the accident. However, the LOCA analysis was reviewed for the case with a flow mismatch between the two loops, with the pipe break assumed to be in the loop with the higher flow. While the flow coastdown and core response are potentially more severe in this assumed case (since the intact loop starts at a lower flow rate and the core response is the same as if both loops were operating at a lower flow rate), a small mismatch has been determined to be acceptable based on engineering judgement. The recirculation system is also assumed to have sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal margins during abnormal operational transients (Ref. 2), which are analyzed in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

A plant specific LOCA analysis has been performed assuming only one operating recirculation loop. This analysis has demonstrated that, in the event of a LOCA caused by a pipe break in the operating recirculation loop, the Emergency Core Cooling System response will provide adequate core cooling, provided the APLHGR requirements are modified accordingly (Ref. 1).

The transient analyses in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR have also been performed for single recirculation loop operation (Ref. 3) and demonstrate sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal margins during the abnormal operational transients analyzed provided the MCPR requirements are modified. During single recirculation loop operation, modification to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) average power range monitor (APRM) and the Rod Block Monitor Allowable Values is also required to account for the different relationships between recirculation drive flow and reactor core flow. The APLHGR and MCPR limits for single loop operation are specified in the COLR. The APRM Flow Biased Neutron Flux-High Allowable Value is in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation." The Rod Block Monitor-Upscale Allowable Value is in LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation."

Recirculation loops operating satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Two recirculation loops are normally required to be in operation with their flows matched within the limits specified in SR 3.4.1.1 to ensure that during a LOCA caused by a break of the piping of one recirculation loop the assumptions of the LOCA analysis are satisfied. Alternatively, with only one recirculation loop in operation, modifications to the required APLHGR limits (LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)"), APRM Flow Biased Neutron Flux-High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), and the Rod Block Monitor-Upscale Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.2.1) must be applied to allow continued operation consistent with the assumptions of Reference 1.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY	<p>In MODES 1 and 2, requirements for operation of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System are necessary since there is considerable energy in the reactor core and the limiting design basis transients and accidents are assumed to occur.</p> <p>In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the consequences of an accident are reduced and the coastdown characteristics of the recirculation loops are not important.</p>
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ACTIONS	<p><u>A.1 and A.2</u></p> <p>With no recirculation loops in operation, the probability of thermal-hydraulic oscillations is greatly increased. Therefore, action must be taken as soon as practicable to reduce power to assure stability concerns are addressed and place the unit in at least MODE 2 within 8 hours and to MODE 3 within 12 hours. In this condition, the recirculation loops are not required to be operating because of the reduced severity of DBAs and transients and minimal dependence on the recirculation loop coastdown characteristics. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.</p>
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B.1 and C.1

With both recirculation loops operating but the flows not matched, the flows must be matched within 2 hours. If matched flows are not restored, the recirculation loop with the lower flow must be declared "not in operation," as required by Required Action B.1. This Required Action does not require tripping the recirculation pump in the lowest flow loop when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than the required limits. However, in cases where large flow mismatches occur, low flow or reverse flow can occur in the low flow loop jet pumps, causing vibration of the jet pumps. If zero or reverse flow is detected, the condition should be alleviated by changing pump speeds to re-establish forward flow or by tripping the pump.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 and C.1 (continued)

With the requirements of the LCO not met for reasons other than Condition A or B (e.g., one loop "not in operation"), the recirculation loops must be restored to operation with matched flows within 24 hours. A recirculation loop is considered not in operation when the pump in that loop is idle or when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than required limits for greater than 2 hours (i.e., Required Action B.1 has been taken). Should a LOCA occur with one recirculation loop not in operation, the core flow coastdown and resultant core response may not be bounded by the LOCA analyses. Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable loop to operating status.

Alternatively, if the single loop requirements of the LCO are applied to the APLHGR and MCPR operating limits and RPS and RBM Allowable Values, operation with only one recirculation loop would satisfy the requirements of the LCO and the initial conditions of the accident sequence.

The 2 hour and 24 hour Completion Times are based on the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period, on a reasonable time to complete the Required Action, and on frequent core monitoring by operators allowing abrupt changes in core flow conditions to be quickly detected.

D.1

With the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. In this condition, the recirculation loops are not required to be operating because of the reduced severity of DBAs and minimal dependence on the recirculation loop coastdown characteristics. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.1.1

This SR ensures the recirculation loops are within the allowable limits for mismatch. At low core flow (i.e., < 70% of rated core flow), the APLHGR and MCPR requirements provide larger margins to the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit such that the potential adverse effect of early boiling transition during a LOCA is reduced. A larger flow mismatch can therefore be allowed when core flow is < 70% of rated core flow. The jet pump loop flow, as used in this Surveillance, is the summation of the flows from all of the jet pumps associated with a single recirculation loop.

The mismatch is measured in terms of percent of rated core flow. If the flow mismatch exceeds the specified limits, the loop with the lower flow is considered not in operation. This SR is not required when both loops are not in operation since the mismatch limits are meaningless during single loop or natural circulation operation. The Surveillance must be performed within 24 hours after both loops are in operation. The 24 hour Frequency is consistent with the Surveillance Frequency for jet pump OPERABILITY verification and has been shown by operating experience to be adequate to detect off normal jet pump loop flows in a timely manner.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.3.3.3.
 2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 3. UFSAR, Section 15.3.1.
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B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.2 Jet Pumps

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Reactor Recirculation System is described in the Background section of the Bases for LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating," which discusses the operating characteristics of the system and how these characteristics affect the Design Basis Accident (DBA) analyses.

The jet pumps are part of the Reactor Recirculation System and are designed to provide forced circulation through the core to remove heat from the fuel. The jet pumps are located in the annular region between the core shroud and the vessel inner wall. Because the jet pump suction elevation is at two-thirds core height, the vessel can be reflooded and coolant level maintained at two-thirds core height even with the complete break of the recirculation loop pipe that is located below the jet pump suction elevation.

Each reactor recirculation loop contains ten jet pumps. Recirculated coolant passes down the annulus between the reactor vessel wall and the core shroud. A portion of the coolant flows from the vessel, through the two external recirculation loops, and becomes the driving flow for the jet pumps. Each of the two external recirculation loops discharges high pressure flow into an external manifold from which individual recirculation inlet lines are routed to the jet pump risers within the reactor vessel. The remaining portion of the coolant mixture in the annulus becomes the suction flow for the jet pumps. This flow enters the jet pump at suction inlets and is accelerated by the drive flow. The drive flow and suction flow are mixed in the jet pump throat section and result in partial pressure recovery. The total flow then passes through the jet pump diffuser section into the area below the core (lower plenum), gaining sufficient head in the process to drive the required flow upward through the core.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Jet pump OPERABILITY is an explicit assumption in the design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analysis evaluated in Reference 1.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

The capability of reflooding the core to two-thirds core height is dependent upon the structural integrity of the jet pumps. If the structural system, including the beam holding a jet pump in place, fails, jet pump displacement and performance degradation could occur, resulting in an increased flow area through the jet pump and a lower core flooding elevation. This could adversely affect the water level in the core during the reflood phase of a LOCA as well as the assumed blowdown flow during a LOCA.

Jet pumps satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The structural failure of any of the jet pumps could cause significant degradation in the ability of the jet pumps to allow reflooding to two-thirds core height during a LOCA. OPERABILITY of all jet pumps is required to ensure that operation of the Reactor Recirculation System will be consistent with the assumptions used in the licensing basis analysis (Ref. 1).

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, the jet pumps are required to be OPERABLE since there is a large amount of energy in the reactor core and since the limiting DBAs are assumed to occur in these MODES. This is consistent with the requirements for operation of the Reactor Recirculation System (LCO 3.4.1).

In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the Reactor Recirculation System is not required to be in operation, and when not in operation, sufficient flow is not available to evaluate jet pump OPERABILITY.

ACTIONS

A.1

An inoperable jet pump can increase the blowdown area and reduce the capability to reflood during a design basis LOCA. If one or more of the jet pumps are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.2.1

This SR is designed to detect significant degradation in jet pump performance that precedes jet pump failure (Ref. 2). This SR is required to be performed only when the loop has forced recirculation flow since surveillance checks and measurements can only be performed during jet pump operation. The jet pump failure of concern is a complete mixer displacement due to jet pump beam failure. Jet pump plugging is also of concern since it adds flow resistance to the recirculation loop. Significant degradation is indicated if the specified criteria confirm unacceptable deviations from established patterns or relationships. The allowable deviations from the established patterns have been developed based on the variations experienced at plants during normal operation and with jet pump assembly failures (Refs. 2 and 3). Each recirculation loop must satisfy one of the performance criteria provided. Since refueling activities (fuel assembly replacement or shuffle, as well as any modifications to fuel support orifice size or core plate bypass flow) can affect the relationship between core flow, jet pump flow, and recirculation loop flow, these relationships may need to be re-established each cycle. Similarly, initial entry into extended single loop operation may also require establishment of these relationships. During the initial weeks of operation under such conditions, while base-lining new "established patterns", engineering judgement of the daily surveillance results is used to detect significant abnormalities which could indicate a jet pump failure.

The recirculation pump speed operating characteristics (pump flow versus pump speed) are determined by the flow resistance from the loop suction through the jet pump nozzles. A change in the relationship may indicate a plug, flow restriction, loss in pump hydraulic performance, leakage, or new flow path between the recirculation pump discharge and jet pump nozzle. For this criterion, the pump flow versus pump speed relationship must be verified.

Individual jet pumps in a recirculation loop normally do not have the same flow. The unequal flow is due to the drive flow manifold, which does not distribute flow equally to all risers. The flow pattern or relationship of one jet pump to

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.2.1 (continued)

the loop average is repeatable. An appreciable change in this relationship is an indication that increased (or reduced) resistance has occurred in one of the jet pumps.

The deviations from normal are considered indicative of a potential problem in the recirculation drive flow or jet pump system (Ref. 2). Normal flow ranges and established jet pump flow patterns are established by plotting historical data as discussed in Reference 2.

The 24 hour Frequency has been shown by operating experience to be timely for detecting jet pump degradation and is consistent with the Surveillance Frequency for recirculation loop OPERABILITY verification.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows this Surveillance not to be performed until 4 hours after the associated recirculation loop is in operation, since these checks can only be performed during jet pump operation. The 4 hours is an acceptable time to establish conditions appropriate for data collection and evaluation.

Note 2 allows this SR not to be performed until 24 hours after THERMAL POWER exceeds 25% RTP. During low flow conditions, jet pump noise approaches the threshold response of the associated flow instrumentation and precludes the collection of repeatable and meaningful data. The 24 hours is an acceptable time to establish conditions appropriate to perform this SR.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.3.
 2. GE Service Information Letter No. 330, including Supplement 1, "Jet Pump Beam Cracks," June 9, 1980.
 3. NUREG/CR-3052, "Closeout of IE Bulletin 80-07: BWR Jet Pump Assembly Failure," November 1984.
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B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.3 Safety and Relief Valves

BASES

BACKGROUND

The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requires the reactor pressure vessel be protected from overpressure during upset conditions by self-actuated safety valves. As part of the nuclear pressure relief system, the size and number of safety valves are selected such that peak pressure in the nuclear system will not exceed the ASME Code limits for the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). Each unit is designed with nine safety valves, one of which also functions in the relief mode. This valve is a dual function Target Rock safety/relief valve (S/RV).

The safety valves and S/RV are located on the main steam lines between the reactor vessel and the first isolation valve within the drywell. The safety valves actuate in the safety mode (or spring mode of operation). In this mode, the safety valve opens when the inlet steam pressure reaches the lift set pressure. At that point, the vertical upward force generated by the inlet pressure under the valve disc balances the downward force generated by the spring. Slight steam leakage develops across the valve disc-to-seat interface and is directed into the huddle chamber. Pressure builds up rapidly in the huddle chamber developing an additional vertical lifting force on the disc and disc holder. This additional force in conjunction with the expansive characteristic of steam causes the valve to "pop" open to almost full lift. This satisfies the Code requirement. The S/RV is a dual function Target Rock valve that can actuate by either of two modes: the safety mode or the relief mode. In the safety mode (or spring mode of operation), the S/RV spring loaded pilot valve opens when steam pressure at the valve inlet overcomes the spring force holding the pilot valve closed. Opening the pilot valve allows a pressure differential to develop across the main valve piston and opens the main valve. In the relief mode (or power actuated mode of operation), automatic or manual switch actuation energizes a solenoid valve which pneumatically actuates a plunger located within the main valve body. Actuation of the plunger allows pressure to be vented from the top of the main valve piston. This allows reactor pressure to lift the main valve piston, which opens the main valve. The relief valves and S/RV discharge steam

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

through a discharge line to a point below the minimum water level in the suppression pool. The safety valves discharge directly to the drywell.

In addition to the safety valves and S/RV, each unit is designed with four relief valves which actuate in the relief mode to control RCS pressure during transient conditions to prevent the need for safety valve actuation (except S/RV) following such transients. The relief valves are also located on the main steam lines between the reactor vessel and the first isolation valve within the drywell. These valves are sized by assuming a turbine trip, a coincident scram and a failure of the turbine bypass system. The relief valves are of the Electromatic type, which are opened by automatic or manual switch actuation of a solenoid. The switch energizes the solenoid to actuate a plunger, which contacts the pilot valve operating lever, thereby opening the pilot valve. When the pilot valve opens, pressure under the main valve disc is vented. This allows reactor pressure to overcome main valve spring pressure, which forces the main valve disc downward to open the main valve. Two of the five relief valves are the low set relief valves and all of the relief valves, including the S/RV, are Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) valves. The low set relief requirements are specified in LCO 3.6.1.6, "Low Set Relief Valves," and the ADS requirements are specified in LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS—Operating."

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The overpressure protection system must accommodate the most severe pressurization transient. Evaluations have determined that the most severe transient is the closure of all main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), followed by reactor scram on high neutron flux (i.e., failure of the direct scram associated with MSIV position) (Ref. 1). For the purpose of the analyses, eight safety valves are assumed to operate in the safety mode. The relief valves and S/RV are not credited to function during this event. The analysis results demonstrate that the design safety valve capacity is capable of maintaining reactor pressure below the ASME Code limit of 110% of vessel design pressure (110% x 1250 psig = 1375 psig). This LCO helps to ensure that the acceptance limit of 1375 psig is met during the Design Basis Event.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

From an overpressure standpoint, the design basis events are bounded by the MSIV closure with flux scram event described above. For other pressurization events, such as a turbine trip or generator load rejection with Main Turbine Bypass System failure (Refs. 2 and 3, respectively), the relief valves as well as the S/RV are assumed to function. The opening of the relief valves during the pressurization event mitigates the increase in reactor vessel pressure, which affects the MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) during these events. In these events, the operation of four of the five relief valves are required to mitigate the events. Reference 4 discusses additional events that are expected to actuate the safety and relief valves.

Safety and relief valves satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The safety function of eight safety valves are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the assumptions of the safety analysis (Ref. 1). The safety valve requirements of this LCO are applicable to the capability of the safety valves to mechanically open to relieve excess pressure when the lift setpoint is exceeded (safety function).

The safety valve setpoints are established to ensure that the ASME Code limit on peak reactor pressure is satisfied. The ASME Code specifications require the lowest safety valve setpoint to be at or below vessel design pressure (1250 psig) and the highest safety valve to be set so that the total accumulated pressure does not exceed 110% of the design pressure for overpressurization conditions. The transient evaluations in the UFSAR are based on these setpoints, but also include the additional uncertainties of $\pm 1\%$ of the nominal setpoint drift to provide an added degree of conservatism.

Operation with fewer valves OPERABLE than specified, or with setpoints outside the ASME limits, could result in a more severe reactor response to a transient than predicted, possibly resulting in the ASME Code limit on reactor pressure being exceeded.

(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued)	The relief valves, including the S/RV, are required to be OPERABLE to limit peak pressure in the main steam lines and maintain reactor pressure within acceptable limits during events that cause rapid pressurization, so that MCPR is not exceeded.
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APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, eight safety valves (not including the S/RV) and five relief valves (including the S/RV) must be OPERABLE, since considerable energy may be in the reactor core and the limiting design basis transients are assumed to occur in these MODES. The safety and relief valves may be required to provide pressure relief to discharge energy from the core until such time that the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System is capable of dissipating the core heat.
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In MODE 4, decay heat is low enough for the Shutdown Cooling System to provide adequate cooling, and reactor pressure is low enough that the overpressure and MCPR limits are unlikely to be approached by assumed operational transients or accidents. In MODE 5, the reactor vessel head is unbolted or removed and the reactor is at atmospheric pressure. The safety and relief functions are not needed during these conditions.

ACTIONS

A.1

With the relief function of one relief valve (or S/RV) inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE relief valves are capable of providing the necessary protection. However, the overall reliability of the pressure relief system is reduced because additional failures in the remaining OPERABLE relief valves could result in failure to adequately relieve pressure during a limiting event. For this reason, continued operation is permitted for a limited time only.

The 14 day Completion Time to restore the inoperable required relief valve to OPERABLE status is based on the relief capability of the remaining relief valves, the low probability of an event requiring relief valve actuation, and a reasonable time to complete the Required Action.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

With less than the minimum number of required safety valves OPERABLE, a transient may result in the violation of the ASME Code limit on reactor pressure. If the relief function of the inoperable relief valves cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time of Required Action A.1, or if the relief function of two or more relief valves are inoperable, or if the safety function of one or more safety valves is inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.3.1

This Surveillance requires that the safety valves, including the S/RV, will open at the pressures assumed in the safety analysis of Reference 1. The demonstration of the safety valve and S/RV safety lift settings must be performed during shutdown, since this is a bench test, to be done in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures. The safety valve and S/RV setpoints are $\pm 1\%$ for OPERABILITY.

SR 3.4.3.2

A manual actuation of each relief valve, including the S/RV, is performed to verify that, mechanically, the valve is functioning properly and no blockage exists in the valve discharge line. This can be demonstrated by the response of the turbine control valves or bypass valves, by a change in the measured steam flow, or by any other method suitable to verify steam flow. Adequate reactor steam dome pressure must be available to perform this test to avoid damaging the valve. Also, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.3.2 (continued)

control reactor pressure when the relief valve or the S/RV diverts steam flow upon opening. Sufficient time is therefore allowed after the required pressure and flow are achieved to perform this test. Adequate pressure at which this test is to be performed is 300 psig (the pressure recommended by the valve manufacturer). Adequate steam flow is represented by at least 2.0 turbine bypass valves open.

This SR is modified by a Note that states the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. Unit startup is allowed prior to performing this test because valve OPERABILITY is verified, per ASME Code requirements (Ref. 5), prior to valve installation. The 12 hours allowed for manual actuation after the required pressure is reached is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides a reasonable time to complete the SR. If the S/RV fails to actuate due only to the failure of the solenoid but is capable of opening on overpressure, the safety function of the S/RV is considered OPERABLE.

The 24 month Frequency ensures that each solenoid for each relief valve is tested. The 24 month Frequency was developed based on the relief valve tests required by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI (Ref. 5). Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.4.3.3

The relief valves, including the S/RV, are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals. A system functional test is performed to verify that the mechanical portions (i.e., solenoids) of the relief valve operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTs in LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation," and LCO 3.3.6.3, "Relief Valve Instrumentation," overlap this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.3.3 (continued)

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation since the valves are individually tested in accordance with SR 3.4.3.2.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.2.2.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.2.3.1.
 3. UFSAR, Section 15.2.2.1.
 4. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 5. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.
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B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE

BASES

BACKGROUND

The RCS includes systems and components that contain or transport the coolant to or from the reactor core. The pressure containing components of the RCS and the portions of connecting systems out to and including the isolation valves define the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The joints of the RCPB components are welded or bolted.

During plant life, the joint and valve interfaces can produce varying amounts of reactor coolant LEAKAGE, through either normal operational wear or mechanical deterioration. Limits on RCS operational LEAKAGE are required to ensure appropriate action is taken before the integrity of the RCPB is impaired. This LCO specifies the types and limits of LEAKAGE. This protects the RCS pressure boundary described in 10 CFR 50.2, 10 CFR 50.55a(c), and UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.4.1 (Ref. 1).

The safety significance of RCS LEAKAGE from the RCPB varies widely depending on the source, rate, and duration. Therefore, detection of LEAKAGE in the primary containment is necessary. Methods for quickly separating the identified LEAKAGE from the unidentified LEAKAGE are necessary to provide the operators quantitative information to permit them to take corrective action should a leak occur that is detrimental to the safety of the facility or the public.

A limited amount of leakage inside primary containment is expected from auxiliary systems that cannot be made 100% leaktight. Leakage from these systems should be detected and isolated from the primary containment atmosphere, if possible, so as not to mask RCS operational LEAKAGE detection.

This LCO deals with protection of the RCPB from degradation and the core from inadequate cooling, in addition to preventing the accident analyses radiation release assumptions from being exceeded. The consequences of violating this LCO include the possibility of a loss of coolant accident.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The allowable RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are based on the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of pipe cracks. The normally expected background LEAKAGE due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system LEAKAGE were also considered. The evidence from experiments suggests that, for LEAKAGE even greater than the specified unidentified LEAKAGE limits, the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such LEAKAGE would grow rapidly.

The unidentified LEAKAGE flow limit allows time for corrective action before the RCPB could be significantly compromised. The 5 gpm limit is a small fraction of the calculated flow from a critical crack in the primary system piping. Crack behavior from experimental programs (Refs. 2 and 3) shows that leakage rates of hundreds of gallons per minute will precede crack instability.

The low limit on increase in unidentified LEAKAGE assumes a failure mechanism of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) that produces tight cracks. This flow increase limit is capable of providing an early warning of such deterioration.

No applicable safety analysis assumes the total LEAKAGE limit. The total LEAKAGE limit considers RCS inventory makeup capability and drywell floor sump capacity.

RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

a. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE

No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material degradation. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

b. Unidentified LEAKAGE

The 5 gpm of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the drywell floor drain sump flow rate monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.

c. Total LEAKAGE

The total LEAKAGE limit is based on a reasonable minimum detectable amount. The limit also accounts for LEAKAGE from known sources (identified LEAKAGE). Violation of this LCO indicates an unexpected amount of LEAKAGE and, therefore, could indicate new or additional degradation in an RCPB component or system.

d. Unidentified LEAKAGE Increase

An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within the previous 24 hour period indicates a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated to determine the source and extent of the LEAKAGE. The increase is measured relative to the steady state value; temporary changes in LEAKAGE rate as a result of transient conditions (e.g., startup) are not considered. As such, the 2 gpm increase limit is only applicable in MODE 1 when operating pressures and temperatures are established. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the RCS operational LEAKAGE LCO applies, because the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the reactor is pressurized.

In MODES 4 and 5, RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are not required since the reactor is not pressurized and stresses in the RCPB materials and potential for LEAKAGE are reduced.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1

With RCS unidentified or total LEAKAGE greater than the limits, actions must be taken to reduce the leak. Because the LEAKAGE limits are conservatively below the LEAKAGE that would constitute a critical crack size, 4 hours is allowed to reduce the LEAKAGE rates before the reactor must be shut down. If an unidentified LEAKAGE has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE; however, the total LEAKAGE limit would remain unchanged.

B.1 and B.2

An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within a 24 hour period is an indication of a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated. Although the increase does not necessarily violate the absolute unidentified LEAKAGE limit, certain susceptible components must be determined not to be the source of the LEAKAGE increase within the required Completion Time. For an unidentified LEAKAGE increase greater than required limits, an alternative to reducing LEAKAGE increase to within limits (i.e., reducing the LEAKAGE rate such that the current rate is less than the "2 gpm increase in the previous 24 hours" limit; either by isolating the source or other possible methods) is to verify the source of the unidentified leakage increase is not material susceptible to IGSCC.

The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable to properly reduce the LEAKAGE increase or verify the source before the reactor must be shut down without unduly jeopardizing plant safety.

C.1 and C.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable,

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.4.1

The RCS LEAKAGE is monitored by a variety of instruments designed to provide alarms when LEAKAGE is indicated and to quantify the various types of LEAKAGE. Leakage detection instrumentation is discussed in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." Sump level and flow rate are typically monitored to determine actual LEAKAGE rates; however, an alternate method which may be used to quantify LEAKAGE is calculating flow rates using sump pump run times. In conjunction with alarms and other administrative controls, a 12 hour Frequency for this Surveillance is appropriate for identifying LEAKAGE and for tracking required trends (Ref. 4).

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.4.1.
 2. GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through-Wall Flaws," April 1968.
 3. NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactor Plants," October 1975.
 4. Generic Letter 88-01, Supplement 1, February 1992.
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B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.5 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.4.1 (Ref. 1), requires means for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of RCS LEAKAGE. Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Ref. 2) describes acceptable methods for selecting leakage detection systems.

Limits on LEAKAGE from the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) are required so that appropriate action can be taken before the integrity of the RCPB is impaired (Ref. 2). Leakage detection systems for the RCS are provided to alert the operators when leakage rates above normal background levels are detected and also to supply quantitative measurement of leakage rates. The Bases for LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Operational LEAKAGE," discuss the limits on RCS LEAKAGE rates.

Systems for separating the LEAKAGE of an identified source from an unidentified source are necessary to provide prompt and quantitative information to the operators to permit them to take immediate corrective action.

LEAKAGE from the RCPB inside the drywell is detected by at least one of the two monitored variables, such as measuring flow from the drywell floor drain sump and primary containment atmospheric particulate radioactivity level. Although alternate methods of detecting RCS LEAKAGE are available, the sole means of quantifying LEAKAGE in the drywell is the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system.

The drywell floor drain sump monitoring system monitors the LEAKAGE collected in the floor drain sump. This unidentified LEAKAGE consists of LEAKAGE from control rod drives, valve flanges or packings, floor drains, the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System, and drywell air cooling unit condensate drains, and any LEAKAGE not collected in the drywell equipment drain sump. Leakage into the drywell floor drain sump is pumped through a piping header that penetrates the containment wall to the floor drain collector tank.

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BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

Two drywell floor drain sump pumps take suction from the drywell floor drain sump and discharge to the Liquid Radioactive Waste Management Systems. The pumps alternate as lead and backup on each successive start. When a high level is reached in the floor drain sump, a level switch actuates to start the lead floor drain sump pump when the pump discharge valves are open. In the event the level continues to rise, a second level switch actuates to start the backup floor drain sump pump and initiates an alarm in the control room. When the level decreases to a low level, both floor drain sump pumps are stopped. A flow transmitter in the discharge line of the drywell floor drain sump pumps provides flow indication in the control room. In addition, a leak rate recorder is provided capable of identifying a 1 gpm change over an 8 hour period. The pumps can also be started from the control room.

The primary containment atmospheric particulate sampling system provides a means to monitor the primary containment atmosphere for airborne particulate radioactivity. An increase of radioactivity may be attributed to RCPB steam or reactor water LEAKAGE. The primary containment atmospheric particulate sampling system is not capable of quantifying LEAKAGE rates. The primary containment atmospheric particulate sampling system consists of a manifold rack that allows drywell atmospheric grab samples to be obtained for analysis and a continuous air monitor that contains particulate and charcoal filters for monitoring of the drywell atmosphere.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

A threat of significant compromise to the RCPB exists if the barrier contains a crack that is large enough to propagate rapidly. LEAKAGE rate limits are set low enough to detect the LEAKAGE emitted from a single crack in the RCPB (Refs. 3 and 4). The drywell floor drain sump monitoring system is designed with the capability of detecting LEAKAGE less than the established LEAKAGE rate limits and providing appropriate alarm of excess LEAKAGE in the control room. The primary containment atmospheric particulate sampling system provides a means to detect changes in LEAKAGE rates (Ref. 5).

A control room alarm provided by the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system allows the operators to evaluate the significance of the indicated LEAKAGE and, if necessary, shut down the reactor for further investigation and

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

corrective action. The allowed LEAKAGE rates are well below the rates predicted for critical crack sizes (Ref. 6). Therefore, these actions provide adequate response before a significant break in the RCPB can occur.

The drywell floor drain sump monitoring system satisfies Criterion 1 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The primary containment atmospheric particulate sampling system is maintained to be consistent with NUREG-1433.

LCO

The drywell floor drain sump monitoring system is required to quantify the unidentified LEAKAGE from the RCS. Thus, for the system to be considered OPERABLE, the flow monitoring portion of the system must be OPERABLE. The primary containment atmospheric particulate sampling system is available to the operators so closer examination can be made to determine the extent of any corrective action that may be required. Only one sampling method (either the manifold rack or the continuous air monitor) is required to meet the OPERABILITY requirements. With the leakage detection systems inoperable, monitoring for LEAKAGE in the RCPB is degraded.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the leakage detection systems are required to be OPERABLE to support LCO 3.4.4. This Applicability is consistent with that for LCO 3.4.4.

ACTIONS

A.1

With the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system inoperable, no other form of sampling can provide the equivalent information to quantify leakage. However, other monitoring systems are normally available that will provide indication of changes in leakage.

With the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system inoperable, but with RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE being determined every 12 hours (SR 3.4.4.1), operation may continue for 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time of Required Action A.1 is acceptable, based on operating experience, considering the alternative form of leakage detection that is normally available and the fact that the LEAKAGE is still being determined every 12 hours.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

With the primary containment atmospheric particulate sampling system inoperable, operation may continue for 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time of Required Action B.1 is acceptable, based on operating experience, considering the alternative form of leakage detection that is normally available and the fact that the LEAKAGE is still being determined every 12 hours (SR 3.4.4.1).

C.1 and C.2

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the actions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.5.1

This SR requires performance of a primary containment atmospheric particulate sample every 12 hours. This is performed by either removing and analyzing the particulate and charcoal filters from the continuous air monitor or by analyzing a grab sample.

SR 3.4.5.2

This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system instrumentation. The test ensures that the system can perform its function in the desired manner. The test also verifies the relative accuracy of the instrument string. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.4.5.2

non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Frequency of 31 days considers instrument reliability, and operating experience has shown it proper for detecting degradation.

SR 3.4.5.3

This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system instrumentation channel (i.e., drywell floor drain sump pump discharge flow integrator). The calibration verifies the accuracy of the instrument string. The Frequency of SR 3.4.5.3 is based on the assumption of a 12 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.4.1.
 2. Regulatory Guide 1.45, May 1973.
 3. GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through-Wall Flaws," April 1968.
 4. NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactor Plants," October 1975.
 5. UFSAR, Section 5.2.5.2.
 6. UFSAR, Section 5.2.5.6.4.
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B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.6 RCS Specific Activity

BASES

BACKGROUND During circulation, the reactor coolant acquires radioactive materials due to release of fission products from fuel leaks into the reactor coolant and activation of corrosion products in the reactor coolant. These radioactive materials in the reactor coolant can plate out in the RCS, and, at times, an accumulation will break away to spike the normal level of radioactivity. The release of coolant during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) could send radioactive materials into the environment.

Limits on the maximum allowable level of radioactivity in the reactor coolant are established to ensure that in the event of a release of any radioactive material to the environment during a DBA, radiation doses are maintained within the limits of 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 1).

This LCO contains iodine specific activity limits. The iodine isotopic activities per gram of reactor coolant are expressed in terms of a DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131. The allowable levels are intended to limit the 2 hour radiation dose to an individual at the site boundary to a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 limit.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Analytical methods and assumptions involving radioactive material in the primary coolant are presented in the UFSAR (Ref. 2). The specific activity in the reactor coolant (the source term) is an initial condition for evaluation of the consequences of an accident due to a main steam line break (MSLB) outside containment. No fuel damage is postulated in the MSLB accident, and the release of radioactive material to the environment is assumed to end when the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) close completely.

This MSLB release forms the basis for determining offsite and control room doses (Ref. 2). The limits on the specific activity of the primary coolant ensure that the 2 hour thyroid and whole body doses at the site boundary, resulting

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

from an MSLB outside containment during steady state operation, will not exceed 10% of the dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100. The limits on the specific activity of the primary coolant also ensure the thyroid dose to control room operators, resulting from a MSLB outside containment during steady state operation will not exceed the limits of GDC 19 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A (Ref. 3).

The limit on specific activity is a value from a parametric evaluation of typical site locations. This limit is conservative because the evaluation considered more restrictive parameters than for a specific site, such as the location of the site boundary and the meteorological conditions of the site.

RCS specific activity satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The specific iodine activity is limited to ≤ 0.2 $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$ DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131. This limit ensures the source term assumed in the safety analysis for the MSLB is not exceeded, so any release of radioactivity to the environment during an MSLB is less than a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 limits and GDC 19 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A (Ref. 3).

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 1, and MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated, limits on the primary coolant radioactivity are applicable since there is an escape path for release of radioactive material from the primary coolant to the environment in the event of an MSLB outside of primary containment.

In MODES 2 and 3 with the main steam lines isolated, such limits do not apply since an escape path does not exist. In MODES 4 and 5, no limits are required since the reactor is not pressurized and the potential for leakage is reduced.

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

When the reactor coolant specific activity exceeds the LCO DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 limit, but is ≤ 4.0 $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$, samples must be analyzed for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 at least once

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

every 4 hours. In addition, the specific activity must be restored to the LCO limit within 48 hours. The Completion Time of once every 4 hours is based on the time needed to take and analyze a sample. The 48 hour Completion Time to restore the activity level provides a reasonable time for temporary coolant activity increases (iodine spikes or crud bursts) to be cleaned up with the normal processing systems.

A Note to the Required Actions of Condition A excludes the MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into the applicable MODE(S) while relying on the ACTIONS even though the ACTIONS may eventually require plant shutdown. This exception is acceptable due to the significant conservatism incorporated into the specific activity limit, the low probability of an event which is limiting due to exceeding this limit, and the ability to restore transient specific activity excursions while the plant remains at, or proceeds to power operation.

B.1, B.2.1, B.2.2.1, and B.2.2.2

If the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 cannot be restored to ≤ 0.2 $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$ within 48 hours, or if at any time it is > 4.0 $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$, it must be determined at least once every 4 hours and all the main steam lines must be isolated within 12 hours. Isolating the main steam lines precludes the possibility of releasing radioactive material to the environment in an amount that is more than a small fraction of the requirements of 10 CFR 100 and GDC 19 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A (Ref. 3) during a postulated MSLB accident.

Alternatively, the plant can be placed in MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. This option is provided for those instances when isolation of main steam lines is not desired (e.g., due to the decay heat loads). In MODE 4, the requirements of the LCO are no longer applicable.

The Completion Time of once every 4 hours is the time needed to take and analyze a sample. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to isolate the main steam lines in an orderly manner and without

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2.1, B.2.2.1, and B.2.2.2 (continued)

challenging plant systems. Also, the allowed Completion Times for Required Actions B.2.2.1 and B.2.2.2 for placing the unit in MODES 3 and 4 are reasonable, based on operating experience, to achieve the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.6.1

This Surveillance is performed to ensure iodine remains within limit during normal operation. The 7 day Frequency is adequate to trend changes in the iodine activity level.

This SR is modified by a Note that requires this Surveillance to be performed only in MODE 1 because the level of fission products generated in other MODES is much less.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 100.11.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.6.4.
 3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.
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B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.7 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System—Hot Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	Irradiated fuel in the shutdown reactor core generates heat during the decay of fission products and increases the temperature of the reactor coolant. This decay heat must be removed to reduce the temperature of the reactor coolant to $\leq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ in preparation for performing Refueling or Cold Shutdown maintenance operations, or the decay heat must be removed for maintaining the reactor in the Hot Shutdown condition.
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The three redundant, manually controlled shutdown cooling subsystems (loops) of the SDC System provide decay heat removal. Each loop consists of one motor driven pump, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. Each loop has a common suction from the same recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after circulation through the respective heat exchanger, to the reactor via the associated recirculation loop. The SDC heat exchangers transfer heat to the Service Water System via the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	Decay heat removal by operation of the SDC System in the shutdown cooling mode is not required for mitigation of any event or accident evaluated in the safety analyses. Decay heat removal is, however, an important safety function that must be accomplished or core damage could result.
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The SDC System meets Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO	Two SDC subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and when no recirculation pump is in operation, one SDC subsystem must be in operation. An OPERABLE SDC subsystem consists of one OPERABLE SDC pump, one heat exchanger, the associated piping and valves, and the necessary portions of the RBCCW System capable of providing cooling water to the heat exchanger and SDC pump seal cooler. The subsystems have a common suction source and common discharge piping. Thus, to meet the LCO, two loops must be OPERABLE. Since the piping is a passive component that is assumed not to fail, it is allowed to be
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(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

common to both subsystems. Each shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. In MODE 3, one SDC subsystem can provide the required cooling, but two subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy. Operation of one subsystem can maintain or reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. To ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required.

Note 1 permits both required SDC subsystems and recirculation pumps to not be in operation for a period of 2 hours in an 8 hour period. Note 2 allows one required SDC subsystem to be inoperable for up to 2 hours for the performance of Surveillance tests. These tests may be on the affected SDC System or on some other plant system or component that necessitates placing the SDC System in an inoperable status during the performance. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the SDC subsystems or other operations requiring SDC flow interruption and loss of redundancy.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 3 with reactor vessel coolant temperature below the SDC cut-in permissive temperature (i.e., the actual temperature at which the interlock resets) the SDC System may be operated in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat to reduce or maintain coolant temperature. Otherwise, a recirculation pump is required to be in operation.

In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with reactor vessel coolant temperature greater than or equal to the SDC cut-in permissive temperature, this LCO is not applicable. Operation of the SDC System in the shutdown cooling mode is not allowed above this temperature because the RCS temperature may exceed the design temperature of the shutdown cooling piping. Decay heat removal at reactor temperatures greater than or equal to the SDC cut-in permissive temperature is typically accomplished by condensing the steam in the main condenser.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)	The requirements for decay heat removal in MODES 4 and 5 are discussed in LCO 3.4.8, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System—Cold Shutdown"; LCO 3.9.8, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC)—High Water Level"; and LCO 3.9.9, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC)—Low Water Level."
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ACTIONS

A Note to the ACTIONS excludes the MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into the applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS even though the ACTIONS may eventually require plant shutdown. This exception is acceptable due to the redundancy of the OPERABLE subsystems, the low pressure at which the plant is operating, the low probability of an event occurring during operation in this condition, and the availability of alternate methods of decay heat removal capability.

A second Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to SDC subsystems. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable shutdown cooling subsystems provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable shutdown cooling subsystems. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable SDC subsystem.

A.1, A.2, and A.3

With one required SDC subsystem inoperable for decay heat removal, except as permitted by LCO Note 2, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status without delay. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE subsystem can provide the necessary decay heat removal. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced SDC capability. Therefore, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued)

With both required SDC subsystems inoperable, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided in addition to that provided for the initial SDC subsystem inoperability. This re-establishes backup decay heat removal capabilities, similar to the requirements of the LCO. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities.

The required cooling capacity of the alternate method should be ensured by verifying (by calculation or demonstration) its capability to maintain or reduce temperature. Decay heat removal by ambient losses can be considered as, or contributing to, the alternate method capability. Alternate methods that can be used include (but are not limited to) the Condensate/Feed and Main Steam Systems and the Reactor Water Cleanup System (by itself or using feed and bleed in combination with the Control Rod Drive System or Condensate/Feed System).

However, due to the potentially reduced reliability of the alternate methods of decay heat removal, it is also required to reduce the reactor coolant temperature to the point where MODE 4 is entered.

B.1, B.2, and B.3

With no required SDC subsystem and no recirculation pump in operation, except as permitted by LCO Note 1, reactor coolant circulation by the SDC subsystem or recirculation pump must be restored without delay.

Until SDC or recirculation pump operation is re-established, an alternate method of reactor coolant circulation must be placed into service. This will provide the necessary circulation for monitoring coolant temperature. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the coolant circulation function and is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation. Furthermore, verification of the functioning of the alternate method must be reconfirmed every 12 hours thereafter. This will provide assurance of continued temperature monitoring capability.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required SDC subsystem or recirculation pump), the reactor coolant temperature and pressure must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.7.1

This Surveillance verifies that one SDC subsystem or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the SDC subsystem in the control room.

This Surveillance is modified by a Note allowing sufficient time to align the SDC System for shutdown cooling operation after clearing the pressure interlock that isolates the system, or for placing a recirculation pump in operation. The Note takes exception to the requirements of the Surveillance being met (i.e., forced coolant circulation is not required for this initial 2 hour period), which also allows entry into the Applicability of this Specification in accordance with SR 3.0.4 since the Surveillance will not be "not met" at the time of entry into the Applicability.

REFERENCES

None.

