



**Constellation
Nuclear**

**Calvert Cliffs
Nuclear Power Plant**

*A Member of the
Constellation Energy Group*

January 4, 2001

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Unit Nos. 1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318
Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments - 10 CFR 50.59

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2), Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant hereby submits a report containing brief descriptions of changes, tests, and experiments approved under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.

Attachment (1) of this report includes 50.59 evaluations recorded and approved between February 1, 2000 and December 31, 2000. Items in the report are sorted by 50.59 identification number.

Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

Gary L. Detter
General Supervisor-Design Engineering

GLD/TWG/bjd

Attachment: (1) Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments
[10 CFR 50.59(b)(2)]

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ATTACHMENT (1)

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
[10 CFR 50.59(b)(2)]

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00258	50.59	64	0002	09/06/2000	08/30/2000	01/04/2001

Subject SAFETY EVALUATION TPSS MODIFICATION

Text SUMMARY:

THE ESP RELOCATES THE SAMPLE CONNECTION POINT FOR THE CONDENSATE HEADER UPSTREAM OF THE DEMINERALIZERS. THAT SAMPLE POINT WILL NOW TERMINATE IN THE CDSS VICE THE TPSS. FURTHER, THE DISSOLVED OXYGEN ANALYZERS 1 & 2 AE 6440 1 IN THE TURBINE PLANT SAMPLE SYSTEM (TPSS) 1(2)T21 WILL BE MOVED TO PANELS 1 & 2C57A IN THE CONDENSATE DEMINERALIZER SAMPLING SYSTEM CDSS). THE NEW SAMPLE LINE ROUTING WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY SHORTER THAN THE EXISTING SAMPLE LINE RESULTING IN A REDUCED SAMPLE TRANSIT TIME.

THIS ESP ALSO INSTALLS NEW HYDRAZINE ANALYZERS 1&2 AE 6417 IN PANELS 1&2T21. THE HYDRAZINE ANALYZERS WILL BE ADDED TO THE EXISTING STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER SAMPLE LINES INSIDE PANEL 1&2T21 AND WILL BE USED TO MONITOR HYDRAZINE IN THE FEEDWATER.

ANOTHER ACTIVITY OF THE PROPOSED ESP WILL INSTALL A NEW MANIFOLD TO ALLOW HOTWELL SAMPLES TO BE ANALYZED FOR SODIUM BY CONNECTING THE CONDENSATE HOTWELL SAMPLE LINES (6 LINES PER UNIT) TO THE EXISTING SODIUM ANALYZERS IN PANELS 1&2T21A. THESE MONITORS WILL BE USED TO CHECK FOR SODIUM CONTENT IN THE CONDENSATE SYSTEM WHICH IS INDICATIVE OF CONDENSER TUBE FAILURE.

THIS ESP WILL INSTALL CROSS CONNECTS WITH ISOLATION VALVES BETWEEN THE 11 & 12 AND 21 & 22 MAIN STEAM HEADER SAMPLE LINES AND ADD ROOT VALVES TO EACH RESPECTIVE SAMPLE POINT. THIS WILL PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY TO SAMPLE THE 12 & 22 MAIN STEAM HEADERS WHILE MAINTAINING THE REDUCED HEAT LOAD ON THE ISOTHERMAL BATH SAMPLE COOLERS.

THE PROPOSED ESP ALSO CONNECTS THE HOTWELL SAMPLE LINES IN 1(2)T21 TO THE SODIUM ANALYZER SAMPLE LINE WHICH GOES TO 1(2)T21A. THE SAMPLE ISOLATION STOP VALVES IN 1(2)T21 ARE CLOSED AND THE CONDENSATE PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER pH ANALYZERS IN PANELS 1&2T21 ARE ABANDONED TO SUPPORT SODIUM SAMPLING OF THE HOTWELL SAMPLES.

THIS ACTIVITY ALSO REPLACES THE EXISTING TUBE-IN-SHELL SAMPLE COOLERS WITH NEW TUBE-IN-TUBE SAMPLE COOLERS, PROVIDES A NEW TEMPERATURE CONTROL LOOP TO CONTROL SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURE SUPPLYING TO THE NEW SAMPLE COOLERS, AND REARRANGES THE PIPING BETWEEN THE CIRCULATING WATER PUMP, THE EXISTING 3-WAY TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE, AND THE ISOBATH.

NONE OF THE SSCS AFFECTED BY THE PROPOSED ESP PERFORM ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS.

ALL AFFECTED SSCS ARE CLASSIFIED AS NON-SAFETY RELATED BY THE CCNPP Q-LIST.

THE NECESSARY CHANGES TO THE UFSAR ARE ATTACHED. SECTION 9.6.2.5 HAS BEEN REVISED TO INDICATE THAT THE CONDENSER HOTWELL SAMPLES PASS THROUGH INDIVIDUAL PRIMARY COOLERS SUPPLIED WITH SRW.

AS DISCUSSED ABOVE, THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR IS NOT INCREASED. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR ARE ALSO NOT INCREASED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OR AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR. THERE ARE NO OFFSITE DOSE CONSEQUENCES. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY, AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IS NOT AFFECTED. THEREFORE, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACTIVITIES DEFINED IN THIS SAFETY EVALUATION.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00278	50.59	64	0002	02/23/2000	02/07/2000	06/21/2000

Subject ISSUE REV 5 OF THE U1C14 COLR

Text SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION JUSTIFIED REV. 5 OF THE U1C14 COLR. REV. 5 IMPLEMENTED TWO CHANGES TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION. THE FIRST CHANGE REMOVED THE REQUIREMENT TO CREDIT THE NEGATIVE REACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH 44 CEAs FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE 71C14 BECAUSE SUFFICIENT CYCLE BURNUP HAS BEEN OBTAINED. THE SECOND CHANGE CLARIFIES THAT THE REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION MAINTAINS $k_{eff} < 0.95$ when including a 1% k/k conservative allowance for uncertainties. The results of all analyses of record conservatively apply to Unit 1 Cycle 14 in Modes 6 and 5. It is concluded that operation of Unit 1 Cycle 14 in Modes 6 and 5 does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00345	50.59	64	0002	06/29/2000	06/19/2000	01/03/2001

Subject UNIT 2 CYCLE 13 RELOAD SAFETY EVALUATION TO ADDRESS GRID FRETTING AND SPALLATION

Text SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE OPERATION OF UNIT 2 CYCLE 13. MODIFICATIONS TO THE FUEL ASSEMBLY AND THE RELOAD CORE DESIGN WERE CONSIDERED. THE USE OF A THIRD FULL BATCH OF ERBIUM FOR UNIT 2 AS A BURNABLE ABSORBER WAS CONSIDERED. THE PRE-TRIP STEAM LINE BREAK EVENT, AND SEIZED ROTOR EVENT WERE EVALUATED USING NRC APPROVED DNB CONVOLUTION METHODOLOGY TO PREDICT THE PERCENTAGE OF FUEL FAILURES. THE EVALUATION ASSUMED P_{FT} AND P_{XYT} LIMITS EQUAL TO 1.65 AND RESULTED IN FUEL FAILURES LESS LIMITING THAN THAT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. THE CHANGES ASSOCIATED WITH P_{FT} AND P_{XYT} LIMITS EQUAL TO 1.65 ARE IMPLEMENTED IN THE UNIT 2 CYCLE 13 COLR AND ARE VERIFIED TO BE APPLICABLE TO UNIT 2 CYCLE 13. THE LOSS OF LOAD EVENT WAS ANALYZED FOR A DECREASE IN THE RANGE OF TURBINE STOP VALVE CLOSURE TIMES. THE ANALYSIS CONCLUDED THAT THE PEAK RCS AND STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURES AND THE LINEAR HEAT RATE DO NOT EXCEED THE NRC ACCEPTANCE LIMITS. THE EXCESS HEAT REMOVAL EVENT WAS EVALUATED FOR AN INCREASE IN FEED WATER FLOW AND A DECREASE IN FEEDWATER ENTHALPY. THIS EVALUATION CONCLUDED THAT THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED RESULTS WERE MORE LIMITING. THE POST-TRIP STEAM LINE BREAK EVENT WAS RE-EVALUATED WITH REGARD TO COOLABILITY FOR AN INCREASE IN THE SAFETY INJECTION SWEEPOUT VOLUME. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT FUEL FAILURE DUE TO VIOLATION OF THE DNB SAFDL OR DUE TO EXCEEDING THE CENTER LINE MELT (CLM) LIMIT DID NOT OCCUR FOLLOWING THE RETURN TO POWER FOR

