APS

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102-04521-AKK/SAB/TNW
January 16, 2001

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-37
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Sirs:

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2, and 3
Docket Nos. STN 50-528/529/530
Technical Specifications Bases Revision 7 Update

Pursuant to PVNGS Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications Bases Control Program," Arizona Public Service Company (APS) is submitting the changes to the TS Bases incorporated into Revision 7. These changes are provided in the enclosure on Revision 7 pages with the changes identified by revision bars. Also enclosed are insertion instructions for the Revision 7 pages.

No commitments are being made to the NRC by this letter.

Should you have any questions, please contact Scott A. Bauer at (623) 393-5978.

Sincerely,

Angela Krainik

AKK/SAB/TNW/kg

Enclosure

cc: E. W. Merschoff (all w/o enclosure)
J. N. Donohew
J. H. Moorman

A001

PVNGS Technical Specifications Bases Revision 7

Insertion Instructions and

Revised Pages

PVNGS Technical Specifications Bases
Revision 7
Insertion Instructions

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PVNGS

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
Units 1, 2, and 3

Technical Specification Bases

Revision 7
January 16, 2001

PALO VERDE

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BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

refueling water tank. The operator should borate with the best source available for the plant conditions.

In determining the boration flow rate, the time in core life must be considered. For instance, the most difficult time in core life to increase the RCS boron concentration is at the beginning of cycle, when boron concentration may approach or exceed 2000 ppm. Assuming that a value of 1% $\Delta k/k$ must be recovered and a boration flow rate of 26 gpm, it is possible to increase the boron concentration of the RCS by 100 ppm in approximately 35 minutes with a 4000 ppm source.

If a boron worth of 10 pcm/ppm is assumed, this combination of parameters will increase the SDM by 1% $\Delta k/k$. These boration parameters of 26 gpm and 4000 ppm represent typical values and are provided for the purpose of offering a specific example.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.1.1

SDM is verified by performing a reactivity balance calculation, considering the listed reactivity effects:

a. RCS boron concentration;

b. CEA positions;

c. RCS average temperature;

d. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation;

e. Xenon concentration;

f. Samarium concentration; and

g. Isothermal temperature coefficient (ITC).

Using the ITC accounts for Doppler reactivity in this calculation because the reactor is subcritical, and the fuel temperature will be changing at the same rate as the RCS.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)	The Frequency of 24 hours is based on the generally slow change in required boron concentration, and also allows sufficient time for the operator to collect the required data, which includes performing a boron concentration analysis, and complete the calculation. When taking credit for the Xenon concentration in the reactivity balance calculation, the frequency may have to be administratively controlled to ensure that SDM does not go below the limit due to Xenon decay.
REFERENCES	1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26. 2. UFSAR, Section 15.2. 3. UFSAR, Section 15.4. 4. 10 CFR 100.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

concentrated solution, such as that normally found in the refueling water tank. The operator should borate with the best source available for the plant conditions.

In determining the boration flow rate the time in core life must be considered. For instance, the most difficult time in core life to increase the RCS boron concentration is at the beginning of cycle, when boron concentration may approach or exceed 2000 ppm. Assuming that a value of 1% $\Delta k/k$ must be recovered and a boration flow rate of 26 gpm, it is possible to increase the boron concentration of the RCS by 100 ppm in approximately 35 minutes with a 4000 ppm source. If a boron worth of 10 pcm/ppm is assumed, this combination of parameters will increase the SDM by 1% $\Delta k/k$. These boration parameters of 26 gpm and 4000 ppm represent typical values and are provided for the purpose of offering a specific example.

B.1 and B.2

If the K_{N-1} requirements are not met or reactor criticality is achievable by Shutdown Group CEA movement, boration must be initiated promptly and CEA position varied to restore K_{N-1} within limit or to ensure criticality due to Shutdown Group CEA movement is not achievable. A Completion Time of 15 minutes is adequate for an operator to correctly align and start the required systems and components and vary CEA position. It is assumed that boration will be continued and CEA position varied to return K_{N-1} to within limit or prevent reactor criticality due to Shutdown Group CEA movement. CEA movement is only required if the specific limit exceeded can be improved by taking this action.

In the determination of the required combination of boration flow rate and boron concentration, there is no unique requirement that must be satisfied. Since it is imperative to raise the boron concentration of the RCS as soon as possible, the boron concentration should be a highly concentrated solution, such as that normally found in the refueling water tank. The operator should borate with the best source available for the plant conditions.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

In determining the boration flow rate the time in core life must be considered. For instance, the most difficult time in core life to increase the RCS boron concentration is at the beginning of cycle, when the boron concentration will exceed 2000 ppm. Assuming that a value of 1% $\Delta k/k$ must be recovered and a boration flow rate of 26 gpm, it is possible to increase the boron concentration of the RCS by 100 ppm in approximately 35 minutes with a 4000 ppm source. If a boron worth of 10 pcm/ppm is assumed, this combination of parameters will increase the SDM by 1% $\Delta k/k$. These boration parameters of 26 gpm and 4000 ppm represent typical values and are provided for the purpose of offering a specific example.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.3

SDM, K_{N-1}, and criticality not being achievable with Shutdown Group CEA withdrawal are verified by performing a reactivity balance calculation, considering the listed reactivity effects:

a. RCS boron concentration;

b. CEA positions;

c. RCS average temperature;

d. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation;

e. Xenon concentration;

f. Samarium concentration; and

g. Isothermal temperature coefficient (ITC).

