

March 21, 2001

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Subject: **Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362**
Proposed Change Number NPF-10/15-517
Revision of Facility Operating Licenses
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
Units 2 and 3


Enclosed are Amendment Application Number 201 to Facility Operating License NPF-10, and Amendment Application Number 186 to Facility Operating License NPF-15, for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, respectively. The Amendment Applications consist of Proposed Change Number (PCN)-517 and are provided in Enclosure 1 to this letter.

PCN-517 is a request to administratively update the Facility Operating Licenses by deleting license conditions which have been completed.

The Southern California Edison Company requests this amendment be issued effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

If you have any questions regarding these amendment applications, please contact me or Mr. Jack L. Rainsberry (949) 368-7420.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc: E. W. Merschoff, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV
J. A. Sloan, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 & 3
L. Raghavan, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3
S. Y. Hsu, Department of Health Services, Radiologic Health Branch

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
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Application of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA)	
EDISON COMPANY, <u>ET AL.</u> for a Class 103)	Docket No. 50-361
License to Acquire, Possess, and Use)	
a Utilization Facility as Part of)	Amendment Application
Unit No. 2 of the San Onofre Nuclear)	No. 201
Generating Station)	

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90,
hereby submit Amendment Application No. 201. This amendment application consists of
Proposed Change No. NPF-10-517 to Facility Operating License NPF-10. Proposed
Change No. NPF-10-517 is a request to administratively update the Facility Operating
License by deleting completed license conditions.

Subscribed on this 26th day of March, 2001.

Respectfully submitted,
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY


By: 
Dwight E. Nunn
Vice President

State of California

County of San Diego

On 3/24/2001 before me Mariane Sanchez, personally
appeared Dwight E. Nunn, personally known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in
his authorized capacity, and that by his signature on the instrument the person, or the
entity upon behalf of which the person acted, executed the instrument.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

Signature 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Application of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA)	
EDISON COMPANY, <u>ET AL.</u> for a Class 103)	Docket No. 50-362
License to Acquire, Possess, and Use)	
a Utilization Facility as Part of)	Amendment Application
Unit No. 3 of the San Onofre Nuclear)	No. 186
Generating Station)	

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90,
hereby submit Amendment Application No. 186. This amendment application consists of
Proposed Change No. NPF-15-517 to Facility Operating License NPF-15. Proposed
Change No. NPF-15-517 is a request to administratively update the Facility Operating
License by deleting completed license conditions.

Subscribed on this 21st day of March, 2001.

Respectfully submitted,
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY


By: 
Dwight E. Nunn
Vice President

State of California

County of San Diego

On 3/21/2001 before me Mariane Sanchez, personally
appeared Dwight E. Nunn, personally known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in
his authorized capacity, and that by his signature on the instrument the person, or the
entity upon behalf of which the person acted, executed the instrument.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

Signature 



Enclosure 1

DESCRIPTION AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS ANALYSIS

PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-10/15-517

DESCRIPTION AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS ANALYSIS FOR PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-10/15-517

This is a request to revise the San Onofre Unit 2 and Unit 3 facility Operating Licenses (OLs) by deleting license conditions which have been completed.

EXISTING LICENSE CONDITIONS

Unit 2: See Attachment A

Unit 3: See Attachment B

PROPOSED LICENSE CONDITIONS (highlight for additions and strike-out for deletions)

Unit 2: See Attachment C

Unit 3: See Attachment D

PROPOSED LICENSE CONDITIONS

Unit 2: See Attachment E

Unit 3: See Attachment F

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE

Many license conditions are completed and are no longer required to be identified in the licenses.

This proposed change is a request to simplify the Facility Operating Licenses and to delete license conditions which have been completed. Proposed reformatted licenses are provided to reflect the deletion of the completed license conditions.

DISCUSSION

A. Background

The license conditions were mostly generated at the time of initial licensing of San Onofre Units 2 and 3. At that time there were a number of outstanding items which were required to be completed as conditions for Low Power and Full Power operation of Unit 2 and Unit 3. Since many of the required conditions have been completed or are captured elsewhere (e.g., Technical Specifications), these amendment requests are to simplify the Facility Operating Licenses by deleting completed license conditions.

B. Impact of Change on Plant Operation

These proposed changes will remove completed license conditions from the San Onofre Unit 2 and 3 Facility Operating Licenses.

No physical changes to the plant, or the way it is operated, are being made as a result of these proposed Facility Operating Licenses changes.

C. Discussion

The license conditions which are being requested to be deleted are described below, along with an explanation of how each condition was completed. Editorial changes are also discussed, as appropriate.

Unit 2 Operating License (OL) License Conditions Proposed Deletions and Bases for Deletion:

2.C.(4) Intentionally Deleted

It is proposed that the above text be deleted because the new list is renumbered and includes only active license conditions.

2.C.(5) Environmental Qualification (Section 3.11, SER, SSER #3, SSER #4) - This paragraph intentionally deleted

It is proposed that the above text be deleted because the new list is renumbered and includes only active license conditions.

2.C.(6) High Burnup Fission Gas Release - "Prior to beginning the cycle of reactor operation during which peak fuel pellet burnups will achieve greater than 20,000 megawatt days per metric ton of uranium SCE shall provide revised analyses using fission gas release models acceptable to the NRC staff."

Basis - Revised analyses for Units 2 and 3 High Burnup Fission Gas Release and associated methodology were submitted to the NRC by SCE letter dated June 7, 1984 (Reference 1) to respond to this license condition. Letters from SCE to the NRC dated November 21, 1989 (Reference 2) and July 11, 1990 (Reference 3) provided information to address fuel rod maximum allowable gas pressure to support peak fuel burnup greater than 420 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). NRC approval was provided for plant specific use of C-E topical report CEN-372-A-P for all subsequent cycles by an NRC letter to SCE dated August 3, 1990 (Reference 4) requiring supporting information to remain in auditable form and for SCE to seek NRC staff approval for any changes to

the conclusions of these analyses in future reload analyses. The NRC August 3, 1990 "auditable" requirements are met by the fuel performance reload analyses generated by SCE using topical report SCE-9801-A-P, "Reload Analysis Methodology for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3" submitted to the NRC by SCE to NRC letter dated November 30, 1998 (Reference 5). This topical report was approved by the NRC Safety Evaluation letter to SCE dated June 2, 1999 (Reference 6). The NRC August 3, 1990 requirement for SCE to seek NRC staff approval for any changes is met as described in topical report SCE-9801-A-P, Section 4.5.3, third paragraph, which specifies that "Methodology changes that are not compliant with the NRC approved methodology....will not be implemented without prior NRC approval."

2.C.(7) Low Temperature Overpressurization Protection - Prior to operation for more than five (5) effective full power years, SCE shall provide a report describing its reexamination of the Technical Specification requirements for steam generator/RCS (Reactor Coolant System) delta T (Temperature) and SDCS (Shut Down Cooling System) initiation temperature limits. The report must either demonstrate that the current Technical Specification limits are still suitably conservative, or propose and justify revised limits.

Basis - NRC to SCE letter dated June 23, 1989 (Reference 7) confirmed that SCE to NRC letter dated May 8, 1989 (Reference 8) satisfied this license condition by verifying that the original steam generator/Reactor Coolant System delta temperature and the Shutdown Cooling System initiation temperature limits were still suitably conservative, prior to five effective power years of plant operation.

2.C.(8) Control Room Pressurization Capability - "By November 1, 1982, SCE shall complete the modifications required to achieve a positive pressure of 1/8" water gauge in the control room. Tests shall be performed on the modified system to verify the 1/8" positive pressure."

Basis - The required modifications for a positive pressure of \geq 1/8 inch water gauge (W.G.) were installed by Design Change Package (DCP) 2/3-952.1M (Reference 9). Testing for this item is controlled by the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement SR 3.7.11.4, implemented by Maintenance Procedure SO23-I-2.44, to ensure that the control room emergency air clean up system maintains a positive pressure of \geq 1/8 inch W.G.

2.C.(9) Seismic Trip System - "Prior to initially exceeding five (5) percent power, the seismic trip system shall be operable."

Basis - The seismic trip system was determined to be operable and this license condition was closed by NRC Inspection Report 50-361/82-17 (Reference 10) dated June 17, 1982 (item 6.a.(1)).

2.C.(10) Volume Control Tank Outlet Valve Control Logic - Safety

Actuation - "Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the volume control tank outlet valve control logic shall be modified to ensure that the valve does not change position following safety injection actuation signal reset."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated October 27, 1982 (Reference 109) describes implementation of an emergency procedure change to incorporate a step to place the volume control tank (VCT) outlet valve in the manual mode prior to resetting SIAS. Design Change Package (DCP) 2-203J (Proposed Facility Change [PFC] 82-125) was completed to satisfy the volume control tank (VCT) outlet valve requirements of this license condition (Reference 11). NRC inspection report 83-03 and 83-04 dated March 14, 1983 (Reference 111), paragraph 4, verified completion of this design modification.

2.C.(11) Instrumentation Compliance with Post Accident Monitoring Instrument (PAMI) Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 - "By May 15, 1982, SCE shall submit a proposal, including a proposed implementation schedule, for meeting Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated May 13, 1982 (Reference 12) provided the proposal including the proposed implementation schedule to meet Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97 and satisfy this license condition. Subsequent changes to implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.97 Revision 2 were established by SCE to NRC correspondence, such as SCE letter to the NRC dated July 26, 1984 (Reference 13) or by 10CFR50.59. NRC letter to SCE dated May 26, 1987 (Reference 14) transmitted the SER for San Onofre Units 2 and 3 conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2.

2.C.(12)a Control System Failures - "By April 1, 1983, SCE shall provide an evaluation of control system failures caused by high energy line break, and by failures of any power sources, sensor, or sensor impulse lines which provide power or signals to two or more control systems. Implementation of any corrective action resulting from this evaluation shall

be completed on a schedule acceptable to the NRC.”

Basis - SCE letters to the NRC dated April 1, 1983 (Reference 15), April 20, 1983 (Reference 16), and February 20, 1987 (Reference 17) provided the information required by this license condition. NRC letter to SCE dated August 17, 1988 (Reference 18) concluded that no further evaluation was required and that this license condition had been satisfied.

2.C.(13) Diesel Generator Modifications - “Prior to startup following the first refueling outage. SCE shall install a heavy duty turbocharger gear drive assembly on the emergency diesel generators.”

Basis - Design Change Package (DCP) 2/3-1020.SM (Reference 19) installed the required heavy duty turbocharger gear drive assembly to satisfy this license condition. NRC inspection report 83-39, and 83-40 dated January 19, 1984 (Reference 112), paragraph 5, verified completion of this design modification.

2.C.(14) Fire Protection

*To maintain numerical sequence it is proposed that designation of this license condition be revised to: **2.C.(4) Fire Protection** because the new list is renumbered and includes only active license conditions.*

2.C.(15) Turbine Disk Inspection - “Prior to startup following the second refueling outage, the bores of the low pressure turbine disc shall be inspected for ultrasonic indications.”

Basis - General Electric Company of England inspected the bores of the low pressure turbine disc for ultrasonic indications prior to startup following the second refueling outage to satisfy this license condition. SCE letter to the NRC dated June 20, 1986 (Reference 20), informed the NRC that these inspections were performed and provided the inspection report.

2.C.(16) Radioactive Waste System - ““Wet” solid radwaste shall not be shipped from the facility until the NRC has approved the waste solidification Process Control Program.”

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated April 19, 1984 (Reference 21) requested interim approval of the waste solidification Process Control Program (PCP). NRC letter dated April 24, 1984 (Reference 22) granted the requested interim approval and advised: “If we (NRC) find upon completion of our review that additional measures are required to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20.311 or 10 CFR 61, we will so inform you at that

time.” There has been no NRC notification requiring any additional measures to meet the 10 CFR 20.311 or 10 CFR 61 requirements. The April 24, 1984 NRC to SCE letter also advised: “We (NRC) hereby authorize you to proceed with solidification of spent resin in accordance with the revised SONGS PCP (San Onofre Health Physics Procedure SO23-VII-8.5.1....” The requirements for the waste solidification PCP were therefore relocated to San Onofre procedure SO123-VII-8.5.1., in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 89-01. Because the NRC has not required additional measures to meet the 10 CFR 20.311 or 10 CFR 61 since April 24, 1984 this license condition is satisfied.

2.C.(17) Purge System Monitors - “Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, equipment having the capability to continuously monitor and sample the containment purge exhaust directly from the purge stack shall be operable.”

Basis - The required radiation monitoring was satisfied prior to startup following the first refueling outage, as described in SCE letter to the NRC dated March 2, 1984 (Reference 23). Design Change Packages (DCP) 2/3-53N “Addition of Containment Purge System Monitors” were installed in Unit 2 and 3 in 1986 and 1988 respectively, per DCP 2/3-53N completion packages (Reference 24).

2.C.(18) Initial Test Program - “SCE shall conduct the post-fuel loading initial test program (set forth in Section 14 of the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended) without making any major modifications to this program unless such modifications have been identified and have received prior NRC approval. Major modifications are defined as:

- a. Elimination of any test identified in Section 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, as being essential.
- b. Modification of test objectives, methods, or acceptance criteria for any test identified in Section 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, as being essential.
- c. Performance of any test at a power level different than that described in the test procedure.
- d. Failure to complete any tests included in the described program (planned or scheduled for power levels up to the authorized power level).”

Basis - SCE requested NRC approval of certain test modifications by telephone and in SCE letters dated February 1, 1983 (Reference 25), and July 14, 1983 (Reference 26) which were approved respectively by NRC letters dated May 23, 1983 (Reference 27), May 12, 1983 (Reference 28), and July 29, 1983 (Reference 29). SCE letter to the NRC dated October 21, 1983 (Reference 30) subsequently provided the final supplementary report to the Startup Report which addressed testing from issuance of the operating license through completion of startup testing.

2.C.(19)a. Shift Technical Advisor - "SCE shall provide a fully trained on-shift technical advisor to the shift supervisor (watch engineer)."

Basis - NRC inspection report 50-361/82-10 dated March 15, 1982 (Reference 31) reported satisfactory completion of this item (item 3.a.). The ongoing function of shift technical advisor (STA) is described in Technical Specification 5.2.2.g. and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) section 13.1.2.2.2.

2.C.(19)b. Shift Manning (I.A.1.1, SSER #1) - Deleted
It is proposed that the above text be deleted because the new list is renumbered and includes only active license conditions.

2.C.(19)c. Independent Safety Engineering Group - "SCE shall have an on-site independent safety engineering group."

Basis - This License Condition has been completed by SCE establishing the on-site independent safety engineering group functions. The principal on-site independent safety engineering group function is to examine plant operating characteristics. The Nuclear Oversight and Regulatory Affairs Department Nuclear Safety Group has established an operating experience program as described in the San Onofre Quality Assurance Topical Report section 17.2.20.4 to evaluate INPO reports, NRC publications, vendor 10 CFR Part 21 letters, and other appropriate sources of operating experience information. The other on-site independent safety engineering group function is to maintain surveillance of plant activities. The Quality Assurance organization performs surveillances and audits of a wide range of plant activities. This wide range of plant activities is described in section 17.2.18 of the San Onofre Quality Assurance Topical Report.

2.C.(19)d. Procedures for Transients and Accidents - "By May 1, 1982, SCE shall provide emergency procedure guidelines. Emergency procedures based on guidelines approved by the NRC shall be

implemented prior to startup following the first refueling outage.”

Basis - Emergency procedures have been implemented to satisfy the requirements of this License condition as verified in NRC letters to SCE dated August 3, 1988 (Reference 32) and May 31, 1990 (Reference 33).

2.C.(19)e. Procedures for Verifying Correct Performance of Operating Activities - “Prior to fuel loading, SCE shall implement a system for verifying the correct performance of operating activities, and shall keep the system in effect thereafter.”

Bases - The independent verification requirements have been incorporated in San Onofre procedures and programs. The NRC closed this license condition in NRC Unit 2/3 inspection report 82-39/82-31 dated December 7, 1982 (Reference 34) (item 14.c.).

2.C.(19)f. 1-17 Control Room Design Review - “Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall:

1. Prioritize the control room annunciator windows.
2. Delete master acknowledge capabilities of the annunciator system.
3. Incorporate a second flash note/audible scheme into the annunciator system to alert the operator of an alarm returned to normal.
4. Identify changes required to correct control room lighting for optimum operator performance.
5. Revise control room labeling according to a hierarchical scheme.
6. Label Foxboro containment spray controller.
7. Replace RC loop hot leg temperature scales with appropriate scale divisions.
8. Eliminate 10X multiplier from RC loop hot leg and cold leg temperature.
9. Make all labels flush with the face of the instrument bezel.
10. Incorporate normal and abnormal operating range indications on applicable instruments.

11. Replace Dymo tape with permanent labels or markers.
12. Color code all component bezels.
13. Add channel identification to emergency feedwater controls.
14. Label dual function vertical scales to identify each scale.
15. Provide increase/decrease labels for the containment spray chemical controllers.
16. Incorporate the requirement to replace burned-out lamps in the procedures.
17. Add phone jacks to the control room back-panel areas.

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall complete the changes required to correct control room lighting for optimum operator performance.”

Basis - By SCE letter to the NRC dated August 19, 1982 (Reference 35) SCE notified the NRC that these 17 items were complete and described how the control room lighting requirements were fulfilled. The NRC Safety Evaluation Report on the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) was provided in NRC to SCE letter dated December 15, 1986 (Reference 37). The Safety Evaluation Report concluded that the DCRDR activities of SCE met all requirements.

2.C.(19)g. Special Low Power Testing and Training - “By April 16, 1982, SCE shall provide detailed test procedures and a safety analysis.”

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated April 15, 1982 (Reference 38) provided the safety analysis and detailed test procedures to satisfy this license condition.

2.C.(19)h. Reactor Coolant System Vents - “By May 1, 1982, SCE shall provide procedures or procedure guidelines for reactor coolant gas vent system operation and testing.”

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated April 27, 1982 (Reference 39) provided procedural guidelines and the reactor coolant gas vent system operating instruction to satisfy this license condition. NRC Inspection Report 50-361/82-27 dated October 5, 1982 (Reference 36) (item 3.e.) verified compliance.