THE FULL POWER CASES, THUS AVERTING THE NEED TO INVOKE THE CORE COOLABILITY LIMIT. THE RESULTS OF THIS EVALUATION WERE BOUNDED BY THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED RESULTS FOR THE POST-TRIP STEAM LINE BREAK EVENT. A TOTAL OF 48 CEAS WERE CREDITED FOR REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION. THE UNIT 2 CYCLE 13 SAFETY ANALYSES ACCOUNTED FOR ALL THE RELOAD CORE DIFFERENCES. REVISION 0001 OF THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE IMPACT OF NOT INSTALLING THREE INCORE INSTRUMENTS (ICIS). IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE CORE MONITORING SYSTEM WAS NOT ADVERSELY EFFECTED BY NOT INSTALLING THESE ICIS. REVISION 0002 OF THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE IMPACT OF SPALLATION AND GRID TO ROD FRETTING ON UNIT 2 CYCLE 13. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT OPERATION OF UNIT 2 CYCLE 13 DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00371	50.59	64	0000	10/02/2000	02/11/2000	11/28/2000
Subject	SCBA UTILIZATION POST ACCIDENT WITH ENHANCED CONTROL ROOM INLEAKAGE					
Text	SUMMARY:					

THIS ACTIVITY ENCOMPASSES CALCULATION PACKAGES, SAFETY EVALUATION SCREEN, SAFETY EVALUATION, AND UFSAR CHANGES TO SUPPORT INCREASED CONTROL ROOM INLEAKAGE. THE INCREASED CONTROL ROOM INLEAKAGE OF 3500 CFM REQUIRES THAT THE CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL BE CAPABLE OF DONNING SCBAs WITHIN 32 MINUTES POST MHA AND WITHIN 82 MINUTES POST PHA, RATHER THAN THE 45 MINUTES POST MHA AND 3 HOURS POST PHA REQUIRED AT 910 CFM INLEAKAGE. THE CONTROL ROOM CHEMICAL HABITABILITY ANALYSES ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THE INCREASED INLEAKAGE. NOTE THAT CURRENT LICENSING BASIS INCLUDES CREDIT FOR SCBAs. THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES LESS TIME TO IMPLEMENT PROTECTIVE MEASURES, WHICH HAS BEEN VERIFIED BY TESTING. THE METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED IN THE ANALYSIS IS IDENTICAL TO THAT PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY THE NRC.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00388	50.59	64		08/14/2000	11/04/1999	11/28/2000
Subject	SAFETY EVALUATION FOR ESP ES199601526-109, UNIT 1 SGR FEEDWATER					
Text	SUMMARY:					

IN SUPPORT OF THE CCNPP UNIT 1 STEAM GENERATOR REPLACEMENT (SGR), ESP ES199601526-109 PROVIDES FOR THE REMOVAL AND MODIFICATION OF EXISTING SECTIONS OF THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPING (PIPING CLASS DB-1) ATTACHED TO STEAM GENERATORS SG11 AND SG12. THIS ESP SUPPLEMENT ALSO ADDRESSES THE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY SUPPORTS AND THE SUBSEQUENT REINSTALLATION OF THE PIPING SECTIONS TO THE REPLACEMENT STEAM GENERATORS (RSGs), INCLUDING ANY NECESSARY PIPING MODIFICATIONS TO ACHIEVE FIT-UP.

OUTAGE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ESP WILL BE LIMITED TO UNIT 1 COLD SHUTDOWN (MODE 5), REFUELING SHUTDOWN (MODE 6), OR WITH THE REACTOR DEFUELED AND ALL FUEL REMOVED FROM CONTAINMENT (DEFUELED), WITH THE FURTHER MODE 5 RESTRICTION THAT ACTIVITIES AFFECTING THE SECONDARY SIDE BOUNDARY MUST AWAIT CLEARANCE BY PLANT OPERATIONS TO ASSURE THAT THE STEAM GENERATORS ARE NO LONGER REQUIRED TO BE MAINTAINED AVAILABLE FOR RCS DECAY HEAT REMOVAL. ATTACHMENT AND REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY SUPPORTS TO THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPING WITHOUT APPLICATION OF RESTRAINING FORCES IS CONSIDERED TO BE AN ACTIVITY NOT AFFECTING THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY OF THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM. ALL FEEDWATER SYSTEM SECONDARY SIDE PRESSURE BOUNDARY-AFFECTING ACTIVITIES MUST BE COMPLETED AND THE RSGs BE RESTORED TO OPERABILITY AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STEAM GENERATOR REPLACEMENT OUTAGE PRIOR TO PLANT OPERATIONS RELYING ON THE STEAM GENERATORS TO FUNCTION AS RCS DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DEVICES.

THE LICENSING AND DESIGN BASES FOR THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPING ARE TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE SECONDARY SIDE PRESSURE BOUNDARY/CONTAINMENT BARRIER, TO FUNCTION TO REMOVE RCS DECAY HEAT USING THE STEAM GENERATORS AS A HEAT REMOVAL MECHANISM, AND TO MINIMIZE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK (I.E., MAIN FEEDWATER LINE BREAK). ESP ES199601526-109 CONTAINS AN ASME CODE RECONCILIATION WHICH DEMONSTRATES THAT IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES (I.E., PIPE CUTTING, PREPARATION AND WELDING, PIPING MODIFICATION DESIGN, AND WELD TESTING/INSPECTION) WILL BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS, AS RECONCILED TO THE ORIGINAL PLANT CONSTRUCTION CODE. THIS CODE RECONCILIATION INCLUDES RSG MODIFICATION EVALUATIONS FOR PIPING DESIGN, FABRICATION, INSTALLATION AND INSPECTION/TESTING TO VERIFY THAT INSTALLATION EQUIVALENCY TO THE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION CODE HAS BEEN MAINTAINED.

ESP ES199601526-109 IMPLEMENTATION WILL ENSURE THAT ANY REPLACEMENT FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPING IS ENGINEERED-EQUIVALENT AND RESTORED TO THE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION CODE, RESULTING IN NO CHANGES TO THE CCNPP UFSAR DESIGN BASES ACCIDENT OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION ASSUMPTIONS. AS A RESULT OF THESE MEASURES, FEEDWATER PIPING RELIABILITY IS REESTABLISHED EQUIVALENT TO PRE-ESP IMPLEMENTATION RELIABILITY SO THAT THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR IS NOT INCREASED. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR WILL NOT BE INCREASED. EQUALLY, NO ACCIDENT INITIATORS OF ACCIDENTS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION MECHANISMS OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR ARE CREATED.