Using the ITC accounts for Doppler reactivity in this calculation because the reactor is subcritical, and the fuel temperature will be changing at the same rate as that of the RCS.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	CEA alignment satisfies Criteria 2 and 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).
LCO	The limits on part length, shutdown, and regulating CEA alignments ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis will remain valid. The requirements on OPERABILITY ensure that upon reactor trip, the CEAs will be available and will be inserted to provide enough negative reactivity to shut down the reactor. The OPERABILITY requirements also ensure that the CEA banks maintain the correct power distribution and CEA alignment. The requirement is to maintain the CEA alignment to within 6.6 inches between any CEA and all other CEAs in its group. Failure to meet the requirements of this LCO may produce unacceptable power peaking factors, DNBR, and LHRs, or unacceptable SDMs, all of which may constitute initial conditions inconsistent with the safety analysis.
APPLICABILITY	The requirements on CEA OPERABILITY and alignment are applicable in MODES 1 and 2 because these are the only MODES in which neutron (or fission) power is generated, and the OPERABILITY (e.g., trippability) and alignment of CEAs have the potential to affect the safety of the plant. In MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, the alignment limits do not apply because the reactor is shut down and not producing fission power. In the shutdown modes, the OPERABILITY of the shutdown and regulating CEAs has the potential to affect the required SDM, but this effect can be compensated for by an increase in the boron concentration of the RCS. See LCO 3.1.2, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) - Reactor Trip Breakers Closed," for SDM in MODES 3, 4, and 5, and LCO 3.9.1, "Boron Concentration," for boron concentration requirements during refueling.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

A CEA may become misaligned, yet remain trippable. In this condition, the CEA can still perform its required function of adding negative reactivity should a reactor trip be necessary.

If one or more CEAs (regulating, shutdown, or part length) are misaligned by 6.6 inches and ≤ 9.9 inches but trippable, or one CEA misaligned by > 9.9 inches but trippable, continued operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided, within 1 hour, the power is reduced in accordance with the limits in the COLR, and within 2 hours CEA alignment is restored. Regulating and part length CEA alignment can be restored by either aligning the misaligned CEA(s) to within 6.6 inches of its group or aligning the misaligned CEA's group to within 6.6 inches of the misaligned CEA(s). Shutdown CEA alignment can be restored by aligning the misaligned CEA(s) to within 6.6 inches of its group.

Xenon redistribution in the core starts to occur as soon as a CEA becomes misaligned. Reducing THERMAL POWER in accordance with the limits in the COLR ensures acceptable power distributions are maintained (Ref. 3). For small misalignments (< 9.9 inches) of the CEAs, there is:

a. A small effect on the time dependent long term power distributions relative to those used in generating LCOs and limiting safety system settings (LSSS) setpoints;

b. A negligible effect on the available SDM; and

c. A small effect on the ejected CEA worth used in the accident analysis.

With a large CEA misalignment (≥ 9.9 inches), however, this misalignment would cause distortion of the core power distribution. This distortion may, in turn, have a significant effect on the time dependent, long term power distributions relative to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints. The effect on the available SDM and the ejected CEA worth used in the accident analysis remain small.

Therefore, this condition is limited to the single CEA misalignment, while still allowing 2 hours for recovery.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1

With any CEA not fully inserted and less than the minimum required reactivity equivalent available for insertion, or with all CEAs inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the reactivity equivalent of the highest worth withdrawn CEA, restoration of the minimum shutdown reactivity requirements must be accomplished by increasing the RCS boron concentration. The required Completion Time of 15 minutes for initiating boration allows the operator sufficient time to align the valves and start the boric acid pumps and is consistent with the Completion Time of LCO 3.1.2.

In the determination of the required combination of boration flow rate and boron concentration, there is no unique requirement that must be satisfied. Since it is imperative to raise the boron concentration of the RCS as soon as possible, the boron concentration should be a highly concentrated solution, such as that normally found in the refueling water tank. The operator should borate with the best source available for the plant conditions.

In determining the boration flow rate the time in core life must be considered. For instance, the most difficult time in core life to increase the RCS boron concentration is at the beginning of cycle, when boron concentration may approach or exceed 2000 ppm. Assuming that a value of 1% $\Delta k/k$ must be recovered and a boration flow rate of 26 gpm, it is possible to increase the boron concentration of the RCS by 100 ppm in approximately 35 minutes with a 4000 ppm source. If a boron worth of 10 pcm/ppm is assumed, this combination of parameters will increase the SDM by 1% $\Delta k/k$. These boration parameters of 26 gpm and 4000 ppm represent typical values and are provided for the purpose of offering a specific example.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.9.1

Verification of the position of each partially or fully withdrawn full length or part length CEA is necessary to ensure that the minimum negative reactivity requirements for insertion on a trip are preserved. A 2 hour Frequency is sufficient for the operator to verify that each CEA position is within the acceptance criteria.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SR 3.1.9.2

Prior demonstration that each CEA to be withdrawn from the core during PHYSICS TESTS is capable of full insertion, when tripped from at least a 50% withdrawn position, ensures that the CEA will insert on a trip signal. The 7 day Frequency ensures that the CEAs are OPERABLE prior to reducing SDM requirements to less than the limits of LCO 3.1.2.

SR 3.1.9.3

During MODE 3, verification that the reactor is subcritical by at least the reactivity equivalent of the highest estimated CEA worth ensures that the minimum negative reactivity requirements are preserved. The negative reactivity requirements are verified by performing a reactivity balance calculation, considering the listed reactivity effects:

a. RCS boron concentration;

b. CEA positions;

c. RCS average temperature;

d. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation;

e. Xenon concentration; and

f. Samarium concentration.

The Frequency of 2 hours is based on the generally slow change in required boron concentration, and it allows sufficient time for the operator to collect the required data.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Section XI.

2. 10 CFR 50.59.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2, August 1978.

4. ANSI/ANS-19.6.1-1985, December 13, 1985.

5. UFSAR, Chapter 14.

6. 10 CFR 50.46.

7. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

Condition A applies to the failure of a single CEAC channel. There are only two CEACs, each providing CEA deviation input into all four CPC channels. The CEACs include complex diagnostic software, making it unlikely that a CEAC will fail without informing the CPCs of its failed status. With one failed CEAC, the CPC will receive CEA deviation penalty factors from the remaining OPERABLE CEAC. If the second CEAC should fail (Condition B), the CPC will use large preassigned penalty factors. The specific Required Actions allowed are as follows:

With one CEAC inoperable, the second CEAC still provides a comprehensive set of comparison checks on individual CEAs within subgroups, as well as outputs to all CPCs, CEA deviation alarms, and position indication for display. Verification every 4 hours that each CEA is within 6.6 inches of the other CEAs in its group provides a check on the position of all CEAs and provides verification of the proper operation of the remaining CEAC. An OPERABLE CEAC will not generate penalty factors until deviations of > 9.0 inches within a subgroup are encountered.

The Completion Time of once per 4 hours is adequate based on operating experience, considering the low probability of an undetected CEA deviation coincident with an undetected failure in the remaining CEAC within this limited time frame.

As long as Required Action A.1 is accomplished as specified, the inoperable CEAC can be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is adequate for most repairs, while minimizing risk, considering that dropped CEAs are detectable by the redundant CEAC, and other LCOs specify Required Actions necessary to maintain DNBR and LPD margin.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5 and B.6

Condition B applies if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Required Action A are not met, or if both CEACs are inoperable. Actions associated with this Condition involve disabling the Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System (CEDMCS), while providing increased assurance that CEA deviations are not occurring and informing all OPERABLE CPC channels, via a software flag, that both CEACs are failed. This will ensure that the large penalty factor associated with two CEAC failures will be applied to CPC calculations. The penalty factor for two failed CEACs is sufficiently large that power must be maintained significantly < 100% RTP if CPC generated reactor trips are to be avoided. The Completion Time of 4 hours is adequate to accomplish these actions while minimizing risks.

The Required Actions are as follows:

B.1

Meeting the DNBR margin requirements of LCO 3.2.4, "DNBR" ensures that power level is within a conservative region of operation based on actual core conditions.

B.2

This Action requires that the CEAs are maintained fully withdrawn (≥ 144.75"), except as required for specified testing or flux control via group #5. This verification ensures that undesired perturbations in local fuel burnup are prevented. The Upper Electrical Limit (UEL) CEA reed switches provide an acceptable indication of CEA position.

B.3

The "RSPT/CEAC Inoperable" addressable constant in each of the OPERABLE CPCs is set to indicate that both CEACs are inoperable. This provides a conservative penalty factor to ensure that a conservative effective margin is maintained by the CPCs in the computation of DNBR and LPD trips.

(continued)

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits

BASES

BACKGROUND

These Bases address requirements for maintaining RCS pressure, temperature, and flow rate within limits assumed in the safety analyses. The safety analyses (Ref. 1) of normal operating conditions and anticipated operational occurrences assume initial conditions within the normal steady state envelope. The limits placed on DNB related parameters ensure that these parameters will not be less conservative than were assumed in the analyses and thereby provide assurance that the minimum Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) will meet the required criteria for each of the transients analyzed.

The LCO limits for minimum and maximum RCS pressures as measured at the pressurizer are consistent with operation within the nominal operating envelope and are bounded by those used as the initial pressures in the analyses.

The LCO limit for minimum and maximum RCS cold leg temperatures are in accordance with the area of acceptable operation shown in Figure 3.4.1-1, are consistent with operation at the indicated power level, and are bounded by those used as the initial temperatures in the analyses.

The LCO limit for minimum RCS flow rate is bounded by those used as the initial flow rates in the analyses. The RCS flow rate is not expected to vary during plant operation with all pumps running.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The requirements of LCO 3.4.1 represent the initial conditions for DNB limited transients analyzed in the safety analyses (Ref. 1). The safety analyses have shown that transients initiated from the limits of this LCO will meet the DNBR criterion of ≥ 1.3. This is the acceptance limit for the RCS DNB parameters. Changes to the facility that could impact these parameters must be assessed for their impact on the DNBR criterion.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The transients analyzed for include loss of coolant flow events and dropped or stuck Control Element Assembly (CEA) events. A key assumption for the analysis of these events is that the core power distribution is within the limits of LCO 3.1.7, "Regulating CEA Insertion Limits"; LCO 3.1.8, "Part Length CEA Insertion Limits"; LCO 3.2.3, "AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T_q)"; and LCO 3.2.5, "AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI).

The RCS DNB limits satisfy Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.56(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

This LCO specifies limits on the monitored process variables - RCS pressurizer pressure, RCS cold leg temperature, and RCS total flow rate - to ensure that the core operates within the limits assumed for the plant safety analyses. Operating within these limits will result in meeting the DNBR criterion in the event of a DNB limited transient.

The LCO numerical value for minimum flow rate is given for the measurement location but has not been adjusted for instrument error. Plant specific limits of instrument error are established by the plant staff to meet the operational requirements of minimum flow rate.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 1 for RCS flow rate, MODES 1 and 2 for RCS pressurizer pressure, Mode 1 for RCS cold leg temperature, and MODE 2 with $K_{eff} \geq 1$ for RCS cold leg temperature, the limits must be maintained during steady state operation in order to ensure that DNBR criteria will be met in the event of an unplanned loss of forced coolant flow or other DNB limited transient. In all other MODES, the power level is low enough so that DNBR is not a concern.

(continued)

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality

BASES

BACKGROUND

Establishing the value for the minimum temperature for reactor criticality is based upon considerations for:

a. Operation within the existing instrumentation ranges and accuracies;

b. Operation within the bounds of the existing accident analyses; and

c. Operation with the reactor vessel above its minimum nil ductility reference temperature when the reactor is critical.