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.8 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System—Cold Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	Irradiated fuel in the shutdown reactor core generates heat during the decay of fission products and increases the temperature of the reactor coolant. This decay heat must be removed to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant $\leq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ in preparation for performing Refueling or maintenance operations, or the decay heat must be removed for maintaining the reactor in the Cold Shutdown condition.
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The three redundant, manually controlled shutdown cooling subsystems (loops) of the SDC System provide decay heat removal. Each loop consists of one motor driven pump, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. Each loop has a common suction from the same recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after circulation through the respective heat exchanger, to the reactor via the low pressure coolant injection path and associated recirculation loop. The SDC heat exchangers transfer heat to the Service Water System, via the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	Decay heat removal by operation of the SDC System in the shutdown cooling mode is not required for mitigation of any event or accident evaluated in the safety analyses. Decay heat removal is, however, an important safety function that must be accomplished or core damage could result.
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The SDC System meets Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO	Two SDC subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and when no recirculation pump is in operation, one SDC subsystem must be in operation. An OPERABLE SDC subsystem consists of one OPERABLE SDC pump, one heat exchanger, the associated piping and valves, and the necessary portions of the RBCCW System capable of providing cooling water to the heat exchanger and SDC pump seal cooler. The subsystems have a common suction source and common discharge piping. Thus, to meet the LCO, two loops must be OPERABLE. Since the piping is a passive
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(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

component that is assumed not to fail, it is allowed to be common to both subsystems. Additionally, each shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. In MODE 4, one SDC subsystem can provide the required cooling, but two subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy. Operation of one subsystem can maintain or reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. To ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required.

Note 1 allows both required SDC subsystems to not be in operation during hydrostatic testing. This allowance is acceptable because adequate reactor coolant circulation will be maintained by operation of a reactor recirculation pump to ensure adequate core flow and since systems are available to control reactor coolant temperature. Note 2 permits both SDC subsystems and recirculation pumps to not be in operation for a period of 2 hours in an 8 hour period. Note 3 allows one required SDC subsystem to be inoperable for up to 2 hours for the performance of Surveillance tests. These tests may be on the affected SDC System or on some other plant system or component that necessitates placing the SDC System in an inoperable status during the performance. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the SDC subsystems or other operations requiring SDC flow interruption and loss of redundancy.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 4, the SDC System must be OPERABLE and one SDC subsystem shall be operated in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat to maintain coolant temperature below 212°F. Otherwise, a recirculation pump is required to be in operation.

In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with reactor vessel coolant temperature greater than or equal to the SDC cut-in permissive temperature, this LCO is not applicable. Operation of the SDC System in the shutdown cooling mode is not allowed above this temperature because the RCS temperature may exceed the design temperature of the

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY
(continued)

shutdown cooling piping. Decay heat removal at reactor temperatures greater than or equal to the SDC cut-in permissive temperature is typically accomplished by condensing the steam in the main condenser.

The requirements for decay heat removal in MODE 3 below the cut-in permissive temperature and in MODE 5 are discussed in LCO 3.4.7, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System—Hot Shutdown"; LCO 3.9.8, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC)—High Water Level"; and LCO 3.9.9, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC)—Low Water Level."

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to SDC subsystems. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable shutdown cooling subsystems provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable shutdown cooling subsystems. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable SDC subsystem.

A.1

With one of the two required SDC subsystems inoperable, except as permitted by LCO Note 3, the remaining subsystem is capable of providing the required decay heat removal. However, the overall reliability is reduced. Therefore, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided. With both required SDC subsystems inoperable, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided in addition to that provided for the initial SDC subsystem inoperability. This re-establishes backup decay heat removal capabilities, similar to the requirements of the LCO. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore, verification of the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

functional availability of these alternate method(s) must be reconfirmed every 24 hours thereafter. This will provide assurance of continued heat removal capability.

The required cooling capacity of the alternate method should be ensured by verifying (by calculation or demonstration) its capability to maintain or reduce temperature. Decay heat removal by ambient losses can be considered as, or contributing to, the alternate method capability. Alternate methods that can be used include (but are not limited to) the Condensate/Feed and Main Steam System and the Reactor Water Cleanup System (by itself or using feed and bleed in combination with the Control Rod Drive System or Condensate/Feed System).

B.1 and B.2

With no required SDC subsystem and no recirculation pump in operation, except as permitted by LCO Notes 1 and 2, and until SDC or recirculation pump operation is re-established, an alternate method of reactor coolant circulation must be placed into service. This will provide the necessary circulation for monitoring coolant temperature. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the coolant circulation function and is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation. Furthermore, verification of the functioning of the alternate method must be reconfirmed every 12 hours thereafter. This will provide assurance of continued temperature monitoring capability.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required SDC System or recirculation pump), the reactor coolant temperature and pressure must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

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BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.8.1

This Surveillance verifies that one SDC subsystem or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the SDC subsystem in the control room.

REFERENCES

None.

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.9 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits

BASES

BACKGROUND

All components of the RCS are designed to withstand effects of cyclic loads due to system pressure and temperature changes. These loads are introduced by startup (heatup) and shutdown (cooldown) operations, power transients, and reactor trips. This LCO limits the pressure and temperature changes during RCS heatup and cooldown, within the design assumptions and the stress limits for cyclic operation.

The Specification contains P/T limit curves for heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and criticality, and also limits the maximum rate of change of reactor coolant temperature. The P/T limit curves are applicable for 32 effective full power years.

Each P/T limit curve defines an acceptable region for normal operation. The usual use of the curves is operational guidance during heatup or cooldown maneuvering, when pressure and temperature indications are monitored and compared to the applicable curve to determine that operation is within the allowable region.

The LCO establishes operating limits that provide a margin to brittle failure of the reactor vessel and piping of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The vessel is the component most subject to brittle failure. Therefore, the LCO limits apply mainly to the vessel.

10 CFR 50, Appendix G (Ref. 1), requires the establishment of P/T limits for material fracture toughness requirements of the RCPB materials. Reference 1 requires an adequate margin to brittle failure during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and system hydrostatic tests. It mandates the use of the ASME Code, Section III, Appendix G (Ref. 2).

The actual shift in the RT_{NDT} of the vessel material will be established periodically by removing and evaluating the irradiated reactor vessel material specimens, in accordance with ASTM E 185 (Ref. 3) and Appendix H of 10 CFR 50 (Ref. 4). The operating P/T limit curves will be adjusted,

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

as necessary, based on the evaluation findings and the recommendations of Reference 5.

The P/T limit curves are composite curves established by superimposing limits derived from stress analyses of those portions of the reactor vessel and head that are the most restrictive. At any specific pressure, temperature, and temperature rate of change, one location within the reactor vessel will dictate the most restrictive limit. Across the span of the P/T limit curves, different locations are more restrictive, and, thus, the curves are composites of the most restrictive regions.

The non-nuclear heatup and cooldown curve applies during heatups with non-nuclear heat (e.g., recirculation pump heat) and during cooldowns when the reactor is not critical (e.g., following a scram). The curve provides the minimum reactor vessel metal temperatures based on the most limiting vessel stress.

The P/T criticality limits include the Reference 1 requirement that they be at least 40°F above the non-critical heatup curve or the non-critical cooldown curve and not lower than the minimum permissible temperature for the inservice leak and hydrostatic testing. Reference 1 also allows boiling water reactors to operate with the core critical below the minimum permissible temperature allowed for the inservice hydrostatic pressure test (i.e., inservice leak and hydrostatic testing) when the water level is within the normal range for power operation and the pressure is less than 20% of the preservice system hydrostatic test pressure (for Dresden 2 and 3, this pressure is 312 psig). Under these conditions, the minimum temperature is 60°F above the RT_{NDT} of the closure flange regions which are stressed by the bolt preload (for Dresden 2 and 3, this temperature is 83°F).

The consequence of violating the LCO limits is that the RCS has been operated under conditions that can result in brittle failure of the RCPB, possibly leading to a nonisolable leak or loss of coolant accident. In the event these limits are exceeded, an evaluation must be performed to determine the effect on the structural integrity of the

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BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)	RCPB components. ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. 6), provides a recommended methodology for evaluating an operating event that causes an excursion outside the limits.
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	<p>The P/T limits are not derived from Design Basis Accident (DBA) analyses. They are prescribed during normal operation to avoid encountering pressure, temperature, and temperature rate of change conditions that might cause undetected flaws to propagate and cause nonductile failure of the RCPB, a condition that is unanalyzed. Reference 7 approved the curves and limits required by this Specification. Since the P/T limits are not derived from any DBA, there are no acceptance limits related to the P/T limits. Rather, the P/T limits are acceptance limits themselves since they preclude operation in an unanalyzed condition.</p> <p>RCS P/T limits satisfy Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ij).</p>
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LCO	<p>The elements of this LCO are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. RCS pressure and temperature are within the limits specified in Figures 3.4.9-1, 3.4.9-2, and 3.4.9-3, heatup and cooldown rates are $\leq 100^{\circ}\text{F}$ in any 1 hour period during RCS heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and the RCS temperature change during inservice leak and hydrostatic testing is $\leq 20^{\circ}\text{F}$ in any 1 hour period when the RCS temperature and pressure are being maintained with the limits of Figure 3.4.9-1;b. The temperature difference between the reactor vessel bottom head coolant and the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) coolant is $\leq 145^{\circ}\text{F}$ during recirculation pump startup in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4;c. The temperature difference between the reactor coolant in the respective recirculation loop and in the reactor vessel is $\leq 50^{\circ}\text{F}$ during recirculation pump startup in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4;
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(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

- d. RCS pressure and temperature are within the criticality limits specified in Figure 3.4.9-3, prior to achieving criticality; and
- e. The reactor vessel flange and the head flange temperatures are $\geq 83^{\circ}\text{F}$ when tensioning the reactor vessel head bolting studs and when the reactor head is tensioned.

These limits define allowable operating regions and permit a large number of operating cycles while also providing a wide margin to nonductile failure.

The rate of change of temperature limits control the thermal gradient through the vessel wall and are used as inputs for calculating the heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing P/T limit curves. Thus, the LCO for the rate of change of temperature restricts stresses caused by thermal gradients and also ensures the validity of the P/T limit curves.

Violation of the limits places the reactor vessel outside of the bounds of the stress analyses and can increase stresses in other RCS components. The consequences depend on several factors, as follows:

- a. The severity of the departure from the allowable operating pressure temperature regime or the severity of the rate of change of temperature;
- b. The length of time the limits were violated (longer violations allow the temperature gradient in the thick vessel walls to become more pronounced); and
- c. The existence, size, and orientation of flaws in the vessel material.

APPLICABILITY

The potential for violating a P/T limit exists at all times. For example, P/T limit violations could result from ambient temperature conditions that result in the reactor vessel metal temperature being less than the minimum allowed temperature for boltup. Therefore, this LCO is applicable even when fuel is not loaded in the core.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

Operation outside the P/T limits while in MODE 1, 2, or 3 must be corrected so that the RCPB is returned to a condition that has been verified by stress analyses.

The 30 minute Completion Time reflects the urgency of restoring the parameters to within the analyzed range. Most violations will not be severe, and the activity can be accomplished in this time in a controlled manner.

Besides restoring operation within limits, an engineering evaluation is required to determine if RCS operation can continue. The evaluation must verify the RCPB integrity remains acceptable and must be completed if continued operation is desired. Several methods may be used, including comparison with pre-analyzed transients in the stress analyses, new analyses, or inspection of the components. ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. 6), may be used to support the evaluation. However, its use is restricted to evaluation of the vessel beltline.

The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable to accomplish the evaluation of a mild violation. More severe violations may require special, event specific stress analyses or inspections. A favorable evaluation must be completed if continued operation is desired.

Condition A is modified by a Note requiring Required Action A.2 be completed whenever the Condition is entered. The Note emphasizes the need to perform the evaluation of the effects of the excursion outside the allowable limits. Restoration alone per Required Action A.1 is insufficient because higher than analyzed stresses may have occurred and may have affected the RCPB integrity.

B.1 and B.2

If a Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, the plant must be placed in a lower MODE because either the RCS remained in an unacceptable P/T region for an extended period of increased stress, or a

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

sufficiently severe event caused entry into an unacceptable region. Either possibility indicates a need for more careful examination of the event, best accomplished with the RCS at reduced pressure and temperature. With the reduced pressure and temperature conditions, the possibility of propagation of undetected flaws is decreased.

Pressure and temperature are reduced by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1 and C.2

Operation outside the P/T limits in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3 (including defueled conditions) must be corrected so that the RCPB is returned to a condition that has been verified by stress analyses. The Required Action must be initiated without delay and continued until the limits are restored.

Besides restoring the P/T limit parameters to within limits, an engineering evaluation is required to determine if RCS operation is allowed. This evaluation must verify that the RCPB integrity is acceptable and must be completed before approaching criticality or heating up to $> 212^{\circ}\text{F}$. Several methods may be used, including comparison with pre-analyzed transients, new analyses, or inspection of the components. ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. 6), may be used to support the evaluation; however, its use is restricted to evaluation of the beltline.

Condition C is modified by a Note requiring Required Action C.2 be completed whenever the Condition is entered. The Note emphasizes the need to perform the evaluation of the effects of the excursion outside the allowable limits. Restoration alone per Required Action C.1 is insufficient because higher than analyzed stresses may have occurred and may have affected the RCPB integrity.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.9.1

Verification that operation is within limits is required every 30 minutes when RCS pressure and temperature conditions are undergoing planned changes. This Frequency is considered reasonable in view of the control room indication available to monitor RCS status. Also, since temperature rate of change limits are specified in hourly increments, 30 minutes permits a reasonable time for assessment and correction of minor deviations.

Surveillance for heatup, cooldown, or inservice leak and hydrostatic testing may be discontinued when the criteria given in the relevant plant procedure for ending the activity are satisfied.

This SR has been modified with a Note that requires this Surveillance to be performed only during system heatup and cooldown operations and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.

SR 3.4.9.2

A separate limit is used when the reactor is approaching criticality. Consequently, the RCS pressure and temperature must be verified within the appropriate limits before withdrawing control rods that will make the reactor critical.

Performing the Surveillance within 15 minutes before control rod withdrawal for the purpose of achieving criticality provides adequate assurance that the limits will not be exceeded between the time of the Surveillance and the time of the control rod withdrawal.

SR 3.4.9.3 and SR 3.4.9.4

Differential temperatures within the applicable limits ensure that thermal stresses resulting from the startup of an idle recirculation pump will not exceed design allowances. In addition, compliance with these limits ensures that the assumptions of the analysis for the startup of an idle recirculation loop (Ref. 8) are satisfied.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.9.3 and SR 3.4.9.4 (continued)

Performing the Surveillance within 15 minutes before starting the idle recirculation pump provides adequate assurance that the limits will not be exceeded between the time of the Surveillance and the time of the idle pump start.

An acceptable means of demonstrating compliance with the temperature differential requirement in SR 3.4.9.4 is to compare the temperatures of the operating recirculation loop and the idle loop.

SR 3.4.9.3 and SR 3.4.9.4 have been modified by a Note that requires the Surveillance to be performed only in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. In MODE 5, the overall stress on limiting components is lower. Therefore, ΔT limits are not required. The Notes also state the SRs are only required to be met during a recirculation pump startup since this is when the stresses occur.

SR 3.4.9.5, SR 3.4.9.6, and SR 3.4.9.7

Limits on the reactor vessel flange and head flange temperatures are generally bounded by the other P/T limits during system heatup and cooldown. However, operations approaching MODE 4 from MODE 5 and in MODE 4 with RCS temperature less than or equal to certain specified values require assurance that these temperatures meet the LCO limits.

The flange temperatures must be verified to be above the limits within 30 minutes before and every 30 minutes thereafter while tensioning the vessel head bolting studs to ensure that once the head is tensioned the limits are satisfied. When in MODE 4 with RCS temperature $\leq 93^{\circ}\text{F}$, 30 minute checks of the flange temperatures are required because of the reduced margin to the limits. When in MODE 4 with RCS temperature $\leq 113^{\circ}\text{F}$, monitoring of the flange temperature is required every 12 hours to ensure the temperature is within the specified limits.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.9.5, SR 3.4.9.6, and SR 3.4.9.7 (continued)

The 30 minute Frequency reflects the urgency of maintaining the temperatures within limits, and also limits the time that the temperature limits could be exceeded. The 12 hour Frequency is reasonable based on the rate of temperature change possible at these temperatures.

SR 3.4.9.5 is modified by a Note that requires the Surveillance to be performed only when tensioning the reactor vessel head bolting studs. SR 3.4.9.6 is modified by a Note that requires the Surveillance to be initiated 30 minutes after RCS temperature $\leq 93^{\circ}\text{F}$ in MODE 4. SR 3.4.9.7 is modified by a Note that requires the Surveillance to be initiated 12 hours after RCS temperature $\leq 113^{\circ}\text{F}$ in MODE 4. The Notes contained in these SRs are necessary to specify when the reactor vessel flange and head flange temperatures are required to be verified to be within the specified limits.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.
 2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G.
 3. ASTM E 185-82, July 1982.
 4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix H.
 5. Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 1988.
 6. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Appendix E.
 7. Letter from Robert Pulsifer (NRC) to ComEd, "Issuance of Amendments 153 and 148 for Dresden 2 and 3," dated February 28, 1997.
 8. UFSAR, Section 15.4.4.
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B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.10 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure

BASES

BACKGROUND

The reactor steam dome pressure is an assumed value in the determination of compliance with reactor pressure vessel overpressure protection criteria and is also an assumed initial condition of design basis accidents and transients.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The reactor steam dome pressure of ≤ 1005 psig is an initial condition of the vessel overpressure protection analysis of Reference 1. This analysis assumes an initial maximum reactor steam dome pressure and evaluates the response of the pressure relief system, primarily the safety valves, during the limiting pressurization transient. The determination of compliance with the overpressure criteria is dependent on the initial reactor steam dome pressure; therefore, the limit on this pressure ensures that the assumptions of the overpressure protection analyses are conserved. Reference 2 also assumes an initial reactor steam dome pressure for the analyses of design basis accidents and transients used to determine the limits for fuel cladding integrity (see Bases for LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") and 1% cladding plastic strain (see Bases for LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," LCO 3.2.3, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)," and LCO 3.2.4, "Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Gain and Setpoint"). The nominal reactor operating pressure is approximately 1005 psig. Transient analyses typically use the nominal or a design dome pressure as input to the analysis. Small deviations (5 to 10 psi) from the nominal pressure are not expected to change most of the transient analyses results. However, sensitivity studies for fast pressurization events (main turbine generator load rejection without bypass, turbine trip without bypass, and feedwater controller failure) indicate that the delta-CPR may increase for lower initial pressures. Therefore, the fast pressurization events have considered a bounding initial pressure based on a typical operating range to assure a conservative delta-CPR and operating limit.

Reactor steam dome pressure satisfies the requirements of Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO	The specified reactor steam dome pressure limit of ≤ 1005 psig ensures the plant is operated within the assumptions of the reactor overpressure analysis. Operation above the limit may result in a transient response more severe than analyzed.
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APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1 and 2, the reactor steam dome pressure is required to be less than or equal to the limit. In these MODES, the reactor may be generating significant steam and events that may challenge the overpressure limits are possible.
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In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the limit is not applicable because the reactor is shut down. In these MODES, the reactor pressure is well below the required limit, and no anticipated events will challenge the overpressure limits.

ACTIONS

A.1

With the reactor steam dome pressure greater than the limit, prompt action should be taken to reduce pressure to below the limit and return the reactor to operation within the bounds of the analyses. The 15 minute Completion Time is reasonable considering the importance of maintaining the pressure within limits. This Completion Time also ensures that the probability of an accident occurring while pressure is greater than the limit is minimized.

B.1

If the reactor steam dome pressure cannot be restored to within the limit within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.10.1

Verification that reactor steam dome pressure is ≤ 1005 psig ensures that the initial condition of the vessel overpressure protection analysis is met. Operating experience has shown the 12 hour Frequency to be sufficient for identifying trends and verifying operation within safety analyses assumptions.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.2.2.1.
 2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
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B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND ISOLATION CONDENSER (IC) SYSTEM

B 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The ECCS is designed, in conjunction with the primary and secondary containment, to limit the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The ECCS uses two independent methods (flooding and spraying) to cool the core during a LOCA. The ECCS network consists of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, the Core Spray (CS) System, the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System, and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). The suppression pool provides the required source of water for the ECCS. Although no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the contaminated condensate storage tank (CCST), it is capable of providing a source of water for the HPCI, LPCI and CS systems.

On receipt of an initiation signal, ECCS pumps automatically start; the system aligns and the pumps inject water, taken either from the CCST or suppression pool, into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) as RCS pressure is overcome by the discharge pressure of the ECCS pumps. Although the system is initiated, ADS action is delayed, allowing the operator to interrupt the timed sequence if the system is not needed. The HPCI pump discharge pressure almost immediately exceeds that of the RCS, and the pump injects coolant into the vessel to cool the core. If the break is small, the HPCI System will maintain coolant inventory as well as vessel level while the RCS is still pressurized. If HPCI fails, it is backed up by ADS in combination with LPCI and CS. In this event, the ADS timed sequence would be allowed to time out and open the relief valves and safety/relief valve (S/RV) depressurizing the RCS, thus allowing the LPCI and CS to overcome RCS pressure and inject coolant into the vessel. If the break is large, RCS pressure initially drops rapidly and the LPCI and CS cool the core.

Water from the break returns to the suppression pool where it is used again and again. Water in the suppression pool is circulated through a heat exchanger cooled by the Containment Cooling Service Water System. Depending on the

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

location and size of the break, portions of the ECCS may be ineffective; however, the overall design is effective in cooling the core regardless of the size or location of the piping break.

The combined operation of all ECCS subsystems are designed to ensure that no single active component failure will prevent automatic initiation and successful operation of the minimum required ECCS equipment.

The CS System (Ref. 1) is composed of two independent subsystems. Each subsystem consists of a motor driven pump, a spray sparger above the core, and piping and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the sparger. The CS System is designed to provide cooling to the reactor core when reactor pressure is low. Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the CS pumps in both subsystems are automatically started immediately when normal AC power is available and approximately 14 seconds after emergency power is available. When the RPV pressure drops sufficiently, CS System flow to the RPV begins. A full flow test line is provided to route water from and to the suppression pool to allow testing of the CS System without spraying water in the RPV.

The LPCI System is composed of two LPCI subsystems (loops) (Ref. 2). Each subsystem consists of two motor driven pumps and piping and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the RPV via the selected recirculation loop. The two LPCI subsystems are interconnected via the two, normally open, LPCI System cross-tie valves. The LPCI System is equipped with a loop select logic that determines which, if any, of the recirculation loops has been broken and selects the non-broken loop for injection. If neither loop is determined to be broken, then "B" recirculation loop is selected for injection. The LPCI System cross-tie valves must be open to support OPERABILITY of both LPCI subsystems. Similarly, the LPCI swing bus is required to be energized to support both LPCI subsystems. Therefore, with the LPCI cross-tie valves not full open, or the LPCI swing bus not energized, both LPCI subsystems must be considered inoperable. The LPCI subsystems are designed to provide core cooling at low RPV pressure. Upon receipt of an initiation signal, all four LPCI pumps are automatically

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

started (simultaneously and immediately when normal AC power is available, and sequentially, with A and C pumps after approximately 4 seconds and B and D pumps after approximately 9 seconds, when emergency AC power is available). LPCI System valves are automatically positioned to ensure the proper flow path for water from the suppression pool to inject into the selected recirculation loop. When the RPV pressure drops sufficiently, the LPCI flow to the RPV, via the selected recirculation loop, begins. The water then enters the reactor through the jet pumps. Full flow test lines are provided for each LPCI subsystem to route water from and to the suppression pool, to allow testing of the LPCI pumps without injecting water into the RPV. These test lines also provide suppression pool cooling capability, as described in LCO 3.6.2.3, "Suppression Pool Cooling."

The HPCI System (Ref. 3) consists of a steam driven turbine pump unit, piping, and valves to provide steam to the turbine, as well as piping and valves to transfer water from the suction source to the core via the feedwater system line, where the coolant is distributed within the RPV through the feedwater sparger. Suction piping for the system is provided from the CCST and the suppression pool. Pump suction for HPCI is normally aligned to the CCST source to minimize injection of suppression pool water into the RPV. However, if the CCST water supply is low, or if the suppression pool level is high, an automatic transfer to the suppression pool water source ensures a water supply for continuous operation of the HPCI System. The steam supply to the HPCI turbine is piped from the reactor vessel.

The HPCI System is designed to provide core cooling for a wide range of reactor pressures (150 psig to 1120 psig). Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the HPCI turbine stop valve and turbine steam supply valve open simultaneously and the turbine accelerates to a specified speed. As the HPCI flow increases, the turbine control valves are automatically adjusted to maintain design flow. Exhaust steam from the HPCI turbine is discharged to the suppression pool. A full flow test line is provided to route water from and to the CCST to allow testing of the HPCI System during normal operation without injecting water into the RPV.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

The ECCS pumps are provided with minimum flow bypass lines, which discharge to the suppression pool. The valves in these lines automatically open or remain open to prevent pump damage due to overheating when other discharge line valves are closed. To ensure rapid delivery of water to the RPV and to minimize water hammer effects, all ECCS pump discharge lines are filled with water. The LPCI and CS System discharge lines are kept full of water using a "keep fill" system (jockey pump system). The HPCI System is normally aligned to the CCST. The height of water in the CCST is sufficient to maintain the piping full of water up to the first isolation valve. When the HPCI System is aligned to the suppression pool the "keep fill" system must be aligned to the HPCI discharge line.

The ADS (Ref. 4) consists of 5 valves (4 relief valves and one S/RV). It is designed to provide depressurization of the RCS during a small break LOCA if HPCI fails or is unable to maintain required water level in the RPV. ADS operation reduces the RPV pressure to within the operating pressure range of the low pressure ECCS subsystems (CS and LPCI), so that these subsystems can provide coolant inventory makeup. The S/RV used for automatic depressurization is equipped with one air accumulator and associated inlet check valve. The accumulator provides the pneumatic power to actuate the valve. However, the S/RV is not credited in the safety analysis since qualification of the accumulator for this valve to perform the ADS function has not been demonstrated (Ref. 5).

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The ECCS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for a postulated LOCA. The accidents for which ECCS operation is required are presented in References 6 and 7. The required analyses and assumptions are defined in Reference 8. The results of these analyses are also described in Reference 9.

This LCO helps to ensure that the following acceptance criteria for the ECCS, established by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 10), will be met following a LOCA, assuming the worst case single active component failure in the ECCS:

- a. Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is $\leq 2200^{\circ}\text{F}$;

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

- b. Maximum cladding oxidation is ≤ 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation;
- c. Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is ≤ 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react;
- d. The core is maintained in a coolable geometry; and
- e. Adequate long term cooling capability is maintained.

The limiting single failures are discussed in Reference 8. For a large discharge pipe break LOCA, failure of the LPCI valve on the unbroken recirculation loop is considered the most severe failure. For a small break LOCA, HPCI failure is the most severe failure. In the analysis of events requiring ADS operation, it is assumed that only three of the five ADS valves operate. Therefore, four ADS valves are required to be OPERABLE to meet single failure criteria. The remaining OPERABLE ECCS subsystems provide the capability to adequately cool the core and prevent excessive fuel damage.

The ECCS satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and four electromechanical ADS valves are required to be OPERABLE. The S/RV can not be used to satisfy the ADS requirement. The ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the two CS subsystems, the two LPCI subsystems, and one HPCI System. The low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the two CS subsystems and the two LPCI subsystems.

With less than the required number of ECCS subsystems OPERABLE, the potential exists that during a limiting design basis LOCA concurrent with the worst case single failure, the limits specified in Reference 10 could be exceeded. All ECCS subsystems must therefore be OPERABLE to satisfy the single failure criterion required by Reference 10.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY	All ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, and 3, when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling would be required to prevent fuel damage in the event of a break in the primary system piping. In MODES 2 and 3, when reactor steam dome pressure is ≤ 150 psig, ADS and HPCI are not required to be OPERABLE because the low pressure ECCS subsystems can provide sufficient flow below this pressure. ECCS requirements for MODES 4 and 5 are specified in LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS-Shutdown."
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ACTIONS

A.1

If any one LPCI pump is inoperable, the inoperable pump must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE pumps provide adequate core cooling during a LOCA. However, overall ECCS reliability is reduced, because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE LPCI subsystems, concurrent with a LOCA, may result in the LPCI subsystems not being able to perform their intended safety function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 11 that evaluated the impact on ECCS availability, assuming various components and subsystems were taken out of service. The results were used to calculate the average availability of ECCS equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA as a function of allowable repair times (i.e., Completion Times).

B.1

If a LPCI subsystem is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or a CS subsystem is inoperable, the inoperable low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE subsystems provide adequate core cooling during a LOCA. However, overall ECCS reliability is reduced, because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE subsystems, concurrent with a LOCA, may result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended safety function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study (Ref. 11) that evaluated the impact on ECCS availability, assuming various components and

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

subsystems were taken out of service. The results were used to calculate the average availability of ECCS equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA as a function of allowed outage times (i.e., Completion Times).

C.1

If one LPCI pump in each subsystem is inoperable, one LPCI pump must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE ECCS subsystems provide adequate core cooling during a LOCA. However, overall ECCS reliability is reduced because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE ECCS subsystems, concurrent with a LOCA, may result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended safety function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study (Ref. 11) that evaluated the impact on ECCS availability, assuming various components and subsystems were taken out of service. The results were used to calculate the average availability of ECCS equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA as a function of allowed outage times (i.e., Completion Times).

D.1

If two LPCI subsystems are inoperable for reasons other than Condition C, one inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CS subsystems provide adequate core cooling during a LOCA. However, overall ECCS reliability is reduced, because a single failure in one of the remaining CS subsystems, concurrent with a LOCA, may result in ECCS not being able to perform its intended safety function. The 72 hour Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 11 that evaluated the impact on ECCS availability, assuming various components and subsystems were taken out of service. The results were used to calculate the average availability of ECCS equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA as a function of allowable repair times (i.e., Completion Times).

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

E.1 and E.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D is not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1 and F.2

If the HPCI System is inoperable and the IC System is verified to be OPERABLE, the HPCI System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days. In this Condition, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diverse low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems in conjunction with ADS. Also, the IC System will automatically provide core cooling at most reactor operating pressures. Verification of IC OPERABILITY is therefore required immediately when HPCI is inoperable. This may be performed as an administrative check by examining logs or other information to determine if IC is out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the IC System. If the OPERABILITY of the IC System cannot be verified, however, Condition I must be immediately entered. In the event of component failures concurrent with a design basis LOCA, there is a potential, depending on the specific failures, that the minimum required ECCS equipment will not be available. A 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 11 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

G.1 and G.2

If any one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem, or one LPCI pump in both LPCI subsystems, is inoperable in addition to an inoperable HPCI System, the inoperable low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem(s) or the HPCI System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

G.1 and G.2 (continued)

In this Condition, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of the ADS and the remaining low pressure ECCS subsystems. However, the overall ECCS reliability is significantly reduced because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE subsystems concurrent with a design basis LOCA may result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended safety function. Since both a high pressure system (HPCI) and a low pressure subsystem(s) are inoperable, a more restrictive Completion Time of 72 hours is required to restore either the HPCI System or the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status. This Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 11 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

H.1

The LCO requires four ADS valves to be OPERABLE in order to provide the ADS function. Reference 12 contains the results of an analysis that evaluated the effect of two ADS valves being out of service. Per this analysis, operation of only three ADS valves will provide the required depressurization. However, overall reliability of the ADS is reduced, because a single failure in the OPERABLE ADS valves could result in a reduction in depressurization capability. Therefore, operation is only allowed for a limited time. The 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 10 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

I.1 and I.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F, G, or H is not met, or if two or more required ADS valves are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and reactor steam dome pressure reduced to ≤ 150 psig within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS I.1 and I.2 (continued)

are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

J.1

When multiple ECCS subsystems are inoperable, as stated in Condition J, the plant is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.1

The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCI System, CS System, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the RCS upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines are full is to vent at the high points. The 31 day Frequency is based on the gradual nature of void buildup in the ECCS piping, the procedural controls governing system operation, and operating experience.

SR 3.5.1.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.2 (continued)

those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. For the HPCI System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.

The 31 day Frequency of this SR was derived from the Inservice Testing Program requirements for performing valve testing at least once every 92 days. The Frequency of 31 days is further justified because the valves are operated under procedural control and because improper valve position would only affect a single subsystem. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.5.1.3

Verification every 31 days of the correct breaker alignment to the LPCI swing bus demonstrates that the AC electrical power is available to ensure proper operation of the associated LPCI injection valves and the recirculation pump discharge valves. The 31 day Frequency has been found acceptable based on engineering judgment and operating experience.

SR 3.5.1.4

Cycling the recirculation pump discharge valves through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically OPERABLE and will close when required.

Upon initiation of an automatic LPCI subsystem injection signal, these valves are required to be closed to ensure full LPCI subsystem flow injection in the reactor via the recirculation jet pumps. De-energizing the valve in the closed position will also ensure the proper flow path for the LPCI subsystem. Acceptable methods of de-energizing the valve include de-energizing breaker control power, racking out the breaker or removing the breaker.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.4 (continued)

The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. If any recirculation pump discharge valve is inoperable and in the open position, both LPCI subsystems must be declared inoperable.

SR 3.5.1.5, SR 3.5.1.6, and SR 3.5.1.7

The performance requirements of the low pressure ECCS pumps are determined through application of the 10 CFR 50, Appendix K criteria (Ref. 8) and are bounded by the requirements of SR 3.5.1.5. This periodic Surveillance is performed (in accordance with the ASME Code, Section XI, requirements for the ECCS pumps) to verify that the ECCS pumps will develop the flow rates required by the respective analyses. The low pressure ECCS pump flow rates ensure that adequate core cooling is provided to satisfy the acceptance criteria of Reference 10. The pump flow rates are verified against a test line pressure or system head equivalent to the RPV pressure expected during a LOCA. The total system pump outlet pressure is adequate to overcome the elevation head pressure between the pump suction and the vessel discharge, the piping friction losses, and RPV pressure present during a LOCA. These values have been established analytically.

The flow tests for the HPCI System are performed at two different pressure ranges such that system capability to provide rated flow against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure is tested at both the higher and lower operating ranges of the system. The required system head should overcome the RPV pressure and associated discharge line losses. Adequate reactor steam pressure must be available to perform these tests. Additionally, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the HPCI System diverts steam flow. Therefore, sufficient time is allowed after adequate pressure and flow are achieved to perform these tests. Reactor steam pressure must be ≥ 920 psig to perform SR 3.5.1.6 and ≥ 150 psig to perform SR 3.5.1.7. Adequate steam flow is represented by at least 2 turbine bypass

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.5, SR 3.5.1.6, and SR 3.5.1.7 (continued)

valves open, or total steam flow $\geq 10^6$ lb/hr. Reactor startup is allowed prior to performing the low pressure Surveillance test because the reactor pressure is low and the time allowed to satisfactorily perform the Surveillance test is short. The reactor pressure is allowed to be increased to normal operating pressure since it is assumed that the low pressure test has been satisfactorily completed and there is no indication or reason to believe that HPCI is inoperable.

Therefore, SR 3.5.1.6 and SR 3.5.1.7 are modified by Notes that state the Surveillances are not required to be performed until 12 hours after the reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. The 12 hours allowed for performing the flow test after the required pressure and flow are reached is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides reasonable time to complete the SRs.

The Frequency for SR 3.5.1.5 and SR 3.5.1.6 is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program requirements. The 24 month Frequency for SR 3.5.1.7 is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a startup from a plant outage. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.5.1.8

The ECCS subsystems are required to actuate automatically to perform their design functions. This Surveillance verifies that, with a required system initiation signal (actual or simulated), the automatic initiation logic of HPCI, CS, and LPCI will cause the systems or subsystems to operate as designed, including actuation of the system throughout its emergency operating sequence, automatic pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. This SR also ensures that the HPCI System will automatically restart on an RPV low-low water level signal

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.8 (continued)

received subsequent to an RPV high water level trip and that the HPCI suction is automatically transferred from the CCST to the suppression pool on high suppression pool water level or low CCST water level. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.1 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection/spray during the Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance.

SR 3.5.1.9

The ADS designated valves are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals. A system functional test is performed to demonstrate that the mechanical portions of the ADS function (i.e., solenoids) operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated initiation signal, causing proper actuation of all the required components. SR 3.5.1.10 and the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.1 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.9 (continued)

Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation since the valves are individually tested in accordance with SR 3.5.1.10.

SR 3.5.1.10

A manual actuation of each ADS valve is performed to verify that the valve and solenoid are functioning properly and that no blockage exists in the valve discharge lines. This is demonstrated by the response of the turbine control or bypass valve or by a change in the measured flow or by any other method suitable to verify steam flow. Adequate reactor steam dome pressure must be available to perform this test to avoid damaging the valve. Also, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the ADS valves divert steam flow upon opening. Sufficient time is therefore allowed after the required pressure and flow are achieved to perform this SR. Adequate pressure at which this SR is to be performed is 300 psig (the pressure recommended by the valve manufacturer). Adequate steam flow is represented by at least 2 turbine bypass valves open. Reactor startup is allowed prior to performing this SR because valve OPERABILITY and the setpoints for overpressure protection are verified, per ASME requirements, prior to valve installation. Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note that states the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. The 12 hours allowed for manual actuation after the required pressure is reached is sufficient to achieve stable conditions and provides adequate time to complete the Surveillance. SR 3.5.1.9 and the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.1 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.10 (continued)

The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply just prior to or during a startup from a plant outage. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.5.1.11

The LPCI System injection valves and recirculation pump discharge valves are powered from the LPCI swing bus, which must be energized after a single failure, including loss of power from the normal source to the swing bus. Therefore, the automatic transfer capability from the normal power source to the backup power source must be verified to ensure the automatic capability to detect loss of normal power and initiate an automatic transfer to the swing bus backup power source. Verification of this capability every 24 months ensures that AC electrical power is available for proper operation of the associated LPCI injection valves and recirculation pump valves. The swing bus automatic transfer scheme must be OPERABLE for both LPCI subsystems to be OPERABLE. The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a startup from a plant outage. Operating experience has shown that the components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.3.2.1.
2. UFSAR, Section 6.3.2.2.
3. UFSAR, Section 6.3.2.3.
4. UFSAR, Section 6.3.2.4.

(continued)

BASES

REFERENCES
(continued)

5. Letter from J.A. Zwolinski (NRC) to D.L. Farrar (Commonwealth Edison Company), "Resolution of NUREG-0737 Item II.K.3.28, Verify Qualification of Accumulators on Automatic Depressurization Valves," dated June 16, 1986.
 6. UFSAR, Section 15.6.4.
 7. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5.
 8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.
 9. UFSAR, Section 6.3.3.
 10. 10 CFR 50.46.
 11. Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.
 12. EMF-97-025(P) Revision 1, LOCA Break Spectrum for Dresden Unit 2 and 3, dated May 30, 1997.
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B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND ISOLATION CONDENSER (IC) SYSTEM

B 3.5.2 ECCS – Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	A description of the Core Spray (CS) System and the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS – Operating."
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The ECCS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The long term cooling analysis following a design basis LOCA (Ref. 1) demonstrates that only one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is required, post LOCA, to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown. It is reasonable to assume, based on engineering judgement, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5.
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The low pressure ECCS subsystems satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO	Two low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. The low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems consist of two CS subsystems and two LPCI subsystems. Each CS subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or contaminated condensate storage tanks (CCSTs) to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). Each LPCI subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or the CCSTs to the RPV. A single LPCI pump is required per subsystem because of the similar injection capacity in relation to a CS subsystem. In addition, in MODES 4 and 5, the LPCI System cross-tie valves are not required to be open.
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(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY OPERABILITY of the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems is required in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure adequate coolant inventory and sufficient heat removal capability for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the vessel. Requirements for ECCS OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3 are discussed in the Applicability section of the Bases for LCO 3.5.1. ECCS subsystems are not required to be OPERABLE during MODE 5 with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed and the water level maintained at ≥ 23 ft above the RPV flange. This provides sufficient coolant inventory to allow operator action to terminate the inventory loss prior to fuel uncover in case of an inadvertent draindown.

The Automatic Depressurization System is not required to be OPERABLE during MODES 4 and 5 because the RPV pressure is ≤ 150 psig, and the CS System and the LPCI subsystems can provide core cooling without any depressurization of the primary system.

The High Pressure Coolant Injection System is not required to be OPERABLE during MODES 4 and 5 since the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the vessel.

ACTIONS A.1 and B.1

If any one required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status in 4 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE subsystem can provide sufficient vessel flooding capability to recover from an inadvertent vessel draindown. However, overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining OPERABLE subsystem concurrent with a vessel draindown could result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended function. The 4 hour Completion Time for restoring the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status is based on engineering judgment that considered the remaining available subsystem and the low probability of a vessel draindown event.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and B.1 (continued)

With the inoperable subsystem not restored to OPERABLE status in the required Completion Time, action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

C.1, C.2, D.1, D.2, and D.3

With both of the required ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable, all coolant inventory makeup capability may be unavailable. Therefore, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. One required ECCS injection/spray subsystem must also be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Time to restore at least one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action will be taken to provide the required cooling capacity or to initiate actions to place the plant in a condition that minimizes any potential fission product release to the environment.

