



**Duke Power Company**

*A Duke Energy Company*

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July 27, 2000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555-0001  
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Duke Energy Corporation  
Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2  
Docket Nos. 50-413, 50-414

Supplement to License Amendment Request for  
Technical Specification 3.7.10, Control Room  
Area Ventilation System; and Technical  
Specification 3.7.12, Auxiliary Building  
Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System

REFERENCE: Letter, M. S. Tuckman (Duke) to U. S. Nuclear  
Regulatory Commission, Dated April 18, 2000,  
SUBJECT: License Amendment Request for  
Technical Specification 3.7.10, Control Room  
Area Ventilation System; and Technical  
Specification 3.7.12, Auxiliary Building  
Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System

Pursuant to 10CFR50.90 and by means of the letter referenced  
above, Duke Energy Corporation submitted to the NRC a  
license amendment request (LAR) for the Catawba Nuclear  
Station Facility Operating License and Technical  
Specifications (TS). This LAR addressed degraded pressure  
boundaries for two ventilation systems at Catawba.

This April 18, 2000 LAR was discussed on July 18, 2000  
during a telephone conference call between NRC officials and  
Duke representatives. Based upon the discussions that took  
place during this conference call, Duke is hereby submitting  
a supplement to the April 18, 2000 LAR. The changes  
proposed in this supplement apply to the Bases for TS 3.7.10  
and 3.7.12 and are being made in order to make this LAR

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consistent with Industry/TSTF Standard Technical  
Specification Change Traveler TSTF-287, Rev. 5.

The contents of this supplementary amendment package are as follows:

- An Affidavit
- Attachment 1 provides a marked copy of the existing Technical Specifications Bases for Catawba Units 1 and 2. These marked copies show the proposed changes.
- Attachment 2 provides the reprinted Technical Specifications Bases pages for Catawba Units 1 and 2.

The Description of the Proposed Changes and Technical Justification, the No Significant Hazards Consideration Evaluation, the basis for the categorical exclusion from performing an Environmental Assessment/Impact Statement, and the other changes as originally contained in the April 18, 2000 LAR submittal are not impacted by this supplement.

Pursuant to 10CFR50.91, a copy of this supplement is being sent to the State of South Carolina.

Implementation of the changes proposed in this LAR will provide Catawba with additional operational flexibility without a significant increase in risk. Duke Energy Corporation maintains its original request that the NRC review and approve this LAR by October 18, 2000. It has been determined that the NRC's standard 30-day implementation grace period will be adequate for this LAR.

Duke Energy Corporation reaffirms the following commitment:

At the time of implementation of the applicable changes contained in this LAR, Catawba will have approved, written administrative controls in place that describe the compensatory measures to be taken when the affected pressure boundaries are opened.

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Inquiries on this matter should be directed to J. S. Warren  
at (704) 382-4986.

Very truly yours,



M. S. Tuckman

xc w/Attachments:

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Catawba Owners: NCMPA-1, SREC, PMPA, NCEMC

NRIA File/ELL

Catawba Group File: 801.01 (T. K. Pasour)

Catawba Document Control File: 801.01 (T. K. Pasour)

AFFIDAVIT

M. S. Tuckman, being duly sworn, states that he is Executive Vice President of Duke Energy Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission these amendments to the Catawba Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52 and associated Technical Specifications; and that all statements and matters set forth herein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

M. S. Tuckman

M. S. Tuckman, Executive Vice President

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 27<sup>TH</sup> day of

July, 2000

Mary P. Delms, Notary Public

My commission expires: Jan 22, 2001

SEAL

Attachment 1

Catawba Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications Bases

Marked Copy

## BASES

### LCO (continued)

OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available assuming a single failure disables the other train. Total system failure could result in exceeding a dose of 5 rem to the control room operator in the event of a large radioactive release.

The CRAVS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to limit operator exposure are OPERABLE in both trains. A CRAVS train is OPERABLE when the associated:

- a. Fan is OPERABLE;
- b. HEPA filters and carbon adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and
- c. Ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors.