The reactor coolant moderator temperature coefficient used in core operating and accident analysis is typically defined for the normal operating temperature range (550°F to 611°F). Nominal T_{cold} for making the reactor critical is 565°F. Safety and operating analyses for lower temperature have not been made.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

There are no accident analyses that dictate the minimum temperature for criticality.

The RCS minimum temperature for criticality satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The purpose of the LCO is to prevent criticality below the minimum normal operating temperature (550°F) and to prevent operation in an unanalyzed condition.

The LCO is only applicable in MODES 1 and 2 with $K_{eff} \geq 1.0$ and provides a reasonable distance to the limit of 545°F. This allows adequate time to trend its approach and take corrective actions prior to exceeding the limit.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY	The reactor has been designed and analyzed to be critical in MODES 1 and 2 only and in accordance with this specification. Criticality is not permitted in any other MODE. Therefore, this LCO is applicable in MODE 1, and MODE 2 when $K_{eff} \geq 1.0$. Monitoring is required at or below a T_{cold} of 550°F. The no load temperature of 565°F is maintained by the Steam Bypass Control System.
ACTIONS	A.1 If T_{cold} is below 545°F, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 30 minutes. Rapid reactor shutdown can be readily and practically achieved within a 30 minute period. The allowed time reflects the ability to perform this action and to maintain the plant within the analyzed range.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	SR 3.4.2.1 T_{cold} is required to be verified ≥ 545°F once within 30 minutes after any RCS loop T_{cold} < 550°F and every 30 minutes thereafter. The 30 minute time period is frequent enough to prevent inadvertent violation of the LCO. A Note states the Surveillance is required whenever the reactor is critical and temperature is below 550°F. A second Frequency requires T_{cold} to be verified within 30 minutes of reaching criticality. This will require repeated performance of SR 3.4.2.1 since a reactor startup takes longer than 30 minutes. The 30 minute time period is frequent enough to prevent inadvertent violation of the LCO.
REFERENCES	1. UFSAR, Section 15.

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.4 RCS Loops - MODES 1 and 2

BASES

BACKGROUND

The primary function of the RCS is removal of the heat generated in the fuel due to the fission process and transfer of this heat, via the steam generators (SGs), to the secondary plant.

The secondary functions of the RCS include:

a. Moderating the neutron energy level to the thermal state, to increase the probability of fission;

b. Improving the neutron economy by acting as a reflector;

c. Carrying the soluble neutron poison, boric acid;

d. Providing a second barrier against fission product release to the environment; and

e. Removing the heat generated in the fuel due to fission product decay following a unit shutdown.

The RCS configuration for heat transport uses two RCS loops. Each RCS loop contains a SG and two Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs). An RCP is located in each of the two SG cold legs. The pump flow rate has been sized to provide core heat removal with appropriate margin to Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) during power operation and for anticipated transients originating from power operation. This Specification requires two RCS loops with both RCPs in operation in each loop. The intent of the Specification is to require core heat removal with forced flow during power operation. Specifying two RCS loops provides the minimum necessary paths (two SGs) for heat removal.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Safety analyses contain various assumptions for the Design Bases Accident (DBA) initial conditions including RCS pressure, RCS temperature, reactor power level, core parameters, and safety system setpoints. The important

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

aspect for this LCO is the reactor coolant forced flow rate, which is represented by the number of RCS loops in service.

The reactor coolant pumps provide sufficient forced circulation flow through the reactor coolant system to assure adequate heat removal from the reactor core during power operation. The plant is designed to operate with both reactor coolant loops and associated reactor coolant pumps in operation, and maintain a departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) above the DNBR Safety Limit during all normal operations and anticipated transients. The safety analyses that are of most importance to RCP operation are the total loss of reactor coolant flow, single pump locked rotor, single pump (broken shaft or coastdown), and rod withdrawal events (Ref. 1).

RCS Loops – MODES 1 and 2 satisfy Criteria 2 and 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (C)(2)(ii).

LCO

The purpose of this LCO is to require adequate forced flow for core heat removal. Flow is represented by having both RCS loops with both RCPs in each loop in operation for removal of heat by the two SGs. To meet safety analysis acceptance criteria for DNB, four pumps are required at rated power.

Each OPERABLE loop consists of two RCPs providing forced flow for heat transport to an SG that is OPERABLE in accordance with the Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program. SG, and hence RCS loop, OPERABILITY with regard to SG water level is ensured by the Reactor Protection System (RPS) in MODES 1 and 2.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, the reactor is critical and thus has the potential to produce maximum THERMAL POWER. Thus, to ensure that the assumptions of the accident analyses remain valid, all RCS loops are required to be OPERABLE and in operation in these MODES to prevent DNB and core damage.

The decay heat production rate is much lower than the full power heat rate. As such, the forced circulation flow and heat sink requirements are reduced for lower, noncritical MODES as indicated by the LCOs for MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Operation in other MODES is covered by:

LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops – MODE 3";
LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops – MODE 4";
LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops – MODE 5, Loops Filled";
LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops – MODE 5, Loops Not Filled";
LCO 3.9.4, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation – High Water Level" (MODE 6); and
LCO 3.9.5, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation – Low Water Level" (MODE 6).

ACTIONS

A.1

If the requirements of the LCO are not met, the Required Action is to reduce power and bring the plant to MODE 3. This lowers power level and thus reduces the core heat removal needs and minimizes the possibility of violating DNB limits. It should be noted that the reactor will trip and place the plant in MODE 3 as soon as the RPS senses less than four RCPs operating.