2.C.(19)i. Post-Accident Sample System - "The PASS shall be operable and the post-accident sampling program shall be implemented as described in the SCE letter of April 14, 1983, and revised by SCE letter of October 2, 1992."

Basis - The post-accident sampling program, implemented as described in the above referenced letters (References 40 and 41) and NRC safety evaluation issued on April 6, 1993 (Reference 42), is controlled per Technical Specification 5.5.2.2. "Post Accident Sampling Program" (Note: SCE submitted Technical Specification Amendment request Nos. 205 (Unit 2) and 190 (Unit 3) in an SCE to NRC letter dated January 11, 2001 (Reference 106) to delete Technical Specification 5.5.2.2, based on NRC approval of Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) topical report CE-NPD-1157 Rev. 1 "Technical Justification for the Elimination of the Post Accident Sampling System from the Plant Design and Licensing Bases for CEOG (Combustion Engineering Owners Group) Utilities.")

2.C.(19)j. Safety Valve Test Requirements - "SCE shall conform to the results of the EPRI test program. By April 1, 1982, SCE shall provide confirmation of the adequacy of the San Onofre 2 RCS safety valves based on a preliminary review of generic test program results. By July 1, 1982, SCE shall provide evidence supported by test of safety valve functionality for expected operating and accident (non-ATWS) conditions. The testing shall demonstrate that the valves will open and reclose under the expected flow conditions. By July 1, 1982, SCE shall provide an evaluation of the adequacy of the associated piping and supports at San Onofre 2."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated June 29, 1982 (Reference 43) provided reports containing the required information to satisfy this license condition.

2.C.(19)k. Direct Indication of Safety Valve Position - "Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, the safety valve position indication system shall be environmentally and seismically qualified consistent with the component or system to which it is attached, and documentation of this shall be provided."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated April 22, 1982 (Reference 44) confirmed that the safety valve position indication system had been appropriately seismically and environmentally qualified to meet the requirements of this license condition.

2.C.(19)l. AFW (Auxiliary Feedwater) Pump 48-Hour Endurance Test - "Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall conduct a 48-hour endurance test of all auxiliary feedwater pumps."

Basis - Prior to exceeding 5% power SCE conducted 48-hour endurance tests on the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater pumps. NRC Inspection Report 50-361/82-27 (Reference 36) (item 2.c.) verified compliance.

2.C.(19)m. Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer Heaters - "Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall implement procedures to preclude the automatic reapplication of pressurizer heaters to Class 1E buses upon SIAS reset."

Basis - NRC Inspection report 82-23 and 82-13 dated July 14, 1982 (Reference 113), item 2, documented NRC inspection of applicable procedures and concluded that the procedures had adequate provisions to preclude the unintentional automatic re-loading of pressurizer heaters onto Class 1E buses on SIAS reset. Subsequently, Design Change Package (DCP) 2/3-247J (Reference 107) was installed to modify the pressurizer heater control circuits to prevent automatic power restoration to these devices.

2.C.(19)n. Additional Monitoring Instrumentation - "Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, the mid/high range noble gas monitors and iodine and particulate isokinetic samplers shall be operable."

Basis - SCE Audit Report SCES-041-83 (Reference 45), Item 9 verified that these gas monitors were calibrated, functionally tested, and operable prior to exceeding five (5) percent power at Unit 2. NRC Inspection report 84-29 and 84-30 dated December 17, 1984 (Reference 114), item 4, documented NRC verification that this item was acceptable.

2.C.(19)o. ICC (Inadequate Core Cooling) Instrumentation - "Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the following items shall be completed:

- 1 The subcooling monitors shall be modified to include the maximum unheated junction thermocouple temperature and the representative core exit thermocouple input.
2. Incore detector assemblies (core exit thermocouples and associated cabling) shall be environmentally qualified and shall have seismic and environmentally qualified Class 1E connectors.

3. Qualified cables shall be installed for the core exit thermocouples.
4. A safety parameter display system shall be provided.
5. The heated junction thermocouple probe and associated process instrumentation shall be installed."

Basis - The actions for equipment required by this license condition were determined to be completed by NRC inspection. Item 14.a. of NRC inspection reports 50-361/82-39 and 50-362/82-31 dated December 7, 1982 (Reference 34) verified that the required actions had been completed for items 1, 2, 3, and 5. The safety parameter display requirement (Item 4) was satisfied in response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 89-06 regarding certification of implementation of a Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). SCE letter to the NRC dated January 31, 1991 (Reference 105) informed the NRC that installation of the SONGS Critical Functions Monitoring System (CFMS) had been completed. NRC acceptance of the CFMS meeting the SPDS requirement was provided in NRC letter to SCE dated April 23, 1990 (Reference 99).

2.C.(19)p. Voiding in the Reactor Coolant System - "By May 1, 1982, SCE shall provide the results of the Combustion Engineering Owners Group analysis of the potential for RCS voiding during anticipated transients."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated April 28, 1982 (Reference 46) described how this license condition has been satisfied. NRC letter dated March 8, 1984 (Reference 47) concluded that this requirement had been met. While not a license condition for Unit 3, this resolution also addressed and resolved the requirements for Unit 3.

2.C.(19)q. Revised Model for Small-Break LOCA (Loss Of Coolant Accidents) - By May 1, 1982, SCE shall provide the results of the Combustion Engineering Owners Group effort on model justification or a revised analytical model.

Basis - In April 1982 Combustion Engineering (C-E) transmitted copies of revision 1 of C-E topical report CEN-203 to the NRC. CEN-203 addressed revised small break LOCAs for San Onofre Units 2 and 3. SCE to NRC letter dated May 21, 1987 (Reference 48) provided final verification analysis input concerning this license condition. The NRC response dated July 17, 1987 (Reference 49) found that the requirements of this license

condition had been met, closed Unit 2 License conditions 2.C(19)q and 2.C(19)r, and also closed Unit 3 license condition 2.C(17)i.

2.C.(19)r. Plant-Specific Calculations for Compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.46 - "Within one year after model revisions are approved by the NRC, SCE shall provide a supplemental plant-specific analysis to verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.46, using the revised models developed under item II.K.3.30."

Basis - SCE to NRC letter dated May 21, 1987 (Reference 48) provided final verification analysis input concerning this license condition. The NRC response dated July 17, 1987 (Reference 49) found that the requirements of this license condition had been met.

2.C.(19)s. Improving Licensee Emergency Preparedness -

- "1. By April 1, 1982, SCE shall provide a functional description of the upgraded emergency support facilities. (Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility).
2. By January 1, 1983, the upgraded emergency support facilities shall be operational.
3. SCE shall maintain interim emergency support facilities (Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility) until the upgraded facilities are completed."

Basis - The requirements of this license condition have been satisfied. Item 1 was met by SCE to NRC letter dated March 31, 1982 (Reference 50). Item 2 was stated to be operational with two equipment exceptions in an SCE to NRC letter dated December 15, 1982 (Reference 51). SCE stated in a follow up letter to the NRC dated May 13, 1983 (Reference 52) that one of the exceptions identified in the December 15, 1982 letter was completed, and the remaining outstanding item was installation by the NRC of the red and green telephones. These telephones were installed in 1982 and subsequently replaced in 1992 by the current FTS-2000 system for emergency telephone communication with the NRC, in response to NRC Generic Letter 91-14. Since the upgraded emergency support facilities were operational, as discussed above, requirement 3 to maintain interim emergency support facilities was superseded.

2.C.(20)a. & b. Surveillance Program - "Prior to entering any operational mode for the first time, including initial fuel loading, SCE shall:

- a. Have completed a review of the surveillance procedures applicable

- to the change of mode, and determined that the procedures demonstrate the operability of the required systems With respect to all acceptance criteria defined in the Technical Specifications.
- b. Have dispatched written certification to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region V, that the actions defined in a, above, have been completed for the mode or modes to be entered."

Basis - SCE to NRC letters dated February 16, 1982, (Reference 53) March 11, 1982 (Reference 54), April 14, 1982 (Reference 55), May 6, 1982 (Reference 56), July 23, 1982 (Reference 57), and September 3, 1982 (Reference 58) satisfy both "a" and "b" for Unit 2 entry into Modes 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively.

2.C.(21) Laboratory Instrumentation - "Prior to initial entry into operating Mode 2, the laboratory instrumentation described in Sections 11.5.2.2.2 and 12.5.2.2.1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report shall be calibrated and shall be capable of analyzing sample types and geometries necessary to support facility operation. In addition, at that time there shall also be approved, written procedures governing laboratory operations and analyses."

Basis - NRC inspection report 361/82-05, dated April 27, 1982 (Reference 59) determined that all prior comments and unresolved items relative to radiochemical measures and procedures had been addressed and resolved. Therefore, this license condition has been fulfilled.

2.C.(22) Design Verification Program - "Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall provide the final report of the Design Verification Program being conducted by the General Atomic Company, and NRC approval of the results must be obtained."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated April 5, 1982 (Reference 60) described the General Atomic Company (GA) design verification program, and provided copies of the GA final report, "Independent Verification of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 & 3 Seismic Design and Quality Assurance Effectiveness," to the NRC. NRC letter to SCE dated April 20, 1982 (Reference 61) summarized an April 12, 1982 GA, SCE, and NRC meeting in which SCE outlined the basis for confidence in the design and the design process. The NRC provided final approval of the results in section 3.7.4 of Unit 2 and 3 SER Supplement 6 dated June 30, 1982 (Reference 62).

2.C.(23) Emergency Preparedness Conditions -

"a. Conditions of ASLB Initial Decision of May 14, 1982

Within five (5) months of initially exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall:

- i. Demonstrate that both meteorological towers and the Health Physics Computer System are fully installed and operational. SCE shall maintain offsite assessment and monitoring capabilities, essentially as described in the hearing (See Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D1.12, pp. 136-140), at no less than that level of readiness, pending development of satisfactory capability of offsite response organizations (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.27, pp. 145-146, and Section V, Paragraph B, pp. 213-214).
- ii. Provide an assessment of whether public information regarding emergency planning should also be presented in Spanish (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph F.32, pp. 168, and Section V, Paragraph C.2, pp. 215).
- iii. Provide revised plans demonstrating that the "extended" Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) concept has been deleted from the San Onofre onsite and offsite plans and the Plume Exposure Pathway EFZ boundary has been extended, along with siren coverage, to Dana Point and all of San Juan Capistrano (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.25, pp. 98, and Section V, Paragraph C.5, pp. 216; see also Order (making Clarifying Change in Initial Decision) dated May 25, 1982).

b. Completion of Emergency Preparedness Requirements

In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of the procedures in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's proposed rules, 44 CFR 350, is an indication that a major substantive problem exists in achieving or maintaining an adequate state of preparedness, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(s) (2) will apply.

c. Condition of ASLB of February 1, 1983 (Medical Services)

By September 17, 1983, or six months from the date that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issues its determination of the medical

services questions certified by it, whichever is the shorter period of time, SCE shall demonstrate that SCE and offsite jurisdictions have developed and stand ready to implement arrangements for medical services as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (12) (See Initial Decision, Section III, pp. 43-47, and Section V Paragraph D. pp. 216-217, and Stipulation and Order Modifying License Condition, February 1, 1983).

d. Conditions of ALAB-717, March 4, 1983

- i. By July 2, 1983, SCE shall provide evidence that it has undertaken further efforts to assemble and to keep current as reasonably complete a list as possible of housebound people within the plume emergency planning zone who would require transportation assistance in the event of an evacuation.
- ii. By July 2, 1983, SCE shall provide evidence that a training program has been developed and initiated to assist Orange County Transit District bus drivers in the discharge of their responsibilities in the event of a radiological emergency at San Onofre."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated February 4, 1983 (Reference 63) provided documentation that the license conditions were satisfied for items a.i, a.ii, and a.iii. Item b can be deleted since it was stated to ensure satisfactory preparedness progress upon the NRC granting full power operation. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) ruling on Off-site Medical Services dated August 12, 1983 (Reference 64) confirmed compliance with item c. SCE letter to the NRC dated July 1, 1983 (Reference 65) provided documentation that the d.i and d.ii license conditions were satisfied. The County of Orange is responsible for maintaining a database of the special needs population within the Emergency Planning Zone. During an emergency, guidance is provided for coordinating activities for individuals identified as requiring special assistance in accordance with the "County of Orange Emergency Plan," Part Two: Annex B-4 Page 1 (Movement (Evacuation) Operations) and, Annex B-6 Pages 1 and 2 (Medical Operations), Annex D Page 47 (Transportation Coordinator Checklist) (Reference 103). The County of Orange is responsible for training its emergency workers in accordance with "Interjurisdictional Policy #20, Training," which describes the emergency worker training responsibility and requirements for all offsite Emergency Planning Zone jurisdictions (Reference 104).

2.C.(24) RCS Depressurization System, PORVs (Power Operated Relief Valves) - "By June 30, 1983, SCE shall provide a complete response to the NRC letter of March 27, 1982, requesting additional information relative to the capability of San Onofre 2 and 3 for rapid depressurization and decay heat removal without power operating relief valves (PORV's)."

Basis - SCE to NRC letters dated June 22, 1983 (Reference 66) and September 21, 1983 (Reference 67) provided information which satisfied the requirements of this license condition.

2.C.(25) Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Bearings - "By October 30, 1982, SCE shall submit a proposed hardware modification and schedule for implementation that will increase the reliability of the AFW motor-driven pumps in the event of a break in the high energy line feeding the steam-driven pump. In the interim, prior to the installation of a hardware modification acceptable to the NRC staff, SCE shall perform an augmented in-service inspection of the steam line in accordance with SCE's letter of July 12, 1982."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated October 29, 1982 (Reference 108) provided details of hardware modification options which addressed this license condition. SCE letter to the NRC dated March 7, 1983 (Reference 68) provided information on daily visual inspections of the AFW pump turbine steam line and details of planned implementation of a lube oil system to satisfy the requirements of this license condition. SCE letters to the NRC dated April 2, 1984 and August 8, 1984 (References 115 and 116, respectively) provided revised design information on the gravity-feed auxiliary feedwater motor lube oil system. The lube oil system was installed by Design Change Packages (DCPs) 2/3-127.M (Reference 69), rendering augmented in-service inspection (ISI) performance unnecessary; the modification completed all actions related to the license condition. This system is discussed in San Onofre Unit 2 Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 90-015, submitted in SCE to NRC letter dated January 18, 1991 (Reference 117), and is described in UFSAR section 10.4.9.2.2.

Paragraph E. - It is proposed that an asterisk be added after the text "Safeguards Contingency Plan," to relate the associated footnote.

Paragraph G. - To reflect the above proposed license condition deletions it is proposed to revise the first sentence of paragraph G from "SCE shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, items C(1), C(3), through C(13), C(15) through C(22), and F..." to "SCE shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, items

C(1), C(3), and F..."

Unit 3 Facility Operating License (OL) License Conditions Proposed Deletions and Bases for Deletion:

2.c.(4) Intentionally Deleted

It is proposed that the above text be deleted because the new list is renumbered and includes only active license conditions.

2.C.(5) Environmental Qualification (Section 3.11, SER, SSER #3, SSER #4) - This paragraph intentionally deleted

It is proposed that the above text be deleted because the new list is renumbered and includes only active license conditions.

2.C.(6) High Burnup Fission Gas Release - "Prior to beginning the cycle of reactor operation during which peak fuel pellet burnups will achieve greater than 20,000 megawatt days per metric ton of uranium, SCE shall provide revised analyses using fission gas release models acceptable to the NRC staff."

Basis - Revised analyses for Units 2 and 3 High Burnup Fission Gas Release and associated methodology were submitted to the NRC by SCE letter dated June 7, 1984 (Reference 1) to respond to this license condition. Letters from SCE to the NRC dated November 21, 1989 (Reference 2) and July 11, 1990 (Reference 3) provided information to address fuel rod maximum allowable gas pressure to support peak fuel burnup greater than 420 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). NRC approval was provided for plant specific use of C-E topical report CEN-372-A-P for all subsequent cycles by an NRC letter to SCE dated August 3, 1990 (Reference 4) requiring supporting information to remain in auditable form and for SCE to seek NRC staff approval for any changes. The NRC August 3, 1990 "auditable" requirements are met by the fuel performance reload analyses generated by SCE using topical report SCE-9801-A-P, "Reload Analysis Methodology for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3" submitted to the NRC by SCE to NRC letter dated November 30, 1998 (Reference 5). This topical report was approved by the NRC Safety Evaluation letter to SCE dated June 2, 1999 (Reference 6). The NRC August 3, 1990 requirement for SCE to seek NRC staff approval for any changes is met as described in topical report SCE-9801-A-P, Section 4.5.3, third paragraph, which specifies that "Methodology changes that are not compliant with the NRC approved methodology....will not be implemented without prior NRC approval."

2.C.(7) Low Temperature Overpressurization Protection - "Prior to operation for more than five (5) effective full power years, SCE shall provide a report describing its reexamination of the Technical Specification requirements for steam generator/reactor coolant system delta temperature and shutdown cooling system initiation temperature limits that are presently provided for overpressure protection. The report must either demonstrate that the current Technical Specification limits are still suitably conservative, or propose and justify revised limits."

Basis - NRC to SCE letter dated September 19, 1989 (Reference 89) confirmed that SCE to NRC letter dated June 12, 1989 (Reference 90) satisfied this license condition by verifying that the original steam generator/Reactor Coolant System delta temperature and the Shutdown Cooling System initiation temperature limits were still suitably conservative, prior to five effective full power years of plant operation.

2.C.(8) Volume Control Tank Outlet Valve Control Logic - Safety Actuation - "Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the volume control tank outlet valve control logic shall be modified to ensure that the valve does not change position following safety injection actuation signal reset. In the interim, SCE shall maintain emergency procedures that require the volume control tank outlet valve to be placed in the manual mode prior to SIAS reset."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated October 27, 1982 (Reference 109) describes implementation of an emergency procedure change to incorporate a step to place the volume control tank (VCT) outlet valve in the manual mode prior to resetting SIAS. Design Change Package (DCP) 3-203J (Proposed Facility Change [PFC] 82-125) was completed to satisfy the VCT outlet valve requirements of this license condition (Reference 91). NRC inspection report 83-03 and 83-04 dated March 14, 1983 (Reference 111), paragraph 4, verified completion of this design modification.

