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ComEd

August 15, 2000

SVP-00-138

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2
Facility Operating License No. DPR-30
NRC Docket No. 50-265

Subject: Reactor Trip from Generator Load Reject

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 265/00-008, Revision 00, for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(iv). The licensee shall report any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature.

Determination of the root cause for this event is in progress. A supplemental report will be submitted upon completion of the root cause determination.

Any other actions described in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) Company. They are described for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. C.C. Peterson at (309) 654-2241, extension 3609.

Respectfully,

George P. Barnes for

Joel P. Dimmette, Jr.
Site Vice President
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station

cc: Regional Administrator – NRC Region III
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station

IE22

bcc: Project Manager – NRR
Office of Nuclear Facility Safety, - IDNS
Senior Reactor Analyst – IDNS
Resident Inspector - IDNS
Manager of Energy Practice – Winston and Strawn
Director, Licensing and Compliance – ComEd
Vice President, Regulatory Services– ComEd
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Regulatory Assurance Manager – Dresden Nuclear Power Station
Regulatory Assurance Manager – Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
NRC Coordinator – Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
NSRB Site Coordinator – Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
SVP Letter File

NRC FORM 366 (6-1998) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 06/30/2001

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the information and Records Management Branch (t-6 f33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office Of Management And Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	05000265	1 of 3

TITLE (4)
Reactor Trip from Generator Load Reject

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1	05000254
07	18	2000	2000	008	00	08	15	2000	FACILITY NAME: N/A	DOCKET NUMBER: 05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	1
POWER LEVEL (10)	100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more) (11)

	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)
	20.2203(a)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)
	20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Charles Peterson, Regulatory Assurance Manager	(309) 654-2241 ext 3609

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	NO		09	26	00

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i. e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At 0548 hours on July 18, 2000, Unit 2 scrammed from full load due to a C-phase generator differential relay operation. The trip was concurrent with a fault on the C-phase of a 345KV line caused by an insulator failure. Equipment on Unit 2 responded as expected to shut the unit down.

Immediately after the Unit 2 scram, the Unit 1 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT), which normally provides offsite power to one division of Unit 1, tripped due to an attempted automatic reclosure of a 345KV breaker in the switchyard, resulting in the trip of the 345KV breaker supplying power to the RAT. The loads normally fed from the RAT transferred to the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT), which normally provides power from the Unit 1 generator to one division of Unit 1. Unit 1 continued to operate for about ten hours with power supplied by the UAT, after which the RAT was reenergized and the loads transferred.

The root cause determination for this event is not complete. A supplemental report will be submitted upon completion of the root cause determination.

The safety significance of this event was minimal. On Unit 2, all control rods inserted, and reactor water level and pressure were controlled using the normal coolant supply and heat removal systems. On Unit 1, the UAT supplied power during the event, with offsite power available from the Unit 2 RAT, in accordance with plant design and Technical Specifications.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2511 MWt rated core thermal power
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Codes are identified in the text as [XX] and are obtained from IEEE Standard 805-1984, IEEE Recommended Practice for System Identification in Nuclear Power Plants and Related Facilities.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Reactor Trip from Generator Load Reject

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Units: 1 and 2 Event Date: July 18, 2000 Event Time: 0548
Reactor Mode: 1 (Unit 1 and 2) Mode Name: Power Operation Power Level: 100 (Unit 1 and 2)

Power Operation (1) - Mode switch in the RUN position with average reactor coolant temperature at any temperature.

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

At 0548 hours on July 18, 2000, Unit 2 scrammed from full load due to a C-phase generator [GEN] [TB] differential relay [87] operation. The trip was concurrent with a fault about five miles from Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station on the C-phase of a 345KV line that feeds the station. The fault was caused by an insulator [INS] failure. Equipment on Unit 2 responded as expected to shut the unit down.

Immediately after the Unit 2 scram, the Unit 1 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer [XFMR] (RAT), which normally provides offsite power to one division of the Unit 1 emergency and balance-of-plant busses [BU], tripped. This was due to an attempted automatic reclosure of a 345KV breaker [BRK] in the switchyard [FK], resulting in the trip of a 345KV breaker supplying power to the RAT. The loads normally fed from the RAT transferred to the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT), which normally provides power from the Unit 1 generator to one division of the Unit 1 emergency and balance-of-plant busses. This put Unit 1 in a seven-day Technical Specification allowed outage time. At 1456 hours the Unit 1 RAT was reenergized and at 1529 hours the loads normally fed from the Unit 1 RAT were transferred back.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The root cause determination for this event is not complete. A supplemental report will be submitted upon completion of the root cause determination.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS

The safety significance of the Unit 2 scram was minimal. All control rods inserted, and reactor water level and pressure were controlled using the normal coolant supply and heat removal systems.

The safety significance of operation of Unit 1 with the RAT tripped was minimal. The UAT supplied power during the event, with offsite power available throughout the event from the Unit 2 RAT through bus crossties, in accordance with plant design and Technical Specifications.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Determination of the root cause for this event is in progress. A supplemental report will be submitted upon completion of the root cause determination.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

Previous occurrences will be provided in the supplemental report.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

Component failure data will be provided in the supplemental report.