The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging safety systems.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.4.1

This SR requires verification every 12 hours that the required number of RCS loops are in operation and circulating reactor coolant. Verification includes flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help to ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal while maintaining the margin to DNB. The Frequency of 12 hours has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess degradation and verify operation within safety analyses assumptions. In addition, control room indication and alarms will normally indicate loop status.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 15.

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the four spring loaded pressurizer safety valves is to provide RCS overpressure protection. Operating in conjunction with the Reactor Protection System, four valves are used to ensure that the Safety Limit (SL) of 2750 psia is not exceeded for analyzed transients during operation in MODES 1, 2 and 3. One safety valve used for MODE 4. For MODE 5, and MODE 6 with the head on, overpressure protection is provided by operating procedures and the LCO 3.4.13, "Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System."

The self actuated pressurizer safety valves are designed in accordance with the requirements set forth in the ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III (Ref. 1). The required lift pressure is 2475 psia +3%, -1%. The safety valves discharge steam from the pressurizer to a quench tank located in the containment. The discharge flow is indicated by an increase in temperature downstream of the safety valves and by an increase in the quench tank temperature and level.

The lift setting is for the ambient conditions associated with MODES 1, 2, and 3. This requires either that the valves be set hot or that a correlation between hot and cold settings be established.

The pressurizer safety valves are part of the primary success path and mitigate the effects of postulated accidents. OPERABILITY of the safety valves ensures that the RCS pressure will be limited to 110% of design pressure. The consequences of exceeding the ASME pressure limit (Ref. 1) could include damage to RCS components, increased leakage, or a requirement to perform additional stress analyses prior to resumption of reactor operation.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	All accident analyses in the UFSAR that require safety valve actuation assume operation of four pressurizer safety valves to limit increasing reactor coolant pressure. The overpressure protection analysis is also based on operation of four safety valves and assumes that the valves open at the high range of the setting (2475 psia + 3%). These valves must accommodate pressurizer pressure and volume insurges that could occur during transients due to decrease in heat removal by the secondary systems, reactivity and power distribution anomalies, and increases in RCS inventory. Single failure of a safety valve is neither assumed in the accident analysis nor required to be addressed by the ASME Code. Compliance with this specification is required to ensure that the accident analysis and design basis calculations remain valid. The pressurizer safety valves satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).
LCO	The four pressurizer safety valves are set to open at 25 psia less than RCS design pressure (2475 psia) and within the ASME specified tolerance to avoid exceeding the maximum RCS design pressure SL, to maintain accident analysis assumptions, and to comply with ASME Code requirements. The limit protected by this specification is the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) SL of 110% of design pressure. Inoperability of one or more valves could result in exceeding the SL if a transient were to occur. The consequences of exceeding the ASME pressure limit could include damage to one or more RCS components, increased leakage, or additional stress analysis being required prior to resumption of reactor operation.
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, OPERABILITY of four valves is required because the combined capacity is required to keep reactor coolant pressure below 110% of its design value during certain accidents. MODE 3 is conservatively included, although the listed accidents may not require four safety valves for protection.

(continued)

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.11 Pressurizer Safety Valves-MODE 4

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the four spring loaded pressurizer safety valves is to provide RCS overpressure protection. One safety valve is used for portions of MODE 4. For the remainder of MODE 4, MODE 5, and MODE 6 with the head on, overpressure protection is provided by operating procedures and the LCO 3.4.13, "Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System."

The self actuated pressurizer safety valves are designed in accordance with the requirements set forth in the ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III (Ref. 1). The required lift pressure is 2475 psia +3%, -1%. The safety valves discharge steam from the pressurizer to a quench tank located in the containment. The discharge flow is indicated by an increase in temperature downstream of the safety valves and by an increase in the quench tank temperature and level.

The lift setting is for the ambient conditions associated with MODES 1, 2, and 3. This requires either that the valves be set hot or that a correlation between hot and cold settings be established.

The pressurizer safety valves are part of the primary success path and mitigate the effects of postulated accidents. OPERABILITY of the safety valves ensures that the RCS pressure will be limited to 110% of design pressure. The consequences of exceeding the ASME pressure limit (Ref. 1) could include damage to RCS components, increased leakage, or a requirement to perform additional stress analyses prior to resumption of reactor operation.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Pressurizer Safety Valve Requirements

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit (SL) of 2750 psia. Each safety valve is designed to relieve a minimum of 454,336 lb per hour of saturated steam at valve setpoint. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown above LTOP System temperatures.

Shutdown Cooling System Suction Line Relief Valve Requirements

A single Shutdown Cooling System suction line relief valve provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization in the event that no pressurizer safety valves are OPERABLE.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

All accident analyses in the UFSAR that require safety valve actuation assume operation of four pressurizer safety valves to limit increasing reactor coolant pressure. The overpressure protection analysis is also based on operation of four safety valves and assumes that the valves open at the high range of the setting (2475 psia + 3%). These valves must accommodate pressurizer pressure and volume insurges that could occur during transients due to decrease in heat removal by the secondary systems, reactivity and power distribution anomalies, and increase in RCS inventory. Single failure of a safety valve is neither assumed in the accident analysis nor required to be addressed by the ASME Code. Compliance with this specification is required to ensure that the accident analysis and design basis calculations remain valid.

The pressurizer safety valves satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

(continued)

BASES

LCO

RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

a. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE

No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material deterioration. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.

b. Unidentified LEAKAGE

One gallon per minute (gpm) of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and containment sump level monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB, if the LEAKAGE is from the pressure boundary.

c. Identified LEAKAGE

Up to 10 gpm of identified LEAKAGE is considered allowable because LEAKAGE is from known sources that do not interfere with detection of identified LEAKAGE and is well within the capability of the RCS makeup system. Identified LEAKAGE includes LEAKAGE to the containment from specifically known and located sources, but does not include pressure boundary LEAKAGE or controlled Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal leakoff (a normal function not considered LEAKAGE). Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of a component or system.