If at least one required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the 4 hour Completion Time, additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring secondary containment is OPERABLE; one standby gas treatment subsystem is OPERABLE; and secondary containment isolation capability is available in each associated penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactivity releases (i.e., one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability. The administrative controls may consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1, C.2, D.1, D.2, and D.3 (continued)

secondary containment is indicated). OPERABILITY may be verified by an administrative check, or by examining logs or other information, to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the Surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.2.1

The minimum water level of 10 ft 4 inches above the bottom of the suppression chamber required for the suppression pool is periodically verified to ensure that the suppression pool will provide adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the CS System and LPCI subsystem pumps, recirculation volume, and vortex prevention. With the suppression pool water level less than the required limit, all ECCS injection/spray subsystems are inoperable unless they are aligned to OPERABLE CCSTs.

When suppression pool level is < 10 ft 4 inches, the CS and LPCI subsystems are considered OPERABLE only if they can take suction from the CCSTs, and the CCSTs water volume is sufficient to provide the required NPSH and vortex prevention for the CS pump and LPCI pump. Therefore, a verification that either the suppression pool water level is \geq 10 ft 4 inches or that required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are aligned to take suction from the CCSTs and the CCSTs contain \geq 140,000 available gallons of water, equivalent to 23 ft in both CCSTs with the CCSTs crosstied, ensures that the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems can supply at least 140,000 gallons of makeup water to the RPV. The CS and LPCI suctions are uncovered at the 90,000 gallon level. However, as noted, only one required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem may take credit for the CCST option during OPDRVs. During OPDRVs, the volume in the CCSTs may not provide adequate makeup if the RPV were

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.2.1 (continued)

completely drained. Therefore, only one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is allowed to use the CCSTs. This ensures the other required ECCS subsystem has adequate makeup volume.

The 12 hour Frequency of these SRs was developed considering operating experience related to suppression pool water level and CCST water level variations and instrument drift during the applicable MODES. Furthermore, the 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool or CCST water level condition.

SR 3.5.2.2, SR 3.5.2.4, and SR 3.5.2.5

The Bases provided for SR 3.5.1.1, SR 3.5.1.5, and SR 3.5.1.8 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.2, SR 3.5.2.4, and SR 3.5.2.5, respectively.

SR 3.5.2.3

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The 31 day Frequency is appropriate because the valves are operated under procedural control and the probability of their being mispositioned during this time period is low.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.3.3.4.1.
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B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND ISOLATION CONDENSER (IC) SYSTEM

B 3.5.3 IC System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The IC System is not part of the ECCS; however, the IC System is included with the ECCS section because of their similar functions.

The IC System is designed to operate either automatically or manually following reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation to provide adequate core cooling. Under these conditions, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and IC systems perform similar functions.

The IC System (Ref.1) is a passive high pressure system comprised of one natural circulation heat exchanger, two AC motor-operated isolation valves, two D.C. motor-operated isolation valves, and two tube side high point vent isolation valves to main steam line "A". The IC System functions as a heat sink for decay heat removal from the reactor vessel following reactor scram and isolation from the main condenser. This function prevents overheating of the reactor fuel, controls reactor pressure, and limits the loss of reactor coolant through the relief valves. The IC System is automatically initiated by sustained reactor vessel high pressure and, once activated, remains in operation until manually removed from service.

The isolation condenser shell contains two tube bundles. When the IC System is in operation, both tube bundles are in service.

The IC System is designed to provide core cooling for reactor pressure ≥ 150 psig. The shell side of the condenser has a minimum water level of 6 feet which provides an inventory of $\geq 18,700$ gallons. This minimum level provides $\geq 11,300$ gallons (approximately 3 feet) of water above the top of the tube bundles. The shell side water temperature must be $\leq 210^\circ\text{F}$. During normal plant operations, when the system is in standby, makeup is from the clean demineralized water storage tank. Makeup during IC System operation can be provided from the Condensate

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)	Transfer System. Since during operation of the IC System, water in the shell will boil, the condenser is vented to the atmosphere via one line.
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The function of the IC System is to respond to main steam line isolation events by providing core cooling to the reactor. Although the IC System is an Engineered Safety Feature System, no credit is taken in the accident analyses for IC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, the system satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
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LCO	The OPERABILITY of the IC System provides adequate core cooling such that actuation of any of the low pressure ECCS subsystems is not required in the event of RPV isolation. The IC System reduces the loss of RPV inventory during an isolation event.
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APPLICABILITY	The IC System is required to be OPERABLE during MODE 1, and MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, since IC is the primary non-ECCS source for core cooling when the reactor is isolated and pressurized. In MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure \leq 150 psig, and in MODES 4 and 5, IC is not required to be OPERABLE since the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient core cooling.
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ACTIONS	<u>A.1 and A.2</u> If the IC System is inoperable during MODE 1, or MODE 2 or 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, and the HPCI System is immediately verified to be OPERABLE, the IC System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days. In this Condition, loss of the IC System will not affect the overall plant capability to provide makeup inventory at high reactor pressure since the HPCI System is the only high pressure system assumed to function during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). OPERABILITY of HPCI is therefore verified immediately when the IC System is inoperable. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or
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(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

other information, to determine if HPCI is out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean it is necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the HPCI System. If the OPERABILITY of the HPCI System cannot be immediately verified, however, Condition B must be immediately entered. For transients and certain abnormal events with no LOCA, IC (as opposed to HPCI) is an acceptable source of core cooling which also limits the loss of the RPV water level. Therefore, a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable IC to OPERABLE status.

The 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study (Ref. 2) that evaluated the impact on ECCS availability, assuming various components and subsystems were taken out of service. The results were used to calculate the average availability of ECCS equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA as a function of allowed outage times (AOTs). Because of similar functions of HPCI and IC, the AOTs (i.e., Completion Times) determined for HPCI are also applied to IC.

B.1 and B.2

If the IC System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or if the HPCI System is simultaneously inoperable, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and reactor steam dome pressure reduced to ≤ 150 psig within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.3.1

This SR verifies the water volume and temperature in the shell side of the IC to be sufficient for proper operation. Based on a scram from 2552.3 MWt (101% RTP), a minimum water level of 6 feet at a temperature of $\leq 210^{\circ}\text{F}$ in the condenser

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.3.1 (continued)

provides sufficient decay heat removal capability for 20 minutes of operation without makeup water, before beginning to uncover the tube bundles. The volume and temperature allow sufficient time for the operator to provide makeup to the condenser.

The 24 hour Frequency is based on operating experience related to the trending of the parameter variations during normal operation.

SR 3.5.3.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the IC flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path will exist for IC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The 31 day Frequency of this SR was derived from the Inservice Testing Program requirements for performing valve testing at least once every 92 days. The Frequency of 31 days is further justified because the valves are operated under procedural control and because improper valve position would affect only the IC System. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.5.3.3

The IC System is required to actuate automatically in order to verify its design function satisfactorily. This Surveillance verifies that, with a required system initiation signal (actual or simulated), the automatic initiation logic of the IC System will cause the system to

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.3.3 (continued)

operate as designed; that is, actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed design function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.5.3.4

Verifying the proper flow path and heat exchange capacity for IC System operation ensures the capability of the IC System to remove the design heat load. This SR verifies the IC System capability to remove heat consistent with the design requirements of 252.5×10^6 Btu/hr. The IC System capacity is equivalent to the decay heat rate 5 minutes after a reactor scram.

The 60 month Frequency is based on engineering judgement, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.6.
 2. Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the primary containment is to isolate and contain fission products released from the Reactor Primary System following a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material. The primary containment consists of a drywell, which is a steel pressure vessel, enclosed in reinforced concrete, and a suppression chamber, which is a steel torus-shaped pressure vessel, connected by vent pipes. The primary containment surrounds the Reactor Primary System and provides an essentially leak tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the primary containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
 1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or
 2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)";
- b. The primary containment air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.2, "Primary Containment Air Lock";
- c. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed; and
- d. The sealing mechanism associated with each primary containment penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)	This Specification ensures that the performance of the primary containment, in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	<p>The safety design basis for the primary containment is that it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.</p> <p>The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage.</p> <p>Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary containment are presented in References 1 and 2. The safety analyses assume a nonmechanistic fission product release following a DBA, which forms the basis for determination of offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, based on an assumed leakage rate from the primary containment. OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.</p> <p>The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L_a) is 1.6% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the design basis LOCA peak calculated containment pressure (P_a) of 48 psig.</p> <p>Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).</p>
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LCO	Primary containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to $\leq 1.0 L_a$, except prior to the first startup after performing a required Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage test. At this time, applicable leakage limits must be met. In addition, the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber must be limited to
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(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued) ensure the primary containment pressure and temperature does not exceed design limits. Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses.

Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.2.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.

ACTIONS

A.1

In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2

If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.1

Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet air lock leakage limit (SR 3.6.1.2.1) or main steam isolation valve leakage limit (SR 3.6.1.3.10) does not necessarily result in a failure of this SR. The impact of the failure to meet these SRs must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage test is required to be $< 0.6 L_a$ for combined Type B and C leakage, and $\leq 0.75 L_a$ for overall Type A leakage. At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria is based on an overall Type A leakage limit of $\leq 1.0 L_a$. At $\leq 1.0 L_a$ the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.1.2

Maintaining the pressure suppression function of the primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR measures drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure during a 7.5 minute period to ensure that the leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.

Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure (≥ 1.0 psid) between the drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the measured bypass leakage is $\leq 2\%$ of the acceptable A/\sqrt{K} design value of 0.18 ft^2 (Ref. 4). The leakage test is performed every 24 months. The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.2 (continued)

view of the fact that component failures that might have affected this test are identified by other primary containment SRs. Two consecutive test failures, however, would indicate unexpected primary containment degradation, in this event, the Note indicates, increasing the Frequency to once every 12 months is required until the situation is remedied as evidenced by passing two consecutive tests.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.1.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5.
 3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
 4. Dresden Station Special Report No. 23, "Information Concerning Dresden Units 2 and 3 Drywell to Torus Vacuum Breakers," April 1973.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Lock

BASES

BACKGROUND

One double door primary containment air lock has been built into the primary containment to provide personnel access to the drywell and to provide primary containment isolation during the process of personnel entering and exiting the drywell. The air lock is designed to withstand the same loads, temperatures, and peak design internal and external pressures as the primary containment (Ref. 1). As part of the primary containment, the air lock limits the release of radioactive material to the environment during normal unit operation and through a range of transients and accidents up to and including postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).

Each air lock door has been designed and tested to certify its ability to withstand a pressure in excess of the maximum expected pressure following a DBA in primary containment. Each of the doors contains double gasketed seals and local leakage rate testing capability to ensure pressure integrity. To effect a leak tight seal, the air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e., an increase in primary containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door).

Each air lock is nominally a right circular cylinder, 10 ft in diameter, with doors at each end that are interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening. The air lock is provided with gear driven position indicators on both doors that provide local indication of door position. During periods when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent primary containment entry is necessary. Under some conditions as allowed by this LCO, the primary containment may be accessed through the air lock, when the interlock mechanism has failed, by manually performing the interlock function.

The primary containment air lock forms part of the primary containment pressure boundary. As such, air lock integrity and leak tightness are essential for maintaining primary

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)	containment leakage rate to within limits in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the safety analysis.
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	<p>The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage. The primary containment is designed with a maximum allowable leakage rate (L_a) of 1.6% by weight of the containment air mass per 24 hours at the design basis LOCA peak calculated containment pressure (P_a) of 48 psig (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.</p> <p>Primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is also required to minimize the amount of fission product gases that may escape primary containment through the air lock and contaminate and pressurize the secondary containment.</p> <p>The primary containment air lock satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).</p>
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LCO	<p>As part of the primary containment pressure boundary, the air lock safety function is related to control of containment leakage following a DBA. Thus, the air lock structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.</p> <p>The primary containment air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door to be opened at a time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of primary containment does not exist when primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in the air lock is</p>
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(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued)	sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry or exit from primary containment.
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APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the primary containment air lock is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.
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ACTIONS	<p>The ACTIONS are modified by Note 1, which allows entry and exit to perform repairs of the affected air lock component. If the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily accessed to repair. If the inner door is the one that is inoperable, however, then a short time exists when the containment boundary is not intact (during access through the OPERABLE outer door). The allowance to open the OPERABLE door, even if it means the primary containment boundary is temporarily not intact, is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the primary containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door is expected to be open. The required administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual to assure closure of the OPERABLE door except during entry and exit, and to assure the OPERABLE door is relocked after completion of the containment entry and exit.</p>
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The ACTIONS are modified by a second Note, which ensures appropriate remedial measures are taken when necessary, if air lock leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, actions are not required, even if primary containment leakage is exceeding L_a . Therefore, the Note is added to require ACTIONS for LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," to be taken in this event.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

A.1, A.2, and A.3

With one primary containment air lock door inoperable, the OPERABLE door must be verified closed (Required Action A.1) in the air lock. This ensures that a leak tight primary containment barrier is maintained by the use of an OPERABLE air lock door. This action must be completed within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

In addition, the air lock penetration must be isolated by locking closed the OPERABLE air lock door within the 24 hour Completion Time. The 24 hour Completion Time is considered reasonable for locking the OPERABLE air lock door, considering that the OPERABLE door is being maintained closed.

Required Action A.3 ensures that the air lock penetration has been isolated by the use of a locked closed OPERABLE air lock door. This ensures that an acceptable primary containment leakage boundary is maintained. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate given the low likelihood of a locked door being mispositioned and other administrative controls. Required Action A.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas or areas with limited access due to inerting and allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the appropriate remedial actions. The exception of Note 1 does not affect tracking the Completion Time from the initial entry into Condition A; only the requirement to comply with the Required Actions. Note 2 allows use of the air lock for entry and exit for 7 days under administrative controls.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued)

Primary containment entry may be required to perform Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillances and Required Actions, as well as other activities inside primary containment that are required by TS or activities that support TS-required equipment. This Note is not intended to preclude performing other activities (i.e., non-TS-related activities) if the primary containment was entered, using the inoperable air lock, to perform an allowed activity listed above. The required administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual to assure closure of the OPERABLE door except during entry and exit, and to assure the OPERABLE door is relocked after completion of the containment entry and exit. This allowance is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the primary containment during the short time that the OPERABLE door is expected to be open.

B.1, B.2, and B.3

With an air lock interlock mechanism inoperable, the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are consistent with those specified in Condition A.

The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the appropriate remedial actions. Note 2 allows entry into and exit from the primary containment under the control of a dedicated individual stationed at the air lock to ensure that only one door is opened at a time (i.e., the individual performs the function of the interlock).

Required Action B.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas or areas with limited access due to inerting and that allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1, C.2, and C.3

If the air lock is inoperable for reasons other than those described in Condition A or B, Required Action C.1 requires action to be immediately initiated to evaluate containment overall leakage rates using current air lock leakage test results. An evaluation is acceptable since it is overly conservative to immediately declare the primary containment inoperable if the overall air lock leakage is not within limits. In many instances, primary containment remains OPERABLE, yet only 1 hour (according to LCO 3.6.1.1) would be provided to restore the air lock door to OPERABLE status prior to requiring a plant shutdown. In addition, even with both doors failing the seal test, the overall containment leakage rate can still be within limits.

Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the primary containment air lock must be verified closed. This action must be completed within the 1 hour Completion Time. This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, which require that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

Additionally, the air lock must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours (Required Action C.3). The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable for restoring an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status considering that at least one door is maintained closed in the air lock.

D.1 and D.2

If the inoperable primary containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.2.1

Maintaining the primary containment air lock OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established during initial air lock and primary containment OPERABILITY testing. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR, requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria which are applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the combined Types B and C primary containment leakage rate.

SR 3.6.1.2.2

The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is not normally challenged when the primary containment air lock door is used for entry and exit (procedures require strict adherence to single door opening), this test is only required to be performed every 24 months. The 24 month

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.2.2 (continued)

Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage, and the potential for loss of primary containment OPERABILITY if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate given that the interlock is not challenged during the use of the air lock.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.1.3.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the PCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) to within limits. Primary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a DBA.

The OPERABILITY requirements for PCIVs help ensure that an adequate primary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that primary containment function assumed in the safety analyses will be maintained. These isolation devices are either passive or active (automatic). Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), blind flanges (which include plugs and caps as listed in Reference 1), and closed systems are considered passive devices. Check valves, or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident, are considered active devices. Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration, except for penetrations isolated by excess flow check valves, so that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analyses. One of these barriers may be a closed system.

The reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers serve a dual function, one of which is primary containment isolation. However, since the other safety function of the vacuum breakers would not be available if the normal PCIV actions were taken, the PCIV OPERABILITY requirements are not applicable to the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers valves. Similar surveillance

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

requirements in the LCO for reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers provide assurance that the isolation capability is available without conflicting with the vacuum relief function.

The primary containment purge valves are 18 inches in diameter; vent valves are 2, 6, and 18 inches in diameter. The 18 inch primary containment vent and purge valves are normally maintained closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure the primary containment boundary is maintained except for torus purge valve 1601-56. This valve is normally open for pressure control. This is acceptable since this valve and other vent and purge valves are designed to automatically close on LOCA conditions. The isolation valves on the 18 inch vent lines from the suppression chamber and drywell have 2 inch bypass lines around them for use during normal reactor operation. Use of the 2 inch vent valves will reduce oxygen content during operation and prevent high pressure from reaching the Standby Gas Treatment System filter trains and the Reactor Building Ventilation System in the unlikely event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) during venting.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The PCIVs LCO was derived from the assumptions related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during major accidents. As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment. Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to this LCO.

The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material for which the consequences are mitigated by PCIVs are a LOCA and a main steam line break (MSLB). In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or close within the required isolation times following event initiation. This ensures that potential paths to the environment through PCIVs (including primary containment purge valves) are minimized. Of the events analyzed in References 2 and 3, the LOCA is the most limiting event due to radiological consequences. The closure time of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) is a significant variable from a radiological standpoint. The MSIVs are required to close within 3 to 5 seconds since the

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

3 second closure time is assumed in the MSIV closure (the most severe overpressurization transient) analysis (Ref. 4) and the LOCA analysis (Ref. 2), and the 5 second closure time provides added margin to the 10 seconds assumed in the MSIB analysis (Ref. 3). Likewise, it is assumed that the primary containment isolates such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled.

The DBA analysis assumes that isolation of the primary containment is complete and leakage is terminated, except for the maximum allowable leakage rate, L_a , prior to fuel damage.

The single failure criterion required to be imposed in the conduct of unit safety analyses was considered in the original design of the primary containment vent and purge valves. Two valves in series on each vent and purge line provide assurance that both the supply and exhaust lines could be isolated even if a single failure occurred.

PCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

PCIVs form a part of the primary containment boundary. The PCIV safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the primary containment boundary during a DBA.

The power operated, automatic isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and actuate on an automatic isolation signal. While the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers isolate primary containment penetrations, they are excluded from this Specification. Controls on their isolation function are adequately addressed in LCO 3.6.1.7, "Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers." The valves covered by this LCO are listed with their associated stroke times in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 1).

The normally closed manual PCIVs are considered OPERABLE when the valves are closed and blind flanges are in place, or open under administrative controls. Normally closed automatic PCIVs which are required by design (e.g., to meet

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements) to be de-activated and closed, are considered OPERABLE when the valves are de-activated and closed. These passive isolation valves and devices are those listed in Reference 1.

MSIVs must meet additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing.

This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5. Certain valves, however, are required to be OPERABLE to prevent inadvertent reactor vessel draindown. These valves are those whose associated instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation." (This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.

A.1 and A.2

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, except for MSIV leakage rate not within limit, the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured. For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time (8 hours for main steam lines). The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. For main steam lines, an 8 hour Completion Time is allowed. The Completion Time of 8 hours for the main steam lines allows a period of time to restore the MSIVs to OPERABLE status given the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown.

For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, and no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside primary containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the devices inside primary containment, the time period specified "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the devices and the existence of other administrative controls ensuring that device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action A.2 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

B.1

With one or more penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs inoperable, except for MSIV leakage rate not within limit, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

be isolated within 1 hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

C.1 and C.2

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, except for MSIV leakage rate not within limit, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. The Completion Time of 4 hours for valves other than EFCVs and in penetrations with a closed system is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The Completion Time of 72 hours for penetrations with a closed system is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The closed system must meet the requirements of Reference 5. The Completion Time of 72 hours for EFCVs is also reasonable considering the instrument and the small pipe diameter of penetration (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. This Required Action does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV. For penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions. This Note is necessary since this Condition is written specifically to address those penetrations with a single PCIV.

Required Action C.2 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

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BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

D.1

With the MSIV leakage rate (SR 3.6.1.3.10) not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met. Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 8 hours. Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices. The Completion Time of 8 hours allows a period of time to restore MSIV leakage rate to within limit given the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown.

E.1 and E.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1 and F.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met for PCIV(s) required OPERABLE in MODE 4 or 5, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. Action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. If suspending an OPDRV would result in closing the shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the

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BASES

ACTIONS

F.1 and F.2 (continued)

valve(s) to OPERABLE status. This allows shutdown cooling to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.3.1

This SR ensures that the 18 inch primary containment vent and purge valves are closed as required or, if open, opened for an allowable reason. If a vent or purge valve is opened in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable. The torus purge valve, 1601-56, is normally open for pressure control, therefore this valve is excluded from this SR. However, this is acceptable since this valve is designed to automatically close on LOCA conditions. The SR is modified by a Note stating that the SR is not required to be met when the vent or purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may be opened for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open, provided the drywell vent and purge valves and their associated suppression chamber vent and purge valves are not open simultaneously. The 18 inch vent and purge valves are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other PCIV requirements discussed in SR 3.6.1.3.2.

SR 3.6.1.3.2

This SR verifies that each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions, is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those PCIVs outside primary containment, and capable of being mispositioned, are in the correct position. Since verification of position for

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.3.2 (continued)

PCIVs outside primary containment is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the PCIVs are in the correct positions. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since access to these areas is typically restricted for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

SR 3.6.1.3.3

This SR verifies that each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange located inside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits. For PCIVs inside primary containment, the Frequency "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these PCIVs are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.3.3 (continued)

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

SR 3.6.1.3.4

The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Surveillance of explosive charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will actuate when required. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience that has demonstrated the reliability of the explosive charge continuity.

SR 3.6.1.3.5

Verifying the isolation time of each power operated, automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV full closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.6. The isolation time test ensures that each valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.6.1.3.6

Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the DBA and transient analyses. This ensures that the calculated radiological consequences of these events remain within 10 CFR 100 limits. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.7

Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed only during a unit outage since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt the normal operation of many critical components. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.1.3.8

This SR requires a demonstration that each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve (EFCV) is OPERABLE by verifying that the valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated instrument line break condition. This test is performed by blowing down the instrument line during an inservice leak or hydrostatic test and verifying a distinctive "click" when the poppet valve seats or a quick reduction in flow. This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform as designed. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.3.8 (continued)

transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.1.3.9

The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.4). Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life and operating life, as applicable, of the explosive charges must be followed.

SR 3.6.1.3.10

The analyses in References 2 and 3 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. The leakage rate of each main steam isolation valve path is assumed to be the maximum pathway leakage (leakage through the worse of the two isolation valves). If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed the actual leakage rate is the lesser leakage rate of the two valves. This method of quantifying leakage is only to be used for this SR (i.e., Appendix J maximum pathway leakage limits are to be quantified in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program). The combined leakage through all MSIV leakage paths must be ≤ 46 scfh when tested at ≥ 25 psig. This ensures that MSIV leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

MSIV leakage is considered part of L_a .

(continued)

BASES (continued)

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|------------|-----------------------------------|
| REFERENCES | 1. Technical Requirements Manual. |
| | 2. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5. |
| | 3. UFSAR, Section 15.6.4. |
| | 4. UFSAR, Section 15.2.4. |
| | 5. UFSAR, Section 6.2.4.1. |
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.4 Drywell Pressure

BASES

BACKGROUND	The drywell pressure is limited during normal operations to preserve the initial conditions assumed in the accident analysis for a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	<p>Primary containment performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for postulated LOCAs (Ref. 1). Among the inputs to the DBA is the initial primary containment internal pressure (Ref. 1). Analyses assume an initial drywell pressure of 1.5 psig. This limitation ensures that the safety analysis remains valid by maintaining the expected initial conditions and ensures that the peak LOCA drywell internal pressure does not exceed the maximum allowable of 62 psig.</p> <p>The maximum calculated drywell pressure occurs during the reactor blowdown phase of the DBA, which assumes an instantaneous recirculation line break. The calculated peak drywell pressure for this limiting event is 48 psig (Ref. 1).</p> <p>Drywell pressure satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).</p>
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LCO	In the event of a DBA, with an initial drywell pressure ≤ 1.5 psig, the resultant peak drywell accident pressure will be maintained below the drywell design pressure.
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APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, maintaining drywell pressure within limits is not required in MODE 4 or 5.
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(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1

With drywell pressure not within the limit of the LCO, drywell pressure must be restored within 1 hour. The Required Action is necessary to return operation to within the bounds of the primary containment analysis. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

B.1 and B.2

If drywell pressure cannot be restored to within the limit within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.4.1

Verifying that drywell pressure is within the limit ensures that unit operation remains within the limit assumed in the primary containment analysis. The 12 hour Frequency of this SR was developed, based on operating experience related to trending of drywell pressure variations during the applicable MODES. Furthermore, the 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal drywell pressure condition.

REFERENCES

1. Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3 Plant Unique Analysis Report, COM-02-041, May 1983.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature

BASES

BACKGROUND	The drywell contains the reactor vessel and piping, which add heat to the airspace. Drywell coolers remove heat and maintain a suitable environment. The average airspace temperature affects the calculated response to postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). The limitation on the drywell average air temperature was developed as reasonable, based on operating experience. The limitation on drywell air temperature is used in the Reference 1 safety analyses.
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	<p>Primary containment performance is evaluated for a spectrum of break sizes for postulated loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) (Ref. 1). Among the inputs to the design basis analysis is the initial drywell average air temperature (Ref. 1). Analyses assume an initial average drywell air temperature of 150°F. This limitation ensures that the safety analysis remains valid by maintaining the expected initial conditions and ensures that the peak LOCA drywell temperature does not exceed the maximum allowable temperature of 281°F (Ref. 2). Exceeding this design temperature may result in the degradation of the primary containment structure under accident loads. Equipment inside primary containment required to mitigate the effects of a DBA is designed to operate and be capable of operating under environmental conditions expected for the accident.</p> <p>Drywell air temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).</p>
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LCO	In the event of a DBA, with an initial drywell average air temperature less than or equal to the LCO temperature limit, the resultant peak accident temperature is maintained below the drywell design temperature. As a result, the ability of primary containment to perform its design function is ensured.
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(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, maintaining drywell average air temperature within the limit is not required in MODE 4 or 5.
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ACTIONS	<p><u>A.1</u></p> <p>With drywell average air temperature not within the limit of the LCO, drywell average air temperature must be restored within 8 hours. The Required Action is necessary to return operation to within the bounds of the primary containment analysis. The 8 hour Completion Time is acceptable, considering the sensitivity of the analysis to variations in this parameter, and provides sufficient time to correct minor problems.</p>
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B.1 and B.2

If the drywell average air temperature cannot be restored to within the limit within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<p><u>SR 3.6.1.5.1</u></p>
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Verifying that the drywell average air temperature is within the LCO limit ensures that operation remains within the limits assumed for the primary containment analyses. Drywell air temperature is monitored in various quadrants and at various elevations (referenced to mean sea level) selected to provide a representative sample of the overall drywell atmosphere. Due to the shape of the drywell, a volumetric average is used to determine an accurate representation of the actual average temperature.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENT

SR 3.6.1.5.1 (continued)

The 24 hour Frequency of the SR was developed based on operating experience related to drywell average air temperature variations and temperature instrument drift during the applicable MODES and the low probability of a DBA occurring between surveillances. Furthermore, the 24 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal drywell air temperature condition.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.1.3.
 2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.1.1.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.6 Low Set Relief Valves

BASES

BACKGROUND The relief valves can actuate in either the relief mode, the Automatic Depressurization System mode, or the low set relief mode. In addition, one relief valve is designed to open in the safety mode. (However, for the purposes of this LCO, only the low set relief mode of the relief valves is required.) In the low set relief mode (or power actuated mode of operation), a switch energizes the solenoid to actuate a plunger, which contacts the pilot valve operating lever, thereby, opening the pilot valve. When the pilot valve opens, pressure under the main valve disc is vented. This allows reactor pressure to overcome main valve spring pressure, which forces the main valve disc downward to open the main valve. The main valve can stay open with valve inlet steam pressure as low as 50 psig. Below this pressure, steam pressure may not be sufficient to hold the main valve open against the spring force of the main valve.

Two of the relief valves are equipped to provide the low set relief function. The low set relief setpoints cause the low set relief valves to be opened at a lower pressure than the other relief valves and stay open longer, so that reopening more than two relief valves is prevented on subsequent actuations. Therefore, the low set relief function prevents excessive short duration relief valve cycles with valve actuation at the low set relief setpoint.

Each relief valve discharges steam through a discharge line and quencher to a location near the bottom of the suppression pool, which causes a load on the suppression pool wall. Actuation at lower reactor pressure results in a lower load. A time delay in the low set relief valve logic prevents actuation concurrent with an elevated water level in the discharge line.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The low set relief mode functions to ensure that the containment design basis of no more than two relief valve operating on "subsequent actuations" is met. In other words, multiple simultaneous openings of relief valves (following the initial opening), and the corresponding

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

higher loads, are avoided. The safety analysis demonstrates that the low set relief functions to avoid the induced thrust loads on the relief valve discharge line resulting from "subsequent actuations" of the relief valve during Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). Even though two low set relief valves are specified, only one low set relief valve is required to operate in any DBA analysis.

Low set relief valves satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Two low set relief valves are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the assumptions of the safety analyses (Ref. 1). The requirements of this LCO are applicable to the mechanical and electrical capability of the low set relief valves to function for controlling the opening and closing of the low set relief valves.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, an event could cause pressurization of the reactor and opening of relief valves. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the low set relief valves OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one low set relief valve inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE low set relief valve is adequate to perform the designed function. However, the overall reliability is reduced. The 14 day Completion Time takes into account the redundant capability afforded by the remaining low set relief valve and the low probability of an event occurring during this period in which the remaining low set relief valve capability would be required.

B.1 and B.2

If two low set relief valves are inoperable or if the inoperable low set relief valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.6.1

A manual actuation of each low set relief valve is performed to verify that the valve and solenoids are functioning properly and no blockage exists in the valve discharge line. This can be demonstrated by the response of the turbine control or bypass valve, by a change in the measured steam flow, or by any other method that is suitable to verify steam flow. Adequate reactor steam dome pressure must be available to perform this test to avoid damaging the valve. Also, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the low set relief valves divert steam flow upon opening. Sufficient time is therefore allowed, after the required pressure and flow are achieved, to perform this test. Adequate pressure at which this test is to be performed is ≥ 300 psig (the pressure recommended by the valve manufacturer). Adequate steam flow is represented by at least 2 turbine bypass valves open.

The 24 month Frequency was based on the relief valve tests required by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI (Ref. 2). The Frequency of 24 months ensures that each solenoid for each low set relief valve is tested. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that states the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. Unit startup is allowed prior to performing the test because valve OPERABILITY is verified by Reference 2 prior to valve installation. The 12 hours allowed for manual actuation

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.6.1 (continued)

after the required pressure and flow is reached is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides a reasonable time to complete the SR.

SR 3.6.1.6.2

The low set relief designated relief valves are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals. A system functional test is performed to verify that the mechanical portions (i.e., solenoids) of the low set relief function operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.6.3, "Low Set Relief Valve Instrumentation," overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation. This prevents a reactor pressure vessel pressure blowdown.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.1.3.5.3.
 2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.7 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers is to relieve vacuum when primary containment depressurizes below reactor building pressure. If the drywell depressurizes below reactor building pressure, the negative differential pressure is mitigated by flow through the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers and through the suppression-chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers. The design of the external (reactor building-to-suppression chamber) vacuum relief provisions consists of two vacuum breakers (a mechanical vacuum breaker and an air operated butterfly valve), located in series in each of two parallel 20 inch lines connected to a common 20 inch inlet line from the reactor building. The two parallel 20 inch vacuum breaker lines connect to a common 20 inch line, which, in turn, connects to the suppression chamber airspace. The butterfly valve is actuated by a differential pressure switch. The mechanical vacuum breaker is self actuating (similar to a check valve) and can be locally operated for testing purposes. The two vacuum breakers in series must be closed to maintain a leak tight primary containment boundary.

A negative differential pressure across the drywell wall is caused by rapid depressurization of the drywell. Events that cause this rapid depressurization are cooling cycles, inadvertent primary containment spray actuation, and steam condensation in the event of a primary system rupture. Reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers prevent an excessive negative differential pressure across the primary containment boundary. Cooling cycles result in minor pressure transients in the drywell, which occur slowly and are normally controlled by heating and ventilation equipment. Inadvertent spray actuation results in a more significant pressure transient and becomes important in sizing the external (reactor building-to-suppression chamber) vacuum breakers.

The external vacuum breakers are sized on the basis of the air flow from the secondary containment that is required to mitigate the depressurization transient and limit the

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

maximum negative containment (drywell and suppression chamber) pressure to within design limits. The maximum depressurization rate is a function of the primary containment spray flow rate and temperature and the assumed initial conditions of the primary containment atmosphere. Low spray temperatures and atmospheric conditions that yield the minimum amount of contained noncondensable gases are assumed for conservatism.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers are presented in Reference 1 as part of the accident response of the containment systems. Internal (suppression-chamber-to-drywell) and external (reactor building-to-suppression chamber) vacuum breakers are provided as part of the primary containment to limit the negative differential pressure across the drywell and suppression chamber walls, which form part of the primary containment boundary.

The safety analyses assume the external vacuum breakers to be closed initially, with the mechanical vacuum breakers counter balanced to open at 0.5 psid and to be fully open in 5 seconds. The air operated butterfly valve vacuum breakers are assumed to open concurrent with the mechanical vacuum breakers and be full open in 30 seconds (Ref. 1). Since only one of the two parallel 20 inch vacuum breaker lines is required to protect the suppression chamber from excessive negative differential pressure, the single active failure criterion is satisfied. Design Basis Accident (DBA) analyses assume the vacuum breakers to be closed initially and that at least one vacuum breaker in each line remains closed and leak tight with positive primary containment pressure.

Three cases were considered in the safety analyses to determine the adequacy of the external vacuum breakers:

- a. Inadvertent actuation of one drywell spray loop during normal operation;
- b. Inadvertent actuation of one drywell spray loop during normal operation with the suppression chamber free air volume completely filled with saturated steam; and

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

- c. Inadvertent actuation of one drywell spray loop during normal operation with the suppression chamber free air volume filled with an air/steam mixture.

The results of these three cases show that the external vacuum breakers, with an opening setpoint of 0.5 psid, are capable of maintaining the differential pressure within design limits.

The reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers satisfy 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

All reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the assumptions used in the safety analyses. The requirement ensures that the two vacuum breakers (mechanical vacuum breaker and air operated butterfly valve) in each of the two lines from the reactor building to the suppression chamber airspace are closed (except during testing or when performing their intended function). Also, the requirement ensures both vacuum breakers in each line will open to relieve a negative pressure in the suppression chamber.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could result in excessive negative differential pressure across the drywell wall caused by the rapid depressurization of the drywell. The event that results in the limiting rapid depressurization of the drywell is the primary system rupture, which purges the drywell of air and fills the drywell free airspace with steam. Subsequent condensation of the steam would result in depressurization of the drywell, which, after the suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers open (due to excessive differential pressure between the suppression chamber and drywell), would result in depressurization of the suppression chamber. The limiting pressure and temperature of the primary system prior to a DBA occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3. Excessive negative pressure inside primary containment could occur due to inadvertent initiation of drywell sprays.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breaker line.

A.1

With one or more lines with one vacuum breaker not closed, the leak tight primary containment boundary may be threatened. Therefore, the inoperable vacuum breakers must be restored to OPERABLE status or the open vacuum breaker closed within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the redundancy afforded by the remaining breakers, the fact that the OPERABLE breaker in each of the lines is closed, and the low probability of an event occurring that would require the vacuum breakers to be OPERABLE during this period.

B.1

With one or more lines with two vacuum breakers not closed, primary containment integrity is not maintained. Therefore, one open vacuum breaker must be closed within 1 hour. This Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

C.1

With one line with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, the leak tight primary containment boundary is intact. The ability to mitigate an event that causes a containment depressurization is threatened, however, if both vacuum breakers in at least one vacuum breaker penetration are not OPERABLE. Therefore, the inoperable vacuum breaker must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. This is consistent with the Completion Time for Condition A and the fact that the leak tight primary containment boundary is being maintained.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

D.1

With two lines with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, the primary containment boundary is intact. However, in the event of a containment depressurization, the function of the vacuum breakers is lost. Therefore, all vacuum breakers in one line must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. This Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

E.1 and E.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion time can not be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.7.1

Each vacuum breaker is verified to be closed to ensure that a potential breach in the primary containment boundary is not present. This Surveillance is performed by observing local or control room indications of vacuum breaker position. The 14 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is considered adequate in view of other indications of vacuum breaker status available to operations personnel, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

Two Notes are added to this SR. The first Note allows reactor-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers opened in conjunction with the performance of a Surveillance to not be considered as failing this SR. These periods of opening vacuum breakers are controlled by plant procedures and do not represent inoperable vacuum breakers. The second Note is included to clarify that vacuum breakers open due to an actual differential pressure are not considered as failing this SR.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.6.1.7.2

Each vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens properly to perform its design function and returns to its fully closed position. This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The 92 day Frequency of this SR was developed based upon Inservice Testing Program requirements to perform valve testing at least once every 92 days.

SR 3.6.1.7.3

Demonstration of vacuum breaker opening setpoint is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of ≤ 0.5 psid is valid. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. For this plant, the 24 month Frequency has been shown to be acceptable, based on operating experience, and is further justified because of other surveillances performed at shorter Frequencies that convey the proper functioning status of each vacuum breaker.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.1.2.4.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.8 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers is to relieve vacuum in the drywell. There are 12 internal vacuum breakers installed in 6 parallel lines connecting the suppression chamber to the vent headers of the vent system between the drywell and the suppression chamber. The vacuum breakers allow air and steam flow from the suppression chamber to the drywell when the drywell is at a negative pressure with respect to the suppression chamber. Therefore, suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers prevent an excessive negative differential pressure across the suppression chamber-drywell boundary. Each vacuum breaker is a self actuating valve, similar to a check valve, which can be locally operated for testing purposes.

A negative differential pressure across the drywell wall is caused by rapid depressurization of the drywell. Events that cause this rapid depressurization are cooling cycles, inadvertent drywell spray actuation, and steam condensation from sprays or subcooled water reflood of a break in the event of a primary system rupture. Cooling cycles result in minor pressure transients in the drywell that occur slowly and are normally controlled by heating and ventilation equipment. Spray actuation or spill of subcooled water out of a break results in more significant pressure transients and becomes important in sizing the internal vacuum breakers.

In the event of a primary system rupture, steam condensation within the drywell results in the most severe pressure transient. Following a primary system rupture, air in the drywell is purged into the suppression chamber free airspace, leaving the drywell full of steam. Subsequent condensation of the steam can be caused in two possible ways, namely, Emergency Core Cooling Systems flow from a recirculation line break, or drywell spray actuation following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). These two cases determine the maximum depressurization rate of the drywell.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

In addition, the waterleg in the Mark I Vent System downcomer is controlled by the drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure. If the drywell pressure is less than the suppression chamber pressure, there will be an increase in the vent waterleg. This will result in an increase in the water clearing inertia in the event of a postulated LOCA, resulting in an increase in the peak drywell pressure. This in turn will result in an increase in the pool swell dynamic loads. The internal vacuum breakers limit the height of the waterleg in the vent system during normal operation.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers are presented in Reference 1 as part of the accident response of the primary containment systems. Internal (suppression chamber-to-drywell) and external (reactor building-to-suppression chamber) vacuum breakers are provided as part of the primary containment to limit the negative differential pressure across the drywell and suppression chamber walls that form part of the primary containment boundary.