2.C.(9) Compliance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 - "Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall comply with the recommendations of Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," as described in the SCE letter of May 13, 1982."

Basis - This license condition was satisfied by implementation of several Design Change Packages (DCPs)s including DCPs 3-0236J, 3-6160J, and 3-6424J and as documented in NRC to SCE letter dated May 4, 1984 (Reference 81) and SCE to NRC letter dated July 26, 1984 (Reference 13).

Subsequent changes to implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 were established by SCE to NRC correspondence and 10 CFR 50.59. NRC letter to SCE dated May 26, 1987 (Reference 14) transmitted the SER for San Onofre Units 2 and 3 conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2.

2.C.(10) Control System Failures - "By April 1, 1983, SCE shall provide an evaluation, for NRC staff review and approval, of control system failures caused by high energy line break, and by failures of any power sources, sensors, or sensor impulse lines which provide power or signals to two or more control systems. Implementation of any corrective action resulting from this evaluation shall be completed on a schedule acceptable to the NRC."

Basis - SCE letters to the NRC dated April 1, 1983 (Reference 15), April 20, 1983 (Reference 16), and February 20, 1987 (Reference 17) provided the information required by this license condition. NRC letter to SCE dated August 17, 1988 (Reference 18) concluded that no further evaluation was required and that this license condition had been satisfied.

2.C.(11) Diesel Generator Modifications - "Prior to startup following the first refueling outage. SCE shall install a heavy duty turbocharger gear drive assembly on the emergency diesel generators."

Basis - Design Change Package (DCP) 2/3-1020.SM (Reference 19) installed the required heavy duty turbocharger gear drive assembly to satisfy this license condition. NRC inspection report 83-39, and 83-40 dated January 19, 1984 (Reference 112), paragraph 5, verified completion of this design modification.

2.C.(12) Fire Protection

*To maintain numerical sequence it is proposed that the designation of this license condition be revised to: **2.C.(4) Fire Protection***

2.C.(13) Turbine Disk Inspection - "Prior to startup following the second refueling outage, the bores of the low pressure turbine disc shall be inspected for ultrasonic indications."

Basis - General Electric Company of England inspected the bores of the low pressure turbine disc for ultrasonic indications prior to startup following the second refueling outage to satisfy this license condition. SCE letter to the NRC dated March 23, 1987 (Reference 102), informed the NRC that these inspections were performed and provided the inspection report.

2.C.(14) Radioactive Waste System - "Wet solid radwaste shall not be shipped from the facility until the NRC has approved the waste solidification Process Control Program."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated April 19, 1984 (Reference 21) requested interim approval of the waste solidification Process Control Program (PCP). NRC letter dated April 24, 1984 (Reference 22) granted the requested interim approval and advised: "If we (NRC) find upon completion of our review that additional measures are required to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20.311 or 10 CFR 61, we will so inform you at that time." There has been no NRC notification requiring any additional measures to meet the 10 CFR 20.311 or 10 CFR 61 requirements. The April 24, 1984 NRC to SCE letter also advised: "We (NRC) hereby authorize you to proceed with solidification of spent resin in accordance with the revised SONGS PCP (San Onofre Health Physics Procedure SO23-VII-8.5.1...." The requirements for the waste solidification PCP were therefore relocated to San Onofre procedure SO123-VII-8.5.1., in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 89-01. Because the NRC has not required additional measures to meet the 10 CFR 20.311 or 10 CFR 61 since April 24, 1984 this license condition is satisfied.

2.C.(15) Purge System Monitors - "Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, equipment having the capability to continuously monitor and sample the containment purge exhaust directly from the purge stack shall be operable."

Basis - The required radiation monitoring was satisfied prior to startup following the first refueling outage, as described in SCE letter to the NRC dated March 2, 1984 (Reference 23). Design Change Packages (DCP) 2/3-53N "Addition of Containment Purge System Monitors" were installed in Unit 2 and 3 in 1986 and 1988 respectively, per DCP 2/3-53N completion packages (Reference 24).

2.C.(16) Initial Test Program - "SCE shall conduct the post-fuel loading initial test program (set forth in Section 14 of the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended through Amendment 30) without making any major modifications to this program unless such modifications have been identified and have received prior NRC approval. Major modifications are defined as:

- a. Elimination of any test identified in Section 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, as being essential.

- b. Modification of test objectives, methods, or acceptance criteria for any test identified in Section 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, as being essential.
- c. Performance of any test at a power level different than that described in the test procedure.
- d. Failure to complete any tests included in the described program (planned or scheduled for power levels up to the authorized power level)."

Basis - SCE requested NRC approval of certain test modifications in SCE to NRC letters dated June 29, 1983 (Reference 92), September 20, 1983 (Reference 93), and October 19, 1983 (Reference 94) which were approved respectively by NRC to SCE letters dated August 19, 1983 (Reference 95), September 28, 1983 (Reference 96), and November 18, 1983 (Reference 97). SCE letter to the NRC dated May 25, 1984 (Reference 98) provided the Startup Report which addressed testing from issuance of the Low Power operating license through completion of startup testing.

2.C.(17)a. Procedures for Transients and Accidents - "Emergency procedures based on guidelines approved by the NRC shall be implemented prior to startup following the first refueling outage that occurs six months or more after NRC approval of the guidelines."

Basis - Emergency procedures have been implemented to satisfy the requirements of this License condition as verified in NRC letters to SCE dated August 3, 1988 (Reference 32) and May 31, 1990 (Reference 33).

2.C.(17)b. Procedures for Verifying Correct Performance of Operating Activities - "Prior to fuel loading, SCE shall implement a system for verifying the correct performance of operating activities, and shall keep the system in effect thereafter."

Bases - The independent verification requirements have been incorporated in San Onofre procedures and programs. The NRC closed this license condition in NRC Unit 2/3 inspection report 82-39/82-31 dated December 7, 1982 (Reference 34) (item 14.c.).

2.C.(17)c. Control Room Design Review - "The control room modifications identified as required in Section 22 Item I.D.1 of Supplement No. 1 to the SER shall be installed and made operational on the schedules identified for each modification in Supplement No. 1 to the SER."

Basis - The NRC Safety Evaluation Report on the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) was provided in NRC to SCE letter dated December 15, 1986 (Reference 37). The Safety Evaluation Report concluded that the DCRDR activities of SCE met all requirements.

2.C.(17)d. Post-Accident Sample System - "The PASS shall be operable and the post-accident sampling program shall be implemented as described in the SCE letter of April 14, 1983, and revised by SCE letter of October 2, 1992."

Basis - The post-accident sampling program, implemented as described in the above referenced letters (References 40 and 41) and NRC safety evaluation issued on April 6, 1993 (Reference 42), is controlled per Technical Specification 5.5.2.2. "Post Accident Sampling Program" (Note: SCE submitted Technical Specification Amendment request Nos. 205 (Unit 2) and 190 (Unit 3) in an SCE to NRC letter dated January 11, 2001 (Reference 106) to delete Technical Specification 5.5.2.2, based on NRC approval of Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) topical report CE-NPD-1157 Rev. 1 "Technical Justification for the Elimination of the Post Accident Sampling System from the Plant Design and Licensing Bases for CEOG (Combustion Engineering Owners Group) Utilities.")

2.C.(17)e. Direct Indication of Safety Valve Position - "The safety valve position indication system shall be environmentally and seismically qualified consistent with the component or system to which it is attached, and documentation of this shall be maintained."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC on April 22, 1982 (Reference 44) confirmed that the safety valve position indication system had been appropriately seismically and environmentally qualified to meet the requirements of this license condition.

2.C.(17)f. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump 48-Hour Endurance Test - "Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall conduct a 48-hour endurance test of all auxiliary feedwater pumps. The results of the test shall be submitted to the NRC staff."

Basis - Prior to exceeding 5% power SCE conducted 48-hour endurance tests on the Unit 3 auxiliary feedwater pumps. The test results were submitted to the NRC by SCE letter dated September 9, 1983 (Reference 100) and NRC to SCE letter dated August 27, 1984 (Reference 101) verified compliance.

2.C.(17)g. Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer Heaters - "SCE shall maintain in effect procedures to preclude the automatic reapplication of pressurizer heaters to Class 1E buses upon SIAS reset."

Basis - NRC Inspection report 82-23 and 82-13 dated July 14, 1982 (Reference 113), item 2, documented NRC inspection of applicable procedures and concluded that the procedures had adequate provisions to preclude the unintentional automatic re-loading of pressurizer heaters onto Class 1E buses on SIAS reset. Subsequently, Design Change Package (DCP) 2/3-247J (Reference 107) was installed to modify the pressurizer heater control circuits to prevent automatic power restoration to these devices.

2.C.(17)h. Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) Instrumentation - "Prior to fuel loading , the following items shall be completed, and shall be maintained thereafter:

1. The subcooling monitors shall be modified to include the maximum unheated junction thermocouple temperature and the representative core exit thermocouple input.
2. Incore detector assemblies (core exit thermocouples and associated cabling) shall be environmentally qualified and shall have seismic and environmentally qualified Class 1E connectors.
3. Qualified cables shall be installed for the core exit thermocouples.
4. The heated junction thermocouple probe and associated process instrumentation shall be installed prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the heated junction thermocouple system and the safety parameter display system shall be operable and shall be maintained operable thereafter."

Basis - Item 14a of NRC inspection reports 50-361/82-39 and 50-362/82-31 dated December 7, 1982 (Reference 34) (item 14.a.) verified completion of items 1 through 4. The safety parameter display requirement was satisfied in response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 89-06 regarding certification of implementation of a Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). SCE letter to the NRC dated January 31, 1991 (Reference 105) informed the NRC that installation of the SONGS Critical Functions Monitoring System (CFMS) had been completed. NRC acceptance of the CFMS meeting the SPDS requirement was provided in NRC letter to SCE dated April 23, 1990 (Reference 99).

2.C.(17)i. Plant-Specific Calculations for Compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.46 - "Within one year after model revisions are approved by the NRC, SCE shall provide a supplemental plant-specific analysis to verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.46, using the revised models developed under item II.K.3.30."

Basis - SCE to NRC letter dated May 21, 1987 (Reference 48) provided final verification analysis input concerning this license condition. The NRC response dated July 17, 1987 (Reference 49) found that the requirements of this license condition had been met.

2.C.(17)j. Improving Licensee Emergency Preparedness -

- "1. By January 1, 1983, the upgraded emergency support facilities shall be operational.
2. SCE shall maintain interim emergency support facilities (Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility) until the upgraded facilities are completed."

Basis - The requirements of this license condition have been satisfied. Upgraded facilities were completed to satisfy item 1 with two equipment exceptions as stated in an SCE to NRC letter dated December 15, 1982 (Reference 51). SCE stated in a follow up letter to the NRC dated May 13, 1983 (Reference 52) that one of the exceptions identified in the December 15, 1982 letter was completed, and the remaining outstanding item was installation by the NRC of the red and green telephones. These telephones were installed in 1982 and subsequently replaced in 1992 by the current FTS-2000 system for emergency telephone communication with the NRC, in response to NRC Generic Letter 91-14. Since the upgraded emergency support facilities were operational, as discussed above, requirement 2 to maintain interim emergency support facilities was superseded.

2.C.(18) Emergency Preparedness Conditions -

- "a. Conditions of ASLB Initial Decision of May 14, 1982

By February 17, 1983, SCE shall:

1. Provide evidence that both meteorological towers and the Health Physics Computer System are fully installed and operational. SCE shall maintain offsite assessment and monitoring capabilities, essentially as described in the

hearing (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.1-12, pp. 136-140), at no less than that level of readiness, pending development of satisfactory capability of offsite response Paragraph D.27, pp. 145-146, Section V, Paragraph B, pp. 213-214).

2. Provide an assessment of whether public information regarding emergency planning should also be presented in Spanish (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph F.32, pp. 168, and Section V, Paragraph C.2, pp. 215).
3. Provide revised plans demonstrating that the "extended" Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) concept has been deleted from the San Onofre onsite and offsite plans and the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ boundary has been extended, along with siren coverage, to Dana Point and all of San Juan Capistrano (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.25, pp. 98, and Section V, Paragraph C.5, pp. 216; see also Order (Making Clarifying Change in Initial Decision) dated May 25, 1982).

b. Completion of Emergency Preparedness Requirements

In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of the procedures in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's proposed rules, 44 CFR 350, is an indication that a major substantive problem exists in achieving or maintaining an adequate state of preparedness, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(s) (2) will apply.

c. Deleted Amendment No. 8 dated September 16, 1983

d. Conditions of ALAB 717, March 4, 1983

- i. By July 2, 1983, SCE shall provide evidence that it has undertaken further efforts to assemble and to keep current as reasonably complete a list as possible of housebound people within the plume emergency planning zone who would require transportation assistance in the event of an evacuation.
- ii. By July 2, 1983, SCE shall provide evidence that a training program has been developed and initiated to assist Orange County Transit District bus drivers in the discharge of their

responsibilities in the event of a radiological emergency at San Onofre."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated February 4, 1983 (Reference 63) provided documentation that the license conditions were satisfied for items a.i, a.ii, and a.iii. Item b can be deleted since it was stated to ensure satisfactory preparedness progress upon the NRC granting full power operation. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) ruling on Off-site Medical Services dated August 12, 1983 (Reference 64) confirmed compliance with item c. SCE letter to the NRC dated July 1, 1983 (Reference 65) provided documentation that the d.i and d.ii license conditions were satisfied. The County of Orange is responsible for maintaining a database of the special needs population within the Emergency Planning Zone. During an emergency, guidance is provided for coordinating activities for individuals identified as requiring special assistance in accordance with the "County of Orange Emergency Plan," Part Two: Annex B-4 Page 1 (Movement (Evacuation) Operations) and, Annex B-6 Pages 1 and 2 (Medical Operations), Annex D Page 47 (Transportation Coordinator Checklist) (Reference 103). The County of Orange is responsible for training its emergency workers in accordance with "Interjurisdictional Policy #20, Training," which describes the emergency worker training responsibility and requirements for all offsite Emergency Planning Zone jurisdictions (Reference 104).

2.C.(19) RCS Depressurization System, (PORV's) - "By June 30, 1983, SCE shall provide a complete response to the NRC letter of March 27, 1982, including information relative to the capability of San Onofre 3 for rapid depressurization and decay heat removal without power operated relief valves (PORVs)."

Basis - SCE to NRC letters dated June 22, 1983 (Reference 66) and September 21, 1983 (Reference 67) provided information which satisfied the requirements of this license condition.

2.C.(20) Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Bearings - "Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall install and make operational the lubrication oil cooling system for the auxiliary feedwater pump motor bearings described in SCE's letter of March 7, 1983. Prior to installation of the lube oil cooling system, SCE shall perform daily visual inspection of the steam lines in the AFW pump room in accordance with SCE's letter of July 12, 1982."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated October 29, 1982 (Reference 108) provided details of hardware modification options which addressed this

license condition. SCE letter to the NRC dated March 7, 1983 (Reference 68) provided information on daily visual inspections of the AFW pump turbine steam line and details of planned implementation of a lube oil system to satisfy the requirements of this license condition. SCE letters to the NRC dated April 2, 1984 and August 8, 1984 (References 115 and 116, respectively) provided revised design information on the gravity-feed auxiliary feedwater motor lube oil system. The lube oil system was installed by Design Change Packages (DCPs) 2/3-127.M (Reference 69), rendering augmented in-service inspection (ISI) performance unnecessary; the modification completed all actions related to the license condition. This system is discussed in San Onofre Unit 2 Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 90-015, submitted in SCE to NRC letter dated January 18, 1991 (Reference 117), and is described in UFSAR section 10.4.9.2.2.

2.C.(21)a & b Surveillance Program - "Prior to entering any operational mode for the first time, including initial fuel loading, SCE shall:

- a. Have completed a review of the surveillance procedures applicable to the change of mode, and determined that the procedures demonstrate the operability of the required systems With respect to all acceptance criteria defined in the Technical Specifications.
- b. Have dispatched written certification to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region V, that the actions defined in a, above, have been completed for the mode or modes to be entered."

Basis - SCE to NRC letters dated November 15, 1982 (Reference 70), November 29, 1982 (Reference 71), December 27, 1982 (Reference 72), January 14, 1983 (Reference 73), August 26, 1983 (Reference 74), and September 14, 1983 (Reference 75) satisfy both "a" and "b" for Unit 3 entry into Modes 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively.

2.C.(22) Auxiliary Building Ventilation System - "SCE shall complete all modifications to the auxiliary building ventilation system described in the November 5, 1982 letter from H. Ray, SCE, to R. Engelken, NRC, on the schedule proposed In the November 5, 1982 letter."

Basis - The above discussed SCE to NRC letter dated November 5, 1982 (Reference 85) documented several SCE commitments concerning planned temporary and permanent corrective actions to improve the design and operation of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System. These actions were completed and the associated hardware changes were installed by implementation of Design Change Package (DCP) 790M (Reference 76).

2.C.(23) Fuel Assembly Shoulder Gap Clearance - "Prior to entering Startup (Mode 2) after each refueling, SCE shall either provide a report that demonstrates that the existing fuel element assembly (FEA) has sufficient available shoulder gap clearance for at least the next cycle of operation, or identify to the NRC and implement a modified FEA design that has adequate shoulder gap clearance for at least the next cycle of operation. The commitment will apply until the NRC concurs that the shoulder gap clearance provided is adequate for the design life of the fuel."

Basis - SCE letter to the NRC dated May 23, 1986 (Reference 77) satisfied this license condition, as confirmed by NRC letter to SCE dated August 25, 1986 (Reference 78). While not a license condition for Unit 2, this resolution also addressed and resolved the requirements for Unit 2. Each Unit's new fuel cycle has a Reload Analysis Report (RAR) which addresses fuel shoulder gap clearance.

2.C.(24) Isolation Capability for Primary EOF - "By January 1, 1984 the primary EOF ventilation system shall be modified to provide isolation capability as described in the SCE letter of July 22, 1983."

Basis - SCE letters to the NRC dated January 9, 1984 (Reference 79) and March 14, 1984 (Reference 80) describe the EOF Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) control logic modifications which were completed to satisfy this license condition.

2.C.(25) Correction of CPC Software Error - "At the first outage of sufficient duration (7 days in Mode 5) after February 2, 1984, SCE shall correct the software error in the Core Protection Calculators discussed in the SCE letters dated March 7, 1983 and July 22, 1983."