(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued)

LCO 3.4.15, "RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage," measures leakage through each individual PIV and can impact this LCO. Of the two PIVs in series in each isolated line, leakage measured through one PIV does not result in RCS LEAKAGE when the other is leaktight. If both valves leak and result in a loss of mass from the RCS, the loss must be included in the allowable identified LEAKAGE.

d. Primary to Secondary LEAKAGE through Any One SG

The maximum allowable operational primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one SG of 150 gpd is based on operating experience as an indication of one or more propagating tube leak mechanisms. This operational limit is significantly less than the initial conditions assumed in the safety analyses. The Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program described in TS Section 5.5.9 ensures that the structural integrity of the SG tubes is maintained. The 150 gpd leakage rate limit provides additional assurance against tube rupture at normal and faulted conditions and provides additional assurance that cracks will not propagate to burst prior to detection by leakage monitoring methods and commencement of plant shutdown. Primary to secondary LEAKAGE must be included in the total allowable limit for identified LEAKAGE.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the RCS is pressurized.

In MODES 5 and 6, LEAKAGE limits are not required because the reactor coolant pressure is far lower, resulting in lower stresses and reduced potentials for LEAKAGE.

(continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

During this event, the SITs discharge to the RCS as soon as RCS pressure decreases to below SIT pressure. As a conservative estimate, the LBLOCA analysis does not take credit for the SI pump flow until the SITs are empty. The actual delay from the time that the pressurizer pressure reaches the SIAS setpoint to the time that the SI flow is delivered to the RCS does not exceed 30 seconds. No operator action is assumed during the blowdown stage of a large break LOCA.

The worst case small break LOCA also assumes a time delay before pumped flow reaches the core. For the larger range of small breaks, the rate of blowdown is such that the increase in fuel clad temperature is terminated solely by the SITs, with pumped flow then providing continued cooling. As break size decreases, the SITs and HPSI pumps both play a part in terminating the rise in clad temperature. As break size continues to decrease, the role of the SITs continues to decrease until they are not required, and the HPSI pumps become solely responsible for terminating the temperature increase.

This LCO helps to ensure that the following acceptance criteria, established by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 3) for the ECCS, will be met following a LOCA:

a. Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is ≤ 2200°F;

b. Maximum cladding oxidation is ≤ 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation;

c. Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is ≤ 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react; and

d. The core is maintained in a coolable geometry.

Since the SITs discharge during the blowdown phase of a LOCA, they do not contribute to the long term cooling requirements of 10 CFR 50.46.

Since the SITs are passive components, single active failures are not applicable to their operation. The SIT isolation valves and SIT nitrogen vent valves, however, are not single failure proof;

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

therefore, whenever the SIT motor operated isolation valves are open, power is removed from their operators and the switch is key locked open. Whenever the SIT vent valves are closed, power is removed with a keylock switch.

These precautions ensure that the SITs are available during an accident (Ref. 4). With power supplied to the valves, a single active failure could result in a valve failure, which would render one SIT unavailable for injection. If a second SIT is lost through the break, only two SITs would reach the core. Active failures that could affect the SITs would be the closure of a motor operated outlet valve or opening of a solenoid operated nitrogen vent valve, the requirement to remove power from these eliminates this failure mode.

The minimum volume requirement for the SITs ensures that three SITs can provide adequate inventory to reflood the core and downcomer following a LOCA. The downcomer then remains flooded until the HPSI and LPSI systems start to deliver flow.

The maximum volume limit is based on maintaining an adequate gas volume to ensure proper injection and the ability of the SITs to fully discharge, as well as limiting the maximum amount of boron inventory in the SITs.

A minimum of 1750 cubic feet of borated water, and a maximum of 1950 cubic feet of borated water are used in the safety analyses as the volume in the SITs. To allow for instrument inaccuracy, a 28% narrow range (corresponding to 1802 cubic feet) and a 72% narrow range (corresponding to 1914 cubic feet) are specified. The analyses are based upon the cubic feet requirements; the percentage figures are provided in the LCO for operator use because the level indicator provided in the control room is marked in percentages, not in cubic feet.

The minimum nitrogen cover pressure requirement ensures that the contained gas volume will generate discharge flow rates during injection that are consistent with those assumed in the safety analyses.

The maximum nitrogen cover pressure limit ensures that excessive amounts of gas will not be injected into the RCS after the SITs have emptied.

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B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.5 Refueling Water Tank (RWT)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The RWT supports the ECCS and the Containment Spray System by providing a source of borated water for Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) pump operation.

The RWT supplies two ECCS trains by separate, redundant supply headers. Each header also supplies one train of the Containment Spray System. A motor operated isolation valve is provided in each header to allow the operator to isolate the usable volume of the RWT from the ECCS after the ESF pump suction has been transferred to the containment sump following depletion of the RWT during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). A separate header is used to supply the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) from the RWT. Use of a single RWT to supply both trains of the ECCS is acceptable since the RWT is a passive component, and passive failures are not assumed to occur coincidently with the Design Basis Event during the injection phase of an accident. Not all the water stored in the RWT is available for injection following a LOCA; the location of the ECCS suction piping in the RWT will result in some portion of the stored volume being unavailable.

The High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI), Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI), and containment spray pumps are provided with recirculation lines that ensure each pump can maintain minimum flow requirements when operating at shutoff head conditions. These lines discharge back to the RWT, which vents to the Fuel Building Ventilation System. When the suction for the HPSI and containment spray pumps is transferred to the containment sump, this flow path must be isolated to prevent a release of the containment sump contents to the RWT. If not isolated, this flow path could result in a release of contaminants to the atmosphere and the eventual loss of suction head for the ESF pumps.