The safety analyses assume that the internal vacuum breakers are closed initially and are fully open at a differential pressure of 0.5 psid (Ref. 2). Additionally, 3 of the 12 internal vacuum breakers are assumed to fail in a closed position (Ref. 1). The results of the analyses show that the design pressure is not exceeded even under the worst case accident scenario. The vacuum breaker opening differential pressure setpoint and the requirement that 9 of 12 vacuum breakers be OPERABLE are a result of the requirement placed on the vacuum breakers to limit the vent system waterleg height. The vacuum breakers are sized on the basis of the Bodega pressure suppression system tests. These tests were conducted by simulating a small break LOCA, which tend to cause vent system waterleg height variations. The vacuum breaker capacity selected is more than adequate to limit the pressure differential between the suppression chamber and drywell post LOCA with the valves set to operate at 0.5 psid differential pressure. Design Basis Accident (DBA) analyses assume the vacuum breakers to be closed initially and to remain closed and leak tight until the suppression chamber is at a positive pressure relative to the drywell.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	The suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
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LCO	Only 9 of the 12 vacuum breakers must be OPERABLE for opening to provide assurance that the vacuum breakers will open so that drywell-to-suppression chamber negative differential pressure remains below the design value. This LCO also ensures that all suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers are closed (except during testing or when the vacuum breakers are performing their intended design function). The requirement that the vacuum breakers be closed ensures that there is no excessive bypass leakage should a LOCA occur.
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APPLICABILITY	<p>In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could result in excessive negative differential pressure across the drywell wall, caused by the rapid depressurization of the drywell. The event that results in the limiting rapid depressurization of the drywell is the primary system rupture that purges the drywell of air and fills the drywell free airspace with steam. Subsequent condensation of the steam would result in depressurization of the drywell, which, after the suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers open (due to excessive differential pressure between the suppression chamber and drywell), would result in depressurization of the suppression chamber. The limiting pressure and temperature of the primary system prior to a DBA occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3. Excessive negative pressure inside the drywell could occur due to inadvertent actuation of drywell sprays.</p>
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In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced by the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES; therefore, maintaining suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one of the required vacuum breakers inoperable for opening (e.g., a vacuum breaker is not open and may be stuck closed or not within its opening setpoint limit, so that it

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

would not function as designed during an event that depressurized the drywell), the remaining eight OPERABLE vacuum breakers are capable of providing the vacuum relief function. However, overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in one of the remaining vacuum breakers could result in an excessive suppression chamber-to-drywell differential pressure during a DBA. Therefore, with one of the nine required vacuum breakers inoperable, 72 hours is allowed to restore at least one of the inoperable vacuum breakers to OPERABLE status so that plant conditions are consistent with those assumed for the design basis analysis. The 72 hour Completion Time is considered acceptable due to the low probability of an event in which the remaining vacuum breaker capability would not be adequate.

B.1

With one vacuum breaker not closed, communication between the drywell and suppression chamber airspace exists, and, as a result, there is the potential for primary containment overpressurization due to this bypass leakage if a LOCA were to occur. Therefore, the open vacuum breaker must be closed. A short time is allowed to close the vacuum breaker due to the low probability of an event that would pressurize primary containment. The required 4 hour Completion Time is considered adequate to safely plan and complete the manual cycling necessary to close the vacuum breaker which may be located in a high radiation area.

C.1 and C.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.8.1

Each vacuum breaker is verified closed to ensure that this potential large bypass leakage path is not present. This Surveillance is performed by observing the vacuum breaker position indication. The 14 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is considered adequate in view of other indications of vacuum breaker status available to operations personnel, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

Two Notes are added to this SR. The first Note allows suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers opened in conjunction with the performance of a Surveillance to not be considered as failing this SR. These periods of opening vacuum breakers are controlled by plant procedures and do not represent inoperable vacuum breakers. The second Note is included to clarify that vacuum breakers open due to an actual differential pressure are not considered as failing this SR.

SR 3.6.1.8.2

Each required vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens adequately to perform its design function and returns to the fully closed position. This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The 31 day Frequency of this SR was developed, based on Inservice Testing Program requirements to perform valve testing at least once every 92 days. A 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide additional assurance that the vacuum breakers are OPERABLE. In addition, this functional test is required within 12 hours after a discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the relief valves.

SR 3.6.1.8.3

Verification of the vacuum breaker opening setpoint from the closed position is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of 0.5 psid is valid. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.8.3 (continued)

the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency has been shown to be acceptable, based on operating experience, and is further justified because of other surveillances performed at shorter Frequencies that convey the proper functioning status of each vacuum breaker.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.1.2.4.2.
 2. UFSAR, Table 6.2-1.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature

BASES

BACKGROUND

The suppression chamber is a toroidal shaped, steel pressure vessel containing a volume of water called the suppression pool. The suppression pool is designed to absorb the decay heat and sensible energy released during a reactor blowdown from relief valve discharges or from Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). The suppression pool must quench all the steam released through the downcomer lines during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). This is the essential mitigative feature of a pressure suppression containment that ensures that the peak containment pressure is maintained below the maximum allowable pressure for DBAs (62 psig). The suppression pool must also condense steam from steam exhaust lines in the turbine driven High Pressure Coolant Injection System. Suppression pool average temperature (along with LCO 3.6.2.2, "Suppression Pool Water Level") is a key indication of the capacity of the suppression pool to fulfill these requirements.

The technical concerns that lead to the development of suppression pool average temperature limits are as follows:

- a. Complete steam condensation;
 - b. Primary containment peak pressure and temperature;
 - c. Condensation oscillation loads; and
 - d. Chugging loads.
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The postulated DBA against which the primary containment performance is evaluated is the entire spectrum of postulated pipe breaks within the primary containment. Inputs to the safety analyses include initial suppression pool water volume and suppression pool temperature (Reference 1 for LOCAs and Reference 2 for the pool temperature analyses required by Reference 3). An initial pool temperature of 95°F is assumed for the Reference 1, 2, and 4 analyses. Reactor shutdown at a pool temperature of

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

110°F and vessel depressurization at a pool temperature of 120°F are assumed for the Reference 2 analyses. The limit of 105°F, at which testing is terminated, is not used in the safety analyses because DBAs are assumed to not initiate during unit testing.

Suppression pool average temperature satisfies Criteria 2 and 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

A limitation on the suppression pool average temperature is required to provide assurance that the containment conditions assumed for the safety analyses are met. This limitation subsequently ensures that peak primary containment pressures and temperatures do not exceed maximum allowable values during a postulated DBA or any transient resulting in heatup of the suppression pool. The LCO requirements are:

- a. Average temperature $\leq 95^{\circ}\text{F}$ with THERMAL POWER $> 1\%$ RTP and no testing that adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed. This requirement ensures that licensing bases initial conditions are met.
- b. Average temperature $\leq 105^{\circ}\text{F}$ with THERMAL POWER $> 1\%$ RTP and testing that adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed. This required value ensures that the unit has testing flexibility, and was selected to provide margin below the 110°F limit at which reactor shutdown is required. When testing ends, temperature must be restored to $\leq 95^{\circ}\text{F}$ within 24 hours according to Required Action A.2. Therefore, the time period that the temperature is $> 95^{\circ}\text{F}$ is short enough not to cause a significant increase in unit risk.
- c. Average temperature $\leq 110^{\circ}\text{F}$ with THERMAL POWER $\leq 1\%$ RTP. This requirement ensures that the unit will be shut down at $> 110^{\circ}\text{F}$. The pool is designed to absorb decay heat and sensible heat but could be heated beyond design limits by the steam generated if the reactor is not shut down.

At 1% RTP, heat input is approximately equal to normal system heat losses.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause significant heatup of the suppression pool. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining suppression pool average temperature within limits is not required in MODE 4 or 5.
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ACTIONS	<p><u>A.1 and A.2</u></p> <p>With the suppression pool average temperature above the specified limit when not performing testing that adds heat to the suppression pool and when above the specified power limit, the initial conditions exceed the conditions assumed for the Reference 1, 2, and 4 analyses. However, primary containment cooling capability still exists, and the primary containment pressure suppression function will occur at temperatures well above those assumed for safety analyses. Therefore, continued operation is allowed for a limited time. The 24 hour Completion Time is adequate to allow the suppression pool average temperature to be restored below the limit. Additionally, when suppression pool temperature is $> 95^{\circ}\text{F}$, increased monitoring of the suppression pool temperature is required to ensure that it remains $\leq 110^{\circ}\text{F}$. The once per hour Completion Time is adequate based on past experience, which has shown that pool temperature increases relatively slowly except when testing that adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed. Furthermore, the once per hour Completion Time is considered adequate in view of other indications in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool average temperature condition.</p>
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B.1

If the suppression pool average temperature cannot be restored to within limits within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the power must be reduced to $\leq 1\%$ RTP within 12 hours. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce power from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1

Suppression pool average temperature is allowed to be $> 95^{\circ}\text{F}$ with THERMAL POWER $> 1\%$ RTP, and when testing that adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed. However, if temperature is $> 105^{\circ}\text{F}$, all testing must be immediately suspended to preserve the heat absorption capability of the suppression pool. With the testing suspended, Condition A is entered and the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are applicable.

D.1 and D.2

Suppression pool average temperature $> 110^{\circ}\text{F}$ requires that the reactor be shut down immediately. This is accomplished by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Further cooldown to MODE 4 within 36 hours is required at normal cooldown rates (provided pool temperature remains $\leq 120^{\circ}\text{F}$). Additionally, when suppression pool temperature is $> 110^{\circ}\text{F}$, increased monitoring of pool temperature is required to ensure that it remains $\leq 120^{\circ}\text{F}$. The once per 30 minute Completion Time is adequate, based on operating experience. Given the high suppression pool average temperature in this condition, the monitoring Frequency is increased to twice that of Condition A. Furthermore, the 30 minute Completion Time is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool average temperature condition.

E.1 and E.2

If suppression pool average temperature cannot be maintained at $\leq 120^{\circ}\text{F}$, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the reactor pressure must be reduced to < 150 psig within 12 hours, and the plant must be brought to at least MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued)

Continued addition of heat to the suppression pool with suppression pool temperature > 120°F could result in exceeding the design basis maximum allowable values for primary containment temperature or pressure. Furthermore, if a blowdown were to occur when the temperature was > 120°F, the maximum allowable bulk and local temperatures could be exceeded very quickly.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1.1
REQUIREMENTS

The suppression pool average temperature is regularly monitored to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The average temperature is determined by taking an arithmetic average of OPERABLE suppression pool water temperature channels. The 24 hour Frequency has been shown, based on operating experience, to be acceptable. When heat is being added to the suppression pool by testing, however, it is necessary to monitor suppression pool temperature more frequently. The 5 minute Frequency during testing is justified by the rates at which tests will heat up the suppression pool, has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience, and provides assurance that allowable pool temperatures are not exceeded. The Frequencies are further justified in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool average temperature condition.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
 2. NEDC-22170, Dresden 2 and 3 Nuclear Generating Plant Suppression Pool Temperature Response, July 1982.
 3. NUREG-0783.
 4. Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3 Plant Unique Analysis Report, COM-02-041, May 1983.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND

The suppression chamber is a toroidal shaped, steel pressure vessel containing a volume of water called the suppression pool. The suppression pool is designed to absorb the energy associated with decay heat and sensible heat released during a reactor blowdown from relief valve discharges or from a Design Basis Accident (DBA). The suppression pool must quench all the steam released through the downcomer lines during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). This is the essential mitigative feature of a pressure suppression containment, which ensures that the peak containment pressure is maintained below the maximum allowable pressure for DBAs (62 psig). The suppression pool must also condense steam from the steam exhaust line in the turbine driven High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System and provides the main emergency water supply source for the reactor vessel. The suppression pool volume ranges between 116,300 ft³ at the low water level limit of 14 ft 6.5 inches and 119,800 ft³ at the high water level limit of 14 ft 10.5 inches.

If the suppression pool water level is too low, an insufficient amount of water would be available to adequately condense the steam from the relief valve quenchers, downcomer lines, or HPCI turbine exhaust line. Low suppression pool water level could also result in an inadequate emergency makeup water source to the Emergency Core Cooling System. The lower volume would also absorb less steam energy before heating up excessively. Therefore, a minimum suppression pool water level is specified.

If the suppression pool water level is too high, it could result in excessive clearing loads from relief valve discharges and excessive pool swell loads during a DBA LOCA. Therefore, a maximum pool water level is specified. This LCO specifies an acceptable range to prevent the suppression pool water level from being either too high or too low.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	Initial suppression pool water level affects suppression pool temperature response calculations, calculated drywell pressure during vent clearing for a DBA, calculated pool swell loads for a DBA LOCA, and calculated loads due to relief valve discharges. Suppression pool water level must be maintained within the limits specified so that the safety analysis of Reference 1 remains valid.
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Suppression pool water level satisfies Criteria 2 and 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO	A limit that suppression pool water level be ≥ 14 ft 6.5 inches and ≤ 14 ft 10.5 inches above the bottom of the suppression chamber is required to ensure that the primary containment conditions assumed for the safety analyses are met. Either the high or low water level limits were used in the safety analyses, depending upon which is more conservative for a particular calculation.
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APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA would cause significant loads on the primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. The requirements for maintaining suppression pool water level within limits in MODE 4 or 5 is addressed in LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - Shutdown."
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ACTIONS

A.1

With suppression pool water level outside the limits, the conditions assumed for the safety analyses are not met. If water level is below the minimum level, the pressure suppression function still exists as long as the downcomers are covered, HPCI turbine exhaust is covered, and relief valve quenchers are covered. If suppression pool water level is above the maximum level, protection against overpressurization still exists due to the margin in the peak containment pressure analysis and the capability of the Suppression Pool Spray System. Therefore, continued operation for a limited time is allowed. The 2 hour Completion Time is sufficient to restore suppression pool water level to within limits. Also, it takes into account the low probability of an event impacting the suppression pool water level occurring during this interval.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

If suppression pool water level cannot be restored to within limits within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.2.1

Verification of the suppression pool water level is to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The 24 hour Frequency has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience. Furthermore, the 24 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool water level condition.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.2.3 Suppression Pool Cooling

BASES

BACKGROUND Following a Design Basis Accident (DBA), the Suppression Pool Cooling System removes heat from the suppression pool. The suppression pool is designed to absorb the sudden input of heat from the primary system. In the long term, the pool continues to absorb residual heat generated by fuel in the reactor core. Some means must be provided to remove heat from the suppression pool so that the temperature inside the primary containment remains within design limits. This function is provided by two redundant suppression pool cooling subsystems. The purpose of this LCO is to ensure that both subsystems are OPERABLE in applicable MODES.

Each suppression pool cooling subsystem contains two pumps and one heat exchanger and is manually initiated and independently controlled. The two subsystems perform the suppression pool cooling function by circulating water from the suppression pool through the containment cooling heat exchangers and returning it to the suppression pool. Containment cooling service water, circulating through the tube side of the heat exchangers, exchanges heat with the suppression pool water and discharges this heat to the external heat sink.

The heat removal capability of one low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) pump in one subsystem is sufficient to meet the overall DBA pool cooling requirement for loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and transient events such as a turbine trip or stuck open relief valve. Relief valve leakage and High Pressure Coolant Injection System testing increase suppression pool temperature more slowly. The Suppression Pool Cooling System is also used to lower the suppression pool water bulk temperature following such events.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Reference 1 contains the results of analyses used to predict primary containment pressure and temperature following large and small break LOCAs. The intent of the analyses is to demonstrate that the heat removal capacity of the Suppression Pool Cooling System is adequate to maintain the

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

primary containment conditions within design limits. The suppression pool temperature is calculated to remain below the design limit.

The Suppression Pool Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

During a DBA, a minimum of one suppression pool cooling subsystem is required to maintain the primary containment peak pressure and temperature below design limits (Ref. 1). To ensure that these requirements are met, two suppression pool cooling subsystems must be OPERABLE with power from two safety related independent power supplies. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one subsystem is OPERABLE assuming the worst case single active failure. A suppression pool cooling subsystem is OPERABLE when one of the pumps, the heat exchanger, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls are OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause both a release of radioactive material to primary containment and a heatup and pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, the Suppression Pool Cooling System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one suppression pool cooling subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE suppression pool cooling subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment cooling function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment cooling capability. The 7 day Completion Time is acceptable in light of the redundant suppression pool cooling capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

With two suppression pool cooling subsystems inoperable, one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. In this condition, there is a substantial loss of the primary containment pressure and temperature mitigation function. The 8 hour Completion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and the potential avoidance of a plant shutdown transient that could result in the need for the suppression pool cooling subsystems to operate.

C.1 and C.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.3.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the suppression pool cooling mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the accident analysis. This is acceptable since the suppression pool cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Frequency of 31 days is justified because the valves are operated under procedural control, improper valve position would affect only a single subsystem, the probability of an

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.3.1 (continued)

event requiring initiation of the system is low, and the system is a manually initiated system. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience.

SR 3.6.2.3.2

Verifying that each required LPCI pump develops a flow rate ≥ 5000 gpm while operating in the suppression pool cooling mode with flow through the associated heat exchanger ensures that the primary containment peak pressure and temperature can be maintained below the design limits during a DBA (Ref. 1). The flow is a normal test of centrifugal pump performance required by ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 2). This test confirms one point on the pump design curve, and the results are indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
 2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.2.4 Suppression Pool Spray

BASES

BACKGROUND

Following a Design Basis Accident (DBA), the Suppression Pool Spray System removes heat from the suppression chamber airspace. The suppression pool is designed to absorb the sudden input of heat from the primary system from a DBA or a rapid depressurization of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) through relief valves. The heat addition to the suppression pool results in increased steam in the suppression chamber, which increases primary containment pressure. Steam blowdown from a DBA can also bypass the suppression pool and end up in the suppression chamber airspace. Some means must be provided to remove heat from the suppression chamber so that the pressure and temperature inside primary containment remain within analyzed design limits. This function is provided by two redundant suppression pool spray subsystems. The purpose of this LCO is to ensure that both subsystems are OPERABLE in applicable MODES.

Each of the two suppression pool spray subsystems contains two pumps and one heat exchanger, which are manually initiated and independently controlled. The two subsystems perform the suppression pool spray function by circulating water from the suppression pool through the containment cooling heat exchangers and returning it to the suppression pool spray sparger. The sparger only accommodates a small portion of the total low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) pump flow; the remainder of the flow returns to the suppression pool through the suppression pool cooling return line or minimum flow line. Thus, both suppression pool cooling and suppression pool spray functions may be performed when the Suppression Pool Spray System is initiated. Containment cooling service water, circulating through the tube side of the heat exchangers, exchanges heat with the suppression pool water and discharges this heat to the external heat sink. Either suppression pool spray subsystem is sufficient to condense the steam from small bypass leaks from the drywell to the suppression chamber airspace during the postulated DBA.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	Reference 1 contains the results of analyses used to predict primary containment pressure and temperature following large and small break loss of coolant accidents. The intent of the analyses is to demonstrate that the pressure reduction capacity of the Suppression Pool Spray System is adequate to maintain the primary containment conditions within design limits. The time history for primary containment pressure is calculated to demonstrate that the maximum pressure remains below the design limit.
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The Suppression Pool Spray System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO	In the event of a DBA, a minimum of one suppression pool spray subsystem is required to mitigate potential bypass leakage paths and maintain the primary containment peak pressure below the design limits (Ref. 1). To ensure that these requirements are met, two suppression pool spray subsystems must be OPERABLE with power from two safety related independent power supplies. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one subsystem is OPERABLE assuming the worst case single active failure. A suppression pool spray subsystem is OPERABLE when one of the pumps, the heat exchanger, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls are OPERABLE.
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APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining suppression pool spray subsystems OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5.
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ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u> With one suppression pool spray subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE suppression pool spray subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment bypass leakage mitigation function.
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(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment bypass mitigation capability. The 7 day Completion Time was chosen in light of the redundant suppression pool spray capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1

With both suppression pool spray subsystems inoperable, at least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. In this condition, there is a substantial loss of the primary containment bypass leakage mitigation function. The 8 hour Completion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and because alternative methods to reduce pressure in the primary containment are available.

C.1 and C.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.4.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the suppression pool spray mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.4.1 (continued)

accident analysis. This is acceptable since the suppression pool spray mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Frequency of 31 days is justified because the valves are operated under procedural control, improper valve position would affect only a single subsystem, the probability of an event requiring initiation of the system is low, and the system is a manually initiated system. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience.

SR 3.6.2.4.2

This Surveillance is performed every 10 years to verify that the spray nozzles are not obstructed and that spray flow will be provided when required. The 10 year Frequency is adequate to detect degradation in performance due to the passive nozzle design and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.2.5 Drywell-to-Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure

BASES

BACKGROUND	The toroidal shaped suppression chamber, which contains the suppression pool, is connected to the drywell (part of the primary containment) by eight main vent pipes. The main vent pipes exhaust into a continuous vent header, from which 96 downcomer pipes extend into the suppression pool. The pipe exit is 3.67 ft below the minimum suppression pool water level required by LCO 3.6.2.2, "Suppression Pool Water Level." During a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the increasing drywell pressure will force the waterleg in the downcomer pipes into the suppression pool at substantial velocities as the "blowdown" phase of the event begins. The length of the waterleg has a significant effect on the resultant primary containment pressures and loads.
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The purpose of maintaining the drywell at a slightly higher pressure with respect to the suppression chamber is to minimize the drywell pressure increase necessary to clear the downcomer pipes to commence condensation of steam in the suppression pool and to minimize the mass of the accelerated water leg. This reduces the hydrodynamic loads on the torus during the LOCA blowdown. The required differential pressure results in a downcomer waterleg of 3.21 to 3.54 ft.
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Initial drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure affects both the dynamic pool loads on the suppression chamber and the peak drywell pressure during downcomer pipe clearing during a Design Basis Accident LOCA. Drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure must be maintained within the specified limits so that the safety analysis remains valid.

Drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO	A drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure limit of 1.0 psid is required to ensure that the containment conditions assumed in the safety analyses are met. A
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(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued) drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure of
< 1.0 psid corresponds to a downcomer water leg of
> 3.54 ft. Failure to maintain the required differential
pressure could result in excessive forces on the suppression
chamber due to higher water clearing loads from downcomer
vents and higher pressure buildup in the drywell.

A Note is provided to allow for periods of up to 4 hours
when the LCO is not required to be met during the
performance of required Surveillances that reduce the
differential pressure. The 4 hour time is acceptable since
the probability of a DBA LOCA occurring during this time is
low.

APPLICABILITY Drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure must be
controlled when the primary containment is inert. The
primary containment must be inert in MODE 1, since this is
the condition with the highest probability for an event that
could produce hydrogen. It is also the condition with the
highest probability of an event that could impose large
loads on the primary containment.

Inerting primary containment is an operational problem
because it prevents primary containment access without an
appropriate breathing apparatus. Therefore, the primary
containment is inerted as late as possible in the unit
startup and is de-inerted as soon as possible in the unit
shutdown. As long as reactor power is < 15% RTP, the
probability of an event that generates hydrogen or excessive
loads on primary containment occurring within the first
24 hours following a startup or within the last 24 hours
prior to a shutdown is low enough that these "windows," with
the primary containment not inerted, are also justified.
The 24 hour time period is a reasonable amount of time to
allow plant personnel to perform inerting or de-inerting.

ACTIONS

A.1

If drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure is
not within the limit, the conditions assumed in the safety
analyses are not met and the differential pressure must be
restored to within the limit within 24 hours. The 24 hour
Completion Time provides sufficient time to restore

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

differential pressure to within limit and takes into account the low probability of an event that would create excessive suppression chamber loads occurring during this time period.

B.1

If the differential pressure cannot be restored to within limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by reducing power to $\leq 15\%$ RTP within 8 hours. The 8 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce reactor power from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.5.1

The drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure is regularly monitored to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The 12 hour Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience relative to differential pressure variations and pressure instrument drift during applicable MODES and by assessing the proximity to the specified LCO differential pressure limit. Furthermore, the 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal pressure condition.

REFERENCES

None.

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.3.1 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration

BASES

BACKGROUND The primary containment is designed to withstand events that generate hydrogen either due to the zirconium metal water reaction in the core or due to radiolysis. The primary method to control hydrogen is to inert the primary containment. With the primary containment inerted, that is, oxygen concentration < 4.0 volume percent (v/o), a combustible mixture cannot be present in the primary containment for any hydrogen concentration. The capability to inert the primary containment and maintain oxygen < 4.0 v/o provides a method to mitigate events that produce hydrogen and oxygen. For example, an event that rapidly generates hydrogen from zirconium metal water reaction will result in excessive hydrogen in primary containment, but oxygen concentration will remain < 4.0 v/o and no combustion can occur. Long term generation of both hydrogen and oxygen from radiolytic decomposition of water may eventually result in a combustible mixture in primary containment. Radiolysis is the only significant reaction mechanism whereby oxygen, the limiting combustion reactant, is produced within the containment. The Technical Specification requirement to inert the primary containment and maintain oxygen < 4.0 v/o, in conjunction with the elimination of potential sources of air and oxygen (other than by radiolysis) from entering the primary containment provide assurance that the amount of oxygen that could be introduced into the containment will not cause the containment to become de-inerted within the first 30 days after an accident. This is consistent with the requirements of Generic Letter 84-09 (Ref. 1) for plants without recombiners. This LCO ensures that oxygen concentration does not exceed 4.0 v/o during operation in the applicable conditions.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The Reference 2 calculations assume that the primary containment is inerted when a Design Basis Accident loss of coolant accident occurs. Thus, the hydrogen assumed to be released to the primary containment as a result of metal water reaction in the reactor core will not produce

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

combustible gas mixtures in the primary containment. Oxygen, which is subsequently generated by radiolytic decomposition of water, will not result in the primary containment becoming de-inerted within the first 30 days following an accident.

Primary containment oxygen concentration satisfies 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The primary containment oxygen concentration is maintained < 4.0 v/o to ensure that an event that produces any amount of hydrogen and oxygen does not result in a combustible mixture inside primary containment.

APPLICABILITY

The primary containment oxygen concentration must be within the specified limit when primary containment is inerted, except as allowed by the relaxations during startup and shutdown addressed below. The primary containment must be inert in MODE 1, since this is the condition with the highest probability of an event that could produce hydrogen and oxygen.

Inerting the primary containment is an operational problem because it prevents containment access without an appropriate breathing apparatus. Therefore, the primary containment is inerted as late as possible in the plant startup and de-inerted as soon as possible in the plant shutdown. As long as reactor power is < 15% RTP, the potential for an event that generates significant hydrogen and oxygen is low and the primary containment need not be inert. Furthermore, the probability of an event that generates hydrogen occurring within the first 24 hours of a startup, or within the last 24 hours before a shutdown, is low enough that these "windows," when the primary containment is not inerted, are also justified. The 24 hour time period is a reasonable amount of time to allow plant personnel to perform inerting or de-inerting.

ACTIONS

A.1

If oxygen concentration is ≥ 4.0 v/o at any time while operating in MODE 1, with the exception of the relaxations allowed during startup and shutdown, oxygen concentration

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

must be restored to < 4.0 v/o within 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time is allowed when oxygen concentration is ≥ 4.0 v/o because of the availability of other hydrogen and oxygen mitigating systems (e.g., post-accident nitrogen purge) and the low probability and long duration of an event that would generate significant amounts of hydrogen and oxygen occurring during this period.

B.1

If oxygen concentration cannot be restored to within limits within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, power must be reduced to $\leq 15\%$ RTP within 8 hours. The 8 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce reactor power from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.3.1.1

The primary containment must be determined to be inerted by verifying that oxygen concentration is < 4.0 v/o. The 7 day Frequency is based on the slow rate at which oxygen concentration can change and on other indications of abnormal conditions (which could lead to more frequent checking by operators in accordance with plant procedures). Also, this Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

REFERENCES

1. Generic Letter 84-09, May 1984.
 2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.5.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment

BASES

BACKGROUND The function of the secondary containment is to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and closure of certain valves whose lines penetrate the secondary containment, the secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations that take place inside primary containment, when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment.

The secondary containment is a structure that completely encloses both primary containments and those components that may be postulated to contain primary system fluid. This structure forms a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products. It is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the environmental pressure (e.g., due to pump and motor heat load additions). To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the secondary containment to be designed as a conventional structure, the secondary containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure. Requirements for these systems are specified separately in LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES There are two principal accidents for which credit is taken for secondary containment OPERABILITY. These are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident (Ref. 2). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to each of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained, the hatches and blowout panels must be closed and sealed, the sealing mechanisms (e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings) associated with each secondary containment penetration must be OPERABLE (such that secondary containment leak tightness can be maintained), and all inner or all outer doors in each secondary containment access opening must be closed.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1

If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2

If secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1, C.2, and C.3

Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment. CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1, C.2, and C.3 (continued)

specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.1.1

This SR ensures that the secondary containment boundary is sufficiently leak tight to preclude exfiltration under expected wind conditions. The 24 hour Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience related to secondary containment vacuum variations during the applicable MODES and the low probability of a DBA occurring.

Furthermore, the 24 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal secondary containment vacuum condition.

SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.4

Verifying that one secondary containment access door in each access opening is closed and each equipment hatch is closed and sealed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. In addition, for equipment hatches that are floor plugs, the "sealed" requirement is effectively met by gravity. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in the access opening is closed. An access opening contains one inner and one outer door. In some cases a secondary containment barrier contains multiple inner or multiple outer doors. For these cases, the access openings share the inner door or the outer door, i.e., the access openings have a common inner door or outer door. The intent is to not breach the secondary containment at any

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 (continued)

time when secondary containment is required. This is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times, i.e., all inner doors closed or all outer doors closed. Thus each access opening has one door closed. However, all secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening. The 31 day Frequency for SR 3.6.4.1.2 has been shown to be adequate, based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other indications of door status that are available to the operator. The 24 month Frequency for SR 3.6.4.1.4 is considered adequate in view of the existing administrative controls on equipment hatches.

SR 3.6.4.1.3

The SGT System exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. Each SGT subsystem is designed to maintain the secondary containment at ≥ 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour at a flow rate of ≤ 4000 cfm. To ensure that all fission products released to the secondary containment are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.3 verifies that a pressure in the secondary containment that is less than the lowest postulated pressure external to the secondary containment boundary can be maintained. When the SGT System is operating as designed, the maintenance of secondary containment pressure cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.3 demonstrates that the pressure in the secondary containment can be maintained ≥ 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour using one SGT subsystem at a flow rate ≤ 4000 cfm. The 1 hour test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. The primary purpose of the SR is to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. The secondary purpose of the SR is to ensure that the SGT subsystem being tested functions as designed. There is a separate LCO with Surveillance Requirements that serves the primary purpose of ensuring OPERABILITY of the SGT System. This SR need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. The SGT subsystem used for this Surveillance is staggered to ensure that in

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.1.3 (continued)

addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, either SGT subsystem will perform this test. The inoperability of the SGT System does not necessarily constitute a failure of this Surveillance relative to secondary containment OPERABILITY. Operating experience has shown the secondary containment boundary usually passes the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.7.3.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the SCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Refs. 1 and 2). Secondary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment following a DBA, or that are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE or take place outside primary containment, are maintained within the secondary containment boundary.

The OPERABILITY requirements for SCIVs help ensure that an adequate secondary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. These isolation devices consist of either passive devices or active (automatic) devices. Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), and blind flanges are considered passive devices.

Automatic SCIVs (i.e., dampers) close on a secondary containment isolation signal to establish a boundary for untreated radioactive material within secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents.

Other penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary containment barrier to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for which the secondary containment boundary is required are a loss of coolant accident (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident (Ref. 2). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events, but the boundary established by SCIVs is required to ensure that

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

leakage from the primary containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System before being released to the environment.

Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

SCIVs form a part of the secondary containment boundary. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The power operated, automatic, isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3).

The normally closed manual SCIVs are considered OPERABLE when the valves are closed and blind flanges are in place, or open under administrative controls. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Reference 3.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

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BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.

The second Note provides clarification, that for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV.

A.1 and A.2

In the event that there are one or more penetration flow paths with one SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to secondary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration, and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time is very low.

For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, but no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is appropriate because the isolation devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that the affected penetration remains isolated.

Required Action A.2 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

B.1

With two SCIVs in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 4 hours. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time, is very low.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

The Condition has been modified by a Note stating that Condition B is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two isolation valves. This clarifies that only Condition A is entered if one SCIV is inoperable in each of two penetrations.

C.1 and C.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.1, D.2, and D.3

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action D.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

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BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.2.1

This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those SCIVs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

Since these SCIVs are readily accessible to personnel during normal operation and verification of their position is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the SCIVs are in the correct positions. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these SCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

A second Note has been included to clarify that SCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.6.4.2.2

Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated, automatic SCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. The Frequency of this SR is 92 days.

SR 3.6.4.2.3

Verifying that each automatic SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents. This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a secondary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.6.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.7.3.
 3. Technical Requirements Manual.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The SGT System is required by UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.4.12 (Ref. 1). The function of the SGT System is to ensure that radioactive materials that leak from the primary containment into the secondary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) are filtered and adsorbed prior to exhausting to the environment.

The SGT System consists of two fully redundant subsystems that are shared between Unit 2 and Unit 3, each with its own set of ductwork, dampers, charcoal filter train, and controls.

Each charcoal filter train consists of (components listed in order of the direction of the air flow):

- a. A demister;
- b. An electric heater;
- c. A rough prefilter;
- d. A high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter;
- e. A charcoal adsorber;
- f. A second HEPA afterfilter; and
- g. A centrifugal fan.

The sizing of the SGT System equipment and components is based on the results of an infiltration analysis, as well as an exfiltration analysis of the secondary containment. Each SGT subsystem is capable of processing the secondary containment volume, which includes both Unit 2 and Unit 3. The internal pressure of the secondary containment is maintained at a negative pressure of ≥ 0.25 inches water gauge when the SGT System is in operation, which represents the internal pressure required to ensure zero exfiltration of air from the building, even at wind speeds of 100 mph.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

The demister is provided to remove entrained water in the air, while the electric heater reduces the relative humidity of the airstream to less than 70% (Ref. 2). The prefilter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter removes fine particulate matter and protects the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorber removes gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter collects any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.

The SGT System automatically starts and operates in response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system. Following initiation, the primary charcoal filter train inlet damper opens, the cooling damper closes, the associated fan starts, and the fan discharge damper opens. When sufficient flow develops, the heater turns on and the flow control damper begins modulating to control system flow and maintain a negative pressure in the secondary containment. If either a low flow or heater off condition exists for the primary subsystem after 20 seconds, the primary subsystem is tripped and the standby SGT subsystem starts.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The design basis for the SGT System is to mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accidents (Ref. 3 and 4). For these analyzed events, the SGT System is assumed to be manually initiated after 10 minutes to reduce, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Following a DBA, a minimum of one SGT subsystem is required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for two OPERABLE subsystems ensures operation of at least one SGT subsystem in the event of a single active failure.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY
(continued)

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT System in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status in 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT System and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2

If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem should immediately be placed in operation. This action

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3 (continued)

ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities must not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

D.1

If both SGTS subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT system may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. Therefore, one SGT subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of supporting the required radioactivity release control function in MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring the SGT System) occurring during periods where the required radioactivity release control function may not be maintained is minimal.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

E.1 and E.2

If one SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1, F.2, and F.3

When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action F.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.3.1

Operating (from the control room using the manual initiation switch) each SGT subsystem for ≥ 10 continuous hours ensures that both subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation with the heaters on (automatic heater cycling to maintain temperature) for ≥ 10 continuous hours every 31 days eliminates moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31 day Frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and controls and the redundancy available in the system.

SR 3.6.4.3.2

This SR verifies that the required SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The SGT System filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 5). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.6.4.3.3

This SR verifies that each SGT subsystem starts on receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.6.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. Therefore, the Frequency was found to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

- REFERENCES
1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.4.12.
 2. UFSAR, Section 6.5.3.2.
 3. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5.
 4. UFSAR, Section 15.7.3.
 5. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2.
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B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.1 Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The CCSW System is designed to provide cooling water for the containment cooling heat exchangers, required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. The CCSW System is operated whenever the containment cooling heat exchangers are required to operate in the suppression pool cooling or containment spray mode of the LPCI System.

The CCSW System consists of two independent and redundant subsystems. Each subsystem is made up of a header, two 3500 gpm pumps, a suction source, valves, piping, heat exchanger, and associated instrumentation. Either of the two subsystems is capable of providing the required cooling capacity with two pumps operating to maintain safe shutdown conditions. Also, when available, both subsystems with one pump operating in each subsystem are capable of providing the required cooling capacity to maintain safe shutdown conditions. The two subsystems are separated from each other (and cannot be cross connected), so that failure of one subsystem will not affect the OPERABILITY of the other subsystem. The CCSW System is designed with sufficient redundancy so that no single active component failure can prevent it from achieving its design function. The CCSW System is described in the UFSAR, Section 9.2.1, Reference 1.

Cooling water is pumped by the CCSW pumps from the associated crib house suction bay through the tube side of the containment cooling heat exchangers, and discharges to the Service Water (SW) 48-inch discharge header and subsequently to the cooling lake or Illinois River. The normal and ultimate heat sink (UHS) cooling water sources for the CCSW System are described in UFSAR, Section 9.2.5 (Ref. 2). The SW System and the discharge flow paths to the cooling lake and Illinois River are described in UFSAR, Sections 9.2.2 and 2.4.8 (Refs. 3 and 4), respectively.

The system is initiated manually from the control room. If operating and a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) occurs, the

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

system is automatically tripped to allow the diesel generators to automatically power only that equipment necessary to reflood the core. The system can be manually started any time the LOCA signal is manually overridden or clears and adequate electrical power is available.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The CCSW System removes heat from the suppression pool to limit the suppression pool temperature and primary containment pressure following a LOCA. This ensures that the primary containment can perform its function of limiting the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a LOCA. The ability of the CCSW System to support long term cooling of the primary containment is discussed in UFSAR, Section 6.2.2 (Ref. 5). This analysis explicitly assumes that the CCSW System will provide adequate cooling support to the equipment required for safe shutdown. This analysis includes the evaluation of the long term primary containment response after a design basis LOCA.

Analyses for long term cooling were performed for one LPCI pump, two CCSW pumps, and one containment cooling heat exchanger (this assumes a single failure of an emergency diesel generator) using different pump flow rates and heat exchanger performance values which were also evaluated for the various flows. As discussed in the UFSAR, Section 6.2.1.3.2 (Ref. 6) for these analyses, manual initiation of the OPERABLE CCSW subsystem and containment cooling are assumed to occur 10 minutes after a DBA. The CCSW flow assumed in the analyses is 2500 gpm per pump with two pumps operating in one loop. In this case, the maximum suppression chamber water temperature and pressure are 178.6°F and 9.8 psig, respectively, well below the design temperature of 281°F and maximum allowable pressure of 62 psig.

The CCSW System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Two CCSW subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

A CCSW subsystem is considered OPERABLE when:

- a. Two pumps are OPERABLE; and
- b. An OPERABLE flow path is capable of taking suction from the UHS and transferring the water to the containment cooling heat exchanger and separately to the associated safety related equipment at the assumed flow rate.

An adequate suction source is not addressed in this LCO since the minimum net positive suction head and maximum suction source temperature are covered by the requirements specified in LCO 3.7.3, "Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)."

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the CCSW System is required to be OPERABLE to support the OPERABILITY of primary containment cooling (LCO 3.6.2.3, "Suppression Pool Cooling," and LCO 3.6.2.4, "Suppression Pool Spray"). The Applicability is therefore consistent with the requirements of these systems.

The CCSW System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 as it does not support or otherwise affect Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System operation. The Unit 2 CCSW System is required to be OPERABLE during the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). At least one Unit 2 CCSW pump, the Ultimate Heat Sink, and a flow path are required during these conditions to provide backup cooling to the condensing unit of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System (LCO 3.7.4, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System").

ACTIONS

A.1

With one CCSW pump inoperable, the inoperable pump must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE CCSW pumps are adequate to perform the CCSW heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced CCSW capability. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the remaining CCSW heat removal capability and the low probability of a DBA with concurrent worst case single failure.

B.1

With one CCSW pump inoperable in each subsystem, if no additional failures occur in the CCSW System, then the remaining OPERABLE pumps and flow paths provide adequate heat removal capacity for long term containment cooling to maintain safe shutdown conditions. One inoperable pump is required to be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time for restoring one inoperable CCSW pump to OPERABLE status is based on engineering judgment, considering the level of redundancy provided and the low probability of an event occurring requiring CCSW during this period.

C.1

Required Action C.1 is intended to handle the inoperability of one CCSW subsystem for reasons other than Condition A. The Completion Time of 7 days is allowed to restore the CCSW subsystem to OPERABLE status. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE CCSW subsystem is adequate to perform the CCSW heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CCSW subsystem could result in loss of CCSW function. The Completion Time is based on the redundant CCSW capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of an event occurring requiring CCSW during this period.

D.1

With both CCSW subsystems inoperable (e.g., both subsystems with inoperable pumps(s) or flow paths, or one subsystem with an inoperable pump and one subsystem with an inoperable

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 (continued)

flow path), the CCSW System is not capable of performing its intended function. At least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. The 8 hour Completion Time for restoring one CCSW subsystem to OPERABLE status, is based on the Completion Times provided for the suppression pool cooling and spray functions.

E.1 and E.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions A, B, C, or D are not met, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.1.1

Verifying the correct alignment for each manual and power operated valve in each CCSW subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for CCSW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be realigned to its accident position. This is acceptable because the CCSW System is a manually initiated system.