Basis - The commitment date to correct an error in the CPC and Control Element Assembly Calculator (CEAC) software was revised to the first available outage of sufficient duration after May 1, 1984 by SCE to NRC letter dated November 16, 1983 (Reference 82). Associated Technical Specification changes were requested by SCE to NRC letter dated April 10, 1984 (Reference 83) and implemented per Amendments 30 and 19 for Units 2 and 3, respectively dated January 9, 1985 (Reference 84).

2.C.(26) (Auxiliary Feedwater System Reports) - "Until the first refueling outage, SCE shall provide a monthly report describing any occurrences resulting in the degradation (including, but not limited to component failures, maintenance errors, and operator errors) of the auxiliary feedwater system. The report shall identify the cause of such occurrences. The report does not relieve the licensee from any existing requirements for Licensee Event

Reports (LERs)."

Basis - On September 16, 1985 Unit 3 entered its first refueling outage having completed the requirement of this license condition to submit to the NRC reports during Cycle 1 operation on the auxiliary feedwater system to describe any occurrences resulting in degradation of the system. The reports were submitted by SCE to the NRC by letters dated November 9, 1983; December 23, 1983; February 29, 1984; March 20, 1984; April 26, 1984; September 13, 1984; October 18, 1984; January 14, 1985; February 6, 1985; May 8, 1985; June 17, 1985, and October 25, 1985.

Paragraph E. - It is proposed that an asterisk be added after the text "Safeguards Contingency Plan," to relate the associated footnote.

Paragraph G. - To reflect the above proposed license condition deletions it is proposed to revise the first sentence of paragraph G from "SCE shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, items C(1), C(3), through C(13), C(15) through C(22), and F..." to "SCE shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, items C(1), C(3), and F..."

Paragraph K. - In accordance with the Commission's direction in its Statement of Policy, Licensing and Regulatory Policy and Procedures for Environmental Protection: Uranium Fuel Cycle Impacts, October 29, 1982, this license is subject to the final resolution of the pending litigation involving Table S-3. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, No. 74-1586 (D. C. Cir., April 27, 1982).

Basis - The Supreme Court decision overturned the Court of Appeals decision that had found the NRC's rules for evaluation of a nuclear power plant's fuel cycle (that are based on Table S-3) arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with NEPA. The case is *Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.* 462 U.S. 87 (1983) (Reference 110). This case was decided together with *NRC v. NRDC* and one other case. The Supreme Court decision upheld the NRC's rules, with which SCE has been complying since 1982.

Attachment 1 to the Unit 3 OL - The following item must be completed prior to initial criticality: The deficiency identified by the SCE letter dated July 19, 1982, to R. H. Engelken from Dr. L. T. Papay regarding discrepant inputs to the Core Protection Calculator from Reactor Coolant Pump shaft speed Control Element Assembly position indication shall be corrected.

Basis - The final report on Core Protection Calculator, submitted as an attachment to the above July 19, 1982 SCE to NRC letter (Reference 86), described corrective action to resolve this item. Subsequently, Item 3 of NRC inspection report 83-11 and 12 dated April 14, 1983 (Reference 87) determined that acceptable corrective action had been completed and closed Licensee Event Report (LER) number 82-034 [submitted to the NRC by SCE to NRC letter dated July 2, 1982] (Reference 88) on this item.

No Significant Hazards Considerations

The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. A discussion of these standards as they relate to this amendment request follows:

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

This proposed change is administrative since it only deletes completed San Onofre Units 2 and 3 license conditions, providing appropriate references and discussion of the actions taken which document their completion. There is no physical plant change or change to plant operation which could increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated is not increased.

2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?

Response: No

This proposed change is administrative because it only deletes completed San Onofre Units 2 and 3 license conditions and there is no physical plant change or change to plant operation which could introduce any mechanism which could create a new or different kind of accident.

Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated is not created.

3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No

This change is administrative because it only deletes completed San Onofre Units 2 and 3 license conditions and there is no physical plant change or change to plant operation, therefore there is no impact a margin of safety.

Therefore, a significant reduction in a margin of safety is not involved.

Based on the responses to these three criteria, Southern California Edison (SCE) has concluded that the proposed amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.

Environmental Consideration:

SCE has determined that the proposed amendments involve no changes in the amount or type of effluent that may be released offsite, and results in no increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. As described above, the proposed operating license amendments involves no significant hazards consideration and, as such, meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) and (10).

REFERENCES

1. SCE to NRC letter dated June 7, 1984, "Analysis of Unit 2 Fission Gas Pressure for Burnups Greater than 20,000 MWD/T"
2. SCE to NRC letter dated November 21, 1989, "Cycle 5 Operation at Extended Burnup - Fuel Pin Fission Gas Pressure and Fuel Assembly Shoulder Gap Adequacy"
3. SCE to NRC letter dated July 11, 1990, "Plant-Specific Use of Topical Report CEN-372-P, Fuel Rod Maximum Allowable Gas Pressure"
4. NRC to SCE letter dated August 3, 1990, "Plant-Specific Use of Topical Report CEN-372-P, Fuel Rod Maximum Allowable Gas Pressure"
5. SCE to NRC letter dated November 30, 1998, "June 16, 1998 Meeting between SCE, Asea Brown Boveri Combustion Engineering (ABB CE), and NRC Staff at White Flint to Discuss Reload Analysis Technology Transfer from ABB CE to SCE for San Onofre"
6. NRC to SCE letter dated June 2, 1999, "Evaluation of Reload Analysis Methodology Technology Transfer"
7. NRC to SCE letter dated June 23, 1989, "License Condition 2.C.7, Low Temperature Overpressurization"
8. SCE to NRC letter dated May 8, 1989, "License Condition 2.C.7, Low Temperature Overpressurization"
9. Design Change Package (DCP) 2/3-952.1M, "Control Room Pressure Boundary Modification"
10. NRC to SCE letter dated June 17, 1982, "NRC Inspections #82-09 and #82-17"
11. Design Change Package (DCP) 2-203J, "Revise Volume Control Tank Outlet Valve Control Circuit to Prevent Reopening on SIAS Reset"
12. SCE to NRC letter dated May 13, 1982, "Position to Comply with Operating License Condition C.(11) and Submittal of Program and Implementation Schedule to Meet Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev 2"
13. SCE to NRC letter dated July 26, 1984, "Response to Exceptions of Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97"
14. NRC to SCE letter dated May 26, 1987, "Safety Evaluation for Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2"
15. SCE to NRC letter dated April 1, 1983, "Response to NRC Question regarding Qualification of Control Systems"

REFERENCES

16. SCE to NRC letter dated April 20, 1983, "Revised Response to NRC Question Regarding License Conditions Relative to High Energy Line Break"
17. SCE to NRC letter dated February 20, 1987, "License Conditions 2.C(12) and 2.C.(10), Volume Control Tank Outlet Valve Control Logic - Safety Actuation"
18. NRC to SCE letter dated August 17, 1988, "Safety Evaluation Report for License Condition 2.C(12) and 2.C.(10), Volume Control Tank Outlet Valve Control Logic - Safety Actuation"
19. Design Change Package (DCP) 2/3-1020SM, "Replace Existing Standard Duty Turbochargers with Heavy Duty Turbochargers on all Emergency Diesel Generator Engines"
20. SCE to NRC letter dated June 20, 1986, "Inspection Reports of Low Pressure turbine Rotor Discs"
21. SCE to NRC letter dated April 19, 1984, "Results of Meeting Regarding Waste Solidification Process Control Program"
22. NRC to SCE letter dated April 24, 1984, "Interim Approval of Process Control Program (PCP)"
23. SCE to NRC letter dated March 2, 1984, "Proposed Changes to Appendix A Technical Specifications to Revise Technical Specifications Relating to Radiation and Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation, Radioactive Effluents and the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program"
24. Design Change Package (DCP)-2/3 53N, "Containment Purge System Monitors"
25. SCE to NRC letter dated February 1, 1983, "Evaluation Relative to the Method for Initiating the 80% Loss of Flow Natural Circulation Test"
26. SCE to NRC letter dated July 14, 1983, "Request for Concurrence Regarding Power Ascension Testing Sequence"
27. NRC to SCE letter dated May 23, 1983, "San Onofre 2 Startup Testing"
28. NRC to SCE letter dated May 12, 1983, "Proposed Deletion of Integral Test of CPC Functional Capability"
29. NRC to SCE letter dated July 29, 1983, "San Onofre 2 Turbine Trip Test"
30. SCE to NRC letter dated October 21, 1983, "Supplement II to Startup Report"
31. NRC to SCE letter dated March 15, 1982, "NRC Inspection 82-10 for San Onofre Unit 2"

REFERENCES

32. NRC to SCE letter dated August 3, 1988, "License Condition 2.C(19)d, Procedures for Transients and Accidents, for San Onofre 2 and License Condition 2.C(17)a for San Onofre Unit 3
33. NRC to SCE letter dated May 31, 1990, "Safety Evaluation for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3, Procedures Generation Package"
34. NRC to SCE letter dated December 7, 1982, "NRC Inspection Report 82-39/82-31"
35. SCE to NRC letter dated August 19, 1982, "Corrective Actions Identified in License Condition (19)f, Control Room Design Review "
36. NRC to SCE letter dated October 5, 1982, "NRC Inspection #82-19 and #82-27"
37. NRC to SCE letter dated December 15, 1986, "Safety Evaluation Report on Detailed Control Room Design Review"
38. SCE to NRC letter dated April 15, 1982, "Natural Circulation Test Program"
39. SCE to NRC letter dated April 27, 1982, "Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System"
40. SCE to NRC letter dated April 14, 1983, "Results of PASS Demonstration Test"
41. SCE to NRC letter dated October 2, 1992, "Amendment Application Nos. 119 and 103, Changes to License Conditions 2.C.(19)i and 2.C.(17)d, Post Accident Sampling System"
42. NRC to SCE letter dated April 6, 1993, "Issuance of Amendment Nos. 103 and 92", Changes to License Conditions 2.C.(19)i and 2.C.(17)d, Post Accident Sampling System"
43. SCE to NRC letter dated June 29, 1982, "SONGS 2/3 Pressurizer Safety Valve Operability and Safety Valve Discharge piping Adequacy Report"
44. SCE to NRC letter dated April 22, 1982, "Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Safety Valve Position Indication System"
45. SCE Audit Report No. SCES-41-83, dated July 31, 1983, "Compliance with SONGS 2 and 3 Operating License Conditions"
46. SCE to NRC letter dated April 28, 1982, "Submittal of CEN-199, Effects of Vessel Head Voiding During Transients and Accidents in CE NSSS's," March 1982
47. NRC to SCE letter dated March 8, 1984, "Review of NUREG-0737 Item II.K.2.17, Voiding in Reactor Coolant System During Transients"

REFERENCES

48. SCE to NRC letter dated May 21, 1987, "Resolution of Small-Break LOCA and Operating License Conditions"
49. NRC to SCE letter dated July 17, 1987, "Completion of NUREG-0737 Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31," Regarding License Conditions 2.C.(19)q. and 2.c.(19)r., "Revised Model for Small-Break LOCA (Loss Of Coolant Accident)" and "Plant-Specific Calculations for Compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.46," respectively
50. SCE to NRC letter dated March 31, 1982, "Submittal of Report: SONGS 2 and 3 Emergency Response Facilities"
51. SCE to NRC letter dated December 15, 1982, "Compliance with License Condition 2.C(19)s.1, SONGS 2 and 3 Emergency Support Facilities"
52. SCE to NRC letter dated May 13, 1983, "Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability,"
53. SCE to NRC letter dated February 16, 1982, "Satisfaction of Surveillance Program Requirements for Initial Entry into an Operational Mode (Mode 6), Unit 2"
54. SCE to NRC letter dated March 11, 1982, "Satisfaction of Surveillance Program Requirements for Initial Entry into an Operational Mode, Unit 2"
55. SCE to NRC letter dated April 14, 1982, "Satisfaction of Surveillance Program Requirements for Initial Entry into an Operational Mode, Unit 2"
56. SCE to NRC letter dated May 6, 1982, "Satisfaction of Surveillance Program Requirements for Initial Entry into an Operational Mode, Unit 2"
57. SCE to NRC letter dated July 23, 1982, "Satisfaction of Surveillance Program Requirements for Initial Entry into an Operational Mode, Unit 2"
58. SCE to NRC letter dated September 3, 1982, "Satisfaction of Surveillance Program Requirements for Initial Entry into an Operational Mode, Unit 2"
59. NRC to SCE letter dated April 27, 1982, "Inspection Report No. 82-05"
60. SCE to NRC letter dated April 5, 1982, "Request for Expedited Review of Report: Independent Verification of SONGS 2&3 Seismic Design and Quality Assurance Program Effectiveness "
61. NRC to SCE letter dated April 20, 1982, "Summary of Meeting to Discuss Final Report on GA Independent Design Review Program"
62. NRC to SCE letter dated June 30, 1982, "Issuance of Supplement No. 6 to Safety Evaluation Report"

REFERENCES

63. SCE to NRC letter dated February 4, 1983, "Status of Emergency Preparedness Conditions"
64. August 12, 1983 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Memorandum and Order / Ruling on Off-site Medical Services Issue
65. SCE to NRC letter dated July 1, 1983, "U2 Emergency Preparedness License Conditions 2.C(23)d.i and 2.C(23)d.ii and U3 Emergency Preparedness License Conditions 2.C(18)d.i and 2.C(18)d.ii"
66. SCE to NRC letter dated June 22, 1983, "Response to NRC Questions on Depressurization and Decay Heat Removal"
67. SCE to NRC letter dated September 21, 1983, "Submittal of Revised Report CEN-239, Depressurization and Decay Heat Removal Responses to NRC Questions"
68. SCE to NRC letter dated March 7, 1983, "Response to Request for Information on AFW Pump Motor Bearing Qualification and Correction of CPC Software Error"
69. Design Change Package (DCP) 2/3-127.M "Gravity Lube Oil System for Aux. Feed Pump Motor Bearing Cooling"
70. SCE to NRC letter dated November 15, 1982, "Request for License to Load Fuel and Commence Initial Facility Testing Up to 5% of Rated Thermal Power, Unit 3"
71. SCE to NRC letter dated November 29, 1982, "Satisfaction of Surveillance Program Requirements for Initial Entry into an Operational Mode, Unit 3"
72. SCE to NRC letter dated December 27, 1982, "Satisfaction of Surveillance Program Requirements for Initial Entry into an Operational Mode, Unit 3"
73. SCE to NRC letter dated January 14, 1983, "Satisfaction of Surveillance Program Requirements for Initial Entry into an Operational Mode, Unit 3"
74. SCE to NRC letter dated August 26, 1983, "Satisfaction of Surveillance Program Requirements for Initial Entry into an Operational Mode, Unit 3"
75. SCE to NRC letter dated September 14, 1983, "Satisfaction of Surveillance Program Requirements for Initial Entry into an Operational Mode, Unit 3"
76. Design Change Package (DCP) 790.5M, "Fan Control Logic Modification, Radwaste Building"
77. SCE to NRC letter dated May 23, 1986, "Submittal of Report: CEN-332(s)-P, SONGS 2 End of Cycle 2 Shoulder Gap Evaluation"

REFERENCES

78. NRC to SCE letter dated August 25, 1986, "Safety Evaluation on Shoulder Gap Clearance"
79. SCE to NRC letter dated January 9, 1984, "Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Ventilation System"
80. SCE to NRC letter dated March 14, 1984, "Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Ventilation System"
81. NRC to SCE letter dated May 4, 1984, "Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2"
82. SCE to NRC letter dated November 16, 1983, "Changes to the Core Protection Calculator (CPC)"
83. SCE to NRC letter dated April 10, 1984, "Request for Staff Approval of Proposed Change NPF-10/15-138, CPC and CEAC Software Modifications"
84. NRC to SCE letter dated January 9, 1985, "Issuance of Amendment Nos. 30 and 19, Movable Control Element Assemblies"
85. SCE to NRC letter dated November 5, 1982, "Auxiliary Building Ventilation"
86. July 19, 1982, Final Report on Core Protection Calculator, SONGS 3
87. NRC to SCE letter dated April 14, 1983, "NRC Inspection Report # 83-11/ 83-12"
88. SCE to NRC letter dated July 2, 1982, "Licensee Event Report 2-82-034, RCP Shaft Speed and Control Element Assembly Inputs to the Core Protection Calculator"
89. NRC to SCE letter dated September 19, 1989, "Closeout of Generic Letter 88-11 and License Condition 2.C.7, Low Temperature Overpressurization Protection"
90. SCE to NRC letter dated June 12, 1989, "Proposed Technical Specification Change (PCN) 292, Pressure-Temperature Limits, Cold Shutdown-Loops Filled, Hot Shutdown, Overpressure Protection System, RCS Temperature"
91. Design Change Package (DCP) 3-203J, "Revise Volume Control Tank Outlet Valve Control Circuit to Prevent Reopening on SIAS Reset"
92. SCE to NRC letter dated June 29, 1983, "Proposed FSAR Modifications, Initial Criticality and Loss of Offsite Power Test"
93. SCE to NRC letter dated September 20, 1983, "Request for Reconsideration of Schedule for Loss of Offsite Power Test"
94. SCE to NRC letter dated October 19, 1983, "Turbine Trip Test"

