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TABLE 3.1.1 NOTES (Cont'd)

3. When the requirements in the column "Minimum Number of Operating Instrument Channels Per Trip System" cannot be met for one system, that system shall be tripped. If the requirements cannot be met for both trip systems, the appropriate ACTIONS listed below shall be taken:
 - a) Initiate insertion of operable rods and complete insertion of all operable rods within four hours.
 - b) Reduce power level to IRM range and place mode switch in the "Startup/Hot Standby" position within eight hours.
 - c) Reduce turbine load and close main steam line isolation valves within 8 hours.
 - d) Reduce reactor power to less than 30% of rated within 8 hours.
4. "W" is percent rated two loop drive flow where 100% rated drive flow is that flow equivalent to 48×10^6 lbs/hr core flow. ΔW is the difference between the two loop and single loop drive flow at the same core flow. This difference must be accounted for during single loop operation. $\Delta W = 0$ for two recirculation loop operation.
5. To be considered operable an APRM must have at least 2 LPRM inputs per level and at least a total of 13 LPRM inputs, except that channels A, C, D, and F may lose all LPRM inputs from the companion APRM Cabinet plus one additional LPRM input and still be considered operable.
6. The top of the enriched fuel has been designated as 0 inches and provides common reference level for all vessel water level instrumentation.
7. Channel shared by the Reactor Protection and Primary Containment Isolation Systems.
8. An alarm setting of 1.5 times normal background at rated power shall be established to alert the operator to abnormal radiation levels in primary coolant.
9. Channel signals for the turbine control valve fast closure trip shall be derived from the same event or events which cause the control valve fast closure.
10. Turbine stop valve closure and turbine control valve fast closure scram signals may be bypassed at $\leq 30\%$ of reactor Rated Thermal Power.
11. Not used.
12. While performing refuel interlock checks which require the mode switch to be in Startup, the reduced APRM high flux scram need not be operable provided:
 - a. The following trip functions are operable:
 1. Mode switch in shutdown,
 2. Manual scram,
 3. High flux IRM scram
 4. High flux SRM scram in noncoincidence,
 5. Scram discharge volume high water level, and;
 - b. No more than two (2) control rods withdrawn. The two (2) control rods that can be withdrawn cannot be face adjacent or diagonally adjacent.

3.3 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

2. The Control Rod Drive Housing Support System shall be in place when the Reactor Coolant System is pressurized above atmospheric pressure with fuel in the reactor vessel unless all operable control rods are fully inserted.
3. While the reactor is below 20% power, the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) shall be operating while moving control rods except that:
 - (a) If after withdrawal of at least 12 control rods during a startup, the RWM fails, the startup may continue provided a second licensed operator verifies that the operator at the reactor console is following the control rod program; or
 - (b) If all rods, except those that cannot be moved with control rod drive

4.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- positive coupling and the results of each test shall be recorded. The drive and blade shall be coupled and fully withdrawn. The position and over-travel lights shall be observed.
2. The Control Rod Drive Housing Support System shall be inspected after reassembly and the results of the inspection recorded.
 3. Prior to control rod withdrawal for startup the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) shall be verified as operable by performing the following:
 - (a) Verify that the control rod withdrawal sequence for the Rod Worth Minimizer computer is correct.
 - (b) The Rod Worth Minimizer diagnostic test shall be performed.

3.6 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

D. Safety and Relief Valves

1. During reactor power operating conditions and whenever the reactor coolant pressure is greater than 150 psig and temperature greater than 350°F, both safety valves and at least three of the four relief valves shall be operable.
2. If Specification 3.6.D.1 is not met, initiate an orderly shutdown and the reactor coolant pressure shall be below 150 psig and 350°F within 24 hours.

E. Structural Integrity and Operability Testing

The structural integrity and the operability of the safety-related systems and components shall be maintained at the level required by the original acceptance standards throughout the life of the plant.

4.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

D. Safety and Relief Valves

1. Operability testing of Safety and Relief Valves shall be in accordance with Specification 4.6.E. The lift point of the safety and relief valves shall be set as specified in Specification 2.2.B.

E. Structural Integrity and Operability Testing

1. Inservice inspection of safety-related components shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the NRC.

Inservice inspection of piping, identified in NRC Generic Letter 88-01, shall be performed in accordance with the staff positions on schedule, methods, and personnel and sample expansion included in the Generic Letter or in accordance with alternate measures approved by NRC Staff.

3.6 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

F. Jet Pumps

1. Whenever the reactor is in the startup/hot standby or run modes, all jet pumps shall be intact and all operating jet pumps shall be operable. If it is determined that a jet pump is inoperable, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.
2. Flow indication from each of the twenty jet pumps shall be verified prior to initiation of reactor startup from a cold shutdown condition.

4.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

2. Operability testing of safety-related pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(f), except where specific written relief has been granted by the NRC.

F. Jet Pumps

1. Whenever there is recirculation flow with the reactor in the startup/hot standby or run modes, jet pump integrity and operability shall be checked daily by verifying that the following two conditions do not occur simultaneously:
 - a. The recirculation pump flow differs by more than 10% from the established speed-flow characteristics.
 - b. The indicated total core flow is more than 10% greater than the core flow value derived from established power-core flow relationships.
2. In the event that the jet pump(s) fail the tests in Specifications 4.6.F.1.a and 4.6.F.1.b, determine their operability by verifying that each individual jet pump ΔP deviation from average loop ΔP does not vary from its normal established deviation by more than 10%.