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

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|------------|------------------------------|
| REFERENCES | 1. UFSAR, Section 9.2.1. |
| | 2. UFSAR, Section 9.2.5. |
| | 3. UFSAR, Section 9.2.2. |
| | 4. UFSAR, Section 2.4.8. |
| | 5. UFSAR, Section 6.2.2. |
| | 6. UFSAR, Section 6.2.1.3.2. |
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B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DGCW) System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The DGCW System is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from the two diesel generator (DG) heat exchangers. Each DGCW subsystem provides cooling water to its associated DG. The DGCW System can also be used as an alternate water supply for containment cooling service water (CCSW) keep fill and can be aligned to provide cooling water to the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) room coolers. However, the sole safety related function of the DGCW System is to provide cooling water to the DG heat exchangers.

The DGCW pump autostarts upon receipt of a DG start signal when power is available to the pump's electrical bus. Cooling water is pumped from the crib house circulating water bays by the DGCW pump to the associated DG heat exchangers. After removing heat from the heat exchangers, the water is discharged to a service water (SW) discharge header. A cross tie header allows the DGCW pumps to take suction from alternate circulating water bays when a bay is unavailable. Also, the capability exists to align the DGCW subsystem associated with either DG2 or DG3 to provide cooling water to the DG 2/3 heat exchangers. However, the DGCW pump associated with DG2 or DG3 would not auto-start on a DG 2/3 start signal. Furthermore, the DGCW pumps can only provide sufficient cooling for its associated (two) heat exchangers. A complete description of the DGCW System is presented in the UFSAR, Section 9.5.5 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The ability of the DGCW System to provide adequate cooling to the DG heat exchangers is an implicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in the UFSAR, Chapters 6 and 15 (Refs. 2 and 3, respectively). The ability to provide onsite emergency AC power is dependent on the ability of the DGCW System to cool the DGs.

The DGCW System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO The OPERABILITY of the DGCW System is required to provide a coolant source to ensure effective operation of the DGs in the event of an accident or transient. The OPERABILITY of the DGCW System is based on having an OPERABLE pump and an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the ultimate heat sink and transferring water to the associated DG heat exchangers. The OPERABILITY of the opposite unit's DGCW subsystem is required to provide adequate cooling to ensure effective operation of the required opposite unit's DG heat exchangers in the event of an accident in order to support operation of the shared systems such as the Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room Emergency Ventilation System.

An adequate suction source is not addressed in this LCO since the minimum net positive suction head of the DGCW pump and the maximum suction source temperature are covered by the requirements specified in LCO 3.7.3, "Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)."

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the DGCW subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to support the OPERABILITY of equipment serviced by the DGCW subsystems and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the DGCW subsystems are determined by the systems they support; therefore, the requirements are not the same for all facets of operation in MODES 4 and 5. Thus, the LCOs of the systems supported by the DGCW subsystems will govern DGCW System OPERABILITY requirements in MODES 4 and 5.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS Table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each DGCW subsystem. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for the Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable DGCW subsystem. Complying with the Required Actions for one inoperable DGCW subsystem may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable DGCW subsystem(s) are governed by separate Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

A.1

If one or more DGCW subsystems are inoperable, the associated DG(s) cannot perform their intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable. In accordance with LCO 3.0.6, this also requires entering into the Applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.2.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual valves in the DGCW subsystem flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for DGCW subsystem operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

SR 3.7.2.2

This SR ensures that each DGCW subsystem pump will automatically start to provide required cooling to the associated DG heat exchangers when the DG starts. These starts may be performed using actual or simulated initiation signals.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, this Frequency is concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

- REFERENCES
1. UFSAR, Section 9.5.5.
 2. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
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B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.3 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) and the Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DGCW) Systems are designed to provide cooling water to components required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. The CCSW System is described in UFSAR, Section 9.2.1 (Ref. 1) while the DGCW System is described in UFSAR, Section 9.5.5 (Ref. 2). These systems are also described in the Bases for LCO 3.7.1, "Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) System," and LCO 3.7.2, "Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DGCW) System." The UHS provides a suction source and discharge pathway for the cooling water associated with these systems. The UHS is described in UFSAR, Section 9.2.5 (Ref. 3).

The UHS consists of water sources from either the Kankakee River (normal), or the cooling lake (alternate) and can be aligned as either a closed cycle operating system utilizing the cooling lake and canals, or an open cycle operating system with the discharge returning to the Illinois River. The UHS provides cooling water to plant systems (Main Condenser Circulating Water System (primary user), the CCSW System, the Service Water System, the Fire Protection System, and the DGCW System) for both normal and emergency plant operations.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Sufficient water inventory is available for the CCSW and the DGCW Systems post LOCA cooling requirements. This water source is provided by the UHS. The ability of the UHS to support long term cooling of the reactor containment is assumed in evaluations of the equipment required for safe reactor shutdown presented in the UFSAR, Section 6.2 (Ref. 4). These analyses include the evaluation of the long term primary containment response after a design basis LOCA.

The ability of the UHS to provide adequate cooling to the identified safety equipment is an implicit assumption for the safety analyses evaluated in Reference 4. The ability to provide onsite emergency AC power is dependent on the

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	ability of the UHS to cool the DGs. The long term cooling capability of the CCSW pumps and DGCW pumps is also dependent on the cooling provided by the UHS System.
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The UHS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO	The OPERABILITY of the UHS is based on having a minimum water level in the CCSW and DGCW pump suction bays of 501.5 ft mean sea level and a maximum water temperature of 95°F.
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APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the UHS is required to be OPERABLE to support OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the CCSW and DGCW Systems. Therefore, the UHS is required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.
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In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the UHS is determined by the systems it supports.

ACTIONS	<u>A.1 and A.2</u>
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If the UHS is determined inoperable the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<u>SR 3.7.3.1</u>
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This SR verifies the water level in the CCSW and DGCW pump suction bays to be sufficient for the proper operation of the CCSW and DGCW pumps (net positive suction head and pump vortexing are considered in determining this limit). The 24 hour Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.7.3.2

Verification of the UHS temperature ensures that the heat removal capabilities of the CCSW and DGCW Systems are within the assumptions of the DBA analysis. The 24 hour Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 9.2.1.
 2. UFSAR, Section 9.5.5.
 3. UFSAR, Section 9.2.5.
 4. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
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B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.4 Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The CREV System provides a radiologically controlled environment from which the unit can be safely operated following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). The control room emergency zone served by the CREV System consists of the main control room and the Train B Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) equipment room.

The safety related function of the CREV System consists of a single high efficiency air filtration train for emergency treatment of outside supply air. The filter train consists of an electric heater, a prefilter, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section, a second HEPA filter, two 100% capacity booster fans in parallel, the Train B air handling unit (excluding the refrigeration condensing unit), and the associated ductwork and dampers. The electric heater is used to limit the relative humidity of the air entering the filter train. Prefilters and HEPA filters remove particulate matter, which may be radioactive. The charcoal adsorbers provide a holdup period for gaseous iodine, allowing time for decay.

The CREV System is a standby system, parts of which also operate during normal unit operations to maintain the control room emergency zone environment. Upon receipt of a reactor building ventilation system high-high radiation alarm (indicative of conditions that could result in radiation exposure to control room emergency zone personnel), operator action is required within 40 minutes to switch to the isolation/pressurization mode of operation and close the kitchen and locker room exhaust fan dampers to minimize infiltration of contaminated air into the control room emergency zone. A system of dampers isolates the control room emergency zone, and the air is recirculated. Outside air is taken in at the emergency outside air ventilation intake and is mixed with the recirculated air after the outside air has passed through the air filtration unit (AFU) for removal of airborne radioactive particles.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

The CREV System is designed to maintain the control room emergency zone environment for a 30 day continuous occupancy after a DBA without exceeding 5 rem whole body dose or its equivalent to any part of the body. The CREV System will pressurize the control room emergency zone to about 0.125 inches water gauge to minimize infiltration of air from adjacent zones. CREV System operation in maintaining control room habitability is discussed in the UFSAR, Sections 6.4, 9.4, and 15.6.5 (Refs. 1, 2, and 3, respectively).

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The ability of the CREV System to maintain the habitability of the control room emergency zone is an explicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in the UFSAR, Sections 6.4 and 15.6.5 (Refs. 1 and 3, respectively). The isolation/pressurization mode of the CREV System is assumed to operate following a DBA loss of coolant accident, fuel handling accident, main steam line break, and control rod drop accident. The radiological doses to control room personnel as a result of the DBA loss of coolant accident are summarized in Reference 3.

The CREV System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The CREV System is required to be OPERABLE. Total system failure could result in exceeding a dose of 5 rem to the control room operators in the event of a DBA.

The CREV System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are OPERABLE. The system is considered OPERABLE when its associated:

- a. AFU is OPERABLE,
- b. Train B air handling unit (fan portion only) is OPERABLE, including the ductwork, to maintain air circulation to and from the control room emergency zone; and
- c. Emergency outside air ventilation intake is OPERABLE.

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

The AFU is considered OPERABLE when a booster fan is OPERABLE; HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and heater, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation through the filter train can be maintained.

In addition, the control room emergency zone boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors, such that the pressurization limit of SR 3.7.4.4 can be met. However, it is acceptable for access doors to be open for normal control room emergency zone entry and exit and not consider it to be a failure to meet the LCO.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the CREV System must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the CREV System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

- a. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment;
 - b. During CORE ALTERATIONS; and
 - c. During operations with potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).
-

ACTIONS

A.1

With the CREV System inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the inoperable CREV System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable CREV System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.1, C.2, and C.3

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3 while in MODE 1, 2, or 3 would require the unit to be shutdown, but would not require immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The NOTE to the ACTIONS, "LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable," ensures that the actions for immediate suspension of irradiated fuel assembly movement are not postponed due to entry into LCO 3.0.3.

With the CREV System inoperable, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require the CREV System to be placed in the isolation/pressurization mode of operation. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS C.1, C.2, and C.3 (continued)

immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Action must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.4.1

This SR verifies that the CREV System in a standby mode starts from the control room and continues to operate. This SR includes initiating flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing the system once every month provides an adequate check on this system. Monthly heater operation for ≥ 10 continuous hours, during system operation dries out any moisture that has accumulated in the charcoal as a result of humidity in the ambient air. Furthermore, the 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment.

SR 3.7.4.2

This SR verifies that the required CREV testing is performed in accordance with Specification 5.5.7, "Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)." The CREV filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 4). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.4.3

This SR verifies that on a manual initiation from the control room, the CREV System filter train starts and the isolation dampers close. Operating experience has shown that these components normally pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was found to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.7.4.4

This SR verifies the integrity of the control room emergency zone and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air. The control room emergency zone positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper function of the CREV System. During the emergency isolation/pressurization mode of operation, the CREV System is designed to slightly pressurize the control room emergency zone ≥ 0.125 inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to the adjacent areas to minimize unfiltered inleakage. The CREV System is designed to maintain this positive pressure at a flow rate of ≤ 2000 scfm to the control room emergency zone in the isolation/pressurization mode. The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with industry practice and other filtration systems SRs.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.
 2. UFSAR, Section 9.4.
 3. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5.
 4. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.
-

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.5 Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC portion of the control room area Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System (hereafter referred to as the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System) provides temperature control for the control room emergency zone following isolation of the control room emergency zone.

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is a single zone system that services only those rooms that are a part of the control room emergency zone. The system provides cooling of the recirculated and outside air makeup for the control room emergency zone. The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System, addressed by this Specification, consists of the Train B air handling unit (AHU), ductwork, dampers, refrigeration condensing unit, and instrumentation and controls to provide for control room emergency zone temperature control.

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is designed to provide a controlled environment under both normal and accident conditions. The system provides the required temperature control to maintain a suitable control room emergency zone environment for a sustained occupancy of over 100 persons. The design conditions for habitability of the control room emergency zone environment are 70°F to 80°F and 40% to 50% relative humidity. The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System operation in maintaining the control room emergency zone temperature is discussed in the UFSAR, Section 6.4 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The design basis of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is to maintain the control room emergency zone temperature for a 30 day continuous occupancy following isolation of the control room emergency zone.

During emergency operation, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System maintains a habitable environment and ensures the OPERABILITY of components in the control room emergency zone. The safety related Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System (Train B HVAC) is powered from diesel

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

generator supported switchgear. Train B Control Room HVAC is normally in the standby condition and is used for accident mitigation. Train A Control Room HVAC is nonsafety related and is in operation during normal conditions. The Train B refrigeration condensing unit, normally served by the Service Water System, can be provided with cooling water from the Unit 2 Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) System. The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements. The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is capable of removing sensible and latent heat loads from the control room emergency zone, including consideration of equipment heat loads and personnel occupancy requirements to ensure equipment OPERABILITY.

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is required to be OPERABLE. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits.

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to maintain the control room emergency zone temperature are OPERABLE. These components include the cooling coils, fans, chillers, compressors, ductwork, dampers, and associated instrumentation and controls. In addition, during conditions in MODES other than MODES 1, 2, and 3 when the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is required to be OPERABLE (e.g., during CORE ALTERATIONS), the necessary portions of the Unit 2 CCSW System and Ultimate Heat Sink capable of providing cooling to the refrigeration condensing unit are part of the OPERABILITY requirements covered by this LCO.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control room emergency zone temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY limits following control room emergency zone isolation.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)	<p>In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a Design Basis Accident are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment;b. During CORE ALTERATIONS; andc. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).
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ACTIONS	<p><u>A.1</u></p> <p>With the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the system must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room emergency zone isolation and the availability of alternate nonsafety cooling methods.</p> <p><u>B.1 and B.2</u></p> <p>In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.</p>
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(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1, C.2, and C.3

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3 while in MODE 1, 2, or 3 would require the unit to be shutdown, but would not require immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Note to the ACTIONS, "LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable," ensures that the actions for immediate suspension of irradiated fuel assembly movement are not postponed due to entry into LCO 3.0.3.

With the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Action must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.5.1

This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the control room emergency zone heat load assumed in the safety analyses. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The 24 month Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is not expected over this time period.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.6 Main Condenser Offgas

BASES

BACKGROUND	During unit operation, steam from the low pressure turbine is exhausted directly into the main condenser. Air and noncondensable gases are collected in the main condenser, then exhausted through the steam jet air ejectors (SJAEs) to the Main Condenser Offgas System. The offgas from the main condenser normally includes radioactive gases.
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The Main Condenser Offgas System has been incorporated into the unit design to reduce the gaseous radwaste emission. This system uses a catalytic recombiner to recombine radiolytically dissociated hydrogen and oxygen. The gaseous mixture is cooled by the offgas condenser; the water and condensibles are stripped out by the offgas condenser and moisture separator. The radioactivity of the remaining gaseous mixture (i.e., the offgas recombiner effluent) is monitored downstream of the moisture separator prior to entering the holdup line.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The main condenser offgas gross gamma activity rate is an initial condition of the Main Condenser Offgas System failure event, discussed in Reference 1. The analysis assumes a gross failure in the Main Condenser Offgas System that results in the rupture of the Main Condenser Offgas System pressure boundary. The gross gamma activity rate is controlled to ensure that, during the event, the calculated offsite doses will be well within the limits of 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 2).
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The main condenser offgas limits satisfy Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO	To ensure compliance with the assumptions of the Main Condenser Offgas System failure event (Ref. 1), the fission product release rate should be consistent with a noble gas release to the reactor coolant of 100 $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{MWt-second}$ after decay of 30 minutes. The LCO is established consistent with this requirement ($2527 \text{ MWt} \times 100 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{MWt-second} = 252,700 \mu\text{Ci/second}$).
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(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY	The LCO is applicable when steam is being exhausted to the main condenser and the resulting noncondensibles are being processed via the Main Condenser Offgas System. This occurs during MODE 1, and during MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated and the SJAE in operation. In MODES 4 and 5, main steam is not being exhausted to the main condenser and the requirements are not applicable.
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ACTIONS

A.1

If the offgas radioactivity rate limit is exceeded, 72 hours is allowed to restore the gross gamma activity rate to within the limit. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, the time required to complete the Required Action, the large margins associated with permissible dose and exposure limits, and the low probability of a Main Condenser Offgas System rupture.

B.1, B.2, B.3.1, and B.3.2

If the gross gamma activity rate is not restored to within the limits in the associated Completion Time, all main steam lines or the SJAE must be isolated. This isolates the Main Condenser Offgas System from significant sources of radioactive steam. The main steam lines are considered isolated if at least one main steam isolation valve in each main steam line is closed, and at least one main steam line drain valve in each drain line is closed. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the actions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

An alternative to Required Actions B.1 and B.2 is to place the unit in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.6.1

This SR, on a 31 day Frequency, requires an isotopic analysis of a representative offgas sample (taken at the recombiner outlet or the SJAE outlet if the recombiner is bypassed) to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The noble gases to be sampled are Xe-133, Xe-135, Xe-138, Kr-85M, Kr-87, and Kr-88. If the measured rate of radioactivity increases significantly as indicated by the main condenser air ejector noble gas activity monitor (by $\geq 50\%$ after correcting for expected increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER), an isotopic analysis is also performed within 4 hours after the increase is noted, to ensure that the increase is not indicative of a sustained increase in the radioactivity rate. The 31 day Frequency is adequate in view of other instrumentation that continuously monitor the offgas, and is acceptable, based on operating experience.

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR is not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line is not isolated and the SJAE is in operation. Only in this condition can radioactive fission gases be in the Main Condenser Offgas System at significant rates.

REFERENCES

1. Letter E-DAS-015-00 from D.A. Studley (Sciencetech-NUS) to T. Leffler (ComEd), dated January 24, 2000.
 2. 10 CFR 100.
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B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.7 Main Turbine Bypass System

BASES

BACKGROUND	The Main Turbine Bypass System is designed to control steam pressure when reactor steam generation exceeds turbine requirements during unit startup, sudden load reduction, and cooldown. It allows excess steam flow from the reactor to the condenser without going through the turbine. The bypass capacity of the system is 40% of the Nuclear Steam Supply System rated steam flow. Sudden load reductions within the capacity of the steam bypass can be accommodated without reactor scram. The Main Turbine Bypass System consists of a nine valve manifold connected to the main steam lines between the main steam isolation valves and the main turbine stop valves. Each of the nine valves is operated by hydraulic cylinders. The bypass valves are controlled by the pressure regulation function of the Turbine Electrohydraulic Control System, as discussed in the UFSAR, Section 7.7.4 (Ref. 1). The bypass valves are normally closed, and the pressure regulator controls the turbine control valves that direct all steam flow to the turbine. If the speed governor or the load limiter restricts steam flow to the turbine, the pressure regulator controls the system pressure by opening the bypass valves sequentially. When the bypass valves open, the steam flows from the main steam equalizing header to the bypass manifold through the bypass valve, to its bypass line, where an orifice further reduces the steam pressure before the steam enters the condenser.
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The Main Turbine Bypass System is assumed to function during the turbine trip, turbine generator load rejection and feedwater controller failure transients, as discussed in the UFSAR, Sections 15.2.3.2, 15.2.2.2, and 15.1.2 (Refs. 2, 3, and 4, respectively). Opening the bypass valves during the pressurization event mitigates the increase in reactor vessel pressure, which affects the MCPR during the event. An inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System may result in an MCPR penalty.
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The Main Turbine Bypass System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to be OPERABLE to limit peak pressure in the main steam lines and maintain reactor pressure within acceptable limits during events that cause rapid pressurization, so that the Safety Limit MCPR is not exceeded. With the Main Turbine Bypass System inoperable, modifications to the MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") may be applied to allow this LCO to be met. The MCPR limit for the inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System is specified in the COLR. An OPERABLE Main Turbine Bypass System requires the bypass valves to open in response to increasing main steam line pressure. This response is within the assumptions of the applicable analyses (Refs. 2, 3, and 4).

APPLICABILITY The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to be OPERABLE at $\geq 25\%$ RTP to ensure that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not violated during the turbine generator load rejection, turbine trip, and feedwater controller failure transients. As discussed in the Bases for LCO 3.2.2, sufficient margin to these limits exists at $< 25\%$ RTP. Therefore, these requirements are only necessary when operating at or above this power level.

ACTIONS A.1

If the Main Turbine Bypass System is inoperable (one or more bypass valves inoperable), and the MCPR limits for an inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System, as specified in the COLR, are not applied, the assumptions of the design basis transient analysis may not be met. Under such circumstances, prompt action should be taken to restore the Main Turbine Bypass System to OPERABLE status or adjust the MCPR limits accordingly. The 2 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on the time to complete the Required Action and the low probability of an event occurring during this period requiring the Main Turbine Bypass System.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

If the Main Turbine Bypass System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status and the MCPR limits for an inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System are not applied, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 25% RTP. As discussed in the Applicability section, operation at < 25% RTP results in sufficient margin to the required limits, and the Main Turbine Bypass System is not required to protect fuel integrity during the turbine generator load rejection, turbine trip, and feedwater controller failure transients. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.7.1

Cycling each main turbine bypass valve through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically OPERABLE and will function when required. The 92 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 92 day Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.7.7.2

The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to actuate automatically to perform its design function. This SR demonstrates that, with the required system initiation signals, the valves will actuate to their required position. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and because of the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.7.7.3

This SR ensures that the TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME, as defined in the transient analysis inputs for the cycle, is in compliance with the assumptions of the appropriate safety analyses. The response time limits are specified in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 5). The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and because the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 7.7.4.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.2.3.2.
 3. UFSAR, Section 15.2.2.2.
 4. UFSAR, Section 15.1.2.
 5. Technical Requirements Manual.
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B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.8 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND	The minimum water level in the spent fuel storage pool meets the assumptions of iodine decontamination factors following a fuel handling accident.
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A general description of the spent fuel storage pool design is found in the UFSAR, Section 9.1.2 (Ref. 1). The assumptions of the fuel handling accident are found in Reference 2.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The water level above the irradiated fuel assemblies is an explicit assumption of the fuel handling accident. A fuel handling accident is evaluated to ensure that the radiological consequences (calculated whole body and thyroid doses at the exclusion area and low population zone boundaries) are $\leq 25\%$ of 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 3) exposure guidelines NUREG-0800 (Refs. 4 and 5) and less than the 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19 limits (Ref. 6). A fuel handling accident could release a fraction of the fission product inventory by breaching the fuel rod cladding as discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 7).
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The fuel handling accident is evaluated for the dropping of an irradiated fuel assembly onto the reactor core. The water level in the spent fuel storage pool provides for absorption of water soluble fission product gases and transport delays of soluble and insoluble gases that must pass through the water before being released to the secondary containment atmosphere. This absorption and transport delay reduces the potential radioactivity of the release during a fuel handling accident.

The spent fuel storage pool water level satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO	The specified water level preserves the assumptions of the fuel handling accident analysis (Ref. 2). As such, it is the minimum required for fuel movement within the spent fuel storage pool.
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(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY	This LCO applies during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool or whenever movement of new fuel assemblies occurs in the spent fuel storage pool with irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the spent fuel storage pool, since the potential for a release of fission products exists.
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ACTIONS	<p><u>A.1</u></p> <p>Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.</p> <p>When the initial conditions for an accident cannot be met, action must be taken to preclude the accident from occurring. If the spent fuel storage pool level is less than required, the movement of fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool is suspended immediately. Suspension of this activity shall not preclude completion of movement of a fuel assembly to a safe position. This effectively precludes a spent fuel handling accident from occurring.</p>
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<p><u>SR 3.7.8.1</u></p> <p>This SR verifies that sufficient water is available in the event of a fuel handling accident. The water level in the spent fuel storage pool must be checked periodically. The 7 day Frequency is acceptable, based on operating experience, considering that the water volume in the pool is normally stable, and all water level changes are controlled by unit procedures.</p>
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(continued)

BASES (continued)

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 9.1.2.
 2. Letter E-DAS-00-046 from D.A. Studley (Sciencetech) to Robert Tsai (ComEd), "Submittal of Calculation in Support of Improved Tech. Spec. Program," dated February 14, 2000.
 3. 10 CFR 100.
 4. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4, Revision 1, July 1981.
 5. NUREG-0800, Section 6.4 Revision 2, July 1981.
 6. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.
 7. Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 1972.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.1 AC Sources – Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The unit Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources consist of the offsite power sources, and the onsite standby power sources (diesel generators (DGs) 2, 3, and 2/3). As required by UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.2.8 (Ref. 1), the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems.

The Class 1E unit AC distribution system is, for the most part, divided into redundant load groups (Divisions 1 and 2), so loss of any one group does not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed. The exception is that the opposite unit's Division 2 AC Electrical Power Distribution System powers shared Division 2 loads (i.e., standby gas treatment subsystem, Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System (Unit 3 only), and Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System (Unit 3 only)). Although shared by both units, the CREV System and Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System are single train systems that are powered only from a single Unit 2 motor control center. Each unit's load group has connections to two physically independent offsite power sources and a single DG.

Offsite power is supplied to each of the 138 kV and 345 kV switchyards from the transmission network by six and seven transmission lines, respectively. From the 138 kV switchyards, one qualified electrically and physically separated circuit normally provides AC power, through reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) 22, to 4160 V Essential Service System (ESS) bus 24-1 via ESS bus 24 to supply the Division 2 loads of Unit 2. From the 345 kV switchyard, another qualified, electrically and physically separated circuit normally provides AC power, through RAT 32, to 4160 V ESS bus 34-1 via ESS bus 34 to supply the Division 2 loads of Unit 3. Unit auxiliary transformer (UAT) 21, which is normally supplied by the Unit 2 main generator, is normally aligned to Unit 2 to supply Division 1 4160 V ESS bus 23-1 via ESS bus 23. Finally, UAT 31, which is normally supplied by the Unit 3 main generator, is normally aligned to Unit 3 to supply Division 1 4160 V ESS bus 33-1 via ESS bus 33.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

When a main generator is not operating, the loads fed from the UAT are automatically transferred to the RAT on a generator trip (RAT 22 will supply 4160 V ESS bus 23-1 via 4160 V ESS bus 23 and RAT 32 will supply 4160 V ESS bus 33-1 via 4160 V ESS bus 33). The given unit's RAT is the primary (normal) offsite source to the Division 1 and 2 load groups. The RAT of the opposite unit provides the second (alternate) qualified offsite source through bus ties provided between the corresponding ESS buses of the two units. Additionally, the UAT of either unit provides another source of offsite power to the ESS buses only when the unit is shutdown and the UAT is being backfed from the grid. Physical changes to the generator links are required to place the unit in an alignment to allow backfeed. The offsite AC electrical power sources are designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. A detailed description of the offsite power network and circuits to the onsite Class 1E ESS buses is found in the UFSAR, Section 8.2 (Ref. 2).

A qualified offsite circuit consists of all breakers, transformers, switches, interrupting devices, cabling, and controls required to transmit power from the offsite transmission network to the onsite Class 1E ESS bus or buses.

RATs 22 and 32 are sized to accommodate the simultaneous starting of all ESF loads on receipt of an accident signal without the need for load sequencing.

The onsite standby power source for 4160 V ESS 23-1, 24-1, 33-1, and 34-1 consists of three DGs. DGs 2 and 3 are dedicated to ESS buses 24-1 and 34-1, respectively. DG 2/3 is a shared power source and can supply either Unit 2 ESS bus 23-1 or Unit 3 ESS bus 33-1. A DG starts automatically on a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal (i.e., low reactor water level signal or high drywell pressure signal) (refer to LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation") or on an ESS bus degraded voltage or undervoltage signal (refer to LCO 3.3.8.1, "Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation"). After the DG has started, it automatically ties to its respective bus after offsite power

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

is tripped as a consequence of ESS bus undervoltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with a LOCA signal. The DGs also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the ESS bus on a LOCA signal alone. In the event of a LOCA on a unit, DG 2/3 will start and supply the unit (bus 23-1 or 33-1) experiencing the accident if no offsite power is available. This is accomplished by using the accident signal to prevent the DG 2/3 output breaker from closing on the nonaccident unit. Following the trip of offsite power, buses 23-1, 24-1, 33-1, and 34-1 are automatically disconnected from their normal supply and all nonessential loads are disconnected from the ESS bus. When the DG is tied to the ESS bus, loads are then sequentially connected to their respective ESS bus, if a LOCA signal is present, by the sequence logic. The sequencing logic controls the starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG.

In the event of a loss of offsite power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a LOCA.

Certain required plant loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading of the DGs in the process. Within 30 seconds after the initiating signal is received, all automatic and permanently connected loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.

DGs 2, 3, and 2/3 have the following ratings:

- a. 2600 kW – continuous,
- b. 2860 kW – 2000 hours.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 3) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 4), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Isolation Condenser (IC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System, two separate and independent DGs, one qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the opposite unit's Division 2 onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution subsystem capable of supporting equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas treatment (SGT) System," LCO 3.7.4, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System" (Unit 3 only), and LCO 3.7.5, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System" (Unit 3 only), and the opposite unit's DG capable of supporting the equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, LCO 3.7.4 (Unit 3 only), and LCO 3.7.5 (Unit 3 only), ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA.

Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the UFSAR, and are part of the licensing basis for the unit.

Each offsite circuit from the 138 kV and 345 kV switchyards must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the 4160 V ESS buses. An offsite circuit to

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

each unit consists of the incoming breakers and disconnects to the respective 22 and 32 RATs, RATs 22 and 32, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to 4160 V ESS buses. A qualified circuit does not have to be connected to the ESS bus (i.e., the main generator can be connected to the ESS bus) as long as the capability to fast transfer to the qualified circuit exists. The other qualified offsite circuit for each unit is provided by a bus tie between the corresponding ESS buses of the two units. The breakers connecting the buses must be capable of closure. For Unit 2, LCO 3.8.1.a is met if RAT 22 is capable of supplying ESS buses 23-1 and 24-1 and if RAT 32 (or UAT 31 on backfeed) can supply ESS bus 23-1 via ESS bus 33 and 33-1 and the associated bus tie or ESS bus 24-1 via ESS bus 34 and 34-1 and the associated bus tie. For Unit 3, LCO 3.8.1.a is met if RAT 32 can supply ESS buses 33-1 and 34-1 and if RAT 22 (or UAT 21 on backfeed) can supply ESS bus 33-1 via ESS bus 23 and 23-1 and the associated bus tie or ESS bus 34-1 via ESS bus 24 and 24-1 and the associated bus tie. For Unit 2, LCO 3.8.1.c is met if RAT 32 (or UAT 31 on backfeed) is capable of supplying ESS bus 39 to support equipment required by LCO 3.6.4.3. For Unit 3, LCO 3.8.1.c is met if RAT 22 (or UAT 21 on backfeed) is capable of supplying ESS bus 29 to support equipment required by LCO 3.6.4.3, LCO 3.7.4, and LCO 3.7.5.

The respective unit DG and common DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective 4160 V ESS bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within 13 seconds. Each respective unit DG and common DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the 4160 V ESS buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions, such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient condition. Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of non-essential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.

The opposite unit's DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its Division 2 Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued) must be accomplished within 13 seconds and is required to be met from the same variety of initial conditions specified for the respective unit and shared DGs. For Unit 2 to meet LCO 3.8.1.d, DG 3 must be capable of supplying ESS bus 34-1 on a loss of power to the bus in order to supply ESS bus 39 to support equipment required by LCO 3.6.4.3. Similarly, for Unit 3 to meet LCO 3.8.1.d, DG 2 must be capable of supplying ESS bus 24-1 on a loss of power to the bus in order to supply ESS bus 29 to support equipment required by LCO 3.6.4.3, LCO 3.7.4, and LCO 3.7.5.

In addition, fuel oil storage and fuel oil transfer pump requirements must be met for each required DG.

The AC sources must be separate and independent (to the extent possible) of other AC sources. For the DGs, the separation and independence are complete. For the offsite AC sources, the separation and independence are to the extent practical. A qualified circuit may be connected to both divisions of either unit, with manual transfer capability to the other circuit OPERABLE, and not violate separation criteria. A qualified circuit that is not connected to the 4160 V ESS buses is required to have OPERABLE manual transfer capability to the 4160 V ESS buses to support OPERABILITY of that qualified circuit.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

A Note has been added taking exception to the Applicability requirements for the opposite unit's Division 2 AC electrical power sources in LCO 3.8.1.c and d, provided the associated required equipment (SGT subsystem, CREV System (Unit 3 only), and Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System (Unit 3 only)) is inoperable. This exception is

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY
(continued)

intended to allow declaring of the opposite unit's Division 2 supported equipment inoperable either in lieu of declaring the opposite unit's Division 2 source inoperable, or at any time subsequent to entering ACTIONS for an inoperable opposite unit Division 2 source. This exception is acceptable since, with the opposite unit powered Division 2 equipment inoperable and the associated ACTIONS entered, the opposite unit Division 2 AC sources provide no additional assurance of meeting the above criteria.

The AC power requirements for MODES 4 and 5 and other conditions in which AC sources are required are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources – Shutdown."

ACTIONS

A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to exclude the MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4 for the opposite unit's AC electrical power sources. This exception allows entry into the applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS even though the ACTIONS may eventually require a plant shutdown. This allowance is acceptable due to the low probability of an event requiring the opposite unit equipment.

A.1

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the remaining required offsite circuit on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met. However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition C, for two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.

A.2

Required Action A.2, which only applies if the division cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure of the associated DG does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions (i.e.,

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.2 (continued)

single division systems are not included). Redundant required features failures consist of inoperable features associated with a division redundant to the division that has no offsite power.

The Completion Time for Required Action A.2 is intended to allow time for the operator to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. The division has no offsite power supplying its loads; and
- b. A redundant required feature on the other division is inoperable.

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (one offsite circuit inoperable) a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time would begin to be tracked.

Discovering no offsite power to one 4160 V ESS bus of the onsite Class 1E Power Distribution System coincident with one or more inoperable redundant required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with any other ESS bus that has offsite power, results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Twenty-four hours is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before the unit is subjected to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection may have been lost for the required feature's function; however, function is not lost. The 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

A.3

With one offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the plant safety systems. In this condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System.

The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.3 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or b. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DG is inoperable, and that DG is subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 7 days. This situation could lead to a total of 14 days, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the offsite circuit. At this time, a DG could again become inoperable, the circuit restored OPERABLE, and an additional 7 days (for a total of 21 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 14 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or b. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 7 day and 14 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.

Similar to Required Action A.2, the Completion Time of Required Action A.3 allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This exception results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.1.a or b was initially not met, instead of at the time that Condition A was entered.

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BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one DG inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the required offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions must then be entered.

B.2

Required Action B.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions (i.e., single division systems are not included). Redundant required features failures consist of inoperable features associated with a division redundant to the division that has an inoperable DG.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. An inoperable DG exists; and
- b. A redundant required feature on the other division (Division 1 or 2) is inoperable.

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (one DG inoperable), a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Discovering one required DG inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable redundant required support or supported

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.2 (continued)

features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DG(s), results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.3.1 and B.3.2

Required Action B.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG(s), SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), they are declared inoperable upon discovery, and Condition E or G of LCO 3.8.1 is entered, as applicable. Once the failure is repaired, and the common cause failure no longer exists, Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG(s), performance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of those DGs.

In the event the inoperable DG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either B.3.1 or B.3.2, the station corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour constraint imposed while in Condition B.

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BASES

ACTIONS

B.3.1 and B.3.2 (continued)

According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 5), 24 hours is a reasonable time to confirm that the OPERABLE DG(s) are not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.

B.4

In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.4 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or b. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently restored OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 7 days. This situation could lead to a total of 14 days, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the DG. At this time, an offsite circuit could again become inoperable, the DG restored OPERABLE, and an additional 7 days (for a total of 21 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 14 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or b. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 7 day and 14 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

Similar to Required Action B.2, the Completion Time of Required Action B.4 allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This exception results in establishing the "time zero" at the time that LCO 3.8.1.a or b was initially not met, instead of the time that Condition B was entered.

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BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1 and C.2

Required Action C.1 addresses actions to be taken in the event of inoperability of redundant required features concurrent with inoperability of two offsite circuits. Required Action C.1 reduces the vulnerability to a loss of function. The Completion Time for taking these actions is reduced to 12 hours from that allowed with one division without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety divisions are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours is appropriate. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions, (i.e., single division systems are not included in the list). Redundant required features failures consist of any of these features that are inoperable because any inoperability is on a division redundant to a division with inoperable offsite circuits.

The Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. Two required offsite circuits are inoperable; and
- b. A redundant required feature is inoperable.

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (two offsite circuits inoperable), a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition C for a period that should not exceed 24 hours. This level of degradation means that the offsite

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BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more DGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this degradation level:

- a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and
- b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.

With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. In fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with the available offsite AC sources two less than required by the LCO, operation may continue for 24 hours. If two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours, unrestricted operation may continue. If only one required offsite source is restored within 24 hours, power operation continues in accordance with Condition A.

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BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

D.1 and D.2

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it were inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition D is entered with no AC source to any 4160 V ESS bus (i.e., the bus is de-energized), ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems—Operating," must be immediately entered. This allows Condition D to provide requirements for the loss of the required offsite circuit and one required DG without regard to whether a division is de-energized. LCO 3.8.7 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized division.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 12 hours. In Condition D, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. Since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition C (loss of both required offsite circuits). This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

E.1

With two required DGs inoperable, there is no more than one remaining standby AC source. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, sufficient standby AC sources may not be available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for the majority of ESF equipment at this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown. (The immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1 (continued)

result in a total loss of AC power.) Since any inadvertent unit generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with both DGs inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours. The Completion Time assumes complete loss of onsite (DG) AC capability to power the minimum loads needed to respond to analyzed events.

F.1 and F.2

If the inoperable AC electrical power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

G.1

Condition G corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.2.9 (Ref. 7). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions). The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8), Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 10), as addressed in the UFSAR.

The Surveillances are modified by two Notes to clearly identify how the Surveillances apply to the given unit and the opposite unit AC electrical power sources. Note 1 states that SR 3.8.1.1 through 3.8.1.20 are applicable only to the given unit AC electrical power sources and Note 2 states that SR 3.8.1.21 is applicable to the opposite unit AC electrical power sources. These Notes are necessary since the opposite unit AC electrical power sources are not required to meet all of the requirements of the given unit AC electrical power sources (e.g., the opposite unit's DG is not required to start on the opposite unit's ECCS initiation signal to support the OPERABILITY of the given unit).

Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following summary is applicable. The minimum steady state output voltage of 3952 V is 90% of the nominal 4160 V output voltage. This value, which is specified in ANSI C84.1 (Ref. 11), allows for voltage drop to the terminals of 4000 V motors whose minimum operating voltage is specified as 90% or 3600 V. It also allows for voltage drops to motors and other equipment down through the 120 V level where minimum operating voltage is also usually specified as 90% of name plate rating. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 4368 V is equal to the maximum operating voltage specified for 4000 V motors. It ensures that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 4000 V motors is no more than the maximum rated operating voltages. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to $\pm 2\%$ of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations found in Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8).

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.1

This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and loads are connected to their preferred power source and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. The 7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the control room.

SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.8

These SRs help to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition.

To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, these SRs have been modified by a Note (Note 1 for SR 3.8.1.2 and Note 1 for SR 3.8.1.8) to indicate that all DG starts for these Surveillances may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup prior to loading.

For the purposes of this testing, the DGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

In order to reduce stress and wear on diesel engines, the manufacturer has recommended a modified start in which the starting speed of DGs is limited, warmup is limited to this lower speed, and the DGs are gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading. These start procedures are the intent of Note 2 of SR 3.8.1.2.

SR 3.8.1.8 requires that, at a 184 day Frequency, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 13 seconds. The 13 second start requirement supports the assumptions in the design basis

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.8 (continued)

LOCA analysis of UFSAR, Section 6.3 (Ref. 12). The 13 second start requirement is not applicable to SR 3.8.1.2 (see Note 2 of SR 3.8.1.2), when a modified start procedure as described above is used. If a modified start is not used, the 13 second start requirement of SR 3.8.1.8 applies.

Since SR 3.8.1.8 does require a 13 second start, it is more restrictive than SR 3.8.1.2, and it may be performed in lieu of SR 3.8.1.2.

In addition, the DG is required to maintain proper voltage and frequency limits after steady state is achieved. The voltage and frequency limits are normally achieved within 13 seconds. The time for the DG to reach steady state operation, unless the modified DG start method is employed, is periodically monitored and the trend evaluated to identify degradation of governor and voltage regulator performance.

To minimize testing of the common DG, Note 3 of SR 3.8.1.2 and Note 2 of SR 3.8.1.8 allow a single test of the common DG (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit. However, to the extent practicable, the tests should be alternated between units. If the DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

The 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8). The 184 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.8 is a reduction in cold testing consistent with Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 5). These Frequencies provide adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing.

SR 3.8.1.3

This Surveillance verifies that the DGs are capable of synchronizing and accepting a load approximately equivalent to that corresponding to the continuous rating. A minimum

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.3 (continued)

run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.

Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0 when running synchronized with the grid. The 0.8 power factor value is the design rating of the machine at a particular kVA. The 1.0 power factor value is an operational condition where the reactive power component is zero, which minimizes the reactive heating of the generator. Operating the generator at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0 avoids adverse conditions associated with underexciting the generator and more closely represents the generator operating requirements when performing its safety function (running isolated on its associated 4160 V ESS bus). The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

The 31 day Frequency for this Surveillance is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8).

Note 1 modifies this Surveillance to indicate that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized.

Note 2 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test.