REFERENCES

95. NRC to SCE letter dated August 19, 1983, "Changes to San Onofre 3 Startup Test Program"
96. NRC to SCE letter dated September 28, 1983, "Changes to San Onofre 3 Startup Test Program"
97. NRC to SCE letter dated November 18, 1983, "Approval for Deletion of 100% Power Turbine Trip Test at SONGS 3"
98. SCE to NRC letter dated May 25, 1984, "Startup Report - San Onofre 3"
99. NRC to SCE letter dated April 23, 1990, "Response to NRC Generic Letter 89-06 on the Safety Parameter Display System"
100. SCE to NRC letter dated September 9, 1983 "Satisfaction of License Condition 2.C.(17)f, 48-hour Endurance Test of All Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps"
101. NRC to SCE letter dated August 27, 1984, "Safety Evaluation of 48 Hour AFW Pump Test, San Onofre Unit 3"
102. SCE to NRC letter dated March 23, 1987, "Inspection Reports of Unit 3 Low Pressure Turbine Rotor Discs"
103. "County of Orange Emergency Plan," dated July 1999
104. "Interjurisdictional Policy # 20, Training" dated September 1989, Revised: April, 1999
105. SCE to NRC letter dated January 31, 1991, "Safety Parameter Display System"
106. SCE to NRC letter dated January 11, 2001, "Application for Technical Specification Improvement to Eliminate requirements for Post Accident Systems Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process"
107. Design Change Package (DCP) 2/3-247J "Modification of Pressurizer Back-up Heaters Control Circuits to Prevent Automatic Power Restoration on ESFAS Reset"
108. SCE to NRC letter dated October 29, 1982 "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Modification"
109. SCE to NRC letter dated October 27, 1982 "Volume Control Tank Valve Actuation"
110. Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. et al. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. 462 U.S. 87 (1983)
111. NRC to SCE letter dated March 14, 1983 "NRC Inspection Report # 83-03 and 83-04"
112. NRC to SCE letter dated January 19, 1984 "NRC Inspection Report # 83-39 and 83-40"

REFERENCES

- 113. NRC to SCE letter dated July 14, 1982 "NRC Inspection Report # 82-13 and 82-23"
- 114. NRC to SCE letter dated December 17, 1984 "NRC Inspection Report # 84-29 and 84-30"
- 115. SCE to NRC letter dated April 2, 1984 "Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Bearings"
- 116. SCE to NRC letter dated August 8, 1984 "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Bearing Qualification"
- 117. SCE to NRC letter dated January 18, 1991 "Licensee Event Report No. 90-015, Revision 1"

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Attachment A
(Existing Facility Operating License)
SONGS Unit 2

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA
THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-361

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 2

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

License No NPF-10

Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 was issued to the Southern California Edison Company, the San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California and the City of Anaheim, California to read as follows:

- A. This license applies to the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, a pressurized water nuclear reactor and associated equipment (the facility), owned by the licensees. The facility is located in San Diego County, California, and is described in The Final Safety Analysis Report as supplemented and amended, and the Environmental Report as supplemented and amended.
- B. Subject to the conditions and requirements incorporated herein, the Commission hereby licenses:
- (1) Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California, and the City of Anaheim, California to possess the facility at the designated location in San Diego County, California, in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this license;
 - (2) Southern California Edison Company (SCE), pursuant to Section 103 of the Act and 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities", to possess, use, and operate the facility at the designated location in San Diego County, California, in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this license;
 - (3) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended;
 - (4) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibrations, and as fission detectors in amounts as required;

- (5) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and
 - (6) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. Transshipment of Unit 1 fuel between Units 1 and 2 shall be in accordance with SCE letters to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated March 11, March 18 and March 23, 1988, and in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 10 CFR Part 71.
- C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
- (1) Maximum Power Level

Southern California Edison Company (SCE) is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of full power (3390 megawatts thermal).
 - (2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 177, are hereby incorporated in the license. SCE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
 - (3) Antitrust Conditions

SCE shall comply with the antitrust conditions delineated in Appendix C to this license.
 - (4) Intentionally Deleted

* The parenthetical notation following the title of many license conditions denotes the section of the Safety Evaluation Report and/or its supplements wherein the license condition is discussed.

(5) Environmental Qualification (Section 3.11, SER, SSER #3, SSER #4)

This paragraph intentionally deleted.

(6) High Burnup Fission Gas Release (Section 4.2.2.2, SER)

Prior to beginning the cycle of reactor operation during which peak fuel pellet burnups will achieve greater than 20,000 megawatt days per metric ton of uranium SCE shall provide revised analyses using fission gas release models acceptable to the NRC staff.

(7) Low Temperature Overpressurization Protection (Section 5.2.2.2, SER)

Prior to operation for more than five (5) effective full power years, SCE shall provide a report describing its reexamination of the Technical Specification requirements for steam generator/RCS delta T and SDCS initiation temperature limits. The report must either demonstrate that the current Technical Specification limits are still suitably conservative, or propose and justify revised limits.

(8) Control Room Pressurization Capability (Section 6.4, SER, SSER #5)

By November 1, 1982, SCE shall complete the modifications required to achieve a positive pressure of 1/8" water gauge in the control room. Tests shall be performed on the modified system to verify the 1/8" positive pressure.

(9) Seismic Trip System (Section 7.2.5, SSER #4)

Prior to initially exceeding five (5) percent power, the seismic trip system shall be operable.

(10) Volume Control Tank Control Logic (Section 7.3.5, SSER #4)

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the volume control tank outlet valve control logic shall be modified to ensure that the valve does not change position following safety injection actuation signal reset.

(11) Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Section 7.5.1, SER, SSER #5)

By May 15, 1982, SCE shall submit a proposal, including a proposed implementation schedule, for meeting Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97.

(12) Control System Failures (Section 7.7, SSER #4)

- a. By April 1, 1983, SCE shall provide an evaluation of control system failures caused by high energy line break, and by failures of any power sources, sensor, or sensor impulse lines which provide power or signals to two or more control systems. Implementation of any corrective action resulting from this evaluation shall be completed on a schedule acceptable to the NRC.

(13) Diesel Generator Modifications (Section 8.3.1, SER)

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage. SCE shall install a heavy duty turbocharger gear drive assembly on the emergency diesel generators.

(14) Fire Protection (Section 9.5.1, SER, SSER #4, SSER #5, Section 1.12, SSER #5; SE dated November 15, 1982; Revision 1 to Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Evaluation dated June 29, 1988)

SCE shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. This program shall be (1) as described in the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis through Revision 3 as revised by letters to the NRC dated May 31, July 22, and November 20, 1987 and January 21, February 22, and April 21, 1988; and (2) as approved in the NRC staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-0712) dated February 1981; Supplements 4 and 5 to the SER, dated January 1982 and February 1982, respectively; and the safety evaluation dated November 15, 1982; as supplemented and amended by the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Evaluation for San Onofre 2 and 3, Revision 1 dated June 29, 1988. SCE may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

(15) Turbine Disc Inspection (Section 10.2.2, SER)

Prior to startup following the second refueling outage, the bores of the low pressure turbine disc shall be inspected for ultrasonic indications.

(16) Radioactive Waste System (Section 11.1, SER, SSER #5)

"Wet" solid radwaste shall not be shipped from the facility until the NRC has approved the waste solidification Process Control Program.

(17) Purge System Monitors (Section 11.3, SER, SSER #5)

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, equipment having the capability to continuously monitor and sample the containment purge exhaust directly from the purge stack shall be operable.

(18) Initial Test Program (Section 14, SER)

SCE shall conduct the post-fuel loading initial test program (set forth in Section 14 of the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended) without making any major modifications to this program unless such modifications have been identified and have received prior NRC approval. Major modifications are defined as:

- a. Elimination of any test identified in Section 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, as being essential.

- b. Modification of test objectives, methods, or acceptance criteria for any test identified in Section 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, as being essential.
- c. Performance of any test at a power level different than that described in the test procedure.
- d. Failure to complete any tests included in the described program (planned or scheduled for power levels up to the authorized power level).

(19) NUREG-0737 Conditions (Section 22)

Each of the following conditions shall be completed to the satisfaction of the NRC. Each item references the related subpart of Section 22 of the SER and/or its supplements.

a. Shift Technical Advisor (I.A.1.1, SSER #1)

SCE shall provide a fully trained on-shift technical advisor to the shift supervisor (watch engineer).

b. Shift Manning (I.A.1.3, SSER #1, SSER #5)

Deleted.

c. Independent Safety Engineering Group (1.B.1.2, SSER #1)

SCE shall have an on-site independent safety engineering group.

d. Procedures for Transients and Accidents (I.C.1, SSER #1, SSER #2, SSER #5)

By May 1, 1982, SCE shall provide emergency procedure guidelines. Emergency procedures based on guidelines approved by the NRC shall be implemented prior to startup following the first refueling outage.

e. Procedures for Verifying Correct Performance of Operating Activities (I.C.6, SSER #1)

Prior to fuel loading, SCE shall implement a system for verifying the correct performance of operating activities, and shall keep the system in effect thereafter.

f. Control Room Design Review (I.D.1, SSER #1)

Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall:

1. Prioritize the control room annunciator windows.
2. Delete master acknowledge capabilities of the annunciator system.
3. Incorporate a second flash note/audible scheme into the annunciator system to alert the operator of an alarm returned to normal.

4. Identify changes required to correct control room lighting for optimum operator performance.
5. Revise control room labeling according to a hierarchical scheme.
6. Label Foxboro containment spray controller.
7. Replace RC loop hot leg temperature scales with appropriate scale divisions.
8. Eliminate 10X multiplier from RC loop hot leg and cold leg temperature.
9. Make all labels flush with the face of the instrument bezel.
10. Incorporate normal and abnormal operating range indications on applicable instruments.
11. Replace Dymo tape with permanent labels or markers.
12. Color code all component bezels.
13. Add channel identification to emergency feedwater controls.
14. Label dual function vertical scales to identify each scale.
15. Provide increase/decrease labels for the containment spray chemical controllers.
16. Incorporate the requirement to replace burned-out lamps in the procedures.
17. Add phone jacks to the control room back-panel areas.

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall complete the changes required to correct control room lighting for optimum operator performance.

g. Special Low Power Testing and Training (I.G.1, SSER #1)

By April 16, 1982, SCE shall provide detailed test procedures and a safety analysis.

h. Reactor Coolant System Vents (II.B .1), SSER #1 , SSER #4)

By May 1, 1982, SCE shall provide procedures or procedure guidelines for reactor coolant gas vent system operation and testing.

i. Post-Accident Sampling System (NUREG-0737 Item II.B.3)

The PASS shall be operable and the post-accident sampling program shall be implemented as described in the SCE letter of April 14, 1983, and revised by SCE letter of October 2, 1992.

j. Safety Valve Test Requirements (II.D.1, SSER #1)

SCE shall conform to the results of the EPRI test program. By April 1, 1982, SCE shall provide confirmation of the adequacy of the San Onofre 2 RCS safety valves based on a preliminary review of generic test program results. By July 1, 1982, SCE shall provide evidence supported by test of safety valve functionality for expected operating and accident (non-ATWS) conditions. The testing shall demonstrate that the valves will open and reclose under the expected flow conditions. By July 1, 1982, SCE shall provide an evaluation of the adequacy of the associated piping and supports at San Onofre 2.

k. Direct Indication of Safety Valve Position (II.D.3, SSER #1)

Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, the safety valve position indication system shall be environmentally and seismically qualified consistent with the component or system to which it is attached, and documentation of this shall be provided.

l. AFW Pump 48-hour Endurance Test (II.E.1.1, SSER #1)

Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall conduct a 48-hour endurance test of all auxiliary feedwater pumps.

m. Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer Heaters (II.E.3.1, SSER #1, SSER #5)

Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall implement procedures to preclude the automatic reapplication of pressurizer heaters to Class IE buses upon SIAS reset.

n. Additional Monitoring Instrumentation (II.F.1, SSER #1, SSER #4)

Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, the mid/high range noble gas monitors and iodine and particulate isokinetic samplers shall be operable.

o. ICC Instrumentation (II.F.2, SSER #1, SSER #2, SSER #4)

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the following items shall be completed:

1. The subcooling monitors shall be modified to include the maximum unheated junction thermocouple temperature and the representative core exit thermocouple input.
2. Incore detector assemblies (core exit thermocouples and associated cabling) shall be environmentally qualified and shall have seismic and environmentally qualified Class IE connectors.
3. Qualified cables shall be installed for the core exit thermocouples.

4. A safety parameter display system shall be provided.
5. The heated junction thermocouple probe and associated process instrumentation shall be installed.

p. Voiding in the Reactor Coolant System (II.K.2.17, SSER #1, SSER #5)

By May 1, 1982, SCE shall provide the results of the Combustion Engineering Owners Group analysis of the potential for RCS voiding during anticipated transients.

q. Revised Model for Small-Break LOCAs (II.K.3.30, SSER #1, SSER #4, SSER #5)

By May 1, 1982, SCE shall provide the results of the Combustion Engineering Owners Group effort on model justification or a revised analytical model.

r. Plant-Specific Calculations for Compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.46 (II.K.3.31), SSER #1)

Within one year after model revisions are approved by the NRC, SCE shall provide a supplemental plant-specific analysis to verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.46, using the revised models developed under item II.K.3.30.

s. Improving Licensee Emergency Preparedness (III.A.2, SSER#1, SSER #5)

1. By April 1, 1982, SCE shall provide a functional description of the upgraded emergency support facilities. (Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility).
2. By January 1, 1983, the upgraded emergency support facilities shall be operational.
3. SCE shall maintain interim emergency support facilities (Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility) until the upgraded facilities are completed.

(20) Surveillance Program (Section 1.12, SSER #5)

Prior to entering any operational mode for the first time, including initial fuel loading, SCE shall:

- a. Have completed a review of the surveillance procedures applicable to the change of mode, and determined that the procedures demonstrate the operability of the required systems With respect to all acceptance criteria defined in the Technical Specifications.

- b. Have dispatched written certification to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region V, that the actions defined in a, above, have been completed for the mode or modes to be entered.

(21) Laboratory Instrumentation (Section 1.12, SSER #5)

Prior to initial entry into operating Mode 2, the laboratory instrumentation described in Sections 11.5.2.2.2 and 12.5.2.2.1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report shall be calibrated and shall be capable of analyzing sample types and geometries necessary to support facility operation. In addition, at that time there shall also be approved, written procedures governing laboratory operations and analyses.

(22) Design Verification Program (Section 3.7.4, SSER #5)

Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall provide the final report of the Design Verification Program being conducted by the General Atomic Company, and NRC approval of the results must be obtained.

(23) Emergency Preparedness Conditions

- a. Conditions of ASLB Initial Decision of May 14, 1982

Within five (5) months of initially exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall:

- i. Demonstrate that both meteorological towers and the Health Physics Computer System are fully installed and operational. SCE shall maintain offsite assessment and monitoring capabilities, essentially as described in the hearing (See Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D1.12, pp. 136-140), at no less than that level of readiness, pending development of satisfactory capability of offsite response organizations (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.27, pp. 145-146, and Section V, Paragraph B, pp. 213-214).
- ii. Provide an assessment of whether public information regarding emergency planning should also be presented in Spanish (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph F.32, pp. 168, and Section V, Paragraph C.2, pp. 215).
- iii. Provide revised plans demonstrating that the "extended" Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) concept has been deleted from the San Onofre onsite and offsite plans and the Plume Exposure Pathway EFZ boundary has been extended, along with siren coverage, to Dana Point and all of San Juan Capistrano (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.25, pp. 98, and Section V, Paragraph C.5, pp. 216; see also Order (making Clarifying Change in Initial Decision) dated May 25, 1982).

b. Completion of Emergency Preparedness Requirements

In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of the procedures in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's proposed rules, 44 CFR 350, is an indication that a major substantive problem exists in achieving or maintaining an adequate state of preparedness, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(s) (2) will apply.

c. Condition of ASLB of February 1, 1983 (Medical Services)

By September 17, 1983, or six months from the date that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issues its determination of the medical services questions certified by it, whichever is the shorter period of time, SCE shall demonstrate that SCE and offsite jurisdictions have developed and stand ready to implement arrangements for medical services as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (12) (See Initial Decision, Section III, pp. 43-47, and Section V Paragraph D. pp. 216-217, and Stipulation and Order Modifying License Condition, February 1, 1983).

d. Conditions of ALAB-717, March 4, 1983

- i. By July 2, 1983, SCE shall provide evidence that it has undertaken further efforts to assemble and to keep current as reasonably complete a list as possible of housebound people within the plume emergency planning zone who would require transportation assistance in the event of an evacuation.
- ii. By July 2, 1983, SCE shall provide evidence that a training program has been developed and initiated to assist Orange County Transit District bus drivers in the discharge of their responsibilities in the event of a radiological emergency at San Onofre.

(24) RCS Depressurization System (PORV's)

By June 30, 1983, SCE shall provide a complete response to the NRC letter of March 27, 1982, requesting additional information relative to the capability of San Onofre 2 and 3 for rapid depressurization and decay heat removal without power operating relief valves (PORV's).

(25) Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Bearings

By October 30, 1982, SCE shall submit a proposed hardware modification and schedule for implementation that will increase the reliability of the AFW motor-driven pumps in the event of a break in the high energy line feeding the steam-driven pump. In the interim, prior to the installation of a hardware modification acceptable to the NRC staff, SCE shall perform an augmented in-service inspection of the steam line in accordance with SCE's letter of July 12, 1982.

- D. Exemptions to certain requirements of Appendices G, H and J to 10 CFR Part 50 are described in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Safety Evaluation Report. These exemptions are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, these exemptions are hereby granted. The facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission.
- E. SCE shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plans, which may contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled: "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Physical Security Plan," with revisions submitted through April 22, 1988; "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Security Force Training and Qualification Plan," with revisions submitted through October 22, 1986; and "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Safeguards Contingency Plan," with revisions submitted through December 29, 1987. Changes made in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 shall be implemented in accordance with the schedule set forth therein.
- F. This license is subject to the following additional condition for the protection of the environment:
- Before engaging in activities that may result in a significant adverse environmental impact that was not evaluated or that is significantly greater than that evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement, SCE shall provide a written notification of such activities to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and receive written approval from that office before proceeding with such activities.
- G. SCE shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, items C(1), C(3) through C(13), C(15) through C(22), and F of this license within 24 hours by telephone and confirm by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV, or his designee, no later than the first working day following the violation, with a written followup report within fourteen (14) days.
- H. SCE shall notify the Commission, as soon as possible but not later than one hour, of any accident at this facility which could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products in excess of allowable limits for normal operation established by the Commission.

* On September 29, 1983, the Safeguards Contingency Plan was made a separate, companion document to the Physical Security Plan pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54.

- I. SCE shall have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.
- J. This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on February 16, 2022.

