

February 9, 2001

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Stop P1-137
Washington, DC 20555-0001

ULNRC-04382

Gentlemen:



**DOCKET NUMBER 50-483
CALLAWAY PLANT UNIT 1
UNION ELECTRIC CO.
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-30
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2001-001-00**

**Missed step in test procedure results in an invalid Reactor Trip Breaker actuation
due to the system being improperly removed from service**

The enclosed licensee event report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (iv) to report an automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature during Solid State Protection System Testing.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John D. Patterson", with the word "for" written in smaller cursive below it.

Warren A. Witt
Manager, Callaway Plant

WAW 2/9/2001
WAW/jer

Enclosure

IE22

ULNRC-04382
February 9, 2001
Page 2

cc: Mr. Ellis W. Merschoff
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011-8064

Senior Resident Inspector
Callaway Resident Office
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
8201 NRC Road
Steedman, MO 65077

Mr. Jack N. Donohew (2 copies)
Licensing Project Manager, Callaway Plant
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 7E1
Washington, DC 20555-2738

Manager, Electric Department
Missouri Public Service Commission
PO Box 360
Jefferson City, MO 65102

Mr. Thomas A. Baxter
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N. Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20037

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
700 Galleria Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339

NRC FORM 366 (1-2001)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2001 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 B6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.								
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)												
FACILITY NAME (1) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Callaway Plant Unit 1</div>				DOCKET NUMBER (2) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">05000483</div>		PAGE (3) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">1 OF 3</div>						
TITLE (4) Missed step in test procedure results in an invalid Reactor Trip Breaker actuation due to the system being improperly removed from service.												
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)		OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)				
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER		
01	12	2001	2001	- 001	00	02	09	2001	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER		
										05000		
										05000		
OPERATING MODE (9)		POWER LEVEL (10)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)								
1		1 0 0		20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)		
				20.2201(d)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		
				20.2203(a)(1)		50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		73.71(a)(4)		
				20.2203(a)(2)(i)		50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)		73.71(a)(5)		
				20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)		OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A		
				20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.46(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)				
				20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)				
				20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)				
				20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)				
				20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)												
NAME M. A. Reidmeyer, Supervisor, Regional Regulatory Affairs								TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (573) 676-4306				
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)												
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX			
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)								EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO							
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)												
<p>At 09:28 on 01-12-01, with the Plant operating at full power, an unplanned actuation of the "A" Reactor Trip Breaker occurred during testing of "A" Solid State Protection System (SSPS). The "A" Reactor Trip Breaker Bypass Breaker had previously been closed as part of the testing procedure; therefore the "A" Trip Breaker actuation had no effect on Plant operation</p> <p>Due to a missed step in the procedure, the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT switch for the "A" train SSPS had not been placed in the INHIBIT position. Placing the switch in the INHIBIT position generates an Intermediate Range Rodstop Block and blocks the source range detector. Immediately prior to this step is a caution statement that has a requirement to notify the Reactor Operator. The Technician read the statement, notified the Reactor Operator as required, and incorrectly initialed the following step as complete, but failed to reposition the switch. When the Technicians cycled the "A" logic switch, the "A" Reactor Trip Breaker opened and the Control Room received annunciator 56B, RCS < 50 degrees F sub-cool. The Control Room Supervisor suspended testing, notified I&C Supervision, notified Engineering and initiated an immediate review of the events. It was discovered that the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT switch had not been placed in the INHIBIT position. The switch was placed in INHIBIT and the test was completed.</p>												

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Callaway Plant Unit 1	05000483	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		2001	- 001	- 00	

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

At 09:28 on 01-12-01, with the Plant operating at full power, an unplanned actuation of the "A" Reactor Trip Breaker (SB52SB102BRTA) occurred during Actuation Logic Testing of "A" Solid State Protection System (SSPS), in accordance with ISF-SB-00A29 (FCTNAL-ANAL; SSPS TRAIN A FCTNAL TEST). The "A" Reactor Trip Breaker Bypass Breaker had previously been closed as part of the testing procedure; therefore the "A" Trip Breaker actuation had no effect on Plant operation.

The initial conditions were established per ISF-SB-00A29 and the testing began. Due to a missed step in the procedure, the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT switch for the "A" train SSPS had not been placed in the INHIBIT position. Placing the switch in the INHIBIT position generates an Intermediate Range Rodstop Block and blocks energizing the source range detector. Immediately prior to this step is a caution statement that explains the function of the switch and a requirement to notify the Reactor Operator prior to placing the switch in INHIBIT. The Technician read the statement, notified the Reactor Operator as required, and incorrectly initialed the following step as complete, but failed to reposition the switch. The test proceeded without incident until the Technicians began rotating logic "A" test switch. The Technicians did not receive proper indication when it was rotated to position 14. The procedure allows the Technicians to cycle the switch, to clean the contacts. When the Technicians cycled the switch, the "A" Reactor Trip Breaker opened and the Control Room received annunciator 56B, RCS < 50 degrees F sub-cool. The Control Room Supervisor suspended testing, notified I&C Supervision, notified Engineering and initiated an immediate review of the events. During the review it was discovered that the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT switch had not been placed in the INHIBIT position, contrary to the procedure. The switch was placed in INHIBIT and the test was completed.

At 12:40, the NRC Operations Center was notified of this event in compliance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (ii).

BASIS FOR REPORTABILITY:

This event was determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (ii) / 10CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv) as an event that resulted in an automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).

CONDITION AT TIME OF EVENT:

MODE 1, Power Operations-100%

ROOT CAUSE:

The I&C technician had not placed the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT switch in INHIBIT even though he had signed the step off. The test procedure contained a caution that required action (notify the Reactor Operator) prior to performing the step (place switch in INHIBIT). Grouping both actions together and providing a single sign off contributed to the likelihood of error. This missed procedure step, by the I&C technician, left the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT switch in the NORMAL position. This allowed the test signal to actuate the "A" Reactor Trip Breaker.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Callaway Plant Unit 1	05000483	2001	- 001	- 00	3 OF 3

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The test procedure (ISF-SB-00A32) for "B" train has been revised to remove the notification from the caution and make it a separate step.

The test procedure (ISF-SB-00A29) for "A" train will be revised prior to the next use, to remove the notification from the caution and make it a separate step.

This event will be included in the Operating Experience for future Actuation Logic Testing of Solid State Protection System (SSPS) work.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The risk assessment (10CFR50.65(a)(4)) for performing this testing includes the possibility of a Reactor Trip. This event did not result in a Reactor Trip or plant transient. The missed procedure step did not result in any additional quantifiable risk to the health and safety of the public.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

A review of the previous three years determined that there have not been any similar events.

FOOTNOTES:

The system and component codes listed below are from IEEE Standard 805-1984 and IEEE Standard 803A-1984, respectively.

System JD

Component BRK