Note 3 indicates that this Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations.

Note 4 stipulates a prerequisite requirement for performance of this SR. A successful DG start must precede this test to credit satisfactory performance.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.3 (continued)

To minimize testing of the common DG, Note 5 allows a single test of the common DG (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit. However, to the extent practicable, the test should be alternated between units. If the DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.4

This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is at or above the level at which fuel oil is automatically added. The level is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 1 hour of DG operation at full load plus 10%.

This SR also provides verification that there is an adequate inventory of fuel oil in the storage tanks to support each DG's operation for approximately 2 days at full load. The approximate 2 day period is sufficient time to place the unit in a safe shutdown condition and to bring in replenishment fuel from an offsite location.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and facility operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.1.5 and SR 3.8.1.7

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tank once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is accomplished by draining a portion of the contents from the bottom of the day tank to the top of the storage tank.

(continued)

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SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.5 and SR 3.8.1.7 (continued)

Checking for and removal of any accumulated water from the bulk storage tank once every 92 days also eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies are established by Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 10). This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided that accumulated water is removed during performance of this Surveillance.

SR 3.8.1.6

This Surveillance demonstrates that each fuel oil transfer pump operates and automatically transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. It is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that each fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer systems are OPERABLE.

The Frequency for this SR is consistent with the Frequency for testing the DGs in SR 3.8.1.3. DG operation for SR 3.8.1.3 is normally long enough that fuel oil level in the day tank will be reduced to the point where the fuel oil transfer pump automatically starts to restore fuel oil level by transferring oil from the storage tank.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.9

Transfer of each 4160 V ESS bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The 24 month Frequency of the Surveillance is based on engineering judgment taking into consideration the plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed on the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.8.1.10

Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. The largest single load for each DG is a service water pump (686 kW). The specified load value conservatively bounds the expected kW rating of the single largest loads under accident conditions. This Surveillance may be accomplished by:

- a. Tripping the DG output breaker with the DG carrying greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load while paralleled to offsite power, or while solely supplying the bus; or
- b. Tripping its associated single largest post-accident load with the DG solely supplying the bus.

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8), the load rejection test is acceptable if the diesel speed does not

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.10 (continued)

exceed the nominal (synchronous) speed plus 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 115% of nominal speed, whichever is lower. This corresponds to 66.73 Hz, which is the nominal speed plus 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint.

The time, voltage and frequency tolerances specified in this SR are derived from Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8) recommendations for response during load sequence intervals. The 3 seconds specified in SR 3.8.1.10.b is equal to 60% of the 5 second load sequence interval associated with sequencing the ECCS low pressure pumps during an undervoltage on the bus concurrent with a LOCA. The 4 seconds specified in SR 3.8.1.10.c is equal to 80% of the 5 second load sequence interval associated with sequencing the ECCS low pressure pumps during an undervoltage on the bus concurrent with a LOCA. The voltage and frequency specified are consistent with the design range of the equipment powered by the DG. SR 3.8.1.10.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.10.b and SR 3.8.1.10.c are steady state voltage and frequency values specified to which the system must recover following load rejection. The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration the plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize testing of the common DG and allow a single test of the common DG (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit. If the DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.11

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8), paragraph C.2.2.8, this Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load.

These acceptance criteria provide DG damage protection. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event, and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, a load band (90% to 100%) has been specified based on Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8).

The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration the plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by two Notes. To minimize testing of the common DG, Note 1 allows a single test of the common DG (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit. If the DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit. Note 2 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary transients outside the voltage limit do not invalidate this test.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.12

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8), paragraph C.2.2.4, this Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.

The DG auto-start and energization of permanently connected loads time of 13 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis for responding to a design basis large break LOCA (Ref. 12). The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved.

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanently connected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, a component or system may be out-of-service and closure of its associated breaker during this test may damage the component or system. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs shall be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and lube oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.13

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 9), paragraph C.2.2.5, this Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (13 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal). In addition, the DG is required to maintain proper voltage and frequency limits after steady state is achieved. The time for the DG to reach the steady state voltage and frequency limits is periodically monitored and the trend evaluated to identify degradation of governor and voltage regulator performance. The DG is required to operate for ≥ 5 minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

SR 3.8.1.14

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8) paragraph C.2.2.12, this Surveillance demonstrates that DG non-critical protective functions (e.g., high jacket water temperature) are bypassed on an ECCS initiation test signal and critical protective functions (engine overspeed and generator differential current) trip the DG to avert substantial damage to the DG unit. The non-critical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.14 (continued)

The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment, takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 3.8.1.15

Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8), paragraph C.2.2.9, requires demonstration that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours, 22 hours of which is at a load equivalent to 90% to 100% of the continuous rating of the DG and 2 hours of which is at a load equivalent to 105% to 110% of the continuous rating of the DG. The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelube and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed at a power factor as close to the accident load power factor as practicable. When synchronized with offsite power, the power factor limit is ≤ 0.85 . This power factor is chosen to bound the actual worst case inductive loading that the DG could experience under design basis accident conditions.

The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance is modified by three Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients do not invalidate this test. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test. Note 2 is provided in recognition that under certain conditions, it is necessary

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.15 (continued)

to allow the surveillance to be conducted at a power factor other than the specified limit. During the Surveillance, the DG is normally operated paralleled to the grid, which is not the configuration when the DG is performing its safety function following a loss of offsite power (with or without a LOCA). Given the parallel configuration to the grid during the Surveillance, the grid voltage may be such that the DG field excitation level needed to obtain the specified power factor could result in a transient voltage within the DG windings higher than the recommended values if the DG output breaker were to trip during the Surveillance. Therefore, the power factor shall be maintained as close as practicable to the specified limit while still ensuring that if the DG output breaker were to trip during the Surveillance that the maximum DG winding voltage would not be exceeded. To minimize testing of the common DG, Note 3 allows a single test of the common DG (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit. If the DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.16

This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 13 seconds. The 13 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis for responding to a design basis large break LOCA (Ref. 12). In addition, the DG is required to maintain proper voltage and frequency limits after steady state is achieved. The time for the DG to reach the steady state voltage and frequency limits is periodically monitored and the trend evaluated to identify degradation of governor and voltage regulator performance.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.16 (continued)

The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration the plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by three Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at approximately full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing. To minimize testing of the common DG, Note 3 allows a single test of the common DG (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit. If the DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.17

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8), paragraph C.2.2.11, this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronization and load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the auto-start logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be in ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an auto-close signal on bus undervoltage, and the individual load timers are reset.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

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SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.18

Under accident conditions with loss of offsite power loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequence time delay relays. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents. The -10% load sequence time interval limit ensures that a sufficient time interval exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load. There is no upper limit for the load sequence time interval since, for a single load interval (i.e., the time between two load blocks), the capability of the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the second load is not negatively affected by a longer than designed load interval, and if there are additional load blocks (i.e., the design includes multiple load intervals), then the lower limit requirements (-10%) will ensure that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the remaining load blocks (i.e., all load intervals must be $\geq 90\%$ of the design interval). Reference 14 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESS buses.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 3.8.1.19

In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

This Surveillance demonstrates DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.12, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ECCS initiation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.19 (continued)

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

SR 3.8.1.20

This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper frequency and voltage within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously.

The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8).

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

SR 3.8.1.21

With the exception of this Surveillance, all other Surveillances of this Specification (SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.20) are applied only to the given unit AC sources. This Surveillance is provided to direct that appropriate Surveillances for the required opposite unit AC sources are governed by the applicable opposite unit Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable opposite unit Surveillances will satisfy the opposite unit requirements, as well as satisfying the given unit Surveillance

(continued)

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SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.21 (continued)

Requirement. Exceptions are noted to the opposite unit SRs of LCO 3.8.1. SR 3.8.1.9 and SR 3.8.1.20 are excepted since only one opposite unit offsite circuit and DG is required by the given unit's Specification. SR 3.8.1.13, SR 3.8.1.18, and SR 3.8.1.19 are excepted since these SRs test the opposite unit's ECCS initiation signal, which is not needed for the AC electrical power sources to be OPERABLE on the given unit.

The Frequency required by the applicable opposite unit SR also governs performance of that SR for the given unit.

As Noted, if the opposite unit is in MODE 4 or 5, or moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, the following opposite unit SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.1.3, SR 3.8.1.10 through SR 3.8.1.12, and SR 3.8.1.14 through SR 3.8.1.17. This ensures that a given unit SR will not require an opposite unit SR to be performed, when the opposite unit Technical Specifications exempts performance of an opposite unit SR (however, as stated in the opposite unit SR 3.8.2.1 Note 1, while performance of an SR is exempted, the SR must still be met).

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.2.8.
2. UFSAR, Section 8.2.
3. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
4. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
5. Generic Letter 84-15, July 2, 1984.
6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Revision 0, December 1974.
7. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.2.9.
8. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 3, July 1993.
9. Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977.

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BASES

REFERENCES
(continued)

10. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Revision 1, October 1979.
 11. ANSI C84.1, 1982.
 12. UFSAR, Section 6.3.
 13. UFSAR, Section 8.3.1.5.1.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.2 AC Sources – Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources – Operating."
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 and 5, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:
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- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

In general, when the unit is shutdown the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrences significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed within the ACTIONS. This allowance is in recognition that

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

certain testing and maintenance activities must be conducted, provided an acceptable level of risk is not exceeded. During MODES 4 and 5, performance of a significant number of required testing and maintenance activities is also required. In MODES 4 and 5, the activities are generally planned and administratively controlled. Relaxations from typical MODES 1, 2, and 3 LCO requirements are acceptable during shutdown MODES, based on:

- a. The fact that time in an outage is limited. This is a risk prudent goal as well as a utility economic consideration.
- b. Requiring appropriate compensatory measures for certain conditions. These may include administrative controls, reliance on systems that do not necessarily meet typical design requirements applied to systems credited in operation MODE analyses, or both.
- c. Prudent utility consideration of the risk associated with multiple activities that could affect multiple systems.
- d. Maintaining, to the extent practical, the ability to perform required functions (even if not meeting MODES 1, 2, and 3 OPERABILITY requirements) with systems assumed to function during an event.

In the event of an accident during shutdown, this LCO ensures the capability of supporting systems necessary for avoiding immediate difficulty, assuming either a loss of all offsite power or a loss of all onsite (diesel generator (DG)) power.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

One offsite circuit supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) of LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems – Shutdown," ensures that all required loads are powered from offsite power. An OPERABLE DG, associated with a Distribution System Essential Service System (ESS) bus required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, ensures that a diverse power source is available for providing electrical power support

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BASES

LCO
(continued)

assuming a loss of the offsite circuit. Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit and DG ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and reactor vessel draindown).

The qualified offsite circuit(s) must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to their respective ESS bus(es), and of accepting required loads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the UFSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. The offsite circuit from the 138 kV or 345 kV switchyard consists of the incoming breakers and disconnects to the 22 or 32 reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT), associated 22 or 32 RAT, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to 4160 V ESS buses required by LCO 3.8.8. Another qualified circuit is provided by the bus tie between the corresponding ESS buses of the two units.

The required DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, connecting to its respective 4160 V ESS bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads. This sequence must be accomplished within 13 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the 4160 V ESS buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with engine hot and DG in standby with engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillances. Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY. The necessary portions of the DG Cooling Water and Ultimate Heat Sink System capable of providing cooling to the required DG is also required.

It is acceptable for divisions to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required divisions.

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BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment to provide assurance that:

- a. Systems providing adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

ACTIONS

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3 while in MODE 1, 2, or 3 would require the unit to be shutdown, but would not require immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Note to the ACTIONS, "LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable," ensures that the actions for immediate suspension of irradiated fuel assembly movement are not postponed due to entry into LCO 3.0.3.

A.1

An offsite circuit is considered inoperable if it is not available to one required 4160 V ESS bus. If two or more 4160 V ESS buses are required per LCO 3.8.8, one division

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable that are not powered from offsite power, appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the required feature(s) LCOs' ACTIONS. Required features remaining powered from a qualified offsite circuit, even if that circuit is considered inoperable because it is not powering other required features, are not declared inoperable by this Required Action. For example, if both Division 1 and 2 ESS buses are required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, and only the Division 1 ESS buses are not capable of being powered from offsite power, then only the required features powered from Division 1 ESS buses are required to be declared inoperable.

A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4

With the required offsite circuit not available to all required divisions, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable per Required Action A.1. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4
(continued)

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A have been modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESS bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.8 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit whether or not a division is de-energized. LCO 3.8.8 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized division.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3 to be applicable. SR 3.8.1.9 is not required to be met since only one offsite circuit is required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.20 is excepted because starting independence is not required with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.21 is not required to be met because the opposite unit's DG is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment. Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.1 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs, and to preclude de-energizing a required 4160 V ESS bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of SRs. With limited AC sources available, a single event

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.2.1 (continued)

could compromise both the required circuit and the DG. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and offsite circuit are required to be OPERABLE. Note 2 states that SRs 3.8.1.13 and 3.8.1.19 are not required to be met when its associated ECCS subsystem(s) are not required to be OPERABLE. These SRs demonstrate the DG response to an ECCS initiation signal (either alone or in conjunction with a loss of offsite power signal). This is consistent with the ECCS instrumentation requirements that do not require the ECCS initiation signals when the associated ECCS subsystem is not required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS – Shutdown."

REFERENCES

None.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil and Starting Air

BASES

BACKGROUND	<p>For proper operation of the standby DGs, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the fuel oil. Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 1) addresses the recommended fuel oil practices as supplemented by ANSI N195 (Ref. 2). The fuel oil properties governed by these SRs are the water and sediment content, the flashpoint and kinematic viscosity, specific gravity (or API gravity), and impurity level.</p> <p>Each DG has a starting air system that includes two pair of air receivers. Each pair has adequate capacity for three successive starts without recharging the air start receivers.</p>
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	<p>The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 3), and Chapter 15 (Ref. 4), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DGs are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Isolation Condenser (IC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.</p> <p>Since diesel fuel oil and starting air subsystem support the operation of the standby AC power sources, they satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).</p>
LCO	<p>Stored diesel fuel oil is required to meet specific standards for quality. This requirement supports the availability of DGs required to shut down the reactor and to maintain it in a safe condition for an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA with loss of offsite power.</p>

(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued)	The starting air system is required to have a minimum capacity for three successive DG starts without recharging the air start receivers.
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APPLICABILITY	The AC sources (LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2) are required to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an AOO or a postulated DBA. Because stored diesel fuel oil and starting air subsystems support LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2, stored diesel fuel oil and starting air are required to be within limits when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE.
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ACTIONS	The ACTIONS Table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each DG. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable DG subsystem. Complying with the Required Actions for one inoperable DG subsystem may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable DG subsystem(s) are governed by separate Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.
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A.1

This Condition is entered as a result of a failure to meet the acceptance criterion for particulates. Normally, trending of particulate levels allows sufficient time to correct high particulate levels prior to reaching the limit of acceptability. Poor sample procedures, contaminated sampling equipment, and errors in laboratory analysis can produce failures that do not follow a trend. Since the presence of particulates does not mean failure of the fuel oil to burn properly in the diesel engine, since particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Surveillance Frequency intervals, and since proper engine performance has been recently demonstrated (within 31 days), it is prudent to allow a brief period prior to declaring the associated DG inoperable. The 7 day Completion Time allows for further evaluation, resampling, and re-analysis of the DG fuel oil.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

With the new fuel oil properties defined in the Bases for SR 3.8.3.1 not within the required limits, a period of 30 days is allowed for restoring the stored fuel oil properties. This period provides sufficient time to test the stored fuel oil to determine that the new fuel oil, when mixed with previously stored fuel oil, remains acceptable, or to restore the stored fuel oil properties. This restoration may involve feed and bleed procedures, filtering, or combination of these procedures. Even if a DG start and load was required during this time interval and the fuel oil properties were outside limits, there is high likelihood that the DG would still be capable of performing its intended function.

C.1

With the required starting air receiver pressure < 220 psig, sufficient capacity for three successive DG starts does not exist. However, as long as the receiver pressure is ≥ 175 psig, there is adequate capacity for at least one start, and the DG can be considered OPERABLE while the air receiver pressure is restored to the required limit. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration to the required pressure prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining air start capacity, the fact that most DG starts are accomplished on the first attempt, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

D.1

With a Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met, or the stored diesel fuel oil or starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons other than addressed by Condition A, B, or C, the associated DG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.1

The tests of new fuel oil prior to addition to the storage tanks are a means of determining whether new fuel oil is of the appropriate grade and has not been contaminated with substances that would have an immediate detrimental impact on diesel engine combustion. If results from these tests are within acceptable limits, the fuel oil may be added to the storage tanks without concern for contaminating the entire volume of fuel oil in the storage tanks. These tests are to be conducted prior to adding the new fuel to the storage tank(s). The tests, limits, and applicable ASTM Standards are as follows:

- a. Sample the new fuel oil in accordance with ASTM D4057-95 (Ref. 5);
- b. Verify that the new fuel oil sample has: (1) an absolute specific gravity at 60°F of ≥ 0.83 and ≤ 0.89 or an API gravity at 60°F of ≥ 27 and ≤ 39 when tested in accordance with ASTM D1298-99 (Ref. 5); (2) a kinematic viscosity at 40°C of ≥ 1.9 centistokes and ≤ 4.1 centistokes when tested in accordance with ASTM D445-97 (Ref. 5); and (3) a flash point of $\geq 125^\circ\text{F}$ when tested in accordance with ASTM D93-99c (Ref. 5); and
- c. Verify that the new fuel oil has a clear and bright appearance with proper color when tested in accordance with ASTM D4176-93 (Ref. 5) or a water and sediment content within limits when tested in accordance with ASTM D2709-96e (Ref. 5). The clear and bright appearance with proper color test is only applicable to fuels that meet the ASTM color requirements (i.e., ASTM color 5 or less).

Failure to meet any of the above limits is cause for rejecting the new fuel oil, but does not represent a failure to meet the LCO concern since the fuel oil is not added to the storage tanks.

Following the initial new fuel oil sample, the fuel oil is analyzed within 31 days following addition of the new fuel oil to the fuel oil storage tank(s) to establish that the other properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-98b (Ref. 5) are met for new fuel oil when tested in accordance

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.1 (continued)

with ASTM D975-98b (Ref. 5), except that the analysis for sulfur may be performed in accordance with ASTM D1552-95 (Ref. 5), ASTM D2622-98 (Ref. 5), or ASTM D4294-98 (Ref. 5). The 31 day period is acceptable because the fuel oil properties of interest, even if they were not within stated limits, would not have an immediate effect on DG operation. This Surveillance ensures the availability of high quality fuel oil for the DGs.

Fuel oil degradation during long term storage shows up as an increase in particulate, mostly due to oxidation. The presence of particulate does not mean that the fuel oil will not burn properly in a diesel engine. The particulate can cause fouling of filters and fuel oil injection equipment, however, which can cause engine failure.

Particulate concentrations should be determined in accordance with ASTM D5452-98 (Ref. 5). This method involves a gravimetric determination of total particulate concentration in the fuel oil and has a limit of 10 mg/l. It is acceptable to obtain a field sample for subsequent laboratory testing in lieu of field testing.

The Frequency of this test takes into consideration fuel oil degradation trends that indicate that particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Frequency intervals.

SR 3.8.3.2

This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for each DG is available. The system design requirements provide for a minimum of three engine starts without recharging. The pressure specified in this SR is intended to support the lowest value at which the three starts can be accomplished.

The 31 day Frequency takes into account the capacity, capability, redundancy, and diversity of the AC sources and other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

- REFERENCES
1. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 1, October 1979.
 2. ANSI N195, 1976.
 3. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 4. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 5. ASTM Standards: D4057-95; D1298-99; D445-97; D93-99c;
D4176-93; D2709-96e; D975-98b; D1552-95; D2622-98;
D4294-98; and D5452-98.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The DC electrical power systems provide the AC emergency power system with control power. They also provide both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment. Also, these DC subsystems provide DC electrical power to inverters, which in turn power the AC essential service buses. As required by UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.2.8 (Ref. 1), the DC electrical power system is designed to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions, assuming a single failure. The DC electrical power system is consistent with the recommendations of Safety Guide 6 (Ref. 2) and IEEE-308 (Ref. 3).

The 250 VDC power sources provide motive power to selected safety related larger DC loads such as DC motor-driven pumps and valves. Each unit includes a 250 VDC source consisting of a 250 VDC battery and an associated 250 VDC full capacity battery charger. An additional 250 VDC full capacity (swing) charger is available for use between the units. The swing charger can only be aligned to one battery at a time. Each 250 VDC battery and charger supplies power to both Unit 2 and Unit 3 loads. Therefore, for the purposes of this Specification, each unit has two 250 VDC electrical power subsystems. One 250 VDC electrical power subsystem includes the associated unit 250 VDC battery and full capacity battery charger while the other 250 VDC electrical power subsystem includes the opposite unit 250 VDC battery and the full capacity charger. The normal and swing full capacity chargers are normally supplied from an associated unit AC load group bus. These AC buses are arranged so they can be aligned to any viable available plant AC source. The loads between the redundant 250 VDC subsystem are not transferable.

The Division 1 and Division 2 125 VDC power sources provide both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment, as well as circuit breaker control power for the nonsafety related 4160 V switchgear, and all 480 V load centers. Each unit includes a 125 VDC source consisting of

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

a 125 VDC battery and two 125 VDC full capacity chargers (normal and spare). Each 125 VDC unit source (125 VDC battery and associated chargers) supplies power to the associated unit Division 1 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystem and the opposite unit Division 2 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystem. The Division 1 and 2 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems provide power to redundant loads, therefore both unit 125 VDC sources are needed to support the operation of both units. These sources are referred to as the Division 1 and 2 125 VDC electrical power sources since they supply the associated units Division 1 and 2 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems, respectively. In addition, the Division 2 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems provide control power to safety related loads common to both units such as the Standby Gas Treatment System. Therefore, the opposite unit Division 2 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystem is needed to support the operations of the given unit. This source is referred to as the opposite unit's 125 VDC electrical power subsystem; however it receives power from the given units battery and full capacity chargers. The design also includes an alternate battery for each 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystem. However, the design configuration of the alternate battery is susceptible to single failure and therefore is not reliable as a normal 125 VDC source. The chargers are supplied from a 480 VAC bus. These AC buses are arranged so they can be aligned to any viable available plant AC source. The loads between the redundant 125 VDC subsystems are not automatically transferable except for the diesel generator (DG) (i.e., 2/3 DG control circuit), High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, and Automatic Depressurization System, the logic circuits and valves of which are normally fed from the Division 1 125 VDC system.

During normal operation, the DC loads are powered from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system. In case of loss of normal power to the battery charger, the DC loads are automatically powered from the associated batteries.

The DC power distribution system is described in more detail in Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution System—Operating," and LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution System—Shutdown."

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

Each battery has adequate storage capacity to carry the normal loads plus all loads required for safe shutdown on one unit and operational loads required to limit the consequences of a design basis event on the other unit for a period of 4 hours (Ref. 4).

Each DC battery is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distribution centers. Each subsystem is located in an area separated physically and electrically from the other subsystems to ensure that a single failure in one subsystem does not cause a failure in a redundant subsystem. There is no sharing between redundant Class 1E subsystems such as batteries, battery chargers, or distribution panels.

The batteries for DC electrical power subsystems are sized to produce required capacity at 80% of nameplate rating, corresponding to warranted capacity at end of life cycles and the 100% design demand. The minimum design voltage limit is 105/210 V.

Each DC electrical power subsystem battery charger has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining its battery bank fully charged. Each battery charger has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 24 hours while supplying normal steady state loads (Ref. 4).

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 5) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 6), assume that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the DGs, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining DC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC power or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of
10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The DC electrical power subsystems—with: a) each 250 VDC subsystem consisting of one 250 VDC battery, one battery charger and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated unit bus, b) the Division 1 125 VDC subsystem consisting of the unit 125 VDC battery, one full capacity battery charger, a unit bus, and the corresponding control equipment, and interconnecting cabling up to the associated unit 125 VDC Division 1 bus, c) the Division 2 125 VDC subsystem consisting of the opposite unit 125 VDC battery, one full capacity battery charger, opposite unit buses, and all the corresponding control equipment, interconnecting cabling, and bus ties up to the unit 125 VDC Division 2 bus, and d) the opposite unit Division 2 125 VDC subsystem consisting of the unit 125 VDC battery, one full capacity battery charger, unit buses, and the corresponding control equipment, interconnecting cabling and bus ties up to the associated opposite unit 125 VDC Division 2 bus are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA. Loss of any DC electrical power subsystem does not prevent the minimum safety function from being performed (Ref. 4).

APPLICABILITY

The DC electrical power sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure safe unit operation and to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY
(continued)

- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 4 and 5 and other conditions in which the DC electrical power sources are required are addressed in LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources – Shutdown."

ACTIONS

A.1

Condition A, 250 VDC battery inoperable as a result of maintenance or testing, represents one subsystem with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of 250 VDC power to the affected subsystem. Operation in this Condition is needed during the operating cycle to ensure the battery is maintained OPERABLE.

If one of the 250 VDC batteries is inoperable, the remaining 250 VDC electrical power subsystem has the capacity to support a safe shutdown of one unit and to mitigate an accident condition in the other unit. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation is limited. Required Action A.1 limits the time the unit can operate in this condition to 7 cumulative days per operating cycle, for any one battery. Therefore, each 250 VDC battery can be removed from service to perform maintenance or testing as long as the cumulative time is not exceeded for that battery.

The 7 day cumulative Completion Time is based on the capacity and capability of the remaining DC sources to supply the required loads.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

Condition B, 250 VDC battery inoperable due to the need to replace the battery as determined by maintenance or testing, represents one subsystem with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of 250 VDC power to the affected subsystem. Operation in this Condition may be needed during the operating cycle to completely replace a battery to maintain the 250 VDC subsystem OPERABLE for the remainder of the cycle.

If one of the 250 VDC batteries is inoperable, the remaining 250 VDC electrical power subsystem has the capacity to support a safe shutdown of one unit and to mitigate an accident condition in the other unit. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation is limited. Required Action B.1 limits the time the unit can operate in this condition to 7 days. Therefore, each 250 VDC battery can be removed from service to completely replace a battery.

The 7 day Completion Time to restore the 250 VDC battery is based on the capacity and capability of the remaining DC sources to supply the required loads.

C.1

With one 250 VDC electrical power subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition B or C, Condition C represents one 250 VDC electrical power subsystem with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of 250 VDC power to the affected buses. The 2 hour limit is consistent with the allowed time for an inoperable DC Distribution System subsystem.

If one 250 VDC electrical power subsystem is inoperable (e.g., inoperable battery, inoperable required battery charger(s), or inoperable required battery charger and

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

associated inoperable battery), the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown of one unit and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time is based on Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7) and reflects a reasonable time to assess unit status as a function of the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem and, if the DC electrical power subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unit shutdown.

D.1 and D.2

Condition D, Division 1 or 2 125 VDC battery inoperable as a result of maintenance or testing, represents one division with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected division. Operation in this Condition is needed during the operating cycle to ensure the battery is maintained OPERABLE. Condition D is modified by a Note indicating that the Condition is only applicable when the opposite unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

If one of the 125 VDC batteries is inoperable, the remaining 125 VDC electrical power subsystem has the capacity to support a safe shutdown of one unit and to mitigate an accident condition in the other unit. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation is limited. Required Action D.2 limits the time the unit can operate in this condition to 7 cumulative days per operating cycle, for any one battery. Therefore, each 125 VDC battery can be removed from service to perform maintenance or testing as long as the cumulative time is not exceeded for that battery. In addition, Required Action D.1 requires the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

associated OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem to be placed in service. An OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem consists of the alternate 125 VDC battery and one full capacity battery charger. For the alternate 125 VDC battery to be considered OPERABLE, all SR requirements associated with the alternate 125 VDC battery must be met. Therefore, placement of the OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem in service will help ensure that the design basis can be met. (The full capacity battery charger is the same battery charger (normal or spare) associated with the normal 125 VDC electrical power subsystem.) However, the design configuration of the alternate battery is susceptible to single failure and hence, is not as reliable as the normal battery. Therefore, only a limited time of operation is allowed in this condition.

The 2 hour Completion Time to place the associated OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem in service provides sufficient time to safely remove the Division 1 or 2 125 VDC electrical power subsystem from service and place the alternate supply in service. The 7 day cumulative Completion Time is based on the capacity and capability of the remaining DC Sources, including the enhanced capability afforded by the capability of the alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem to supply the required loads.

E.1 and E.2

Condition E, Division 1 or 2 125 VDC battery inoperable due to the need to replace the battery as determined by maintenance or testing, represents one division with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected division. Operation in this Condition may be needed during the operating cycle to completely replace a battery to maintain the Division 1 or 2 VDC subsystem OPERABLE for the remainder of the cycle. Condition E is modified by a Note indicating that the Condition is only applicable when the opposite unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1 and E.2 (continued)

If one of the 125 VDC batteries is inoperable, the remaining 125 VDC electrical power subsystem has the capacity to support a safe shutdown of one unit and to mitigate an accident condition in the other unit. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation is limited. Required Action E.2 limits the time the unit can operate in this condition to 7 days. Therefore, each 125 VDC battery can be removed from service to completely replace a battery. In addition, Required Action E.1 requires the associated OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem to be placed in service. An OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem consists of the alternate 125 VDC battery and one full capacity battery charger. For the alternate 125 VDC battery to be considered OPERABLE, all SR requirements associated with the alternate 125 VDC battery must be met. Therefore, placement of the OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem in service will help ensure that the design basis can be met. (The full capacity battery charger is the same battery charger (normal or space) associated with the normal 125 VDC electrical power subsystem.) However, the design configuration of the alternate battery is susceptible to single failure and hence, is not as reliable as the normal battery. Therefore, only a limited time of operation is allowed in this condition.

The 2 hour Completion Time to place the associated OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem in service provides sufficient time to safely remove the Division 1 or 2 125 VDC electrical power subsystem from service and place the alternate supply in service. The 7 day Completion Time to restore the 125 VDC battery is based on the capacity and capability of the remaining DC Sources, including the enhanced capability afforded by the capability of the alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem to supply the required loads.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

F.1 and F.2

With one Division 1 or Division 2 125 VDC electrical power subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Conditions D or E, Condition F represents one division with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event, and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected division. The 2 hour limit is consistent with the allowed time for an inoperable DC Distribution System division.

If one 125 VDC electrical power subsystem is inoperable (e.g., inoperable battery, inoperable required battery charger, or inoperable required battery charger and associated inoperable battery), the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time is based on Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7) and reflects a reasonable time to assess unit status as a function of the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem and, if the DC electrical power subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unit shutdown.

Required Action F.2 is modified by a Note indicating that the action is only applicable if the opposite unit is not in MODE 1, 2, or 3. In this condition, the shutdown unit is under maintenance and a complete test of at least one 125 VDC subsystem may be necessary. Required Action F.2 requires the OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem to be placed in service in 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time to place associated OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem in service provides sufficient time to safely remove the Division 1 and 2 125 VDC electrical power subsystem from service and place the alternate supply in service. An OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem consists of the alternate 125 VDC battery and one full capacity battery charger. For

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

F.1 and F.2 (continued)

the alternate 125 VDC battery to be considered OPERABLE all SR requirements associated with the 125 VDC battery must be met. (The full capacity battery charger is the same battery charger (normal or spare) associated with the normal 125 VDC electrical power subsystem.) Upon completing this Required Action continuous operation is allowed, since if the opposite unit associated OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem is placed in service supplying the unit Division 2 loads, the design configuration will not be susceptible to single failure and hence, the reliability is consistent with the normal battery.

G.1

With the opposite unit Division 2 125 VDC electrical power system inoperable, certain redundant Division 2 features (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment System) will not function if a design basis event were to occur. With a standby gas treatment subsystem inoperable, LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment System" requires restoration of the inoperable SGT subsystem to OPERABLE status in 7 days. Therefore, a 7 day Completion Time is provided to restore the opposite unit Division 2 125 VDC electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE status. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant system(s) and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

H.1 and H.2

If the DC electrical power subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The Completion Time to bring the unit to MODE 4 is consistent with the time required in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.1

Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery and maintain the battery in a fully charged state. The voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the initial voltages assumed in the battery sizing calculations. The 7 day Frequency is conservative when compared with manufacturers recommendations and IEEE-450 (Ref. 8). SR 3.8.4.1.c is modified by a Note. The Note requires the Unit 2 alternate battery to meet the specified voltage limit only when it is required to be OPERABLE. This battery is required to be OPERABLE when it is being used to meet Required Actions D.1, E.1, or F.2.

SR 3.8.4.2

Visual inspection to detect corrosion of the battery cells and connections, or measurement of the resistance of each intercell and terminal connection, provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The connection resistance limits established for this SR are within the values established by industry practice. The connection resistance limits of this SR are related to the resistance of individual bolted connections, and do not include the resistance of conductive components (e.g., cables or conductors located between cells, racks, or tiers).

The Frequency for these inspections, which can detect conditions that can cause power losses due to resistance heating, is 92 days. This Frequency is considered acceptable based on operating experience related to detecting corrosion trends.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.4.3 and SR 3.8.4.7

Battery charger capability requirements are based on the design capacity of the chargers (Ref. 4). According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 9), the battery charger supply is required to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensures that these requirements can be satisfied.

The 18 month Frequency for SR 3.8.4.3 is acceptable based on engineering judgement. Operating experience has shown that the 250 V battery chargers usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

The 24 Frequency for SR 3.8.4.7 is acceptable given the administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 24 month intervals. In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 3.8.4.4

Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and battery racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance. The presence of physical damage or deterioration does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR, provided an evaluation determines that the physical damage or deterioration does not affect the OPERABILITY of the battery (its ability to perform its design function).

The 24 month Frequency for the Surveillance is based on engineering judgement. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.4.5 and SR 3.8.4.6

Visual inspection and resistance measurements of intercell and terminal connections provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could indicate degraded battery condition. The anti-corrosion material is used to help ensure good electrical connections and to reduce terminal deterioration. The visual inspection for corrosion is not intended to require removal of and inspection under each terminal connection.

The removal of visible corrosion is a preventive maintenance SR. The presence of visible corrosion does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR, provided visible corrosion is removed during performance of this Surveillance.

The connection resistance limits are within the values established by industry practice. The connection resistance limits of this SR are related to the resistance of individual bolted connections, and do not include the resistance of conductive components (e.g., cables or conductors located between cells, racks, or tiers).

The 24 month Frequency for the Surveillance is based on engineering judgement. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.8.4.8

A battery service test is a special test of the battery's capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The test can be performed using simulated or actual loads. The discharge rate and test length corresponds to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4.

The Frequency of 24 months is acceptable, given unit conditions required to perform the test and the other requirements existing to ensure adequate battery performance during these 24 month intervals. In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.8 (continued)

This SR is modified by a Note. The Note allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test provided the modified performance discharge test completely envelopes the service test. This substitution is acceptable because a modified performance discharge test represents a more severe test of battery capacity than SR 3.8.4.8.

SR 3.8.4.9

A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the as found condition, after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.

A battery modified performance discharge test is a simulated duty cycle normally consisting of just two rates; the one minute rate published for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance discharge test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. (The test can consist of a single rate if the test rate employed for the performance discharge test exceeds the 1 minute rate and continues to envelope the duty cycle of the service test.) Since the ampere-hours removed by a rated one minute discharge represents a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of the performance discharge test. The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.

A modified performance discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.9 (continued)

to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service test when the modified performance discharge test is performed in lieu of a service test. Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.4.9; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 3.8.4.9 while satisfying the requirements of SR 3.8.4.8 at the same time.

The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 8) and IEEE-485 (Ref. 10). These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer's rating, since IEEE-485 (Ref. 10) recommends using an aging factor of 125% in the battery size calculation. A capacity of 80% shows that the battery rate of deterioration is increasing, even if there is ample capacity to meet the load requirements.

The Frequency for this test is normally 60 months. If the battery shows degradation, or if the battery has reached 85% of its expected life and capacity is < 100% of the manufacturer's rating, the Surveillance Frequency is reduced to 12 months. However, if the battery shows no degradation but has reached 85% of its expected life, the Surveillance Frequency is only reduced to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity \geq 100% of the manufacturer's rating. Degradation is indicated, consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 8), when the battery capacity drops by more than 10% relative to its capacity on the previous performance test or when it is \geq 10% below the manufacturer's rating. The 12 month and 60 month Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE-450 (Ref. 8). The 24 month Frequency is derived from the recommendations of IEEE-450 (Ref. 8).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

- REFERENCES
1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.2.8.
 2. Safety Guide 6, March 10, 1971.
 3. IEEE Standard 308, 1974.
 4. UFSAR, Section 8.3.2.
 5. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 6. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 7. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Revision 0, December 1974.
 8. IEEE Standard 450, 1995.
 9. Regulatory Guide 1.32, Revision 2, February 1977.
 10. IEEE Standard 485, 1978.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.5 DC Sources – Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources – Operating."
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.
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The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

- The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

In general, when the unit is shut down, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced or eliminated, and in minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

The shutdown Technical Specification requirements are designed to ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated accidents. Worst case Design Basis Accidents which are analyzed for operating MODES are generally viewed not to be a significant concern during shutdown MODES due to the lower energies involved. The Technical Specifications therefore require a lesser complement of electrical equipment to be available during shutdown than is required during operating MODES. More recent work completed on the potential risks associated with shutdown, however, have found significant risk associated with certain shutdown evolutions. As a result, in addition to the requirements established in the Technical Specifications, the Industry has adopted NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management," as an industry initiative to manage shutdown tasks and associated electrical support to maintain risk at an acceptable low level. This may require the availability of additional equipment beyond that required by the shutdown Technical Specifications.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of
10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The DC electrical power subsystems—with: a) the required 250 VDC subsystem consisting of one 250 VDC battery, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus; and b) the required 125 VDC subsystem consisting of one battery, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus—are required to be OPERABLE to support some of the required DC distribution subsystems required OPERABLE

(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued)	by LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems – Shutdown." This requirement ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown). The associated alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem may be used to satisfy the requirements of the 125 VDC subsystems.
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APPLICABILITY	<p>The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; andd. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition. <p>The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.4.</p>
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ACTIONS	<p>LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3 while in MODE 1, 2, or 3</p>
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(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

would require the unit to be shutdown, but would not require immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Note to the ACTIONS, "LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable," ensures that the actions for immediate suspension of irradiated fuel assembly movement are not postponed due to entry into LCO 3.0.3.

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4

By allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with associated DC electrical power subsystem(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. However, in many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.5.1

SR 3.8.5.1 requires all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.9 to be applicable. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.5.1 (continued)

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE 250 VDC source from being discharged below their capability to provide the required power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters

BASES

BACKGROUND	This LCO delineates the limits on electrolyte temperature, level, float voltage, and specific gravity for the DC electrical power subsystems batteries. A discussion of these batteries and their OPERABILITY requirements is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources – Operating," and LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources – Shutdown."
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	<p>The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power subsystems provide normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.</p> <p>The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit as discussed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4 and LCO 3.8.5.</p> <p>Since battery cell parameters support the operation of the DC electrical power subsystems, they satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).</p>
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LCO	Battery cell parameters must remain within acceptable limits to ensure availability of the required DC power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. Electrolyte limits are conservatively established, allowing continued DC electrical system function even with Category A and B limits not met.
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APPLICABILITY	The battery cell parameters are required solely for the support of the associated DC electrical power subsystem. Therefore, these cell parameters are only required when the associated DC electrical power subsystem is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the Applicability discussions in Bases for LCO 3.8.4 and LCO 3.8.5.
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(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS Table is modified by a Note which indicates that separate Condition entry is allowed for each battery. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable DC electrical power subsystem. Complying with the Required Actions for one inoperable DC electrical power subsystem may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable DC electrical power subsystem(s) are governed by separate Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1, A.2, and A.3

With parameters of one or more cells in one or more batteries not within Table 3.8.6-1 limits (i.e., Category A limits not met or Category B limits not met, or Category A and B limits not met) but within the Category C limits specified in Table 3.8.6-1, the battery is degraded but there is still sufficient capacity to perform the intended function. Therefore, the affected battery is not required to be considered inoperable solely as a result of Category A or B limits not met, and continued operation is permitted for a limited period.

The pilot cell(s) electrolyte level and float voltage are required to be verified to meet the Category C limits within 1 hour (Required Action A.1). This check provides a quick indication of the status of the remainder of the battery cells. One hour provides time to inspect the electrolyte level and to confirm the float voltage of the pilot cell(s). One hour is considered a reasonable amount of time to perform the required verification.

Verification that the Category C limits are met (Required Action A.2) provides assurance that during the time needed to restore the parameters to the Category A and B limits, the battery is still capable of performing its intended function. A period of 24 hours is allowed to complete the initial verification because specific gravity measurements must be obtained for each connected cell. Taking into consideration both the time required to perform the required verification and the assurance that the battery cell parameters are not severely degraded, this time is

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BASES

ACTIONS A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued)

considered reasonable. The verification is repeated at 7 day intervals until the parameters are restored to Category A and B limits. This periodic verification is consistent with the normal Frequency of pilot cell Surveillances.