Attachment B
(Existing Facility Operating License)
SONGS Unit 3

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY
THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA
THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-362

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNIT 3

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

License No. NPF-15

Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 was issued to the Southern California Edison Company, the San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California, and the City of Anaheim, California to read as follows:

- A. This license applies to the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3, a pressurized water nuclear reactor and associated equipment (the facility), owned by the licensees. The facility is located in San Diego County, California, and is described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, through Amendment 30, and the Environmental Report, as amended, through Amendment 6.
- B. Subject to the conditions and requirements incorporated herein, the Commission hereby licenses:
 - (1) Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California, and the City of Anaheim, California to possess the facility at the designated location in San Diego County, California, in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this license;
 - (2) Southern California Edison Company (SCE), pursuant to Section 103 of the Act and 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," to possess, use, and operate the facility at the designated location in San Diego County, California in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this license.
 - (3) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended;
 - (4) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required;

- (5) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and
 - (6) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 3. Transshipment of Unit 1 fuel between Units 1 and 3 shall be in accordance with SCE letters to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated March 11, March 18 and March 23, 1988, and in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 10 CFR Part 71.
- C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
- (1) Maximum Power Level

Southern California Edison Company (SCE) is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of full power (3390 megawatts thermal).
 - (2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 168, are hereby incorporated in the license. SCE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
 - (3) Antitrust Conditions

SCE shall comply with the antitrust conditions delineated in Appendix C to this license.
 - (4) Intentionally Deleted
 - (5) Environmental Qualification (Section 3.11, SER, SSER #3, SSER #4)

This paragraph intentionally deleted.

The parenthetical notation following the title of many license conditions denotes the section of the Safety Evaluation Report and/or its supplements wherein the license condition is discussed.

(6) High Burnup Fission Gas Release (Section 4.2.2.2, SER)

Prior to beginning the cycle of reactor operation during which peak fuel pellet burnups will achieve greater than 200,000 megawatt days per metric ton of uranium, SCE shall provide revised analyses using fission gas release models acceptable to the NRC staff.

(7) Low Temperature Overpressurization Protection (Section 5.2.2.2, SER)

Prior to operation for more than five (5) effective full power years, SCE shall provide a report describing its reexamination of the Technical Specification requirements for steam generator/reactor coolant system delta temperature and shutdown cooling system initiation temperature limits that are presently provided for overpressure protection. The report must either demonstrate that the current Technical Specification limits are still suitably conservative, or propose and justify revised limits.

(8) Volume Control Tank Control Logic (Section 7.3.5, SSER #4)

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the volume control tank outlet valve control logic shall be modified to ensure that the valve does not change position following safety injection actuation signal reset. In the interim, SCE shall maintain emergency procedures that require the volume control tank outlet valve to be placed in the manual mode prior to SIAS reset.

(9) Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Section 7.5.1, SER, SSER #5)

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall comply with the recommendations of Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," as described in the SCE letter of May 13, 1982.

(10) Control System Failures (Section 7.7, SER, SSER #4)

By April 1, 1983, SCE shall provide an evaluation, for NRC staff review and approval, of control system failures caused by high energy line break, and by failures of any power sources, sensors, or sensor impulse lines which provide power or signals to two or more control systems. Implementation of any corrective action resulting from this evaluation shall be completed on a schedule acceptable to the NRC.

(11) Diesel Generator Modifications (Section 8.3.1, SER)

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage. SCE shall install a heavy duty turbocharger gear drive assembly on the emergency diesel generators.

- (12) Fire Protection (Section 9.5.1, SER, SSER #4, SSER #5, Section 1.12, SSER #5; SE dated November 15, 1982; Revision 1 to Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Evaluation dated June 29, 1988)

SCE shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. This program shall be (1) as described in the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis through Revision 3 as revised by letters to the NRC dated May 31, July 22, and November 20, 1987 and January 21, February 22, and April 21, 1988; and (2) as approved in the NRC staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-0712) dated February 1981; Supplements 4 and 5 to the SER, dated January 1982 and February 1982, respectively; and the safety evaluation dated November 15, 1982; as supplemented and amended by the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Evaluation for San Onofre 2 and 3, Revision 1 dated June 29, 1988. SCE may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

- (13) Turbine Disc Inspection (Section 10.2.2, SER)

Prior to startup following the second refueling outage, the bores of the low pressure turbine disc shall be inspected for flaws using ultrasonic testing. The results of the inspection shall be submitted to the NRC staff.

- (14) Radioactive Waste System (Section 11.1, SER, SSER #5)

"Wet" solid radwaste shall not be shipped from the facility until the NRC has approved the waste solidification Process Control Program.

- (15) Purge System Monitors (Section 11.3, SER, SSER #5)

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, equipment having the capability to continuously monitor and sample the containment purge exhaust directly from the purge stack shall be operable.

- (16) Initial Test Program (Section 14, SER)

SCE shall conduct the post-fuel loading initial test program (set forth in Section 14 of the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, through Amendment 30) without making any major modifications to this program unless such modifications have been identified and have received prior NRC approval. Major modifications are defined as:

- a. Elimination of any test identified in Section 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, as being essential.
- b. Modification of test objectives, methods, or acceptance criteria for any test identified in Section 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, as being essential.
- c. Performance of any test at a power level different than that described in the test procedure.

- d. Failure to complete any tests included in the described program (planned or scheduled for power levels up to the authorized power level).

(17) NUREG-0737 Conditions (Section 22)

Each of the following conditions shall be completed to the satisfaction of the NRC. Each item references the related subpart of Section 22 of the SER and/or its supplements.

- a. Procedures for Transients and Accidents (I.C.1, SSER #1, SSER #2, SSER #5)

Emergency procedures based on guidelines approved by the NRC shall be implemented prior to startup following the first refueling outage that occurs six months or more after NRC approval of the guidelines.

- b. Procedures for Verifying Correct Performance of Operating Activities (I.C.6, SSER #1)

Prior to fuel loading, SCE shall implement a system for verifying the correct performance of operating activities, and shall keep the System in effect thereafter.

- c. Control Room Design Review (I.D.1, SSER #1)

The control room modifications identified as required in Section 22, Item I.D.1 of Supplement No. 1 to the SER shall be installed and made operational on the schedules identified for each modification in Supplement No. 1 to the SER.

- d. Post Accident Sampling System (NUREG-0737 Item II.B.3)

The PASS shall be operable and the post-accident sampling program shall be implemented as described in the SCE letter of April 14, 1983, and revised by SCE letter of October 2, 1992.

- e. Direct Indication of Safety Valve Position (II.D.3, SSER #1)

The safety valve position indication system shall be environmentally and seismically qualified consistent with the component or system to which it is attached, and documentation of this shall be maintained.

- f. AFW Pump 48-hour Endurance Test (II.E.1.1, SSER #11)

Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall conduct a 48-hour endurance test of all auxiliary feedwater pumps. The results of the test shall be submitted to the NRC staff.

g. Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer Heaters (II.E.3.1, SSER #1, SSER #5)

SCE shall maintain in effect procedures to preclude the automatic reapplication of pressurizer heaters to Class IE buses upon SIAS reset.

h. ICC Instrumentation (II.F.2, SSER #1, SSER #2, SSER #4)

Prior to fuel loading, the following items shall be completed, and shall be maintained thereafter:

1. The subcooling monitors shall be modified to include the maximum unheated junction thermocouple temperature and the representative core exit thermocouple input.
2. Incore detector assemblies (core exit thermocouples and associated cabling) shall be environmentally qualified and shall have seismic and environmentally qualified Class IE connectors.
3. Qualified cables shall be installed for the core exit thermocouples.
4. The heated junction thermocouple probe and associated process instrumentation shall be installed.

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the heated junction thermocouple system and the safety parameter display system shall be operable and shall be maintained operable thereafter.

i. Plant-Specific Calculations for Compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.46 (II.K.3.31, SSER #1)

Within one year after model revisions are approved by the NRC, SCE shall provide a supplemental plant-specific analysis to verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.46, using the revised models developed under Item II.K.3.30.

j. Improving Licensee Emergency Preparedness (III.A.2, SSER #1, SSER #5)

1. By January 1, 1983, the upgraded emergency support facilities shall be operational.
2. SCE shall maintain interim emergency support facilities (Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility) until the upgraded facilities are completed.

(18) Emergency Preparedness Conditions

a. Conditions of ASLB Initial Decision of May 14, 1982

By February 17, 1983, SCE shall:

1. Provide evidence that both meteorological towers and the Health Physics Computer System are fully installed and operational. SCE shall maintain offsite assessment and monitoring capabilities, essentially as described in the hearing (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.1-12, pp. 136-140), at no less than that level of readiness, pending development of satisfactory capability of offsite response Paragraph D.27, pp. 145-146, Section V, Paragraph B, pp. 213-214).
2. Provide an assessment of whether public information regarding emergency planning should also be presented in Spanish (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph F.32, pp. 168, and Section V, Paragraph C.2, pp. 215).
3. Provide revised plans demonstrating that the "extended" Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) concept has been deleted from the San Onofre onsite and offsite plans and the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ boundary has been extended, along with siren coverage, to Dana Point and all of San Juan Capistrano (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.25, pp. 98, and Section V, Paragraph C.5, pp. 216; see also Order (Making Clarifying Change in Initial Decision) dated May 25, 1982).

b. Completion of Emergency Preparedness Requirements

In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of the procedures in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's proposed rules, 44 CFR 350, is an indication that a major substantive problem exists in achieving or maintaining an adequate state of preparedness, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(s) (2) will apply.

c. Deleted Amendment No. 8 dated September 16, 1983

d. Conditions of ALAB 717, March 4, 1983

- i. By July 2, 1983, SCE shall provide evidence that it has undertaken further efforts to assemble and to keep current as reasonably complete a list as possible of housebound people within the plume emergency planning zone who would require transportation assistance in the event of an evacuation.
- ii. By July 2, 1983, SCE shall provide evidence that a training program has been developed and initiated to assist Orange County Transit District bus drivers in the discharge of their responsibilities in the event of a radiological emergency at San Onofre.

(19) RCS Depressurization System (PORV's)

By June 30, 1983, SCE shall provide a complete response to the NRC letter of March 27, 1982, including information relative to the capability of San Onofre 3 for rapid depressurization and decay heat removal without power operated relief valves (PORVs).

(20) Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Motor Bearings

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall install and make operational the lubrication oil cooling system for the auxiliary feedwater pump motor bearings described in SCE's letter of March 7, 1983. Prior to installation of the lube oil cooling system, SCE shall perform daily visual inspection of the steam lines in the AFW pump room in accordance with SCE's letter of July 12, 1982.

(21) Surveillance Program (Section 1.12, SSER #5)

Prior to entering any operational mode for the first time, including initial fuel loading, SCE shall:

- a. Have completed a review of the surveillance procedures applicable to the change of mode, and determined that the procedures demonstrate the operability of the required systems with respect to all acceptance criteria defined in the Technical Specifications.
- b. Have dispatched written certification to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region V, that the actions defined in (a), above, have been completed for the mode or modes to be entered.

(22) Auxiliary Building Ventilation System.

SCE shall complete all modifications to the auxiliary building ventilation system described in the November 5, 1982 letter from H. Ray, SCE, to R. Engelken, NRC, on the schedule proposed in the November 5, 1982 letter.

(23) Fuel Assembly Shoulder Gap Clearance (SCE letter of July 25, 1983)

Prior to entering Startup (Mode 2) after each refueling, SCE shall either provide a report that demonstrates that the existing fuel element assembly (FEA) has sufficient available shoulder gap clearance for at least the next cycle of operation, or identify to the NRC and implement a modified FEA design that has adequate shoulder gap clearance for at least the next cycle of operation. The commitment will apply until the NRC concurs that the shoulder gap clearance provided is adequate for the design life of the fuel.

(24) Isolation Capability for Primary EOF

By January 1, 1984 the primary EOF ventilation system shall be modified to provide isolation capability as described in the SCE letter of July 22, 1983.

(25) Correction of CPC Software Error

At the first outage of sufficient duration (7 days in Mode 5) after February 2, 1984, SCE shall correct the software error in the Core Protection Calculators discussed in the SCE letters dated March 7, 1893 and July 22, 1983.

- (26) Until the first refueling outage, SCE shall provide a monthly report describing any occurrences resulting in the degradation (including, but not limited to component failures, maintenance errors, and operator errors) of the auxiliary feedwater system. The report shall identify the cause of such occurrences. The report does not relieve the licensee from any existing requirements for Licensee Event Reports (LERs).

- D. Exemptions to certain requirements of Appendices G, H and J to 10 CFR Part 50 are described in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Safety Evaluation Report. These exemptions are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, these exemptions are hereby granted. The facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission.
- E. SCE shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plans, which may contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled: "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Physical Security Plan," with revisions submitted through April 22, 1988; "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Security Force Training and Qualification Plan," with revisions submitted through October 22, 1986; and "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Safeguards Contingency Plan," with revisions submitted through December 29, 1987. Changes made in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 shall be implemented in accordance with the schedule set forth therein.
- F. This license is subject to the following additional condition for the protection of the environment:
- Before engaging in activities that may result in a significant adverse environmental impact that was not evaluated or that is significantly greater than that evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement, SCE shall provide a written notification of such activities to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and receive written approval from that office before proceeding with such activities.

* On September 29, 1983, the Safeguards Contingency Plan was made a separate, companion document to the Physical Security Plan pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54.

- G. SCE shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, items C(1), C(3) through C(11), C(13) through C(22), and F of this license within 24 hours by telephone and confirm by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV, or his designee, no later than the first working day following the violation, with a written followup report within fourteen (14) days.
- H. SCE shall notify the commission, as soon as possible but not later than one hour, of any accident at this facility which could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products in excess of allowable limits for normal operation established by the Commission.
- I. SCE shall have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.
- J. This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on November 15, 2022.
- K. In accordance with the Commission's direction in its Statement of Policy, Licensing and Regulatory Policy and Procedures for Environmental Protection; Uranium Fuel Cycle Impacts, October 29, 1982, this license is subject to the final resolution of the pending litigation involving Table S-3. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, No. 74-1586 (D. C. Cir., April 27, 1982).

ATTACHMENT 1
TO
NPF-15

The following item must be completed prior to initial criticality:

The deficiency identified by the SCE letter, dated July 19, 1982, to R.H. Engelken from Dr. L.T. Papay regarding discrepant inputs to the Core Protection Calculator from Reactor Coolant Pump shaft speed and Control Element Assembly position indication shall be corrected.

Attachment C

**(Proposed Amendments to Facility Operating License)
(Redline and Strikeout)**

SONGS Unit 2

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA
THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-361

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 2

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

License No NPF-10

Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 was issued to the Southern California Edison Company, the San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California and the City of Anaheim, California to read as follows:

- A. This license applies to the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, a pressurized water nuclear reactor and associated equipment (the facility), owned by the licensees. The facility is located in San Diego County, California, and is described in The Final Safety Analysis Report as supplemented and amended, and the Environmental Report as supplemented and amended.
- B. Subject to the conditions and requirements incorporated herein, the Commission hereby licenses:
- (1) Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California, and the City of Anaheim, California to possess the facility at the designated location in San Diego County, California, in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this license;
 - (2) Southern California Edison Company (SCE), pursuant to Section 103 of the Act and 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities", to possess, use, and operate the facility at the designated location in San Diego County, California, in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this license;
 - (3) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended;
 - (4) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibrations, and as fission detectors in amounts as required;

- (5) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and
 - (6) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. Transshipment of Unit 1 fuel between Units 1 and 2 shall be in accordance with SCE letters to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated March 11, March 18 and March 23, 1988, and in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 10 CFR Part 71.
- C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
- (1) Maximum Power Level

Southern California Edison Company (SCE) is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of full power (3390 megawatts thermal).
 - (2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 177, are hereby incorporated in the license. SCE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
 - (3) Antitrust Conditions

SCE shall comply with the antitrust conditions delineated in Appendix C to this license.
 - ~~(4) Intentionally Deleted~~

* The parenthetical notation following the title of many license conditions denotes the section of the Safety Evaluation Report and/or its supplements wherein the license condition is discussed.