This LCO ensures that:

a. The RWT contains sufficient borated water to support the ECCS during the injection phase;

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

b. Sufficient water volume exists in the containment sump to support continued operation of the ESF pumps at the time of transfer to the recirculation mode of cooling; and

c. The reactor remains subcritical following a LOCA.

Insufficient water inventory in the RWT could result in insufficient cooling capacity of the ECCS when the transfer to the recirculation mode occurs. Improper boron concentrations could result in a reduction of SDM or excessive boric acid precipitation in the core following a LOCA, as well as excessive caustic stress corrosion of mechanical components and systems inside containment.

The RWT also provides a source of borated water to the charging system for makeup to the RCS to compensate for contraction of the RCS coolant during plant cooldown while maintaining adequate shutdown margin. Although this charging system boration function is not required to be in a Technical Specification LCO per 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) criteria, the RWT volume requirements of Figure 3.5.5-1 include this function in order to provide the plant operators with a single requirement for RWT volume.

For hot zero power temperature of 565 degrees F, the RWT volume requirement of 600,000 gallons will ensure adequate shutdown margin during a subsequent cooldown. For power levels greater than zero, with a corresponding increase in average RCS temperature, the volume of borated water to maintain the shutdown margin is the same as at zero power. Contraction requirements are greater at higher average RCS temperatures; however, the additional contraction is accommodated by an acceptable reduction in pressurizer level. Consequently, for operation at average RCS temperatures greater than 565 degrees F, the minimum volume required in the RWT is constant at 600,000 gallons.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The Containment Spray System accelerates the air mixing process between the upper dome space of the containment atmosphere during LOCA operations. It also prevents any hot spot air pockets during the containment cooling mode and avoids any hydrogen concentration in pocket areas.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The Containment Spray System limits the temperature and pressure that could be experienced following a DBA. The Containment Spray System is required to be capable of reducing containment pressure to 1/2 the peak pressure within 24 hours following a DBA. The limiting DBAs considered relative to containment temperature and pressure are the Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). The DBA LOCA and MSLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients. No DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. The postulated DBAs are analyzed with regard to containment ESF systems, assuming the loss of one ESF bus, which is the worst case single active failure, resulting in one train of the Containment Spray System being rendered inoperable.

The analysis and evaluation show that under the worst case scenario, the highest peak containment pressure is 52.0 psig (experienced during a LOCA). The analysis shows that the peak containment vapor temperature is 405.65°F (experienced during a MSLB). Both results are within the design. (See the Bases for Specifications 3.6.4, "Containment Pressure," and 3.6.5, "Containment Air Temperature," for a detailed discussion.) The analyses and evaluations assume a power level of 102% RTP, one containment spray train operating, and initial (pre-accident) conditions of 120°F and 16.7 psia (LOCA) and 13.22 psia (MSLB). The analyses also assume a response time delayed initiation in order to provide a conservative calculation of peak containment pressure and temperature responses.

The effect of an inadvertent containment spray actuation has been analyzed. An inadvertent spray actuation reduces the containment pressure to -2.6 psig due to the sudden cooling effect in the interior of the air tight containment. Additional discussion is provided in the Bases for Specification 3.6.4.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The modeled Containment Spray System actuation from the containment analysis is based upon a response time associated with exceeding the containment High-High pressure setpoint to achieve full flow through the containment spray nozzles. The Containment Spray System total response time includes diesel generator startup (for loss of offsite power), block loading of equipment, containment spray pump startup, and spray line filling (Ref. 2).

The Containment Spray System mixes the containment atmosphere to provide a uniform hydrogen concentration. Hydrogen may accumulate in containment following a LOCA as a result of:

a. A metal steam reaction between the zirconium fuel rod cladding and the reactor coolant;

b. Radiolytic decomposition of water in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the containment sump;

c. Hydrogen in the RCS at the time of the LOCA (i.e., hydrogen dissolved in the reactor coolant and hydrogen gas in the pressurizer vapor space); or

d. Corrosion of metals exposed to Containment Spray System and Emergency Core Cooling Systems solution.

To evaluate the potential for hydrogen accumulation in containment following a LOCA, the hydrogen generation as a function of time following the initiation of the accident is calculated. Conservative assumptions recommended by Reference 8 are used to maximize the amount of hydrogen calculated.

The Containment Spray System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO

During a DBA, one containment spray train is required to maintain the containment peak pressure and temperature below the design limits (Ref. 5), to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere to maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analysis, and provide hydrogen mixing. To ensure that these requirements are met, two containment spray trains must be OPERABLE. Each spray train must be capable of taking suction from the RWT on a

(continued)

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The primary purpose of the MSSVs is to provide overpressure protection for the secondary system. The MSSVs also provide protection against overpressurizing the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) by providing a heat sink for the removal of energy from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) if the preferred heat sink, provided by the Condenser and Circulating Water System, is not available.

Five MSSVs are located on each of the four main steam lines, outside containment, upstream of the main steam isolation valves, as described in the UFSAR, Section 5.2 (Ref. 1). The MSSV rated capacity passes the full steam flow at 102% RTP (100% + 2% for instrument error) with the valves full open. This meets the requirements of the ASME Code, Section III (Ref. 2). The MSSV design includes staggered setpoints, according to Table 3.7.1-2, in the accompanying LCO, so that only the number of valves needed will actuate. Staggered setpoints reduce the potential for valve chattering if there is insufficient steam pressure to fully open all valves.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The design basis for the MSSVs comes from Reference 2; its purpose is to limit secondary system pressure to ≤ 110% of design pressure when passing 100% of design steam flow. This design basis is sufficient to cope with any Anticipated Operational Occurrence (AOO) or accident considered in the Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis.