INSERT 2  
LCO Note  
Bases

The CRAVS is shared between the two units. The system must be OPERABLE for each unit when that unit is in the MODE of Applicability. Additionally, both normal and emergency power must also be OPERABLE because the system is shared. If a CRAVS component becomes inoperable, or normal or emergency power to a CRAVS component becomes inoperable, then the Required Actions of this LCO must be entered independently for each unit that is in the MODE of applicability of the LCO.

### APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and during CORE ALTERATIONS, CRAVS must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a DBA.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and in MODE 6, for CORE ALTERATIONS, the CRAVS must be OPERABLE to cope with the release from a fuel handling accident.

### ACTIONS

#### A.1

When one CRAVS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining

## INSERT 2

### LCO Note Bases

The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the control room pressure boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening when a need for control room pressure boundary isolation is indicated.



## BASES

## ACTIONS (continued)

OPERABLE CRAVS train is adequate to perform the control room protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CRAVS train could result in loss of CRAVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

<sup>C</sup>  
B.1 and B.2

or control  
room pressure  
boundary

INSERT 3

In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CRAVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes accident risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

<sup>D</sup> <sup>D</sup> <sup>D</sup>  
C.1, C.2.1, and C.2.2

In MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, if the inoperable CRAVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, action must be taken to immediately place the OPERABLE CRAVS train in operation. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure would be readily detected.

<sup>D</sup>  
An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

<sup>D</sup>  
Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note indicating to place the system in the chlorine protection mode if automatic transfer to high chlorine protection mode is inoperable.

<sup>E</sup> <sup>E</sup>  
C.1 and C.2

In MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, with two CRAVS trains inoperable, action

### INSERT 3

#### B.1

If the control room pressure boundary is inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4 such that the CRAVS trains cannot establish or maintain the required pressure, action must be taken to restore an OPERABLE control room pressure boundary within 24 hours. During the period that the control room pressure boundary is inoperable, appropriate compensatory measures (consistent with the intent of GDC 19) should be utilized to protect control room operators from potential hazards such as radioactive contamination, toxic chemicals, smoke, temperature and relative humidity, and physical security. Preplanned measures should be available to address these concerns for intentional and unintentional entry into the condition. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period and the use of compensatory measures. The 24 hour Completion Time is a typically reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the control room pressure boundary.

BASES

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## ACTIONS (continued)

must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might enter the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

F

F.1

For reasons other than Condition B,

If both CRAVS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the CRAVS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

G G

F.1 and F.2

With one or more CRAVS heaters inoperable, the heater must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Alternatively, a report must be initiated per Specification 5.6.6, which details the reason for the heater's inoperability and the corrective action required to return the heater to OPERABLE status.

The heaters do not affect OPERABILITY of the CRAVS filter trains because charcoal adsorber efficiency testing is performed at 30°C and 95% relative humidity. The accident analysis shows that site boundary radiation doses are within 10 CFR 100 limits during a DBA LOCA under these conditions.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTSSR 3.7.10.1

Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not too severe, testing each train once every month provides an adequate check of this system. Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture accumulated in the carbon from humidity in the ambient air. Systems with heaters must be operated from the control room for  $\geq 10$  continuous hours with the heaters energized and flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. The 31 day Frequency is based on the reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy availability.

BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)SR 3.7.10.2

This SR verifies that the required CRAVS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CRAVS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 5). The VFTP includes testing the performance of the HEPA filter, carbon adsorber efficiency, minimum flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated carbon. Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.10.3

This SR verifies that each CRAVS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The Frequency of 18 months is specified in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 5).

SR 3.7.10.4

This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure, and the assumed inleakage rates of the potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper functioning of the CRAVS. During the emergency mode of operation, the CRAVS is designed to pressurize the control room  $\geq 0.125$  inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas in order to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The CRAVS is designed to maintain this positive pressure with one train at a makeup flow rate of 4000 cfm. The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-0800 (Ref. 6).

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.
2. UFSAR, Section 9.4.1
3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
4. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
5. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2.
6. NUREG-0800, Section 6.4, Rev. 2, July 1981.