~~(5) Environmental Qualification (Section 3.11, SER, SSER #3, SSER #4)~~

~~This paragraph intentionally deleted.~~

~~(6) High Burnup Fission Gas Release (Section 4.2.2.2, SER)~~

~~Prior to beginning the cycle of reactor operation during which peak fuel pellet burnups will achieve greater than 20,000 megawatt days per metric ton of uranium SCE shall provide revised analyses using fission gas release models acceptable to the NRC staff.~~

~~(7) Low Temperature Overpressurization Protection (Section 5.2.2.2, SER)~~

~~Prior to operation for more than five (5) effective full power years, SCE shall provide a report describing its reexamination of the Technical Specification requirements for steam generator/RCS delta T and SDCS initiation temperature limits. The report must either demonstrate that the current Technical Specification limits are still suitably conservative, or propose and justify revised limits.~~

~~(8) Control Room Pressurization Capability (Section 6.4, SER, SSER #5)~~

~~By November 1, 1982, SCE shall complete the modifications required to achieve a positive pressure of 1/8" water gauge in the control room. Tests shall be performed on the modified system to verify the 1/8" positive pressure.~~

~~(9) Seismic Trip System (Section 7.2.5, SSER #4)~~

~~Prior to initially exceeding five (5) percent power, the seismic trip system shall be operable.~~

~~(10) Volume Control Tank Control Logic (Section 7.3.5, SSER #4)~~

~~Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the volume control tank outlet valve control logic shall be modified to ensure that the valve does not change position following safety injection actuation signal reset.~~

~~(11) Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Section 7.5.1, SER, SSER #5)~~

~~By May 15, 1982, SCE shall submit a proposal, including a proposed implementation schedule, for meeting Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97.~~

~~(12) Control System Failures (Section 7.7, SSER #4)~~

~~a. By April 1, 1983, SCE shall provide an evaluation of control system failures caused by high energy line break, and by failures of any power sources, sensor, or sensor impulse lines which provide power or signals to two or more control systems. Implementation of any corrective action resulting from this evaluation shall be completed on a schedule acceptable to the NRC.~~

~~(13) Diesel Generator Modifications (Section 8.3.1, SER)~~

~~Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall install a heavy duty turbocharger gear drive assembly on the emergency diesel generators.~~

~~(14) Fire Protection (Section 9.5.1, SER, SSER #4, SSER #5, Section 1.12, SSER #5; SE dated November 15, 1982; Revision 1 to Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Evaluation dated June 29, 1988)~~

SCE shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. This program shall be (1) as described in the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis through Revision 3 as revised by letters to the NRC dated May 31, July 22, and November 20, 1987 and January 21, February 22, and April 21, 1988; and (2) as approved in the NRC staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-0712) dated February 1981; Supplements 4 and 5 to the SER, dated January 1982 and February 1982, respectively; and the safety evaluation dated November 15, 1982; as supplemented and amended by the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Evaluation for San Onofre 2 and 3, Revision 1 dated June 29, 1988. SCE may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

~~(15) Turbine Disc Inspection (Section 10.2.2, SER)~~

~~Prior to startup following the second refueling outage, the bores of the low pressure turbine disc shall be inspected for ultrasonic indications.~~

~~(16) Radioactive Waste System (Section 11.1, SER, SSER #5)~~

~~"Wet" solid radwaste shall not be shipped from the facility until the NRC has approved the waste solidification Process Control Program.~~

~~(17) Purge System Monitors (Section 11.3, SER, SSER #5)~~

~~Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, equipment having the capability to continuously monitor and sample the containment purge exhaust directly from the purge stack shall be operable.~~

~~(18) Initial Test Program (Section 14, SER)~~

~~SCE shall conduct the post-fuel loading initial test program (set forth in Section 14 of the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended) without making any major modifications to this program unless such modifications have been identified and have received prior NRC approval. Major modifications are defined as:~~

- ~~a. Elimination of any test identified in Section 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, as being essential.~~

- ~~b. Modification of test objectives, methods, or acceptance criteria for any test identified in Section 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, as being essential.~~
- ~~c. Performance of any test at a power level different than that described in the test procedure.~~
- ~~d. Failure to complete any tests included in the described program (planned or scheduled for power levels up to the authorized power level).~~

~~(19) NUREG-0737 Conditions (Section 22)~~

~~Each of the following conditions shall be completed to the satisfaction of the NRC. Each item references the related subpart of Section 22 of the SER and/or its supplements.~~

~~a. Shift Technical Advisor (I.A.1.1, SSER #1)~~

~~SCE shall provide a fully trained on-shift technical advisor to the shift supervisor (watch engineer).~~

~~b. Shift Manning (I.A.1.3, SSER #1, SSER #5)~~

~~Deleted.~~

~~c. Independent Safety Engineering Group (1.B.1.2, SSER #1)~~

~~SCE shall have an on-site independent safety engineering group.~~

~~d. Procedures for Transients and Accidents (I.C.1, SSER #1, SSER #2, SSER #5)~~

~~By May 1, 1982, SCE shall provide emergency procedure guidelines. Emergency procedures based on guidelines approved by the NRC shall be implemented prior to startup following the first refueling outage.~~

~~e. Procedures for Verifying Correct Performance of Operating Activities (I.C.6, SSER #1)~~

~~Prior to fuel loading, SCE shall implement a system for verifying the correct performance of operating activities, and shall keep the system in effect thereafter.~~

~~f. Control Room Design Review (I.D.1, SSER #1)~~

~~Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall:~~

- ~~1. Prioritize the control room annunciator windows.~~
- ~~2. Delete master acknowledge capabilities of the annunciator system.~~
- ~~3. Incorporate a second flash note/audible scheme into the annunciator system to alert the operator of an alarm returned to normal.~~

- ~~4. Identify changes required to correct control room lighting for optimum operator performance.~~
 - ~~5. Revise control room labeling according to a hierarchical scheme.~~
 - ~~6. Label Foxboro containment spray controller.~~
 - ~~7. Replace RC loop hot leg temperature scales with appropriate scale divisions.~~
 - ~~8. Eliminate 10X multiplier from RC loop hot leg and cold leg temperature.~~
 - ~~9. Make all labels flush with the face of the instrument bezel.~~
 - ~~10. Incorporate normal and abnormal operating range indications on applicable instruments.~~
 - ~~11. Replace Dymo tape with permanent labels or markers.~~
 - ~~12. Color code all component bezels.~~
 - ~~13. Add channel identification to emergency feedwater controls.~~
 - ~~14. Label dual function vertical scales to identify each scale.~~
 - ~~15. Provide increase/decrease labels for the containment spray chemical controllers.~~
 - ~~16. Incorporate the requirement to replace burned-out lamps in the procedures.~~
 - ~~17. Add phone jacks to the control room back-panel areas.~~
- ~~Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall complete the changes required to correct control room lighting for optimum operator performance.~~
- ~~g. Special Low Power Testing and Training (I.G.1, SSER #1)~~
- ~~By April 16, 1982, SCE shall provide detailed test procedures and a safety analysis.~~
- ~~h. Reactor Coolant System Vents (II.B.1), SSER #1, SSER #4)~~
- ~~By May 1, 1982, SCE shall provide procedures or procedure guidelines for reactor coolant gas vent system operation and testing.~~
- ~~i. Post-Accident Sampling System (NUREG-0737 Item II.B.3)~~
- ~~The PASS shall be operable and the post-accident sampling program shall be implemented as described in the SCE letter of April 14, 1983, and revised by SCE letter of October 2, 1992.~~

~~j. Safety Valve Test Requirements (II.D.1, SSER #1)~~

~~SCE shall conform to the results of the EPRI test program. By April 1, 1982, SCE shall provide confirmation of the adequacy of the San Onofre 2 RCS safety valves based on a preliminary review of generic test program results. By July 1, 1982, SCE shall provide evidence supported by test of safety valve functionality for expected operating and accident (non-ATWS) conditions. The testing shall demonstrate that the valves will open and reclose under the expected flow conditions. By July 1, 1982, SCE shall provide an evaluation of the adequacy of the associated piping and supports at San Onofre 2.~~

~~k. Direct Indication of Safety Valve Position (II.D.3, SSER #1)~~

~~Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, the safety valve position indication system shall be environmentally and seismically qualified consistent with the component or system to which it is attached, and documentation of this shall be provided.~~

~~l. AFW Pump 48-hour Endurance Test (II.E.1.1, SSER #1)~~

~~Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall conduct a 48-hour endurance test of all auxiliary feedwater pumps.~~

~~m. Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer Heaters (II.E.3.1, SSER #1, SSER #5)~~

~~Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall implement procedures to preclude the automatic reapplication of pressurizer heaters to Class IE buses upon SIAS reset.~~

~~n. Additional Monitoring Instrumentation (II.F.1, SSER #1, SSER #4)~~

~~Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, the mid/high range noble gas monitors and iodine and particulate isokinetic samplers shall be operable.~~

~~o. ICC Instrumentation (II.F.2, SSER #1, SSER #2, SSER #4)~~

~~Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the following items shall be completed:~~

- ~~1. The subcooling monitors shall be modified to include the maximum unheated junction thermocouple temperature and the representative core exit thermocouple input.~~
- ~~2. Incore detector assemblies (core exit thermocouples and associated cabling) shall be environmentally qualified and shall have seismic and environmentally qualified Class IE connectors.~~
- ~~3. Qualified cables shall be installed for the core exit thermocouples.~~

- ~~4. A safety parameter display system shall be provided.~~
- ~~5. The heated junction thermocouple probe and associated process instrumentation shall be installed.~~
- ~~p. Voiding in the Reactor Coolant System (II.K.2.17, SSER #1, SSER #5)~~
 - ~~By May 1, 1982, SCE shall provide the results of the Combustion Engineering Owners Group analysis of the potential for RCS voiding during anticipated transients.~~
- ~~q. Revised Model for Small-Break LOCAs (II.K.3.30, SSER #1, SSER #4, SSER #5)~~
 - ~~By May 1, 1982, SCE shall provide the results of the Combustion Engineering Owners Group effort on model justification or a revised analytical model.~~
- ~~r. Plant-Specific Calculations for Compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.46 (II.K.3.31), SSER #1)~~
 - ~~Within one year after model revisions are approved by the NRC, SCE shall provide a supplemental plant-specific analysis to verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.46, using the revised models developed under item II.K.3.30.~~
- ~~s. Improving Licensee Emergency Preparedness (III.A.2, SSER#1, SSER #5)~~
 - ~~1. By April 1, 1982, SCE shall provide a functional description of the upgraded emergency support facilities. (Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility).~~
 - ~~2. By January 1, 1983, the upgraded emergency support facilities shall be operational.~~
 - ~~3. SCE shall maintain interim emergency support facilities (Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility) until the upgraded facilities are completed.~~
- ~~(20) Surveillance Program (Section 1.12, SSER #5)~~
 - ~~Prior to entering any operational mode for the first time, including initial fuel loading, SCE shall:~~
 - ~~a. Have completed a review of the surveillance procedures applicable to the change of mode, and determined that the procedures demonstrate the operability of the required systems With respect to all acceptance criteria defined in the Technical Specifications.~~

- ~~b. Have dispatched written certification to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region V, that the actions defined in a, above, have been completed for the mode or modes to be entered.~~

~~(21) Laboratory Instrumentation (Section 1.12, SSER #5)~~

~~Prior to initial entry into operating Mode 2, the laboratory instrumentation described in Sections 11.5.2.2.2 and 12.5.2.2.1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report shall be calibrated and shall be capable of analyzing sample types and geometries necessary to support facility operation. In addition, at that time there shall also be approved, written procedures governing laboratory operations and analyses.~~

~~(22) Design Verification Program (Section 3.7.4, SSER #5)~~

~~Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall provide the final report of the Design Verification Program being conducted by the General Atomic Company, and NRC approval of the results must be obtained.~~

~~(23) Emergency Preparedness Conditions~~

- ~~a. Conditions of ASLB Initial Decision of May 14, 1982~~

~~Within five (5) months of initially exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall:~~

- ~~i. Demonstrate that both meteorological towers and the Health Physics Computer System are fully installed and operational. SCE shall maintain offsite assessment and monitoring capabilities, essentially as described in the hearing (See Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D1.12, pp. 136-140), at no less than that level of readiness, pending development of satisfactory capability of offsite response organizations (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.27, pp. 145-146, and Section V, Paragraph B, pp. 213-214).~~
- ~~ii. Provide an assessment of whether public information regarding emergency planning should also be presented in Spanish (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph F.32, pp. 168, and Section V, Paragraph C.2, pp. 215).~~
- ~~iii. Provide revised plans demonstrating that the "extended" Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) concept has been deleted from the San Onofre onsite and offsite plans and the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ boundary has been extended, along with siren coverage, to Dana Point and all of San Juan Capistrano (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.25, pp. 98, and Section V, Paragraph C.5, pp. 216; see also Order (making Clarifying Change in Initial Decision) dated May 25, 1982).~~

~~b. Completion of Emergency Preparedness Requirements~~

~~In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of the procedures in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's proposed rules, 44 CFR 350, is an indication that a major substantive problem exists in achieving or maintaining an adequate state of preparedness, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(s) (2) will apply.~~

~~c. Condition of ASLB of February 1, 1983 (Medical Services)~~

~~By September 17, 1983, or six months from the date that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issues its determination of the medical services questions certified by it, whichever is the shorter period of time, SCE shall demonstrate that SCE and offsite jurisdictions have developed and stand ready to implement arrangements for medical services as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (12) (See Initial Decision, Section III, pp. 43-47, and Section V Paragraph D. pp. 216-217, and Stipulation and Order Modifying License Condition, February 1, 1983).~~

~~d. Conditions of ALAB-717, March 4, 1983~~

~~i. By July 2, 1983, SCE shall provide evidence that it has undertaken further efforts to assemble and to keep current as reasonably complete a list as possible of housebound people within the plume emergency planning zone who would require transportation assistance in the event of an evacuation.~~

~~ii. By July 2, 1983, SCE shall provide evidence that a training program has been developed and initiated to assist Orange County Transit District bus drivers in the discharge of their responsibilities in the event of a radiological emergency at San Onofre.~~

~~(24) RCS Depressurization System (PORV's)~~

~~By June 30, 1983, SCE shall provide a complete response to the NRC letter of March 27, 1982, requesting additional information relative to the capability of San Onofre 2 and 3 for rapid depressurization and decay heat removal without power operating relief valves (PORV's).~~

~~(25) Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Bearings~~

~~By October 30, 1982, SCE shall submit a proposed hardware modification and schedule for implementation that will increase the reliability of the AFW motor-driven pumps in the event of a break in the high energy line feeding the steam-driven pump. In the interim, prior to the installation of a hardware modification acceptable to the NRC staff, SCE shall perform an augmented in-service inspection of the steam line in accordance with SCE's letter of July 12, 1982.~~

- D. Exemptions to certain requirements of Appendices G, H and J to 10 CFR Part 50 are described in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Safety Evaluation Report. These exemptions are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, these exemptions are hereby granted. The facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission.
- E. SCE shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plans, which may contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled: "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Physical Security Plan," with revisions submitted through April 22, 1988; "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Security Force Training and Qualification Plan," with revisions submitted through October 22, 1986; and "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, *Safeguards Contingency Plan," with revisions submitted through December 29, 1987. Changes made in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 shall be implemented in accordance with the schedule set forth therein.
- F. This license is subject to the following additional condition for the protection of the environment:
- Before engaging in activities that may result in a significant adverse environmental impact that was not evaluated or that is significantly greater than that evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement, SCE shall provide a written notification of such activities to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and receive written approval from that office before proceeding with such activities.
- G. SCE shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, items C(1), C(3) ~~through C(13)~~, ~~C(15) through C(22)~~, and F of this license within 24 hours by telephone and confirm by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV, or his designee, no later than the first working day following the violation, with a written followup report within fourteen (14) days.
- H. SCE shall notify the Commission, as soon as possible but not later than one hour, of any accident at this facility which could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products in excess of allowable limits for normal operation established by the Commission.

* On September 29, 1983, the Safeguards Contingency Plan was made a separate, companion document to the Physical Security Plan pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54.

- I. SCE shall have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.
- J. This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on February 16, 2022.

Attachment D

**(Proposed Amendments to Facility Operating License)
(Redline and Strikeout)**

SONGS Unit 3

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY
THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA
THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-362

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNIT 3

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

License No. NPF-15

Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 was issued to the Southern California Edison Company, the San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California, and the City of Anaheim, California to read as follows:

- A. This license applies to the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3, a pressurized water nuclear reactor and associated equipment (the facility), owned by the licensees. The facility is located in San Diego County, California, and is described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, through Amendment 30, and the Environmental Report, as amended, through Amendment 6.
- B. Subject to the conditions and requirements incorporated herein, the Commission hereby licenses:
- (1) Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California, and the City of Anaheim, California to possess the facility at the designated location in San Diego County, California, in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this license;
 - (2) Southern California Edison Company (SCE), pursuant to Section 103 of the Act and 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," to possess, use, and operate the facility at the designated location in San Diego County, California in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this license.
 - (3) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended;
 - (4) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required;

- (5) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and
 - (6) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 3. Transshipment of Unit 1 fuel between Units 1 and 3 shall be in accordance with SCE letters to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated March 11, March 18 and March 23, 1988, and in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 10 CFR Part 71.
- C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
- (1) Maximum Power Level

Southern California Edison Company (SCE) is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of full power (3390 megawatts thermal).
 - (2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 168, are hereby incorporated in the license. SCE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
 - (3) Antitrust Conditions

SCE shall comply with the antitrust conditions delineated in Appendix C to this license.
 - ~~(4) Intentionally Deleted~~
 - ~~(5) Environmental Qualification (Section 3.11, SER, SSER #3, SSER #4)~~
 - ~~————— This paragraph intentionally deleted. —————~~

The parenthetical notation following the title of many license conditions denotes the section of the Safety Evaluation Report and/or its supplements wherein the license condition is discussed.