The events that challenge the MSSV relieving capacity, and thus RCS pressure, are those characterized as decreased heat removal events, and are presented in the FSAR, Section 15.2 (Ref. 3). Of these, the full power Loss Of Condenser Vacuum (LOCV) event is the limiting AOO. An LOCV isolates the turbine and condenser, and terminates normal feedwater flow to the steam generators. Before delivery of auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators, RCS pressure reaches ≤ 2742 psia. This peak pressure is < 110% of the design pressure of 2500 psia, but high enough to actuate the pressurizer safety valves.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	The limiting accident for peak RCS pressure is the full power feedwater line break (FWLB), inside containment, with the failure of the backflow check valve in the feedwater line from the affected steam generator. Water from the affected steam generator is assumed to be lost through the break with minimal additional heat transfer from the RCS. With heat removal limited to the unaffected steam generator, the reduced heat transfer causes an increase in RCS temperature, and the resulting RCS fluid expansion causes an increase in pressure. The RCS pressure increases to ≤ 2843 psia, with the pressurizer safety valves providing relief capacity. These results were found acceptable by the NRC based on the low probability of the event. The MSSVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).
LCO	This LCO requires all MSSVs to be OPERABLE in compliance with Reference 2, even though this is not a requirement of the DBA analysis. This is because operation with less than the full number of MSSVs requires limitations on allowable THERMAL POWER (to meet Reference 2 requirements), and adjustment to the Reactor Protection System trip setpoints. These limitations are according to those shown in Table 3.7.1-1 and Required Action A.2 in the accompanying LCO. An MSSV is considered inoperable if it fails to open upon demand. The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is defined as the ability to open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam generator overpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced. The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The lift settings, according to Table 3.7.1-2 in the accompanying LCO, correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure. This LCO provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform their designed safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in a challenge to the RCPB.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

If the MSSVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status in the associated Completion Time, or if one or more steam generators have less than six MSSVs OPERABLE, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.1.1

This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoints in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 4), requires that safety and relief valve tests be performed in accordance with ANSI/ASME OM-1-1987 (Ref. 5). According to Reference 5, the following tests are required for MSSVs:

a. Visual examination;

b. Seat tightness determination;

c. Setpoint pressure determination (lift setting);

d. Compliance with owner's seat tightness criteria; and

e. Verification of the balancing device integrity on balanced valves.

The ASME Standard requires that all valves be tested every 5 years, and a minimum of 20% of the valves tested every 24 months. The ASME Code specifies the activities and frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements. Table 3.7.1-2 allows a ± 3% setpoint tolerance for OPERABILITY; however, the valves are reset to ± 1% during the Surveillance to allow for drift.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.1.1 (continued)

This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This is to allow testing of the MSSVs at hot conditions. The MSSVs may be either bench tested or tested in situ at hot conditions using an assist device to simulate lift pressure. If the MSSVs are not tested at hot conditions, the lift setting pressure shall be corrected to ambient conditions of the valve at operating temperature and pressure.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.2.

2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Article NC-7000, Class 2 Components.

3. UFSAR, Section 15.2.

4. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Subsection IWV.

5. ANSI/ASME OM-1-1987.

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.16 Secondary Specific Activity

BASES

BACKGROUND

Activity in the secondary coolant results from steam generator tube outleakage from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Under steady state conditions, the activity is primarily iodines with relatively short half lives, and thus is indication of current conditions. During transients, I-131 spikes have been observed as well as increased releases of some noble gases. Other fission product isotopes, as well as activated corrosion products in lesser amounts, may also be found in the secondary coolant.

A limit on secondary coolant specific activity during power operation minimizes releases to the environment because of normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and accidents.

This limit is lower than the activity value that might be expected from a 1 gpm tube leak (LCO 3.4.14, "RCS Operational LEAKAGE") of primary coolant at the limit of 1.0 μCi/gm (LCO 3.4.17, "RCS Specific Activity"). The steam line failure is assumed to result in the release of the noble gas and iodine activity contained in the steam generator inventory, the feedwater, and reactor coolant LEAKAGE. Most of the iodine isotopes have short half lives (i.e., < 20 hours). I-131, with a half life of 8.04 days, concentrates faster than it decays, but does not reach equilibrium because of blowdown and other losses.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The accident analysis of the main steam line break (MSLB), as discussed in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assumes the initial secondary coolant specific activity to have a radioactive isotope concentration of 0.10 μCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131. This assumption is used in the analysis for determining the radiological consequences of the postulated accident. The accident analysis, based on this and other assumptions, shows that the radiological consequences of an MSLB do not exceed a small fraction of the unit EAB limits (Ref. 1) for whole body and thyroid dose rates.

With the loss of offsite power, the remaining steam generator is available for core decay heat dissipation by venting steam to the atmosphere through MSSVs and Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs). The Auxiliary Feedwater System supplies the necessary makeup to the steam generator. Venting continues until the reactor coolant temperature and pressure have decreased sufficiently for the Shutdown Cooling System to complete the cooldown.

In the evaluation of the radiological consequences of this accident, the activity released from the steam generator connected to the failed steam line is assumed to be released directly to the environment. The unaffected steam generator is assumed to discharge steam and any entrained activity through MSSVs and ADVs during the event.

Secondary specific activity limits satisfy Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO

As indicated in the Applicable Safety Analyses, the specific activity limit in the secondary coolant system of ≤ 0.10 μCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 to limit the radiological consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) to a small fraction of the required limit (Ref. 1).

Monitoring the specific activity of the secondary coolant ensures that when secondary specific activity limits are exceeded, appropriate actions are taken in a timely manner to place the unit in an operational MODE that would minimize the radiological consequences of a DBA.

(continued)