NO  
CHANGES  
ON THIS  
PAGE -  
FOR  
INFORMATION  
ONLY

BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

The design basis of the ABFVES is established by the large break LOCA. The system evaluation assumes a passive failure of the ECCS outside containment, such as an SI pump seal failure, during the recirculation mode. In such a case, the system limits radioactive release to within the 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 6) limits, or the NRC staff approved licensing basis (e.g., a specified fraction of Reference 6 limits). The analysis of the effects and consequences of a large break LOCA is presented in Reference 4. The ABFVES also actuates following a small break LOCA, to clean up releases of smaller leaks, such as from valve stem packing.

Two types of system failures are considered in the accident analysis: complete loss of function, and excessive LEAKAGE. Either type of failure may result in a lower efficiency of removal for any gaseous and particulate activity released to the ECCS pump rooms following a LOCA.

The ABFVES satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 7).

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LCO


Two independent and redundant trains of the ABFVES are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming that a single failure disables the other train coincident with loss of offsite power. Total system failure could result in the atmospheric release from the ECCS pump room exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA).

ABFVES is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to maintain the ECCS pump room filtration are OPERABLE in both trains.

An ABFVES train is considered OPERABLE when its associated:

- a. Fan is OPERABLE;
- b. HEPA filter and carbon adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and
- c. Ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE and air circulation can be maintained.

INSERT 5  
LCO Note Bases



The ABFVES fans power supply is provided by buses which are shared between the two units. If normal or emergency power to the ABFVES becomes inoperable, then the Required Actions of this LCO must be entered independently for each unit that is in the MODE of applicability of the LCO.

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## INSERT 5

### LCO Note Bases

The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening when a need for ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary isolation is indicated.

## BASES

### APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the ABFVES is required to be OPERABLE consistent with the OPERABILITY requirements of the ECCS.

In MODE 5 or 6, the ABFVES is not required to be OPERABLE since the ECCS is not required to be OPERABLE.

### ACTIONS

#### A.1

With one ABFVES train inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. During this time, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the ABFVES function.

The 7 day Completion Time is appropriate because the risk contribution is less than that for the ECCS (72 hour Completion Time), and this system is not a direct support system for the ECCS. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

Concurrent failure of two ABFVES trains would result in the loss of functional capability; therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

INSERT 6

C      C  
B.1 and B.2

or ECCS pump rooms  
pressure boundary

If the ABFVES train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

D      D  
C.1 and C.2

With one or more ABFVES heaters inoperable, the heater must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Alternatively, a report must be initiated per Specification 5.6.6, which details the reason for the heater's inoperability and the corrective action required to return the heater to OPERABLE status.

## INSERT 6

### B.1

If the ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary is inoperable such that the ABFVES trains cannot establish or maintain the required pressure, action must be taken to restore an OPERABLE ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary within 24 hours. During the period that the ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary is inoperable, appropriate compensatory measures (consistent with the intent, as applicable, of GDC 19, 60, 64, and 10CFR100) should be utilized to protect plant personnel from potential hazards such as radioactive contamination, toxic chemicals, smoke, temperature and relative humidity, and physical security. Preplanned measures should be available to address these concerns for intentional and unintentional entry into the condition. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period and the use of compensatory measures. The 24 hour Completion Time is a typically reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary.



BASES

## ACTIONS (continued)

The heaters do not affect OPERABILITY of the ABFVES filter trains because charcoal adsorber efficiency testing is performed at 30°C and 95% relative humidity. The accident analysis shows that site boundary radiation doses are within 10 CFR 100 limits during a DBA LOCA under these conditions.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTSSR 3.7.12.1

Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once a month provides an adequate check on this system. Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture that may have accumulated in the carbon from humidity in the ambient air. Systems with heaters must be operated from the control room  $\geq 10$  continuous hours with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and with the heaters energized. The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of equipment and the two train redundancy available.

SR 3.7.12.2

This SR verifies that the required ABFVES testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The ABFVES filter tests are in accordance with Reference 5. The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, carbon adsorbers efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated carbon (general use and following specific operations). Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.12.3

This SR verifies that each ABFVES train starts and operates with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with that specified in Reference 4.