THE CHANGE IN DESIGN PRESSURE FOR SECTIONS OF FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPING FROM THE FEEDWATER PENETRATIONS TO THE STEAM GENERATORS FROM 1500 PSIG TO 1400 PSIG DOES NOT COMPROMISE THE SAFETY OR DESIGN BASES OF THESE FEEDWATER LINES, AS WAS CONCLUDED IN SAFETY EVALUATION NO. 90-B-045-164-R0 (DECEMBER 19, 1990). ESP ES199601526-109 CONTAINS A HOLD POINT TO EVALUATE THE EFFECT OF ANY REPLACEMENT STEAM GENERATOR STEAM PRESSURE INCREASE ON THE BGE CALCULATION M-90-143 EVALUATED WORST CASE SCENARIO PRESSURE POSTULATED TO BE EXPERIENCED BY THIS FEEDWATER PIPING TO ENSURE THAT A 1400 PSIG DESIGN PRESSURE REMAINS BOUNDING FOR THIS FEEDWATER PIPING.

IN THE REVIEW CONDUCTED TO PERFORM THIS 10 CFR 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION, THE FOLLOWING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES WERE IDENTIFIED AS APPLICABLE FOR REVIEW FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ESP ES199601526-109: B3.4.7, B3.4.8, B3.6.1, B3.6.3, AND B.3.9.3. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THESE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES WAS DEMONSTRATED TO NOT BE REDUCED.

BASED ON THE 10 CFR 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION PERFORMED FOR ESP ES199601526-109, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DOES NOT EXIST, AND THAT THIS ESP MAY BE PERFORMED WITHOUT PRIOR NRC APPROVAL. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ESP ES199601526-109 HAS NO EFFECT ON THE INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL INSTALLATION (ISFSI), AND THUS A 10 CFR 72.48 SAFETY EVALUATION WAS NOT PERFORMED.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00397	50.59	64		06/14/2000	11/04/1999	09/25/2000

Subject SAFETY EVALUATION FOR ESP ES199601526-121, UNIT 1 SGR CONTINGENCY RCS ELBOWS

Text SUMMARY:

IN SUPPORT OF THE CCNPP UNIT 1 STEAM GENERATOR REPLACEMENT (SGR), ESP ES199601526-121 PROVIDES FOR THE CONTINGENCY USE OF DESIGNATED REPLACEMENT REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) COLD LEG ELBOWS TO BE EMPLOYED AS REQUIRED TO ENABLE ACCEPTABLE FITUP OF THE RCS COLD LEG NOZZLES OF THE NEW REPLACEMENT STEAM GENERATORS (RSGs) WITH THEIR RCS COLD LEG CONNECTING PIPING. ESP ES199601526-121 ADDRESSES BOTH THE COMPONENT QUALIFICATION AND THE INSTALLATION ASPECTS PARTICULAR TO THE SCOPE OF THIS ESP SUPPLEMENT, AS DISTINCT FROM THE SCOPE OF ESP ES199601526-116, "UNIT 1 RSG MODIFICATION." THE ESP SUPPLEMENT WHICH PROVIDES OVERALL CONTROL OF THE REMOVAL OF THE ORIGINAL STEAM GENERATORS (OSGs) AND INSTALLATION OF THE RSGs.

WHEN ESP ES199601526 121 IS IMPLEMENTED, THE REMOVAL OF THE DESIGNATED RCS COLD LEG ELBOW(S), MACHINING, FITUP/WELDING, AND NDE EXAMINATION OF THE ELBOW TO RCS CONNECTING PIPING WELD(S) WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING THE UNIT 1 DEFUELED CONDITION, WITH BASELINE NDE PERFORMED PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF RECTOR REFUELING IN ORDER TO VERIFY THE REESTABLISHMENT OF NECESSARY RCS INTEGRITY.

THE ESP ES199601526 121 DESIGN INPUT REQUIREMENTS (DIR) CONTAINS AN ENGINEERING REVIEW THAT DEMONSTRATES THAT THE PROCUREMENT AND INSTALLATION OF THE CONTINGENCY RCS COLD LEG ELBOWS WILL BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS, AS RECONCILED TO THE ORIGINAL PLANT CONSTRUCTION CODE. THE REPLACEMENT RCS COLD LEG ELBOW(S) PROVIDES EQUIVALENT PRESSURE BOUNDARY FUNCTION, MATERIAL, AND PIPING GEOMETRY AS THE EXISTING RCS COLD LEG ELBOW(S) SUCH THAT RCS FUNCTIONALITY AND OPERABILITY ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. THE USE OF WELD CLADDING VERSUS MILL CLADDING ON ELBOW HYDRAULIC PERFORMANCE IS EVALUATED TO BE NEGLIGIBLE. ESP ES199601526 121 IMPLEMENTATION WILL ENSURE THAT THE CONNECTION OF THE REPLACEMENT RCS COLD LEG ELBOW(S) TO ITS RCS PIPING INTERFACE IS ENGINEERED-EQUIVALENT AND RESTORED TO THE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION CODE, RESULTING IN NO CHANGES TO THE CCNPP UFSAR DESIGN BASES ACCIDENT OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION ASSUMPTIONS, INCLUDING NRC APPROVED USE OF LEAK-BEFORE-BREAK OF PRIMARY COOLANT LOOP PIPING. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES IS NOT REDUCED.

BASED ON THE 10 CFR 50.59 IMPLEMENTATION SAFETY EVALUATION PERFORMED FOR ESP ES199601526-121, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DOES NOT EXIST, AND THAT THIS ESP MAY BE PERFORMED WITHOUT PRIOR NRC APPROVAL.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00407	50.59	64	0000	04/12/2000	12/08/1999	08/02/2000

Subject UNIT 1 CYCLE 15 RELOAD MODIFICATION

Text SUMMARY:

SE00407 EVALUATED THE OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 15 IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4. (THE CORE ONLOAD OF UIC15 AND OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 15 IN MODES 5 AND 6 WERE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED UNDER SE00424 REV. 0 AND 1.) UNIT 1 CYCLE 15 REPRESENTS THE FIRST FULL BATCH IMPLEMENTATION OF VALUE ADDED PELLET FUEL AT CALVERT CLIFFS. IT IS ALSO THE FIRST RELOAD TO USE THE IMPROVED ENDF/B VI CROSS SECTION LIBRARY IN LIEU OF THE TRADITIONAL ENDF/B-IV CROSS SECTION LIBRARY. TWO TEST LEAD FUEL ASSEMBLIES (LFAs) WILL BE REINSERTED IN UIC15 FOR A THIRD CYCLE OF IRRADIATION. THESE LFAs CONTAIN ADVANCE FUEL DESIGN FEATURES INCLUDING VALUE ADDED PELLETS, MIXING GRIDS AND SPRINGS. MODIFICATIONS TO THE FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN AND THE RELOAD CORE DESIGN WERE CONSIDERED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS. ERBIUM CONTINUES TO BE USED AS AN INTEGRAL BURNABLE ABSORBER FOR THIS 24 MONTH FUEL CYCLE. A COLR FOR UIC15 HAS BEEN DEVELOPED PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF TECH SPEC 5.6.5. THE TM/LP TRIP SETPOINTS HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO MATCH THOSE CURRENTLY IN USE ON UNIT 2. THE SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN MATERIAL (POLYMER) ON THE BOTTOM FEET OF ASSEMBLY 1S018. ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO MINIMIZE GRID TO ROD FRETTING WEAR. ONLY 42 OF 45 INCORE INSTRUMENTS (ICIS) WERE INSTALLED FOR UIC15. IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 15 IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4 IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00412	50.59	64	0000	02/09/2000	01/17/2000	06/21/2000

Subject SAFETY EVALUATION FOR ADDITION OF VOLTAGE REGULATOR TRANSFER CIRCUIT MODIFICATION

Text SUMMARY:

THE NEW UNIT 1 MAIN GENERATOR REQUIRES ADDITIONAL MODIFICATION PRIOR TO BEING PLACED IN SERVICE. THESE ACTIVITIES UNDER THE SCOPE OF ES199500911 006 INCLUDE THE REPLACEMENT OF THE VOLTS PER HERTZ PROTECTION (HXP), THE REPLACEMENT OF THE PRECISION RESISTOR, ADDING THE REDUNDANT BREAKER POSITION IN THE REGULATOR TRANSFER CIRCUIT (94R) AND REVISING THE ANNUNCIATION ALARM STATUS.

