



Tennessee Valley Authority Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

July 26, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

10 CFR 50.73

Gentlemen:

**TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)
UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR-79 - REPORT 50-327/2000S01**

The enclosed report provides details of a failure of safeguard systems that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to the protected area. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(d). If you have any questions about this report, please telephone me at (423) 843-7001 or Pedro Salas at (423) 843-7170.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "R. Purcell".

Richard T. Purcell
Site Vice President
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

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Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) UNIT 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000327

PAGE (3)

1 OF 6

TITLE (4)

Failure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
06	28	2000	2000	-- S01 --	00	07	26	2000	SQN UNIT 2	05000328
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									NA	05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	100	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)
		20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(I)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	X 73.71
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
J. W. Proffitt, Licensing Engineer	(423) 843-6651

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

Abstract (Limit to 1400 paces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

Not Applicable

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION	
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Unit 1	05000327				2 OF 6
		2000 --	S01 --	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT**A. Event:**

On June 28, 2000, at 1853 Eastern daylight time (EDT), a security officer was dispatched to assist an employee in getting through a vital area door controlled by a cardreader. The officer determined that the cardreader was not working properly. At 1855 EDT, a security alert was declared based on a security computer malfunction. Compensatory measures were implemented to secure or post an officer at the vital area doors.

Security continued to evaluate the security computer malfunction. The security officers determine that the computer malfunction affected more than the vital area doors and initiated compensatory measures for the perimeter in accordance with the physical security plan. During the time of the event, it was discovered that four perimeter alarms were not received (annunciated) in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) or the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS). This discovery identified a potential vulnerability in the security system that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area. No unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area occurred. Subsequently, the security computer system was returned to service and the compensatory measures were discontinued.

B. Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences:

June 28, 2000, at 1853 EDT A security officer was dispatched to assist an employee in getting through a vital area door.

June 28, 2000, at 1855 EDT Security determined that the security computer system was malfunctioning and declared a security alert.

June 28, 2000, at 1904 EDT Compensatory measures for the vital area doors were completed.

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		2000 --	S01	-- 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

June 28, 2000, at 1935 EDT Security determined that the computer malfunction affected more than the vital area doors and initiated compensatory measures for the perimeter.

June 28, 2000, at 1945 EDT Compensatory measures for the perimeter were completed.

June 28, 2000, at 2040 EDT It was discovered that four perimeter alarms were not received (annunciated) in the CAS or SAS.

June 29, 2000 at 0048 EDT The Security computer system was returned to service and functioning properly.

June 29, 2000 at 0443 EDT Security declared an 'All Clear' following a verification that the security system was functioning properly and a security sweep of the site was complete.

C. Location:

The malfunction of the security computer affected the protected area perimeter and the vital area doors.

D. Operating Phase:

Units 1 and 2 were in power operation at 100 percent power.

E. Safety Systems Affected or Threatened:

The malfunction of the security computer system affected the intrusion detection system on the perimeter and the vital area doors.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Unit 1	05000327	2000 --	S01	-- 00	4 OF 6

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

F. Type of Security Force Onsite:

The Security force at SQN is managed by TVA and consists of TVA employees and contract employees under Burns International Security Services.

G. Number and Type of Personnel Involved:

The number of Security personnel involved was 16. These included Burns International Security Services officers and supervisors.

H. Method of Discovery:

The malfunction of the computer was determined when an individual could not gain access through a vital area door.

I. Procedural Errors Involved:

None.

J. Immediate Actions Taken In response To The Event:

Compensatory measures were established within the required timeframe in accordance with the Physical Security Plan.

K. Corrective Actions Taken or Planned:

This event and lessons learned were discussed with each of the CAS and SAS operators and supervisors.

The Security procedure that provides instruction for CAS and SAS operation is being revised to provide additional steps to determine if the security computer system is functioning properly.

The computer training is being revised to include additional steps to be used to verify that the security computer system is functioning properly.

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		2000 --	S01 --	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

The CAS and SAS operators will be trained on the revised operating procedure.

L. Local, State, Or Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Contacted:

No local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies were contacted. The nature of the event did not require notification of these agencies.

M. Description Of Media Interest and Press Release:

TVA did not issue a press release on this event.

N. Indication of Previous Similar Events:

There have been no previous similar events involving a failure of the Security computer software.

O. Knowledgeable Contact:

J. R. Setliffe at (423) 843-8836.

P. Description of Failed or Malfunctioned Equipment:

The security computer is a Digital VAX 4000-50.

Q. Apparent Cause:

The computer malfunction could not be duplicated; therefore, the cause of the computer malfunction could not be determined. The computer malfunctioned in a way that it was undetected by the CAS and SAS operators.

R. Status of Equipment prior to Event:

The security computer appears to have been operating properly at 1828 EDT on June 28, 2000, prior to the event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Unit 1	05000327	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION	6 OF 6
		2000 --	S01 --	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

S. Effect on Plant Safety:

During the time of the event four perimeter alarms were not received (annunciated) in the CAS or SAS. This failure to annunciate was discovered at 2040 EDT on June 28, 2000. This discovery identified a potential vulnerability in the security system that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area. No unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area occurred.