*No Changes on this page  
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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.7.12.4

This SR verifies the integrity of the ECCS pump room enclosure. The ability of the ECCS pump room to maintain a negative pressure, with respect to potentially uncontaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper functioning of the ABFVES. During the post accident mode of operation, the ABFVES is designed to maintain a slight negative pressure in the ECCS pump room, with respect to adjacent areas, to prevent unfiltered LEAKAGE. The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-0800, Section 6.5.1 (Ref. 8).

This test is conducted with the tests for filter penetration; thus, an 18 month Frequency on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with that specified in Reference 5.

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.5.
2. UFSAR, Section 9.4.
3. UFSAR, Section 14.4.
4. UFSAR, Section 15.6.
5. Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Rev. 2).
6. 10 CFR 100.11.
7. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
8. NUREG-0800, Section 6.5.1, Rev. 2, July 1981.

*No Changes on this page  
For Information Only*

Attachment 2

Catawba Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications Bases  
Reprinted Pages

## BASES

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### LCO (continued)

OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available assuming a single failure disables the other train. Total system failure could result in exceeding a dose of 5 rem to the control room operator in the event of a large radioactive release.

The CRAVS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to limit operator exposure are OPERABLE in both trains. A CRAVS train is OPERABLE when the associated:

- a. Fan is OPERABLE;
- b. HEPA filters and carbon adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and
- c. Ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors.

The CRAVS is shared between the two units. The system must be OPERABLE for each unit when that unit is in the MODE of Applicability. Additionally, both normal and emergency power must also be OPERABLE because the system is shared. If a CRAVS component becomes inoperable, or normal or emergency power to a CRAVS component becomes inoperable, then the Required Actions of this LCO must be entered independently for each unit that is in the MODE of applicability of the LCO.

The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the control room pressure boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening when a need for control room pressure boundary isolation is indicated.

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### APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and during CORE ALTERATIONS, CRAVS must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a DBA.

BASES

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## APPLICABILITY (continued)

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and in MODE 6, for CORE ALTERATIONS, the CRAVS must be OPERABLE to cope with the release from a fuel handling accident.

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## ACTIONS

A.1

When one CRAVS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CRAVS train is adequate to perform the control room protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CRAVS train could result in loss of CRAVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

B.1

If the control room pressure boundary is inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4 such that the CRAVS trains cannot establish or maintain the required pressure, action must be taken to restore an OPERABLE control room pressure boundary within 24 hours. During the period that the control room pressure boundary is inoperable, appropriate compensatory measures (consistent with the intent of GDC 19) should be utilized to protect control room operators from potential hazards such as radioactive contamination, toxic chemicals, smoke, temperature and relative humidity, and physical security. Preplanned measures should be available to address these concerns for intentional and unintentional entry into the condition. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period and the use of compensatory measures. The 24 hour Completion Time is a typically reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the control room pressure boundary.

C.1 and C.2

In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CRAVS or control room pressure boundary train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes accident risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

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BASES

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## ACTIONS (continued)

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2

In MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, if the inoperable CRAVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, action must be taken to immediately place the OPERABLE CRAVS train in operation. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

Required Action D.1 is modified by a Note indicating to place the system in the chlorine protection mode if automatic transfer to high chlorine protection mode is inoperable.

E.1 and E.2

In MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, with two CRAVS trains inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might enter the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

F.1

If both CRAVS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, for reasons other than Condition B, the CRAVS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

G.1 and G.2

With one or more CRAVS heaters inoperable, the heater must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Alternatively, a report must be initiated per Specification 5.6.6, which details the reason for the heater's inoperability and the corrective action required to return the

## BASES

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### ACTIONS (continued)

heater to OPERABLE status.

The heaters do not affect OPERABILITY of the CRAVS filter trains because charcoal adsorber efficiency testing is performed at 30°C and 95% relative humidity. The accident analysis shows that site boundary radiation doses are within 10 CFR 100 limits during a DBA LOCA under these conditions.

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### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

#### SR 3.7.10.1

Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not too severe, testing each train once every month provides an adequate check of this system. Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture accumulated in the carbon from humidity in the ambient air. Systems with heaters must be operated from the control room for  $\geq 10$  continuous hours with the heaters energized and flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. The 31 day Frequency is based on the reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy availability.