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS REQUIRED TO EVALUATE THE ADDITION OF THE REDUNDANT BREAKER POSITON CONTACT, IN THE REGULATOR TRANSFER CIRCUIT FOR THE NEW EXCITER VOLTAGE REGULATOR FOR UNIT 1 MAIN GENERATOR, SINCE IT AFFECTS THE SAR FIGURE 8.7 SH. 01 (BGE DWG. 61029). THIS CONTACT IS SIMILAR TO THE CONTACT USED FROM THE MAIN EXCITER BREAKER 41A1. THE ADDITION OF REDUNDANT BREAKER CONTACT WILL PROVIDE INCREASED RELIABILITY BY AVOIDING UNNECESSARY TRIP IN CASE EITHER EXCITER BREAKER OPENS. SINCE THE ADDITION OF THE REDUNDANT BREAKER CONTACT IN SERIES WITH THE CONTACT FROM MAIN EXCITER BREAKER, IT ONLY AFFECTS THE REGULATOR TRANSFER CIRCUIT.

THE ADDITION OF NEW EXCITER VOLTAGE REGULATOR, AND USE OF CONTACT FROM MAIN EXCITER BREAKER 41A1 TO TRANSFER THE REGULATOR IN MANUAL MODE HAS EARLIER BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED UNDER 50.59 SE00236, ES199500911-002.

THE CHANGES UNDER THIS ACTIVITY DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

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SE00413	50.59	64	0000	02/01/2000	01/19/2000	08/02/2000

Subject INSTALLATION OF MNSA DEVICES ON PRESSURIZER

Text SUMMARY:

THE PRESSURIZER INSTRUMENT NOZZLES ARE BEING MODIFIED BY ES199800338. THESE NOZZLES ARE CURRENTLY WELDED ON THE INTERIOR OF THE PRESSURIZER USING A PARTIAL PENETRATION WELD. THIS MODIFICATION WILL INSTALL MECHANICAL NOZZLE SEAL ASSEMBLIES (MNSA) ON EACH OF THE PRESSURIZER INSTRUMENT NOZZLES. THE MNSA PROVIDES BOTH PRESSURE INTEGRITY AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY FOR THE NOZZLE. CONSEQUENTLY, IT REPLACES THE FUNCTION OF THE INTERIOR WELD, SUCH THAT THE WELD IS NOW CLASSIFIED AS CLADDING.

UFSAR FIGURE 4-8 IS AN ONLINE OF THE PRESSURIZER. THIS FIGURE IS BEING ANNOTATED TO INDICATE THE PRESENCE OF THE MNSA. THERE ARE NO OTHER IMPACTS ON THE UFSAR.

THE MNSA IS A FULLY QUALIFIED ASME SECTION III DESIGNATED APPURTENANCE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE MNSA HAS NO IMPACT ON THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF ANY ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED IN THE UFSAR. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS NO IMPACT ON THE PRESSURIZER RESPONSE TO ANY ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION. THEREFORE, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS OR MALFUNCTIONS PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED IN THE UFSAR ARE NOT CHANGED.

A REVIEW OF THE FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS OF THE MNSA CONCLUDED THAT THEY ARE NO DIFFERENT THAN THOSE OF THE EXISTING WELDED NOZZLE DESIGN. THE ONE EXCEPTION IS THAT A MNSA LEAK DOES NOT RESULT IN THE POTENTIAL FOR NOZZLE EJECTION EVEN IF LEFT UNNOTICED AND UNCORRECTED FOR A LONG PERIOD (I.E., MULTIPLE FUEL CYCLES, WHICH IS NOT CREDIBLE). THERE IS NO IMPACT ON THE MARGIN OF SAFETY OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00414	50.59	64	0000	03/06/2000	01/21/2000	06/21/2000

Subject EVALUATE MSSV TESTING AT REDUCED POWER, VHPT NOT REDUCED

Text SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A CHANGE TO THE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE (MSSV) TEST PROCEDURE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR PERFORMING THE TESTING OF THE VALVE LIFT SETTING WITH POWER REDUCED TO <=93%, THE VALVE INOPERABLE, AND VARIABLE HIGH POWER TRIP (VHPT) UNCHANGED.

THE CHANGE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) SINCE AN MSSV WILL NOT INADVERTENTLY OPEN WHILE IT IS BEING TESTED, THE VALVE IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE WHEN THE POWER IS REDUCED TO <=93%, AND THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (T/S) ACTION STATEMENT REGARDING VHPT SETPOINT WILL BE MET WHEN ANY MSSV BECOMES INOPERABLE FOR 12 HOURS.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00415	50.59	64		03/08/2000	01/21/2000	06/21/2000

Subject CHANGE UFSAR TO ALLOW PARTIALLY DRAINING 1A FO DAY TANK DURING STP O 8A 1 SECT. 6.1

Text SUMMARY:

STP-O-8A-1 REV 18 SECTION 6.1 INCORPORATES CHANGES TO THE WAY IN WHICH THE 1A EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMPS ARE TESTED TO VERIFY THEIR CAPABILITY OF AUTOMATICALLY STARTING AND PROVIDING MAKEUP TO FUEL OIL DAY TANK AND TO MEET IST CAPACITY TESTING REQUIREMENTS. IN ORDER TO CAUSE THE PUMPS TO START AUTOMATICALLY, FUEL OIL MUST BE DRAINED FROM THE FUEL OIL DAY TANK (FODT) THROUGH A NORMALLY LOCKED SHUT DRAIN VALVE. SAFETY EVALUATION SCREENING FOR THIS PROCEDURE REVISION DETERMINED THAT USING FODT DRAIN VALVE 1A-DFO-029 AND A NSR DRAIN FLOWPATH WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE SAR DESCRIPTION OF THE DESIGN, FUNCTION OR METHOD OF PERFORMING THE FUNCTION OF THE FUEL OIL SYSTEM. THIS TEST WAS NOT DESCRIBED IN THE SAR.

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION PROVIDES THE REASONING, BASIS AND CONSIDERATIONS TO CONCLUDE THAT TESTING THE 1A EDG FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMPS UNDER STP O-8A-1 DOES NOT INVOLVE A CHANGE IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, NOR DOES IT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. THE SAFETY FUNCTIONS OF THE 1A EDG FUEL OIL TRANSFER SUB SYSTEM ARE MAINTAINED DURING THE STP ACTIVITY. THE EVALUATION FACTORS IN THE IMPACT OF HUMAN ERROR IN SOME OF THE QUESTIONS DEALING WITH EXISTING SAR DESCRIBED MALFUNCTIONS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING MALFUNCTIONS OF A DIFFERENT TYPE. FUEL OIL CONSUMPTION RATES ARE BASED ON DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS AND CONTROLLED ENGINEERING CALCULATIONS. IN ORDER TO MEET THE INTENT OF ONE OF THE TECH SPEC BASES, CREDIT IS TAKEN FOR OPERATOR ACTION IN SHUTTING THE FODT DRAIN VALVE WITHIN 3 MINUTES AFTER RECEIVING A LOW-LOW LEVEL ALARM ON THE TANK. NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-78 WAS REVIEWED BY THE PREPARER OF THIS SAFETY EVALUATION AND THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF THIS ACTIVITY WERE FACTORED IN BEFORE TAKING CREDIT FOR OPERATOR ACTION.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00417	50.59	64	0000	02/09/2000	02/02/2000	06/21/2000

Subject INSTALLATION OF SLEEVES IN THE U1 WATER BOXES 11A AND 12A.