Continued operation is only permitted for 31 days before battery cell parameters must be restored to within Category A and B limits. Taking into consideration that, while battery capacity is degraded, sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and to allow time to fully restore the battery cell parameters to normal limits, this time is acceptable for operation prior to declaring the associated DC batteries inoperable.

B.1

When any battery parameter is outside the Table 3.8.6-1 Category C limit for any connected cell, sufficient capacity to supply the maximum expected load requirement is not ensured and the corresponding DC electrical power subsystem must be declared inoperable. Additionally, other potentially extreme conditions, such as any Required Actions of Condition A and associated Completion Time not met or average electrolyte temperature of representative cells $\leq 65^{\circ}\text{F}$, also are cause for immediately declaring the associated DC electrical power subsystem inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.6.1

This SR verifies that Table 3.8.6-1 Category A battery cell parameters are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends regular battery inspections (at least one per month) including voltage, specific gravity, and electrolyte level of pilot cells.

SR 3.8.6.2

The quarterly inspection of specific gravity, voltage, and electrolyte level for each connected cell is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3). In addition, within 7 days of a battery

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.6.2 (continued)

discharge < 105 V for a 125 V battery and < 210 V for a 250 V battery, or a battery overcharge > 150 V for a 125 V battery and > 300 V for a 250 V battery, the battery must be demonstrated to meet Table 3.8.6-1 Category B limits. Transients, such as motor starting transients, which may momentarily cause battery voltage to drop to < 105 V or < 210 V, as applicable, do not constitute a battery discharge provided the battery terminal voltage and float current return to pre-transient values. This inspection is also consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends special inspections following a severe discharge or overcharge, to ensure that no significant degradation of the battery occurs as a consequence of such discharge or overcharge. The 7 day requirement is based on engineering judgement.

SR 3.8.6.3

This Surveillance verification that the average temperature of representative cells is within limits is consistent with a recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) that states that the temperature of electrolytes in representative cells should be determined on a quarterly basis. For this SR, a check of 10% of the connected cells is considered representative.

Lower than normal temperatures act to inhibit or reduce battery capacity. This SR ensures that the operating temperatures remain within an acceptable operating range. This limit is based on manufacturer's recommendations and the battery sizing calculation.

Table 3.8.6-1

This Table delineates the limits on electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific gravity for three different categories. The meaning of each category is discussed below.

Category A defines the normal parameter limit for each designed pilot cell in each battery. The cells selected as pilot cells are those whose temperature, voltage, and

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

electrolyte specific gravity approximate the state of charge of the entire battery.

The Category A limits specified for electrolyte level are based on manufacturer's recommendations and are consistent with the guidance in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), with the extra $\frac{1}{4}$ inch allowance above the high water level indication for operating margin to account for temperature and charge effects. In addition to this allowance, footnote (a) to Table 3.8.6-1 permits the electrolyte level to be temporarily above the specified maximum level during and, for a limited time, following an equalizing charge (normally up to 3 days following the completion of an equalize charge to allow electrolyte stabilization), provided it is not overflowing. These limits ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage, and that adequate electron transfer capability is maintained in the event of transient conditions. IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) recommends that electrolyte level readings should be made only after the battery has been at float charge for at least 72 hours.

The Category A limit specified for float voltage is ≥ 2.13 V per cell. This value is based on the recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which states that prolonged operation of cells below 2.13 V can reduce the life expectancy of cells.

The Category A limit specified for specific gravity for each pilot cell is ≥ 1.200 (0.015 below the manufacturer's fully charged nominal specific gravity or a battery charging current that had stabilized at a low value). This value is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. According to IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), the specific gravity readings are based on a temperature of 77°F (25°C).

The specific gravity readings are corrected for actual electrolyte temperature and level. For each 3°F (1.67°C) above 77°F (25°C), 1 point (0.001) is added to the reading; 1 point is subtracted for each 3°F below 77°F. The specific gravity of the electrolyte in a cell increases with a loss of water due to electrolysis or evaporation. Level correction will be in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

Category B defines the normal parameter limits for each connected cell. The term "connected cell" excludes any battery cell that may be jumpered out.

The Category B limits specified for electrolyte level and float voltage are the same as those specified for Category A and have been discussed above. The Category B limit specified for specific gravity for each connected cell is ≥ 1.195 (0.020 below the manufacturer's fully charged, nominal specific gravity) with the average of all connected cells ≥ 1.205 (0.010 below the manufacturer's fully charged, nominal specific gravity). These values are based on manufacturer's recommendations. The minimum specific gravity value required for each cell ensures that a cell with a marginal or unacceptable specific gravity is not masked by averaging with cells having higher specific gravities.

Category C defines the limits for each connected cell. These values, although reduced, provide assurance that sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and maintain a margin of safety. When any battery parameter is outside the Category C limits, the assurance of sufficient capacity described above no longer exists, and the battery must be declared inoperable.

The Category C limit specified for electrolyte level (above the top of the plates and not overflowing) ensures that the plates suffer no physical damage and maintain adequate electron transfer capability. The Category C limit for voltage is based on IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which states that a cell voltage of 2.07 V or below, under float conditions and not caused by elevated temperature of the cell, indicates internal cell problems and may require cell replacement.

The Category C limit on average specific gravity ≥ 1.195 , is based on manufacturer's recommendations (0.020 below the manufacturer's recommended fully charged, nominal specific gravity). In addition to that limit, it is required that the specific gravity for each connected cell must be no more than 0.020 below the average of all connected cells. This limit ensures that a cell with a marginal or unacceptable specific gravity is not masked by averaging with cells having higher specific gravities.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

The footnotes to Table 3.8.6-1 that apply to specific gravity are applicable to Category A, B, and C specific gravity. Footnote (b) requires the above mentioned correction for electrolyte level and temperature.

Because of specific gravity gradients that are produced during the recharging process, delays of several days may occur while waiting for the specific gravity to stabilize. A stabilized charging current is an acceptable alternative to specific gravity measurement for determining the state of charge of the designated pilot cell. This phenomenon is discussed in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3). Footnote (c) allows the float charge current to be used as an alternate to specific gravity for up to 7 days following a battery recharge. Within 7 days, each connected cell's specific gravity must be measured to confirm the state of charge. Following a minor battery recharge (such as equalizing charge that does not follow a deep discharge) specific gravity gradients are not significant, and confirming measurements may be made in less than 7 days.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 3. IEEE Standard 450, 1995.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.7 Distribution Systems – Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution system for each unit is, for the most part, divided into redundant and independent AC electrical power distribution subsystems (Divisions 1 and 2).

Each AC distribution subsystem consists of two 4160 V Essential Service System (ESS) buses having an offsite source of power as well as an onsite diesel generator (DG) source. During normal operation, each subsystem's ESS buses are connected such that power is supplied to the Division 1 4160 V loads from the unit's main generator through a unit auxiliary transformer (UAT) and from the offsite circuit (via the 138 kV switchyard for Unit 2 and the 345 kV switchyard for Unit 3) through the reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) to supply the Division 2 4160 V loads. The RAT is the primary (normal) offsite power source to the ESS buses of a given unit. The RAT of the opposite unit provides the alternate qualified offsite source through bus ties provided between the corresponding ESS buses of the two units. During a loss of the normal offsite power source to the 4160 V ESS buses, the alternate supply breaker attempts to close. If all offsite sources are unavailable, the onsite emergency unit DGs supply power to the 4160 V ESS buses.

Each AC distribution subsystem also includes 480 VAC ESS buses 28 and 29 (Unit 2) and buses 38 and 39 (Unit 3), associated motor control centers, transformers, and distribution panels.

The 120 VAC instrument bus is normally powered from 480 VAC bus 28-2 for Unit 2 and 480 VAC bus 38-2 for Unit 3. The alternate power supply for the Unit 2 120 VAC instrument bus is supplied from 480 VAC MCC 25-2 and the Unit 3 120 VAC instrument bus is supplied from 480 VAC MCC 35-2. On a loss of normal power to the instrument bus an automatic bus transfer (ABT) switches to the alternate supply and automatically switches back to the normal supply when the normal supply is restored. However, the instrument bus ABT

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

is only provided for reliability and is not required to be OPERABLE (i.e., only one power source to the instrument bus is required).

The 120 VAC essential service bus is normally supplied by a static uninterruptible power supply (UPS). Power to the UPS is supplied in order of preference; for Unit 2 by 480 VAC bus 29, 250 VDC bus 2, or 480 VAC bus 25; and for Unit 3 by 480 VAC bus 39, 250 VDC bus 3, or 480 VAC bus 36. An alternate supply via an ABT for the Unit 2 120 VAC essential service bus is supplied from 480 VAC bus 28-2 and the Unit 3 120 VAC essential service bus is supplied from 480 VAC bus 38-2. However, similar to the instrument bus ABT, the essential service bus ABT is not required to be OPERABLE.

There is one 250 VDC station service electrical power distribution subsystem (i.e., the 250 VDC system consists of one subsystem) and two independent 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems that support the necessary power for ESF functions. The 250 VDC electrical power distribution subsystem provides motive power to the larger Division 2 DC loads such as DC motor-driven pumps and valves. The power source for the reactor building 250 VDC buses (2A/2B and 3A/3B) is the opposite unit's battery. Division 1 and 2 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems provide control power to selected safety related equipment as well as circuit breaker control power for 4160 V, 480 V, control relays, and annunciators. The Division 2 125 VDC subsystem for each unit is provided power by the opposite unit's battery and provides control power to a shared standby gas treatment subsystem.

The list of required distribution buses for Unit 2 and Unit 3 is presented in Tables B 3.8.7-1 and B 3.8.7-2, respectively.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2,

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Isolation Condenser (IC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC electrical power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution system satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The required electrical power distribution subsystems listed in Table B 3.8.7-1 for Unit 2 and Table B 3.8.7-2 for Unit 3 ensure the availability of AC and DC electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA. The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. As noted in Table B 3.8.7-1 and Table B 3.8.7-2 (Footnote a), each division of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is a subsystem.

Maintaining the Division 1 and 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE, as well as portions of the opposite unit's Division 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems necessary to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," LCO 3.7.4, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System" (Unit 3 only), LCO 3.7.5, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System" (Unit 3 only), and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources—Operating," ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

(continued)

BASES

LC0
(continued)

The AC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses and electrical circuits to be energized to their proper voltages. OPERABLE DC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses to be energized to their proper voltage from either the associated battery or charger.

Based on the number of safety significant electrical loads associated with each bus listed in Table B 3.8.7-1 for Unit 2 and Table B 3.8.7-2 for Unit 3, if one or more of the buses becomes inoperable, entry into the appropriate ACTIONS of LC0 3.8.7 is required. Some buses, such as distribution panels, which help comprise the AC and DC distribution systems are not listed in Table B 3.8.7-1 for Unit 2 and Table B 3.8.7-2 for Unit 3. The loss of electrical loads associated with these buses may not result in a complete loss of a redundant safety function necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition. Therefore, should one or more of these buses become inoperable due to a failure not affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in Table B 3.8.7-1 for Unit 2 and Table B 3.8.7-2 for Unit 3 (e.g., a breaker supplying a single distribution panel fails open), the individual loads on the bus would be considered inoperable, and the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LC0s governing the individual loads would be entered. However, if one or more of these buses is inoperable due to a failure also affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in Table B 3.8.7-1 for Unit 2 and Table B 3.8.7-2 for Unit 3 (e.g., loss of 4160 V ESS bus, which results in de-energization of all buses powered from the 4160 V ESS bus), then although the individual loads are still considered inoperable, the Conditions and Required Actions of the LC0 for the individual loads are not required to be entered, since LC0 3.0.6 allows this exception (i.e., the loads are inoperable due to the inoperability of a support system governed by a Technical Specification; the 4160 V ESS bus).

In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety related AC and DC power distribution subsystems must be open. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem, which could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function(s). If

(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued)	any tie breakers between redundant safety related AC or DC power distribution subsystems are closed, the electrical power distribution subsystem that is not being powered from its normal source (i.e., it is being powered from its redundant electrical power distribution subsystem) is considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety related, redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. It does not, however, preclude redundant Class 1E 4160 V ESS buses from being powered from the same offsite circuit.
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APPLICABILITY	<p>The electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of A00s or abnormal transients; andb. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.
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Electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 4 and 5 and other conditions in which AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are required are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown."

ACTIONS

A.1

With one or more required AC buses, motor control centers, or distribution panels inoperable and a loss of function has not yet occurred, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining electrical power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC buses, motor control centers, and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

The Condition A worst scenario is one division without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to the division and the associated DG inoperable). In this situation, the unit is more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the unit operators' attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining division by stabilizing the unit and restoring power to the affected division. The 8 hour time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because of:

- a. The potential for decreased safety if the unit operators' attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected division to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit.
- b. The low potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the division with AC power. (The redundant component is verified OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 5.5.11, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP).")

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.7.a. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DC electrical power distribution subsystem is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, LCO 3.8.7.a may already have been not met for up to 2 hours. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours, since initial failure of LCO 3.8.7.a to restore the AC electrical power distribution subsystem. At this time a DC electrical power distribution subsystem could again become inoperable, and the AC electrical power distribution subsystem could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet LCO 3.8.7.a indefinitely.

B.1

With one or more DC buses inoperable and a loss of safety function has not yet occurred, the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem (which may be the opposite unit's subsystem for a loss of the 250 VDC turbine building bus) is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours by powering the bus from the associated battery or charger.

Condition B worst scenario is one subsystem without adequate DC power, potentially with both the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation the plant is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining subsystem, and restoring power to the affected subsystem.

This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the majority of components that would be without power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate DC power, which would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours, is acceptable because of:

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

- a. The potential for decreased safety when requiring a change in plant conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while not allowing stable operations to continue;
- b. The potential for decreased safety when requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power, while not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected division;
- c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour Completion Time for DC electrical power distribution subsystems is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3).

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.7.a. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an AC electrical power distribution subsystem is inoperable and subsequently restored OPERABLE, LCO 3.8.7.a may already have been not met for up to 8 hours. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours, since initial failure of LCO 3.8.7.a, to restore the DC electrical power distribution subsystem. At this time, an AC electrical power distribution subsystem could again become inoperable, and DC electrical power distribution could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This allowance results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition B was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential of failing to meet LCO 3.8.7.a indefinitely.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1

With one or more required opposite unit Division 2 AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable, the redundant required features of the standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem may not function if a design basis event were to occur. In addition, Unit 2 and Unit 3 share the single train Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) and the associated Air Conditioning (AC) System. Since these systems are powered only from Unit 2, an inoperable Unit 2 Division 2 AC electrical power distribution subsystem could result in a loss of the CREV System and Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System functions (for both units).

With a standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem inoperable, LCO 3.6.4.3 requires restoration of the inoperable SGT subsystem to OPERABLE status in 7 days. Similarly, with the CREV System inoperable, LCO 3.7.4 requires restoration of the inoperable CREV System to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System inoperable, LCO 3.7.5 requires restoration of the inoperable Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System to OPERABLE status in 30 days. Therefore, a 7 day Completion Time is provided to restore the required opposite unit Division 2 AC and DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant system(s) and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

The Required Action is modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.8.1 be entered and Required Actions taken if the inoperable opposite unit AC electrical power distribution subsystem results in an inoperable required offsite circuit. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.

D.1 and D.2

If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1

Condition E corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical distribution system that causes a required safety function to be lost. When the inoperability of two or more AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems, in combination, results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown. The term "in combination" means that the loss of function must result from the inoperability of two or more AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems; a loss of function solely due to a single AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperability even with another AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystem concurrently inoperable, does not require entry into Condition E.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.7.1

This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical divisions are maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems, redundant power

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.7.1 (continued)

supplies available to the essential service and instrument 120 VAC buses, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to bus and subsystem malfunctions.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
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Table B 3.8.7-1 (page 1 of 1)
Unit 2 AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems

TYPE	VOLTAGE	DIVISION 1 ^(a)	DIVISION 2 ^{(a)(b)}
AC safety bus	4160 V	ESS buses 23, 23-1	ESS buses 24, 24-1
	480 V	ESS bus 28	ESS bus 29
	120 V	Unit instrument bus	Unit essential service bus
250 VDC buses	250 V	NA	TB MCC 2, RB MCC 2A, RB MCC 2B
125 VDC buses	125 V	TB main buses 2, 2A-1; RB distribution panel 2	TB reserve buses 2, 2B, 2B-1

- (a) Each division of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is a subsystem. The 250 VDC buses constitute a single subsystem (Division 2).
- (b) OPERABILITY requirements of the opposite unit's Division 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem require OPERABILITY of the opposite unit's Division 2 4160 VAC, 480 VAC, essential services 120 VAC, and 125 VDC buses.

Table B 3.8.7-2 (page 1 of 1)
Unit 3 AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems

TYPE	VOLTAGE	DIVISION 1 ^(a)	DIVISION 2 ^{(a)(b)}
AC safety bus	4160 V	ESS buses 33, 33-1	ESS buses 34, 34-1
	480 V	ESS bus 38	ESS bus 39
	120 V	Unit instrument bus	Unit essential service bus
250 VDC buses	250 V	NA	TB MCC 3, RB MCC 3A, RB MCC 3B
125 VDC buses	125 V	TB main buses 3, 3A, 3A-1; RB distribution panel 3	TB reserve buses 3B, 3B-1

- (a) Each division of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is a subsystem. The 250 VDC buses constitute a single subsystem (Division 2).
- (b) OPERABILITY requirements of the opposite unit's Division 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem require OPERABILITY of the opposite unit's Division 2 4160 VAC, 480 VAC, essential services 120 VAC, and 125 VDC buses.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems – Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Operating."
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.
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The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the electrical distribution system, including the opposite unit Division 2 electrical distribution subsystem, necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications required systems, equipment, and components—both specifically addressed by their own LCO, and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3 while in MODE 1, 2, or 3 would require the unit to be shutdown, but would not require immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Note to the ACTIONS, "LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable," ensures that the actions for immediate suspension of irradiated fuel assembly movement are not postponed due to entry into LCO 3.0.3.

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, and A.2.5

Although redundant required features may require redundant divisions of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem division may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made, (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, and A.2.5 (continued)

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required shutdown cooling (SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the SDC ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring SDC inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate SDC ACTIONS.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the plant safety systems may be without power.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.8.1
REQUIREMENTS

This Surveillance verifies that the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are functioning properly, with the buses energized. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required power is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the electrical power distribution subsystems, as well as other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks

BASES

BACKGROUND

Refueling equipment interlocks restrict the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods to reinforce unit procedures that prevent the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling. The refueling interlock circuitry senses the conditions of the refueling equipment and the control rods. Depending on the sensed conditions, interlocks are actuated to prevent the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods.

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods, when fully inserted, serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions during all fuel movement activities and accidents.

Two channels of instrumentation are provided to sense the position of the refueling platform and the full insertion of all control rods. Additionally, inputs are provided for the loading of the refueling platform main hoist fuel grapple, the loading of the refueling platform trolley frame mounted hoist, the loading of the refueling platform monorail mounted hoist, the full retraction of the fuel grapple, and the loading of the service platform hoist. With the reactor mode switch in the shutdown or refuel position, the indicated conditions are combined in logic circuits to determine if all restrictions on refueling equipment operations and control rod insertion are satisfied.

A control rod not at its full-in position interrupts power to the refueling equipment to prevent operating the equipment over the reactor core when loaded with a fuel assembly. Conversely, the refueling equipment located over the core and loaded with fuel inserts a control rod withdrawal block in the Reactor Manual Control System to prevent withdrawing a control rod.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

The refueling platform has two mechanical switches that open before the platform or any of its hoists are physically located over the reactor vessel. Each hoist load is sensed by an electronic load cell. The service platform uses relay logic to perform the interlock and load functions. The fuel grapple main hoist load signals input via a signal conditioning unit (SCU) to a programmable logic controller (PLC). The PLC performs the associated interlock and load functions. The monorail and frame-mounted hoist load cells input via SCUs to electronic setpoint modules that perform their associated interlock and load functions. The PLC opens the associated fuel-loaded circuits at a load lighter than the combined weight of a single fuel assembly and inner-most mast section assembly in water. The electronic setpoint modules open the associated fuel-loaded circuits at a load lighter than the weight of a single fuel assembly in water.

The refueling interlocks use these indications to prevent operation of the refueling equipment with fuel loaded over the core whenever any control rod is withdrawn, or to prevent control rod withdrawal whenever fuel loaded refueling equipment is over the core (Ref. 2).

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The refueling interlocks are explicitly assumed in the UFSAR analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 3). This analysis evaluates the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

Criticality and, therefore, subsequent prompt reactivity excursions are prevented during the insertion of fuel, provided all control rods are fully inserted during the fuel insertion. The refueling interlocks accomplish this by preventing loading of fuel into the core with any control rod withdrawn or by preventing withdrawal of a rod from the core during fuel loading.

The refueling platform location switches activate at a point outside of the reactor core, such that, with a fuel assembly loaded and a control rod withdrawn, the fuel is not over the core.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	Refueling equipment interlocks satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
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LCO	To prevent criticality during refueling, the refueling interlocks associated with the reactor mode switch refuel position ensure that fuel assemblies are not loaded into the core with any control rod withdrawn.
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To prevent these conditions from developing, the all-rods-in, the refueling platform position, the refueling platform fuel grapple fuel loaded, the refueling platform trolley frame mounted hoist fuel loaded, the refueling platform monorail mounted hoist fuel loaded, the refueling platform fuel grapple fully retracted position, and the service platform hoist fuel loaded inputs are required to be OPERABLE when the associated equipment is in use for in-vessel fuel movement. These inputs are combined in logic circuits, which provide refueling equipment or control rod blocks to prevent operations that could result in criticality during refueling operations.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 5, a prompt reactivity excursion could cause fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. The refueling equipment interlocks protect against prompt reactivity excursions during MODE 5. The interlocks are required to be OPERABLE during in-vessel fuel movement with refueling equipment associated with the interlocks when the reactor mode switch is in the refuel position. The interlocks are not required when the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position since a control rod block (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation") ensures control rod withdrawals can not occur simultaneously with in-vessel fuel movements.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and CORE ALTERATIONS are not possible. Therefore, the refueling interlocks are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

With one or more of the required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable (does not include the one-rod-out interlock addressed in LCO 3.9.2), the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply or is not necessary. This can be performed by ensuring fuel assemblies are not moved in the reactor vessel or by ensuring that the control rods are inserted and cannot be withdrawn. Therefore, Required Action A.1 requires that in-vessel fuel movement with the affected refueling equipment must be immediately suspended. This action ensures that operations are not performed with equipment that would potentially not be blocked from unacceptable operations (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with a control rod withdrawn). Suspension of in-vessel fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Alternately, Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 require that a control rod withdrawal block be inserted and that all control rods are subsequently verified to be fully inserted. Required Action A.2.1 ensures that no control rods can be withdrawn. This action ensures that control rods cannot be inappropriately withdrawn since an electrical or hydraulic block to control rod withdrawal is in place. Required Action A.2.2 is normally performed after placing the rod withdrawal block in effect and provides a verification that all control rods are fully inserted. Like Required Action A.1, Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 ensure that unacceptable operations are prohibited (e.g., loading fuel into a core cell with the control rod withdrawn).

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.1.1

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates each required refueling equipment interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.1.1 (continued)

single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.

The 7 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of refueling interlocks and their associated input status that are available to unit operations personnel.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7.
 2. UFSAR, Section 7.7.1.2.2.
 3. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
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B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock

BASES

BACKGROUND

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock restricts the movement of control rods to reinforce unit procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod is permitted to be withdrawn.

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock prevents the selection of a second control rod for movement when any other control rod is not fully inserted (Ref. 2). It is a logic circuit that has redundant channels. It uses the all-rods-in signal (from the control rod full-in position indicators discussed in LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication") and a rod selection signal (from the Reactor Manual Control System).

This Specification ensures that the performance of the refuel position one-rod-out interlock in the event of a Design Basis Accident meets the assumptions used in the safety analysis of Reference 3.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The refueling position one-rod-out interlock is explicitly assumed in the UFSAR analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 3). This analysis evaluates the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock and adequate SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)") prevent criticality by preventing withdrawal of more than one control rod. With

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

one control rod withdrawn, the core will remain subcritical, thereby preventing any prompt critical excursion.

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

To prevent criticality during MODE 5, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock ensures no more than one control rod may be withdrawn. Both channels of the refuel position one-rod-out interlock are required to be OPERABLE and the reactor mode switch must be locked in the refuel position to support the OPERABILITY of these channels.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 5, with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the OPERABLE refuel position one-rod-out interlock provides protection against prompt reactivity excursions.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock is not required to be OPERABLE and is bypassed. In MODES 1 and 2, the Reactor Protection System (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation") and the control rods (LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY") provide mitigation of potential reactivity excursions. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod block (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation") ensures all control rods are inserted, thereby preventing criticality during shutdown conditions.

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

With the refueling position one-rod-out interlock inoperable, the refueling interlocks may not be capable of preventing more than one control rod from being withdrawn. This condition may lead to criticality.

Control rod withdrawal must be immediately suspended, and action must be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Action must continue until all such

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

control rods are fully inserted. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, do not have to be inserted.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.2.1

Proper functioning of the refueling position one-rod-out interlock requires the reactor mode switch to be in Refuel. During control rod withdrawal in MODE 5, improper positioning of the reactor mode switch could, in some instances, allow improper bypassing of required interlocks. Therefore, this Surveillance imposes an additional level of assurance that the refueling position one-rod-out interlock will be OPERABLE when required. By "locking" the reactor mode switch in the proper position (i.e., removing the reactor mode switch key from the console while the reactor mode switch is positioned in refuel), an additional administrative control is in place to preclude operator errors from resulting in unanalyzed operation.

The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other administrative controls utilized during refueling operations to ensure safe operation.

SR 3.9.2.2

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each channel demonstrates the associated refuel position one-rod-out interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The 7 day Frequency is considered adequate because of demonstrated circuit reliability, procedural

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.2.2 (continued)

controls on control rod withdrawals, and visual indications available in the control room to alert the operator to control rods not fully inserted. To perform the required testing, the applicable condition must be entered (i.e., a control rod must be withdrawn from its full-in position). Therefore, SR 3.9.2.2 has been modified by a Note that states the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7.
 2. UFSAR, Section 7.7.1.2.2.
 3. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
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B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.3 Control Rod Position

BASES

BACKGROUND

Control rods provide the capability to maintain the reactor subcritical under all conditions and to limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase caused by a malfunction in the Control Rod Drive System. During refueling, movement of control rods is limited by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks," and LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock") or the control rod block with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation").

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

The refueling interlocks allow a single control rod to be withdrawn at any time unless fuel is being loaded into the core. To preclude loading fuel assemblies into the core with a control rod withdrawn, all control rods must be fully inserted. This prevents the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling operations.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"), the intermediate range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1).

The safety analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling in the UFSAR (Ref. 2) assumes the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

Thus, prior to fuel reload, all control rods must be fully inserted to minimize the probability of an inadvertent criticality.

Control rod position satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

All control rods must be fully inserted during applicable refueling conditions to minimize the probability of an inadvertent criticality during refueling.

APPLICABILITY

During MODE 5, loading fuel into core cells with control rods withdrawn may result in inadvertent criticality. Therefore, the control rods must be inserted before loading fuel into a core cell. All control rods must be inserted before loading fuel to ensure that a fuel loading error does not result in loading fuel into a core cell with the control rod withdrawn.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and no fuel loading activities are possible. Therefore, this Specification is not applicable in these MODES.

ACTIONS

A.1

With all control rods not fully inserted during the applicable conditions, an inadvertent criticality could occur that is not analyzed in the UFSAR. All fuel loading operations must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.3.1

During refueling, to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical, all control rods must be fully inserted prior to and during fuel loading. Periodic checks of the control rod position ensure this condition is maintained.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.3.1 (continued)

The 12 hour Frequency takes into consideration the procedural controls on control rod movement during refueling as well as the redundant functions of the refueling interlocks.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
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B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication

BASES

BACKGROUND

The full-in position indication channel for each control rod provides necessary information to the refueling interlocks to prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling operations. During refueling, the refueling interlocks (LC0 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks," and LC0 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock") use the full-in position indication channel to limit the operation of the refueling equipment and the movement of the control rods. Two full-in position indication switches (S51 and S52) provide input to the all-rods-in logic for each control rod. Switch S51 provides full core display beyond full-in (scram) position indication (green dashes - no readout) and switch S52 provides full core display normal green full-in position indication. Switch S52 is set slightly beyond switch S00, which provides the digital "00" full-in position readout (switch S00 does not provide input to the all-rods-in logic and is not considered a full-in channel). When switch S52 is actuated, the color of the full core display "00" readout is changed from amber to green, indicating the control rod is full-in and latched. Switches S51 and S52 are wired in parallel, such that, if either switch indicates full-in, the all-rods-in logic will receive a full-in signal for that control rod. Therefore, each control rod is considered to have only one "full-in" position indication channel. The absence of the full-in position indication channel signal for any control rod removes the all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks and prevents fuel loading. Also, this condition causes the refuel position one-rod-out interlock to not allow the selection of any other control rod. The all-rods-in logic provides two signals, one to each of the two Reactor Manual Control System rod block circuits.

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"), the intermediate range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation").
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The safety analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 2) assumes the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM. The full-in position indication channel is required to be OPERABLE so that the refueling interlocks can ensure that fuel cannot be loaded with any control rod withdrawn and that no more than one control rod can be withdrawn at a time.

Control rod position indication satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO	The control rod full-in position indication channel for each control rod must be OPERABLE to provide the required input to the refueling interlocks. A channel is OPERABLE if it provides correct position indication to the refueling equipment interlock all-rods-in logic (LCO 3.9.1) and the refuel position one-rod-out interlock logic (LCO 3.9.2).
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APPLICABILITY	During MODE 5, the control rods must have OPERABLE full-in position indication channels to ensure the applicable refueling interlocks will be OPERABLE.
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In MODES 1 and 2, requirements for control rod position are specified in LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY." In MODES 3 and 4, with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod block (LCO 3.3.2.1) ensures all control rods are inserted, thereby preventing criticality during shutdown conditions.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to control rod position indication channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable control rod position indication channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, this Note has been provided, which allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable control rod position indication channel.

A.1.1, A.1.2, A.1.3, A.2.1 and A.2.2

With one or more full-in position indication channels inoperable, compensating actions must be taken to protect against potential reactivity excursions from fuel assembly insertions or control rod withdrawals. This may be accomplished by immediately suspending in-vessel fuel movement and control rod withdrawal, and immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Actions must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, do not have to be inserted. Suspension of in-vessel fuel movements and control rod withdrawal shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position.

Alternatively, actions must be immediately initiated to fully insert the control rod(s) associated with the inoperable full-in position indicator(s) and disarm (electrically or hydraulically) the drive(s) to ensure that the control rod is not withdrawn. A control rod can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. A control rod can be electrically disarmed by disconnecting power from all four directional control valve solenoids. Actions must continue

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1.1, A.1.2, A.1.3, A.2.1 and A.2.2 (continued)

until all associated control rods are fully inserted and drives are disarmed. Under these conditions (control rod fully inserted and disarmed), an inoperable full-in channel may be bypassed to allow refueling operations to proceed. An alternate method must be used to ensure the control rod is fully inserted (e.g., use the "00" notch position indication).

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.4.1

The full-in position indication channels provide input to the one-rod-out interlock and other refueling interlocks that require an all-rods-in permissive. The interlocks are actuated when the full-in position indication for any control rod is not present, since this indicates that all rods are not fully inserted. Therefore, testing of the full-in position indication channels is performed to ensure that when a control rod is withdrawn, the full-in position indication is not present. This is performed by verifying the absence of full-in position indication (green dashes or green "00") at the full core display digital display module, when the control rod is not full-in. The full-in position indication channel is considered inoperable even with the control rod fully inserted, if it would continue to indicate full-in with the control rod withdrawn. Performing the SR each time a control rod is withdrawn from the full-in position is considered adequate because of the procedural controls on control rod withdrawals and the visual indications available in the control room to alert the operator to control rods not fully inserted.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
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B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY – Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND Control rods are components of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System, the primary reactivity control system for the reactor. In conjunction with the Reactor Protection System, the CRD System provides the means for the reliable control of reactivity changes during refueling operation. In addition, the control rods provide the capability to maintain the reactor subcritical under all conditions and to limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase caused by a malfunction in the CRD System.

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The CRD System is the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided by refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks," and LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One Rod-Out Interlock"), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"), the intermediate range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation").

The safety analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 2) evaluates the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling and also fuel assembly insertion with a control rod withdrawn. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. Control rod scram provides protection should a prompt reactivity excursion occur.

Control rod OPERABILITY during refueling satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO	Each withdrawn control rod must be OPERABLE. The withdrawn control rod is considered OPERABLE if the scram accumulator pressure is ≥ 940 psig and the control rod is capable of being automatically inserted upon receipt of a scram signal. Inserted control rods have already completed their reactivity control function, and therefore are not required to be OPERABLE.
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APPLICABILITY	<p>During MODE 5, withdrawn control rods must be OPERABLE to ensure that when a scram occurs the control rods will insert and provide the required negative reactivity to maintain the reactor subcritical.</p> <p>For MODES 1 and 2, control rod requirements are found in LCO 3.1.2, "Reactivity Anomalies," LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times," and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators." During MODES 3 and 4, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate requirements for control rod OPERABILITY during these conditions.</p>
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ACTIONS	<p><u>A.1</u></p> <p>With one or more withdrawn control rods inoperable, action must be immediately initiated to fully insert the inoperable control rod(s). Inserting the control rod(s) ensures the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. Actions must continue until the inoperable control rod(s) is fully inserted.</p>
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<p><u>SR 3.9.5.1 and SR 3.9.5.2</u></p> <p>During MODE 5, the OPERABILITY of control rods is primarily required to ensure a withdrawn control rod will automatically insert if a signal requiring a reactor shutdown occurs. Because no explicit analysis exists for automatic shutdown during refueling, the shutdown function is satisfied if the withdrawn control rod is capable of automatic insertion and the associated CRD scram accumulator pressure is ≥ 940 psig.</p>
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(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.5.1 and SR 3.9.5.2 (continued)

The 7 day Frequency takes into consideration equipment reliability, procedural controls over the scram accumulators, and control room alarms and indicating lights that indicate low accumulator charge pressures.

SR 3.9.5.1 is modified by a Note that allows 7 days after withdrawal of the control rod to perform the Surveillance. This acknowledges that the control rod must first be withdrawn before performance of the Surveillance, and therefore avoids potential conflicts with SR 3.0.1.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
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B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level - Irradiated Fuel

BASES

BACKGROUND

The movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV requires a minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of the RPV flange. During refueling, this maintains a sufficient water level in the reactor vessel cavity and spent fuel pool. Sufficient water is necessary to retain iodine fission product activity in the water in the event of a fuel handling accident (Refs. 1 and 2). Sufficient iodine activity would be retained to limit offsite doses from the accident to $\leq 25\%$ of 10 CFR 100 limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the water level in the RPV is an initial condition design parameter in the analysis of a fuel handling accident in containment postulated by Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 1). A minimum water level of 23 ft (Regulatory Position C.1.c of Ref. 1) allows a decontamination factor of 100 (Regulatory Position C.1.g of Ref. 1) to be used in the accident analysis for iodine. This relates to the assumption that 99% of the total iodine released from the pellet to cladding gap of all the dropped fuel assembly rods is retained by the water. The fuel pellet to cladding gap is assumed to contain 10% of the total fuel rod iodine inventory (Ref. 1).

Analysis of the fuel handling accident inside containment is described in Reference 2. With a minimum water level of 23 ft and a minimum decay time of 24 hours prior to fuel handling, the analysis and test programs demonstrate that the iodine release due to a postulated fuel handling accident is adequately captured by the water and that offsite doses are maintained within allowable limits (Ref. 4). While the worst case assumptions include the dropping of the irradiated fuel assembly being handled onto the reactor core, the possibility exists of the dropped assembly striking the RPV flange and releasing fission products. Therefore, the minimum depth for water coverage to ensure acceptable radiological consequences is specified from the RPV flange. Since the worst case event results in

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	failed fuel assemblies seated in the core, as well as the dropped assembly, dropping an assembly on the RPV flange will result in reduced releases of fission gases.
	RPV water level satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO	A minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of the RPV flange is required to ensure that the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident are within acceptable limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.
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APPLICABILITY	LCO 3.9.6 is applicable when moving irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV. The LCO minimizes the possibility of a fuel handling accident in containment that is beyond the assumptions of the safety analysis. If irradiated fuel is not present within the RPV, there can be no significant radioactivity release as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident. Requirements for handling of new fuel assemblies or control rods (where water depth to the RPV flange is not of concern) are covered by LCO 3.9.7, "RPV Water Level - New Fuel or Control Rods." Requirements for fuel handling accidents in the spent fuel storage pool are covered by LCO 3.7.8, "Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level."
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ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u> If the water level is < 23 ft above the top of the RPV flange, all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV shall be suspended immediately to ensure that a fuel handling accident cannot occur. The suspension of irradiated fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.
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(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.6.1

Verification of a minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of the RPV flange ensures that the design basis for the postulated fuel handling accident analysis during refueling operations is met. Water at the required level limits the consequences of damaged fuel rods, which are postulated to result from a fuel handling accident in containment (Ref. 2).

The Frequency of 24 hours is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the large volume of water and the normal procedural controls on valve positions, which make significant unplanned level changes unlikely.

REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 23, 1972.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.7.3.
 3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4.
 4. 10 CFR 100.11.
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B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.7 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level - New Fuel or Control Rods

BASES

BACKGROUND	<p>The movement of new fuel assemblies or handling of control rods within the RPV when fuel assemblies seated within the reactor vessel are irradiated requires a minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV. During refueling, this maintains a sufficient water level above the irradiated fuel. Sufficient water is necessary to retain iodine fission product activity in the water in the event of a fuel handling accident (Refs. 1 and 2). Sufficient iodine activity would be retained to limit offsite doses from the accident to $\leq 25\%$ of 10 CFR 100 limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.</p>
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	<p>During movement of new fuel assemblies or handling of control rods over irradiated fuel assemblies, the water level in the RPV is an initial condition design parameter in the analysis of a fuel handling accident in containment postulated by Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 1). A minimum water level of 23 ft (Regulatory Position C.1.c of Ref. 1) allows a decontamination factor of 100 (Regulatory Position C.1.g of Ref. 1) to be used in the accident analysis for iodine. This relates to the assumption that 99% of the total iodine released from the pellet to cladding gap of all the dropped fuel assembly rods is retained by the water. The fuel pellet to cladding gap is assumed to contain 10% of the total fuel rod iodine inventory (Ref. 1).</p> <p>Analysis of the fuel handling accident inside containment is described in Reference 2. With a minimum water level of 23 ft and a minimum decay time of 24 hours prior to fuel handling, the analysis and test programs demonstrate that the iodine release due to a postulated fuel handling accident is adequately captured by the water and that offsite doses are maintained within allowable limits (Ref. 4). The related assumptions include the worst case dropping of an irradiated fuel assembly onto the reactor core loaded with irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p>RPV water level satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).</p>

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO	A minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV is required to ensure that the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident are within acceptable limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.
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APPLICABILITY	LCO 3.9.7 is applicable when moving new fuel assemblies or handling control rods (i.e., movement with other than the normal control rod drive) when irradiated fuel assemblies are seated within the RPV. The LCO minimizes the possibility of a fuel handling accident in containment that is beyond the assumptions of the safety analysis. If irradiated fuel is not present within the RPV, there can be no significant radioactivity release as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident. Requirements for fuel handling accidents in the spent fuel storage pool are covered by LCO 3.7.8, "Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level." Requirements for handling irradiated fuel over the RPV are covered by LCO 3.9.6, "Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level - Irradiated Fuel."
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ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u> If the water level is < 23 ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV, all operations involving movement of new fuel assemblies and handling of control rods within the RPV shall be suspended immediately to ensure that a fuel handling accident cannot occur. The suspension of fuel movement and control rod handling shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<u>SR 3.9.7.1</u> Verification of a minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV ensures that the design basis for the postulated fuel handling accident analysis during refueling operations is met. Water at the required level limits the consequences of damaged fuel rods, which are postulated to result from a fuel handling accident in containment (Ref. 2).
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(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.7.1 (continued)

The Frequency of 24 hours is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the large volume of water and the normal procedural controls on valve positions, which make significant unplanned level changes unlikely.

REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 23, 1972.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.7.3.
 3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4.
 4. 10 CFR 100.11.
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B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.8 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) – High Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of the SDC System in MODE 5 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant, as described by UFSAR, Section 5.4.7 (Ref. 1). Two of the three shutdown cooling loops of the SDC System can provide the required decay heat removal. Each loop consists of a motor driven pump, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. The loops can take suction from either recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after it has been cooled by circulation through the respective heat exchanger, to the reactor via either low pressure coolant injection path and the associated recirculation loop. The SDC heat exchangers transfer heat to the Service Water System via the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System. The SDC mode is manually controlled.

In addition to the SDC subsystems, the volume of water above the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) flange provides a heat sink for decay heat removal.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES With the unit in MODE 5, the SDC System is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. The SDC System is required for removing decay heat to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant.

The SDC System satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Only one SDC subsystem is required to be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the RPV and the water level \geq 23 ft above the RPV flange. Only one subsystem is required to be OPERABLE because the volume of water above the RPV flange provides backup decay heat removal capability.

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

An OPERABLE SDC subsystem consists of a SDC pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. In addition, the necessary portions of the RBCCW System must be capable of providing cooling water to the SDC heat exchanger, the SDC pump seal cooler.

Additionally, the SDC subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required. A Note is provided to allow a 2 hour exception for the operating subsystem to not be in operation every 8 hours. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the SDC subsystem or other operations requiring SDC flow interruption.

APPLICABILITY

One SDC subsystem must be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 5, with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level \geq 23 feet above the top of the RPV flange, to provide decay heat removal. SDC subsystem requirements in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS). SDC subsystem requirements in MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level $<$ 23 ft above the RPV flange are given in LCO 3.9.9, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC) - Low Water Level."

ACTIONS

A.1

With no SDC subsystem OPERABLE, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided within 1 hour. In this condition, the volume of water above the RPV flange provides adequate capability to remove decay heat from the reactor core. However, the overall reliability is reduced because loss of water level could result in reduced decay heat removal capability. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore,

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

verification of the functional availability of the alternate method must be reconfirmed every 24 hours thereafter. This will ensure continued heat removal capability.

Alternate decay heat removal methods are available to the operators for review and preplanning in the unit operating procedures. The required cooling capacity of the alternate method should be ensured by verifying (by calculation or demonstration) its capability to maintain or reduce temperature. For example, this may include the use of the Fuel Pool Cooling or Reactor Water Cleanup System operating with the regenerative heat exchanger bypassed or in combination with the Control Rod Drive System or Condensate/Feed System. The method used to remove the decay heat should be the most prudent choice based on unit conditions.

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4

If no shutdown cooling subsystem is OPERABLE and an alternate method of decay heat removal is not available in accordance with Required Action A.1, actions shall be taken immediately to suspend operations involving an increase in reactor decay heat load by suspending loading of irradiated fuel assemblies into the RPV.

Additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring secondary containment is OPERABLE; one standby gas treatment subsystem is OPERABLE; and secondary containment isolation capability is available in each associated penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactive releases (i.e., one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated). This may be performed as an administrative check, by

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 (continued)

examining logs or other information to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, a surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

C.1 and C.2

If no SDC subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required SDC subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.8.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that the required SDC subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the SDC subsystem in the control room.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.
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B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.9 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) – Low Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of the SDC System in MODE 5 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant, as described by UFSAR, Section 5.4.7 (Ref. 1). Two of the three shutdown cooling loops of the SDC System can provide the required decay heat removal. Each loop consists of a motor driven pump, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. The loops can take suction from either recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after it has been cooled by circulation through the respective heat exchanger, to the reactor via either low pressure coolant injection path and the associated recirculation loop. The SDC heat exchangers transfer heat to the Service Water System via the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System. The SDC mode is manually controlled.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES With the unit in MODE 5, the SDC System is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. The SDC System is required for removing decay heat to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant.

The SDC System satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO In MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the water level < 23 ft above the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) flange two SDC subsystems must be OPERABLE and one SDC subsystem must be in operation.

An OPERABLE SDC subsystem consists of a SDC pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. To meet the LCO, one pump in each of the two required loops must be OPERABLE. In addition the necessary portions of the RBCCW System must be capable of providing cooling water to the SDC heat exchanger and the SDC pump seal cooler.

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

Additionally, each SDC subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required. A Note is provided to allow a 2 hour exception for the operating subsystem to not be in operation every 8 hours. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the SDC subsystem or other operations requiring SDC flow interruption.

APPLICABILITY

Two SDC subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and one SDC subsystem must be in operation in MODE 5, with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the RPV flange, to provide decay heat removal. SDC subsystem requirements in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS). SDC subsystem requirements in MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level ≥ 23 ft above the RPV flange are given in LCO 3.9.8, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC) – High Water Level."

ACTIONS

A.1

With one of the two required SDC subsystems inoperable, the remaining subsystem is capable of providing the required decay heat removal. However, the overall reliability is reduced. Therefore, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided. With both required SDC subsystems inoperable, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided in addition to that provided for the initial SDC subsystem inoperability. This re-establishes backup decay heat removal capabilities, similar to the requirements of the LCO. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore, verification of the functional availability of the alternate method(s) must be reconfirmed every 24 hours thereafter. This will ensure continued heat removal capability.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

Alternate decay heat removal methods are available to the operators for review and preplanning in the unit operating procedures. The required cooling capacity of the alternate method should be ensured by verifying (by calculation or demonstration) its capability to maintain or reduce temperature. For example, this may include the use of the Fuel Pool Cooling or Reactor Water Cleanup System operating with the regenerative heat exchanger bypassed or in combination with the Control Rod Drive System or Condensate/Feed System. The method used to remove decay heat should be the most prudent choice based on unit conditions.

Condition A is modified by a Note allowing separate Condition entry for each inoperable SDC subsystem. This is acceptable since the Required Actions for this Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SDC subsystem. Complying with the Required Actions allow for continued operation. A subsequent inoperable subsystem is governed by subsequent entry into the Condition and application of the Required Actions

B.1, B.2, and B.3

With the required decay heat removal subsystem(s) inoperable and the required alternate method(s) of decay heat removal not available in accordance with Required Action A.1, additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring secondary containment is OPERABLE; one standby gas treatment subsystem is OPERABLE; and secondary containment isolation capability is available in each associated penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactive releases (i.e., one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

need for secondary containment isolation is indicated). This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

C.1 and C.2

If no SDC subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required SDC subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.9.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that one SDC subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the SDC subsystems in the control room

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.
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B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to permit operation of the reactor mode switch from one position to another to confirm certain aspects of associated interlocks during periodic tests and calibrations in MODES 3, 4, and 5.

The reactor mode switch is a conveniently located, multiposition, keylock switch provided to select the necessary scram functions for various plant conditions (Ref. 1). The reactor mode switch selects the appropriate trip relays for scram functions and provides appropriate bypasses. The mode switch positions and related scram interlock functions are summarized as follows:

- a. Shutdown—Initiates a reactor scram; bypasses main steam line isolation and low turbine condenser vacuum scrams;
- b. Refuel—Selects Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) scram function for low neutron flux level operation (but does not disable the average power range monitor scram); bypasses main steam line isolation and low turbine condenser vacuum scrams;
- c. Startup/Hot Standby—Selects NMS scram function for low neutron flux level operation (intermediate range monitors and average power range monitors); bypasses main steam line isolation and low turbine condenser vacuum scrams; and
- d. Run—Selects NMS scram function for power range operation.

The reactor mode switch also provides interlocks for such functions as control rod blocks, scram discharge volume trip bypass, refueling interlocks, and main steam isolation valve isolations.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The purpose for reactor mode switch interlock testing is to prevent fuel failure by precluding reactivity excursions or core criticality. The interlock functions of the shutdown

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

and refuel positions normally maintained for the reactor mode switch in MODES 3, 4, and 5 are provided to preclude reactivity excursions that could potentially result in fuel failure. Interlock testing that requires moving the reactor mode switch to other positions (run, startup/hot standby, or refuel) while in MODE 3, 4, or 5, requires administratively maintaining all control rods inserted and no CORE ALTERATIONS in progress. With all control rods inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies, and no CORE ALTERATIONS in progress, there are no credible mechanisms for unacceptable reactivity excursions during the planned interlock testing.

For postulated accidents, such as control rod removal error during refueling, the accident analysis demonstrates that fuel failure will not occur (Ref. 2). The withdrawal of a single control rod will not result in criticality when adequate SDM is maintained. Also, loading fuel assemblies into the core with a single control rod withdrawn will not result in criticality, thereby preventing fuel failure.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. MODES 3, 4, and 5 operations not specified in Table 1.1-1 can be performed in accordance with other Special Operations LCOs (i.e., LCO 3.10.2, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Hot Shutdown," LCO 3.10.3, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Cold Shutdown," and LCO 3.10.7, "SDM Test—Refueling") without meeting this LCO or its ACTIONS. If any testing is performed that involves the reactor mode switch interlocks and requires repositioning beyond that specified in Table 1.1-1 for the current MODE of operation, the testing can be performed, provided all interlock functions potentially defeated are administratively controlled. In MODES 3, 4, and 5 with the reactor mode switch in shutdown as specified in Table 1.1-1,

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

all control rods are fully inserted and a control rod block is initiated. Therefore, all control rods in core cells that contain one or more fuel assemblies must be verified fully inserted while in MODES 3, 4, and 5, with the reactor mode switch in other than the shutdown position. The additional LCO requirement to preclude CORE ALTERATIONS is appropriate for MODE 5 operations, as discussed below, and is inherently met in MODES 3 and 4 by the definition of CORE ALTERATIONS, which cannot be performed with the vessel head in place.

In MODE 5, with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, only one control rod can be withdrawn under the refuel position one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock"). The refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks") appropriately control other CORE ALTERATIONS. Due to the increased potential for error in controlling these multiple interlocks, and the limited duration of tests involving the reactor mode switch position, conservative controls are required, consistent with MODES 3 and 4. The additional controls of administratively not permitting other CORE ALTERATIONS will adequately ensure that the reactor does not become critical during these tests.

APPLICABILITY

Any required periodic interlock testing involving the reactor mode switch, while in MODES 1 and 2, can be performed without the need for Special Operations exceptions. Mode switch manipulations in these MODES would likely result in unit trips. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, this Special Operations LCO is only permitted to be used to allow reactor mode switch interlock testing that cannot conveniently be performed without this allowance or testing that must be performed prior to entering another MODE. Such interlock testing may consist of required Surveillances, or may be the result of maintenance, repair, or troubleshooting activities. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the interlock functions provided by the reactor mode switch in shutdown (i.e., all control rods inserted and incapable of withdrawal) and refueling (i.e., refueling interlocks to prevent inadvertent criticality during CORE ALTERATIONS) positions can be administratively controlled adequately during the performance of certain tests.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, A.3.1, and A.3.2

These Required Actions are provided to restore compliance with the Technical Specifications overridden by this Special Operations LCO. Restoring compliance will also result in exiting the Applicability of this Special Operations LCO.

All CORE ALTERATIONS, except control rod insertion, if in progress, are immediately suspended in accordance with Required Action A.1, and all insertable control rods in core cells that contain one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted within 1 hour, in accordance with Required Action A.2. This will preclude potential mechanisms that could lead to criticality. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, do not have to be inserted. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude the completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position will ensure that all inserted control rods remain inserted and result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1. Alternatively, if in MODE 5, the reactor mode switch may be placed in the refuel position, which will also result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1. A Note is added to Required Action A.3.2 to indicate that this Required Action is not applicable in MODES 3 and 4, since only the shutdown position is allowed in these MODES. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour for Required Action A.2, Required Action A.3.1, and Required Action A.3.2 provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods and place the reactor mode switch in the required position, based on operating experience, and is acceptable given that all operations that could increase core reactivity have been suspended.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.1.1 and SR 3.10.1.2

Meeting the requirements of this Special Operations LCO maintains operation consistent with or conservative to operating with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position (or the refuel position for MODE 5). The functions of the reactor mode switch interlocks that are not in effect, due to the testing in progress, are adequately compensated for by the Special Operations LCO requirements.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.1.1 and SR 3.10.1.2 (continued)

The administrative controls are to be periodically verified to ensure that the operational requirements continue to be met. In addition, the all rods fully inserted Surveillance (SR 3.10.1.1) must be verified by a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other task qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., a shift technical advisor or reactor engineer). The Surveillances performed at the 12 hour and 24 hour Frequencies are intended to provide appropriate assurance that each operating shift is aware of and verifies compliance with these Special Operations LCO requirements.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 7.2.2.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
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B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.2 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Hot Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 3 Special Operations LCO is to permit the withdrawal of a single control rod for testing while in hot shutdown, by imposing certain restrictions. In MODE 3, the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, and all control rods are inserted and blocked from withdrawal. Many systems and functions are not required in these conditions, due to the other installed interlocks that are actuated when the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position. However, circumstances may arise while in MODE 3 that present the need to withdraw a single control rod for various tests (e.g., rod exercising, friction tests, scram timing, and coupling integrity checks). These single control rod withdrawals are normally accomplished by selecting the refuel position for the reactor mode switch. This Special Operations LCO provides the appropriate additional controls to allow a single control rod withdrawal in MODE 3.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod removal error during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied in MODE 3, these analyses will bound the consequences of an accident. Explicit safety analyses in the UFSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SDM exists.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling.

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

Alternate backup protection can be obtained by ensuring that a five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 3 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position can be performed in accordance with other Special Operations LCOs (i.e., LCO 3.10.1, "Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing," without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. However, if a single control rod withdrawal is desired in MODE 3, controls consistent with those required during refueling must be implemented and this Special Operations LCO applied. "Withdrawal" in this application includes the actual withdrawal of the control rod as well as maintaining the control rod in a position other than the full-in position, and reinserting the control rod. The refueling interlocks of LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock," required by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure that only one control rod can be withdrawn.

To back up the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.2), the ability to scram the withdrawn control rod in the event of an inadvertent criticality is provided by this Special Operations LCO's requirements in Item d.1. Alternately, provided a sufficient number of control rods in the vicinity of the withdrawn control rod are known to be inserted and incapable of withdrawal (Item d.2), the possibility of criticality on withdrawal of this control rod is sufficiently precluded, so as not to require the scram capability of the withdrawn control rod. Also, once this alternate (Item d.2) is completed, the SDM requirement to account for both the withdrawn-untrippable control rod and the highest worth control rod may be changed to allow the withdrawn-untrippable control rod to be the single highest worth control rod.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY	Control rod withdrawals are adequately controlled in MODES 1, 2, and 5 by existing LCOs. In MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with this Special Operations LCO or Special Operations LCO 3.10.3, and if limited to one control rod. This allowance is only provided with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position. For these conditions, the one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2), control rod position indication (LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication"), full insertion requirements for all other control rods and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.8.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring," and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY-Refueling"), or the added administrative controls in Item d.2 of this Special Operations LCO, minimize potential reactivity excursions.
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ACTIONS	A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to a single control rod withdrawal while in MODE 3. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.
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A.1

If one or more of the requirements specified in this Special Operations LCO are not met, the ACTIONS applicable to the stated requirements of the affected LCOs are immediately entered as directed by Required Action A.1. Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that clarifies the intent of any other LCO's Required Action, to insert all control rods. This Required Action includes exiting this Special Operations Applicability by returning the reactor mode switch to the shutdown position. A second Note has

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

been added, which clarifies that this Required Action is only applicable if the requirements not met are for an affected LCO.

A.2.1 and A.2.2

Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are alternate Required Actions that can be taken instead of Required Action A.1 to restore compliance with the normal MODE 3 requirements, thereby exiting this Special Operations LCO's Applicability. Actions must be initiated immediately to insert all insertable control rods. Actions must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position will ensure all inserted rods remain inserted and restore operation in accordance with Table 1.1-1. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour to place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.2.1, SR 3.10.2.2, and SR 3.10.2.3

The other LCOs made applicable in this Special Operations LCO are required to have their Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification in accordance with SR 3.10.2.2 is required to preclude the possibility of criticality. The control rods can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. Electrically, the control rods can be disarmed by disconnecting power from all four directional control valve solenoids. SR 3.10.2.2 has been modified by a Note, which clarifies that this SR is not required to be met if SR 3.10.2.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.2.d.1 requirements, since SR 3.10.2.2 demonstrates that the alternative LCO 3.10.2.d.2 requirements are satisfied. Also, SR 3.10.2.3 verifies that all control rods other than the control rod being withdrawn are fully inserted. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable because of the administrative

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS SR 3.10.2.1, SR 3.10.2.2, and SR 3.10.2.3 (continued)

controls on control rod withdrawal, the protection afforded
by the LCOs involved, and hardwire interlocks that preclude
additional control rod withdrawals.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 4 Special Operations LCO is to permit the withdrawal of a single control rod for testing or maintenance, while in cold shutdown, by imposing certain restrictions. In MODE 4, the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, and all control rods are inserted and blocked from withdrawal. Many systems and functions are not required in these conditions, due to the installed interlocks associated with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Circumstances may arise while in MODE 4, however, that present the need to withdraw a single control rod for various tests (e.g., rod exercising, friction tests, scram time testing, and coupling integrity checks). Certain situations may also require the removal of the associated control rod drive (CRD). These single control rod withdrawals and possible subsequent removals are normally accomplished by selecting the refuel position for the reactor mode switch.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod removal error during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied in MODE 4, these analyses will bound the consequences of an accident. Explicit safety analyses in the UFSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SDM exists.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection in the event normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks fail to prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. Alternate backup protection can be obtained by

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

ensuring that a five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal. This alternate backup protection is required when removing a CRD because this removal renders the withdrawn control rod incapable of being scrambled.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 4 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position can be performed in accordance with other LCOs (i.e., Special Operations LCO 3.10.1, "Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing") without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. If a single control rod withdrawal is desired in MODE 4, controls consistent with those required during refueling must be implemented and this Special Operations LCO applied. "Withdrawal" in this application includes the actual withdrawal of the control rod as well as maintaining the control rod in a position other than the full-in position, and reinserting the control rod.

The refueling interlocks of LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock," required by this Special Operations LCO will ensure that only one control rod can be withdrawn. At the time CRD removal begins, the disconnection of the position indication probe will cause LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," and therefore, LCO 3.9.2 to fail to be met. Therefore, prior to commencing CRD removal, a control rod withdrawal block is required to be inserted to ensure that no additional control rods can be withdrawn and that compliance with this Special Operations LCO is maintained.

To back up the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.2) or the control rod withdrawal block, the ability to scram the withdrawn control rod in the event of an inadvertent criticality is provided by the Special Operations LCO requirements in Item c.1. Alternatively, when the scram

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued) function is not OPERABLE, or when the CRD is to be removed, a sufficient number of rods in the vicinity of the withdrawn control rod are required to be inserted and made incapable of withdrawal by electrically or hydraulically disarming the CRD (Item c.2). This precludes the possibility of criticality upon withdrawal of this control rod. Also, once this alternate (Item c.2) is completed, the SDM requirement to account for both the withdrawn-untrippable control rod and the highest worth control rod may be changed to allow the withdrawn-untrippable control rod to be the single highest worth control rod.

APPLICABILITY Control rod withdrawals are adequately controlled in MODES 1, 2, and 5 by existing LCOs. In MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with Special Operations LCO 3.10.2, or this Special Operations LCO, and if limited to one control rod. This allowance is only provided with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position.

During these conditions, the full insertion requirements for all other control rods, the one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2), control rod position indication (LCO 3.9.4), and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.8.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring," and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY—Refueling"), or the added administrative controls in Item b.2 and Item c.2 of this Special Operations LCO, provide mitigation of potential reactivity excursions.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to a single control rod withdrawal while in MODE 4. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued) compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met with the affected control rod insertable, these Required Actions restore operation consistent with normal MODE 4 conditions (i.e., all rods inserted) or with the exceptions allowed in this Special Operations LCO. Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that clarifies the intent of any other LCO's Required Action to insert all control rods. This Required Action includes exiting this Special Operations LCO Applicability by returning the reactor mode switch to the shutdown position. A second Note has been added to Required Action A.1 to clarify that this Required Action is only applicable if the requirements not met are for an affected LCO.

Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are specified, based on the assumption that the control rod is being withdrawn. If the control rod is still insertable, actions must be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods and within 1 hour place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Actions must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour for placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.

B.1, B.2.1, and B.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met with the affected control rod not insertable, withdrawal of the control rod and removal of the associated CRD must be immediately suspended. If the CRD has been removed, such that the control rod is not insertable, the Required Actions require the most expeditious action be taken to either initiate action to restore the CRD and insert its control rod, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.3.1, SR 3.10.3.2, SR 3.10.3.3, and SR 3.10.3.4

The other LCOs made applicable by this Special Operations LCO are required to have their associated surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. The control rods can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. Electrically, the control rods can be disarmed by disconnecting power from all four directional control valve solenoids. Verification that all the other control rods are fully inserted is required to meet the SDM requirements. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted ensures that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the affected control rod. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable because of the administrative controls on control rod withdrawals, the protection afforded by the LCOs involved, and hardware interlocks to preclude an additional control rod withdrawal.

SR 3.10.3.2 and SR 3.10.3.4 have been modified by Notes, which clarify that these SRs are not required to be met if the alternative requirements demonstrated by SR 3.10.3.1 are satisfied.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
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B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.4 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal – Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit the removal of a single CRD during refueling operations by imposing certain administrative controls. Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod, in a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies is permitted to be withdrawn. The refueling interlocks use the "full-in" position indicators to determine the position of all control rods. If the "full-in" position signal is not present for every control rod, then the all rods in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks is not present and fuel loading is prevented. Also, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock will not allow the withdrawal of a second control rod.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection in the event normal refueling procedures, and the refueling interlocks described above fail to prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. The requirement for the refueling interlocks to be OPERABLE precludes the possibility of removing the CRD once a control rod is withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. This Special Operations LCO provides controls sufficient to ensure the possibility of an inadvertent criticality is precluded, while allowing a single CRD to be removed from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. The removal of the CRD involves disconnecting the position indication probe, which causes noncompliance with LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," and, therefore, LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks," and LCO 3.9.2, "Refueling Position One-Rod-Out Interlock." The CRD removal also requires isolation of the CRD from the CRD Hydraulic System, thereby causing inoperability of the control rod (LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY – Refueling").

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod removal error during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied, these analyses will bound the consequences of accidents. Explicit safety analyses in the UFSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that proper operation of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SDM exists. By requiring all other control rods to be inserted and a control rod withdrawal block initiated, the function of the inoperable one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) is adequately maintained. This Special Operations LCO requirement that no other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress adequately compensates for the inoperable all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1).

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. Since the scram function and refueling interlocks may be suspended, alternate backup protection required by this Special Operations LCO is obtained by ensuring that a five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and are incapable of being withdrawn, and all other control rods are inserted and incapable of being withdrawn by insertion of a control rod block.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 5 with any of the following LCOs, LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.8.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring," LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, or LCO 3.9.5 not met, can be performed in accordance with the Required Actions of these LCOs without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. However, if a single CRD removal from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies is desired in MODE 5, controls consistent with those required by LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.3.8.2, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 must be implemented, and this Special Operations LCO applied.

By requiring all other control rods to be inserted and a control rod withdrawal block initiated, the function of the inoperable one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) is adequately maintained. This Special Operations LCO requirement that no other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress adequately compensates for the inoperable all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1). Ensuring that the five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal (by electrically or hydraulically disarming the CRD) adequately satisfies the backup protection that LCO 3.3.1.1 and LCO 3.9.2 would have otherwise provided. Also, once these requirements (Items a, b, and c) are completed, the SDM requirement to account for both the withdrawn-untrippable control rod and the highest worth control rod may be changed to allow the withdrawn-untrippable control rod to be the single highest worth control rod.

APPLICABILITY

Operation in MODE 5 is controlled by existing LCOs. The allowance to comply with this Special Operations LCO in lieu of the ACTIONS of LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.3.8.2, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 is appropriately controlled with the additional administrative controls required by this Special Operations LCO, which reduce the potential for reactivity excursions.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met, the immediate implementation of these Required Actions restores operation consistent with the normal requirements for failure to meet LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 (i.e., all control rods inserted) or with the allowances of this Special Operations LCO. The Completion Times for Required Action A.1, Required Action A.2.1, and Required Action A.2.2 are intended to require that these Required Actions be implemented in a very short time and carried through in an expeditious manner to either initiate action to restore the CRD and insert its control rod, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO. Actions must continue until either Required Action A.2.1 or Required Action A.2.2 is satisfied.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.4.1, SR 3.10.4.2, SR 3.10.4.3, SR 3.10.4.4,
and SR 3.10.4.5

Verification that all the control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, are fully inserted is required to ensure the SDM is within limits. Verification that the local five by five array of control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for removal of the associated CRD, is inserted and disarmed, while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. The control rods can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. Electrically, the control rods can be disarmed by disconnecting power from all four directional control valve solenoids. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted ensures that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the withdrawn control rod. The Surveillance for LCO 3.1.1, which is made applicable by this Special Operations LCO, is required in order to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. Verification that no other CORE ALTERATIONS are being made is required to ensure the assumptions of the safety analysis are satisfied.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.4.1, SR 3.10.4.2, SR 3.10.4.3, SR 3.10.4.4,
and SR 3.10.4.5 (continued)

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable, given the administrative controls on control rod removal and hardwire interlock to block an additional control rod withdrawal.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
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B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.5 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit multiple control rod withdrawal during refueling by imposing certain administrative controls.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod, in a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies is permitted to be withdrawn. When all four fuel assemblies are removed from a cell, the control rod may be withdrawn with no restrictions. Any number of control rods may be withdrawn and removed from the reactor vessel if their cells contain no fuel.

The refueling interlocks use the "full-in" position indicators to determine the position of all control rods. If the "full-in" position signal is not present for every control rod, then the all rods in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks is not present and fuel loading is prevented. Also, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock will not allow the withdrawal of a second control rod.

To allow more than one control rod to be withdrawn during refueling, these interlocks must be defeated. This Special Operations LCO establishes the necessary administrative controls to allow bypassing the "full-in" position indicators.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

Explicit safety analyses in the UFSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will prevent unacceptable reactivity excursions during refueling. To allow multiple control rod withdrawals, control rod removals, associated control rod drive (CRD) removal, or any combination of these, the "full-in" position indication is allowed to be bypassed for each withdrawn control rod if all fuel has been removed from

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

the cell. With no fuel assemblies in the core cell, the associated control rod has no reactivity control function and is not required to remain inserted. Prior to reloading fuel into the cell, however, the associated control rod must be inserted to ensure that an inadvertent criticality does not occur, as evaluated in the Reference 1 analysis.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 5 with either LCO 3.9.3, "Control Rod Position," LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," or LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY-Refueling," not met, can be performed in accordance with the Required Actions of these LCOs without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. If multiple control rod withdrawal or removal, or CRD removal is desired, all four fuel assemblies are required to be removed from the associated cells. Prior to entering this LCO, any fuel remaining in a cell whose CRD was previously removed under the provisions of another LCO must be removed. "Withdrawal" in this application includes the actual withdrawal of the control rod as well as maintaining the control rod in a position other than the full-in position, and reinserting the control rod.

When fuel is loaded into the core with multiple control rods withdrawn, special spiral reload sequences are used to ensure that reactivity additions are minimized. Spiral reloading encompasses reloading a cell (four fuel locations immediately adjacent to a control rod) on the edge of a continuous fueled region (the cell can be loaded in any sequence). Otherwise, all control rods must be fully inserted before loading fuel.

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BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY	Operation in MODE 5 is controlled by existing LCOs. The exceptions from other LCO requirements (e.g., the ACTIONS of LCO 3.9.3, LCO 3.9.4, or LCO 3.9.5) allowed by this Special Operations LCO are appropriately controlled by requiring all fuel to be removed from cells whose "full-in" indicators are allowed to be bypassed.
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ACTIONS	<u>A.1, A.2, A.3.1, and A.3.2</u> If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met, the immediate implementation of these Required Actions restores operation consistent with the normal requirements for refueling (i.e., all control rods inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies) or with the exceptions granted by this Special Operations LCO. The Completion Times for Required Action A.1, Required Action A.2, Required Action A.3.1, and Required Action A.3.2 are intended to require that these Required Actions be implemented in a very short time and carried through in an expeditious manner to either initiate action to restore the affected CRDs and insert their control rods, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<u>SR 3.10.5.1, SR 3.10.5.2, and SR 3.10.5.3</u> Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable, given the administrative controls on fuel assembly and control rod removal, and takes into account other indications of control rod status available in the control room.
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REFERENCES	1. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
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B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.6 Control Rod Testing—Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to permit control rod testing, while in MODES 1 and 2, by imposing certain administrative controls. Control rod patterns during startup conditions are controlled by the operator and the rod worth minimizer (RWM) (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation"), such that only the specified control rod sequences and relative positions required by LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control," are allowed over the operating range from all control rods inserted to the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM. The sequences effectively limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase that could occur during a control rod drop accident (CRDA). During these conditions, control rod testing is sometimes required that may result in control rod patterns not in compliance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6. These tests include SDM demonstrations, control rod scram time testing, and control rod friction testing. This Special Operations LCO provides the necessary exemption to the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 and provides additional administrative controls to allow the deviations in such tests from the prescribed sequences in LCO 3.1.6.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the CRDA are summarized in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. CRDA analyses assume the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. These sequences define the potential initial conditions for the CRDA analyses. The RWM provides backup to operator control of the withdrawal sequences to ensure the initial conditions of the CRDA analyses are not violated. For special sequences developed for control rod testing, the initial control rod patterns assumed in the safety analysis of References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 may not be preserved. Therefore special CRDA analyses are required to demonstrate that these special sequences will not result in unacceptable consequences, should a CRDA occur during the testing. These analyses, performed in accordance with an NRC approved methodology, are dependent on the specific test being performed.

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BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.
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LCO	As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Control rod testing may be performed in compliance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6, and during these tests, no exceptions to the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 are necessary. For testing performed with a sequence not in compliance with LCO 3.1.6, the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 may be suspended, provided additional administrative controls are placed on the test to ensure that the assumptions of the special safety analysis for the test sequence are satisfied. Assurances that the test sequence is followed can be provided by either programming the test sequence into the RWM, with conformance verified as specified in SR 3.3.2.1.8 and allowing the RWM to monitor control rod withdrawal and provide appropriate control rod blocks if necessary, or by verifying conformance to the approved test sequence by a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other task qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., shift technical advisor or reactor engineer). These controls are consistent with those normally applied to operation in the startup range as defined in the SRs and ACTIONS of LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation."
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APPLICABILITY	Control rod testing, while in MODES 1 and 2, with THERMAL POWER greater than 10% RTP is adequately controlled by the existing LCOs on power distribution limits and control rod block instrumentation. Control rod movement during these conditions is not restricted to prescribed sequences and can be performed within the constraints of LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," LCO 3.2.3, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)," and LCO 3.3.2.1. With THERMAL
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BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)	<p>POWER less than or equal to 10% RTP, the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are necessary to perform special tests that are not in conformance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6.</p> <p>While in MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with Special Operations LCO 3.10.2, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Hot Shutdown," or Special Operations LCO 3.10.3, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Cold Shutdown," which provide adequate controls to ensure that the assumptions of the safety analysis of Reference 1 is satisfied. During these Special Operations and while in MODE 5, the one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock,") and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY—Refueling"), or the added administrative controls prescribed in the applicable Special Operations LCOs, provide mitigation of potential reactivity excursions.</p>
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ACTIONS	<p><u>A.1</u></p> <p>With the requirements of the LCO not met (e.g., the control rod pattern is not in compliance with the special test sequence, the sequence is improperly loaded in the RWM) the testing is required to be immediately suspended. Upon suspension of the special test, the provisions of LCO 3.1.6 are no longer excepted, and appropriate actions are to be taken to restore the control rod sequence to the prescribed sequence of LCO 3.1.6, or to shut down the reactor, if required by LCO 3.1.6.</p>
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<p><u>SR 3.10.6.1</u></p> <p>With the special test sequence not programmed into the RWM, a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other task qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., shift technical advisor or reactor engineer) is required to verify conformance with the approved sequence for the test. This verification must be performed during control rod movement to prevent deviations from the specified sequence. A Note is added to indicate that this Surveillance does not need to be met if SR 3.10.6.2 is satisfied.</p>
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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.10.6.2

When the RWM provides conformance to the special test sequence, the test sequence must be verified to be correctly loaded into the RWM prior to control rod movement. This Surveillance demonstrates compliance with SR 3.3.2.1.8, thereby demonstrating that the RWM is OPERABLE. A Note has been added to indicate that this Surveillance does not need to be met if SR 3.10.6.1 is satisfied.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 15.4.10.
 2. XN-NF-80-19(P)(A), Volume 1, Supplement 2, Section 7.1, Exxon Nuclear Methodology for Boiling Water Reactor Neutronics Methods for Design Analysis, (as specified in Technical Specification 5.6.5).
 3. NEDE-24011-P-A-US, General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, (as specified in Technical Specification 5.6.5).
 4. Letter from T. Pickens (BWROG) to G.C. Lainas (NRC) "Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A," BWROG-8644, August 15, 1986.
 5. NFSR-0091, Benchmark of CASMO/MICROBURN BWR Nuclear Design Methods, Commonwealth Edison Topical Report, (as specified in Technical Specification 5.6.5).
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B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.7 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test - Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND	<p>The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit SDM testing to be performed for those plant configurations in which the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head is either not in place or the head bolts are not fully tensioned.</p> <p>LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)," requires that adequate SDM be demonstrated following fuel movements or control rod replacement within the RPV. The demonstration must be performed prior to or within 4 hours after criticality is reached. This SDM test may be performed prior to or during the first startup following the refueling. Performing the SDM test prior to startup requires the test to be performed while in MODE 5, with the vessel head bolts less than fully tensioned (and possibly with the vessel head removed). While in MODE 5, the reactor mode switch is required to be in the shutdown or refuel position, where the applicable control rod blocks ensure that the reactor will not become critical. The SDM test requires the reactor mode switch to be in the startup/hot standby position, since more than one control rod will be withdrawn for the purpose of demonstrating adequate SDM. This Special Operations LCO provides the appropriate additional controls to allow withdrawing more than one control rod from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies when the reactor vessel head bolts are less than fully tensioned.</p>
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	<p>Prevention and mitigation of unacceptable reactivity excursions during control rod withdrawal, with the reactor mode switch in the startup/hot standby position while in MODE 5, is provided by the intermediate range monitor (IRM) neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), and control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation"). The limiting reactivity excursion during startup conditions while in MODE 5 is the control rod drop accident (CRDA).</p>

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

CRDA analyses assume that the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. For SDM tests performed within these defined sequences, the analyses of References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 is applicable. However, for some sequences developed for the SDM testing, the control rod patterns assumed in the safety analyses of References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 may not be met. Therefore, special CRDA analyses, performed in accordance with an NRC approved methodology, are required to demonstrate the SDM test sequence will not result in unacceptable consequences should a CRDA occur during the testing. For the purpose of this test, the protection provided by the normally required MODE 5 applicable LCOs, in addition to the requirements of this LCO, will maintain normal test operations as well as postulated accidents within the bounds of the appropriate safety analyses (Refs. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). In addition to the added requirements for the RWM, APRM, and control rod coupling, the notch out mode is specified for out of sequence withdrawals. Requiring the notch out mode limits withdrawal steps to a single notch, which limits inserted reactivity, and allows adequate monitoring of changes in neutron flux, which may occur during the test.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. SDM tests may be performed while in MODE 2, in accordance with Table 1.1-1, without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. For SDM tests performed while in MODE 5, additional requirements must be met to ensure that adequate protection against potential reactivity excursions is available. To provide additional scram protection, beyond the normally required IRMs, the APRMs are also required to be OPERABLE (LCO 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.a and 2.d as though the reactor were in MODE 2. Because multiple control rods will be withdrawn and the reactor will potentially become critical, the approved control rod withdrawal sequence must be enforced by the RWM

(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued)	(LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 2, MODE 2), or must be verified by a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other task qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., a shift technical advisor or reactor engineer). To provide additional protection against an inadvertent criticality, control rod withdrawals that do not conform to the analyzed rod position sequence specified in LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control," (i.e., out of sequence control rod withdrawals) must be made in the individual notched withdrawal mode to minimize the potential reactivity insertion associated with each movement. Coupling integrity of withdrawn control rods is required to minimize the probability of a CRDA and ensure proper functioning of the withdrawn control rods, if they are required to scram. Because the reactor vessel head may be removed during these tests, no other CORE ALTERATIONS may be in progress. Furthermore, since the control rod scram function with the RCS at atmospheric pressure relies solely on the CRD accumulator, it is essential that the CRD charging water header remain pressurized. This Special Operations LCO then allows changing the Table 1.1-1 reactor mode switch position requirements to include the startup/hot standby position, such that the SDM tests may be performed while in MODE 5.
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APPLICABILITY	These SDM test Special Operations requirements are only applicable if the SDM tests are to be performed while in MODE 5 with the reactor vessel head removed or the head bolts not fully tensioned. Additional requirements during these tests to enforce control rod withdrawal sequences and restrict other CORE ALTERATIONS provide protection against potential reactivity excursions. Operations in all other MODES are unaffected by this LCO.
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ACTIONS	<u>A.1 and A.2</u> With one or more control rods discovered uncoupled during this Special Operation, a controlled insertion of each uncoupled control rod is required; either to attempt recoupling, or to preclude a control rod drop. This controlled insertion is preferred since, if the control rod fails to follow the drive as it is withdrawn (i.e., is "stuck" in an inserted position), placing the reactor mode
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(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

switch in the shutdown position per Required Action B.1 could cause substantial secondary damage. If recoupling is not accomplished, operation may continue, provided the control rods are fully inserted within 3 hours and disarmed (electrically or hydraulically) within 4 hours. Inserting a control rod ensures the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. The control rod is disarmed to prevent inadvertent withdrawal during subsequent operations. The control rods can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. Electrically the control rods can be disarmed by disconnecting power from all four directional control valve solenoids. Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note that allows the RWM to be bypassed if required to allow insertion of the inoperable control rods and continued operation. LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation," Actions provide additional requirements when the RWM is bypassed to ensure compliance with the CRDA analysis.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, considering the small number of allowed inoperable control rods, and provide time to insert and disarm the control rods in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Condition A is modified by a Note allowing separate Condition entry for each uncoupled control rod. This is acceptable since the Required Actions for this Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each uncoupled control rod. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation. Subsequent uncoupled control rods are governed by subsequent entry into the Condition and application of the Required Actions.

B.1

With one or more of the requirements of this LCO not met for reasons other than an uncoupled control rod, the testing should be immediately stopped by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown or refuel position. This results in a condition that is consistent with the requirements for MODE 5 where the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are no longer required.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.7.1, SR 3.10.7.2, and SR 3.10.7.3

LCO 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.a and 2.d, made applicable in this Special Operations LCO, are required to have applicable Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met (SR 3.10.7.1). However, the control rod withdrawal sequences during the SDM tests may be enforced by the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 2, MODE 2 requirements) or by a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other task qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., a shift technical advisor or reactor engineer). As noted, either the applicable SRs for the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1) must be satisfied according to the applicable Frequencies (SR 3.10.7.2), or the proper movement of control rods must be verified (SR 3.10.7.3). This latter verification (i.e., SR 3.10.7.3) must be performed during control rod movement to prevent deviations from the specified sequence. These surveillances provide adequate assurance that the specified test sequence is being followed.

SR 3.10.7.4

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this LCO will ensure that the reactor is operated within the bounds of the safety analysis. The 12 hour Frequency is intended to provide appropriate assurance that each operating shift is aware of and verifies compliance with these Special Operations LCO requirements.

SR 3.10.7.5

Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the control rod drive mechanism and will perform its intended function when necessary. The verification is required to be performed any time a control rod is withdrawn to the "full-out" notch position, or prior to declaring the control rod OPERABLE after work on the control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling. This Frequency is acceptable, considering the low probability that a control rod will become uncoupled when it is not being moved as well as operating experience related to uncoupling events.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.10.7.6

CRD charging water header pressure verification is performed to ensure the motive force is available to scram the control rods in the event of a scram signal. Since the reactor is depressurized in MODE 5, there is insufficient reactor pressure to scram the control rods. Verification of charging water header pressure ensures that if a scram were required, capability for rapid control rod insertion would exist. The minimum pressure of 940 psig is well below the expected pressure of approximately 1500 psig while still ensuring sufficient pressure for rapid control rod insertion. The 7 day Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience and takes into account indications available in the control room.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 15.4.10.
 2. XN-NF-80-19(P)(A), Volume 1, Supplement 2, Section 7.1, Exxon Nuclear Methodology for Boiling Water Reactor Neutronics Methods for Design Analysis, (as specified in Technical Specification 5.6.5).
 3. NEDE-24011-P-A-US, General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, (as specified in Technical Specification 5.6.5).
 4. Letter from T. Pickens (BWROG) to G.C. Lainas (NRC) "Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A," BWROG-8644, August 15, 1986.
 5. NFSR-0091, Benchmark of CASMO/MICROBURN BWR Nuclear Design Methods, Commonwealth Edison Topical Report, (as specified in Technical Specification 5.6.5).
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