#### SR 3.7.10.2

This SR verifies that the required CRAVS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CRAVS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 5). The VFTP includes testing the performance of the HEPA filter, carbon adsorber efficiency, minimum flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated carbon. Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

#### SR 3.7.10.3

This SR verifies that each CRAVS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The Frequency of 18 months is specified in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 5).

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BASES

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## SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.7.10.4

This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure, and the assumed inleakage rates of the potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper functioning of the CRAVS. During the emergency mode of operation, the CRAVS is designed to pressurize the control room  $\geq 0.125$  inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas in order to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The CRAVS is designed to maintain this positive pressure with one train at a makeup flow rate of 4000 cfm. The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-0800 (Ref. 6).

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.
2. UFSAR, Section 9.4.1
3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
4. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
5. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2.
6. NUREG-0800, Section 6.4, Rev. 2, July 1981.



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BASES

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LCO (continued)

The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening when a need for ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary isolation is indicated.

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APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the ABFVES is required to be OPERABLE consistent with the OPERABILITY requirements of the ECCS.

In MODE 5 or 6, the ABFVES is not required to be OPERABLE since the ECCS is not required to be OPERABLE.

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ACTIONS

A.1

With one ABFVES train inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. During this time, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the ABFVES function.

The 7 day Completion Time is appropriate because the risk contribution is less than that for the ECCS (72 hour Completion Time), and this system is not a direct support system for the ECCS. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

Concurrent failure of two ABFVES trains would result in the loss of functional capability; therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

B.1

If the ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary is inoperable such that the ABFVES trains cannot establish or maintain the required pressure, action must be taken to restore an OPERABLE ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary within 24 hours. During the period that the ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary is inoperable, appropriate compensatory measures (consistent with the intent, as applicable, of GDC 19, 60, 64, and 10CFR100) should be utilized to protect plant personnel from potential

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## BASES

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### ACTIONS (continued)

hazards such as radioactive contamination, toxic chemicals, smoke, temperature and relative humidity, and physical security. Preplanned measures should be available to address these concerns for intentional and unintentional entry into the condition. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period and the use of compensatory measures. The 24 hour Completion Time is a typically reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary.

#### C.1 and C.2

If the ABFVES train or ECCS pump rooms pressure boundary cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

#### D.1 and D.2

With one or more ABFVES heaters inoperable, the heater must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Alternatively, a report must be initiated per Specification 5.6.6, which details the reason for the heater's inoperability and the corrective action required to return the heater to OPERABLE status.

The heaters do not affect OPERABILITY of the ABFVES filter trains because charcoal adsorber efficiency testing is performed at 30°C and 95% relative humidity. The accident analysis shows that site boundary radiation doses are within 10 CFR 100 limits during a DBA LOCA under these conditions.

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### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

#### SR 3.7.12.1

Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once a month provides an adequate check on this system. Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture that may have accumulated in the carbon from humidity in the ambient air. Systems with heaters must be operated from the control room  $\geq 10$  continuous hours with flow through the HEPA filters and

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BASES

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## SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

charcoal adsorbers and with the heaters energized. The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of equipment and the two train redundancy available.

SR 3.7.12.2

This SR verifies that the required ABFVES testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The ABFVES filter tests are in accordance with Reference 5. The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, carbon adsorbers efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated carbon (general use and following specific operations). Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.12.3

This SR verifies that each ABFVES train starts and operates with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with that specified in Reference 4.

SR 3.7.12.4

This SR verifies the integrity of the ECCS pump room enclosure. The ability of the ECCS pump room to maintain a negative pressure, with respect to potentially uncontaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper functioning of the ABFVES. During the post accident mode of operation, the ABFVES is designed to maintain a slight negative pressure in the ECCS pump room, with respect to adjacent areas, to prevent unfiltered LEAKAGE. The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-0800, Section 6.5.1 (Ref. 8).

This test is conducted with the tests for filter penetration; thus, an 18 month Frequency on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with that specified in Reference 5.

## BASES

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### REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.5.
2. UFSAR, Section 9.4.
3. UFSAR, Section 14.4.
4. UFSAR, Section 15.6.
5. Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Rev. 2).
6. 10 CFR 100.11.
7. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
8. NUREG-0800, Section 6.5.1, Rev. 2, July 1981.