~~(6) High Burnup Fission Gas Release (Section 4.2.2.2, SER)~~

~~Prior to beginning the cycle of reactor operation during which peak fuel pellet burnups will achieve greater than 200,000 megawatt days per metric ton of uranium, SCE shall provide revised analyses using fission gas release models acceptable to the NRC staff.~~

~~(7) Low Temperature Overpressurization Protection (Section 5.2.2.2, SER)~~

~~Prior to operation for more than five (5) effective full power years, SCE shall provide a report describing its reexamination of the Technical Specification requirements for steam generator/reactor coolant system delta temperature and shutdown cooling system initiation temperature limits that are presently provided for overpressure protection. The report must either demonstrate that the current Technical Specification limits are still suitably conservative, or propose and justify revised limits.~~

~~(8) Volume Control Tank Control Logic (Section 7.3.5, SSER #4)~~

~~Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the volume control tank outlet valve control logic shall be modified to ensure that the valve does not change position following safety injection actuation signal reset. In the interim, SCE shall maintain emergency procedures that require the volume control tank outlet valve to be placed in the manual mode prior to SIAS reset.~~

~~(9) Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Section 7.5.1, SER, SSER #5)~~

~~Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall comply with the recommendations of Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," as described in the SCE letter of May 13, 1982.~~

~~(10) Control System Failures (Section 7.7, SER, SSER #4)~~

~~By April 1, 1983, SCE shall provide an evaluation, for NRC staff review and approval, of control system failures caused by high energy line break, and by failures of any power sources, sensors, or sensor impulse lines which provide power or signals to two or more control systems. Implementation of any corrective action resulting from this evaluation shall be completed on a schedule acceptable to the NRC.~~

~~(11) Diesel Generator Modifications (Section 8.3.1, SER)~~

~~Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall install a heavy duty turbocharger gear drive assembly on the emergency diesel generators.~~

(124) Fire Protection (Section 9.5.1, SER, SSER #4, SSER #5, Section 1.12, SSER #5; SE dated November 15, 1982; Revision 1 to Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Evaluation dated June 29, 1988)

SCE shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. This program shall be (1) as described in the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis through Revision 3 as revised by letters to the NRC dated May 31, July 22, and November 20, 1987 and January 21, February 22, and April 21, 1988; and (2) as approved in the NRC staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-0712) dated February 1981; Supplements 4 and 5 to the SER, dated January 1982 and February 1982, respectively; and the safety evaluation dated November 15, 1982; as supplemented and amended by the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Evaluation for San Onofre 2 and 3, Revision 1 dated June 29, 1988. SCE may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

~~(13) Turbine Disc Inspection (Section 10.2.2, SER)~~

~~Prior to startup following the second refueling outage, the bores of the low pressure turbine disc shall be inspected for flaws using ultrasonic testing. The results of the inspection shall be submitted to the NRC staff.~~

~~(14) Radioactive Waste System (Section 11.1, SER, SSER #5)~~

~~"Wet" solid radwaste shall not be shipped from the facility until the NRC has approved the waste solidification Process Control Program.~~

~~(15) Purge System Monitors (Section 11.3, SER, SSER #5)~~

~~Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, equipment having the capability to continuously monitor and sample the containment purge exhaust directly from the purge stack shall be operable.~~

~~(16) Initial Test Program (Section 14, SER)~~

~~SCE shall conduct the post-fuel loading initial test program (set forth in Section 14 of the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, through Amendment 30) without making any major modifications to this program unless such modifications have been identified and have received prior NRC approval. Major modifications are defined as:~~

- ~~a. Elimination of any test identified in Section 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, as being essential.~~
- ~~b. Modification of test objectives, methods, or acceptance criteria for any test identified in Section 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, as being essential.~~
- ~~c. Performance of any test at a power level different than that described in the test procedure.~~

- ~~_____ d. Failure to complete any tests included in the described program (planned or scheduled for power levels up to the authorized power level).~~
- ~~_____ (17) NUREG-0737 Conditions (Section 22)~~
- ~~_____ Each of the following conditions shall be completed to the satisfaction of the NRC. Each item references the related subpart of Section 22 of the SER and/or its supplements.~~
- ~~_____ a. Procedures for Transients and Accidents (I.C.1, SSER #1, SSER #2, SSER #5)~~
- ~~_____ Emergency procedures based on guidelines approved by the NRC shall be implemented prior to startup following the first refueling outage that occurs six months or more after NRC approval of the guidelines.~~
- ~~_____ b. Procedures for Verifying Correct Performance of Operating Activities (I.C.6, SSER #1)~~
- ~~_____ Prior to fuel loading, SCE shall implement a system for verifying the correct performance of operating activities, and shall keep the System in effect thereafter.~~
- ~~_____ c. Control Room Design Review (I.D.1, SSER #1)~~
- ~~_____ The control room modifications identified as required in Section 22, Item I.D.1 of Supplement No. 1 to the SER shall be installed and made operational on the schedules identified for each modification in Supplement No. 1 to the SER.~~
- ~~_____ d. Post Accident Sampling System (NUREG-0737 Item II.B.3)~~
- ~~_____ The PASS shall be operable and the post-accident sampling program shall be implemented as described in the SCE letter of April 14, 1983, and revised by SCE letter of October 2, 1992.~~
- ~~_____ e. Direct Indication of Safety Valve Position (II.D.3, SSER #1)~~
- ~~_____ The safety valve position indication system shall be environmentally and seismically qualified consistent with the component or system to which it is attached, and documentation of this shall be maintained.~~
- ~~_____ f. AFW Pump 48-hour Endurance Test (II.E.1.1, SSER #11)~~
- ~~_____ Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall conduct a 48-hour endurance test of all auxiliary feedwater pumps. The results of the test shall be submitted to the NRC staff.~~

~~g. Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer Heaters (II.E.3.1, SSER #1, SSER #5)~~

~~SCE shall maintain in effect procedures to preclude the automatic reapplication of pressurizer heaters to Class IE buses upon SIAS reset.~~

~~h. ICC Instrumentation (II.F.2, SSER #1, SSER #2, SSER #4)~~

~~Prior to fuel loading, the following items shall be completed, and shall be maintained thereafter:~~

- ~~1. The subcooling monitors shall be modified to include the maximum unheated junction thermocouple temperature and the representative core exit thermocouple input.~~
- ~~2. Incore detector assemblies (core exit thermocouples and associated cabling) shall be environmentally qualified and shall have seismic and environmentally qualified Class IE connectors.~~
- ~~3. Qualified cables shall be installed for the core exit thermocouples.~~
- ~~4. The heated junction thermocouple probe and associated process instrumentation shall be installed.~~

~~Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the heated junction thermocouple system and the safety parameter display system shall be operable and shall be maintained operable thereafter.~~

~~i. Plant-Specific Calculations for Compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.46 (II.K.3.31, SSER #1)~~

~~Within one year after model revisions are approved by the NRC, SCE shall provide a supplemental plant-specific analysis to verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.46, using the revised models developed under Item II.K.3.30.~~

~~j. Improving Licensee Emergency Preparedness (III.A.2, SSER #1, SSER #5)~~

- ~~1. By January 1, 1983, the upgraded emergency support facilities shall be operational.~~
- ~~2. SCE shall maintain interim emergency support facilities (Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility) until the upgraded facilities are completed.~~

~~(18) Emergency Preparedness Conditions~~

~~a. Conditions of ASLB Initial Decision of May 14, 1982~~

~~By February 17, 1983, SCE shall:~~

- ~~1. Provide evidence that both meteorological towers and the Health Physics Computer System are fully installed and operational. SCE shall maintain offsite assessment and monitoring capabilities, essentially as described in the hearing (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.1-12, pp. 136-140), at no less than that level of readiness, pending development of satisfactory capability of offsite response Paragraph D.27, pp. 145-146, Section V, Paragraph B, pp. 213-214).~~
- ~~2. Provide an assessment of whether public information regarding emergency planning should also be presented in Spanish (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph F.32, pp. 168, and Section V, Paragraph C.2, pp. 215).~~
- ~~3. Provide revised plans demonstrating that the "extended" Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) concept has been deleted from the San Onofre onsite and offsite plans and the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ boundary has been extended, along with siren coverage, to Dana Point and all of San Juan Capistrano (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.25, pp. 98, and Section V, Paragraph C.5, pp. 216; see also Order (Making Clarifying Change in Initial Decision) dated May 25, 1982).~~

~~b. Completion of Emergency Preparedness Requirements~~

~~In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of the procedures in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's proposed rules, 44 CFR 350, is an indication that a major substantive problem exists in achieving or maintaining an adequate state of preparedness, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(s) (2) will apply.~~

~~c. Deleted Amendment No. 8 dated September 16, 1983~~

~~d. Conditions of ALAB 717, March 4, 1983~~

- ~~i. By July 2, 1983, SCE shall provide evidence that it has undertaken further efforts to assemble and to keep current as reasonably complete a list as possible of housebound people within the plume emergency planning zone who would require transportation assistance in the event of an evacuation.~~
- ~~ii. By July 2, 1983, SCE shall provide evidence that a training program has been developed and initiated to assist Orange County Transit District bus drivers in the discharge of their responsibilities in the event of a radiological emergency at San Onofre.~~

~~(19) RCS Depressurization System (PORV's)~~

~~By June 30, 1983, SCE shall provide a complete response to the NRC letter of March 27, 1982, including information relative to the capability of San Onofre 3 for rapid depressurization and decay heat removal without power operated relief valves (PORVs).~~

~~(20) Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Motor Bearings~~

~~Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall install and make operational the lubrication oil cooling system for the auxiliary feedwater pump motor bearings described in SCE's letter of March 7, 1983. Prior to installation of the lube oil cooling system, SCE shall perform daily visual inspection of the steam lines in the AFW pump room in accordance with SCE's letter of July 12, 1982.~~

~~(21) Surveillance Program (Section 1.12, SSER #5)~~

~~Prior to entering any operational mode for the first time, including initial fuel loading, SCE shall:~~

- ~~a. Have completed a review of the surveillance procedures applicable to the change of mode, and determined that the procedures demonstrate the operability of the required systems with respect to all acceptance criteria defined in the Technical Specifications.~~
- ~~b. Have dispatched written certification to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region V, that the actions defined in (a), above, have been completed for the mode or modes to be entered.~~

~~(22) Auxiliary Building Ventilation System.~~

~~SCE shall complete all modifications to the auxiliary building ventilation system described in the November 5, 1982 letter from H. Ray, SCE, to R. Engelken, NRC, on the schedule proposed in the November 5, 1982 letter.~~

~~(23) Fuel Assembly Shoulder Gap Clearance (SCE letter of July 25, 1983)~~

~~Prior to entering Startup (Mode 2) after each refueling, SCE shall either provide a report that demonstrates that the existing fuel element assembly (FEA) has sufficient available shoulder gap clearance for at least the next cycle of operation, or identify to the NRC and implement a modified FEA design that has adequate shoulder gap clearance for at least the next cycle of operation. The commitment will apply until the NRC concurs that the shoulder gap clearance provided is adequate for the design life of the fuel.~~

~~(24) Isolation Capability for Primary EOF~~

~~By January 1, 1984 the primary EOF ventilation system shall be modified to provide isolation capability as described in the SCE letter of July 22, 1983.~~

~~(25) Correction of CPC Software Error~~

~~At the first outage of sufficient duration (7 days in Mode 5) after February 2, 1984, SCE shall correct the software error in the Core Protection Calculators discussed in the SCE letters dated March 7, 1993 and July 22, 1983.~~

~~(26) Until the first refueling outage, SCE shall provide a monthly report describing any occurrences resulting in the degradation (including, but not limited to component failures, maintenance errors, and operator errors) of the auxiliary feedwater system. The report shall identify the cause of such occurrences. The report does not relieve the licensee from any existing requirements for Licensee Event Reports (LERs).~~

- D. Exemptions to certain requirements of Appendices G, H and J to 10 CFR Part 50 are described in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Safety Evaluation Report. These exemptions are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, these exemptions are hereby granted. The facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission.
- E. SCE shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plans, which may contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled: "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Physical Security Plan," with revisions submitted through April 22, 1988; "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Security Force Training and Qualification Plan," with revisions submitted through October 22, 1986; and "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, *Safeguards Contingency Plan," with revisions submitted through December 29, 1987. Changes made in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 shall be implemented in accordance with the schedule set forth therein.
- F. This license is subject to the following additional condition for the protection of the environment:
- Before engaging in activities that may result in a significant adverse environmental impact that was not evaluated or that is significantly greater than that evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement, SCE shall provide a written notification of such activities to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and receive written approval from that office before proceeding with such activities.

* On September 29, 1983, the Safeguards Contingency Plan was made a separate, companion document to the Physical Security Plan pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54.

- G. SCE shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, items C(1), C(3) through C(11), C(13) through C(22), and F of this license within 24 hours by telephone and confirm by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV, or his designee, no later than the first working day following the violation, with a written followup report within fourteen (14) days.
- H. SCE shall notify the commission, as soon as possible but not later than one hour, of any accident at this facility which could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products in excess of allowable limits for normal operation established by the Commission.
- I. SCE shall have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.
- J. This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on November 15, 2022.
- ~~K. In accordance with the Commission's direction in its Statement of Policy, Licensing and Regulatory Policy and Procedures for Environmental Protection, Uranium Fuel Cycle Impacts, October 29, 1982, this license is subject to the final resolution of the pending litigation involving Table S-3. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, No. 74-1586 (D. C. Cir., April 27, 1982).~~

~~ATTACHMENT 1~~

~~TO~~

~~NPF-15~~

~~The following item must be completed prior to initial criticality:~~

~~The deficiency identified by the SCE letter, dated July 19, 1982, to R.H. Engelken from Dr. L.T. Papay regarding discrepant inputs to the Core Protection Calculator from Reactor Coolant Pump shaft speed and Control Element Assembly position indication shall be corrected~~

Attachment E
(Proposed Amendments to Facility Operating License)
SONGS Unit 2

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA
THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-361

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 2

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

License No NPF-10

Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 was issued to the Southern California Edison Company, the San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California and the City of Anaheim, California to read as follows:

- A. This license applies to the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, a pressurized water nuclear reactor and associated equipment (the facility), owned by the licensees. The facility is located in San Diego County, California, and is described in The Final Safety Analysis Report as supplemented and amended, and the Environmental Report as supplemented and amended.
- B. Subject to the conditions and requirements incorporated herein, the Commission hereby licenses:
- (1) Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California, and the City of Anaheim, California to possess the facility at the designated location in San Diego County, California, in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this license;
 - (2) Southern California Edison Company (SCE), pursuant to Section 103 of the Act and 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities", to possess, use, and operate the facility at the designated location in San Diego County, California, in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this license;
 - (3) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended;
 - (4) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibrations, and as fission detectors in amounts as required;

- (5) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and
 - (6) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. Transshipment of Unit 1 fuel between Units 1 and 2 shall be in accordance with SCE letters to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated March 11, March 18 and March 23, 1988, and in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 10 CFR Part 71.
- C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
- (1) Maximum Power Level

Southern California Edison Company (SCE) is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of full power (3390 megawatts thermal).
 - (2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 177, are hereby incorporated in the license. SCE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
 - (3) Antitrust Conditions

SCE shall comply with the antitrust conditions delineated in Appendix C to this license.

* The parenthetical notation following the title of many license conditions denotes the section of the Safety Evaluation Report and/or its supplements wherein the license condition is discussed.

(4) Fire Protection (Section 9.5.1, SER, SSER #4, SSER #5, Section 1.12, SSER #5; SE dated November 15, 1982; Revision 1 to Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Evaluation dated June 29, 1988)

SCE shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. This program shall be (1) as described in the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis through Revision 3 as revised by letters to the NRC dated May 31, July 22, and November 20, 1987 and January 21, February 22, and April 21, 1988; and (2) as approved in the NRC staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-0712) dated February 1981; Supplements 4 and 5 to the SER, dated January 1982 and February 1982, respectively; and the safety evaluation dated November 15, 1982; as supplemented and amended by the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Evaluation for San Onofre 2 and 3, Revision 1 dated June 29, 1988. SCE may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

- D. Exemptions to certain requirements of Appendices G, H and J to 10 CFR Part 50 are described in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Safety Evaluation Report. These exemptions are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, these exemptions are hereby granted. The facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission.
- E. SCE shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plans, which may contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled: "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Physical Security Plan," with revisions submitted through April 22, 1988; "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Security Force Training and Qualification Plan," with revisions submitted through October 22, 1986; and "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, *Safeguards Contingency Plan," with revisions submitted through December 29, 1987. Changes made in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 shall be implemented in accordance with the schedule set forth therein.

* On September 29, 1983, the Safeguards Contingency Plan was made a separate, companion document to the Physical Security Plan pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54.

- F. This license is subject to the following additional condition for the protection of the environment:

Before engaging in activities that may result in a significant adverse environmental impact that was not evaluated or that is significantly greater than that evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement, SCE shall provide a written notification of such activities to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and receive written approval from that office before proceeding with such activities.

- G. SCE shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, items C(1), C(3), and F of this license within 24 hours by telephone and confirm by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV, or his designee, no later than the first working day following the violation, with a written followup report within fourteen (14) days.
- H. SCE shall notify the Commission, as soon as possible but not later than one hour, of any accident at this facility which could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products in excess of allowable limits for normal operation established by the Commission.
- I. SCE shall have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.
- J. This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on February 16, 2022.

Attachment F
(Proposed Amendments to Facility Operating License)
SONGS Unit 3

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY
THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA
THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-362

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNIT 3

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

License No. NPF-15

Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 was issued to the Southern California Edison Company, the San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California, and the City of Anaheim, California to read as follows:

- A. This license applies to the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3, a pressurized water nuclear reactor and associated equipment (the facility), owned by the licensees. The facility is located in San Diego County, California, and is described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, through Amendment 30, and the Environmental Report, as amended, through Amendment 6.
- B. Subject to the conditions and requirements incorporated herein, the Commission hereby licenses:
- (1) Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California, and the City of Anaheim, California to possess the facility at the designated location in San Diego County, California, in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this license;
 - (2) Southern California Edison Company (SCE), pursuant to Section 103 of the Act and 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," to possess, use, and operate the facility at the designated location in San Diego County, California in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this license.
 - (3) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended;
 - (4) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required;

- (5) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and
 - (6) SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 3. Transshipment of Unit 1 fuel between Units 1 and 3 shall be in accordance with SCE letters to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated March 11, March 18 and March 23, 1988, and in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 10 CFR Part 71.
- C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
- (1) Maximum Power Level

Southern California Edison Company (SCE) is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of full power (3390 megawatts thermal).
 - (2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 168, are hereby incorporated in the license. SCE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
 - (3) Antitrust Conditions

SCE shall comply with the antitrust conditions delineated in Appendix C to this license.

The parenthetical notation following the title of many license conditions denotes the section of the Safety Evaluation Report and/or its supplements wherein the license condition is discussed.

- (4) Fire Protection (Section 9.5.1, SER, SSER #4, SSER #5, Section 1.12, SSER #5; SE dated November 15, 1982; Revision 1 to Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Evaluation dated June 29, 1988)

SCE shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. This program shall be (1) as described in the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis through Revision 3 as revised by letters to the NRC dated May 31, July 22, and November 20, 1987 and January 21, February 22, and April 21, 1988; and (2) as approved in the NRC staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-0712) dated February 1981; Supplements 4 and 5 to the SER, dated January 1982 and February 1982, respectively; and the safety evaluation dated November 15, 1982; as supplemented and amended by the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Evaluation for San Onofre 2 and 3, Revision 1 dated June 29, 1988. SCE may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

- D. Exemptions to certain requirements of Appendices G, H and J to 10 CFR Part 50 are described in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Safety Evaluation Report. These exemptions are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, these exemptions are hereby granted. The facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission.
- E. SCE shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plans, which may contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled: "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Physical Security Plan," with revisions submitted through April 22, 1988; "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Security Force Training and Qualification Plan," with revisions submitted through October 22, 1986; and "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, *Safeguards Contingency Plan," with revisions submitted through December 29, 1987. Changes made in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 shall be implemented in accordance with the schedule set forth therein.

* On September 29, 1983, the Safeguards Contingency Plan was made a separate, companion document to the Physical Security Plan pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54.

- F. This license is subject to the following additional condition for the protection of the environment:

Before engaging in activities that may result in a significant adverse environmental impact that was not evaluated or that is significantly greater than that evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement, SCE shall provide a written notification of such activities to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and receive written approval from that office before proceeding with such activities.

- G. SCE shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, items C(1), C(3) and F of this license within 24 hours by telephone and confirm by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV, or his designee, no later than the first working day following the violation, with a written followup report within fourteen (14) days.
- H. SCE shall notify the commission, as soon as possible but not later than one hour, of any accident at this facility which could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products in excess of allowable limits for normal operation established by the Commission.
- I. SCE shall have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.
- J. This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on November 15, 2022.