Text SUMMARY:

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY UNDER ESP IS TO PROVIDE THE DESIGN ENGINEERING REQUIRED TO INSTALL SLEEVES FOR REPAIRING DEGRADED HEAT EXCHANGER TUBES IN THE UNIT 1 MAIN CONDENSERS AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (CCNPP). THE MODIFICATION WILL ALLEVIATE THE NEED FOR PLUGGING TUBES WHICH HAVE BECOME CORRODED OR ARE OTHERWISE CONSIDERED TO HAVE LOST STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY. THE TECHNIQUE CONSISTS OF INSTALLING AN AL6XN SLEEVE WHICH IS FLUSH WITH THE OUTSIDE OF THE TUBE SHEET AND SPANS A SUFFICIENT DEPTH INTO THE CONDENSER TUBE TO REPAIR THE DEFECT. THE SLEEVE WILL BE INSTALLED WITH ONE ROLL EXPANSION LOCATED WITHIN THE TUBESHEET WHILE THE OTHER END WILL BE ROLL EXPANDED IN THE FREE SPAN PORTION OF THE TUBE. IN ADDITION, THE SLEEVE BETWEEN THE TUBESHEET AND FREE SPAN ROLL EXPANSIONS WILL BE HYDRAULICALLY

EXPANDED TO IMPROVE THE HEAT TRANSFER AND FLOW CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SLEEVED TUBE. THIS HYDRAULIC EXPANSION WILL BE PERFORMED TO THE POINT THAT THE SLEEVE CONTACTS THE TUBE. ONCE EXPANDED, THE SLEEVES BECOME INTEGRAL WITH THE PARENT TUBES. THE THIN WALL CONSTRUCTION AND HYDRAULIC EXPANSION ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF END-STEP EROSION WHICH HAS BEEN HISTORICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER TUBE INSERTS. THIS IS NOT A "BAND AID" REPAIR BUT A FULL RESTORATION WHICH WILL ADD YEARS OF ADDITIONAL SERVICE TO THE CONDENSERS.

REASON FOR A 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION: A NOTE IS BEING ADDED TO UPSAR SECTION 9.3.2.2 AND TABLE 10-1 TO INCLUDE THAT SB-676, AL6XN SLEEVES MAY BE INSTALLED. REFER TO UCR 00144 FOR UPSAR CHANGES.

THE ACTIVITY DOES NOT CHANGE ANY FUNCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONDENSERS. THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT DEGRADE OR PREVENT ACTIONS DESCRIBED OR ASSUMED IN THE SAR AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL CODES AND STANDARDS.

THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00419	50.59	64		02/17/2000	02/07/2000	06/21/2000

Subject TRM CHANGE FOR TNC 15.1.4, CEA POSITION INDICATION

Text SUMMARY:

AS WRITTEN, TRM TNC 15.1.4 IS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET AND DOES NOT FOLLOW A LOGICAL PROGRESSION OR GIVE CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE FOR ALL CREDIBLE ROD POSITION INDICATION FAILURES. PROPOSED CHANGES TO ENHANCE THE TRM INCLUDE:

CURRENTLY, IF A CONDITION EXISTS WHERE ONE CEA PER GROUP IS PARTIALLY INSERTED (THEREFORE, "FULL OUT" INDICATION IS INOPERABLE) AND THE PULSE COUNTING SYSTEM IS INOPERABLE, NON-CONFORMANCE (a) APPLIES AND ACTION MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN 6 HOURS. HOWEVER, IF THE SAME SITUATION EXISTS WITH MULTIPLE PLANT COMPUTER INDICATIONS INOPERABLE IN A GROUP THEN NON-CONFORMANCE (b) APPLIES AND ACTION MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN 24 HOURS, WHICH IS LESS RESTRICTIVE. THIS IS AN APPARENT OVERSIGHT SINCE IF MULTIPLE RODS ARE EFFECTED THEN A SINGLE ROD IS ALSO EFFECTED. THE PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE TRM WILL CORRECT THIS SITUATION BY APPLYING THE CONTINGENCY MEASURE AND RESTORATION TIMES FOR MULTIPLE EFFECTED CEAs TO A SINGLE CEA.

ANOTHER SCENARIO NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED IN THE TRM IS THE CONDITION WHEREBY MULTIPLE RODS PER GROUP ARE PARTIALLY INSERTED AND THE VOLTAGE DIVIDER REED POSITION INDICATION CHANNEL BECOMES INOPERABLE. THIS SCENARIO IS CREDIBLE SINCE BOTH UNITS ROUTINELY OPERATE WITH RODS PARTIALLY INSERTED. THE PROPOSED CHANGE WILL ADD THE ABOVE NON-CONFORMANCE CONDITION TO THE TRM AND APPLY THE CONTINGENCY MEASURES AND RESTORATION TIMES FOR NON-CONFORMANCE (a). THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ACTIONS REQUIRED WHEN ONE ROD PER GROUP IS EFFECTED.

THE CONTINGENCY MEASURES FOR NON-CONFORMANCE (b) ARE CONFUSING. THE TERMINOLOGY "OPERATION MAY CONTINUE" COULD BE NON-CONSERVATIVELY INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT OPERATION COULD CONTINUE INDEFINITELY WITH ONLY ONE OPERABLE REED SWITCH POSITION INDICATING CHANNEL. THE PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE TRM CLARIFIES THAT THE APPLICABLE ROD POSITION INDICATOR(S) MUST BE RESTORED TO OPERABLE STATUS WITHIN 24 HOURS. THE INTENT OF THE TRM IS TO ENSURE THAT AT LEAST ONE REED SWITCH POSITION INDICATOR CHANNEL IS OPERABLE FOR THE EFFECTED ROD(S) AS A CONDITION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION UP TO 24 HOURS. THE PROPOSED CHANGE WILL REQUIRE VERIFICATION OF OPERABILITY OF AT LEAST ONE REED SWITCH CHANNEL WITHIN ONE HOUR OF ENTRY INTO NON-CONFORMANCE (b). A ONE HOUR LIMIT ENSURES PROMPT VERIFICATION.

ADDITIONALLY, TWO CHANGES THAT ARE CONSIDERED EDITORIAL AND PROVIDE CLARIFICATION ARE PROPOSED. THE WORD "AND" IS BEING REMOVED UNDER THE NORMAL CONDITION ITEM (b), SINCE IT IS NOT NECESSARY AND COULD BE CONFUSED AS A "LOGICAL CONNECTOR" BETWEEN ITEMS (b) AND (c). ADDITIONALLY, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT ACTION A.2.2.1 (ROD WITHDRAWAL) IS NOT PERFORMED PRIOR TO ACTION A.2.A (POWER REDUCTION TO < 70%), A CLARIFYING STATEMENT WILL BE ADDED TO REINFORCE THIS REQUIREMENT. THE INTENDED TRM SEQUENCE (POWER REDUCTION FOLLOWED BY ROD WITHDRAWAL) WAS PREVIOUSLY SUPPORTED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASIS DOCUMENT, WHICH SERVED AS THE BASIS FOR THE TRM REQUIREMENTS.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR, NOR DOES IT CREATE A NEW TYPE OF ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION NOT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00420	50.59	64		07/19/2000	02/11/2000	01/04/2001

Subject 50.59 FOR SWGR FAN REPLACEMENT

Text SUMMARY:

THIS ESP ADDRESSED REPLACEMENT OF THE FAN AND MOTOR SECTIONS OF BOTH SWITCHGEAR (SWGR) ROOM AIR HANDLING UNITS (AHUs) FOR BOTH UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 (I.E., AHUs 11 AND 12 FOR UNIT 1, AND AHUs 21 AND 22 FOR UNIT 2). THE EQUIPMENT AFFECTED IS LOCATED IN ADJACENT MAIN PLANT EXHAUST EQUIPMENT ROOMS 524 AND 526.