3.6 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3. The indicated core flow is the sum of the flow indication from each of the twenty jet pumps. If flow indication failure occurs for two or more jet pumps, immediate corrective action shall be taken. If flow indication for all but one jet pump cannot be obtained within 12 hours an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

G. Single Loop Operation

1. The reactor may be started and operated or operation may continue with a single recirculation loop provided that:
 - a. The designated adjustments for APRM flux scram and rod block trip settings (Specifications 2.1.A.1.a and 2.1.B.1, Table 3.1.1 and Table 3.2.5), rod block monitor trip setting (Table 3.2.5), MCPR fuel cladding integrity safety limit (Specification 1.1.A), and MCPR operating limits and MAPLHGR limits, provided in the Core Operating Limits Report, are initiated within 8 hours. During the next 12 hours, either these adjustments must be completed or the reactor brought to Hot Shutdown.

4.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3. The surveillance requirements of 4.6.F.1 and 4.6.F.2 do not apply to the idle loop and associated jet pumps when in single loop operation.
4. The baseline data required to evaluate the conditions in Specifications 4.6.F.1 and 4.6.F.2 shall be acquired each operating cycle. Baseline data for evaluating 4.6.F.2 while in single loop operation shall be updated as soon as practical after entering single loop operation.

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BASES: 3.6 and 4.6 (Cont'd)

throughout plant life. The inservice inspection and testing programs are performed in accordance with 10CFR50, Section 50.55a(g) except where specific relief has been granted by the NRC. These inspection and testing programs provide further assurance that gross defects are not occurring and ensure that safety-related components remain operable.

The type of inspection planned for each component depends on location, accessibility, and type of expected defect. Direct visual examination is proposed wherever possible since it is sensitive, fast, and reliable. Magnetic particle and liquid penetrant inspections are planned where practical, and where added sensitivity is required. Ultrasonic testing and radiography shall be used where defects can occur on concealed surfaces.

Generic Letter 88-01 established the NRC position for in-service inspection of BWR austenitic stainless steel piping susceptible to Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC).

By letter dated November 9, 1998 (NVY 98-155), NRC approved use of ASME Code Case N-560 in association with inservice inspection of Class 1, Category B-J, piping welds under ASME Section XI. VY's ASME Category B-J piping welds are also Category A piping welds as defined in GL 88-01. The Code Case reduces the inspection sample, while stipulating selection of that sample in accordance with a risk-informed analytical methodology.

The in-service inspection and testing programs presented at this time are based on a thorough evaluation of present technology and state-of-the-art inspection and testing techniques.

F. Jet Pumps

Failure of a jet pump nozzle assembly hold down mechanism, nozzle assembly and/or riser, would increase the cross-sectional flow area for blowdown following the design basis double-ended line break. Therefore, if a failure occurred, repairs must be made.

The following factors form the basis for the surveillance requirements:

- A break in a jet pump decreases the flow resistance characteristic of the external piping loop causing the recirculation pump to operate at a higher flow condition when compared to previous operation.
- The change in flow rate of the failed jet pump produces a change in the indicated flow rate of that pump relative to the other pumps in that loop. Comparison of the data with a normal relationship or pattern provides the indication necessary to detect a failed jet pump.
- The jet pump flow deviation pattern derived from the diffuser to lower plenum differential pressure readings will be used to further evaluate jet pump operability in the event that the jet pumps fail the tests in Specifications 4.6.F.1.a and b.

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Sections 3.13/4.13 deleted

**Pages 241 through 252 have
been intentionally deleted.**

6.2 ORGANIZATION (Cont'd)

4. The individuals who train the operating staff, carry out health physics, or perform quality assurance functions may report to the appropriate on-site manager; however, these individuals shall have sufficient organizational freedom to ensure their independence from operating pressures.

B. Unit Staff

The unit staff organization shall include the following:

1. A non-licensed operator shall be assigned when the reactor contains fuel and an additional non-licensed operator shall be assigned during Plant Startup and Normal Operation.
2. At least one licensed Reactor Operator (RO) or one licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) shall be present in the control room when fuel is in the reactor.
3. When the unit is in Plant Startup or Normal Operation, at least one licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and one licensed Reactor Operator (RO), or two licensed Senior Reactor Operators, shall be present in the control room.
4. Shift crew composition shall meet the requirements stipulated herein and in 10 CFR 50.54(m). Shift crew composition may be less than the minimum requirement of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) and Specifications 6.2.B.1 and 6.2.B.8 for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members, provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements.
5. An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures shall be present on-site when there is fuel in the reactor. The position may be vacant for not more than 2 hours, in order to provide for unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to fill the required position.
6. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety related functions (e.g., licensed SROs, licensed ROs, radiation protection technicians, auxiliary operators, and key maintenance personnel).
7. The operations superintendent or an assistant operations superintendent shall hold an SRO license.
8. While the unit is in Plant Startup or Normal Operation, the Shift Engineer shall provide advisory technical support to the Shift Supervisor (SS).