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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Nine Mile Point Unit 1
Docket No. 50-220
DPR-63

Subject: *Core Shroud Horizontal Weld Repair Assemblies (Tie Rod Assemblies)
Reinspection Scope for Refueling Outage No. 16*

- References:
- 1) Letter to NRC dated December 15, 2000 (NMP1L 1562), "Core Shroud Inspection Scope for Refueling Outage No. 16"
 - 2) Letter to NRC dated May 21, 1999 (NMP1L 1436), "Generic Letter 94-03, "Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking of Core Shrouds in Boiling Water Reactors," Request for Approval Under the Provision of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i) for Modification of the Four Stabilizer Assemblies (Tie Rods) for Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1)"
 - 3) NRC Staff Safety Evaluation dated September 15, 1997, "Transmittal of the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation of the BWR Vessel and Internals Project BWRVIP-07 Report (TAC No. M94959)"
 - 4) NRC Staff Safety Evaluation dated April 27, 1998, "Final Supplement to the Safety Evaluation of the BWR Vessel and Internals Project BWRVIP-07 Report (TAC No. M94959)"
 - 5) BWRVIP-07, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project Guidelines for Reinspection of BWR Core Shrouds"

Gentlemen:

In Reference 1, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) defined the scope of the core shroud reinspection for Nine Mile Point Power Station, Unit 1 (NMP1) during refueling outage No. 16 (RFO16). As a result of the telephone conversations of March 6, 7, and 8, 2001, NMPC agreed to submit clarification of the inspection scope for the Core Shroud Horizontal Weld Repair Assemblies (Tie Rod Assemblies) for RFO16.

In Reference 2, NMPC provided the results of the core shroud inspections for refueling outage No. 15 (RFO15). The detailed visual inspections of the Tie Rod Assemblies revealed that a cap screw had failed on the upper spring assembly of one Tie Rod Assembly. As part of the subsequent extent of condition review, other cap screws that

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were susceptible to the same degradation mechanism both on that Tie Rod Assembly and at similar locations on the other Tie Rod Assemblies were identified. This review concluded that the failed and susceptible locations on the Tie Rod Assemblies were confined to the upper spring assembly region and that the failure was due to stress corrosion cracking resulting from high stress due to differential thermal expansion. A modification was installed at these upper spring locations to eliminate the high stress condition caused by the differential thermal expansion. The modifications were installed prior to restart from RFO15.

In developing the inspection plan for RFO16, NMPC considered the following factors in an engineering evaluation in order to ensure an appropriate level of inspection for all aspects of the core shroud repair:

- The Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project requirements,
- The inspection results and modifications undertaken during RFO15,
- The inspection history of the Tie Rod Assemblies over several outages, and
- The recommendations for reinspection provided by the Tie Rod Assembly designers.

Consistent with the requirements of References 3, 4, and 5, the Tie Rod Assembly areas modified during RFO15 will be reinspected during RFO16. Additionally, based on the recommendations of the engineering evaluation, a complete visual inspection of all accessible areas of each Tie Rod Assembly within the annulus will be performed. These inspections will assure that the required level of quality and safety is applied to the Tie Rod Assemblies. As a result, the continued integrity of the core shroud repair will be maintained.

Very truly yours,



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RBA/TRB/mlg

xc: Mr. H. J. Miller, NRC Regional Administrator, Region 1
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