ALTHOUGH THE REPLACEMENT FANS AND FAN PLENA ARE VERY SIMILAR IN FORM AND FIT, AND IDENTICAL IN FUNCTION TO THE ORIGINAL, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS WERE PERFORMED:

- FAN MOTORS WILL BE REPLACED WITH INCREASED HORSEPOWER MOTORS.
- THE FAN MOTOR STARTER BUCKETS (IN MCCs) WERE REPLACED WITH NEW STARTER BUCKETS. THE EXISTING STARTER BUCKETS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FANS SUPPLIED FROM 1B004 AND 2B004 (AHUs 11 AND 21, RESPECTIVELY) WERE REPLACED WITH LARGER STARTER BUCKETS.
- THE #10 AWG FEEDER CABLES TO MOTORS 1M0436 AND 2M0436 (AHUs 11 AND 21, RESPECTIVELY) WERE REPLACED WITH #8 AWG CABLE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH

- 61-406 SIZING CRITERIA FOR MOTOR FEEDER CABLES.
- EACH REPLACEMENT PLENUM WAS ATTACHED TO THE ADJACENT COIL SECTION OF THE AHU AND CONNECTING DUCT WITHOUT MODIFICATION, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE DRAIN PANS FOR AHUs 12 AND 22. THE EXISTING DRAIN PANS FOR THESE AHUs ARE INTEGRAL TO THE FAN AND COIL SECTIONS IN THE PRESENT CONFIGURATION, AND WERE CUT AND MODIFIED FOR USE WITH THE INLET FACE OF THE NEW FAN SECTIONS. STEEL SUPPORT STRUCTURES FOR THESE AHUs WERE MODIFIED TO SUPPORT THE NEW FAN PLENA.

THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, OR AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

- THE SAFETY RELATED, SEISMIC DESIGN OF THE FAN SECTIONS WAS NOT ADVERSELY IMPACTED BY THIS ACTIVITY.
- SMALL ADDITIONAL LOADS INCLUDED AS A RESULT OF THE USE OF A LARGE FAN MOTOR ARE WITHIN THE CAPABILITY OF THE MCC AND DIESEL GENERATOR SUPPLYING THEM.
- THE SMALL ADDITIONAL HEAD LOADS IN THE MAIN PLANT EXHAUST EQUIPMENT ROOM WERE DETERMINED TO HAVE AN INSIGNIFICANT IMPACT.
- LOAD HANDLING WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN THE VICINITY OF SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS.
- SEISMIC II/I DESIGN OF THE NONSAFETY-RELATED DRAIN PIPING PRECLUDES ITS FAILURE. NOTWITHSTANDING ITS DESIGN, FAILURE OF THE DRAIN PIPING HAS AN INCONSEQUENTIAL AFFECT ON THE OPERATION OF THE AHUs.
- MEASURES WERE IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT SWGR ROOM TEMPERATURE LIMITS WERE NOT EXCEEDED DURING THE MODIFICATIONS.

BECAUSE THE FUNCTION OF THE SWGR AHUs WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED AND NO NEW SYSTEM INTERACTIONS OR FAILURE MODES WERE CREATED, THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT CREATE THE POTENTIAL FOR A MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT DIFFERENT THAN ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. NEITHER THE TS NOR TS BASES ADDRESS SWGR ROOM VENTILATION. NONETHELESS, THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT ADVERSELY IMPACT THE ABILITY OF SWGR ROOM VENTILATION TO MAINTAIN THE SWGR ROOMS AT OR BELOW THEIR MAXIMUM DESIGN TEMPERATURE. ADDITIONALLY, THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT AFFECT THE INDEPENDENCE OR REDUNDANCY OF THE EXISTING SWGR AHUs. THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT REDUCE ANY TS BASES MARGIN OF SAFETY. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00422	50.59	64		02/28/2000	02/25/2000	06/21/2000
Subject	TEMPORARY ALTERATION TO ALLOW A MSR RELIEF VALVE TO BE GAGGED CLOSED					
Text	SUMMARY: THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION WILL ALLOW ONE RELIEF VALVE ON EITHER UNIT 1 MSR (1RV4021, 22, 23, 24, 25 OR 26) TO BE GAGGED SHUT. THE TEMPORARY ALTERATION WILL ONLY BE REQUIRED IF A RELIEF VALVE STICKS OPEN DURING SETPOINT TESTING USING PROCEDURE VALVE 65. GAGGING THE RELIEF VALVE IS THE ONLY WAY TO TAKE THE VALVE OUT OF SERVICE WITHOUT ISOLATING THE MSR. THE REACTOR POWER WILL BE REDUCED TO REDUCE THE STEAM MASS FLOWRATE. THE REDUCED STEAM MASS FLOWRATE WILL BE WITHIN THE RELIEVING CAPACITY OF THE REMAINING RELIEF VALVES. THUS, THE MSR WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE ASME SECTION VIII CODE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION.					

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00423	50.59	64	0001	03/07/2000	03/07/2000	06/21/2000
Subject	OPERABILITY OF LPSI SYSTEM WITH 2MOV635 IN PULL TO OVERRIDE					
Text	SUMMARY: THIS ACTIVITY SUPPORTS SHUTTING AND OVERRIDING THE ACCIDENT SIGNAL TO OPEN FOR ONE OF THE FOUR LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION HEADER MOTOR OPERATED VALVES. THIS ACTIVITY IS BEING IMPLEMENTED AS A COMPENSATORY MEASURE FOR A DEGRADED SAFETY INJECTION CHECK VALVE. THIS ACTIVITY WILL REQUIRE THAT TWO OF THE THREE REMAINING LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION HEADER MOTOR OPERATED VALVES BE PRE POSITIONED TO THEIR ACCIDENT POSITION. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE THE ABOVE CONFIGURATION ENSURES AT LEAST TWO LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION LEGS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM GIVEN THE WORST SINGLE FAILURE. EVEN WITH THE FLOW FROM ONE OF THE INJECTION LEGS ASSUMED LOST OUT THE BREAK DURING A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT, THE ONE REMAINING INJECTION LEG WILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE FLOW TO MAINTAIN CORE COOLING. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.					

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00424	50.59	64	0001	04/05/2000	04/02/2000	06/21/2000
Subject	BETA PRIME PATTERN					

Text

SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION ADDRESSES THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 15 CORE ONLOAD AND OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 15 IN MODES 6 AND 5. REVISION 0 AUTHORIZED A PRIMARY CORE LOADING PATTERN (ALPHA) AND 3 CONTINGENCY CORE LOADING PATTERNS (BETA, GAMMA, NEUTRON). REVISION 1 OF THIS SAFETY EVALUATION ALLOWS THE USE OF THE (BETA PRIME) CORE LOADING PATTERN WHICH IS SIMPLY THE (BETA) PATTERN EXCEPT THAT LFA 1RT1 WILL NOW BE ROTATED 180 DEGREES SO THAT THE SERIAL NUMBER WILL NOW FACE SOUTH INSTEAD OF NORTH. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 15 CORE ONLOAD AN SUBSEQUENT OPERATION IN MODES 6 AND 5 DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00425	50.59	64	0000	04/10/2000	03/20/2000	08/02/2000

Subject

FUEL CLADDING CORROSION

Text

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY ADDS INFORMATION INTO THE UFSAR WHICH CONSIDERS THE PROGRESSION OF FUEL ROD CLADDING CORROSION INTO LIMITED AMOUNTS OF BLISTERING AND SPALLATION OF THE OXIDE LAYER. THIS EVALUATION ALLOWS LIMITED AMOUNTS OF BLISTERING AND SPALLATION OF THE OXIDE LAYER; BUT AT ALL TIMES, THE CLADDING MUST RETAIN A MINIMUM OF 1% STRAIN CAPABILITY. AS LONG AS 1% STRAIN CAPABILITY OF THE CLADDING IS RETAINED, THE MECHANICAL PROPERTIES AND RESPONSE OF THE CLADDING TO NORMAL OPERATION, AOC'S AND POSTULATED ACCIDENTS IS UNCHANGED (THE SAFDL'S ARE PRESERVED). THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00426	50.59	64	0000	03/24/2000	03/24/2000	06/21/2000

Subject

REPLACE UNIT 1 MAIN GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR - REMOVE 360X/G-1B FROM REGULATOR TRIP TO MANUAL

Text

SUMMARY:

THE REPLACEMENT VOLTAGE REGULATOR USES TWO PT SIGNALS FOR OPERATION IN THE CONSTANT MAIN GENERATOR TERMINAL VOLTAGE OR AUTOMATIC MODE. THE NEW REGULATOR WILL OPERATE WITH THE LOSS OF A PT SIGNAL AND WILL TRIP TO THE MANUAL MODE WITH A LOSS OF BOTH PT SIGNALS. THIS ACTIVITY REMOVES THE 360X/G-1B, TRIP TO MANUAL, FOR THE NEW VOLTAGE REGULATOR.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE A USQ.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00428	50.59	64	0000	04/13/2000	04/12/2000	08/02/2000

Subject

APW 3RD TRAIN BELOW MODE 4 FOR FEEDING STEAM GENERATORS

Text

SUMMARY:

THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS TO CLARIFY A STATEMENT REGARDING USE OF THE MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TRAINS. THIS STATEMENT LIMITED USE OF THE MOTOR DRIVEN DRAINS TO EMERGENCY USE ONLY IN ALL MODES. DURING RESEARCH OF THE BASIS FOR THE STATEMENT, AN OVER COMMITMENT TO THE ORIGINAL LICENSING BASIS WAS DISCOVERED. THE 50.59 CORRECTS HOW THE COMMITMENT IS INCORPORATED IN THE UFSAR AND ALLOWS USE OF THE MOTOR DRIVEN TRAIN BELOW MODE 3 FOR THE PURPOSE OF FEEDING STEAM GENERATORS.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFINED BY 10CFR50.59.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00429	50.59	64	0000	07/10/2000	04/24/2000	09/25/2000

Subject

TECH SPEC AND UFSAR CHANGES FOR PEN ROOM AND ECCS PUMP ROOM NEGATIVE PRESSURE DOSE ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS

Text

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES WORDING CHANGES TO UFSAR SECTION 6.6.2 "CONTAINMENT PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM - SYSTEM DESCRIPTION", 9.8.2.3 "AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATING SYSTEMS IN THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING PUMP ROOM VENTILATION", AND TECH SPEC BASES SECTION B 3.7.10 "EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) PUMP ROOM EXHAUST FILTRATION SYSTEM (PREFS)" TO CONVEY THE FACT THAT NO CREDIT FOR THE ECCS PUMP ROOM EXHAUST FILTRATION SYSTEM (PREFS) AND ONLY LIMITED CREDIT FOR THE PENETRATION ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM (PREVS) IS TAKEN IN THE OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATIONS FOR THE CURRENT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. PREVS IS ONLY CREDITED IN THE DOSE CALCULATIONS WITH FILTERING THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL RELEASED THROUGH THE 4 INCH HYDROGEN PURGE LINE (WHICH IS HARD PIPED DIRECTLY INTO THE DUCTWORK IMMEDIATELY UPSTREAM OF THE FILTER INLET PLENUM) AT THE ONSET OF AN MHA.

THE CURRENT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND THE ASSUMPTIONS ARE ALREADY ACCURATELY DESCRIBED IN UFSAR 14.24 ("MAXIMUM HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT").

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00431	50.59	64	0000	09/26/2000	06/15/2000	11/28/2000

Subject MODE 6 TEMPERATURE RESTRICTION

Text SUMMARY:

WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (ITS) IN 1998 CHANGES WERE MADE TO THE DEFINITION OF MODE 6 IN TABLE 1.1-1. PRIOR TO ITS, THE DEFINITION INCLUDED A TEMPERATURE LIMIT OF 140 DEGREES F. IT WAS REMOVED BY ITS AND REPLACED BY "NA" RESULTING IN THE ELIMINATION OF THE TEMPERATURE LIMITATION FOR MODE 6 IN THE LICENSING BASIS. THIS RESULTED IN A PROBLEM SINCE SEVERAL DESIGN CALCULATIONS RELY ON THE MODE 6 TEMPERATURE LIMITATION IN THE TS TO PRESERVE DESIGN INPUT ASSUMPTIONS.

THE PROPOSED CHANGES WILL PLACE THE MODE 6 TEMPERATURE LIMIT OF 140 DEGREES F IN THE COLR UNDER SECTION 3.9.1. THE BORON CONCENTRATION LIMIT FOR MODE 6. THIS WILL ENSURE THAT THE LIMIT IS PRESERVED (SEE REFERENCE 1). WORDS WILL ALSO BE ADDED TO THE TECH SPEC BASES FOR 3.9.1. TO PRESERVE THE BASES FOR NEEDING THE MODE 6 TEMPERATURE RESTRICTION.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00435	50.59	64		08/28/2000	07/06/2000	11/28/2000

Subject TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASIS CLARIFICATION SR 3.5.1.4

Text SUMMARY:

THE SAR STATES "LEVEL AND PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION IS PROVIDED TO MONITOR THE AVAILABILITY OF THE TANKS DURING PLANT OPERATION". THIS ACTIVITY UTILIZES THE KNOWLEDGE THAT IN-LEAKAGE FROM THE RCS IS THE ONLY CREDITABLE MEANS OF UNCONTROLLED BORON DILUTION. PROCEDURES WILL BE PUT IN PLACE TO MONITOR IN-LEAKAGE TO DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO SAMPLE TO PREVENT BORON DILUTION BELOW TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS. BORON DILUTION BELOW TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LIMITS IS A 72-HOUR ACTION STATEMENT.

SO THAT THE BASES REFLECT THE DESCRIPTIONS IN THE SAR, INSERT THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH IN SR 3.5.1.4. FOR THE PURPOSE OF SPECIFYING THAT THE METHOD OF VERIFYING THE BORON CONCENTRATION OF THE SIT'S INCLUDES MONITORING IN-LEAKAGE. VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT SR 3.5.1.4., HOWEVER THE METHOD OF VERIFICATION IS NOT SPECIFIED.

"VERIFICATION CONSISTS OF MONITORING IN-LEAKAGE OR SAMPLING. ALL INTENTIONAL SOURCES OF LEVEL INCREASE ARE MAINTAINED ADMINISTRATIVELY TO ENSURE SIT BORON CONCENTRATIONS ARE WITHIN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS. A SAMPLE OF THE SIT IS REQUIRED, TO VERIFY BORON CONCENTRATION, IF 10 INCHES OR GREATER OF IN-LEAKAGE HAS OCCURRED SINCE LAST SAMPLED."

AN ENGINEERING STUDY OF CALVERT CLIFFS SIT BORON DATA AND IN-LEAKAGE SHOWS THAT MONITORING THE BORON CONCENTRATION BASED ON SIT LEVEL CHANGE IS A CONSERVATIVE AND ACCURATE MEANS OF VERIFYING THE SIT BORON CONCENTRATION. THIS APPROACH IS ALARA, CONSERVATIVE, AND INCORPORATED IN AT LEAST TWO OTHER PLANTS' TECH SPECS (SAN ONOFRE AND PALO VERDE).

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00437	50.59	64		07/12/2000	07/12/2000	09/25/2000

Subject ADD PARTICULATE FILTRATION IN NO. 12 RCWM TANK RECIRCULATION LOOP

Text SUMMARY:

THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION APPROVES INSTALLING A FILTER IN THE NUMBER 12 REACTOR COOLANT WASTE MONITOR TANK RECIRCULATION LOOP. THE FILTER WILL BE USED TO REMOVE ACTIVATED SOLIDS IN THE TANK BEFORE ITS CONTENTS ARE DISCHARGED TO THE CHESAPEAKE BAY. THE FILTER WILL BE CONNECTED TO VENT VALVES IN THE RECIRCULATION LOOP FOR THE NO. 12 RCWM TANK AND DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WILL BE CREATED BY OPERATING ITS ASSOCIATED PUMP AND THROTTLING VALVE 0-RCW-248, WHICH LIES BETWEEN THE TWO VENT VALVE CONNECTION POINTS. THIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE SINGLE LINE DRAWING FOR THE REACTOR COOLANT WASTE PROCESSING, WHICH IS INCLUDED IN THE UPSAR (FIGURE 11-1), WOULD REQUIRE REVISION TO SHOW THE INCLUSION OF THE FILTRATION LOOP. THE FILTRATION LOOP WILL BE CONSIDERED AS PROCESS PIPING IN THE WPS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE OR AFFECT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A USQ.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00439	50.59	64	0000	08/18/2000	08/12/2000	11/28/2000

Subject DEFEAT SACM DG 1A AND 0C HIGH TEMPERATURE TRIPS

Text SUMMARY:

THE SUBJECT ESP DEFEATS THE DIESEL GENERATOR 1A AND 0C HIGH TEMPERATURE TRIPS, ALLOWING THESE TWO DIESELS TO CONTINUE OPERATING WHEN A HIGH TEMPERATURE ALARM OCCURS. FURTHER ACTION UPON RECEIPT OF A HIGH TEMPERATURE ANNUNCIATION IS LEFT TO THE OPERATOR. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH VENDOR GUIDANCE, WHICH STATES THAT THE USE OF AN EXHAUST HIGH TEMPERATURE TRIP IS "NOT SOMETHING THAT THEY NORMALLY SUPPLY. SACM SAW NO BENEFIT IN THIS TRIP FUNCTION...AS LONG AS THE ALARM FUNCTION WAS RETAINED." THIS MODIFICATION MAKES THE PROVISION OF EXHAUST HIGH TEMPERATURE INDICATIONS FOR THESE TWO SACM DIESELS MORE CONSISTENT WITH THE OPERATION OF CCNPP'S FAIRBANKS MORSE 1B, 2A AND 2B DIESELS.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00440	50.59	64	0000	05/06/2000	08/22/2000	11/28/2000

Subject REROUTE EFFLUENT OF MANHOLE 12 AND 19 FROM OUTFALL 002 TO OUTFALL 001 (VIA CW DISCHARGE STRUCTURE)

Text SUMMARY:

CURRENTLY THE EFFLUENT FROM MANHOLE 12 AND 13 DISCHARGES INTO THE CHESAPEAKE BAY AT OUTFALL 002. COPPER CONCENTRATION IN THE EFFLUENT FROM MANHOLE 13 EXCEEDS THE RENEWED STATE ENVIRONMENTAL DISCHARGE PERMIT. TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE, THE EFFLUENT FROM MANHOLE 13 WILL BE REDIRECTED FROM OUTFALL 002 TO OUTFALL 001 (THIS IS VIA THE DISCHARGE STRUCTURE); THE VOLUME OF WATER FLOW THROUGH THE DISCHARGE CONDUIT DILUTES THE CONCENTRATION TO UNDETECTABLE LEVELS. THE MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT IS SATISFIED WITH THIS SOLUTION. TO ENHANCE SECURITY, THE STORM WATER EFFLUENT FROM MANHOLE 12 WILL ALSO BE REDIRECTED FROM OUTFALL 002 TO OUTFALL 001 AND THE PIPE BETWEEN MANHOLE 11 AND 12 SEALED AND ABANDONED.

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY ADDS ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS TO THE CIRCULATING WATER DISCHARGE CONDUIT AND THEREFORE IMPACTS THE UFSAR.

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY POSES NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION because:

- 1) THE CW SYSTEM, YARD OIL/WATER INTERCEPTOR PIT, AND STORM WATER DISCHARGE SYSTEM ARE NOT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY OR CREDITED TO CAUSE OR MITIGATE ANY SAR ACCIDENTS.
- 2) THE CHANGE TO FACILITY ADDS NO ACTIVE COMPONENTS AS THE WATER IS DRAINED BY GRAVITY FEED INTO THE DISCHARGE CONDUITS THROUGH THE ACCESS/ STOP LOG VERTICAL SHAFTS IN THE DISCHARGE STRUCTURE.
- 3) THE CHANGE TO THE FACILITY DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY OF THE SW PUMPS TO DISCHARGE COOLING WATER TO THE CHESAPEAKE BAY THROUGH THE DISCHARGE CONDUITS BECAUSE THE ADDITIONAL WATER ENTERS THE CW CONDUIT AT ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE LEVEL CAUSING NO INCREASE IN BACK PRESSURE ON THE SW PUMPS.

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00441	50.59	64		09/14/2000	08/24/2000	11/28/2000

Subject REDUCTION OF ICI FROM 45 TO 35 FOR UNIT 2 (2001 RFO)

Text SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERS THE REDUCTION OF THE NUMBER OF INSTALLED INCORE INSTRUMENTS (BOTH ICI'S AND CET'S) IN CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 2. AN EVALUATION WAS PERFORMED TO SHOW THAT THE ELIMINATION OF 10 INCORE INSTRUMENTATION ASSEMBLIES FROM THIS UNIT WOULD NOT IMPACT THE ONLINE CORE MONITORING SYSTEM OR INADEQUATE CORE COOLING SYSTEM FROM PERFORMING THEIR FUNCTIONS. THIS EVALUATION ADDRESSES ALL OF THE NRC REQUIREMENTS FOR CHANGES TO INCORE DETECTION SYSTEM -- DETECTION OF A FUEL MISLOADING, VALIDITY OF TILT ESTIMATES, ADEQUATE CORE COVERAGE, ENSURING UNCERTAINTIES WILL MEET TS LIMITS, AND RESTORATION OF THE SYSTEM UPON REFUELING. THIS EVALUATION HAS SHOWN THAT REDUCING FROM 45 TO 35 INCORE INSTRUMENT ASSEMBLIES CONFIGURATION WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF MALFUNCTION, WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR, OR DEGRADE A MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS IS ALSO TRUE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TWO PLATINUM TEST DETECTOR STRINGS. AS A RESULT, THE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).

Document Id	Doc Type	Rev Status	Revision	Date Issued	Create Date	Modified Date
SE00444	50.59	64	0000	09/26/2000	09/01/2000	11/28/2000

Subject REMOVE LOW LUBE OIL SUMP LEVEL TRIP FROM THE 1A AND 0C EDG'S.

Text SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REMOVES THE LOW LUBE OIL SUMP LEVEL TRIP FOR THE 1A AND 0C EDG's. THE ANNUNCIATION SIGNAL OF A LOW LEVEL WILL STILL BE AVAILABLE PROVIDING ADEQUATE TIME FOR OPERATIONS TO REACT TO THE SITUATION. THIS TRIP IS NORMALLY BYPASSED DURING A SIAS SIGNAL, A UV SIGNAL, OR AN EMERGENCY MANUAL SWITCH OPERATION (0C EDG); CONSEQUENTLY, THE REMOVAL OF A NORMALLY BYPASSED TRIP WILL NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE EDG DURING ANY ACCIDENT SCENARIO. THIS ACTIVITY WILL MAKE THE SACM EDG's MORE CONSISTENT WITH THE OPERATION OF THE FAIRBANKS MORSE EDG's. THE UFSAR WILL BE UPDATED TO REFLECT THE REMOVAL OF THIS TRIP FUNCTION FROM BOTH THE 1A AND 0C SACM EDG's.